रामानुजीये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

[[P16]] Yāmunācārya (known in Tamil as Āḷavandār) occupies a unique place among the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers. He was Rāmānujācārya’s grand teacher and Rāmānuja and later writers owe a deep debt of gratitude to Yāmuna and his works. When the Advaita Philosophy was widely popular and the śāstraic teachings of Nāthamuni, Yāmuna’s grandfather and the first in the list of Ācāryas were just nascent, Yāmuna had to play a vital role in promoting the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion and philosophy. He succeeded in this task remarkably well through his works. ¹ The completion of this task of promoting the Viśiṣṭādvaita was left to Rāmānuja. Thus it was Yāmuna that paved the way, so to say, for the great Rāmānuja.

Āgamaprāmāṇya of Yāmuna which we have taken up for a critical edition and study, tries to establish the authority of the Pāñcarātrāgamas, which form an integral part of the Viśiṣṭādvaita religion and philosophy. The Viśiṣṭādvaita school has three aspects : the Sanskrit scriptures owing to Vedic authority, the Sanskrit Āgamas and the Psalms of the Āḷvārs in Tamil. We are not concerned here with the first and last of these above three aspects of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Of the second, viz., the Sanskrit Āgamas, there are two schools : the Vaikhānasa and the Pāñcarātra. Of these two branches of the Śrīvaiṣṇava-āgamas, we are concerned here only with the Pāñcarātra.

Some of the leading exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of thought have written upon both these aspects : the śāstra deriving the Vedic authority and the Pāñcarātrāgamas. Among the pre-Rāmānuja writers of this school whose works we have, Yāmuna is the most important. His contributions cover both the Vedic and the Āgamic aspects. His Gītārthasaṅgraha is on one of the texts of the Prasthānatraya. His Siddhitraya is an independent text linked to the Prasthānatraya. On the Āgamic side, he wrote the Āgamaprāmāṇya taken by us for the present study. The Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya, which is referred to in the Āgamaprāmāṇya, [^16_2] appears to be his own work. ²

YĀMUNA’S PREDECESSORS The exact state of the pre-Yāmuna Viśiṣṭādvaita is not known because of the fact that though there were the works of Nāthamuni, Yāmuna’s grandfather by Yāmuna’s time, they have not come down to posterity.

[[P17]] 2 In the list of teachers recited by Śrīvaiṣṇavas, barring the Divine Teachers, we have the following mentioned in the pre-Yāmuna age : Śaṭhakopa (known in Tamil as Nammāḷvār), Nāthamuni, Puṇḍarīkākṣa (Uyyakkoṇḍār) and Śrīrāmamīśra (Maṇakkalnambī). Of these, Śaṭhakopa is the celebrated Tamil Saint. Thus it is Nāthamuni that forms the first Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher of the South, who wrote works in Sanskrit.

Nāthamuni, perhaps otherwise called Śrīraṅganāthamuni and Śrīnātha, ³ was a native of Vīranārāyaṇapura, a village in the South Arcot District, not far from Chidambaram. This village is now known as Kaṭṭumannārkoil or Kaṭṭumannārguḍī. He lived in the later quarter of the 9th and the major part of the 10th cent. A.D. He had a son called Īśvara and a daughter too. [^17_2] He was a great scholar, philosopher, musician ⁴ and yogin ⁵ all in one.

He wrote Yogarahasya, a treatise on Yoga, and Nyāyatattva, a treatise on the Nyāya philosophy. ⁶ None of these works is available now, though many passages from the second are quoted by Veṅkaṭanātha, the famous later-day Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher. ⁷

An additional significance of the position of Nāthamuni is the fact that he was the grandfather of Yāmuna, whose work we are studying. Yāmuna makes several references to him and his distinguished disciples in his own works. [^17_7]

Nāthamuni was followed by Puṇḍarīkākṣa and he, by Śrīrāmamīśra. It is not known whether these teachers wrote any works or not. Vedānta Deśika, in his works [^17_8] refers to Sadārtha-saṅkṣepa and Vivarana of one Śrīrāmamīśra,

[[P18]] 3 but this author should not be mistaken to Yāmuna’s teacher, as he has said to have commented upon Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasaṅgraha, ⁸ which proves his later date.

YĀMUNA, OUR AUTHOR Yāmuna succeeded Śrīrāmamīśra. He too was a native of Vīranārāyaṇa- pura like his grandfather. Hagiological works like the Prapannāmṛta and the Divyasūricarita, with slight differences in detail, bear testimony to the prodigious learning of Yāmuna even as a boy. They also mention that he came into contact with the Cola King of his times. His Tamil name “Āḷavandār” ⁹ is said to refer to his having had some administrative office. His final spiritual transition is said to have been effected by his previous teacher Śrīrāmamīśra, [^18_3] who it is said, took him to Śrīraṅgam, where Lord Raṅganātha is the deity. No specific autobiographical or historical references could be gathered from Yāmuna’s writings except the few facts relating to his own ancestry. The tradi- tional accounts also speak of two or four sons of Yāmuna. He was born in 918 A.D. and breathed his last in 1038 A.D. [^18_4]

HIS WORKS

Yāmuna wrote Gītārthasaṅgraha, Siddhitraya (comprising Ātma, Īśvara and Saṃvit), Āgamaprāmāṇya, Stotraratna (popularly termed Āḷavandār-stotram), Sristuti (called Catuśślokī), Puruṣanirṇaya (called also Mahāpuruṣanirṇaya) and Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya. Of these, only the first, fourth and the fifth have got old extant commentaries in Sanskrit and Yāmuna’s by Veṅkaṭanātha and Periya- vāccān Pillai respectively. The second work, viz., the Siddhitraya is incomplete in all the three parts. The last two works mentioned above, namely the Puruṣanirṇaya and Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya are not available and Yāmuna refers to them in his Āgamaprāmāṇya. [^18_5]

The Gītārthasaṅgraha is an independent exposition of the traditional interpretation of the Gītā according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school. Bhakti has been mentioned in this work as an indispensable means of mukti and the Jñāna- yoga of the Gītā has been interpreted as the Bhakti-yoga.

The Siddhitraya again is an independent work. The nature of the Individual Self (ātman), the Supreme Being (Īśvara) and Knowledge (saṃvit) are explained here after the refutation of various rival theories.

[[P19]] 4 The Stotraratna is in praise of the Lord, where the agony of the Individual Self trying to reach the divine plane of existence is very well brought out. We find Yāmuna here at his best as a poet. The main concern of this hymn is prapattti, the Doctrine of Surrender, which is one of the cardinal features of this school. This Stotra also brings out other philosophical issues like the Supreme Being, His nature and abode. Tradition records that Rāmānuja got attracted to Yāmuna after listening to this stotra, particularly the verse “svabhāvika….” ¹⁰

The Śrīstuti is a very short work comprising only four ślokas, from which it derives its another but popular name Catuśślokī. Though short, this work has got its own importance, because the author here discusses the independent and strategic position of Lakṣmī, the Consort of the Lord and the Mediator between Him and His devotee. The commentaries on this work by Veṅkaṭanātha and Periyavāccan Piḷḷai are very useful in understanding the significance of Lakṣmī according to this school of thought.

The Puruṣanirṇaya, referred to in the Āgamaprāmāṇya [^19_2] is, we are told, devoted to establishing the Supremacy of Lord Vāsudeva over other deities, on scriptural authority. We have to content ourselves with the relevant portions of the Stotraratna and the Āgamaprāmāṇya where Yāmuna deals with the ques- tion of the supremacy of Viṣṇu.

The Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya, [^19_3] which is also referred to in the Āgama- prāmāṇya, is devoted to establishing the revealed character (apauruṣeyatva) of the Ekāyana-śākhā, which the Pāñcarātrāgamas claim to be their source and which is one of the redactions of the White (Śukla) Yajurveda. This work, like the previous one, exists only in name.

ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYA The Āgamaprāmāṇya is devoted to prove the Vedic character of the Pāñcarātra-texts. In this work, Yāmuna controverts the contentions of his

[[P20]] 5 critics and declares that these Āgamas are as authoritative as the Vedas them- selves, the chief among these critics being the Mīmāṃsaka. ¹¹ It is the Mīmāṃsaka that for the first time questioned the Vedic character of the Pāñcarātrāgamas as well as the followers of these Āgamas. [^20_2] The next critic that is introduced by Yāmuna is the Naiyāyika, with `whom Yāmuna has much in common on matters like the creation of the universe, the existence of a Supreme Being, the Divine authorship of these Āgamas and the agency of the Supreme Being regarding the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe. The instance where Yāmuna is at variance with the Naiyāyika regarding the author- ship of the Vedas. In this regard, Yāmuna argues that the Mīmāṃsaka who holds that the Vedas are revealed (apauruṣeya) and that they are not the work of anybody. The Prabhākaraś’ view of “apūrva” is also refuted by Yāmuna here. While establishing the validity of the Pāñcarātra, Yāmuna has also condemned the Śaivāgamas as being non-Vedic in their treatment of religious conduct, liberation, etc. [^20_3] The Advaitin’s explanation of the four sūtras com- prising the utpattya-sambhava or Pāñcarātra-adhikaraṇa [^20_4] is also refuted here. Yāmuna then refers to the view of “bhāṣyakāra” [^20_5] regarding the validity of these Āgamas. There has been a good deal of speculation among some Vaiṣṇava scholars, as to whom Yāmuna actually refers here by the term “bhāṣyakāra”. Some have taken it to mean “Dramiḍabhāṣyakāra”, who is traditionally said to have commented upon the Brahmasūtra. But this commentary exists only in name. As such, there is nothing wrong in taking this term as referring to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya himself, since this is in keeping with his commentary on the above section, where he does not approve of the validity of that portion of the Pāñcarātra which is found to militate against Vedic doctrines. [^20_6] It may be noted that Śrī Ānanda-tīrtha, popularly known as Madhvācārya, the systematizer of the Dvaita school of philosophy, accepts the validity of these Āgamas in toto [^20_7].

It can be seen that Āgamaprāmāṇya is the only early work that is devoted to the question of the validity of the Pāñcarātra-āgamas.

“āgamādī-nyatantrāntara-siddhānta-bheda-bhinnasya śrīpāñcarātrāgamasya kvacid-api > vedavirodhadībhāvāt kārtṣṇyena prāmāṇyam. . . .”

[[P21]] 6 present attempt is to give a critical edition of this text and make a study of it. This text, of course, has already appeared in print four times but those editions are not satisfactory from the critical point of view.

THE PĀÑCARĀTRĀGAMAS

The Āgama literature of the Pāñcarātra branch of the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion is a vast one. The difference between this and the other branch of these āgamas, viz., the Vaikhānasa, lies only in the details of ritualistic worship in temples. The votaries of these two schools seem to have had some mutual ill-will and hostility which are reflected in some Vaikhānasa and Pāñcarātra works accord- ingly. ¹² Veṅkaṭanātha in his Pāñcarātrarakṣā tried to reconcile these two differing schools and declared that in essence, both these āgamic ways of worship are equally authoritative. [^21_2]

The number of these Pāñcarātrāgamas (called also Saṃhitās and Tantras) is traditionally given as 108. Dr. F. O. Schrader in his masterly work Introduc- tion to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, mentions as many as 210 Saṃhitās and remarks that the original extent of these works must have been one and a half crore of ślokas. [^21_3]

It may be noted that the three main āgamic schools, viz., the Śaiva, Śākta and Vaiṣṇava, have many common features, such as (a) the existence of a Supreme Being with a predominant male or female aspect, (b) the existence of individual souls, (c) the reality of the objective universe and (d) efficacy of unflinching devotion to the Deity in effecting salvation, expressed in the worship of the idols of the Deity. ¹³ “The Vedas and the Āgamas are two different streams of thought running in two parallel channels acting and reacting upon each other so as to ultimately blend together indistinguishably. This is the reason why later thinkers came to hold that the Āgamas and the Vedas are one and the same, being taught or delivered by the same God. . . .". ¹⁴ The votaries of the Śaivāgamas hold that the Vedas and Upaniṣads are of a much general

“tvarṇa pāñcarātrika-nayena pṛthagvidhena > vaikhānasena ca pathi niyatādhikāraḥ > saṃjhāviśeṣaniyamena samarcayantaḥ” etc. [^21_3]: See p. 14.

[[P22]] 7 character whereas the Āgamas are general on matters of worship. ¹⁵ Again, all these Āgamas in general, comprise four sections or topics: Jñāna (Knowledge), Kriyā (Service—construction of temples, consecration etc.), Caryā (Conduct—the observance of daily rites, festivals, etc.) and Yoga (Devotion or Concentration). [^22_2] We find that in the Pāñcarātra texts, only the second and the third topics are treated with more attention than the other two.

EXPLANATION OF THE TERM ‘PĀÑCARĀTRA’

It is worth noting, in passing, that for the term Pāñcarātra, a number of explanations have been offered by various Saṃhitās. We are not, at present, concerned with all these different definitions. This much is certain, however, that the original significance and connotation of the term Pāñcarātra came to be lost in the course of many centuries, which left room for a variety of explana- tions. The most authoritative and perhaps the genuine definition, according to Dr. Schrader is the one given by the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, one of the oldest Pāñcarātra works. [^22_3] This indicates that this system has developed the name Pāñcarātra since it deals with the five-fold manifestation of the Lord Vāsudeva, prana, vyūha, vibhava, arcā and antaryāmin.

VEDIC CHARACTER OF PĀÑCARĀTRA

These āgamas were subjected to doubts regarding their Vedic character from the 7th cent. A.D. or even earlier, while the other group of āgamas, viz., the Vaikhānasa, which is followed by the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion, had been fully established among the people in the course of many centuries.

पञ्चरात्रं च वैखानसं उभयं मतं
यद् वा वैखानस-शास्त्रेषु यद् उक्तं वेदान्त-गम्यम् ।
एते [[तद्-विद्य्|तद्विद्य]] अनुक्ताः पञ्चरात्रं च उक्ताः शास्त्र-भेदतः ।
प्रवर्तन्ते इति वेद-गम्यम् ॥

“pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantraṃ mokṣalakṣaṇam” > pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantraṃ mokṣalakṣaṇam" > pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantraṃ mokṣalakṣaṇam" > pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantraṃ mokṣalakṣaṇam" > pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantraṃ mokṣalakṣaṇam" See further, Dr. J. A. B. van Buitenen, “The Pāñcarātra”, History of Religions, pp. 71-79 (1962); Dr. V. Raghavan, “The Name Pāñcarātra…”, JAOS, vol. 85, pp. 71-79 (1965) and Dr. H. Daniel Smith, “A Typological Survey of Definition: The Name ‘Pāñcarātra’”, JOR, vol. XXXIV, pp. 102-117 (1973).

[[P23]] 8 the Vaikhānasa enjoyed wide popularity and unquestioned authority. The reason behind this is that the Vaikhānasa scriptures had, as their basis, the sūtras of Vikhānas, who is an undoubtedly Vedic Sage. These aphorisms were well expounded by his disciples Atri, Marīci, Kāśyapa and Bhṛgu in their respec- tive Saṃhitās. In the case of the Pāñcarātra, though there are Vedic elements, in addition to them, there are other elements too, which, for a superficial observer appear non-Vedic. All such views are stated and refuted as the pūrva-pakṣa- arguments in this work Āgamaprāmāṇya. The position is that all these Pāñcarātrāgamas lay claim to authority on the ground that they are the direct utterances of Vāsudeva, the Supreme Deity, and also that they are based upon the Ekāyana-śākhā, which forms one of the redactions of the White Yajurveda. This Ekāyana-śākhā, which is generally described sometimes as the Crown and sometimes as the Root of the Vedas, is mentioned in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. ¹⁶ An early Kāśmīrian author Utpala, reverentially quotes several passages from the Ekāyana-śruti, Ekāyana Upaniṣad and many Pāñcarātrāgamas, in his Spanda- pradīpikā. [^23_2] This definitely points to the existence of an Ekāyana Veda, which is of course almost lost now, and which is claimed by the Pāñcarātrāgamas as their source.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYA WAS WRITTEN

We have already noticed above that while the Vaikhānasa gained the confidence of the people, it was only the Pāñcarātra that came to be doubted of its Vedic nature due to a few apparently non-Vedic elements, as for example, the enjoining of a special Initiation (dīkṣā) on a man already initiated by the Upanayana, so as to qualify him to do worship in Viṣṇu temples. Orthodox Vedic followers began to entertain doubts about the Vedic character of the Pāñcarātra and its followers. The inclusion of the Pāñcarātra among the non-Vedic schools by the great Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (about 800 A.D.) in his Tantravārtika, [^23_3] put this school under severe test and shook the confidence of the people deeply. The interpretation of the four aphorisms comprising the Pāñcarātra-section of the Brahmasūtra ¹⁷ by the celebrated Advaita teacher Śaṅkarācārya exposed the philosophical side of these āgamas to still grave doubts. This situation demanded a scholastic approach to the problem of the authority of these texts and consequently, of their followers, called the Bhāgavatas or

“pañcarātraśrutāvapi . . . .yad-vat sopānena prāsādam-aruhet . . .” etc., and > “pañcarātropaniṣadi ca . . . .jñapti ca jñeyam ca . . .” etc. [^23_3]: pp. 114-115.

[[P24]] 9 Ekāyanins. Yāmuna undertook the task of upholding the case of these Āgamas and their adherents as being Vedic in theory as well as practice, which resulted in the composition of the Āgamaprāmāṇya. ¹⁸

NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ’S STAND ON THE VALIDITY OF PĀÑCARĀTRA

It may be interesting to note that Jayantabhaṭṭa of Kāśmīr (about 900 A.D.), a noted Naiyāyika, himself a Śaivite by faith, perhaps for the first time in the annals of Sanskrit literary activity tried to uphold in his Nyāyamañjarī [^24_2] the authoritative character of all āgamas irrespective of their sectarian leanings, provided they are based on the Vedas.

He had clearly stated there that Pāñcarātra is as valid as the Śaivāgamas and there is nothing indicative of its non-authoritative character. ¹⁹ The Buddhist and other non-Vedic schools of thought which have objectionable and extreme practices, are non-authoritative. It may be of additional interest to note a more dedicated attitude of Jayantabhaṭṭa to this question of the validity of Āgamas in his little-known dramatic work Āgamadambara, [^24_4] in which he quotes profusely from his Nyāyamañjarī. It is in these circumstances that the need was felt to devote special attention to the question of the Pāñcarātra scriptures with regard to their validity. As already mentioned, Yāmuna meets the challenge posed by other schools in his Āgamaprāmāṇya, where he examines the entire issue of these āgamas regarding their validity and places them on a firm footing as texts of equal status with the Vedas.

RĀMĀNUJA ON THE VALIDITY OF THESE ĀGAMAS The stand of Rāmānuja on the validity of the Pāñcarātra scriptures is similar to that of Yāmuna. His interpretation of the Utpattyasambhavā or the Pāñcarātra-adhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtra (II.ii.39-42) does not differ in essence from that of Yāmuna, offered in the Āgamaprāmāṇya. ²⁰ Rāmānuja accepts the validity of these āgamas in toto, as texts of equal status with the Vedas, and quotes passages from the Pauṣkara, the Sāttvata and the Paramasaṃ- hitās. Following are some of the important points elucidated by Rāmānuja :

“The very need for defence (of the Pañcanitra by the Vaiṣṇava philosophers) seems to > show that it took some time for the system to be accepted as Vedic.” [^24_2]: Madras, IV, p. 261 ff.

“pāñcarātre ‘pi tenaiva prāmāṇyam-upavarṇitaṃ > aprāmāṇyanimitto hi nāsti tatrapi kiñcana”. [^24_4]: A critical edition of this work is under preparation by Dr. V. Raghavan.

[[P25]] 10 direct utterances of Lord Vāsudeva and that there is nothing non-Vedic in them. ²¹ So, naturally the Mīmāṃsaka (Bhaṭṭa), who upholds the sole authority of the Vedas and who denies the existence of a Supreme Being, becomes the first adversary whom Yāmuna has to tackle first.

THE BHAṬṬA-MĪMĀṂSAKA’S CRITICISM

The Mīmāṃsaka, first of all, examines the sources of these Pāñca- rātrāgamas.

The Pāñcarātrāgamas, like the āgamas of any other school, speak of a certain thing as the summum bonum of life and they prescribe a number of rites like Dīkṣā (Initiation) and Arādhana (worship) of the Lord as a means thereof. The cause and effect relationship between those rites and the resulting heaven, etc. according to the Mīmāṃsaka, cannot be verified by any means of knowledge.

Ocular perception (pratyakṣa), however powerful it might be, has to obey its own natural laws and so it cannot reveal the desired causal connection that subsists between the rites and heaven. Here the Mīmāṃsaka attacks the theory of Supremacy of some person advanced by others in support of the above argument. According to the Mīmāṃsaka there does not exist any person posses- sing unlimited power, knowledge, etc., presiding over this entire universe. Even if such a wide perception is accepted, he states that it cannot be proved that that particular alone realised the desired causal connection between Initiation and heaven.

Inference (anumāna) likewise, is stated to be incapable of establishing the invariable relationship between the means and the end because, the knowledge of invariable concomittance which is the source of anumāna, is absent here. Nobody can know the invariable relationship that exists between Initiation and heaven, where heaven happens to lie beyond the scope of human perception.

The Mīmāṃsaka then observes that there is no Vedic statement (āgama) at all, in favour of these āgamas. Such a Vedic text cannot even be inferred.

Nor are there any Religious Texts (āgamas) which preserve injunctions stating that Initiation is instrumental to heaven. Āgamas are of two types: those connected with human beings as their works and those for which there is no author at all. Of these, the first type of āgamas is not authoritative since it is, after all, the composition of human beings, who are subject to passions like love and hatred and are therefore, prone to err. As for the second type, there

“āgamādī-nyatantrāntara-siddhānta-bheda-bhinnasya śrīpāñcarātrāgamasya kvacid-api > vedavirodhadībhāvāt kārtṣṇyena prāmāṇyam. . . .”

[[P26]] 11 is no revealed text that is in favour of the desired causal connection. Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka states that there is no text which can reveal the sādhya-sādhana relation between the rites these āgamas ordain, and the fruits that are said to accompany the performance of those rites.

Comparison (upamāna), the next means of knowledge too, cannot reveal this relationship. Comparison takes place between two objects well-known. Since the original Vedic text is itself not known here, comparing another statement with it is highly impossible.

The next pramāṇa examined by the Mīmāṃsaka is Assumption (arthāpatti). This is also found to be not helpful in establishing the desired relationship. ‘Incompatibility of statement’, ²² which forms the source of this pramāṇa is absent in the present case. Again, these āgamas cannot stand comparison with Manusmṛti and such other works, in whose case arthāpatti-pramāṇa is applied. Moreover, the aphorism “api vā kartṛ-sāmānyāt….” ²² of Jaimini, which the Pāñcarātrins try to press into service to uphold the validity of their āgamas, sanctions authority only to smṛti works like those of Manu and others, but not to works like the Pāñcarātrāgamas. Smṛtis obtain validity only when the rites enjoined by them are performed by those, who also perform the other duties laid down in the Vedas. The ‘aṣṭakā’ sacrifice ordained by the Smṛtis for instance, is performed by those who perform the other Vedic rites also, as for instance, the sandhyāvandana. But the rites ordained by the Pāñcarātra works are not at all performed by those who carry out the Vedic rites. At the same time, those who follow these Tantric practices are severely condemned by the Vedic people and hence it is beyond all doubt that these āgamas are non-Vedic.

The Mīmāṃsaka then states that the followers of these āgamas who are called Bhāgavatas ²³ are not brāhmaṇas at all. They no doubt, maintain knots of hair and other brāhmaṇical marks but this is no indication of their true caste. [^26_3] Such marks are exhibited even by the śūdras who try to delude people about their true nature.

“The followers of the Pañcaratra were apparently not allowed originally to adopt the Vedic > forms of worship. . . ." [^26_3]: Vide, Dr. Ganganatha Jha, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, p. 101 : “Kumārila > and Prābhākara alike, do not admit of such ‘jātis’ as ‘brāhmaṇatva’, ‘kṣatriyatva’ and > the like, all of which cannot be perceived by the senses. What is meant by calling a man > ‘Brāhmaṇa’ is not that he belongs to any such ‘jāti’ but only that he descended from a > particular line of ancestors. The purity of descent has to be accepted until there is suffi- > cient proof to the contrary." > Cf. Ślokavārtika. vanavāda, V-29: “brāhmaṇatvādi yonitaḥ". and Tantravārtika under > I. ii. 2.

[[P27]] 12 their authors, being human the possibility of error is not ruled out. ²⁴ The “taduparyapi” section of the Śrībhāṣya, [^27_2] according to Vedānta Deśika, indicates that these āgamas might have had as their basis, a Vedic branch which lies scattered and is thus not available. ²⁵ Since Vyāsa and others are known to have had restored some of the Vedic branches that had long ago become extinct, it is also reasonable to suppose that these āgamas had, as their source, some Vedic recension which has now become extinct. [^27_4] Such a supposition is warranted by the statements of Marīci, Āpastamba and others. Even if there be some contradiction between the Pāñcarātra and the Vedas, it is to be understood as based on different contexts such as time, place and the qualified aspirant. Therefore in such cases, the validity of these āgamas would only be of an alternative character (vikalpa). ²⁶ In fine, Deśika states that the Pāñcarātra texts are based on the ekāyana-śruti and corroborates his statement by quoting from many authorities, including some Pāñcarātra works.

THE POSITION OF PĀÑCARĀTRARAKṢĀ

The Pāñcarātrarakṣā of Deśika is a work in three sections, devoted mainly to an explanation and commendation of the five-fold observance of a day of a Vaiṣṇava, namely, “abhigamana” (approaching the Lord, comprising morn- ing prayers, ablation, etc.), “upādāna” (fetching of flowers, etc., for worship), “ijyā” (worship), “svādhyāya” (study of the sacred lore) and “yoga” (meditation). ²⁷

The first section deals with the fourfold division of the Pāñcarātra-mode of worship, technically called the Siddhānta, into Mantra, Āgama, Tantra and Tantrāntara, and their explanation. It is said that all these modes of worship lead to emancipation. [^27_7] On the authority of many Saṃhitās Deśika states that those initiated under the higher orders of the Siddhānta are also eligible to worship according to the lower order of the Siddhānta. Inter-mixture of one Siddhānta-worship with another is prohibited especially regarding the Ekāyana or the Pāñcarātra way of worship. The Pāñcarātra-worship can be followed

“vidhīyamāna-śrama-veṅkateśena. . . .vibhreyam pañcakālasya rakṣā”. [^27_7]: Ibid., p. 110: > “namaste pañcakālajña pañcakālaparāyaṇā. > pañcakālaika-manonmanaṃ tvameva gatirvṛyā”.

[[P28]] 13 by all, irrespective of sex, caste and other considerations. One may question the necessity of the Pāñcarātra-texts themselves, while there are already autho- ritative Vaikhānasa treatises on worship. Deśika replies that those manuals cover only that particular Vedic branch which is followed by the Vaikhānasa and that their scope is thus limited. It is to fill in the gap and to suit the require- ments of the followers of another Vedic branch that the Pāñcarātra texts came up. Even the Vaikhānasa treatises allow in some cases the Pāñcarātra worship- pattern as an alternative, ²⁸ which only points to the authoritative character of these āgamas. It is declared by Deśika more than once that the Pāñcarātra texts are authoritative in toto in as much as they are the direct utterances of Lord Vāsudeva regarding His own worship, the performance of which would result in mokṣa.

As regards statements which exhibit mutual ill-will and hatred found both in the Vaikhānasa and the Pāñcarātra works, Deśika says that such passages are interpolations effected by overambitious and prejudiced disciples as well as worshippers. Both these ways of worship are commended by no less a person than Vyāsa. These two methods of worship should properly be understood as forming the two phases of one and the same Vaiṣṇava-śāstra. Moreover, accord- ing to the principles of exegesis, condemnation of one āgama-text made by another, should only be viewed as based on the intention of praising one particular āgama, but not on that of refuting the other. [^28_2]

The second and the third sections are devoted to a further elaboration of the above-mentioned Observances, “abhigamana”, “upādāna”, etc. It is said that Rāmānuja and his immediate disciples observed them [^28_3] and that even those who follow the path of Surrender should practise them.

AUTHORITIES QUOTED BY YĀMUNA

In the Āgamaprāmāṇya Yāmuna quotes from a variety of sources, which exhibits his familiarity with texts belonging to various schools of thought. He quotes many Mantras and Brāhmaṇa-passages, as also from the Prasthānatraya, the major portion of quotations being from Upaniṣads like the Chāndogya, the Vedāntavāra, the Maitrāyaṇīya, the Mahānārāyaṇa, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Muṇḍaka. He is conversant with the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini and its allied literature, viz., the Śābarabhāṣya, Kumārila’s Tantravārtika (which he

“na hi nindyaṃ nindituṃ prāvartate; api tu ninditāditara-praiṣamittum”. See Pāñcarātrarakṣā, p. 102. [^28_3]: Vide Pāñcarātrarakṣā, pp. 110, 112.

[[P29]] 14 calls Tantravārtika) and Ślokavārtika and Śālikanātha’s Prākaraṇa-pañcikā. It is probable that Yāmuna derives much information regarding the Prabhākara school from Śālikanātha’s compositions but we cannot be certain unless we have some more works of Prabhākara himself. Our author’s familiarity with the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa is equally evident. ²⁹ Yāmuna cites passages from the Nyāya works also. On the Epic side, he quotes the Rāmāyaṇa only for once, and that too, from the latter half. Quotations from the Mahābhārata are many, the bulk of which are from the Śānti and the Bhīṣma Parvans. Many passages are also culled from Purāṇas like the Viṣṇu, the Matsya, the Skanda, the Liṅga, the Varāha, the Āditya, the Brahma, the Brahmāṇḍa, the Padmodbhava and the Bhaviṣyat. Many Pāñcarātra works are quoted, of which reference is made to the Parama, Īśvara and the Mahāsanatkumāra Saṃhitās by name. The sources of some of the passages are yet to be identified. Yāmuna is found to be equally conversant with Śaiva works like the Pāñcādhyāyī and the Māheśvaratantra from which he quotes passages by name. As regards the Smṛtis he quotes those of Manu, Bodhāyana, Yājñavalkya, Atri, Vasiṣṭha, Uśanas, Devala and Saṅkha and many other passages, the sources of which are yet to be traced out.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYA

The influence of the Āgamaprāmāṇya on later writers is indeed great. The Pāñcarātra section (Brahmasūtra, II. ii. 39-42) of Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya, as already examined by us, very closely follows Yāmuna’s explanation of the four aphorisms comprising that section, found in the present work. [^29_2] Rāmānuja, following Yāmuna, treats the first two aphorisms of that section as putting forth the prima facie view and the next two sūtras as giving the siddhānta. The refutation of the contention that some of the statements found in the Pāñcarātrāgamas betray anti-Vedic character, made by Rāmānuja under “vipratiṣedhācca” (II. ii. 42), proceeds on the lines shown by Yāmuna in his Āgamaprāmāṇya. He is also one with Yāmuna in holding that Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata is identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the

“ā śailād adri-kanyā-carama-kiśalaya-nyāsa-dhanya-upakaṇṭhaṃ > cara-kṣoṇita-sita-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś cetoḥ > cara-kṣoṇita-sita-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś cetoḥ > cara-kṣoṇita-sita-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś cetoḥ > cara-kṣoṇita-sita-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś cetoḥ > cara-kṣoṇita-sita-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś cetoḥ > ca prācyā-pratīcya-kṣiti-dhara-yugāldarka-candrā-vatraṃsaṃ > mīmāṃsā-nyāya-śāstra-yuga-śrama-vimalā-manorī- > mṛgyālānī mādṛśo ’nyāḥ” [^29_2]: Cf. the text, p.117 the passage starting with “evaṃ ca. .na ca. ." etc., and Śrībhāṣya II.ii.40. Cf. again the text, p. 118: “vaśabdāt pakṣo viparivartate" etc. and Śrībhāṣya, II. ii. 41: “vaśabdāt pakṣo viparivartate" etc. Deśika in his Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 168, avers that Rāmānuja followed Yāmuna in interpreting the Pāñcarātra section of the Brahmasūtra: “tad-anusāreṇaiva bhāṣyakāraiḥ tri-pāñcarātrādhikaraṇaṃ vyākhyātum".

[[P30]] 15 Brahmasūtra. ³⁰ Refutation of the Pāśupata system of thought found in the Śrībhāṣya under II. ii. 35: “patyur-asāmāñjasyāt” ³¹ is again based upon Yāmuna’s refutation of that school made in the Āgamaprāmāṇya. ³² Sudarśana-sūri, the commentator on the Śrībhāṣya quotes from the Āgamaprāmāṇya ³³ and references made to this work by Vedānta Deśika are indeed numerous.

The influence of the Āgamaprāmāṇya upon later writers may also be gauged from the fact that there appeared two separate treatises on the problem of the validity of the Pāñcarātra texts, called the Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakoddhāra and the Tantrasuddha by Vādhūla Varadācārya and Bhaṭṭāraka Vedottama respectively. Vādhūla Varada appears to be a disciple of Mahācārya (or Doḍḍayācārya) of 16th cent. A.D., the famous author of the Pañcamatabhañjanam [[Pañcamatabhañjanam|Pañcamatabhañjanam]] or Caturmukhya- nāmāvalī of Vedānta Deśika.

The first work mentioned above, viz., the Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakoddhāra, is an unpublished work in the form of palm-leaf and paper mss. ³³ As its very name indicates, this work was intended by its author to make clear the path of the Pāñcarātra scriptures, wantonly strewn with “thorns” (in the form of criticisms) by the opponents. ³⁴ The author, Vādhūla Varadācārya quotes profusely from the Āgamaprāmāṇya and makes express reference to it. ³⁵

The Tantrasuddha of Bhaṭṭāraka Vedottama [^30_7] is a very short work on the same question and those who compare it with the Āgamaprāmāṇya find it to have been inspired by the latter. Many of the passages found here are either reproductions or adaptations of those of the Āgamaprāmāṇya and are lacking in originality. It is however, surprising to note that the author Vedottama does not acknowledge the Āgamaprāmāṇya on which he bases his work.

Here, the very fact that there appeared separate treatises upholding the validity of the Pāñcarātra, in the track of the Āgamaprāmāṇya is enough to indicate the wide popularity and influence of this work of Yāmuna.

“tripāñcarātrārambha-kaṇṭaka-nīhṛtāḥ paraiḥ > tatra sañcarataḥ puṃsāḥ prītyai tanudharmā-āryam”. [^30_7]: Ibid., p. 71 “anyo. . (u)padravācā āgamaprāmāṇyam nirastāb. .”.

[[P31]] 16

THE STYLE OF THE ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYA

The style of the work is powerful and cryptic. Even prose-passages read like metrical ones and the verses, though dialectic in character, bear clear evidence to the great poetic skill of the author. ³⁶ The fact that the passages are mostly metrical, sometimes leaves the readers in doubt as to whether a passage in question is the author’s own composition or a quotation from some other work. [^31_2] Almost every passage bears ample testimony to the vast erudition of the author and especially to his command over the Nyāya dialectics and the Mīmāṃsā exegesis, so that a general reader will find it very difficult to under- stand many of the arguments, unless he is conversant with the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems. The author sparingly employs certain archaic phrases and terms that are not generally found in the later works. ³⁷ It is hoped that the explanations offered by us in the foot-notes would be of some help in this connection.

The second verse at the beginning of this text, read along with the two concluding ones, ³⁸ clearly brings out the disdain of our author for some of his contemporaries, who, out of jealousy, were not fairly disposed towards his works. In the light of this, the terseness of the text can be well appreciated as having been intended by Yāmuna to silence such intolerant critics.

The following is a brief account of the arguments advanced by the critics of the Pāñcarātra school and their refutation by Yāmuna. Followers of this school claim authority to their Āgamas in toto on the ground that they are the

“ye ‘mi keraṇa-mat-sarvī savayaso durmānasārā narāḥ > gambhīrāṇāṃ guṇa-śālinī-mapi girāṃ nindanti nindantu re > sārasārca-vicāra-kauśalad-aparapare ‘vasthitāḥ > śāntāḥ santy-ana-sūyavo ‘pi bahavaḥ śāntāś ca madgirāṃ" This reminds one, of Bhavabhūti’s famous verse: “ye nāma kecidiha" etc. See ibid., pp. 170-171 : > “tat-kālpa-niyukti-bhiśākalaśaḥ kṛtvā tādīyaṃ matam > yacchati-śiṣyāya udārādī sattvatamata-spardhāvaram-uddhṛtiḥ > yac-cetana-sāratamaṃ mukunda-caraṇa-dvandvā-spada-varaṃ > jīvān-mitha-munibhyo-yogam-ahima-pratyakṣa-tat-tvarāyaḥ” > “ākalpaṃ vilasanta sattvatamata-prasardhi-duṣpaddhati- > vyāmugdhoddhadar-vidagdhaparīya-dvādhyā-vidhvāna-sīnān > trimānan-nira-drava-dīdhiti-yonil-drādhi-tā-viśvā-śvālī > śāntān-santarām-upādāya-paduvihr-dvayād-avadyoktāyāḥ”

[[P32]] 17 direct utterances of Lord Vāsudeva and that there is nothing non-Vedic in them. ³⁹ So, naturally the Mīmāṃsaka (Bhaṭṭa), who upholds the sole authority of the Vedas and who denies the existence of a Supreme Being, becomes the first adversary whom Yāmuna has to tackle first.

THE BHAṬṬA-MĪMĀṂSAKA’S CRITICISM

The Mīmāṃsaka, first of all, examines the sources of these Pāñca- rātrāgamas.

The Mīmāṃsaka then observes that there is no Vedic statement (āgama) at all, in favour of these āgamas. Such a Vedic text cannot even be inferred.

“āgamādī-nyatantrāntara-siddhānta-bheda-bhinnasya śrīpāñcarātrāgamasya kvacid-api > vedavirodhadībhāvāt kārtṣṇyena prāmāṇyam. . . .”

[[P33]] 18 is no revealed text that is in favour of the desired causal connection. Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka states that there is no text which can reveal the sādhya-sādhana relation between the rites these āgamas ordain, and the fruits that are said to accompany the performance of those rites.

The next pramāṇa examined by the Mīmāṃsaka is Assumption (arthāpatti). This is also found to be not helpful in establishing the desired relationship. ‘Incompatibility of statement’, ⁴⁰ which forms the source of this pramāṇa is absent in the present case. Again, these āgamas cannot stand comparison with Manusmṛti and such other works, in whose case arthāpatti-pramāṇa is applied. Moreover, the aphorism “api vā kartṛ-sāmānyāt….” ⁴⁰ of Jaimini, which the Pāñcarātrins try to press into service to uphold the validity of their āgamas, sanctions authority only to smṛti works like those of Manu and others, but not to works like the Pāñcarātrāgamas. Smṛtis obtain validity only when the rites enjoined by them are performed by those, who also perform the other duties laid down in the Vedas. The ‘aṣṭakā’ sacrifice ordained by the Smṛtis for instance, is performed by those who perform the other Vedic rites also, as for instance, the sandhyāvandana. But the rites ordained by the Pāñcarātra works are not at all performed by those who carry out the Vedic rites. At the same time, those who follow these Tantric practices are severely condemned by the Vedic people and hence it is beyond all doubt that these āgamas are non-Vedic.

The Mīmāṃsaka then states that the followers of these āgamas who are called Bhāgavatas ⁴¹ are not brāhmaṇas at all. They no doubt, maintain knots of hair and other brāhmaṇical marks but this is no indication of their true caste. [^33_3] Such marks are exhibited even by the śūdras who try to delude people about their true nature.

“The followers of the Pañcaratra were apparently not allowed originally to adopt the Vedic > forms of worship. . . ." [^33_3]: Vide, Dr. Ganganatha Jha, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, p. 101 : “Kumārila > and Prābhākara alike, do not admit of such ‘jātis’ as ‘brāhmaṇatva’, ‘kṣatriyatva’ and > the like, all of which cannot be perceived by the senses. What is meant by calling a man > ‘Brāhmaṇa’ is not that he belongs to any such ‘jāti’ but only that he descended from a > particular line of ancestors. The purity of descent has to be accepted until there is suffi- > cient proof to the contrary." > Cf. Ślokavārtika. vanavāda, V-29: “brāhmaṇatvādi yonitaḥ". and Tantravārtika under > I. ii. 2.

[[P34]] 19 These bhāgavatas are also called by the name sāttvata. This different terminology, however, cannot be explained as due to some social distinction of these people, on the analogy of the two terms “brāhmaṇa” and “parivrājaka”. These sāttvatas, along with sudhanvā, ācārya and others, are said to belong to a particular community, called the “vaiśya-vrātya” community. ⁴²

It is to this outcast-community that the term sāttvata conventionally refers. Etymology may, however, allow the term “sāttvata” to mean the devotee of the Lord, as opposed to the conventional sense. But the Mīmāṃsaka, citing the instance of the rathakāra-nyāya [^34_2] states that when both the etymological and conventional significances are applicable in one and the same place, it is only the conventional sense that has to be preferred to the etymological. Thus, he states that here too, the term sāttvata should be taken only in its conventional sense, referring to the particular vaiśya-vrātya community mentioned above.

The Mīmāṃsaka then identifies these bhāgavatas with sāttvatas on the similarity of their activities, as for example, worshipping in temples for livelihood, administering Initiation, living by the food offered to the Lord, performing sacraments like “garbhādhāna” — not in the familiar Vedic way, but in an entirely different and peculiar way — and using the nirmālya of the Lord. Again, these bhāgavatas are identified with devalakas, on the analogy of many smṛtis, since these bhāgavatas are found to trade in image-worship, which is spoken of as the means of livelihood for the devalakas. So it is concluded that the Pāñcarātra, which is professed by these bhāgavatas who are clearly outside the pale of the Vedas, cannot lay claims to any authority.

Even on the side of instruction, the dīkṣā (Initiation) that these āgamas enjoin on a man to qualify him to worship the Lord, it is argued, is a clear mark of the non-Vedic character of these texts. Upanayana, the Vedic sacrament, is itself enough to qualify one to do worship of God and no other special sacra- ment is needed for this. But still, these āgamas require dīkṣā and over and above the normal upanayana which is enough to indicate their non-Vedic nature.

Again, these āgamas do not find a place in the well-recognized traditional list of the fourteen branches of knowledge (vidyāsthāna), consisting of the four Vedas, their six accessories, the Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya, the Purāṇa and the Dharma- śāstra. All accepted as authoritative on matters of Dharma by all orthodox people. Since the Pāñcarātra is not included among these sources of knowledge, it must fall outside the pale of the Vedas.

The critic, however, admits that these āgamas enjoin worship of the Lord, which may mistake for indicating their Vedic nature. These and similar other inst-

[[P35]] 20 ances, he warns, should not be taken as indicating the true nature of these āgamas. They are merely hypocritical. This is so because, these texts, at a number of places, also pour down instructions regarding mundane practices like charming persons and exorcising evil spirits. “There is too much of black magic and super- stition” ⁴³ in them. These instructions are calculated only to delude the common people. They are not in keeping with the spirit of a text purporting to be based on the Vedas. Therefore, even a stray case of ordaining worship should rightly be regarded as hypocritical. The correct conclusion is that these āgamas are not Vedic.

- - Vedas, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, are apauruṣeya, without an author. The Naiyāyika however, argues that even the Vedas are the work of Īśvara, the Omniscient Lord, since they consist of sentences (vākyas) which would ultimately point to an author. This author could not be human, since the Vedas deal with supra-mundane results like the heaven, which are outside the ken of human be- ings. The Mīmāṃsaka refutes this argument. According to him this reasoning would ultimately result in the authorship of only a human being possessing a physical body and limited knowledge, but not the desired authorship of an omnis- cient Lord. It is well-known that the physical body is only the result of the previous merit and demerit of a particular being. This position therefore does not apply to the divine authorship of the Vedas. If it would apply, it would directly affect the authoritative character of the Vedas themselves. Dharma which lies beyond the scope of the ordinary means of knowledge cannot be revealed by the vākyas composed by human beings.

Regarding the creation and dissolution of this world, the Mīmāṃsaka is of the view that they are not instantaneous operations. “Prabhākara and Kumā- rila alike, deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodic creation and dissolution of all things. They accept a constant process of becoming and pass- ing away. . . .” ⁴⁴ Thus, for instance, the Prabhākara, “though he admits that the Universe is made of constituent parts, and as such it must have a beginning and an end in time, yet he finds no reason for believing that the Universe, as a whole, had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point. Hence, if the constituent factors of the Universe have a begin- ning, they must also cease one after the other; in fact, this is what is actually found to be the case in everyday experience”. ⁴⁵ Creation of the earth, therefore,

[[P36]] 21 means a gradual but not simultaneous accumulation of mass and dissolution, likewise, is a gradual reduction of it.

Continuing, the Mīmāṃsaka says that a Supreme Being need not at all be postulated to account for the entities like the hills, earth and oceans, which we see. We, the human beings (jīvas) who are intelligent, could ourselves produce these entities through sacrifices, and as such, no postulation of a divine agent is justified. It may be argued that a Supreme Person is to be assumed Who can perceive the “apūrva” or the unseen result that arises out of the performance of acts (sacrifices) and which the human beings cannot decidedly see. This argument, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, is only superficial. Human beings are not directly connected with the perception of the apūrva, which is only the instrumental cause of things. It is enough if they understand the efficacy of the rites they perform. They get a knowledge of the productive capacity (śakti) of those rites, through a study of the Vedas. This they can do, since they are endowed with intelligence. This is supported by the critic by citing the analogy of a potter who only understands the efficacy of the clay, the rod, etc., but cannot have a direct perception of their productive capacity (śakti).

Then the critic attacks the Naiyāyika’s view that the entities obtained in the world are liable to destruction, on the ground that they consist of parts. All entities like the earth and the Sun, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, are eternal. The eternal character of these things is proved by the means of knowledge called Recognition (pratyabhijñā), which is a variety of ocular perception (pratyakṣa) and hence, is more powerful and valid than inference (anumāna). This recogni- tion is of the type: “That earth (which people of the past saw) is verily this (which I now see)” and “That Sun is verily this”, etc. People that lived in the past must have had similar recognitions with regard to these and other entities and people that live in future will also have similar recognitions. There is thus, a continuity of knowledge regarding these things during all periods of time — past, present and future. This, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, proves that these entities are eternal.

Again, he criticises the Nyāya theory that an Agent for this world can be inferred, Who is possessed of qualities like Lordship and Omniscience and Who, at the same time, is devoid of a physical body. Referring to worldly experience, he says that every entity that is produced, points to an agent — a human agent — who is found to be dependent, and to possess limited knowledge, and a physical body. So, the so-called Creator of the world would necessarily have to be admitted to be in possession of a body. If this is admitted, then it would naturally follow that that body is also liable to destruction like any other body, since It is also composed of parts. So, inference of a Supreme Being as Creator of

[[P37]] 22 this universe is quite untenable. ⁴⁶ The critic further argues that the knowledge of invariable concomittance, (vyāpti) which is the very life of anumāna (inference), should not stop merely at pointing to an intelligent agent. All the particularities associated with the agent, like his possession of a physical body, limited knowl- edge, etc., which are understood along with the invariable concomittance, should also be taken into account, without any exception.

He then launches his attack against the creative and other activities of the Supreme Person inferred by the Naiyāyika. [^37_2] An agent in general, is found to sit at a particular place and do a bit of work at a particular time, with the necessary instruments, and with a view to achieve some fruit. When this is our practical experience, it is difficult for us to imagine an ultra-mundane God engaged in creating, maintaining and destroying the entire universe, without any appointed place and time, and that too, for no purpose at all since it is declared that all the desires of that God are fully realized. Even if it is admitted that there is such a lord who does all this, the motive behind such activities cannot be explained. To examine, it is not out of mere sport (krīḍā) that the Supreme Being is doing all this, since it is known that He is already happy with all His desires realized. If to create is His nature, which cannot be overcome, it only means that the Lord has no independence. He creates, maintains and destroys the universe restlessly, without a definite plan of His own, being impelled by His own irresistible nature. But if it is said that He creates the beings out of pure mercy, then the actual state of affairs obtained in the creation proves to the con- trary. Many of the beings are not happy and they should have been created happy, if the Creator is merciful. If the individuals’ past karmans are themselves held responsible for their misery, then again, the independence of the Creator-God gets impaired. So, the Mīmāṃsaka declares that there could be no person who

[[P38]] 23 creates the world ⁴⁷ with a direct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma and Who could also compose the Vedas.

He then examines the claim that the Pāñcarātra-texts are as valid as the Vedas themselves, on the ground that they both are the compositions of God. He reiterates his stand that the Vedas are not composed by any person, human or divine. Revealed as they are, their authority is unquestioned. They are eternal since their author is not at all remembered while he deserves to be remembered. Such is not the case with works like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, whose authors like Vālmīki and Vyāsa deserve to be remembered and are also remembered. Since such a remembrance of the author is absent in the case of the Vedas, it is to be admitted without further hesitation that the Vedas are not written by anybody. The author of the Pāñcarātra-works, on the other hand, is known to be Vāsudeva. After an impartial consideration of these facts, one would be forced to admit that these āgamas are not eternal or revealed and that they do not deserve comparison with the eternal Vedas in respect of authority.

He then draws a distinction between the Vedas and the āgamas. The chief characteristic of the Vedas is that they consist of sentences which have got a particular sequence (krama). These sentences cannot be changed of their sequence by persons that may, from time to time, repeat them. But in the case of the Pāñcarātra-texts, there being no such rigid sequence, people may effect changes in them, at their own free will. This characteristic, namely, ‘sequence’, is itself enough, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, to distinguish the Vedas and the Pāñcarātra.

He then turns his attention to the contention of the Pāñcarātrins that the author of their āgamas is the Omniscient Lord and that His Omniscience is not due to any of the well-known means of knowledge but that it is quite natural with Him. The critic points out that it is quite unreasonable to say that a person could get knowledge even without a proper study of the Vedas and such other texts. Further, there is no Vedic statement to the effect that the Supreme Being became Omniscient even without the well-known means of knowledge. Even if such a text is somehow, traced, [^38_2] the Mīmāṃsaka suggests that it should only

[[P39]] 24 be explained as an ‘arthavāda’ — an explanatory passage. To be clear, since the Lord is, in many cases, known to possess knowledge, etc. invariably, He is figuratively said to possess knowledge etc. naturally. This is the way of explain- ing such texts as eulogistic passages. Thus the significance of such texts is always to be understood as secondary but not primary. He further points out that even if such a Person with natural knowledge etc. is admitted to exist, there could be nothing to the credit or advantage of the Pāñcarātra texts as such.

As a matter of fact, the Mīmāṃsaka does not accept Supreme God as such. ⁴⁸ God, according to him, is only that particular term of the authoritative Vedic text (such as agni in the Mantra “agnaye svāhā”), which is itself under- stood to be the recipient of the offerings made in a sacrifice, in a particular con- text. [^39_2]

Continuing the previous discussion that the author of the Pāñcarātra could not be omniscient, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that even the Pāśupatas hold that Śiva, the author of their own Āgamas is the only Omniscient One. Similar is the case with other religious schools too. The promulgators of all religions, however, cannot be admitted to be omniscient because of the divergent views held by them regarding metaphysical issues. Thus it is difficult to state who actually is all-knowing since scriptural texts glorify for instance, both Śiva and Vāsudeva to be so. The Mīmāṃsaka therefore concludes that the Pāñcarātrāgamas could only be the work of some deceitful person bearing the name Vāsudeva. Another point of discredit to the Pāñcarātrins is that Vāsudeva, in the Purāṇas, is stated to have deceived demons by teaching them the non-Vedic systems of thought,

“The Mīmāṃsā, in both schools, is confident that there is no question of rewards coming > from the deity to whom the offerings are made; no deity is either eternal or omnipresent > and there could be no assurance of it ever receiving the numerous offerings made by diverse > votaries, apart from the difficulty of the deity conferring rewards.” (p. 74) > “Despite its emphatic denial of the existence of a Supreme Lord, the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha > (VIII. 40, 41) treats the end of man as to be obtained by meditation upon, and worship > of, the Supreme Spirit which is manifested in each man, and authors such as Āpadeva and > Laugākṣibhāskara, declare that if the sacrifice is performed in honour of Govinda or the > Creator Īśvara, it leads to the highest good, basing this assertion on the authority of the > Bhagavad-gītā.” > “It can hardly be assumed that these deities were not believed to be real by the founders of > the Mīmāṃsā. And there is nothing to show that Jaimini did not accept their existence. > But the later doctrine, as evinced in such works as Devatāsvarūpavicāra of Āpadeva, does > not accept the validity of the descriptions of the deities given in the Purāṇas as showing > the existence of such beings; these passages rank as mere Arthavāda; the deity is merely > that to which offering is made, and has no existence beyond the Mantras addressed to it.” > (p. 78) [^39_2]: Cf. p. 159 of the Text: “na hi kācid jātyā devatā nāṃdasti; yaiva hi haviḥ-pratiyoginā > pramāṇabhūtāt-bulāv-agamyā, sā tatra devatā hi vāsiddhāntāḥ.”

[[P40]] 25 assuming the form of Māyāmohana ⁴⁹ and others. It is therefore proper to suppose that Pāñcarātra which is professedly his own teaching, was deliberately propound- ed by him to delude the people. It is in consonance with this that we find the orthodox Vedic followers not observing the rites ordained by these particular āgamas.

Even granted that the Lord too studied the Vedas like Manu and others under a teacher, there is no need to attribute any originality to him. It is difficult to imagine that He could understand the meaning of the Vedas even without the required study of them, under some preceptor.

Another reason to suppose that these Āgamas are non-Vedic is that they are refuted by other Smṛti-works. The Pāñcarātra-texts themselves draw a distinction between the Vedic and Tantric practices regarding one and the same rite. This distinction would be meaningless if these Āgamas are strictly Vedic character.

An assessment of all the reasonings put forth above, says the Mīmāṃsaka in fine, would only point to the non-Vedic character of the Pāñcarātra system so much so that there is no other choice than to conclude that it is purely the invention of a deceitful man.

THE NAIYĀYIKA’S ARGUMENTS

The Naiyāyika and his stand regarding the position of the Pāñcarātra are introduced by Yāmuna next. It has already been mentioned above (p. 5), that Yāmuna has much in common with the Naiyāyika regarding the existence of an Īśvara, the creation etc. of the world by Him, His authorship regarding the Pāñcarātrāgamas, etc. and that our author differs from him regarding the authorship of the Vedas.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that the Pāñcarātra texts cannot be compared with Manusmṛti and such other works. The Naiyāyika points out that it is Manusmṛti that cannot stand comparison with these āgamas and not the other way. These āgama-texts belong to the same class to which the Vedas belong. They both are derived from one and the same source, namely the “anubhava” (Experience) of the Lord. So, there is no question of these texts themselves being based on the Vedic texts for their authority. Just as two different smṛti-passages ordaining the aṣṭakā and ācamana rites for instance, cannot be said to be mutually dependent, so are these āgamas and the Vedas. Whatever reason one might advance in support of the contention that Vedas are the only authority on matters of Dharma, can equally be applied to the āgamas too.

[[P41]] 26 Vedas, according to the Naiyāyika, are composed by Īśvara, the Lord. These Vedas consist of sentences (vākyas), which unmistakably point to the authorship of some person, who possesses a direct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma, instrumental to the world-creation. It cannot be stated that even while being in the form of sentences, the Vedas need not necessarily be composed by anybody. This extreme view might even lead one to conclude that smoke can come out even without fire, which however is absurd.

It is the Lord alone that could directly perceive Dharma and Adharma, which form the instrumental cause of this world. He composed the Vedas, purely as a matter of mercy towards the individual selves so that they may be of great help to those beings in achieving the objects they desire. It cannot be argued that no perception can visualize Dharma and Adharma. The position is, that unless a person of excelling power is accepted, we cannot account for the entities found in this universe. A direct knowledge of the instrumental and material causes is the chief criterion of one’s becoming the agent or author of a particular thing. Dharma and Adharma, whose instrumentality to this world is accepted even by the Mīmāṃsaka, should necessarily be accepted as perceived by the Lord, Who could also compose the Vedas.

This may lead to the doubt whether entities like the earth and the hills are effects (kārya) or not. The Naiyāyika, with the help of syllogisms, tries to infer that earth, etc. are all effects. They have parts, which help deduce that they are also destructible by persons who know their causes. It is also possible to infer origination and destruction for all entities on the ground that they vibrate while having a manifested form.

When once these arguments establish that earth, etc. are effects, it naturally follows that a Supreme Being capable of perceiving Dharma and Adharma pertaining to those effects, is also accepted. ⁵⁰ The Naiyāyika infers an agent for all entities in this world with the help of syllogistic statements.

It might be contended that creation and dissolution, being mere acts, can independently produce the desired effects, without reference to the agency of any ultra-mundane person. But practically, argues the Naiyāyika, we know that mere insentient acts cannot produce effects independent of a sentient agent. A chisel, for instance, cannot prepare a wooden article without being operated by a carpenter. Human beings of ordinary knowledge and power cannot perceive

“The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, accepting the doctrine of atoms on the one hand and the periodical > creation and destruction of the world on the other, had found it necessary to introduce > the conception of a Creator, in order to secure in some measure, a mode of bringing about > the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their connection with > souls.”

[[P42]] 27 the apūrva — the unseen potency that results from the performance of acts. That is to say, that the human beings cannot become the designers of certain entities. Therefore an Omniscient Designer-Agent of this entire universe is to be presumed. As a corollary, it is to be admitted that qualities like Omniscience, Detachment and Lordship reside in Him. This argument is corroborated by various Mantras, Arthavāda-passages and Purāṇa-statements.

The Naiyāyika argues that there is nothing special about the so-called apauruṣeyatva (revealed character) of the Vedas, advocated by the Mīmāṃsaka. If this ‘eternal character’ of the Vedas belongs actually to the letters (varṇa) that go into their composition, then, same is the case with the Pāñcarātra-texts, which also consist of letters. If this eternity, however, belongs to the words (pada) taken as a unit, even that would apply to these āgamas. If, as the next step, this eternity is attributed to the sequence (ānupūrvī) in which these letters occur, this contention, declares the Naiyāyika, is wrong. Sequence as such, cannot attribute eternity to letters. It is quite clear that sequence is, after all, the result of human utterance (uccāraṇa). This utterance in its turn, is not eternal because it exists so long as a man utters the words. So sequence, which is based upon such a short-lived utterance will naturally be non-eternal. Thus, the theory of apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas advocated so zealously by the Mīmāṃsaka, has nothing special in it, by which the Vedas might be claimed as higher in status than the Pāñcarātrāgamas. The Naiyāyika concludes that both the Vedas and these āgamas are equal in authority, being the compositions of one and the same Īśvara.

The Naiyāyika states that his arguments regarding the existence of a Superhuman Being are not mere logical speculations. They have got the full support of the Upaniṣads. Accordingly, the Upaniṣads state that there is an Īśvara, the Supreme Being, and that He is possessed of qualities like Omniscience and Lordship. He had created this Universe and it is He that could compose the Pāñcarātra texts too. Since these āgamas are the work of such a Person, it naturally follows, contends the logician, that their authority is unquestioned.

The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka does not admit the primary validity of Upaniṣadic statements, which speak of entities already existing (siddha, bhūta or praniṣṭhita vastu) like the Brahman. According to him, all Vedic passages, so as to gain validity, should be explained as supplementary statements speaking of something connected with a ‘thing to be established’ (kārya). This is so because, sentences that speak of an already existing thing might be merely repetitive (anuvāda) or even might go wrong at times (bādhā).

Against such a view, the Naiyāyika argues that just as a sentence speaking of ‘something to be done’ (kārya) is held authoritative by the Prabhākara, so also, a sentence that speaks of a past event (siddha) should be admitted as

[[P43]] 28 valid by him. Sentences speaking of past events should not be divested of their due authority. As regards the contention that a sentence referring to already existent entities (bhūtāpara vākya) is liable to defects, the Naiyāyika states that even a sentence devoted to the so-called kārya is subject to similar defects. A kārya like ‘fetching of chips of wood’ (samiddhāraṇa) for instance, can also be revealed by other means of knowledge like perception (but not necessarily by verbal testimony — śabda), which the Prabhākara himself admits. This, says the Naiyāyika, proves that even a kārya-sentence might be repetitive in character (anuvāda).

In the injunction “One desirous of heaven should perform the fire- sacrifice”, reference is made to the “fire-sacrifice” (agnihotra), which is an already existing entity (siddha), but not something to be established (kārya). Validity of such sentences is admitted by the Prabhākara on the ground that these sentences are the only means of our knowledge regarding the instrumentality of the fire-sacrifice, etc. towards heaven, etc. The Naiyāyika states that even in the case of the Supreme Person, it is only the Upaniṣads that reveal His nature and there is no other pramāṇa that could be applied here. So it is to be admitted that even the Upaniṣadic texts are valid in their own right.

The logician affirms that having a physical body, limited knowledge, etc., which are generally found among human beings, cannot at all be attributed to the Supreme Person whose Omniscience, etc. are glorified by a number of Upaniṣads. He thus concludes that the Pāñcarātra scriptures which owe their origination to such a Lord, have to be viewed as fully authoritative.

THE PRABHĀKARA—MĪMĀṂSAKA’S CRITICISM

It has already been observed that according to the Mīmāṃsaka, every Vedic statement, as a rule, should be connected with something to be done — a kārya, which is not revealed by other means of knowledge.

The connotation of words, in general, is to be arrived at solely by tracing their ultimate purport to a kārya. This is indeed, the process by which youngsters grasp the meaning of words not known to them. This, the Prabhākara illustrates by taking the stock-instance of the usage (vyavahāra) of elderly people. Thus, a youngster who stands near two elderly men, notices one of them bringing a cow when the other man utters the words “bring the cow” (gāṃ ānaya) and concludes that the action of bringing the cow was the result of the former’s under- standing the intention of the latter, when he uttered the words “bring the cow”. The youngster hears the man again say “bring the horse” (aśvaṃ ānaya) and observes that as a result, a different animal is brought. When again, the words “tie up the cow” (gāṃ badhnā) are uttered, a different activity takes place.

[[P44]] 29 Thus, by noticing different actions following different utterances (vyavahāra), the young boy understands what the words “cow” and “horse” actually stand for. In all these cases, the denotation of different words, contends the Prabhākara, is invariably arrived at by connecting those words with the main theme, viz., the kārya, ⁵¹ the activity of bringing, tying, etc. in the above instances.

Another point to be noted is that the liṅ — the optative and other suffixes in an injunction directly denote the kārya, whereas suffixes other than these denote other things connected with it, like the qualified aspirant and the fruit, in a supplementary sense.

It might be urged that even sentences which refer to matters of past (bhūta- vastu) like the birth of a son become authoritative in their own right, without any reference to the so-called kārya. Thus for instance, when a messenger tells a man : “a son is born to you”, a bystander who does not know what actually the message is, notices that the listener feels glad after hearing the above words. Further, the bystander, through indications like blooming of the face and horripilation exhibited by the listener, infers that the words uttered by the messenger should have conveyed to him the happy tidings of the birth of a son. This argument is unsound, says the Prabhākara, because gestures like blooming of the face and horripilation, though indicative of the pleasure of a man, need not necessarily arise from the knowledge of the birth of a son. Reasons for

“The essential character of the word is, in the view of Jaimini, not mere denotation, but > injunction, a view which clearly stands in close relation to the doctrine that the meaning > of words is largely learned by the young from the observation of intercourse among the > old; one addresses the other and the other acts as a result; one says “gāṃ ānaya”, the > other brings the cow. Hence, as against the Vedānta, it is denied that the essence of Vedic > texts lies in the making manifest of the sole existent Brahman, and asserted that, even when > this seems to be the case, the real import of the text is an injunction to meditate on the > Brahman. From this view Prabhākara proceeds to develop a conclusion, which is in harmony > with the view of Śābarasvāmin, that words themselves have no meaning, and obtain it only > in sentences possessing injunctive clauses; “gām” by itself, is nothing, but attains meaning > when enjoined with “ānaya”, the whole then signifying generically the genus ‘cow’ > as connected with ‘bringing’. This view in this school (of Prabhākara) obtains the name > of the ‘theory of signification in syntactical combination’ (anvitābhidhāna). in opposi- > tion to the view of Kumārila, who admits that words possess a meaning independently of > combination in injunctive sentence, and whose theory accepts, therefore, ‘the combina- > tion of significant terms’ (abhihitānvaya). The two schools, however, are at one in hold- > ing that the signification of words is a class-signification, as the theory of eternity of words > demands. The modern Nyāya, on the other hand, insists that the import of words is always > the concrete individual, while the older Nyāya adopts the doctrine that the word expresses > the class (jāti), individual (vyakti) and characteristic mark of the class (ākṛti), all at > once.”

[[P45]] 30 happiness are so manifold that it is practically impossible to decide whether the happiness exhibited by the listener of the sentence “a son is born to you”, is due only to the news conveyed by it or to something else. Proceeding on similar lines, says the Prabhākara, one should get at the meaning of other unknown words which are not found to have the “kārya” as their purport, and which are, however, employed in sentences belonging to the present tense. ⁵² The Prabhākara also advances logical alternatives to assert that only those sentences that have a bearing on kārya are valid.

The apūrva that arises from a performance of certain acts attains a new name niyoga (prompting) at the hands of Prabhākara, since it acts as an incentive to the prompted person (niyojya) and makes him put forth an exertion for accom- plishing the action indicated by the verbal root. “This kārya or niyoga is ex- pressed neither by the verbal root nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence; but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole, all other neces- sary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually. What the sentence as a whole expresses is this niyoga as related to the prompted person expressed by one of the words in the sentence (i.e., the word signifying the result, the person desiring which is the prompted person). . . .and there is no doubt that of all things made known by the sentence, the niyoga is the most important, for, even though the final result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the niyoga that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; and further, because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the niyoga, in view of the fact that the result enters as one of the factors neces- sary for the making up of the full character of the niyoga. To explain, the niyoga cannot be a true niyoga, until there is a niyojya, the person to be prompted to exertion; without exertion there can be no niyoga and gain, without the agent, there can be no exertion; nor can an agent put forth an exertion and be a niyojya, until he is entitled to the undertaking resulting from that exertion, and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a neces- sary factor in the niyoga, this relation between the niyoga and the result being similar to that between the master and servant; without the servant the master cannot be a true ‘master’ and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two.” [^45_2]

All this is only in regard to sentences found in the Vedic texts. As regards the sentences spoken by human beings in this world, the Prabhākara dismisses

[[P46]] 31 their primary authority summarily on the ground that they are inferential in nature. That is to say, that their authority is to be inferred on the ground of their being spoken by reliable persons. ⁵³

In the light of this discussion, the Prabhākara declares that the Upaniṣadic statements which speak of the Brahman, an established entity, should be explained in such a way that they are only arthavāda — or explanatory passages with regard to injunctions of “jñāna” and “upāsanā”. In other words they should be taken as enjoining on one, the meditation of the Omniscient and Blissful Self. By this, one should not, however, be led to the conclusion that there is in fact, such as Person possessed of Omniscience and such other perfections. [^46_2] Even non-existing entities can be spoken of as existing for purposes of meditation and such is the present one. So, statements to the effect that there exists an Omniscient God and so on, are of primary significance and God is nothing but the fabrication of fanatics. Sacrifices, etc. which an agent performs, are ephemeral in nature and one might think that the agent might not get the legitimate fruit of his actions, if his self is not eternal. Upaniṣadic passages which speak of the eternity of the Self, therefore, should be taken as arthavāda or corroborative passages to the above fact, assuring the fruit of one’s actions to one’s own self to be realized in another world.

“Prabhākara holds that the only authoritative testimony to things beyond the reach of the > senses and other means of proof, is the scripture (śāstra). Other words deal only with > matters cognised by perception, inference, etc. and have no inherent cogency. If they give > us true information, it is merely because we believe the speaker to be trustworthy. Thus, > like the Vaiśeṣika school, Prabhākara holds all cognition of this kind to be based on infer- > ence, the argument being “this man says something; he must know what he is talking about; > what he says, therefore, must be true.”. . . .Thus the sole possibility of the validity of verbal > testimony lies in the Veda, which has no author, and therefore, is not vitiated by doubts > as to trustworthiness and ability of correct expression. ." [^46_2]: Cf. Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, pp. 85-86: > The Prābhākara, like the Bhaṭṭa, denies a creator for the universe, who can also know > everything: “If it were true that certain factors of the universe are brought into existence > by an ultra-mundane Supervisor of Dharma-Adharma, this could not be true for the entire > universe, as a whole. For instance, the bodies of all men and animals are found to be > produced by the functioning of the parents, and not by a Supervening agency; and this > fact will enable us to infer the same with regard to the bodies of all animals, past and future > also." The claim of the logicians that our Dharma and Adharma must have a Supervisor, > with more intelligence than us, is also weak. “Dharma—Adharma of the body. . . .must > always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body belongs. . . .Hence > the ultra-mundane ‘God’ can have no knowledge of Dharma and Adharma of the beings > . . . .and without such knowledge, he could not exercise any intelligent control over them; > God could not perceive Dharma by His senses. .nor by his mind as the mind. .cannot per- > ceive Dharma of beings which is outside God’s body."

[[P47]] 32 The Prabhākara thus asserts that there is no sentence in the Veda that refers to a past event primarily, and that everything should be connected with the kārya so as to gain validity.

- - The Advaitin’s Criticism The Advaitin is also introduced by Yāmuna as a critic of the Pāñcarātra. According to him, Bādarāyaṇa himself had refuted the validity of these āgamas in his Brahmasūtra, devoting a separate section for this purpose, called the utpatty-asambhavā or the Pāñcarātra-adhikaraṇa comprising four aphorisms. ⁵⁴ This refutation takes place soon after the other schools of thought like the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are refuted as non-Vedic. So, the Advaitin argues that the con- text in which this adhikaraṇa takes place, is also in full support of his contention.

Another important factor that exhibits the non-Vedic nature of these saṃhitās is that they speak of the origination of jīva, manas, etc. which is fundamentally against the sanction of all the Vedic and smṛti-declarations. The jīva is inborn and mind and other senses originate from the Supreme Being. The Pāñcarātra text which speaks of the birth of the self is: “Lord Vāsudeva is the Highest source and from Him is born the self called Saṅkarṣaṇa; from Saṅkarṣaṇa is born the mind called Pradyumna and thence is born the ahaṅkāra called Aniruddha”. ⁵⁵ The Vedic and smṛti-passages state that the self only comes into contact with the five subtle elements (tanmātrā) for purpose of manifestation. This view is emphasized by the Advaitin through logical arguments and quotations from scriptural texts.

The Advaitin further finds fault with the vyūha-theory advanced by the Pāñcarātrins. According to him, Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa and other forms should either be one in essence with the Supreme Brahman, or different. If these forms are held to possess equal status and differ from each other, there is no purpose served by such an assumption, says the Advaitin, because cosmic activities can be performed by a single form of the Lord. This assumption undermines the posi- tion taken by the Pāñcarātrins that Vāsudeva alone is the Highest Reality. Even if it is argued that all these forms are equal in status and that they pertain to only one Supreme Person, the difficulty regarding the birth of the self cannot be got over. Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot originate from Vāsudeva. Pradyumna likewise cannot arise from Saṅkarṣaṇa and so forth, because some distinction is necessary between a cause and an effect, as in the case of clay and pot. The Pāñcarātrins do not admit of any difference between one form of the Lord and another re-

[[P48]] 33 garding jñāna, aiśvarya etc. There is thus no justification in the vyūha-theory propounded by these āgamas, says the Advaitin. ⁵⁶

The Advaitin continues that there is a lot of contradiction in what the Pāñ- carātra-āgamas teach; they do not show any distinction between qualities (guṇas) and the self which possesses those qualities. They thus say that jñāna, aiśvarya etc. are qualities and that these qualities themselves become different forms of Vāsudeva. Another clear indication of the non-Vedic character of these āgamas is that they undermine the validity of the Vedas themselves. The Advaitin takes up the statement found in one of these texts: “Śāṇḍilya took to a study of these Āgamas, being unable to get the highest good (human end) in all the four Vedas.” This, he says, discloses the nature of these texts since it underestimates the instru- mentality of the Vedas themselves regarding salvation. ⁵⁷

THE SIDDHĀNTA

In reply to all his critics, Yāmuna at the very outset, makes the following inferential statement: “The Pāñcarātra Tantra is authoritative like the Vedic sentences ordaining jyotiṣṭoma, etc., on the ground that it is based upon knowledge which is free from all defects”. He, with all his logical skill, proves that no error can be pointed out in the above statement either with regard to the Subject (pakṣa) or the Probans (hetu), through any means of knowledge, perception, inference or verbal testimony. He, in great detail, examines the possibility of any fallacy being pointed out, and concludes that this inferential statement is perfect in all respects. It had earlier been contended by the opponents that the validity of the Pāñcarātra scriptures cannot be accepted on the ground that they were composed by Vāsudeva, a deceitful person. Defending the cause of the Pāñcarātra texts against the onslaught of the Mīmāṃsaka, Yāmuna questions him as to how he would ward off invalidity for the Vedas on the ground that they too consist of sentences like the works of human authorship. The Mīmāṃsaka would reply that ‘Vedas are impersonal in character (apauruṣeya) and that their validity is therefore unquestionable. In the same vein, Yāmuna declares that the Pāñcarātra-āgamas are the direct utterances of the Omniscient and Merciful Vāsudeva, the Lord of the Universe and that for that very reason, their validity becomes unquestionable.

Clarifying his point, Yāmuna states that validity of words is intrinsic (svataḥ prāmāṇya). ⁵⁸ Their validity gets impaired only when the people that utter them

[[P49]] 34 have defects like deceit and ignorance. Until it is proved beyond doubt that the man who uttered certain words is not dependable regarding the genuineness of the words uttered by him, no person is justified in doubting their validity. Since the author of the Pāñcarātra-āgamas is one that is glorified in the Upaniṣads as Omniscient and Merciful, there is no room for any conjecture that He had evil designs in His mind in composing these āgamas.

The crux of the problem to which the argument then turns is, whether sentences speaking of an already existent entity (bhūta or siddha-vastu) are authoritative or not. The Mīmāṃsakas, as we have already seen, do not admit of any primary validity for such statements. According to them, all statements should be connected with “something to be done” (kārya), if their validity is to be admitted. Accordingly, the statement “you have got a son” (putraste lābhaḥ) is explained by them as not primarily valid, on the ground that gestures of happiness which the listener of the above statement is said to exhibit, need not necessarily make a third man infer that they proceed from the happy tidings of a child-birth. Reasons for happiness might be many, past present and future, and as such, the exact cause for the happiness of the man to whom the above sentence is addressed, cannot be specified. This contention of the Mīmāṃsakas is turned down by the author as preposterous. A third man, who listens to the above sentence addressed to another man, is still able to conclude through the signs of happiness exhibited by him, that he heard the happy news of a child’s birth. The way in which he arrives at such a conclusion is this: He sees the man, soon after listening to the news, making arrangements for the jātakarman sacra- ment for the new-born babe. The third man, who himself had had the occasion to perform such a sacrament when a son was born to his own self, quickly, comes to the conclusion that the news heard by the man in question, must only be re- garding the birth of a child. Since the activity regarding the jātakarman per- formance is noticed in the man only after his listening to the sentence but not before, it is proper to think that it must have been due only to the news of a child’s birth. It may be contended that the news of a child-birth and the per- formance of jātakarman need not have a cause and effect relation on the ground that even those who cannot afford to perform it, are seen to do it, even through displeasure. But this argument cannot stand to reason, says Yāmuna. Even as listening to the statements “gām ānaya” is taken by the Mīmāṃsakas as the cause of the activity of bringing a cow, on the ground that the activity of bringing is found to take place only when the statement had been made, so also, it is proper to admit that the activity of jātakarman-performance must have proceeded from listening to the news of the birth of a child.

Yāmuna states that there is no justification whatsoever in the Prabhākara’s contention that all words have their sole purport in a kārya. In statements like (gāṃ) ānaya and aśvaṃ ānaya, the terms gauḥ (cow) and aśvaḥ (horse) should

[[P50]] 35 be explained in their own individual capacity, without connecting them with the so-called kārya, points out the author. He says that it is possible to interpret terms in conjunction with factors other than the kārya also. Pointing out that the Prabhākara’s dictum that all connotations of words should be arrived at only in relation to a kārya is based upon a wrong conception of the connotation of words, Yāmuna says that this definition cannot be applied to the suffix liṅ. To explain, the optative suffix liṅ conveys the kārya proper in a sentence. ⁵⁹ As such, how can it be said to convey its sense in relation to a kārya, while it itself indicates the kārya?’ asks Yāmuna. So, the proper way of arriving at the significance of words should be untainted by any preconceived notions either in favour of a kārya or a ‘siddha-vastu’. One has to admit that a word conveys its sense in relation to such other thing that is required to complete the sense (ākāṅkṣita) that goes with it (yogya) and which is supplied by a word uttered along with it (āsanna). So, there should be no special attachment to a kārya or a siddha- vastu. Kārya should only be taken as a subsidiary but not the sole cause in arriving at the connotation of words. When its function is over, it is no longer helpful.

Yāmuna then turns to the contention of the Prabhākara that the statements made by human beings cannot be taken as valid as and when they are uttered and that the validity of those statements can be arrived at, only after inferring the reliability of the person that made those statements, because of the fact that human speech is always open to defects like deceit and ignorance. ⁵⁹ Yāmuna states that it is true that in a few cases, where persons are liable to have defects, the statements made by them do not attain validity. But this does not mean that words lose their correct denotative power which is quite natural with them. So, a listener that has a general capacity to understand the mutual connection of words and their meanings, arrives at the sense of a particular word, soon after it is heard. It is not necessary that he should infer the soundness of the source of the words first and then alone get at their sense. The author emphasizes that the knowledge arising out of sentences such as “there are fruits on the river bank”

“There is an obvious difficulty in this reasoning of Prabhākara when it is remembered that > Prabhākara….insists on the self-evidence of cognitions, from which it would seem to > follow that the assertions of any man are prima facie valid, until sublated by better evidence. > Kumārila, who is always anxious to accommodate the views of the school to popular > beliefs, is at the same time more in harmony with the tenets of the school in adopting a > doctrine, which does not involve the general denial of the validity of human testimony. > He adopts therefore, the plan of distinguishing testimony as human and superhuman > (apauruṣeya). while admitting both as valid, though for different reasons. In the case > of the Veda, there is no author. and therefore. the possibility of defects is absolutely pre- > cluded. In the case of human testimony, its validity may be impaired by defects in the > speaker. but the presence of excellences in him precludes the presence of defects.”

[[P51]] 36 which speak of an established entity (bhūtavastu) is purely verbal but not infer- ential.

Yāmuna also refers in this connection to the theory of niyoga advanced by the Prabhākara. According to the latter, apūrva is indicated by the optative suffix liṅ in an injunction. He further says that in the injunctive sentence “one desirous of heaven should perform the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice”, the performer (niyojya) is qualified by the heaven. Refuting this argument, Yāmuna says that heaven is something that is going to be attained in future, but not an al- ready existent entity. So, it cannot become an attribute of the agent. On the other hand, the desire (kāmanā) regarding heaven, which exists at the time of activity could alone be taken as the attribute of the person concerned. All injunc- tions should be understood as referring to the thing to be established (sādhya), the means thereof (sādhana), and the cause-effect relationship subsisting between them (sambandha). It is not always true that a niyoga is ever associated with the realization of certain fruits like heaven. In injunctions ordaining obligatory rites for instance, niyoga has no connection with the realization of a corresponding result. So, the proper way of understanding an injunctive sentence is that the optative and other affixes first make an agent understand that the performance of a particular rite leads to a particular result. Then the agent, motivated by desire regarding the result, exerts. There is nothing contradictory in admitting that words even in ordinary parlance referring to existent factors (siddha-vastu), become valid in their own right.

Yāmuna points out that Upaniṣads, which speak of the Supreme Being, should also be treated as authoritative since they give us a correct knowledge regarding the Lord, a knowledge that is pure from all defects.

As regards the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas that Upaniṣadic texts are not primarily valid on the ground that they speak of a siddha-vastu, the Brahman, the author argues in favour of the validity of the siddhapara-statements, like the Naiyāyika. Defects of repetition (anuvāda) and contradiction to facts (viparyaya), which the Mīmāṃsaka points out in the case of statements speaking of existent factors, can also be pointed out in the case of statements referring to a kārya, says Yāmuna. It is asserted that all pieces of knowledge are valid in their own right, provided they are free from defects like doubt and falsehood, and also that no distinction should be made in terms of something to be done (kārya) and something already existing (siddha).

Yāmuna criticises the Bhaṭṭa view that Omniscience is beyond all possibi- lity. The author states that the above view is directly opposed to the Vedic passages which speak of the Lord’s Omniscience as quite natural with Him: “He sees

[[P52]] 37 even without eyes”, ⁶⁰ “The Knowledge of the Lord is natural” [^52_2] and so on. These statements should not be taken in a secondary sense as urged by the op- ponent, because there is nothing contradictory to their primary significance.

It is argued that the existence of the Supreme Being is asserted by various Upaniṣads, which also attribute Omniscience, Mercy, etc. to Him. When once the Lord is thus proved to exist, it follows that the Pāñcarātra scriptures which depend upon Him for their origination, become undoubtedly valid.

The next discussion is as to who actually is the Highest Deity glorified in the Upaniṣads. Our author declares that Lord Vāsudeva is the Highest Being of the Upaniṣads, Who creates, maintains and destroys the Universe, and that He is Omniscient and Merciful. Yāmuna quotes several passages from the Māhā- nārāyaṇīya, the Viṣṇupurāṇa, the Liṅgapurāṇa, the Varāhapurāṇa and the Manu- smṛti, in support of his view. Rudra and other gods cannot be supreme because they are known to have birth, etc. Texts which seem to glorify them as supreme should be taken in a secondary sense since they are contradicted by direct Vedic assertions that Viṣṇu alone is the Highest Person. The supremacy of Vāsudeva is emphasized by quotations from Purāṇas like the Matsya, the Vāyu, the Bhaviṣyat and the Varāha. The part where Yāmuna deals with the question of the Supre- macy of Nārāyaṇa may be studied with special interest because the Puruṣanirṇaya, another work of his, entirely devoted to this question and to which he himself refers here, is no longer available.

Vāsudeva, who had a direct comprehension of the instrumentality of dīkṣā (Initiation) etc. to salvation, gave out the Pāñcarātra-āgamas to sages like Nārada and Śāṇḍilya. These āgamas ordain the worship of Himself as the only means of attaining the Highest Bliss. But Śaivite and other works ordain non-Vedic practices like “knowing the correct significance of the ‘six brands’ (mudrikāṣaṭka)” and “wearing them” (uddhāraṇa) as the means of salvation. They also declare that mokṣa cannot be attained through the knowledge regarding the Brahman. These and such other factors are directly opposed to scriptures which speak of the Brahman as the source of Highest Bliss. Therefore, there could be no doubt regarding the non-Vedic character and the consequent invalidity of the Śaivāgamas, says Yāmuna.

Yāmuna further points out that the Purāṇas declare that Rudra deluded people by propounding non-Vedic doctrines like the Ārhatas. So, the source of the Śaiva and such other āgamas, propounded by Rudra and gods other than Viṣṇu, could only be deceit, and doubt, which stand in the way of admitting validity for those āgamas.

“yat-cakṣuṣā nā paśyati”. [^52_2]: Ibid. III-6: “na tasya kāryaṃ karaṇaṃ ca vidyate, svābhāvīkī jñānabalakriyā ca”.

[[P53]] 38 As regards the origin of the Pāñcarātra texts, Yāmuna states that Lord Nārāyaṇa, Who possesses an overall knowledge regarding the vast Vedic literature, understood that His devotees were unable to grasp and retain its mean- ing. Then, out of Mercy, He gave them the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās through sages like Nārada and Śāṇḍilya; and these āgamas bring out in an abridged form, the very essence of the Vedic teaching.

Then the author turns to the statement “Śāṇḍilya studied the Pāñcarātrā- gamas, being unable to get the means of attaining the Highest from all the four Vedas”, which had been cited by the Advaitins as an instance of Vedic denun- ciation by the Pāñcarātrāgamas. For this, the reply is given that a deprecatory statement (nindā) should not be taken as deprecating something that is already deprecated. Its purpose is in praising something other than the particular thing denounced. Thus, we should take the present passage as purporting to praising the āgamas, but not as underestimating the Vedas, as alleged. Then the method of construing the passage is also pointed out. The statement does not mean that “there is no human end in the Vedas”. It only means that “Śāṇḍilya could not get at the human end which is laid down in the Vedas, because of their vastness”. Thus it becomes clear that the purport of the āgamas and the Vedas is one and the same and that there is no contradiction between them.

As regards the argument that the Pāñcarātra is non-Vedic since it ordains dīkṣā over and above the upanayana sacrament qualifying one to worship in temples, Yāmuna replies that it is not a non-Vedic mark. Special sacraments are ordained as and when necessary, to qualify one to perform particular duties. Thus for instance, even for the performance of the jyotiṣṭoma rite, special dīkṣās is ordained by the injunction “agnīṣomīyaṃ ekādaśakapālaṃ puroḍāśaṃ nirvapet dīk- ṣiṣyamāṇaḥ”, ⁶¹ on a person who had already been initiated by Upanayana. But this cannot be put forth as the cause for the non-authoritative character of the above Vedic passage.

With regard to the argument that the Pāñcarātra is non-Vedic on the ground that it is not counted as one among the fourteen sources of knowledge, it has been replied that on such a consideration, even Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata of great sages like Vālmīki and Vyāsa would be liable to the same defect of non-Vedic character because they too are not included among the fourteen sources of knowledge.

The next discussion is regarding the alleged condemnation of these āgamas by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahmasūtra. The point to be kept in mind here is that Yāmuna does not hold Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Brahmasūtra to be

[[P54]] 39 identical from Vyāsa the author of the Mahābhārata. ⁶² According to him, both are identical. Thus he states that it is not possible to image Bādarāyaṇa refuting the Bhāgavata religion in his Brahmasūtra, which he himself commends in glowing terms in his Mahābhārata, as the very essence of the four Vedas and so on. Yāmuna quotes many passages from the Mahābhārata in support of his view.

The four aphorisms comprising the utpattyasambhavā or the pāñcarātra- section of the Brahmasūtra (II-ii-39-42) are explained after a refutation of the explanation offered by the Advaitins. The Advaitins hold that all the four aphorisms refute the Pāñcarātrāgamas as non-Vedic. They take a passage “from Vāsudeva is born the Individual Self called Saṅkarṣaṇa; from Saṅkarṣaṇa is born the mind called Pradyumna”, etc. and point out that this is a clear mark of the non-Vedic character of these āgamas, since the self is said to be born, which, on the other hand, is birthless. Against this and such other claims, Yāmuna states that there is nothing in these āgamas that contradicts the Vedic conceptions. He takes the first two aphorisms as giving the pūrva-pakṣa-view and the next two as declaring the siddhānta, ‘the heart of the Sūtra-kāra’. The passage quoted above by the Advaitins does not state that a jīva is liable to birth or that an instrument (mind) is born out of an agent (kartṛ). Terms like jīva and manas point to the Superintending Deities over those entities, having a particular form. Nowhere do the Pāñcarātrāgamas speak that jīva and manas are born. Mind and such other factors are born out of the Brahman Himself according to the Upaniṣads and the Pāñcarātra texts themselves clearly accept this view. So, one has to take the Pāñcarātra to be as valid as the Upaniṣads themselves. The passage in question does not, as contended by the Advaitin, state that there are many Lords, each independent of the other, since the Pāñcarātrins declare on the other hand that there is no plurality of Lords and that Lord Vāsudeva is the Only Source of the entire world-manifestation. [^54_2]

“vyūhatrayasya bhāvāti kalena kalanādh > bhagavān vāsudevastu na vyūho nāpi kalāvin > vyūhatrayam-apekṣaya kalā-vyūhāṇurupam > kālenā-manasām-yady-ad-uttamam-itī-rūcyate”

(śls. 11b-13a)

[[P55]] 40 Lord, out of mere sport, manifests Himself in four different forms and protects the world. We have to accept that these manifestations are as genuine and purposeful as the other manifestations of Viṣṇu such as Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata and Śatrughna. ⁶³

The above argument is purely from the stand-point of a Pāñcarātrin. It will be highly interesting to note that after all, the Pāñcarātra did not fail to appeal to some noble thinkers, even among the followers of Śaṅkara. It appears that Śaṅkara’s attack on the Pāñcarātra vyūha-theory could not convince his own followers. A section of the Advaitins held that the Pāñcarātra-theory of the origination of the jīva, manas, etc., should not be understood literally and primarily. On the other hand, it should be taken in a secondary sense (gauṇa). The Advaitin who held this view was Amalananda Sarasvati, the famous author of the commentary called the Vedāntakalpataru on the Bhāmatī of Vācaspati- miśra, which in its turn, is a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Amalananda advances the following argument in support of the Pāñcarātrā- gamas and their vyūha-theory :

“The Pāñcarātrāgamas were intentionally composed by Lord Vāsudeva. But the fact that He is Omniscient (that is to say that His compositions are valid in toto) is known only through the Vedas, which are, so to say, the voluntary revelations by Lord Vāsudeva (niśvāsitaṃ śrutiḥ). Thus, the Pāñcarātra texts, for their own validity, depend upon a Vedic statement to the effect that their author Vāsudeva is Omniscient, whereas the Vedas, being eternal in character, do not require anything else for their own validity. Their validity is thus intrinsic (svataḥ). Now we read from the Pāñcarātra works that a jīva is born, whereas the Vedic texts declare that a jīva is inborn. In such a case, it is the Vedic texts with intrinsic validity that establish themselves first, prior to the āgama-texts. So we have to attach primary significance to the Vedic doctrine of the non-origina- tion of the individual self and secondary significance (gauṇa) to the āgama-

“vyūhatrayā-pūrvā-vā-dvār-pradhānāḥ parīpathyate > saṅkarṣaṇādī-mūrti-antarāṃ aśeṣa-bhuvanāṃ yataḥ > bibharty-ā-jha-bhāvena vyāpnotyantaśca tat svayam” (18a, 19) Also cf. ibid, Ch. 55, śl. 29: > “saṅkarṣaṇādī-rūpeṇa vyūha-ātmatvaṃ tri-dhā sthitaḥ > tad-āśritakārya-yād-vibhūṣ-sarvatoumukhaḥ” It is thus clear that the argument that the Pāñcarātra vyūha-theory admits the plurality of Gods, is baseless.

“pratitretā-yugaṃ devaḥ sādhu-trāṇa-kṛte hariḥ > rāma-lakṣmaṇa-śatru-ghna-bharatādy-ātmanā svayam > catūr-dhāv-asthitaḥ tad-vat cakr-ātma hari-revā hi > guṇa-pradhāna-bhāvastu rāma-derī-nava yujyate”

[[P56]] 41 doctrine of the origination of the individual self, because there is the Vedic contradiction in attaching primary significance to it. So, there is no question of the āgama statements being due to delusion (na tu bhrāntam).

These āgamas were composed by Vāsudeva, the Divine Being and His Omniscience is attested by the Vedas themselves. The promulgators of other schools of thought like Kapila (of Sāṅkhya) and Patañjali (of Yoga) on the other hand, were human beings and hence were susceptible to err. So, there cannot be any comparison between the Pāñcarātrāgamas and the texts of other schools of thought. It is no doubt stated in some Purāṇas that Lord Vāsudeva appeared as the Buddha and deluded the people through non-Vedic preachings. But there is no proof as such, of any Purāṇic text saying that the Pāñcarātra too was intended by the Lord to delude the world (vyāmoha-artham).

The relevant portion of Amalananda’s commentary is worth quoting in full: ⁶⁴

“pāñcarātra-kartur vāsudevasya yadā-devā sarvajñatvāvagamāt kapila-pat- > añjalyādīnāṃ ca jīvatvāt, pāñcarātrasya purāṇeṣu buddhādid-eśanāvat vyāmohart- > thaṃ īśvara-praṇītatva-śravaṇāt, na yogādy-adhikaraṇagatārthata. . . . . . . . . . . . . > siddhāntastu — buddhi-pūrvakṛtiḥ pāñcarātraṃ, niśvāsitaṃ śrutiḥ! > tena jīva-janis-tatra siddhā gauṇī niyamyate!! > yāvaddhi ekādeśe veda-virodhād-īśvara-buddheḥ vedamūlatvam, vedādvā > narva-viṣayatvaṃ pramīyate, tāvadeva svataḥ-pramāṇa-vedāt jīvinutpatti-pramitau > tad-ṛg-buddhi-pūrvaka-īśvara-vacanān-na jīvot-pattir avagantuṃ śakyate; ataḥ pramāṇa- > paha-taviṣaye gauṇaṃ tad-vacanaṃ, na tu bhrāntaṃ pūrva-pakṣa-yukti-rṛiti". Thus it has been proved that the Pāñcarātrāgamas are not contradicted by Vedic declarations. As regards the contention that these āgamas are contra- dicted by other smṛti-works, or by statements-made by these āgamas elsewhere, Yāmuna says the contradiction is only apparent. The seemingly con- tradictory passages lose their contradiction when we examine them keeping in mind the fact that one text is primary and the others are subordinate. As such, the explanation offered by the Advaitins to the four aphorisms of the Brahmasūtra in question, is entirely against the intentions of Bādarāyaṇa, who holds the Pāñcarātra in high esteem and as valid as the Vedas themselves.

Yāmuna states that Bādarāyaṇa, having refuted systems like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika on the ground that they militate against the Vedic tenets, takes up the question of the validity of the Pāñcarātrāgamas, because the context is

[[P57]] 42 such that the Pāñcarātra may, like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, be subjected to doubts regarding validity. That is why, Bādarāyaṇa questions the validity of the Pāñcarātra in the first two aphorisms which form the pūrva-pakṣa and esta- blishes the invalidity in the last two aphorisms which form the siddhānta. The pūrva-pakṣa-view had already been given above. The conclusion arrived at is that there is no contradiction to the origination of Saṅkarṣaṇa and other forms, since they are the Lord Himself, Who is of the form of Knowledge (vijñāna) and Who is the Origin (ādi) of the entire Universe. So it is to be admitted that the Lord Vāsudeva, though One, Himself becomes the kāraṇa as well as the kārya.

Then Yāmuna explains the same sūtras in different ways and for different purposes. The sūtra na ca kartuḥ kāraṇam (II-ii-40) is explained by him as speaking of the revealed character (apauruṣeyatva) of the Vedas. It is here that the Naiyāyika’s view that the Vedas are the work of Īśvara, is refuted. It may be recalled that Yāmuna differs from the Naiyāyika regarding the author- ship of the Vedas. Vedas, according to Yāmuna, are impersonal in character whereas, for the Naiyāyikas, they are the work of Īśvara, the Lord of the Universe. The above sūtra means, says Yāmuna, that the Vedas are not (na ca) the work (kāraṇam) of Īśvara (kartuḥ). In the course of these explanations, Yāmuna makes it clear that the Pāñcarātra is as valid as the Vedas themselves. He says further that since the Lord Vāsudeva Himself is glorified in many Upaniṣads and Purāṇas, Pāñcarātra, His work, cannot be doubted of its validity by attributing deceit, etc. to Vāsudeva, its author.

Yāmuna then examines the view entertained by the bhāṣyakāra that the Pāñcarātra is partially non-authoritative. He says that this statement had been made by the bhāṣyakāra lest the weak minded should reject the Vedas completely and take up these āgamas because of their easily comprehensible nature.

Regarding the contention that the Pāñcarātra is invalid on the ground that people outside the pale of the Vedas practise the rites ordained by it, Yāmuna disproves it with all his logical skill, posing various alternatives regarding the exact definition of “being outside the pale of the Vedas”. Vedic seers of great repute like Bhṛgu, Bharadvāja and Nārada accept the authority of these āgamas, as is revealed by their own works. Even today, orthodox people are found to perform the rites enjoined in these texts, as for instance, regarding the construction of temples, consecration of images and the like. They perform these rites, even as they perform other Vedic duties.

As regards the argument that Pāñcarātra is invalid since it is followed by the Bhāgavatas who do not belong to any one-of the three higher castes, Yāmuna replies that the Bhāgavatas are orthodox Brāhmaṇas that follow the Ekāyana branch of the Śukla Yajurveda. They too maintain the brāhmaṇical marks like

[[P58]] 43 knots of hair and remember their gotra. The brāhmaṇical status of a man, however, is known by ocular perception (pratyakṣa) coupled with the recollec- tion of the particular family to which he belongs. Since such a practice of remembering the gotra exists among the bhāgavatas, the fact that they are brāhmaṇas is to be accepted without any doubt.

Yāmuna then examines the smṛti-statement that the bhāgavatas belong to the vaiśya-vrātya community, ⁶⁵ which is decidedly non-Vedic. It has been urged by the opponent that the bhāgavatas were referred to by the term sāttvata in the smṛtis. In reply, Yāmuna points out that the terms bhāgavata and sāttvata appearing in the smṛtis need not necessarily be taken as pointing to those belonging to the particular vaiśya-vrātya community because these two terms can as well be taken as referring to people other than those belonging to the above community, bearing the same name. As a matter of fact, the bhāgavatas have nothing to do with the vaiśya-vrātya community referred to in the smṛti-texts. If these two terms bhāgavata and sāttvata are taken as referring only to a low community, Yāmuna argues that even the term ācārya mentioned along with the term sāttvata in the Manusmṛti-passage : “vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā” “cārya eva ca” (X; 23), will have to be taken as referring only to the low-born man and not to the learned Brāhmaṇa teacher. But we know that the term ācārya refers to the teacher in its conventional sense and that it could be a name of some low-born people also.

As regards the contention that the terms bhāgavata and sāttvata should be taken in their conventional sense alone, meaning the low-caste people, the author says this contention is baseless. When a term is capable of yielding a meaning by etymology itself, there is no justification in pressing the conventional sense into service. Even the instance of the rathakāra-nyāya applies only to cases other than the present one. Thus etymologically, these two terms bhāgavata and sāttvata, which are formed by the addition of the suffix “aṇ” to the bases sattvat and bhagavat, refer to the devotees of the Lord conveyed by those bases, and this explanation is to be accepted as genuine.

Therefore, the contention of the opponents that these Bhāgavatas are identical with vrātyas ⁶⁶ on account of similarity of vocation, stands refuted. Vrātyas who look after the temples and the bhāgavatas who perform the five-fold

“The Atharvaveda mentions a new class of beings called ‘vrātyas’. They meant originally > those that were naturally pure and thus needed no saṃskāra — hence they are glorified in > the Atharvaveda. Prāṇa is spoken in the Prāṇopaniṣad as being a ‘vrātya’ and has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya in his Bhāṣya as “prathama-jātvāt anyasya saṃskartur-abhāvāt asaṃskṛtaḥ vrātyaḥ; tvaṃ svabhāvata eva śuddhā ityabhiprāyaḥ”….The Vrātyas seem to have attached greater importance to a life of austerity and meditation upon God, than to the performance of sacrificial rites and the like. It is stated in the Atharvaveda (XV-II) that anyone who “entertains a vrātya will gain the road that gods travel", “will gain possession of waters", “will obtain what is clear", etc. The Veda similarly mentions further other benefits bestowed upon those that honoured the vrātyas. The word ‘vrātya’ may or may not be understood as a form of Brahman — but it is evident that at this and subsequent times there must have developed in the public a reverence for religious mendicants who wandered about the land….without conform- ing themselves to the Brāhmaṇic conventions. Even during the Vedic times, their failure to conform to Vedic rites seems to have been disapproved and the Vrātyas were regarded as falling outside the pale of orthodox society. And an attempt seems to have been made by the orthodox section to take the Vrātyas back into their fold by subjecting them to some purificatory ceremonies called ‘vrātyastomas’, a noteworthy content of the Tāṇḍya-brāhmaṇa of the Sāma Veda. ‘They are sacrifices meant to enable these Aryan but non-Brāhmaṇical Indians to enter the Brāhmaṇical order’ (MacDonel, Sanskrit Literature, p. 210). But it seems that the Vrātyastomas had not much effect and the Vrātya-section continued to develop and increase. Otherwise there was no necessity for the later orthodox literature contained in sūtras and smṛtis to treat of Vrātyas and the Vrātyastomas, e.g., Kātyāyana Śrauta-sūtra says: “vrātyā-yogyaḥ stomaḥ vrātyāḥ prasiddheḥ eva, patitasāvitrikaḥ". (Vācaspatyam: p. 5071). They came to be a heterodox and degraded people, as may be ascertained from the deri- vative explanation of the word ‘vrātya’ as: “vrātāt saṃhāt cyavati yat, avyavahārye saṃskāra-hīne jātima-tropajīvinī" (Vācaspatyam: p. 5071). pp. 151-53. “The position of the Vrātyas was much better than that of the Śūdras. They were certainly non-śūdras but were privileged Aryans and had degraded themselves by discarding the Brāhmaṇical conventions. Otherwise, the Vrātyastomas or the purificatory ceremonies cannot be significant except that they were designed by the orthodox section to take back the Vrātyas, the non-conformists, within their fold” — p. 150.

[[P59]] 44 activities like abhigamana, upādāna, ijyā, svādhyāya and yoga that are ordained upon devout Pāñcarātrins, cannot at all be identical. The usage of terms like bhāgavata and sāttvata should not be understood as necessitated by the non- brāhmaṇical status of those people. They should be explained like the terms brāhmaṇa and parivrājaka. Yāmuna supports this view by citing other nyāyas.

The next contention is that bhāgavatas are not at all orthodox Brāhmaṇas, since they worship the Lord for their livelihood and also take in the food offered to Him, which acts are strictly prohibited by the orthodox. The reply is that all bhāgavatas are not found engaged in worshipping the Lord for livelihood. It is true that some bhāgavatas under acute financial circumstances, perform the worship of Lord Viṣṇu in temples for their maintenance (svārtha). But this does not affect the brāhmaṇical character of the bhāgavatas in general, who are great devotees. Worshipping is prohibited only when it is done by greedy worshippers purely as a trade, but not otherwise.

[[P60]] 45 As regards the argument that the bhāgavatas are identical with the devalakas since they, like the latter, worship God for livelihood and live upon God’s exchequer, which activities are denounced by the smṛtis, Yāmuna on the evidence of many smṛti-passages, replies that the above condemnation applies only to those worshippers that are not initiated according to the Pāñcarātra scriptures. It is also pointed out that the term devalaka applies to one that worships deities other than Viṣṇu like Rudra and Kāḷī.

Regarding the allegation that the bhāgavatas are not orthodox since they eat the food offered to the Lord and use His nirmālya which activities are refuted by the smṛtis, Yāmuna discusses at length and concludes on the evidence of many saṃhitās and smṛtis, that there is nothing contradicting the usage of Lord Viṣṇu’s naivedya and nirmālya. Statements condemning their usage are to be taken as referring to the naivedya and nirmālya of deities other than Viṣṇu. Yāmuna declares that nobody can call in question the holy character of the naivedya and nirmālya of Lord Viṣṇu.

Regarding the contention that the bhāgavatas are non-Vedic on the ground that they perform sacraments like garbhādhāna in a way that is quite different from the familiar one followed by others generally, Yāmuna replies as follows: These bhāgavatas who follow the Ekāyana-śākhā of the White Yajurveda perform sacraments only according to the Gṛhya-sūtra of Kātyāyana. They do not lose their brāhmaṇical status by not performing these rites in the way ordained by other branches of the Veda. Anywhere, this is the case regarding the observa- tion of certain sacraments and a man following a particular Vedic recension should not question the validity of the way in which these very sacraments are performed by other Vedic groups, without taking into consideration the tradi- tional factor that runs through all such practices in general.

The Ekāyana branch of the Śukla Yajurveda on which the Pāñcarātra is claimed to be based, Yāmuna declares, is not of human origin. He refers his readers in this connection, to another work, ‘Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya’, which seems to be his own work, ⁶⁷ and which is unfortunately lost to us. This work establishes the apauruṣeyatva or the revealed character of the Ekāyana branch, says Yāmuna. The Bhāgavatas of the present day (his own times), says Yāmuna in fine, cannot be proved to be Vrātyas (the non-conformists to Vedic rites), since they carry out all the Vedic rites like any other orthodox follower of the Vedas, perform the Sāvitrī (Gāyatrī)—japa and so on.

Towards the end of the text, there are two stanzas in praise of Nāthamuni, the author’s grandfather and the disciples of Nāthamuni. It is said that the disciples of Nāthamuni were great champions of the Bhāgavata (Sāttvata) religion and

[[P61]] 46

that they were unparalleled dialecticians, fit to silence the opponents through the very arguments set forth by the latter. Nāthamuni is glorified here as a great devotee of Lord Mukunda (Viṣṇu, the Bestower of Mokṣa), and as one that had a direct vision of the Three Realities (‘tattva-traya’, i.e., the cit, acit and īśvara), through his Yogic powers.

[[P62]]

See my “Yāmuna’s Contribution to Viśiṣṭādvaita”, published by Prof. M. Rangachary Memorial Trust, Madras, 1971. [^16_2]: See p. 170 Sanskrit text of this work. ↩︎
See p. 4, foot-note 3, below. ↩︎
See T. A. Gopinātha Rau’s “Śrī Subrahmanya Aiyar Lectures on the History of Śrīvaiṣ- ṇavas“, where he identifies Nāthamuni with Śrīnātha, on inscriptional data: p. 30, line 26. [^17_2]: Vide Prapannāmṛta, ch. 108, śl. 71, p. 417. ↩︎
Ibid., p. 413 ff. ↩︎
Ibid., p. 416. ↩︎
Ibid. ↩︎
Nyāyasiddhāñjana: ch. I, pp. 30, 42, 43; ch. III, p. 104; ch. V, pp. 116, 125, 129; ch. VI, p. 159, 161, etc. See also Nyāyapariśuddhi: pp. 109; 130, 132, 138, etc. In this work it is also said that the Nyāyatattva of Nāthamuni criticizes and refutes the classical Nyāya system of Gautama. Cf. p. 87 : “bhagavannāthamunibhir nyāyatattvasaṃhvayā avadhīryākṣapādādīn nyabandhi nyāyapaddhatiḥ” [^17_7]: See Stotraratna: ślokas 1, 2, 3 and 65. These verses state that Nāthamuni was a great philosopher, teacher and devotee. Special reference is made in verse 3 to his bringing the great bhakti-yoga to the reach of the lay man by his preachings as well as writings. See in this connection, Deśika’s commentary on this verse, p. 28. The last verses of Āgamaprāmāṇya also bring about the glory of Nāthamuni and his dis- ciples. Of special importance is the phrase “sva-yogamahi-mā-pratyakṣa-tattva-trayaḥ” attributed by Yāmuna to Nāthamuni, in the penultimate verse, which means that the latter attained a vision of the Three Realities (cit, acit and Īśvara) by means of his Yogic powers. [^17_8]: Nyāyasiddhāñjana ch. I, p. 35; ch. III, p. 106, etc. See also Nyāyapariśuddhi. pp. 152, 153. ↩︎
Vedāntasiddhāñjana, Ch. VI, p. 170. ↩︎
Prapannāmṛta renders this term as “rakṣatāguruḥ” (ch. III, śl. 98). Also cf. ibid. ś. 99 ff. [^18_3]: Veṅkaṭanātha renders this in his Gītārthasaṅgrahārakṣā commentary on Yāmuna’s Gītārthasaṅgraha, p. 16. [^18_4]: T. A. Gopinātha Rau, however, does not accept these dates. See “Śrī Subrahmanya Aiyar Lectures…”, p. 31. [^18_5]: See pp. 90 and 170 of the text. ↩︎
Cf. Stotraratna, verse 11:

svabhāvikānavadhikātiśayeśitṛtvaṃ > nārāyaṇā! tvayi na mṛṣyati vaidikaḥ kaḥ? > brahmā śivaḥ śatamakhaḥ paramasvarāḍ- > ty-ete ‘pi yasya mahimārṇava-vipruṣaste " Vide Prapannāmṛta, ch. IX, p. 22, for the above account. [^19_2]: See p. 90 of the text. See also Yāmuna’s Contribution…, pp. 14-16
Prapannāmṛta ch. 108, p. 416, wrongly ascribes the Puruṣanirṇaya to Nāthamuni. [^19_3]: The exact authorship of this work is open to doubt. The Rahasyatrayasāra of Veṅkaṭanātha, which enumerates the works of Yāmuna as eight in number (counting the three Siddhis of the Siddhitraya separately), does not mention the Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya. But the way in which Yāmuna refers to it in the Āgamaprāmāṇya, which is similar to his reference to the Puruṣanirṇaya, makes us believe that it might be his own work, until It is proved otherwise.
↩︎
Cf. Yatīndramatadīpikā, p. 30: ↩︎
For a refutation of the Pāñcarātra way of worship, see Ānanda-saṃhitā: ch. XIII. śls. 1-4. For a refutation of the Vaikhānasa mode of worship, see the verse “aśrī-karam-asaumyam ca vaikhānasamatattvikam" etc., quoted by Deśika in his Pāñcarātrarakṣā, p. 101, as from Tantra-rāmasamuccaya. [^21_2]: Cf. Sāṅkhyāmṛtadīpikā of Deśika, śl. 32, p. 120: ↩︎
See pp. 299-300, Liṅgadhāraṇa-candrikā of Nandi-keśvara edited by M. R. Sakhare. ↩︎
Ibid, p. 276. For an account of the theories regarding the origin and source of the āgamic lore in general, see Ibid. p. 266 ff. ↩︎
Vide Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā by S. Suryanarayaṇaśāstrī, p. 9, where he quotes Saint Rāmānuja in the Vedārtha-saṅgraha : “the Vedas and the Āgamas are the word of the Lord, who is the Supreme Being, and who are the social doctrines.” How the Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas, etc. interpret the relation: p. 39; “The view generally accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins is that Vedas equally with the Āgamas are authoritative, the only difference between them being that the Vedas are general, the Āgamas are special.” [^22_2]: How the Tantras of the Families by P. T. Śrīnivāsa Iyengar, p. 107: “The carya and kriya books of the Āgamas describe the means of worship….but the upbringing of bhakti in many cases to be supplemented by some psychological discipline to be found in the Brahma-jñāna… the third book of even Āgamas too deals with yoga, the forth book jñāna with dharma… in the sense of exposition of the philosophical principles underlying the Āgama teaching…. Though each Āgama thus possesses aṅga-ṅgāda and upāṅga-pāṭha…the Āgamas are primarily the scriptures of Bhakti Mārga, as the Upaniṣadas are the Scriptures of the Jñāna Mārga. The former is an easy path and the latter a difficult one.” [^22_3]: Cf. Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, XI. 63b-64a: ↩︎
Chāndogya, VII. 1.2: “ṛgvedaṃ bhagavo ‘dhyeme…ekāyanam" Cf. also Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XIII. 6.1.1: “sa etaṃ . . . .pāñcarātraṃ . . . .". [^23_2]: See Spandapradīpikā, pp. 2, 8, 22, 40, etc. : ↩︎
II. II. 42-45. ↩︎
D. N. Radhakrishnan, in his Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 499, observes: ↩︎
Ibid., p. 265: ↩︎
See the text, p. 109 ff. ↩︎
Cf. Yatīndramatadīpikā, p. 30: ↩︎
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, I. iii. 2: “api vā kartṛ-sāmānyāt pramāṇamanumānam syāt”. ↩︎ ↩︎
See Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, p. 497. ↩︎
Cf. Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 167: “evaṃ sākṣāt īśvaradayāmūlatvāt manvādīnibandhanebhyo ‘syātirekaḥ". [^27_2]: Cf. Śrībhāṣya under I. iii. 25: “śaṅkirṇa-brāhmaṇānau" etc. quoted by Deśika. ↩︎
Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 167: “tata eva caiṣāṃ viprakīrṇa-śākhāmūlatvaṃ siddhānta ityapi sūcitam". [^27_4]: Ibid.: “. . . .ucchinna-śākhā-mūlatvamastu”. ↩︎
Ibid., p. 168: “ . .pañcarātrasya śrutyādivirodhe. . . .vikalpa eva “. ↩︎
See Pāñcarātrarakṣā, p. 154: ↩︎
Cf. Pāñcarātrarakṣā, p. 101. Deśika quotes the verse “gurūpadeśasaṃśuddhā kalpa- latā-samṛddhavatāṃ” etc. from the Bhṛgusaṃhitā (a Vaikhānasa-work) and explains the term “kalpalatāmṛddha” as the mantra of the Pāñcarātrāgamas. [^28_2]: See Śābarabhāṣya under II. iv. 20: ↩︎
Cf. the following verse attributed to Yāmuna, quoted in the Prapannāmṛta Ch. 111: ↩︎
I. ii. 42. ↩︎
I. ii. 35. ↩︎
Cf. the text, pp. 61 and 81, and Śrībhāṣya under I. i. 1. ↩︎
Now (restored). ↩︎ ↩︎
The references given here are to the restored ms. on paper. ↩︎
↩︎
The Catuśślokī and particularly the Stotraratna are good instances of Yāmuna’s poetic gifts. [^31_2]: See the text, p. 81, f.n.4; p. 82, f.n.5; p. 96, f.n.8 ↩︎
See the text, p. 29, f.n.2; p. 30, f.n.3. ↩︎
See the text, p. 1 : ↩︎
Cf. Yatīndramatadīpikā, p. 30: ↩︎
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, I. iii. 2: “api vā kartṛ-sāmānyāt pramāṇamanumānam syāt”. ↩︎ ↩︎
See Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, p. 497. ↩︎
Manusmṛti X-23: “vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā" carya eva ca *bhāruśca nijaghnāśca maitrassāttvata eva ca". [^34_2]: Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, VI. i. 44-50. ↩︎
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 499. ↩︎
Keith A. B. Karma-mīmāṃsā, p. 61. ↩︎
Cf. The Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. p. 87. Also cf. Ślokavārtika. Saṃbandhākṣepa- parihāra, śls. 47, 68, where the theories of the creation and dissolution of the universe are refuted and see also Ibid. śl. 113 for a general refutation. ↩︎
Vide The Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, p. 87: “As the Naiyāyika bases his argument on the analogy of the carpenter supervising and guiding the making of wooden articles, and as this carpenter is a bodied being, the analogy, extended a little further, would prove this supervising ‘God’ also to be a bodied being; but at the same time we know that no bodied being can exercise any intelligent control over such subtle things as the atoms, Dharma and Adharma". [^37_2]: Vide Karma-mīmāṃsā, pp. 62-63: Kumārila ridicules the idea of the existence of Prajāpati before creation of matter; without a body, how could he feel desire? If he possessed a body, then matter must have existed before his creative activity, and there is no reason to deny then, the existence of other bodies. Nor is there any intelligible motive for creation; granted that, when the world exists, conditions are regulated by merit and demerit, originally there was no merit or demerit, and the creation of a world full of misery was inexcusable, for it is idle to argue that a creator could only produce a world in which there is sin and pain. Yet, if his action is conditioned, he cannot be omnipotent. If, again, it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement, this contradicts the theory that he is perfectly happy, and would involve him in much wearisome toil." ↩︎
Vide Karma-mīmāṃsā, p. 64: “Though the existence of a creator is denied, the Mīmāṃsā accepts without reserve, the doctrine of the existence of the self or soul and Śābarasvāmin elaborates the case for its existence; Prabhākara and Kumārila both develop the theme in close accordance with this view. The necessity of the existence of the self for the Mīmāṃsā rests on its fundamental assumption that the sacrifices are performed to secure, in many cases, a reward not in this life. There must, therefore, be an eternal entity, distinct from the body, the sense-organs, and cognitions, which is both the doer of actions and the reaper of their reward." [^38_2]: The Bhaṭṭa has in his mind, the text: “na tasya kāryaṃ karaṇaṃ ca vidyate, svābhāvīkī jñāna-bala-kriyā ca" (Śvetāśvatara: III. 6), which states clearly that the Lord’s Knowledge, Power, etc. are natural with Him but not due to any means. ↩︎
Vide the following extracts from the Karma-mīmāṃsā: ↩︎
Cf. the verse “māyāmohana-vigraheṇa hariḥ. .” on p. 52 of the Text. See Viṣṇupurāṇa: III chs. 17 and 18 for this account. ↩︎
Vide Karma-mīmāṃsā, p. 61: ↩︎
Vide Karma-mīmāṃsā, pp. 39-40: ↩︎
Thus, for instance, the meaning of the word “pika” in the sentence “pikaḥ kūjati" should be got with the help of the next term “kūjati’”. Since “kūjana” is characteristic of a cuckoo-bird, the term “pika” is to be taken as standing for the cuckoo-bird. [^45_2]: The Prābhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, pp. 163-164. ↩︎
Cf. Karma-mīmāṃsā, pp. 41-42: ↩︎
Cf. Śaṅkara’s commentary on II. II. 42-45. ↩︎
See Śaṅkara on II. ii. 42. ↩︎
Vide Śaṅkara on II. ii. 44. ↩︎
Cf. Śaṅkara on II. ii. 45. ↩︎
It may be noted that for the Sāṅkhyas, validity and invalidity are both intrinsic; for the Naiyāyikas, they are extrinsic; for the Buddhists, invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic and for the Vedāntins, validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic. ↩︎
Vide Karma-mīmāṃsā, p. 42: ↩︎ ↩︎
Cf. Śvetāśvatara; III-4: “paiśyacakṣuṣāb” sa śrotrīyakarāgāḥ”, and also Kena, I-7: ↩︎
Quoted by Śābara in his commentary on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. XII-i-25, p. 319. ↩︎
I. Whether Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahmasūtra is the same as Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata, is a matter of controversy. See in this connection an article entitled “Is Vyāsa the same as Bādarāyaṇa”, by Śrī P. V. Rāmānuja Śāstrī, which appeared in Vol. VII of the Śrī Venkateswara Oriental Research Institute, Tirupati, 1946. pp. 176–179. [^54_2]: J. Though it is Vāsudeva that manifests Himself as Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, there is nothing to indicate that He is equal with the other three. He is considered to be the Highest and the most important of all these forms. The statement of the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, Ch. XXXVI. 63b — “guṇabuddhāśvabhāvabhinnam eva rūpaṃ”—is to be noted. Vāsudeva is the main form, to which the rest are subordinate and complementary. [^54_3]: Cf. Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, Ch. 53: ↩︎
This explanation of Yāmuna is quite in accordance with the Pāñcarātrāgamas. Cf. Ahir- budhnya Saṃhitā, Ch. 36. śls. 64-65: ↩︎
See Śaṅkarabhāṣya with Bhāmatī, Vedāntakalpataru and Kalpataruparimala edited by M. N. Anantakṛṣṇaśāstrin, re-edited by Bhārgavaśāstrin and published by Paṇḍuraṅ Jawaji, Bombay, 1938, p. 573. ↩︎
Vide Manusmṛti X. 23:

“vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā" cārya eva ca! bhāruśca nijaghnāśca maitrassāttvata eva ca!!"
↩︎
Vide the following extracts from Liṅgadhāraṇacandrikā: ↩︎
See p. 4 foot-note 3. ↩︎