११ वेद-तुल्य-प्रमाणत्वं न

अत्र कश्चिद् आह

कामं कक्ष्यान्तरित-प्रामाण्येषु मन्व्-आदिस्मरणेषु कारणतया वेदाः परिकल्प्यन्ताम्,
पञ्च-रात्र-स्मरणस्य तु किं वेदेन?

The Naiyāyika now argues with the Mīmāṃsaka. His contention is that the Vedas and the Pāñcarātra texts are utterances of one and the same Supreme Being, Who is also the Omniscient Designer-Architect of this wonderful cosmos. He forms the second critic to be refuted by the Siddhāntin, only in so far as the authorship of the Vedas is concerned. For the Siddhāntin, as for the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vedas are revealed, “apauruṣeya”, not composed even by the Supreme.

कक्ष्यया एकया अन्तरितं प्रामाण्यं मन्वादि-शास्त्राणाम्। वेदानां प्रामाण्य-सार्वभौमत्वात्, तद्-अनुसारणाच् च सर्व-स्मृतीनाम्। पञ्च-रात्रं तु वेदवद् एव निरपेक्षतया सर्वोत्कृष्टतया च प्रमाणं, तत्-समान-योग-क्षेमत्वाद् इति हार्दम्।

DISCURSUS:

18. At this point someone interjects:
If you please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute the cause
of the delegated and indirect authority of the Tradition of Manu etc.

A Naiyayika. Traditionally, Nyaya does not accept the Mimānsā view that the Vedas have not originated from a person.

अत्र कश्चिदाह कामं कक्ष्यान्तरितप्रामाण्येषु मन्वादिस्मरणेषु कारणतया वेदाः परिकल्प्यन्ताम्, पञ्चरात्रस्मरणस्य तु किं वेदेन?

तन्-मूलतया ऽवलम्बितेन
वेदानाम् अपि यद्+++(←ईश्वर)+++-अनुभव-निबन्धनं प्रामाण्यं
तद्-अनुभव एव हि पञ्च-रात्र-स्मरणस्य निदानम्,

But is there any reason why we should have to depend exclusively on the Veda
as the basis of the Pañcarātra tradition too?
The same direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the authority of the Vedas themselves
is also the foundation of the authority of the Pañcarâtra doctrine;

the authority of the latter is not based upon the relation of supporting authority
and supported authority which characterizes typical smarta injunctions,

तन्मूलतयाऽवलम्बितेन वेदानामपि यदनुभवनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यं तदनुभव एव हि पञ्चरात्रस्मरणस्य निदानम्, न खलु तुल्यमूलयोरष्टकाचमनस्मरणयोर्मिथोमूलमूलिभावः ।

न खलु तुल्य-मूलयोर् अष्टकाचमन-स्मरणयोर्
मिथो-मूल-मूलि-भावः ।+++(5)+++

e.g., astakā and acamana which have their common basis in the Veda. In fact, the two traditions of the aştaka rite and the acamana rite are not interdependent, but, they are equally and independently authoritative.

न खलु तुल्यमूलयोरष्टकाचमनस्मरणयोर्मिथोमूलमूलिभावः ।

परस्-परम् अपेक्षेते
तुल्य-कक्ष्ये न हि स्मृती ।
पञ्च-रात्र–श्रुती तद्वन्
नापेक्षते परस्परम् ॥

Similarly, Pañcarātra and Scripture are not interdependent.

परस्परमपेक्षेते तुल्यकक्ष्ये न हि स्मृती ।
पञ्चरात्रश्रुती तद्वन्नापेक्षते परस्परम् ॥

वेद-मूलत्व-हानेन
पञ्चरात्रे ऽवसीदति ।
कुतस् तन्-मूलता-हानाद्
आगमो नावसीदति ॥+++(5)+++

पञ्च-रात्रस्य वेद-मूलत्वाभावाद् यदि अप्रामाण्य-प्रसक्तिः, तर्हि पाञ्चरात्र-मूलत्वाभावात् वेदस्याप्य् अप्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्ग इति समानधर्मे। उभयोर् अपि वेद-पञ्च-रात्रयोः भगवद्-अनुभवैक-मूलतया तुल्यत्वात्, तद्-अन्तरे एकतरामूलत्व-प्रयुक्तम् अप्रामाण्यम् अन्यस्य न शक्य-शङ्कम् इति निष्कर्षः।

If Pancaratra collapses as soon as it is denied the support of the Veda,
why then should the Veda not collapse when the support of Pañcaratra is taken away from it?

वेदमूलत्वहानेन पञ्चरात्रेऽवसीदति ।
कुतस्तन्मूलताहानादागमो नावसीदति ॥

आह - “किम् एवं वेदा अपि पुरुषानुभवाधीनप्रामाण्याः पौरुषेया एव?”

This is the objection raised by the Mīmāṃsaka to the above view.

19. The Vedas derive their authority
from direct knowledge which originates from a person
and must therefore naturally derive from a person?

आह - किमेवं वेदा अपि पुरुषानुभवाधीनप्रामाण्याः पौरुषेया एव?

कस् संशयः?
वाक्यत्वं हि पराधीन-रचनत्व-स्वभावम् उपलभ्यमानं
कथम् अपरथा ऽवतिष्ठेत?

The Naiyāyika meets this objection.

Who can doubt it?
For we perceive that words, from their very nature, depend for their composition
on some entity that is different from themselves.

[[17]]
How else could they exist at all?

कस्संशयः, वाक्यत्वं हि पराधीनरचनत्वस्वभावमुपलभ्यमानं कथमपरथाऽवतिष्ठेत

वेदनाम्नो ग्रन्थस्यायं महिमा -
यत् केनचिद् असन्दृब्धो ऽपि वाक्यत्वेनावतिष्ठत

इति चेत्,

If it is objected that

the significance of the Book called Veda
just consists in this that
it does in fact exist as Word though nobody has composed it,

then we reply;

वेदनाम्नो ग्रन्थस्यायं महिमा
यत्केनचिदसन्दृब्धोऽपि वाक्यत्वेनावतिष्ठत

इति चेत्,

हन्त तर्हि पर्वत-वर्तिनो धूमस्यायं महिमा
यज् ज्वलनम् अन्तरेणानुच्छिन्न-सन्तानो गगन-तलम् अधिरोहतीति
किम् इति न स्यात्?+++(5)+++

why, if this were true,
then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists in this
that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire!
It is utterly out of the question.

The argument is thus:
The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language;
language is invariably found to originate from persons.
The Naiyayika compares the Mimasaka’s view in the terms of this argument
with the standard inference:
the mountain has fire, because it has smoke.

हन्त तर्हि पर्वतवर्तिनो धूमस्यायं महिमा यज्ज्वलनमन्तरेणानुच्छिन्नसन्तानो गगनतलमधिरोहतीति किमिति न स्यात् ।

ननु कथम् अतिक्रान्त-मानान्तरावतारे धर्मे
ग्रन्थः सन्दृभ्यते?

मैवं - यतस् सहज-संवेदन–साक्षात्-कृत-धर्माधर्म एव
भगवान् जगद्-अनुकम्पया वेदम्-अनामानं ग्रन्थम् आरचयतीति ।

‘संवेदनं’ ज्ञानम्; तच् च भगवतस् सहजम्। इन्द्रिय-निरपेक्षं तस्य प्रत्यक्षम् इति भावः।

20. OBJECTION. But since the applicability’ of the dharma
cannot be shown by any of the means of knowledge,
how can a book on it be composed?

REPLY. Don’t argue like that:
for the Bhagavan who, of course, has an immediate intuition of dharma and adharma
through the knowledge which is natural to Him
has had this Book called Veda composed out of compassion for the world.

avatara “descent, emergence.” The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the incarnation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority.

ननु कथमतिक्रान्तमानान्तरावतारे धर्मे ग्रन्थः सन्दृभ्यते,
मैवं यतस्सहजसंवेदनसाक्षात्कृतधर्माधर्म एव भगवान् जगदनुकम्पया वेदनामानं ग्रन्थमारचयतीति ।

किम् अस्ति धर्माधर्म-गोचरम् अपि प्रत्यक्षम्?

21. OBJECTION. But does this intuition or perception also encompass dharma and adharma?

किमस्ति धर्माधर्मगोचरमपि प्रत्यक्षम्?

बाढं कथम् अन्यथा तनु-भुवनादि-कार्यम् उपजनयति?

REPLY. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavān be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.?

बाढं कथमन्यथा तनुभुवनादिकार्यमुपजनयति?

स हि तत्र कर्ता भवति
यो यस्योपादानम् उपकरणञ् च साक्षात्-कर्तुं प्रभवति।

For the maker of such effects must be one who is capable of perceiving their material and instrumental causes.

स हि तत्र कर्ता भवति यो यस्योपादानमुपकरणञ्च साक्षात्कर्तुं प्रभवति

धर्माधर्मौ च जगद्-उपकरणम्
इति मीमांसकानाम् अपि सम्मतमेव ।

Now, dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes of the world;
this is also the consensus of the Mimāmsakas.

Consequently we must postulate a certain person who has this perceptual knowledge;
and that person must also be the one who created the Veda at the beginning.

This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (phala) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation.

धर्माधर्मौ च जगदुपकरणमिति मीमांसकानामपि सम्मतमेव ।

यस्तु ब्रूते
“गिरि-भुवनाऽऽदयो भावा न कार्या” इति,
प्रतिब्रूयादेनम् -

22. If one contends that such entities as mountains, earth and the like are not effects,
the “answer is as follows:

यस्तु ब्रूते गिरिभुवनाऽऽदयो भावा न कार्या इति,
प्रतिब्रूयादेनम् -

विवाद-गोचरा भावाः
कार्या +++(भू=)+++विश्वम्-भरादयः ।
विचित्र-सन्-निवेशत्वान्
नरेन्द्र-भवनादिवत् ।
तथा सावयवत्वेन
विनाशो ऽप्य् अवसीयते ॥

‘विचित्र-सन्निवेशत्वात्’, सावयवत्वाद् इति यावत्।

[[18]]
The entities in question, earth etc., are effects,
because they have a complex construction, like a king’s palace (cf. Udayana, Kusumanjali 4.1.).
Similarly, from the fact that they are made up of parts
we conclude that they are subject to destruction.

विवादगोचरा भावाः कार्या विश्वम्भरादयः ।
विचित्रसन्निवेशत्वान्नरेन्द्रभवनादिबत् ।
तथा सावयवत्वेन विनाशोऽप्यवसीयते ॥

विनश्यन्ति च ये भावास्
ते तत्-साधन-वेदिना ।
विनाश्यन्ते यथा तज्-ज्ञैर्
अस्माभिः +++(कमण्डलु=)+++करकादयः ॥

Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed by someone who knows the means by which they can be destroyed,
just as we can destroy clay vessels etc.
when we know by what means to destroy them.

विनश्यन्ति च ये भावास्ते तत्साधनवेदिना ।
विनाश्यन्ते यथा तज्ज्ञैरस्माभिः करकादयः ॥

ये पुनर् अ-परिदृष्ट-बुद्धिमद्-अधिष्ठान–तरु-पतनादि-शकलिता भावाः
तेऽपि विमत्य्-आक्रान्ता
इति नानैकान्तिकत्वम् आवहन्ति ।

‘विमत्याक्रान्ता’ पक्षे क्रोडी-कृता इत्य् अर्थः। पक्षे व्यभिचारशङ्का तु न दोषाय, अपरथा अनुमान-व्यवहार-स्यैवोच्छेद-प्रसङ्गात् इति आशयः।

In the case of entities that are shattered, for instance, by a falling tree,
that is without perceptible intelligent agency,
the cause of their destruction remains dubious:
but because of this very dubiety
there can also be not positive certainty that the cause of their destruction is entirely occasional.

ये पुनरपरिदृष्टबुद्धिमदधिष्ठानतरुपतनादिशकलिता भावाः तेऽपि विमत्याक्रान्ता इति नानैकान्तिकत्वमावहन्ति ।

किं च -

महत्तया सनाथेन
स्पन्दमानत्व-हेतुना ।
उत्पत्ति-भङ्गौ भावानाम्
अनुमातुम् इहोचितौ ॥

‘महत्त्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वाद्‘ इति यावत्।

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to infer in this world
that an entity which has mass and can move is subject to origination and to destruction.

किं च -

महत्तया सनाथेन स्पन्दमानत्वहेतुना ।
उत्पत्तिभङ्गौ भावानामनुमातुमिहोचितौ ॥

तद् एवम् उदीरित-न्याय-प्रसिद्धे विश्वम्-भरादि-कार्यत्वे
सिध्यत्य् एव भगवतस् तद्-उपकरण-धर्माधर्म-साक्षात्-कारित्वम् ।

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed effects, on the grounds adduced above,
it follows that the Bhagavan has knowledge of dharma and adharma
which are the instrumental causes of origination and annihilation.

Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma).

तदेवमुदीरितन्यायप्रसिद्धे विश्वम्भरादिकार्यत्वे सिध्यत्येव भगवतस्तदुपकरणधर्माधर्मसाक्षात्कारित्वम् ।

तथा हि -

विवादाध्यासिता भावा
येऽमी भू-भूधरादयः ।
ते यथोक्तावबोधेन
कर्त्रा केनापि निर्मिताः ॥

Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, mountains and the like,
have been created by a maker who possesses the described knowledge.

तथा हि -

विवादाध्यासिता भावा येऽमी भूभूधरादयः ।
ते यथोक्तावबोधेन कर्त्रा केनापि निर्मिताः ॥

उत्पत्ति-नाश-भागित्वाद्
यद् उत्पत्ति-विनाशवद् ।
दृष्टन् तत्, तादृशा कर्त्रा
निर्मितन् - तद् यथा गृहम् ॥

Everything that has origin and end is, in our experience, created by such a maker,
just because it is subject to origination and annihilation, like a house.

उत्पत्तिनाशभागित्वाद्यदुत्पत्तिविनाशवद् ।
दृष्टन्तत्तादृशा कर्त्रा निर्मितन्तद्यथा गृहम् ॥

न च वाच्यं -

कर्मणाम् एव स्वानुष्ठातृ-पुरुष-समीहितानि संपादयताम् अन्तरा
नान्तरीयकं +++(→नाविना-भूतं)+++ तनु-भुवनादि-कार्य-निर्माणम्

इति …

एव-कारेण ईश्वरो निषिध्यते।

यद् विना यन् न भवति, तत् तस्य नान्तरीयकम्।

[[19]]
23. Let it not be argued that

there is no intermediate production of effects like body, world etc.
between acts that bring about the desires of the person who undertakes them,

This is the Mimaṁsā view
which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation
are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being
whose body is itself the product of dharma and adharma
and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them.
The Mimimsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction,
but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

[[127]]
The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally.
No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act,
by either beginning or ending the universe.
On this cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prabhakara view, and Slokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhitta view.[[127]]
The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally.
No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act,
by either beginning or ending the universe.
On this cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prabhakara view, and Slokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhāṭṭa view.

न च वाच्यं कर्मणामेव स्वानुष्ठातृ पुरुषसमीहितानि संपादयतामन्तरा नान्तरीयकं तनुभुवनादिकार्यनिर्माणमिति …

यतश् चेतनानधिष्ठितानि तानि
न कार्याणि जनयितुम् उत्सहन्ते
अ-चेतनत्वाद् वासीवत्, +++(=क्षुरवत्)+++

न खल्व् अनधिष्ठिता वर्धकिना वासी वर्धनाय प्रवर्तते।

Also cf. Nyāyakusumāñjali: V. P51:

परमाण्व्-आदयो हि चेतनाधिष्ठिताः प्रवर्तन्ते, अचेतनत्वात् वासीवत्।

Also cf. Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahmasūtra: II. ii-1 : P221 [Nirṇayasāgara Edition]:

नाऽचेतनं लोके चेतनानधिष्ठितं स्व-तन्त्रं…दृष्टम्।

for these acts are unable to produce anything unless they are used as an instrument by a spiritual being,
since they are non-spiritual themselves, like an adze:

यतश्चेतनानधिष्ठितानि तानि न कार्याणि जनयितुमुत्सहन्ते अचेतनत्वाद् वासीवत्,

न हि चेतनेन तक्ष्णाऽनधिष्ठिता वासी
स्वयम् एव यूपादीन्य् आपादयितुम् अलम् ।+++(5)+++

without the operation of a spiritual being– the carpenter-
an adze is incapable of effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole,

न हि चेतनेन तक्ष्णाऽनधिष्ठिता वासी स्वयमेव यूपादीन्यापादयितुमलम् ।

न चापूर्वाण्य् अधिष्ठाय
वयं निर्मातुम् ईश्वराः ।
न हि कर्मोदयात् पूर्वं
साक्षात्-कर्तुं क्षमामहे ॥+++(5)+++

And we are not able to create through the instrumentality of apurva factors:
for before the actual fruition of the ritual act we cannot know their instrumentality,

apūrva lit. “that which is unprecedented, not known before, se. by other means of knowledge” in Mimāmsā it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result.

न चा पूर्वाण्यधिष्ठाय वयं निर्मातुमीश्वराः ।
न हि कर्मोदयात् पूर्वं साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमामहे ॥

उक्तं हि उपादानोपकरण-साक्षात्-कारिण एव
तत्र तत्र कर्तृत्वम् इति ।

and it has been said that only a person who has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental causes
can be a maker with respect to these causes.

The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized;
thus the act’s power- apūrva- cannot be known beforehand
as the instrument of effectuation.+++(5)+++
By the Naiyayika’s definition
only one who knows what instruments are effective in production
can actually produce.

उक्तं हि उपादानोपकरणसाक्षात्कारिण एव तत्र तत्र कर्तृत्वमिति ।

न च कर्म-जन्यापूर्व-साक्षात्-कार-क्षमः क्षेत्र-ज्ञः कश्चित् प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते वा,

And there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, to be capable of having the required actual knowledge of the apurva that is to arise from the act.

न च कर्मजन्यापूर्वसाक्षात्कारक्षमः क्षेत्रज्ञः कश्चित् प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते वा,

अतः क्षेत्र-ज्ञ–तद्-उपभोग–तत्-साधन-धर्माधर्मादि–
निखिल-लोकावलोकन-चतुरः कोऽपि निरतिशय-शक्ति-वैचित्र्यः पुरुषो ऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः,
तस्य चाप्रतिघ-ज्ञानत्वादयस् सहजाः ।

Vide Doctrine of Śakti in Indian Literature, P42:

God in the conception of the Naiyāyikas is one that is not only the efficient cause and supreme agent of the world, but possesses innumerable qualities such as knowledge, activity, desire, etc.

Cf. Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, IV. i.21, P. 292:

guṇaviśiṣṭamātmāntaraṃ īśvaraḥ.

Cf. also ibid: P293 :

na tāvadasya buddhiṁ vinā kaściddharmo liṅgabhūtaśśakya upapādayitum.

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the entire Universe with dharma and adharma of all embodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc.,
and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted knowledge etc. subsist.

अतः क्षेत्रज्ञतदुपभोगतत्साधनधर्माधर्मादिनिखिललोकावलोकनच तुरः कोऽपि निरतिशयशक्तिवैचित्र्यः पुरुषोभ्युपगन्तव्यः तस्य चाप्रतिघज्ञानत्वादयस्सहजाः ।

यथाऽहुः -

ज्ञानम् अप्रतिघं तस्य
वैराग्यञ् च जगत्पतेः ।
ऐश्वर्यञ् चैव धर्मश् च
सहसिद्धं चतुष्टयम् ॥

इति,

To be identified. This verse is quoted by Sucaritamiśra in his commentary on the Ślokavārtika, P.110 [Trivandrum Skt. Series No. 90].

As they say (unidentified source): “The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together.”

यथाऽहुः -

ज्ञानमप्रतिघं तस्य वैराग्यञ्च जगत्पतेः ।
ऐश्वर्यञ्चैव धर्मश्च सहसिद्धं चतुष्टयम् ॥

इति,

इमम् एवार्थं मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहास-पुराण-वादा उपोद्वलयन्ति -

Mantras, arthavadas, epic and purana corroborate this point; e.g.

mantra and arthavada: the terms indicate that the Naiyayika continues to address the Mimimsaka, for these of course are Mimāmsā terms, mantra being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, arthavada the descriptive, noninjunctive passages of Brahmana and later Vedic texts.

इममेवार्थं मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणवादा उपोद्वलयन्ति

द्यावा-पृथिवी जनयन् देव एकः ।
प्रजापतिर्वेदानसृजत ।

इत्य् एवम् आदयः ।

Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣat: II. 2.

To be identified.

“The one god, Prajapati, creating heaven and earth, created the Vedas,” etc. (RV. 10. 90. 14)

द्यावापृथिवी जनयन् देव एकः ।
प्रजापतिर्वेदानसृजत ।

इत्येवमादयः ।

स चायम् आदिकाले भगवान्
प्रलीन-निखिल-करण-कलेवरादि–भोगोपकरण–
चेतनेतरायमाण-जीव-जालावलोकन-जनित-महानुग्रहः +++(5)+++…

आदिकले - प्रलयकाले।
यथा हि जडास्
तथैव चेतना अपि करण-कलेवर-विकला भोग-भाजोनाभूवन्न्
इति ते चेतनेतरायमाणा इत्य् उच्यन्ते ।

At the moment of inception
the great Grace of this Person who is the Bhagavan
is evoked by a glance at the aggregate of individual souls
who are almost in a state of non-spiritual stupor,
their instruments for the experiencing of karmic results- body, senses and other organs-being completely dissolved.

स चायमादिकाले (प्रलयकाले) भगवान् प्रलीननिखिलकरणकलेवरादिभोगोपकरणचेतनेतरायमाणजीवजालावलोकनजनितमहानुग्रहः

सकलम् अपि जगद् उपजनय्य
तद्-अभिलषित-समस्त-सांसारिक-सम्पत्-प्राप्त्युपाय-प्रकाशन-बहुलां त्रयीम् एकतो निर्माय

‘एकतः’ कारन्यैनेति यावत्। [[??]]

[[20]]
His Grace evoked, he originates the entire universe
and simultaneously He creates the triple Veda
which states pellucidly the means
by which the souls in transmigration can realize the objects of their desires.

सकलमपि जगदुपजनय्य तदभिलषितसमस्तसांसारिकसम्पत्प्राप्त्युपायप्रकाशनबहुलां त्रयीमेकतो निर्माय

पुनर् अपि विविध-दुरित–+++(तरङ्ग-)+++परम्-पराऽऽकीर्ण–भवार्णव-निमग्नान् उद्विग्नान् अवलोकयन्

Then again, perceiving that they are in a pitiable condition,
being immersed in the ocean of existence
which is perturbed by wave upon wave of all manner of iniquities,

पुनरपि विविधदुरितपरम्पराकीर्णभवार्णवनिमग्ननुद्विग्नानवलोकयन्

परम-करुणतया तप्त-मानसः
परम-निश्रेयस-साधन-स्वाराधनावबोध-साधनी-भूताः पञ्च-रात्र-संहिताः सनत्-कुमार–नारदादिभ्यो ऽभ्यवोचद्

His heart burns with supreme compassion
and He promulgates, through Sanatkumara, Narada etc., the Pancarãtra Samhitās
which constitute the sources of knowledge
about the manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to perfect bliss.

परमकरुणतया तप्तमानसः परमनिश्रेयससाधनस्वाराधनावबोधसाधनीभूताः पञ्चरात्रसंहिताः सनत्कुमार-नारदादिभ्योऽभ्यवोचद्

इति त्रयी-समान–स्व-तन्त्रानुभव-मूलानि तन्त्राणि
कथम् इव यादृश-तादृश-मन्व्-आदि-स्मरण-गोष्ठीम् अधितिष्ठन्ति ?+++(5)+++

Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord
and are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas,
can they belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu or anyone?

इति त्रयीसमानस्वतन्त्रानुभवमूलानि तन्त्राणि कथमिव यादृशतादृशमन्वादिस्मरणगोष्ठीमधितिष्ठन्ति ।

स्याद् एवं यदि वेदानां
निर्माताऽपि प्रमाणतः ।
कुतश्चिद् उपलभ्येत -
न चासाव् उपलभ्यते ॥

The Mīmāṁsaka raises his objection again.

REFUTATION.
24. If this is true, then on what authority is such a creator of the Vedas known to exist?
He is not directly perceived.

Yamuna concurs in the Mimāmsaka’s refutation of the Naiyayika’s views,
to the extent that
he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason;
but he will counter the Mimagisa assertion that God cannot be proved at all,
that in fact there is neither room nor purpose for a God in the universe.
For Yamuna, God has all the characteristics He has for the Naiyayika,
but he proves them from Scripture, not reason.+++(5)+++

स्यादेवं यदि वेदानां निर्माताऽपि प्रमाणतः ।
कुतश्चिदुपलभ्येत न चासावुपलभ्यते ॥

न च वाक्यत्व-लिङ्गेन
वेद-कारो ऽनुमीयते ।
अभिप्रेत-विशेषाणां
विपर्यास-प्रसङ्गतः ।

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is word
that it therefore must have an author,
for that would entail the total reversion of your special contentions.

न च वाक्यत्वलिङ्गेन वेदकारोऽनुमीयते ।
अभिप्रेतविशेषाणां विपर्यासप्रसङ्गतः ।

वाक्यं हि यत् पराधीन-
रचनं संप्रदृश्यते ॥
शरीरिणैव तत् सर्वम्
उच्यमानं विलोक्यते ।+++(5)+++

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for its composition on the agency of some being
is also perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied being …

वाक्यं हि यत् पराधीनरचनं संप्रदृश्यते ॥
शरीरिणैव तत्सर्वमुच्यमानं विलोक्यते ।

पुण्य-पाप-निमित्तञ् च
शरीरं सर्व-देहिनाम् ॥
एवं पुण्येतराधीन-
सुख-दुःखस्य देहिनः ।
अनीश्वरस्य निर्माणं
वाक्यत्वम् अनुमापयेत् ॥+++(5)+++

पुण्यवद् इतरा(पापा)धीनेति भावः।

“निर्माणं” निर्मातृत्वम् इति भावः।

[[21]]
whose happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and evil karman,
and who therefore cannot be God.

पुण्यपापनिमित्तञ्च शरीरं सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥
एवं पुण्येतराधीनसुखदुःखस्य देहिनः ।
अनीश्वरस्य निर्माणं वाक्यत्वमनुमापयेत् ॥

अपि चैवं प्रमाणत्वं
वेदानाम् अपि दुर्लभम् ।
न हि मानान्तरापूर्वे
धर्मे तस्यास्ति संभवः ॥

‘तस्य’ निर्माणस्येत्य् अर्थः।

Moreover, in that case it would be impossible
to establish the authority of the Vedas themselves;
for if dharma-the Law-is not independent of other means of knowledge,
there is no exclusive authority of the Vedas.

That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of apurva facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertaining to dharma.

अपि चैवं प्रमाणत्वं वेदानामपि दुर्लभम् ।
न हि मानान्तरापूर्वे धर्मे तस्यास्ति संभवः ॥

ननु कथं मानान्तरापूर्वो धर्मः,
उक्तं हि

साक्षात्-करोति धर्माधर्मौ -
कथम् अन्यथा तद्-उपकरणं जगज् जनयति

इति।

This is the contention of the Naiyāyika.

25. OBJECTION.
But why should dharma be independent of other means of knowledge?
For we have asserted that

He has actual knowledge of dharma and adharma:
how else could He produce the world of which dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes?

ननु कथं मानान्तरापूर्वो धर्मः, उक्तं हि साक्षात्करोति धर्माधर्मौ कथमन्यथा तदुपकरणं जगज्जनयति इति,

सत्यम् उक्तं - “कोऽपि निर्माता
तद्+++(=ततः)+++ विश्वस्य जगतो”, न हि ।
विद्यते कोऽपि निर्माता
येनैवम् अपि कल्प्यते ॥

The Mīmāṁsaka refutes the above contention of the Naiyāyika.

Vide Śaivasiddhānta, P.74 ff, for the following:

It may be noted that even the Lokāyata (Cārvāka) entertains similar view regarding, the world’s creatorship, i.e., that there is no creator for it.

REPLY.
That has indeed been asserted,
but the assertion is fallacious:
for no creator of the entire universe can be found
of whom this can be assumed.

सत्यमुक्तं कोऽपि निर्माता तद् विश्वस्य जगतो न हि ।
विद्यते कोऽपि निर्माता येनैवमपि कल्प्यते ॥

+++(लोकस्य→)+++ विचित्र-सन्निवेशत्व-
युक्त्या यद् अपि साधितम् +++(सकर्तृकत्वम्)+++ ।
तत्रोच्यते त्रिधा भावा
लौकिकैः परिलोकिताः ॥

To your argument that the world must be effected
because it has a complex construction
can be objected that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities:

विचित्रसन्निवेशत्वयुक्त्या यदपि साधितम् ।
तत्रोच्यते त्रिधा भावा लौकिकैः परिलोकिताः ॥

प्रत्यक्ष-दृष्ट-कर्तारः
केचिद् एते घटादयः ।
अ-विद्यमान-निर्माणास्
तथाऽन्ये गगनादयः ॥
सन्दिह्यमान-निर्माणाः
केचिद् विश्वम्-भरादयः ।

Pāṇini’s sūtra: “nadyṛtaśca” (V. iv-153) would require this to be “pratyakṣadṛṣṭakartṛkāḥ”, since the compound intended by the author here is of the Bahuvrīhi-type. But according to the well-known saying “sthitasya gatiḥ kalpanīyā”, the term “pratyakṣadṛṣṭakartāraḥ” can be interpreted as a Karmadhāraya compound, thus: “yatra pratyakṣadṛṣṭāḥ kartāraḥ, ete kecit ghaṭādayaḥ”, in which case, the expression necessarily has to be split into two parts.

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g. pots and the like;
those which are not found to be made at all (the individual soul) +++(eg. sky)+++;
and those whose creation remained doubtful, like the earth etc.

प्रत्यक्षदृष्टकर्तारः केचिदेते घटादयः ।
अविद्यमाननिर्माणास्तथाऽन्ये गगनादयः ॥
सन्दिह्यमाननिर्माणाः केचिद् विश्वम्भरादयः ।

तत्र प्रथम-सन्दर्शित-राशि-द्वये ऽनवकाश एवेश्वर-व्यापारः ।

In the two first-mentioned cases
there is no room for God’s activity.

तत्र प्रथमसन्दर्शितराशिद्वयेऽनवकाश एवेश्वरव्यापारः ।

अद्यवद् एव विश्वम्-भरादयः क्रम-प्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचययोर्
न युगपद् उदय-विलय-भागिनः।

Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.241, where the same sentence occurs.

As to the third, the earth etc. are not involved in a total origination or disintegrations,
but merely, as now, subject to varying degrees of increase and decrease which are adventitious.

अद्यवदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचययोर्न युगपदुदयविलयभागिनः

ईदृशोत्पत्तिभङ्गौ मीमांसकानाम् अपि सम्मताव् एवेति सिद्ध-साधनत्वम् ।

To say that the Mimāmsakas accept origination and annihilation in this sense is to prove the proved.

The Mimimsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction,
but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

ईदृशोत्पत्तिभङ्गौ मीमांसकानामपि सम्मतावेवेति सिद्धसाधनत्वम् ।

बुद्धिमत् कर्तृता याऽपि
प्रयासेन समर्थिता ।
साध्यते साऽपि सिद्धैव
बुद्धिमन्तो हि चेतनाः ॥

बुद्धिमत्कर्तृता याऽपि प्रयासेन समर्थिता ।
साध्यते साऽपि सिद्धैव बुद्धिमन्तो हि चेतनाः ॥

यागादिभिः स्व-भोगाय
तत् तद् उत्पादयन्ति नः ॥
युक्तञ् चोभय-सिद्धानां
तत्राधिष्ठान-कल्पनम् ।
वयञ्च याग-दानादि
साक्षात् कर्तुं क्षमा यतः ॥

यागादिभिः … Vide Karmamīmāṁsā, P.61:

Though the Mīmāṁsā is so deeply concerned with the sacrifice, it has no belief in the doctrine that the rewards of offering are to be expected either from the deities to whom the offerings are directed to be made, from a God as Creator or apportioner of reward and punishment. The sacrifice generates an unseen potency, whence the goods desired by sacrificers are obtained.

नः … “नः” अस्मद्-इष्टाः चेतना इत्य् अन्वयः।

युक्तं … Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.240:

“yuktaṁ caitat yadubhayavādisiddhānāmeva cetanānāṁ kartṛtvābhyupagamaḥ, lāghavāt; na copādānādyanabhijñatayā tatpratikṣepaḥ।

upādānaṁ pṛthivyādi yāgadānādi sādhanaṁ।
sākṣātkartuṁ kṣamante yat sarva eva hi cetanāḥ॥

सिद्धानां … उभय-वादि-सम्मतानां जीवानाम् इति भावः।

[[22]]
In our opinion, too,
these intelligent agents bring about various results
by means of sacrifices and other acts,
in order to enjoy these results themselves;
and the assumption that they are indeed,
as is proved for both of us, instrumental therein is quite correct,
for we can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, donations and the like.

यागादिभिः स्वभोगाय तत्तदुत्पादयन्ति नः ॥
युक्तञ्चोभयसिद्धानां तत्राधिष्ठानकल्पनम् ।
वयञ्च यागदानादि साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमा यतः ॥

कर्मणः शक्ति-रूपं यद्
अ-पूर्वादि-पदास्पदम् ।
मा भूत् प्रत्यक्षता तस्य
किन् तेनाध्यक्षितेन नः ॥

Cf. Īśvarasiddhi*, P.241, where this verse is reproduced almost as it is, but for a slight change in the second half of the second line, which reads as “śaktimaddhyakṣagocaraḥ”.

However, the special power described with terms like apurva can never be open to perception.
How then can we have use for a supervising God?

Since the apūrva power is suprasensible,
it can never be perceived,
and the assumption of a God who ‘supervises’ and controls this power
because he perceives it is absurd.

कर्मणः शक्तिरूपं यदपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।
माभूत् प्रत्यक्षता तस्य किन्तेनाध्यक्षितेन नः ॥

न खलु कुलालादयः
कुम्भादि-कार्यम् आरिप्समानाः
तद्-उपादानोपकरण-भूत–मृद्-दण्ड-चक्रादि-कार्योत्पादन-शक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य
तत् तद् आरभन्ते ।+++(5)+++

Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.242, for identical statements.

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for instance a potter,
when he wishes to produce a certain product- pots-
must first have direct knowledge of the power of their material cause- clay- and instrumental cause- stick- to produce these products
before he can actually undertake their production.

न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारिप्समानाः तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्दण्डचक्रादिकार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते ।

यदि परं +++(उय्येत)+++- शक्तिम् अ-विदुषाम् +++(कुम्भकारादीनां)+++ अभिलषित-साधनाय तद्-उपादानादि-व्यवहारो ऽनुपपन्नः।
इह तु नित्यागम-जन्मना प्रत्ययेन संप्रत्य्-आकलित-यागादि–तत्-तद्-उत्पादन-पाटवाः पुरुषास् +++(←अनीश्वरा देवा अपि)+++
तैर् एव विश्वम्-भरा+++(=भू)+++ऽऽदि-भावान् आविर्भावयन्ति,

यदि परं … ‘यदि परं’ इत्य् अस्य , ‘यदि यत् किञ्चिद् विवक्षितं, तर्हि एवं वक्तव्यम्’ इत्य् अर्थः।

इह तु … Cf. Ślokavārtika, Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra: śl. 75:

kasyacit hetumātṛatvaṁ yadyadhiṣṭhānatocyate
karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānāṁ tatsiddheḥ siddhasādhanam.

The same idea is expressed in the Īśvarasiddhi, P.242:

āgamādavagamyante vicitrāḥ karmaśaktayaḥ
tena karmabhirātmānaḥ sarvaṁ nirmimatāṁ pṛthak.

प्रत्ययेन … “Pratyaya” here means “jñāna”.

सम्प्रत्याकलित … “Samprati” is used in the sense of “samyak”. Also see the following verse “kṛtārthatvāt krīḍā” etc. where also the word “saṃprati” occurs.

Else people who are unaware of the power of the requisite causes
would never be able to employ these causes in order to produce the results they want.
In the case under discussion the persons concerned do indeed know
which causes are required to bring about the results they want, for they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc.,
through the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scripture.
Thus, aided by these causes, they render manifest such products as earth etc.

यदि परं शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधनाय तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः तद्-उपादानादि-व्यवहारो ऽनुपपन्नः।
इह तु नित्यागमजन्मना प्रत्ययेन संप्रत्याकलितयागादितत्तदुत्पादनपाटवाः पुरुषास्तैरेव विश्वम्भरादिभावानाविर्भावयन्ति,

तथा च प्रत्यक्ष-प्रकृति+++(=उपादान)-+++-करणः कर्म-करण-
प्रवीणो, नैवान्यः क्षम इति च नास्त्यत्र नियमः ॥

By “prakṛti” is meant “upādāna” and by “karaṇa” is meant “nimitta” and the like.

Also, there is no invariable rule
that only an agent to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully known
is capable of undertaking an action
and nobody else.

तथा च - प्रत्यक्षप्रकृतिकरणः कर्मकरणप्रवीणो नैवान्यः क्षम इति च नास्त्यत्र नियमः ॥

अ-पश्यन्न् एवायं प्रकृति+++(=उपादान)+++-करणे स्वात्म-मनसि
ननु ज्ञाने कर्ता भवति पुरुषस् तत् कथम् इव ।
विनाशीदं विश्वं जगद् अवयवित्वाद् इति च यद्
बलीयः प्रत्यक्ष-प्रतिहत-मुखत्वेन तद् असत् ॥
स एवायम् मेरुर् दिवस-कर-बिम्बञ् च तदिदं
धरित्री सैवेति स्फुटम् इह यतो धीर् उदयते ।+++(5)+++

अपश्यन्नेवायं … Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.246: “na copādānādisākṣātkāriṇa eva kartṛtvamityapi niyamaḥ; upādānamupakaraṇaṁ ca aviduṣa evātmano jñānādiṣu kartṛtvāt”.

विनाशीदं … Cf. तथा सावयवत्वेन etc., above.

A man can still be an agent in the action of knowing
without perceiving in his own mind the material and instrumental causes
that go into the making of this action of knowing.
Why, then, contend that the causes must be known first?
27. The contention that the entire Universe is subject to annihilation
because it has parts is incorrect. Such a conclusion is [[23]] cancelled by stronger perceptual evidence against it.

For the knowledge that does arise in the world of here and now is plainly this:
‘Here is the meru; here is the sun; here is the earth.’

अपश्यन्नेवायं प्रकृतिकरणे स्वात्ममनसि
ननु ज्ञाने कर्ता भवति पुरुषस्तत्कथमिव ॥
विनाशीदं विश्वं जगदवयवित्वादिति च यद्
बलीयः प्रत्यक्षप्रतिहतमुखत्वेन तदसत् ॥
स एवायम्मेरुर्दिवसकरबिम्बञ्च तदिदं
धरित्री सैवेति स्फुटमिह यतोधीरुदयते ॥

शक्नोति हि प्रत्यभिज्ञैव
समस्त-काल-सम्बन्धम् एषाम् अवगमयितुम्,
सन्ति हि पूर्वापर-कालयोर् अपि तादृशाः पुरुषाः,
प्रादुःषन्ति येषाम् ईदृश-प्रत्ययाः,
प्रयोगश् च भवति ।

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that
these entities are related to different times;
and certainly both in former and later ages
there arise similar persons
who have the same notion of these entities’ present existence.

शक्नोति हि प्रत्यभिज्ञैव समस्तकालसम्बन्धमेषामवगमयितुम्, सन्ति हि पूर्वापरकालयोरपि तादृशाः पुरुषाः प्रादुःषन्ति येषामीदृशप्रत्ययाः, प्रयोगश्च भवति ।

मही-शैल-पतङ्गादि-
प्रत्यभिज्ञानवन् नरः ।
+++(नरः→)+++ अतीत-कालः, कालत्वाद्
इदानीन्तन-कालवत् +++(←सनरः)+++ ॥ +++(5)+++

This long compound qualifies the term “atītakālaḥ”.

To put it in syllogistic form:

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and mountain,
because the past is time, like the present.

महीशैलपतङ्गादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानवन्नरः ।
अतीतकालः कालत्वादिदानीन्तनकालवत् ॥

एवम् अनागतेऽपि प्रयोगो दर्शयितव्यः ।

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard to the future.

एवमनागतेऽपि प्रयोगो दर्शयितव्यः ।

न चेदृश-प्रयोगेण
घटादेर् अपि नित्यता ।
प्रसज्यते यतस् तत्र
प्रत्यक्षौ भङ्ग-सम्भवौ ॥ +++(4)+++

‘सो ऽयं घट’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञया घटादेर् अपि नित्यत्वं न शङ्कनीयम् इति भावः। तत्र कारणम् आह ‘यत‘ इति ।

This reasoning does not entail the fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal,
for in their case origination and annihilation are directly evident.

न चेदृशप्रयोगेण घटादेरपि नित्यता ।
प्रसज्यते यतस्तत्र प्रत्यक्षौ भङ्गसम्भवौ ॥

विरोधे सति येनात्मा +++(→तर्क-फलम्)+++
हेतुना नैव लभ्यते ।
न लभ्यते ऽविरोधेऽपि
तेनात्मेत्य् अस्त्य् असम्भवः ॥

‘विरोधे सति, येन हेतुना आत्मा नैव लभ्यते [हेतुत्वं हीयत इति यावत्], तेन अविरोधे ऽपि सति, आत्मा न लभ्यतय् इत्य् एतत् न सम्भवति ।’ इति श्लोकस्यास्य पदान्वयः ।

Cf. Tantravārttika under I. iii. 51-54, 55:

na hi yena pramāṇatvaṁ labdhapūrvaṁ kadācana।
tena tat sarvadā labhyamityājñāpayatīśvaraḥ॥
na ca yad balavadruddhamātmānaṁ naiva vindati।
avirodhe ‘pi tenātmā na labdhavyaḥ kathaṁcana॥
na cāpi bādhakābhāvāt labdha ātmeti sarvadā।
labdhavyaḥ sa virodhe ‘pi pūrvasāmānyadarśanāt॥

It does not follow that,
when a certain fact cannot be proved on the strength of a certain ground,
since this ground involves a contradiction,
this same ground cannot prove the same fact
when it does not involve a contradiction.

read “na labhyate .avirodhe” pi; the meaning is this: when a certain fact (the eternality of pots) cannot be proved by a ground (recollection)
because this ground contains a contradiction
(it is recollected that pots having existed cease to exist),
this does not prove that the same ground (recollection) cannot prove the eternality of earth, mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain).

विरोधे सति येनात्मा हेतुना नैव लभ्यते ।
न लभ्यते ऽविरोधेऽपि तेनात्मेत्यस्त्यसम्भवः ॥

महत्त्वे सति स्पन्दमानत्व-युक्त्या
जगज्-जन्म-भङ्गश् च यः प्रत्यपादि ।
स च प्रत्यभिज्ञा-बल-ध्वस्त-हेतुर्
न हृद्यत्वम् अद्य प्रपद्येत युक्त्या ॥

Cf. महत्तया सनाथेन etc., above.

The other inference that has been given to prove that the world is subject to origination and annihilation,
namely on the ground of motion when there is mass,
is likewise incorrect;
for this ground, too, is cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition.
Consequently, inference cannot provide positive proof
that the world is subject to origination and annihilation.

महत्त्वे सति स्पन्दमानत्वयुक्त्या जगज्जन्मभङ्गश्च यः प्रत्यपादि ।
स च प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलध्वस्तहेतुर्न हृद्यत्वमद्य प्रपद्येत युक्त्या ॥

अपि च +++(कर्त्रन्मानेऽपि)+++ धर्मि-विशेष-विरुद्धश् चायं +++(ईश्वराख्यो)+++ हेतुः कार्यत्वाद् इति
कार्यत्वं हि
+++(कर्तृ-)+++स्वभाव–दृष्ट-विग्रहवत्त्व-+अनाप्त-कामत्व-+अनीश्वरत्वासार्वज्ञ्यादि-
व्याप्ति-वित्त्य्-उपयुक्ततरानेक-विशेषानुषक्तं,

[[24]]
28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on the ground that the world is a product;
but this ground precludes a specially qualified producer.
For a product generally implies on the part of its producer
a number of properties which are natural to him
and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the concomitance between him and his product -
Properties like being in possession of a body,
having something left to desire,
being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc.

Vide Karmamīmāṁsā*: pp. 61-62:

Experience, Prabhākara urges, shows us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means; we can argue hence to the facts of the past and future and need invoke no extraneous aid…..Supervision ( by God ) also is impossible, even had God the necessary knowledge; it must take the form either of contact, which is impossible as merit and demerit being qualities are not subject to contact, or inherence, and plainly a man’s qualities cannot inhere in God. If the argument is adduced on the analogy of the carpenter, it may be replied that on this basis, the creator would have to be an embodied spirit, and no embodied spirit can effect such subtle things as the atoms or merit and demerit.

अपि च धर्मिविशेषविरुद्धश्चायं हेतुः कार्यत्वादिति कार्यत्वं हि स्वभावदृष्टविग्रहवत्त्वानाप्तकामत्वानीश्वरत्वासार्वज्ञ्यादिव्याप्तिवित्युपयुक्ततरानेकविशेषानुषक्तं

कथम् इव तत्-प्रत्यनीक-भूताशरीर-नित्य-तृप्त-सर्वज्ञत्वाद्य्-अभिमत-विशेषान् साध्य-धर्मिण्य् अवगमयति?+++(5)+++

How, then, can the fact that the world is a product
convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it
possesses the postulated properties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties,
that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow?

‘सिसाधयिषिते कर्तरि’ इत्य् अर्थः।

कथमिव तत्प्रत्यनीकभूताशरीरनित्यतृप्तसर्त्रज्ञत्वाद्यभिमतविशेषान् साध्यधर्मिण्यवगमयति,

स्व-शरीर-प्रेरणम् अपि शरीर-सम्बन्धासमवायि-कारणक-प्रयत्नवतो नान्यस्येति
न कथंचिद् अशरीरिणः कर्तृत्व-संभवः ॥

The production of a product requires the activation of the body,
which requires on the producer’s part an effort
whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condition bodiless person can be an agent.

स्वशरीरप्रेरणमपि शरीरसम्बन्धासमवायिकारणकप्रयत्नवतो नान्यस्येति न कथंचिदशरीरिणः कर्तृत्वसंभवः ॥

अथैतद्-दोष-हानाय
देहवान् इत्य् उपेयते ।
स देहो जन्मवान् मा वा?
जन्मवत्त्वे ऽनवस्थितिः ॥
नित्यत्वेऽवयवित्वञ्च
स्याद् अनैकान्तिकन् तव +++(“सावयवम् अनित्यम्” इति वदतः)+++ ।+++(5)+++

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argument,
it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body,
then the question arises,
Is that body itself subject to origination or not?
If it be subject to origination,
there is infinite regress.
If it be eternal, then your contention that
whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true.

तावद्-उक्तस्य सावयवत्वहेतोर् नैकान्तिक-दोषो भवेद् इत्य् अन्वयः।

अथैतद्दोषहानाय देहवानित्युपेयते ।
स देहो जन्मवान् मा वा जन्मवत्त्वेऽनवस्थितिः ॥
नित्यत्वेऽवयवित्वञ्च स्यादनैकान्तिकन्तव ।

यद् अप्य् एतेऽवोचन्न्
“अधिकरण-सिद्धान्त-बलतो विशेषास् सिध्यन्ती"त्य्
अयम् अपि च पन्था न घटते ।

The solution of others, namely that God’s special properties can be demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion, does not hold good either.

adhikaranasiddhanta is a conclusion which, as soon as one thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator),
establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience).
On this question, ef. Tarkabhāṣā 43.

“Adhikaraṇasiddhānta” or “Doctrine resting on Implication”, is defined in the Nyāyasūtra under I. i. 30 as “yatsiddhau anvayaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ, so’dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ”. Cf. Vātsyāyana’s bhāṣya on it: “yasya arthasya siddhau anye arthāḥ anuṣajjyante, na tair vinā so’rthaḥ siddhyati, te arthāḥ tadadhiṣṭhānāḥ, so’dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ”. So, Adhikaraṇasiddhānta can be explained as the principle by which, when a certain thing is known or accepted, certain other things automatically follow, by reason of their dependence upon the former. This Adhikaraṇasiddhānta in modern logic is known as “pakṣadharmatā”. Since the fact of earth, etc. having a creator cannot be proved unless that creator is also accepted as a direct perceiver of all entities including the atoms ( the material cause of the cosmos ), the admission of such a power of all-round perception in that creator follows by the principle ‘Adhikaraṇasiddhānta’ ( Implied Doctrine ).

यदप्येतेऽवोचन्नधिकरणसिद्धान्तबलतोविशेषास्सिध्यन्तीत्ययमपि च पन्था न घटते ।

स हि न्यायो जीवेद् अपि यदि च मानान्तरकृतो ।
विरोधो ऽस्यादृष्टः, पुनर् +++(अत्र)+++ अपि विरोधः स्फुटतरः ॥

For that rule holds only of a case where
a conflict follows from a means of knowledge
but does not actually exist.
In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

“अपि च धर्मि-विशेष-विरुद्धश् चायं हेतुः” इति पूर्वम् एव (पु.32) हेतु-विरोधः प्रपञ्चितः।

स हि न्यायो जीवेदपि यदि च मानान्तरकृतो ।
विरोधोऽस्यादृष्टः पुनरपि विरोधः स्फुटतरः ॥

ननु च अवधृताविनाभाव-नियमम् अपि यदि
न विश्वम्-भरादि-बुद्धिमन्-निमित्तताम् अवगमयति
प्रत्यस्तिम् इतस् तर्ह्य् अनुमेयव्यवहारः।
अथावगमयति - अवगमयत्य् एवासाव्
अ-खिल-त्रैलोक्य-निर्माण-प्रवीणन् तमपि कर्तारम्,

[[25]]
29. OBJECTION. But if even a well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being,
then all logical process of deduction is done with.
But if deduction can indeed convey true knowledge,
that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

‘अवधृताविनाभाव-नियमम्’ इत्य् एतत् ‘कार्यत्वम्’ इत्य् अस्य पदस्य अध्याहृतस्य विशेषणं भवितुम् अर्हति। अथवा [[??]]विश्वम्-भरादि इत्य् अस्य वा विशेषणत्वेन स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते।

ननु च अवधृताविनाभावनियममपि यदि न विश्वम्भरादिबुद्धिमन्निमित्ततामवगमयति प्रत्यस्तिमितस्तर्ह्यनुमेयव्यवहारः, अथावगमयति, अवगमयत्येवासावखिलत्रैलोक्यनिर्माणप्रवीणन्तमपि कर्तारम्,

न ब्रूमो नावगमयतीति -
किन्तु, यावन्तो +++(स-शरीरत्वादि-)+++विशेषाः व्याप्ति-ग्रहण-समय-संविदिताः
तान् अप्य् अ-विशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति ।

REPLY. We do not say
that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer,
but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as many properties in this producer
as at the moment of grasping the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

न ब्रूमो नावगमयतीति किन्तु यावन्तो विशेषाः व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयसंविदिताः तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति ।

न च तावताऽतिप्रसङ्गः

Nor do we carry our point too far.

यत्र धूमस् तत्र वह्निर् इति व्याप्तिर् महानसादौ गृहीता। पर्वते धूमं दृष्ट्वा वह्निम् अनुमातुं प्रवृत्तस्य पुरुषस्य, तत्रत्यो ऽपि वह्निः महानसादाव् इव फूत्कारेणैव प्रवृद्ध इति, स च पाकार्थम् उपयुज्यत इत्य्-आद्याः सम्भावनाः सम्भाव्यमाना अत्र अतिप्रसङ्ग-शब्देन सूचिताः। एतेषां विपरीत-विशेषणानां प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाण-बाध्यत्वम् आह प्रमाणान्तरेत्य्-आदिना। तथा च पर्वतं गत्वा तत्रत्यो वह्निः कीदृश इति विचारे क्रियमाणे, पूर्वं वह्नि-विषये सम्भावितान् फूत्कार-प्रवर्धन-पाकोपयोगादीन् अतिप्रसङ्गान् प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाणम् एव निवारयेद् इति भावः।

न च तावताऽतिप्रसङ्गः

प्रमाणान्तर-गोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि
लिङ्ग-बलाद् आपततो विपरीत-विशेषांस्
तत्-प्रमाणम् एव प्रतिरुणद्धि

In a case where the term
which we seek to establish through deduction
can also be known through another means of knowledge,
then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties
which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone.

प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततोविपरीतविशेषांस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि

अत्र पुनर् अतिपतित-मानान्तर-कर्म-भावे भगवति सिषाधयिषिते
यावन्तो ऽन्वय-व्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभाव-भाजो धर्मास्
तान् अप्य् अ-विशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति,

In the present instance, however, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge;
in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance
elicited through positive and negative consideration
are indiscriminately established by the deduction,

अत्र … Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.244.

कर्मभावे … ‘सकल-प्रमाणान्तरानवगते’ इत्य् अर्थः।

स्थापयतीति … कर्तृत्वम् इव अनीश्वरत्वादिकम् अपि धर्म-जातं व्याप्ति-बलेन व्यवस्थापयतीत्य् अर्थः।

अत्र पुनरतिपतितमानान्तरकर्मभावे भगवति सिषाधयिषिते यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति,

तथा च प्राङ्गण-निकट-वर्ति-दूर्वाङ्कुरादिष्व् अनवसित-पुरुष-व्यापार-जन्मस्व् अनैकान्तः,
तत्राप्य् अतीन्द्रिय-पुरुषाधिष्ठान-कल्पना कल्पना-मात्रम् एव ।+++(5)+++

A similarly occasional relationship between producer and product occurs,
for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden.
We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person’s action.
In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world
must remain entirely conjectural,

तथा च … अत्र सन्दर्भानुरोधेन ‘तथा च’ इत्य् अस्य ‘किञ्च’ इत्य् अर्थो वर्णनीयः।

अनैकान्तः … कार्यत्व-हेतुर् इति योजनीयम्।

तथा च प्राङ्गणनिकटवर्तिदूर्वाङ्कुरादिष्वनवसितपुरुषव्यापारजन्मस्वनैकान्तः, तत्राप्यतीन्द्रियपुरुषाधिष्ठानकल्पना कल्पनामात्रमेव ।

क्व वा देशे तिष्ठन्न्, अनवरत-तृप्तिः किम् इति वा
कदा वा निश्शेषञ् जनयति तद् एतद् विमृशतु ॥
क्वचित् तिष्ठन्न् इष्टं, किम् अपि फलम् उद्दिश्य करणैः
कदाचिद् यत्-किञ्चिज् जनयति कुलालादिर् अखिलः ॥

[[26]]

30. Another question to be considered is
from what point in space,
at what point in time,
and to what purpose
a person who is satisfied in all eternity would produce the universe.
Every agent, e.g., a potter, produces a product
by means of certain instruments,
while occupying a certain space at a certain time
and aiming at a certain result which he wants.

Cf. Nyāyamañjarī Vol. I, P.191:

kiṁ kimapi prayojanamananusandhāya jagatsarge pravartate prajāpatirevameva vā ? niṣprayojanīyāṁ pravṛttāvaprekṣāpūrvakāritvāt unmattatulyo’sau bhavet.

Vide Śaivasiddhānta P.83 ff.

To create the world, the Lord should have occupied some place, but where is it exactly, when we definitely know that by then, space itself has not been created ?

Kumārila is the most relentless and vehement critic of the divine origination and dissolution of the universe. Creation of the world is refuted in

Ślokavārtika, under 1-i-5; śl. 47:

pravṛttiḥ kathaṁ ādyā ca jagataḥ saṁpratīyate।
śarīrāder vinā cāsya kathamicchāpi sarjane ?

Dissolution, likewise, is refuted in śl. 68:

pralaye ‘pi pramāṇaṁ naḥ sarvocchedātmake na hi।
na ca prayojanaṁ tena syāt prajāpatikarmaṇā॥

For a detailed refutation of the creative activity of God, at a time when space itself did not exist, see ibid. śls. 45, 50-51:

yadā sarvamidaṁ nāsīt kvāvasthā tatra gamyatām।
prajāpateḥ kva vā sthānaṁ kiṁ rūpaṁ ca pratīyatām॥

sādhanaṁ cāsya dharmādi tadā kiṁcinna vidyate।
na ca nissādhanaḥ kartā kaścit sṛjati kiñcana॥
nādhāreṇa vinā sṛṣṭirūrṇanābherapīṣyate।
prāṇināṁ bhakṣaṇāccāpi tasya lālā pravartate॥

क्व वा देशे तिष्ठन्ननवरतततृप्तिः किमिति वा
कदा वा निश्शेषञ्जनयति तदेताद्विमृशतु ॥
क्वचित्तिष्ठन्निष्टं किमपि फलमुद्दिश्य करणैः
कदाचिद्यत्किञ्चिज्जनयति कुलालादिरखिलः ॥

कृतार्थत्वात् क्रीडा, न च भवति हेतुर् यदि खलु
स्व-भाव–स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रकटितम् अहो सम्प्रति विभोः ॥
अभिप्रेतं किञ्चिद् यद् अयम् असमीक्ष्यैव कुरुते
जगज्-जन्म-स्थेम-प्रविलय-महायासम् अवशः ॥

If the production of the world is purely sport and without ulterior motivation,
since God does not want anything, beware,
for this states clearly that the Lord is by nature independent from anything beside Himself.
Yet willynilly, without regard for anything He might wish, He shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and destroying the world.

कृतार्थत्वात् … Vide Ślokavārtika under I. i. 5, śls. 54-56:

tathā cāpekṣamāṇasya svātantryaṁ pratihanyate।
jagaccāsṛjatastasya kiṁ nāmeṣṭaṁ na siddhyati ?
prayojanamanuddiśya na mando ‘pi pravartate।
evameva pravṛttiścet caitanyenāsya kiṁ bhavet ?
krīḍārthāyāṁ pravṛttau ca vihanyeta kṛtārthatā।
bahuvyāpāratāyāṁ ca kleśo bahutaro bhavet॥

Also cf. ibid: śl. 57, ff.

Cf. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. I, P.192:

atha krīḍārthe jagatsarge bhagavataḥ pravṛttirīdṛśā ca śubhāśubharūpeṇa jagatḥ sṛṣṭena krīḍati parameśvara ityucyate, tarhi krīḍāsādhyasukharahitatvena sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvamanavāptasakalānandatvaṁ nāma tasya svarūpamavahīyate;

na ca krīḍāpi niśśeṣajanatātaṅkakāriṇī।
āyāsabahulā ceyaṁ kartuṁ yuktā mahātmanaḥ॥

tasmānna jagatāṁ nātha īśvaraḥ sraṣṭā saṁhartāpi bhavati.

Also cf. ibid: P.194:

ata eva nirīkṣya durghaṭāṁ jagato janmavināśāḍambaraṁ।
na kadācidanīdṛśaṁ jagat kathitaṁ nītirahasyavedibhiḥ॥

‘सम्प्रति’ सम्यग् इत्य् अर्थः। जगत्-सृजनं भगवतः स्वभावश् चेद् उच्यते, तर्हि सम्यग् एव तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रतिपादितं भवद्विर् इति सोपालम्भम् आह। तदा तु भगवान् परतन्त्र एव स्याद् इत्य् आशयः।

असमीक्ष्यैव … स्वभावत्वाद् एव असमीक्षोपपद्यते।

कृतार्थत्वात्क्रीडा न च भवति हेतुर्यदि खलु
स्वभावस्वातन्त्र्यं प्रकटितमहो सम्प्रति विभोः ॥
अभिप्रेतं किञ्चिद्यदयमसमीक्ष्यैव कुरुते
जगज्जन्मस्थेमप्रविलयमहायासमवशः ॥

अनुकम्पा-प्रयुक्तेन सृज्यमानाश् च जन्तवः
सुखिनः किन् न सृज्यन्ते तत्-कर्मापेक्षया यदि ॥
ततः स्व-तन्त्रता-हानिः, किञ्च तैर् एव +++(कर्माख्यैर्)+++ हेतुभिर्
उपपन्नेऽपि वैचित्र्ये किन् तत् +++(ईश्वर इति)+++ कल्पनयाऽनया ॥+++(4)+++

Is He in creating the creatures prompted by His compassion?
But why, then, does He not create them happy?
If you reply, because God takes karman into account,
then you deny his complete independence.
Besides, if their karman provides sufficient causes for these creatures’ variety,
why assume God at all?

अनुकम्पाप्रयुक्तेन … Vide Ślokavārtika, under I. i-5, śls. 52, 53:

abhāvāccānukampyānāṁ nānukampāsya jāyate।
sṛjecca śubhamevaikaṁ anukaṁpāprayojitaḥ॥
athāśubhād vinā sṛṣṭiḥ sthitirvā nopapadyate।
ātmādhīnābhyupāye hi bhavet kiṁnāma duṣkaram ?

Cf. Īśvarasiddhi, P.244-245:

svārthakāruṇyābhāvena vyāptāḥ prekṣāvataḥ kriyāḥ।
īśvarasyobhayābhāvāt jagatsargo na yujyate॥

avāptakāmatvānna tāvadātmārthe sṛjati; pralayasamaye pralīnasakalakaraṇakalebarādibhogopakaraṇatayā ca cetanānāṁ duḥkhābhāvāt duḥkhidarśanajanitakṛpāprayuktirapi nāstīti vyāpakabhūtasvārthakāruṇyanivṛtteḥ vyāpyabhūtāyā prekṣāvatpravṛttyāpi nivartitavyam;

sukhaikatānāṁ janayet jagat karuṇayā sṛjan।
tatkarmānuvidhāyitve hīyetāsya svatantratā॥

Cf. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. I. P.192:

avāptasarvānandasya rāgādirahitātmanaḥ।
jagadārabhamāṇasya na vidmaḥ kiṁ prayojanam॥

anukampayā pravartata iti cet, maivam —

sargāt pūrvaṁ hi niśśeṣakleśasaṁsparśavarjitāḥ।
nāsya muktā ivātmāno bhavanti karuṇāspadam॥

… … … … … … … … … … …

karuṇāmṛtasaṁsiktahṛdayo vā jagat sṛjan।
kathaṁ sṛjati durvāraduḥkha prāgbhāradāruṇam?

ततः … Cf. ibid*:

nānātma-gata-śubhāśubha-karma-kalāpāpekṣaḥ sraṣṭā prajāpatiriti cet karmāṇyeva hi tarhi sṛjantu jaganti, kiṁ prajāpatinā ? athācetanānāṁ cetanānadhiṣṭhitānāṁ sraṣṭṛtvamaghaṭamānamiti teṣāmadhiṣṭhātā cetanaḥ kalpyata iti cen na; tad-āśrayāṇām ātmanām eva cetanatvāt ta evādhiṣṭhātāro bhaviṣyanti; kimadhiṣṭhātrantareṇeśvareṇa kāryam ?

हेतुभिः — कर्म-स्वभावादिभिः।

अनुकम्पाप्रयुक्तेन सृज्यमानाश्च जन्तवः
सुखिनः किन्न सृज्यन्ते तत्कर्मापेक्षया यदि ॥
ततः स्वतन्त्रताहानिः किञ्च तैरेव हेतुभिर्
उपपन्नेऽपि वैचित्र्ये किन्तत्कल्पनयाऽनया ॥

अतो नास्ति तादृशः पुरुषः
यस् समस्त-जगन्-निर्माण-क्षमः
साक्षात्-कृत-धर्माधर्मो वेदान् आरचयति ।

Therefore, there cannot be such a person
who is capable of creating the universe,
of perceiving immediately dharma and adharma,
and of composing the Vedas.

अतो नास्ति तादृशः पुरुषः यस्समस्तजगन्निर्माणक्षमः साक्षात्कृतधर्माधर्मो वेदानारचयति ।

अपि च यदि वेदाः केनचिद् असृज्यन्त
ततस् तेनामी विरचिता इति
तत्-कर्ता स्मर्येत ।

31. Moreover, if the Vedas were created by someone,
this creator would be remembered:
‘He is the one who has composed them.”

अपि च यदि वेदाः केनचिदसृज्यन्त ततस्तेनामी विरचिता इति तत्कर्ता स्मर्येत ।

न च जीर्णकूपादाव् इवास्मरणं युक्तम्,
युज्यते हि तत्र +++(कूपादि-)+++प्रयोजनाभावात् कर्त्तुरस्मरणम्,

It is not proper to assume
that he has been forgotten,
just as the digger of an exhausted well is forgotten.
The latter is justifiable
because the well no longer serves a purpose.

Cf. Śābarabhāṣya under I. i-5; P.12:

na ca himavadādiṣu kūpārāmādivat asmaraṇaṁ bhavitumarhati..

न च जीर्णकूपादाविवास्मरणं युक्तम्,
युज्यते हि तत्र प्रयोजनाभावात् कर्त्तुरस्मरणम्,

वेदे त्व्
अनेक-द्रव्य-त्यागात्मक–बहुतरायास-साध्यानि कर्माणि
प्रत्ययिततर-निर्मातृ-स्मरणम् अन्तरेण के वा श्रद्दधीरन्,

But in the case of the Vedas, who,
without remembering that the author was reliable,
would give credence to all the Vedic rites
which are to be performed at the expense of great trouble
involving the loss of various properties?

वेदे त्वनेकद्रव्यत्यागात्मकबहुतरायाससाध्यानि कर्माणि प्रत्ययिततरनिर्मातृस्मरणमन्तरेण के वा श्रद्दधीरन्,

तथा हि नित्या वेदाः
अ-स्मर्यमाण-स्मरणार्ह-कर्तृकत्वात्।
ये यथोक्त+++(←ईश्वर-कर्तृत्व)+++-साध्या न भवन्ति,
ते यथोक्त+++(←स्मृत-कर्तृकत्व)+++-साधना अपि न भवन्ति
यथा भारतादयः।
अमी +++(भारतादयः)+++ तु यथोक्त+++(←स्मृत-कर्तृ)+++-साधना इति यथोक्त+++(←ईश्वरेतर-कर्तृक)+++-साध्या एव,

Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas
that they have been composed by a person,
because this person, however worthy of remembrance, is not remembered,
they can no more prove that God was their author
than the Mahabharata and similar books can.

तथा हि नित्या वेदाः अस्मर्यमाणस्मरणार्हकर्तृकत्वाद् ये यथोक्तसाध्या न भवन्ति ते यथोक्तसाधना अपि न भवन्ति यथा भारतादयः, अमी तु यथोक्तसाधना इति यथोक्तसाध्या एव,

तस्माद् अ-पौरुषेया वेदा इति ।

Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person.

तस्मादपौरुषेया वेदा इति ।

स्व-सिद्धान्ताभिनिवेश-व्यामुग्ध-बुद्धिभिर् अभिहितम् इदम् -
यद्-अनुभव-निबन्धनं वेद-प्रामाण्यं
तद्-अनुभव-निबन्धनं पञ्च-रात्र-प्रामाण्यमिति ।

In consequence, the contention that the validity of Pañcaratra is based upon the same immediate cognition
which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself
is the contention of those whose discrimination
has been warped by their bias in favour of their own conclusions.

स्वसिद्धान्ताभिनिवेशव्यामुग्धबुद्धिभिरभिहितमिदम् - यदनुभवनिबन्धनं वेदप्रामाण्यं तदनुभवनिबन्धनं पञ्चरात्रप्रामाण्यमिति ।

ननु च किम् इदम् अपौरुषेयत्वं वेदानाम्?
यदि नित्य-वर्णारब्धत्वं, समानम् इदं पञ्च-रात्र-तन्त्राणाम् ।

32. OBJECTION. But in what does this ‘preterpersonal’ character of the Veda consist?
If it consists in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words,
the same holds true of the Pañicarātra Tantra.

It is the contention of Mimamsa that words and their capacity of conveying meaning are eternal.

The Naiyāyika tries to examine the revealed character (apauruṣeyatva) of the Vedas, which the Mīmāṁsaka so zealously champions.

ननु च किमिदमपौरुषेयत्वं वेदानाम्, यदि नित्यवर्णारब्धत्वं समानमिदं पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणाम् ।

अथ पदानां नित्यता, सापि समानैव।

Or if it is the eternity of the words that constitute it,
again the same is true.

अथ पदानां नित्यता, सापि समानैव।

न चानुपूर्वी-नित्यता, न हि नित्यानाम् आनुपूर्वी-स्वभाव उपपद्यते।

It could not be the eternity of the word-sequence,
for sequence cannot be natural to eternal entities.

Sequence, of course, supposes priority and posteriority of the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal.

न चानुपूर्वीनित्यता, न हि नित्यानामानुपूर्वीस्वभाव उपपद्यते।

“उच्चारणानुपूर्व्याद् आनुपूर्वी वर्णानाम्” इति चेत्
सा तर्हि तद्+++(=आनुपूर्व्य्)+++-अनित्यत्वाद् एव अनित्येति
कः खलु विशेषः पञ्चरात्रश्रुत्योः ।

If it is said that it is the sequence of the sounds
in so far as these sounds are pronounced in one particular sequence,
then we reply that since a sequence of pronunciation is non-eternal,
the sequence of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal.
So where does the difference lie between Pañçaratra and Vedic revelation?

उच्चारणानुपूर्व्यादानुपूर्वी वर्णानामिति चेत् सा तर्हि तदनित्यत्वादेव अनित्येति कः खलु विशेषः पञ्चरात्रश्रुत्योः ।

अयमेव विशेषो यद्
एकत्र स्व-तन्त्र एव पुरुषस् तां ताम् आनुपूर्वीं रचयति
इतरत्र पर-तन्त्रो नियमेन पूर्वाध्येतृ-सिद्धाम् एव विवक्षति,+++(4)+++

[[28]]
REPLY.
The difference lies herein that in the case of the Pañcaratra the sequence is created by an independent person,
whereas in the case of the Veda,
a dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact sequence
which had been laid down before him by students who preceded him.

This is how the Mīmāṁsaka vindicates his contention.

अयमेव विशेषो यदेकत्र स्वतन्त्र एव पुरुषस्तां तामानुपूर्वीं रचयति इतरत्र परतन्त्रो नियमेन पूर्वाध्येतृसिद्धामेव विवक्षति,

+++(अध्ययन-परम्परा-)+++क्रमावान्तर-जातिश् च प्रत्यभिज्ञा-बल-प्रतिष्ठिता नापलापम् अर्हतीत्य् अलं प्रविस्तरेण ।

A category of a different degree
which is established on the strength of recognition
should not be denied.
And with this we conclude our lengthy disquisition.

kramāvāntarajati; the difference resides in the createdness of the Pancarātra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, which introduces a difference of degree between the word sequences of both corpora of verbal statements.

‘अवान्तरजातिर्’ इत्य् अस्य वैलक्षण्यम् इत्य् अर्थः। क्रम-नियमानियमाभ्याम् एव वेद-पञ्च-रात्रयोर् वैलक्षण्यं सुस्पष्टम् इत्य् आशयः।

क्रमावान्तरजातिश्च प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलप्रतिष्ठिता नापलापमर्हतीत्यलं प्रविस्तरेण ।

सिद्धम् इदं न विलक्षण-पुरुषानुभव-निबन्धन-प्रामाण्य-वर्णनं साधीय इति ।

33. The preceding has proved
that the proposition that the Pañcaratra is authoritative
because it is based upon an immediate cognition of a person
categorically different from other persons,
is not viable at all.

सिद्धमिदं न विलक्षणपुरुषानुभवनिबन्धनप्रामाण्यवर्णनं साधीय इति ।

यतो न साक्षात्-कृत-पुण्य-पापः
पुमान् प्रमाण-प्रतिपन्न-सत्त्वः ।
अतो जगन्-मोहयितुं प्रणीतं
नरेण केनापि हि तन्त्रम् एतत् ॥

Since there is no means of knowledge
by which the existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of good and evil can be proved,
it follows that this Tantra must have been promulgated
by some human being with the purpose of deceiving the world.

यतो न साक्षात्कृतपुण्यपापः पुमान् प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नसत्त्वः ।
अतो जगन्मोहयितुं प्रणीतं नरेण केनापि हि तन्त्रमेतत् ॥