१२ ईश्वरे शब्द-प्रमाणं न

ननु च केवल-तर्क-बलाद् अयं
यदि सिषाधयिषा-पदम् ईश्वरः ।
भवतु नाम तथा सति दूषणं
श्रुति-शिरः-प्रमितो हि महेश्वरः ॥

34. OBJECTION. This would be true if proof of the existence of the Lord
could only be sought on the strength of logical argumentation.
As it is, this is a fallacy,
for the great Lord is known on the authority of the upaniṣads.

This is Yamuna’s objection, which states the extent to which he concurs in the preceding Mimāmsā argument against Nyaya.

The Naiyāyika tries to uphold the validity of the Āgama, on the ground that its author, the Supreme Person, is glorified in the Upaniṣads.

ननु च केवलतर्कबलादयं यदि सिषाधयिषापदमीश्वरः ।
भवतु नाम तथा सति दूषणं श्रुतिशिरःप्रमितो हि महेश्वरः ॥

यदा तु सकल-भुवन-निर्माण-क्षम–
सर्व-ज्ञ–सर्वेश्वर–परम-पुरुष-प्रतिपादकानि नित्यागम-वचनान्य् एव बहुलम् उपलभ्यन्ते
कथं तदा तद्-अनुभव-मूल-स्मरण-प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकरणम्?

When we hear the multitudinous statements of the eternal Scriptures
which set forth the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme Personality
who is capable of creating the entire universe,
how then can we refuse to accept the authority of a tradition which derives from His immediate cognition?

Cf. Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, under IV. i. 21, P.291:[[??]]

āgamācca draṣṭā boddhā sarvajñātā īśvaraḥ.

यदा तु सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमसर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरपरमपुरुषप्रतिपादकानि नित्यागमवचनान्येव बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते कथं तदा तदनुभवमूलस्मरणप्रामाण्यानङ्गीकरणम् ।

न च परिनिष्ठित-वस्तु-गोचरतया तानि प्रमाण-मर्यादाम् अतिपतन्ति । तादृशाम् अपि प्रमाणान्तर-सम्भेदातिदूर-गोचराणां पौरुषेय-वचसां स्व-रस-समासादित-प्रामाण्य-वारणायोगात् ।

The Prābhākara’s position with regard to the authority of statements speaking of a past event (siddha or pariniṣṭhitavastu) is criticised by the Naiyāyika here.

अपि च प्रवृत्त-प्रमाणान्तरम् अपि
स्व-गोचरं तद्-गोचरतया नावभासयतीति
परम् अपि प्रमाणम् एव
कुतस् तद्-उपनिपात-सम्भावनया ऽनुवादत्वम्,

Moreover, the theory is that since another means of knowledge can apply to a fact,
a verbal statement concerning this fact cannot validly prove it:
but why should not this other means of knowledge itself be the repetitious one
since verbal testimony concerning its fact may conceivably turn up?

अपि च प्रवृत्तप्रमाणान्तरमपि स्वगोचरं तद्गोचरतया नावभासयतीति परमपि प्रमाणमेव कुतस्तदुपनिपातसम्भावनयाऽनुवादत्वम्,

कथं वा प्रत्यस्तमित-समस्त-पुरुषाशय-दोष-संस्पर्श–नित्यागम-भुवः प्रत्ययस्य पूर्वोपमर्दकतयन्नीयमानस्य
सम्भाव्यमान-विविध-विप्लवैः प्रमाणान्तरैर् अपवादापादनम्
इति यत् किञ्चिद् +++(क्षुद्रम्)+++ एतत् ।

or, why should other means of knowledge which themselves are liable to [[30]]various deficiencies
entail the negation of a notion that arises from eternal Scripture
untouched by all defects inherent in persons,
merely because it is deduced that its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge?
This is absurd.

This objection ignores the priorities among pramanas, or means of knowledge;
for the Prabhakara, Perception, etc. are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of perceptible, etc. contents.
Generally Perception is prior to Inference.
To Yamuna, therefore, no priority of Perception to Scripture is given,
which is expected since in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God’s) Perception,
as in the case of Pancaratra.

पूर्वम् अवगतस्य तन्त्र-सामान्य-ज्ञानस्य उपमर्दकतया इति यावत्।

कथं वा प्रत्यस्तमितसमस्तपुरुषाशयदोषसंस्पर्शनित्यागमभुवः प्रत्ययस्य पूर्वोपमर्दकतयन्नीयमानस्य सम्भाव्यमानविविधविप्लवैः प्रमाणान्तरैरपवादापादनमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

इत्थञ् च श्रुति-शत-समधिगत–विविध-बोधैश्वर्यादि-वैभवे भगवति
सामान्य-दर्शनावसितासार्वज्ञ्य-विग्रहवत्तादयो दोषा
नावकाशम् अश्नुवते हुत-भुजीव शैत्यादयः ।

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily follow from the induction, e.g. absence of omniscience", possession of a body etc.,
find no room in the Bhagavan whose supernal manifestation of miraculous knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from hundreds of shrutis,
just as cold can find no place in fire.

This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both the Naiyayika’s and Mimamsaka’s views:
the defects consequent upon the Nyaya proofs of God are avoided
on the basis of scriptural examination,
since Scripture can indeed validly pronounce on God.

इत्थञ्च श्रुतिशतसमधिगतविविधबोधैश्वर्यादिवैभवे भगवति सामान्यदर्शनावसितासार्वज्ञ्यविग्रहवत्तादयो दोषा नावकाशमश्नुवते हुतभुजीव शैत्यादयः ।

ततश् च -

श्रुति-मूर्ध्नि प्रसिद्धेन
सर्वज्ञेनैव निर्मितम् ।
तन्त्रं मिथ्येति वक्तुं नः
कथं जिह्वा प्रवर्तते ॥

And, in consequence,

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the Tantra is false,
while it is composed by the Omniscient One Himself
who is known through the Upanisads?

ततश्च -
श्रुतिमूर्ध्नि प्रसिद्धेन सर्वज्ञेनैव निर्मितम् ।
तन्त्रं मिथ्येति वक्तुं नः कथं जिह्वा प्रवर्तते ॥

अहो मन्दस्य मीमांसा-
श्रम-हानिर् विजृम्भते ।
मीमांसा-मांसलञ् चेतः
कथमित्थं प्रमाद्यति ॥

Alas for the fool’s grand exhibition of labour in Mimāmsā!
How can a mind schooled in Mimāmsā be so mistaken?

The Prabhakaras, who are notorious for the gaurava ‘complicatedness" of their argumentations.+++(5)+++

The Prābhākara explains his position at great length.

अहो मन्दस्य मीमांसाश्रमहानिर्विजृम्भते ।
मीमांसामांसलञ्चेतः कथमित्थं प्रमाद्यति ॥

कार्ये मानान्तरापूर्वे
समस्तं वैदिकं वचः ।
प्रमाणम् इति हि प्राज्ञाः
मन्यन्ते मान्य-बुद्धयः ॥

36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers command respect,
maintain that all Vedic testimony carries authority
only concerning such karyas as cannot presuppose any other authority.

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā V, P.93:

sarvapadānāmeva hi svābhāvikī vṛddhavyavahārasiddhā kāryaparatā, lākṣaṇikī ca siddhaparateti.

कार्ये मानान्तरापूर्वे समस्तं वैदिकं वचः ।
प्रमाणमिति हि प्राज्ञाः मन्यन्ते मान्यबुद्धयः ॥

पदानां तत्+++(→प्रमाणान्तरागोचर-कार्य)+++-परत्वेन
व्युत्पत्तेर् अवधारणात् ।
न खल्व् अन्य-परे शब्दे
व्युत्पत्तेर् अस्ति सम्भवः ॥

Since words are considered to have their true sense
only when they concern such a karya,
it is impossible that any statement can be denotative
if it concerns something else than a karya.

पदानां तत्परत्वेन व्युत्पत्तेरवधारणात् ।
न खल्वन्यपरे शब्दे व्युत्पत्तेरस्ति सम्भवः ॥

तथा हि वृद्धयोर् व्यवहरतोर् एकतर-वृद्ध-प्रयुक्त-शब्द+++(←“गाम् आनय”)+++-श्रवण-समनन्तर–
जनितान्यतर-वृद्ध-समवेत-चेष्टां दृष्ट्वा
अन्यथा+++(→कारणान्तरैर्)+++ऽनुपपत्त्य्-उन्नीयमाना शब्द-शक्तिस्
तद्-उपपादक-कार्य-पर्यवसायिन्य् +++(इत्य्)+++ एवावसीयते,

Therefore, when a man has observed that in an exchange between two adult persons
a certain inherently related action of one of them takes place
immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the other,
he concludes with certainty that the denoting power of the sentence as inferred by means of circumstantial-implication
terminates completely in the karya that has been conveyed by that sentence.

“Denotation, denoting power, denotativeness” in the following Prabhakara discussions
have to be understood as the power of verbal statements to provide unprecedented and non-superfluous knowledge
concerning their contents.
In the Prabhakara view, a verbal statement by itself is denotative only in injunctive forms,
while substantive statements have denotation either through contextual connection with injunctive statements,
or (but this is not strictly “true” denotation) through repetition of otherwise knowable facts.
This view, which has obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the first place,
is thereupon extended to ordinary language as well,
and is thus expressed in the following theory about learning language which is here understood.
A child learns what certain sentences ‘mean’
by observing the action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences,
When he knows no language meaning (vyutpatti),
he may acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another to “get the cow,”
and subsequently observing that the other is getting the cow:
by associating the two events he knows that an order to get the cow
was the content of the first adult’s statement “get the cow.”
A remark without consequent action (e.g., “It is hot today,”)
cannot convey any such knowledge to one who does not know language.
The process of the child knowing the sentence meaning
is here described as arthapatti “reasoning by circumstantial implication;”
since there is no other ground for the second man’s getting the cow,
it must have been the first man’s statement.

तथा हि वृद्धयोर्व्यवहरतोरेकतरवृद्धप्रयुक्तशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरजनितान्यतरवृद्धसमवेतचेष्टां दृष्ट्वा अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्युन्नीयमाना शब्दशक्तिस्तदुपपादककार्यपर्यवसायिन्येवावसीयते,

प्रतीता हि स्व-कार्य-सन्ताने
कार्य-संविद् एव तत्-तद्-विशिष्ट-चेष्टा-हेतुतया।
तद् अयम् इहापि तादृशीं प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन्न्
एवम् आकलयति -
“नूनम् इतस् सकाशाद् अस्य कार्य-संविद् आविर् आसीत्
यद् अयम् एतदनन्तरं प्रवर्तत” इति,

The very awareness of karya
is known to relate to one’s own karya;
so the onlooker, observing the same process in the present case,
realizes that the one person’s action has been caused by the other person’s variously differentiated behaviour.

“Surely this person has been made aware by the other of this karya
that he proceed to his action immediately upon become aware of what he has to do.”

प्रतीता हि स्वकार्यसन्ताने कार्यसंविदेव तत्तद्विशिष्टचेष्टाहेतुतया तदयमिहापि तादृशीं प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन्नेवमाकलयति - नूनमितस्सकाशादस्य कार्यसंविदाविरासीत् यदयमेतदनन्तरं प्रवर्तत इति,

एवं च
समस्त-व्यवहारानुगत-प्रवृत्ति-निमित्त–कार्य-प्रतिपादन-परतया व्युत्पन्ने शब्दे
यत् पदावापोद्धारानुयायिनो ये ऽर्थ-भागास्
ते प्रथमावगत-प्रधान-भूत-कार्यानुगुणतया
तैस् तैर् अभिधीयन्ते इत्य् अध्यवस्यति,

This leads the observer to the conclusion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly denotative
in so far as it serves to convey a karya
whose specific motivation conforms to the entire statement,
then whatever bits of meaning come to mind
as a result of the addition or omission of words
are denoted by these words
only in strict accordance to this kārya, 71
which thus constitutes the primarily known principal element of the statement.

That is to say that the denotativeness of the words composing the statement
is dependent upon the injunctive denotation of the statement as a whole.

एवं च समस्तव्यवहारानुगतप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकार्यप्रतिपादनपरतया व्युत्पन्ने शब्दे यत्पदावापोद्धारानुयायिनोयेऽर्थभागास्ते प्रथमावगतप्रधानभूतकार्यानुगुणतया तैस्तैरभिधीयन्ते इत्यध्यवस्यति,

तत्र च लिङ्-आदयो
ऽव्यभिचरित-कार्य-संविदः कार्य-शरीरम् एव
साक्षात् समर्पयन्ति।
तिङ्-आदयस् तु
तद्-अपेक्षिताधिकाराद्य्-अनुबन्ध-प्रतिपादन-मुखेन
तत्-समन्वयम् अनुभवन्तीति ।

In such a statement the imperative and optative verbal terminations,
which unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of karya,
convey by themselves the body of the karya,
whereas the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a contextual relation with the karya
by describing consequent matters which required by the karya, e.g. a person’s qualification to accomplish it etc.

The linādi verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries like “should, must, to be to, ought to.”

[[131]]

For example, a sentence:
“He desires to go to heaven,”
which has the verb in the indicative,
followed by a statement
“he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice,”
where the verb is injunctive,
is truly denotative in spite of its indicative form,
since it is obviously subordinated to the injunctive sentence,
to which it describes the performer’s qualification:
only one who desires to go to heaven has title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma sacrifice.

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā* V, P.91:

tatra liṅādipratyayo niyogārthaśarīramevābhidhadhāti, prakṛtistadviṣayam; padāntarāṇi ca viṣayaviśeṣaṇaṁ nāmadheyaṁ niyojyaṁ ca abhidhadhātīti.

तत्र च लिङादयोऽव्यभिचरितकार्यसंविदः कार्यशरीरमेव साक्षात्समर्पयन्ति तिङादयस्तु तदपेक्षिताधिकाराद्यनुबन्धप्रतिपादनमुखेन तत्समन्वयमनुभवन्तीति ।

न च पुत्र-जननादि-स्वरूपावेदन-पर्यवसायिनः पद-निचयस्य
अविरल-पुलकोदय–वदन-विकासादिभिर् अभिमत-सुत-जन्मादि-प्रतिपादन-शक्ति-निश्चयः -
अजातातिवृत्त-प्रत्युत्पन्न-विविध-हर्ष-हेतूपनिपाते “ऽयम् अमुने"ति निर्धृत्य
प्रतिपत्तुम् अशक्यत्वात् ।

37. Take for example the statement that a son has been born to the person spoken to,
a purely substantive statement;
the aggregate of words which convey nothing more than this bare fact
that a son has been born,
is not definitely proved to possess the power [[32]] of denoting the postulated birth of the son
by means of such resultant effects as cheerful looks
or joyfully bristling hairs on the part of the father.

For, it is impossible to establish definitely
that the occurrence of a cause for various joys in future, past and present
is really due to the denotative power of the statement.

This is an example like “it is hot today;” the young father’s happy countenance is not considered an action,

न च … Cf. ibid* V, P.93:

tathāpi putraste jāta iti vākyasya putrajanmākhyaharṣahetupratipādakatā harṣahetūnāmānantyāt duranumānā; na ca pāriśeṣyeṇa tatpratipādakatvādhyavasāyaḥ; bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānānāṁ sannihitavyavahitānāṁ pāriśeṣyāvadhāraṇāyā atyantaduṣkaratvāt.

हेतूपनिपातेयममुनेति … ‘अयं हर्षः अमुना हेतुना जात’ इति निर्धारयितुं शक्यम् इति।

न च पुत्रजननादिस्वरूपावेदनपर्यवसायिनः पदनिचयस्याविरलपुलकोदयवदनविकासादिभिरभिमतसुतजन्मादिप्रतिपादनशक्तिनिश्चयः अजातातिवृत्तप्रत्युत्पन्नविविधहर्षहेतूपनिपातेयममुनेति निर्धृत्य प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।

एतेन +++(“स्वर्गकामः सोमेन यजते”→)+++ व्युत्पन्नेतर-पद-समभिव्याहृत–वर्तमान-निर्देशेऽपि
कार्यैदम्पर्य-विरहित-पद–शक्ति–निश्चय-प्रतिविधिर् +++(लिङ्-आक्षेपेण)+++ अनुसंधातव्यः ।

Therefore, also in the case
when we have a verb in the present indicative
collocated with words that have their proper signification
(in that they refer to things that presuppose no other means of knowledge),
it must be assumed that
in it we have a substitute with a positive (i.e. injunctive) denotation of words
without actually having explicit reference to a kārya.

E.g., the sentence “he who desires to go to heaven offers the soma sacrifice,” is an injunctive statement in indicative form.

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā* V, P.92:

vyutpannetarapadavibhaktyarthāḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati iti vartamānopadeśe’pi yat pāke karaṇaṁ, tat kāṣṭhaśabdena pratipādyata ityavagamya pratyakṣeṇa kāṣṭhānāṁ karaṇabhāvamavagacchantaḥ kāṣṭhaśabde vyutpadyante.

एतेन व्युत्पन्नेतरपदसमभिव्याहृतवर्तमाननिर्देशेऽपि कार्यैदम्पर्यविरहितपदशक्तिनिश्चयप्रतिविधिरनुसंधातव्यः ।

“पदान्तराणि यादृङ्क्षि
व्युत्पद्यन्ते च तादृशम् ।
इदञ् च पदम्” इत्य् एव
तत्र व्युत्पद्यते नरः ॥

38. A person knows that a certain word has a certain denotation,
when it is known what is the denotation, of the other words with which it is collocated.

This is the Prabhakara view of the denotativeness of single words,
summarized in the formula anvitābhidhāna, which is short for kāryānvitābhidhana “denotation of words syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence,”

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā* II, P.179:

śabdāntarāṇi svārtheṣu vyutpadyante yathaiva hi।
āvāpodvāpabhedena tathā kārye liṅādayaḥ॥

पदान्तराणि यादृङ्क्षि व्युत्पद्यन्ते च तादृशम् ।
इदञ्च पदमित्येव तत्र व्युत्पद्यते नरः ॥

तानि कार्यान्वित-स्वार्थ-
बोधकानीति साधितम् ।
अथ तद्-बुद्धि-हेतुत्वात्
प्रामाण्यं भूत-गोचरम् ॥

It is proved that words have the power of denoting things
only in so far as they are contextually connected with a karya;
consequently, their validity concerning an established fact
is based on this that they give rise to the notion of karya.

अथ … The Mīmāṁsaka poses two alternatives to refute the validity of statements referring to existent factors.

“Tadbuddhihetutvāt” means “bhūtavastuviṣayakajñānajanakatvāt”.

तानि कार्यान्वितस्वार्थबोधकानीति साधितम् ।
अथ तद्बुद्धिहेतुत्वात् प्रामाण्यं भूतगोचरम् ॥

इष्यते तद्+++(→कर्य-बोधन)+++-अनेकान्तं+++(=क्वचित्ता)+++
पदेष्व् इति न शोभते ।
अथ तत्+++(→कार्य-बोध)+++-परता हेतुस् +++(व्युत्पत्तेः)+++,
ततश् च स्याद् असिद्धता ॥

It is contended that this denotation of karya is only occasional in words,
but this contention is incorrect;
the ground for words to be denotative
is that they deal with a karya,
so that the contention suffers of the vice of being unproved.

This point will be taken up and confirmed infra §04.

“Tatparatā” means “bhūtavastuparatā”.

इष्यते तदनेकान्तं पदेष्विति न शोभते ।
अथ तत्परता हेतुस्ततश्च स्यादसिद्धता ॥

न ह्य् अकार्यरूपे वस्तुनि क्वचिदपि शाब्दी बुद्धिः प्रर्यवस्यति ।

For a notion that arises from a verbal statement can never terminate in any object whatsoever that is not a karya.

न ह्यकार्यरूपे वस्तुनि क्वचिदपि शाब्दी बुद्धिः प्रर्यवस्यति ।

याः पुनर् लौकिक-शब्द-श्रवण-समनन्तर-भाविन्यो ऽन्वयावगतयस्
ता आनुमानिक्यो ऽभिहिताः,
न शाब्द्य
इत्य् उपपद्यत एव तासाम् अ-तत्-पर्यवसानम् ।

[[33]]
The cognitions of contextual relations
which arise immediately upon hearing a profane statement
are said to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from Inference. 78
Thus it is right that these cognitions do not terminate in karyas.

E.g., a statement “there are fruits on the river bank”
does not by itself, self-sufficiently, create in the hearer
the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank;
the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the hearer must infer
that the speaker knows what he is talking about,
that he knows that fruit means “fruit”,
river bank ‘river bank,” etc.

According to the Prābhākara, all statements made by human beings are only inferential in character and as such, cannot be primarily valid.

याः पुनर्लौकिकशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरभाविन्योऽन्वयावगतयस्ता आनुमानिक्योऽभिहिताः न शाब्द्य इत्युपपद्यत एव तासामतत्पर्यवसानम् ।

यदि तत्+++(=कार्य)+++-परता-ग्राहः
शब्दानां नैव विद्यते ।
“अग्निहोत्रञ् जुहोती"ति
विधिः कस्माद् उपेयते ॥

39. If it were not accepted that verbal statements always bear on karyas,
on what grounds then could an indicative statement like agnihotram juhoti
“he offers the agnihotra”
be accepted as an injunction?

Taittirīya Saṁhitā* V. 9. 1.

यदि तत्परताग्राहः शब्दानां नैव विद्यते ।
अग्निहोत्रञ्जुहोतीति विधिः कस्मादुपेयते ॥

अथ तत्र प्रमाणत्वे
संवृत्ते ऽपि च तावता ।
पुरुषार्थत्व-लाभाय
विधिर् अभ्युपगम्यते ॥

Or if it be claimed that in this case, even though the statement as it stands has no complete validity,
it is accepted as an injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a purpose,

अथ तत्र प्रमाणत्वे संवृत्तेऽपि च तावता ।
पुरुषार्थत्वलाभाय विधिरभ्युपगम्यते ॥

तद् असन् - न प्रमाणानां
प्रयोजन-वशानुगा ।
प्रवृत्तिः, किन्तु तन्-मूलः
प्रयोजन-परिग्रहः ॥

we reply that this claim is incorrect,
since the operation of means of knowledge
is not dependent on purpose,
but rather is the acceptance of purpose
dependent on the operation of the means of knowledge.

तदसन्न प्रमाणानां प्रयोजनवशानुगा ।
प्रवृत्तिः किन्तु तन्मूलः प्रयोजनपरिग्रहः ॥

न खलु कनकम् अभिलषतः
शिलावलोकनम् अनभिमतम्
इति कनकावलोकनता ऽश्रयितुम् उचिता ।

It is not proper to assume that
since one does not like to find rocks
when one is looking for gold
therefore one finds gold!

Cf. Tantravārtika under I. ii 1, P.2:

na hi loṣṭaṁ paśyataḥ taddarśanaṁ niṣprayojanamiti suvarṇadarśanāt kalpyate.

Veṅkaṭanātha quotes this passage in his Śeśvaramīmāṁsā under I. ii. 1, P.57.

न खलु कनकमभिलषतः शिलावलोकनमनभिमतमिति कनकावलोकनताऽश्रयितुमुचिता ।

तात्पर्यम् एव शब्दानां
यावत् कार्ये न कल्पितम् ।
न तावद् वर्तमानादि-
निर्देशे विधि-कल्पनम् ॥+++(5)+++

As long as we do not assume that a statement is denotative
only when it bears on a karya,
we cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative
contains an injunction.+++(5)+++

तात्पर्यमेव शब्दानां यावत्कार्ये न कल्पितम् ।
न तावद्वर्तमानादि निर्देशे विधिकल्पनम् ॥

एवञ् चोपनिषदाम् अपि
तत्र-तत्राम्नायमान-ज्ञानोपासनादि-विधि-शेषतया ऽर्थो व्याकरणीयः,
तद् अयम् अर्थः “सर्वज्ञम् आनन्दम् आत्मानं जानीयात्” इति ।

40. In the same manner
the meaning of the upaniṣads must also be interpreted
as being subordinate to such injunctions as
“One must know the soul, meditate on it, etc.”
which are expressed in differnt passages;
this meaning, then, is that
one must know the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunction.

This is again the Prabhakara view. The Bhatta view is somewhat different;
according to the latter the upanisads are arthavadas (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory of elements of injunctions) to the eternality of the performer’s personality (atman),+++(5)+++
which eternality is presupposed by the efficacy of the injunction:
e.g., the injunction “he who desires heaven must offer with the soma sacrifice”
supposes the immortality of the performer.

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā* V, P.93, ff:

ataśca vedāntānāmapi ātmā jñātavya ityapunarāvṛttaye samāmnātena vidhinā ekavākyatāmāśritya kāryaparatvameva varṇanīyam….api ca siddhārthaparatve’pi śabdasya na vedāntānāṁ paramānandādirūpatve brahmaṇaḥ prāmāṇyamavakalpate; tatra hi brahmasvarūpānuvādenānandādirūpavidhirāstheyah.

एवञ्चोपनिषदामपि तत्रतत्राम्नायमानज्ञानोपासनादिविधिशेषतयाऽर्थो व्याकरणीयः, तदयमर्थः सर्वज्ञमानन्दमात्मानं जानीयात् इति ।

न च तावता स्वरूपम् अपि सिध्यतीत्य् अध्यवसेयम् -
अ-सत्य् एव रूपे तादृशि
तथा विधानोपपत्तेः ।+++(5)+++

That the soul is the object of an injunction
does not by itself however prove
that the soul exists as an established fact;
for there can also be an injunction that
a certain thing be such while actually it is not so;

The Mīmāṁsakas do not accept the existence of any deity that receives the offerings of the votaries and rewards them.

Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā V, P.94:

brahmasvarūpāṁ ca pramāṇāntarasiddhamevāśrayaṇīyam; brahmaśabdasya ca loke pramāṇāntarasiddhātmavācitvena siddheḥ vede’pi sa evārthaḥ; tathā ca sati nityaprakāśaparamānandādirūpavidhiḥ sakalapratipattiviruddhaḥ; sarvapratipattiṣu hi pramāṇasmṛtibhūtāsvātmā prakāśate; na ca tatra paramānandaḥ saṁvedyate; na ca sāṁsārikaduḥkhābhibhūtatvāt tasyāprakāśaḥ, abhibhavānupapatteḥ; avacchinnaṁ hi duḥkham anavacchinnānanda iti nālpīyasā mahataḥ abhibhavaḥ saṁbhavati; svaprakāśasya ca abhibhavāvaraṇānabhivyaktīnām[[??]] asambhava eva;… sakalavikāraśūnyatāpi vijñānādivikārotpatteḥ pramāṇāntaraviruddhaiveti parasparānvayāyogyatayā nānandādiparatvaṁ; ajarāmaratvayostu pramāṇāntaraprasiddhereva anuvādatvāt aprāmāṇyam iti.

न च तावता स्वरूपमपि सिध्यतीत्यध्यवसेयम् असत्येव रूपे तादृशि तथा विधानोपपत्तेः ।

यथैतद् अ-पितर्य् एव “पितरञ् जानीयाद्” इति
तथा चानुद्गीथ ओङ्कार उद्गीथ-विधानम् इति ।

for example the injunction, “Know your father in someone who is not your father,”
or “Know that the[[34]] syllable OM, which is not the udgitha, is the udgitha.” (Ch Up. 1.5.1. [[132]])

अपितर्येव … लौकिकम् इदम् उदाहरणम्। वैदिकम् अपि दर्शयति ‘अनुद्गीथ’ इति।

तथा च … See Chāndogyopaniṣad I. 5: atha khalu ya udgīthaḥ sa praṇavo, yaḥ praṇavaḥ sa udgītha iti. See Raṅgarāmānuja’s commentary on it.

यथैतदपितर्येव पितरञ्जानीयादिति तथा चानुद्गीथ ओङ्कार उद्गीथविधानमिति ।

यानि पुनर् आत्म-सत्यत्व-नित्यत्व-वादीनि वाक्यानि
तान्य् +++(विधि-वाक्ये→)+++अ-विशेषित-काल–कर्म-विधानाक्षिप्यमाण+-
+आमुष्मिक-फल-भोगोचित-चेतन-कर्तृ-प्रतिपादन-पराणि +++(5)+++

All statements that set forth the reality and the eternality of the soul
only serve to convey that there is a spiritual agent,
who is required in order to experience the otherworldly fruits
that are mentioned in ritual injunctions
where the time of fruition is not specified.

In this the Prabhakara concurs with the Bhatta. Injunctions without time of fruition specified are not guaranteed to bring about the desired effect during the present lifetime of the performer.

यानि पुनरात्मसत्यत्वनित्यत्ववादीनि वाक्यानि तान्यविशेषितकालकर्मविधानाक्षिप्यमाणामुष्मिकफलभोगोचितचेतनकर्तृप्रतिपादनपराणि

अतो न किञ्चिद् अपि वचो भूते +++(←सिद्धे)+++ ऽर्थे प्रमाणम् ।

Therefore, no verbal statement whatever is a means of knowing a thing as such.

अतो न किञ्चिदपि वचो भूतेऽर्थे प्रमाणम् ।

अतः सर्वार्थवादानाम् अपि
परिनिष्ठित-रुद्र-रोदनादि-प्रतिपादन-परता-वारणोपपादनेन
विदूरतर-वर्ति-विधि-पदान्वय-स्तावकतयाऽपि प्रदर्शितः

Thus, by denying that the arthavādas, too,
can serve to convey knowledge of facts like Rudra’s weeping,
it is shown that they merely serve to give praise in contextual connection with an injunction,
which may be comparatively remote.

I read ata avarthavādānām.

On this point see KMS 1.2.1. with Sabara’s bhāṣya.

अतः (अत एवार्थवादानाममीति पा. ।) सर्वार्थवादानामपि परिनिष्ठितरुद्ररोदनादिप्रतिपादनपरतावारणोपपादनेन विदूरतरवर्तिविधिपदान्वयस्तावकतयाऽपि प्रदर्शितः

तस्माद् अ-पर्यालोचित-पूर्वापर-पद-तात्पर्याणाम्
आपातायात-श्रद्धा-विरचित-विग्रहो ऽयम् उद्ग्राहितः पुरुष
इत्य् अलम् अतिविस्तरेण ।

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated divine person,
whose personality is the product of the baseless beliefs of people
that have failed to consider the true denotation of preceding or succeeding statements,
is eliminated,
with which we conclude our extensive discussion.

तस्मादपर्यालोचितपूर्वापरपदतात्पर्याणामापातायातश्रद्धाविरचितविग्रहोऽयमुद्ग्राहितः पुरुष इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण ।

सिद्धम् इदं - न श्रुतितो ऽप्य् अभिमत-पुरुषातिशयः सिध्यतीति ।

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture.

सिद्धमिदं न श्रुतितोऽप्यभिमतपुरुषातिशयः सिध्यतीति ।

अपि च भवतु भूतम् अपि वस्तु शास्त्रस्य विषयः,

Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed convey knowledge of facts;

अपि च भवतु भूतमपि वस्तु शास्त्रस्य विषयः,

अथ च कथम् इव चोदना-जनित-धियम् अवधीर्य
धर्माधर्मौ विजानाति कश्चिद् इत्य् अभ्युपेयते?

even so, what possible basis is there
for the assumption that there exists a person
who knows dharma and adharma,
when we take into account the cognition that arises from injunction?

अथ च कथमिव चोदनाजनितधियमवधीर्य धर्माधर्मौ विजानाति कश्चिदित्यभ्युपेयते

सर्वज्ञता हि प्रसिद्धैर् एव प्रमाणैः यथा-यथम् अर्थान् अवगच्छतोऽपि संगच्छते,

Omniscience is possible
only if the omniscient person knows the objects
exactly as they are known by means of the different means of knowledge;

On the Bhatta view of omniscience, cf. Kumārila, Samb. 47-59; 114-116.

Cf. Ślokavārtika under I. i. 2, śls. 111b-117:

yadi ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaissyāt sarvajñaḥ kena vāryate ?
ekena tu pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate।
nūnaṁ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate॥
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaistu yajjātīyārthadarśanam।
bhavedidānīṁ lokasya tathā kālāntare ‘pyabhūt॥
yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanāt।
dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syānna rūpe śrotravṛttitā॥
bhaviṣyati na dṛṣṭaṁ ca pratyakṣasya manāgapi।
sāmarthyaṁ nānumānāder liṅgādirahite kvacit॥
sarvajñakalpanādyaistu vede cāpauruṣeyatā।
tulyatā kalpitā yena tenedaṁ sampradhāryatām॥
sarvajño dṛśyate tāvannedānīmasmadādibhiḥ।
nirākaraṇavacchakyā na cāsīditi kalpanā॥

सर्वज्ञता हि प्रसिद्धैरेव प्रमाणैः यथायथमर्थानवगच्छतोऽपि संगच्छते,

न हि तद् अस्ति वचनं
यद् अस्य
प्रसिद्ध-बुद्ध्य्-उत्पादन-हेतु+++(←श्रम)+++-हान-मुखेन
सार्वज्ञ्यं ज्ञापयति ।

for there is no statement which declares omniscience
by cancelling the normal means of knowledge.

Cf. ibid., śl. 118.

na cāgamena sarvajñastadīye ’nyonyasaṁśrayāt।
narāntarapraṇītasya prāmāṇyaṁ gamyate katham ?

न हि तदस्ति वचनं यदस्य प्रसिद्धबुद्ध्युत्पादनहेतुहानमुखेन सार्वज्ञ्यं ज्ञापयति ।

यद्य् अपि किञ्चिद् अभविष्यत्
तथाऽपि परस्परान्वयाऽनुचित-पदार्थतया
ऽर्थवादतयैव समर्थनीयम्

[[35]]
Even if there were such a statement,
it would have to be explained as an arthavada
since its word-meanings would not allow of mutual relation.

यद्यपि … The Mīmāṁsaka has in mind, statements like “yassarvajñaḥ sarvavit” (Muṇḍaka : I-9) and “na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate, svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca” (Śvetāśvatara : VI-8), which declare that there does exist an Omniscient Being and that His Omniscience is natural but not due to any extraneous factor.

अर्थवादतयैव … Cf. Ślokavārtika, I. i. 2, śls. 118-120:

na cāgamena sarvajñastadīye ’nyonyasaṁśrayāt ।
narāntarapraṇītasya prāmāṇyaṁ gamyate katham ॥
na cāpyevaṁparo nityaḥ śakyo labdhum ihāgamaḥ ।
nityaścedarthavādatvaṁ tatpare syādaniyatā ॥
āgamasya ca nityatve siddhe tatkalpanā vṛthā ।
yatastaṁ pratipadyante dharmameva tato narāḥ ॥

यद्यपि किञ्चिदभविष्यत् तथाऽपि परस्परान्वयाऽनुचितपदार्थतयाऽर्थवादतयैव समर्थनीयम्

प्रमाणान्तरावगत-योग्यतादि-पुरस्-सरी
पदेभ्यो वाक्यार्थ-बुद्धिर् उपजायमाना -
प्रथमतर-निपतितापेक्षित-प्रमाणान्तर-विरोधे
कथम् इव जनिम् अनुभवतीति सम्भावयामः ।

A cognition about a sentence-meaning arises from the individual words
and it presupposes in these words
such properties as appropriateness etc.
which are learnt through other means of knowledge;
now we wonder how such a cognition could arise at all,
if there were a conflict with these other means of knowledge
that are required primarily for the cognition to arise!

i.e, the appropriateness or propriety of a word in collocation with other words; in the sentence “his mother is barren,” “barren” is obviously inappropriate.

प्रमाणान्तरवगत … By the term “pramāṇāntara” here is meant “śabda”.

विरोधे … The term “pramāṇāntara” here means “pratyakṣa”.

प्रमाणान्तरावगतयोग्यतादिपुरस्सरी पदेभ्यो वाक्यार्थबुद्धिरुपजायमाना प्रथमतरनिपतितापेक्षितप्रमाणान्तरविरोधे कथमिव जनिमनुभवतीति सम्भावयामः ।

प्रत्यक्षादि-प्रतिक्षिप्त-
गोचरं वचनं यदि ।
अपि को नु तादात्म्यं
विहन्त्य् आदित्य-यूपयोः +++(यद्-विषयकार्थवादः प्रसिद्धः)+++ ॥ +++(5)+++

If a statement concerning an object that is contradicted by perception etc., were authoritative,
who could then reject the identity of sun and sacrificial pole? +++(5)+++

The identification is considered an arthavada, i,e., laudatory of the sacrificial pole

Vide Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa: II. i.5.2 : “ādityo yūpaḥ”.

The argument is that if perception were not taken as the guiding principle in ascertaining the connotation of passages, one would have to literally identify the Sun and the sacrifical post on the authority of the text “ādityo yūpaḥ”, which is a eulogistic passage. But their identity is disproved by perception itself. Likewise, Omniscience is also to be disproved.

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रतिक्षिप्तगोचरं वचनं यदि ।
अपि को नु तादात्म्यं विहन्त्यादित्ययूपयोः ॥