Source: TW
3 THE SIDDHĀNTACINTĀMAṆI - A DETAILED STUDY
The Siddāntacintāmaṇi of Śrīnivāsa II which we have taken up for a detailed study is mainly concerned with establishing the point that Lord Viṣṇu forms both the material and instrumental causes of the world.
In the opening verse the author pays obeisance to the Supreme Brahman Who is advitīya (Who does not have a second entity as equal to Him) and Who has both Cit and Acit as His body. In the next verse he pays homage to Yatipati (King of Ascetics) i.e., Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, his own grandfather Aṇṇaguru (Aṇṇaya Dīkṣita-I as mentioned in the genealogical table in chapter I), his father (Śrīnivāsa Tātārya I) and his bhāṣyaguru, Kamalānilaya Makhīśvara (i.e., Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita). He states that he could have easy access to all the śāstras due to the grace of his elder brother (Aṇṇaya II) and then undertakes to bring out the secret of the Vedāntas. In another verse he points out that this work is meant for those who, though they have learnt the [[P89]] Siddhānta (of Viśiṣṭādvaita) in a general way, are not well-versed in the actual doctrines and concepts of the system.
Śrīnivāsa points out that the adorable Bādarāyaṇa, in the opening aphorism of his Brahmasūtra (I.1.1): “athāto brahmajijñāsā” states that one should make enquiry into the nature of Brahman. The Taittirīya text (Bhṛgu. I): tad vijijñāsasva (you desire to know That) specifies what is intended by the word ‘tad’, which has been expressed in the preceding sentence itself, viz., yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, etc. So it is clear that the scripture refers only to the causal character of the Brahman in relation to the universe, as the thing to be known. Keeping this in mind, Bādarāyaṇa framed the second rule thus: “janmādyasya yataḥ” (I.1.2) (Brahman is that from Which all the beings are born; that by Which they are sustained after being born, and that Which they enter, after reaching Him). Otherwise he would have composed the second aphorism thus: “janmādikāraṇaṁ brahma” (Brahman is the cause of the origin, etc. of the universe). Even in the Atharvaśikhā text: “kāraṇaṁ tu dhyeyaḥ” (However, the Cause is to be [[P90]] contemplated upon) only this (causal character of the Brahman) is implied as the distinguishing characteristic of the object to be contemplated upon. Moreover, jñāna (knowledge) conveys the idea of dhyāna (meditation) only. So the essence of this discussion is that jijñāsā means only the desire to know and that the distinguishing characteristic of the object desired to be known is nothing but the distinguishing characteristic of the object that is to be meditated upon.
The view that the Brahman is nirguṇa (without any attribute) held by the Advaitins is hereby set aside for the simple reason that unless the distinguishing characteristic of causality is clearly known, the concept of causality remains unknown. It is absolutely necessary that the principle that is pointed out in the Brahmasūtra as jijñāsya must have these characteristic features: (a) It must be the ‘creator’ characterized by a direct knowledge of the Material Cause of the universe viz., Cit and Acit which form Its body; (b) It must also have a desire to create; (c) It should actually perform the act of creation; (d) It should also possess qualities like [[P91]] omniscience and omnipotence which are required to make It the Efficient Cause.
By the same token, the view held by some that meditation should be done on Brahman Who has “unreal” attributes is also rejected. This is so because the specific characteristics which mark the knowledge of the causal principle that forms the means of liberation cannot merely be fictitious.
As a corollary the (Advaitic) view that the world is unreal also stands rejected because the world which consists of the sentient and insentient entities becomes the characteristic feature of the causal principle as the Material Cause. So it has to be an eternally real (pāramārthika) entity. “The view that one travels from untruth to truth has been rejected elsewhere”, points out the author.1
Now comes the objection that one and the same entity cannot form both the Material and Efficient Cause. According to the critic, these two features should necessarily have two different loci. That is why the Naiyāyikas define Nimittakāraṇa (Efficient Cause) [[P92]] as that which is different from the Samavāyikāraṇa (Inherent Cause).2
The terms Samavāyikāraṇa and Upādāna Kāraṇa convey the same meaning too. The difference between the stick which forms the Instrumental Cause of a pot and the lump of clay which constitutes its Material Cause is directly perceived. That is why the scripture need not speak about it. Even scripture cannot convey something which is opposed to direct perception. That is why the Mīmāṁsakas state that statements like “ādityo yūpaḥ” [Tai.Brā.II.1.56.2] (The sacrificial pillar is the Sun) and “kṛṣṇalaṁ śrapayet” [Ib.] (One should fry the iron balls) should be taken in a secondary connotation since the direct meaning is inconsistent with our practical experience. One can deduce that the Material and Efficient Causes are mutually different, with the help of the following inferential statements:
- Brahman cannot be the Efficient Cause of the universe since He is the Material Cause like clay etc. [[P93]]
- Brahman cannot be the Material Cause because He is the Efficient Cause like a potter.
Then we have the scripture (Śvetāśvatara IV.10): “One should realise Māyā as the Material Cause (Prakṛti) and Maheśvara as the One who has Māyā under His control (Māyin)” (i.e., He is the Efficient Cause).
In reply to the above, the author says: Neither Perception nor Inference can prove the difference between the Instrumental and Material Causes. For instance, a stick which forms the efficient cause for producing a pot, forms the material cause for the shape etc. that take place in the pot. That is why the definition given by the logicians for the efficient cause as “that which is different from the inherent cause” (samavāyikāraṇa) is not justifiable.
As a matter of fact there is no contradiction involved in one and the same entity being the material cause as also the efficient cause. Brahman does not form the material cause of the world in His essential nature because of the scriptures which declare that “He is without parts; without activity; peaceful, flawless and taintless” and “The supreme Lord is free from modifications, pure and [[P94]] eternal”. These texts declare that God is free from any kind of modification, which in the ordinary world of our experience, becomes necessary if an entity is to become a Material Cause. Modification means, attainment of a different state of existence in essence. Further, if what the critic says is true, then the world which has Brahman who is full of bliss as its Material Cause, should also become blissful, which, however, is not true. But the Lord becomes the material cause only when He is “qualified” by Cit and Acit. This qualification by cit and acit is again possible through “body-soul” relationship. This interpretation is supported by the Antaryāmibrāhmaṇa-section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Mādhyandina recension) (III.7.3 ff.) commencing with the text: “He whose body the earth is…….; He whose body the waters are……….;” etc. and ending with the passages: “He whose body the soul is ….”; “He whose body the Unmanifest is”; “He whose body the Indestructible” is; “He whose body Mṛtyu (death) is…..” etc. Further, the following words of great sages also confirm this truth: “The entire world is your body” (Rām.Yu. 120.25); “All of them are His body” (Vi. Pu. I. 22. 86); “All that is indeed the body [[P95]] of Hari” (Ib. I.20.38); “That water which is the body of Viṣṇu” (Vi. Pu. II.12.37).
This reference to the world as the “body” of the Lord cannot be taken in a secondary sense because the definition of body given by Śrī Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya (under II.1.9: na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt) (Not so. There is no inconsistency because examples illustrative of the Brahman being unaffected by the evils both as Cause and Effect are available), runs as follows: “yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṁ sarvātmanā svārthe niyantuṁ dhārayituṁ ca śakyam, taccheṣataikasvarūpaṁ ca, tat tasya śarīram”.
(“That particular substance which becomes fit for being invariably controlled and supported by a conscious being for its own sake, and which is subservient to it, becomes the body of the latter”).
This definition does not support such a contention (of secondary signification). The author states that this point has been clearly demonstrated in his other work, the Sāradarpaṇa.
At this point the critic raises the following objection: The Bṛhadāraṇyaka (III.7.9) states that the Vedas, Sacrifice etc. also [[P96]] form the body of the Lord. It is clear that this statement cannot be taken in its primary significance because Vedas are in the form of sound which is a quality (guṇa) and Sacrifice is in the form of an action (kriyā). Thus both of them do not form a substance (dravya). Rāmānuja’s definition of a body specifically mentions only a dravya as forming the body. How can this be accounted for? It cannot be argued that the words “Veda” and “Yajña” refer only to the presiding deities because such an explanation is possible even with reference to the Earth etc., which are mentioned in the same Upaniṣad as constituting the body of the Lord. It is not possible to give secondary interpretation to the words of the scripture so as to suit the requirements of the definition of the body given by Rāmānuja. The critic argues that both the Śrībhāṣya and the Śrutaprakāśikā on it are quite clear. A definition must be universal in its application. If the definition of body given by the Naiyāyikas: “Body is that which is a substratum of the activities, sense-organs, etc.” is not applicable to Earth etc., then by the same token, the definition of Rāmānuja that only a substance (dravya) can form the body of a conscious being is also not applicable [[P97]] universally. So one has to take both the cases as either primary in importance or both as secondary in significance.
In reply to this, Śrīnivāsa says that if one can negate the meaning of scripture with the help of fallacious arguments then one can even disprove the existence of Brahman by logic (as is done by the Buddhists). This would result in God’s becoming a non-God. The word “Brahman” normally indicates the Supreme Brahman. But it can also refer to the individual self. How can one account for this? Does it mean that a Jīva and the Brahman are identical (as contended by the Advaitins)? Therefore, the word “dravya” used by Rāmānuja must be interpreted in such a way that there is no contradiction with practical reality and logic.
In the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa-section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (III. 7) under reference, it is clearly stated that Earth etc. form the body of the Lord. This can be confirmed with the help of valid means like Abhyāsa (Repetition) and Upapatti (justification). In both the Kāṇva and the Mādhyandina recensions of this Upaniṣad the statement “yasya pṛthivī śarīram” (He for whom the earth forms the body) is repeated several times. Therefore it is not [[P98]] reasonable to take the word “śarīra” in a secondary sense. Abhyāsa (Repetition) is one of the six pramāṇas accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas by which the intention of a given passage can be determined.
The six Pramāṇas are: Upakrama (opening statement), Upasaṁhāra (conclusion), Abhyāsa (Repetition), Apūrvatā (Novelty), Phalam (the net result), Arthavāda (Laudatory statement) and Upapatti (Corroboration). The passages that precede the text “yasya pṛthivī śarīram” run as follows: “yaḥ pṛthivyāṁ tiṣṭhan, pṛthivyā antaraḥ” (He who stands inside the earth and who controls it from within). Unless we take the intention (tātparya) into consideration, the connotation of the term “śarīram” cannot be understood at all. Since there is no “pramāṇa” which shows Earth etc. as the body of the Lord, the characteristic called Apūrvatā (Novelty) is also there in this definition. The Mīmāṁsakas also accept Apūrva as the most important indicator in arriving at the import of scriptural passages. Without any specific reason one cannot brush aside the word “śarīram” as secondary in nature. Even the word “Brahman”, for example, which denotes the [[P99]] Supreme Being may, as stated earlier, be interpreted to mean the individual soul, the agent of actions, through secondary connotation. The argument can be extended further and the word Brahman may ultimately be interpreted as the “liberated Jīva” since, like the Supreme Being, he is also of the nature of bliss and full of knowledge that does not contract.
Further, there is no valid means of knowledge which refutes Earth etc. being the body of the Lord. There is a statement: “The sacrificer is a bundle of darbha-grass” (yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ). Here, Perception directly contradicts the identity of the sacrificer and bundle of darbha. Such a possibility does not arise in the case of Earth, Water etc., forming the Lord’s body since Perception cannot apprehend the Lord supporting Earth, Water etc. as their Soul. Likewise it may be argued that the world is independent because it is seen to be so by Pratyakṣa. But this is opposed to scriptures which declare that the world is controlled by the Lord and that it is dependent on Him. Another example is the erroneous perception that the Moon in the sky is of the size of the span of the palm between the thumb and the forefinger (prādeśa). But this is [[P100]] disproved by Scripture which speaks of the vastness of the Moon, that it is a place to which some of the departed souls go, etc.
The author explains that if there is contradiction between two Pramāṇas, one can understand the criterion behind it as follows: That phenomenon which can be proved otherwise (anyathāsiddha) is sublatable by that which cannot otherwise be accounted for (ananyathāsiddha). Thus statements in Grammatical Coordination (sāmānādhikaraṇya) like: “The sacrificer is a bundle of Darbha grass” and “Fire indeed is the Brāhmaṇa” can be explained otherwise too. One need not take as real the identity between Darbha and the Sacrificer on one hand, and between fire and the Brāhmaṇa on the other. The sāmānādhikaraṇya here cannot be understood literally since it is opposed to direct perception. This only proves the difference between the two entities involved. Likewise the statement “tattvamasi” (Chānd. VI.8.7) (That Thou Art) which involves Grammatical Coordination cannot be directly taken as establishing the identity between God and man. This is so because everybody has the experience of his/her being different from God. Also the above passage can be explained as based upon [[P101]] the body-soul relationship subsisting between the living beings and God. Therefore there is no contradiction in holding that Earth etc. constitute the body of God on the basis of scriptural assertion.
The critic goes on to argue that in the wake of contradiction the stronger (prabala) Pramāṇa will sublate the weaker one (durbala). The strength of a Pramāṇa may be either due to its very nature (svarūpa) or due to its character (svabhāva). The Āgama, being impersonal (apauruṣeya), is relatively more powerful than Pratyakṣa by virtue of its Svarūpa itself. The power of the Āgama is also due to its characteristic features (svabhāva). Thus if an Āgama text is seen to be in direct opposition to Perception, we do not conclude that the scripture is invalid. We will only try to establish its validity by explaining its import in a different way. Since scripture disproves the Moon being of the size of the span between the thumb and the forefinger (prādeśa), the Perception of such a phenomenon can only be invalid. Further, the statement that the Moon is of the size of “prādeśa” is only made by a man. Thus Pratyakṣa becomes weaker in comparison with Āgama on two [[P102]] counts: Svarūpa and Svabhāva. As such, Pratyakṣa cannot sublate the more powerful Śruti.
In reply to this objection Śrīnivāsa says that although it is true that the impersonal scripture (apauruṣeya) is more powerful than Pratyakṣa, it still depends upon Pratyakṣa only for making its own meaning known. Hence it is weaker than Pratyakṣa. The “upajīvya-upajīvaka” (the sustainer-sustained) relation between two Pramāṇas must be properly understood. For instance, Inference (Anumāna) cannot prove that Fire is cool to touch because of its direct contradiction by Perception. Inference depends upon Perception only for grasping Vyāpti (invariable concomitance). So it is only an Upajīvaka. Moreover, a more powerful means of knowledge and a weaker means of knowledge cannot be mutually contradictory unless there is a clear case of opposition between them, i.e., when they are to be applied at one and the same time to a single case. The Pramāṇas Pratyakṣa and Śabda cannot simply contradict and cancel each other like light and darkness. The contradiction is not due to their inherent natures as such, but due to the inconsistency that exists between the objects of those [[P103]] Pramāṇas. Coming to the main issue, the author points out that the power of “tātparya-nirṇāyaka-liṅgas” (factors that determine the import of passages) like Upakrama and Upasaṁhāra is acceptable to all the Mīmāṁsakas.
To explain, Upakrama (the opening passage) sublates Upasaṁhāra (concluding statement). A specific statement (viśeṣa) contradicts the general (sāmānya). That rule which has no room at all (niravakāśa) sublates that which has a scope to operate (sāvakāśa). The Naimittika (occasioned acts) and the Kāmya (acts done to attain desired results) sublate the obligatory (nitya) karmans. This kind of sublation of one Pramāṇa by another is dependent upon the relative strength of factors like Upakrama and Upasaṁhāra. The Grammatical coordination found in the text “tattvamasi” can be accounted for even otherwise, on the analogy of the “śarīra-śarīri” relationship.
Therefore this cannot establish Abheda as opposed to Bheda which is a matter of direct perception. In so far as the independent existence of the world is concerned, although it is supported by Pratyakṣa, scriptural passages declare it to be dependent upon the [[P104]] Lord only. This dependence is of course beyond the scope of the human ken of knowledge. So Pratyakṣa is incapable of establishing the independent nature of the universe, in opposition to the scripture. It is thus proved that there is no contradiction from the viewpoint of Pratyakṣa in Earth, Water etc., forming the “body” of the Lord.
Such a position cannot be controverted even by Inference because there is no indicator which is invariably concomitant with the probandum (that which is to be proved). Further even Anumāna becomes sublatable (Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa i.e., Bādha) because of its contradiction with scripture. Nor is there any contradiction to this position by another scripture simply because no such scripture exists.
At this point the critic objects saying that the Earth, Water etc. cannot be proved to be the body of the Lord because of the contradiction with scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be Nirguṇa (without any attributes), Aśarīra (without a body) and Nirdoṣa (without any blemish). There are innumerable scriptural statements such as: “akāyam”, “apāṇipādaḥ”, “paśyati acakṣuḥ” [[P105]] (Śvet. III.19) “sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca”, “niṣkalaṁ, niṣkriyam” etc. which contradict the view that Brahman has body, senses etc. If the Lord has Earth, Water etc. as his body, how can He be referred to as being free from attributes, defects, body, etc.? Further the passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: “He who stands in the Earth…” etc. cannot be taken in its literal sense because there are other passages which pronounce that the Lord has no support (nirādhāra) and no abiding place (apratiṣṭhā). He abides in His own glory (sve mahimni pratiṣṭhitaḥ). Further the Lord is said to be all-pervasive. So how can He be said to exist inside the Earth? Further, terms like “pṛthivī” and “ākāśa” cannot be taken to mean merely Earth, Ether, etc. because this is another statement in the same context which says that the Earth does not know Him (yaṁ pṛthivī na veda) and that the Ether does not know Him. How can the insentient Earth be said to be “unable to know” the Lord? This is a clear case where the presiding Deity of the Earth is meant. Further if Earth has consciousness, then it becomes a living being. One living being cannot become the body of another living being. This is opposed to direct perception. One [[P106]] can only say that it is because of the dependence of an entity on a conscious being, it is referred to as the “body” of that being. So it is a clear instance of secondary importance (gauṇa).
This argument is set aside by our author who states that one Pramāṇa which is anyathāsiddha (that which can be proved otherwise) cannot sublate the scriptural statement which speaks of the Lord having Earth etc. as His body. There is a statement which declares that no living being should be injured (na hiṁsyāt sarvā bhūtāni). But this prohibition becomes applicable only to those cases where living beings are killed just for the sake of fulfilling one’s personal desires (rāgaprāpta-hiṁsā). It has no power to prohibit śāstraic injuries such as offering animals in sacrifice like Agniṣoma. If the sentence “na hiṁsyāt…” is applied in its full force, then there will be no scope for scriptural sanction of animal sacrifice. So the śāstra becomes invalid.
Likewise scriptures which declare that the Lord has no body etc. must be interpreted to mean that the Lord has no body caused by His past karmans. Scripture does not try to contradict the Lord having the Earth and Water as His body. Scripture which tries to [[P107]] make known to us supernormal phenomena cannot be expected to say one thing in one place and contradict the same in another, like a mad person. Otherwise the scriptural statements such as “Neither Sat nor Asat existed at that time”, “He does not have the body and the senses”, cannot convey any conclusive opinion at all. Likewise the statement that the Lord is “nirguṇa” cannot sublate His attributes such as Omniscience, Having all the desires realised, etc. The word Nirguṇa only means that He does not have undesirable qualities (heya-guṇas) belonging to Prakṛti. The upshot of this discussion is that there is no contradiction in the Lord’s having the universe as His body.
It may be contended that the passage “na ha vai saśarīrasya..” indicates that association with body is invariably concomitant with evil. As such it should be admitted that Lord also has sufferings since He has the universe as His body. The author points out that the particles “ha vai” found in that text confirm that suffering is caused by a body which is the outcome of karman. This is admitted on all hands. For instance, although a criminal and a police officer are both present in the same prison there is a major [[P108]] difference between the two. The criminal is being punished because of his crimes in the prison whereas the officer is not subject to it. So like the association with prison, association with the body alone cannot be the criterion for equating God and man. The Muṇḍaka passage (III.1.1) “Two birds of beautiful plumage sitting on the same tree…” clearly demonstrates this point that although both the individual self and the Supreme Self are sharing the same body, it is the former that suffers and the latter shines supreme in his beatific nature.
Further, the sentence “eṣa te ātmā antaryāmyamṛtaḥ” (Bṛh. Up. V.7.3) which is repeated at every step declares that the Lord is the Antaryāmin and that He is immortal. This means that He does not in the least, have any kind of association with undesirable qualities consequent upon His being inside the human body. There are two things to be noted: (1) that which is well-known in the ordinary world of mortals (loka-prasiddha) and (2) that which is well-known in scriptures (śruti-prasiddha). When both these occur at one and the same time it is only the former that takes precedence over the other. Therefore statements like “guṇāḥ guṇeṣu vartante” (Gītā [[P109]] XIV.23), and “daivī hyeṣā guṇamayī” (Ib. VII.14) refer only to the three qualities of Prakṛti viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. So whenever the word “guṇa” is heard, one automatically thinks of the three qualities only which belong to Prakṛti. Therefore when the Lord is referred to as “nirguṇa” it only means that He does not have any quality that is the product of Prakṛti.
The Chāndogya passage (VIII.1.5): “apahatapāpmā vijaraḥ” etc., first of all negates the presence of undesirable qualities in the Lord and then goes on to declare that He is having auspicious attributes (satyakāmaḥ, satyasaṅkalpaḥ). Those which become the counter-correlatives of negation (pratiṣedha-pratiyogins) are only positive virtues. By this we can also conclude, the author points out, that those who contemplate upon Brahman as having no qualities, form, etc. (nirālambana) cannot really go ahead with their contemplation because of its impossibility. In addition, all such passages which ordain meditation on Brahman as possessing innumerable auspicious attributes will also turn out to be invalid. At this juncture the critic may say that on the analogy of seeing the bigger star and then the smaller Arundhatī with its help (because [[P110]] of its apparent proximity) (sthūla-arundhatī-nyāya), and on the analogy of showing the Moon to a child by first pointing to a branch of a tree which appears to be close to the Moon (śākhā-candra-nyāya), all the passages speaking of Brahman as having qualities (saguṇa-vākya) are useful only to arrive at the Ultimate Truth that Brahman is without any quality (nirguṇa). This argument is beside the point, says the author, because noticing a bigger star is not contradictory to one’s sighting the smaller Arundhatī. But according to the Advaitin awareness of Brahman as having qualities is diametrically opposed to the concept of Brahman being devoid of qualities. It is as preposterous as contending that the perception of darkness is useful for the perception of light.
Likewise, scriptural passages which declare the Brahman to be devoid of gross body, hands, feet, eyes and so on are to be interpreted to mean that He does not have a body which is a product of Prakṛti, with which we are familiar. A number of texts such as “na karmaṇā vardhate, no kanīyān” (Tai. Āra.) and “na tasya prākṛtā mūrtiḥ” (Varāha Purāṇa 75. 44) refer only to such a [[P111]] feature. A Smṛti text (Āpastamba XX.4) also declares that “all the living beings form the body of the Lord who abides in the cave of their heart”. Scriptural texts like “acakṣuḥ”, “apāṇipādaḥ” etc. first of all concern themselves with only those features which come to the mind quickly. Therefore those words deny the presence of a “laukika” body for the Lord, but not that of His “alaukika” body.
The statement that the Lord is free from defects does not contradict His having Earth, Water etc. as body because it is only a material body that is subject to defects. Earth, Water etc. have been taken up as bodies by the Lord out of His free will (svecchā) and as such, they cannot be considered as the result of His past karman.
The author also points out that the scripture which speaks of the Lord as forming the Material Cause of the world, like the passage which speaks of His immutability must be taken as valid, and that they both must be understood in their respective spheres without any contradiction.
The critic further argues that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text (III.7.3): “He who stands in the Earth ..” will only point to the Lord’s being [[P112]] dependent on the Earth, Water etc., for His existence. “But is it possible”? asks the author. The Lord is the Self that controls bodies such as Earth and Water. He is said to be inside them like the thread that sustains beads or gems, forming a garland (sūtramaṇi-nyāya). Therefore the two sentences “He who stands in the Earth” and “He who is inside the Earth” clearly point out that while the Lord is inside the Earth, He is the cause of the essential nature (svarūpa), existence (sthiti) and the activity (pravṛtti) of Elements like Earth and Water. This interpretation alone will justify the Lord’s having these Elements as His body.
Then another objection is raised by the critic that the one who is all-pervasive (sarva-vyāpaka) cannot at the same time remain inside (antara) the Elements. Śrīnivāsa says that since the Lord is all-pervasive he can be present both within and without the elements and there is no contradiction at all. Without giving up contact with the space inside, the Lord can be present outside also and this is the speciality with Him (asādhāraṇya). Otherwise the “antarādhikaraṇa” (Br.Sū.I.1.21-22) will have no relevant subject at all for discussion. [[P113]]
Another objection levelled by the critic is that one living being is not seen to form the “body” of another living being. This is not correct, says Śrīnivāsa, because the phenomenon of a living being constituting the body of God is not a matter of direct perception for anybody. The Inference of the nature: “A living being cannot form the body of the Brahman because he is a conscious being” etc., is as fallacious as the Inference which tries to prove that the human skull is white because it is the limb of a living being. Such an argument is of no use in the present case dealing with the topic of God having the universe as His body.
Another objection is that the passage “sad eva somya idam agra āsīt ekam eva advitīyaṁ Brahma” (Chānd. Up. VI.2.1) first speaks of Brahman as qualified by duality (dvaita) and then speaks of there being no second entity (dvaitābhāva). Therefore ultimately the scripture denies the reality of Earth, Water and the like, even as one realises and declares the unreality of silver in a shell. However, this is not acceptable, says our author, because the word “advitīya” (without a second) only negates the existence of another homogenous entity (sajātīya-dvitīya-rāhitya). Yāmuna in his [[P114]] Siddhitraya ("Saṁvitsiddhi") makes the following declaration3: “When we say that the Cola Emperor is without a second (advitīya) in this world, we only intend to deny the existence of another Emperor equal to him. We do not deny the existence of his children, servants, wife and others.” Patañjali the author of the Mahābhāṣya also states that “when a man is asked to find a second bull to match one bull already present, he will naturally look for an animal belonging to the same species (of bull), but not for a horse or a donkey.”
The critic, however, says that in this passage (ekam eva advitīyam) which involves Grammatical Co-ordination, the absence of a second entity is already conveyed by the expression “ekam eva”. So the word “advitīya” will become futile. But according to the Siddhāntin the expression “ekam eva” is significant because it speaks of the Lord alone as having the world of Cit and Acit as body, which is indicated by the later passage of the same Upaniṣad, viz., “tadaikṣata bahu syām” (It reflected: Let [[P115]] me become many). So Abheda-texts cannot dispute and deny Brahman’s having the world as His body.
Passages like “dvā suparṇā” (Muṇḍaka III.1.1) and “jñājñau dvāv ajau” (Śvet. I.9) clearly distinguish the Jīva from the Supreme. “One is omniscient and the other, ignorant. They are two. One is the Ruler and the other, the non-ruler.” Passages speaking of the identity of God and man such as “Tattvamasi” (Chānd. VI.8.7) and “Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi” (Bṛ.Up. I.4.10) are in Grammatical Co-ordination. They cannot deny the difference that exists between the Lord and the world.
According to the rules of interpretation favoured by Jaimini also, passages which speak of Bheda between God and man cannot be considered to be weaker compared to the Abheda texts just because the latter texts come later. Among Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya, Prakaraṇa, Sthāna and Samākhyā, each succeeding principle is actually weaker than the previous one because of the remoteness in its import.
It is thus clear that Earth, Water and the like, primarily constitute the body of God on the basis of proofs like Abhyāsa and [[P116]] Upapatti. Then what about their qualities like Rūpa and Rasa? Śrīnivāsa says that although they are also under the control of God by virtue of their being His body, the qualities themselves cannot form His body. So the Bhāṣyakāra has employed the word “dravya” (substance) while defining the word “śarīra” while explaining the aphorism (II.1.9): na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt.
This is the definition: “yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantuṁ dhārayituṁ ca śakyam, taccheṣataikasvarūpaṁ ca, tat tasya śarīram..”. Explaining this, Vyāsācārya (Sudarśana Sūri) points out (in his Śrutaprakāśikā) that the words “Veda” and “Yajña” spoken of in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka as forming the body of the Lord only refer to the presiding deities of those entities. They actually denote a quality and action (respectively). They are not “dravyas”. So strictly speaking, they do not form His body. That śabda (Veda) is only a quality has been justified by Vedānta Deśika in his Nyāya-siddhāñjana.
The crux of the problem is that Brahman becomes the Material Cause of the universe when He possesses Cit and Acit as His body which have assumed such a subtle condition that does not allow [[P117]] any distinction in terms of Name and Form. The same Brahman becomes the Efficient Cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa) also when He has the Saṅkalpa (Will) which is congenial for such a situation (to create). As such there is no contradiction in the Brahman being both the Material and Instrumental Causes of the world.
Anumāna cannot prove the difference between the Material and Nimitta Kāraṇas in relation to the universe because even Perception which is the basis for Inference, cannot grasp this difference. No Inference can disprove Brahman’s being the Material Cause of the world. The Śvetāśvatara text (IV.10): “māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt, māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram” also does not point out something which is other than Brahman as the Upādāna. It only means that Brahman who has the body comprising Prakṛti which is subject to modification as the Material Cause, also controls it, and that He becomes the Efficient Cause as well. This is indicated by the two words “māyinam” and “maheśvaram”. The Gītā (IX.10): “mayādhyakṣeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram” also points out Brahman as the soul of the universe. There is no text which points out the difference between [[P118]] the Nimitta and Upādāna Kāraṇas in relation to world-manifestation.
At this point the critic may again argue that there may be no contradiction between an Efficient Cause and Material Cause as such, but there is no valid proof to confirm that Brahman Himself is both the Causes. Perception cannot prove it because it does not operate in matters which are beyond the scope of the senses. Since Pratyakṣa has no scope, Anumāna which is based upon it, also cannot deliver the goods. There is also no scriptural text which can prove this beyond any doubt. However, the Taittirīya text: “yato vā imāni bhūtāni” etc. may be interpreted to mean that Brahman can be the Nimitta also. The word “yataḥ” in the Ablative Case need not necessarily refer to Brahman as the Material Cause also. Thus for example, the statement “daṇḍāt ghaṭo jāyate” (a pot is produced because of a stick) does not mean that stick is the Material Cause of pot just because of the employment of the Ablative Case.
To this objection Śrīnivāsa gives the following answer: The Ablative Case in “yataḥ” is ordained by the Pāṇinian rule (I.iv.30) : “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” (The prime cause of the agent of [[P119]] the verb jan [to be born] is called Apādāna). Then by the general rule (II.iii.28) “apādāne pañcamī” the Fifth Case is employed. The Ablative here (yataḥ) cannot be accounted for, unless the word “yat” forms the Upādāna.
To explain, the Ablative Case in “yataḥ” does not merely refer to a cause in general. There is no rule which ordains such a case. If it is a mere cause then the sūtra “hetau” (II.iii.23) (when a word denotes cause it takes the Third Case Suffix) applies. The aphorisms starting from “dhruvam apāye apādānam” (I.iv.24) and ending with “bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ” (I.iv.31) ordain the designation “apādāna” (Ablation). But it is only the aphorism “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” that makes Brahman the Upādāna. Strictly speaking, the aphorism “dhruvam apāye apādānam” (I.iv.24) (A noun whose relation to an action is that of a fixed point from which departure takes place, is called Apādāna or Ablation) cannot be applied here because the universe, at the time of its origination, did not and could not “depart” from Brahman since He is all-pervasive. Therefore “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” is the only aphorism that can be applied to this case. The word “prakṛtiḥ” (Prime Cause) means the [[P120]] Material Cause only. This word is popularly used in cases like a lump of clay and a nugget of gold which undergo modifications.
In the scriptural text “māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt” also the word Prakṛti can only mean the Material Cause. The etymology of the word Prakṛti is “prakaroti iti” (Prakṛti is that which undergoes a variety of changes). It is thus clear that Prakṛti can only be the Material Cause but not a cause in general.
The critic then examines various usages found in some poetic compositions and even in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya to prove his point that the word “prakṛti” could only mean a cause in general (kāraṇa-sāmānya). But our author disproves all these arguments by going into a detailed examination of the position of grammatical aphorisms found in several works like the Mahābhāṣya, the commentary Pradīpa on it by Kaiyaṭa, Prakriyāmañjarī (Name of Ānanda-pūrṇa-vidyāsāgara Muni’s Commentary on the Kāśikāvṛtti [commentary on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī] of Jayāditya and Vāmana) and Padamañjarī (Name of Haradatta’s Commentary on the Kāśikāvṛtti). He also sets aside the view that the word “yataḥ” of the Taittirīya text contains the suffix “tasil” which is used [[P121]] normally to convey the sense of all the case-suffixes (sārva-vibhaktika-tasil). He contends that while the sense of Ablation is naturally and consistently available, there is no justification in going to “tasil” to yield the desired meaning.
Further, the Taittirīya text under discussion “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayantyabhisamviśanti” refers to all the living creatures going towards their Prime Cause (prakṛti) and entering It. Here there are two words: “prayanti” and “abhisamviśanti”. “Prayanti” is not an inflected verb ending with the verbal termination “tiṅ” (tiṅantam). It is the present participial form (śatrarthaka) qualifying the noun “bhūtāni”. “Abhisamviśanti” is the only verb here. Otherwise, if “prayanti” is also taken as a verb then there will be the contingency of accepting two different sentences beginning with the word “yat”. Our author says: “prayanti - pralīyamānāni santi bhūtāni, yad abhisamviśanti - yadavasthāṁ prāpnuvanti”.
The author also clarifies that in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta, Pralaya is not of the nature of total destruction of the entities leading to a total non-existence (abhāvātmakaḥ layaḥ) as in the [[P122]] Nyāya system. It is the phenomenon of the product attaining the same state of the causal factor (ekatva-avasthā-āpattirūpaḥ). He corroborates this by quoting from some Upaniṣads and the Viṣṇupurāṇa (cf. VI.4.18: “agnyavasthe tu salile”). The explanation that “yataḥ” has the Ablative Case Suffix conveying the sense of Material Cause is also corroborated by another passage of the Taittirīya: “ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante” (All these beings are indeed born out of Ānanda). Further, the merger of the living beings is possible only in their Material Cause, but not in their Efficient Cause.
The author also argues that the Material Cause alone is quite well-known to be the source of various living and non-living entities. The aphorism “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” has been formed by Pāṇini only after taking into account, this kind of “projection” of objects from their Prime Cause. Giving a different meaning to the Ablation is therefore, not warranted. For example a person can infer fire on a mountain after seeing the smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. In other words, it is only after ascertaining the invariable relation (vyāpti) between the probans and the [[P123]] probandum one can infer and arrive at the conclusion. This is the natural process of Inference. Likewise one can understand the sense of Ablation used in the word “yataḥ” only after observing the process of evolution of entities from their material causes. It cannot be otherwise. If this is not accepted then it becomes impossible to ascertain the meaning of various case-suffixes that we come across in the Kāraka section of grammatical texts.
Thus for instance when we read the passage “jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta” (Let one desirous of heaven perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice) we understand the karaṇatva (instrumentality) of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice because of its Instrumental Case-ending (tṛtīyā vibhakti). Likewise, the Second Case affix in “vrīhin avahanti” (She pounds the paddy), the Fourth Case in “maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍaṁ prayacchati” (He gives the staff to Maitrāvaruṇa), the sense of Ablation in “āgrayaṇāt gṛhṇāti” (“He receives from Āgrayaṇa” [Āgrayaṇa means the first Soma libation]), the sense of the Sixth Case in expressions like “dīkṣā somasya” (Initiation of Soma), the sense of location in the expression “same yajeta” (One should perform a sacrifice on the [[P124]] even ground) etc., will not become intelligible at all. Behind the employment of every Case-ending there is what is called “lokaprasiddhi” (popular usage among the people of the world) also. But the critic argues further that Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya has actually observed in his commentary on the aphorism “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” that the aphorism “dhruvam apāye apādānam” can be set aside (idamapi sūtraṁ pratyākhyātuṁ śakyam). He cites usages like: “goloma-avi-lomabhyāṁ dūrvāḥ jāyante” (The dūrvā grass is generated from the hairs of the bulls and sheep) and “apakrāmanti tāḥ tebhyaḥ” (They come out of those things).
Śrīnivāsa replies that this contention of the critic can be accepted to be sensible if the passage “yato vā” can also be brought under the scope of the aphorism “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ”. Brahman being all-pervasive, the universe which is invariably associated with Him never “comes out” separate from Him in the process of creation. Therefore the objection is ruled out.
Further it must be stated that what Patañjali has stated is only based on the general day-to-day observation in practical life. [[P125]] Normally whatever is generated from a source comes out of it and becomes a different entity. But each system of Philosophy has its own interpretation of origination. In the Vaiśeṣika system for example it is held that a product comes out of its cause, being inseparably associated with paramāṇus (subtle atoms). “Is it actually a case of kārya leaving its source”? asks Śrīnivāsa.
The Sāṅkhya System speaks of the origination and destruction of an entity as the manifestation (āvirbhāva) and disappearance (tirobhāva) of that entity. Therefore an effect need not necessarily leave its source as it comes out of it. That is what Kaiyaṭa has also stated. Even in the case of a product coming out of its Material Cause, it is not a hard and fast rule that the effect should always be distinct and separate from its cause. Such a thing will not take place when the entire material gets transformed into the object. That will happen only when a portion of matter gets transformed as the product. In the case of the world coming out the Lord also only such an interpretation is possible. There will be a modification of only a minute portion of Lord’s “body” which is qualified by Cit and Acit. So there is no contradiction in our interpretation. [[P126]]
In our system (Viśiṣṭādvaita) in so far the creation of the Universe is concerned, Brahman is admitted as the Material Cause qualified by Cit and Acit. “Separation” of the product viz., the gross universe from that primordial cause (God) takes place in the process of creation. But by the word “separation” (viśleṣaḥ) absolute separation from the source is not meant. For example when we say the śara-grass has grown out of a mountain-peak, the grass does not totally leave its connection with the mountain-top. In the case of the Brahman who is all-pervasive, He becomes the Upādāna Kāraṇa possessing the subtle Cit and Acit as His body. So the employment of the Fifth Case Suffix in the sense of Ablation is quite justifiable.
Even granting that the Fifth Case is used to convey the simple sense of causation, the expression “yato vā” can be taken as a restatement (anuvāda) of the two concepts of being the Efficient Cause and the Material Cause. The case of Pralaya has already been explained as the attainment of the state of the “prime cause”. The expression “yena jātāni jīvanti” makes it clear that the world has its life totally determined by and dependent on the Cause. It is [[P127]] thus clear that there can be no other Nimitta here apart from the Brahman. So “yataḥ” conveys here both the senses of Nimitta and Upādāna. By this our contention that Brahman is the Material Cause gets all the more confirmed.
The concept of “knowing everything by knowing the One” (ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam) can also go well with our position that Brahman becomes the Material Cause. The knowledge of the Nimittakāraṇa does not lead to a knowledge of all the effects. By knowing the stick for example, we do not know a pot which is entirely different from the stick. But once we know the Material Cause we will also be able to know the products generated by that cause. “The lump of clay which I saw in the morning has itself become the pot, pitcher etc. in the afternoon”, we say.
But the critic goes on to say that if there is no difference at all between the Material Cause and its effects then the declaration that the “Knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of all” becomes inconsistent because there is nothing which can be referred to as all (sarvam). One may say that the difference between the Material Cause and its effects lies in one belonging to the previous portion [[P128]] of time and the other, to the subsequent part of time. One is marked by the form of the lump while the other is seen to be a pot and the like.
Even then the difficulty persists because the knowledge of one does not lead to the knowledge of the other. Since Brahman is known, there being nothing else to be known (apart from Brahman) all other entities become more or less known (as being identical with Brahman). This is the view of the critic. But our author maintains that there is no difference between the Material Cause and its products. Still we have to account for a variety of products having different shapes related to different periods of time when they appeared. Those products are not altogether different from the material cause. Although the material cause is one, products like pot and pitcher are mutually different. This difference can be traced to the difference in the state of existence of clay. If cause and effect are totally different from each other, then the Chāndogya declaration that “the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all” cannot be accounted for at all. [[P129]]
At this stage another objection is raised that although the knowledge of Brahman leads to the knowledge of the Acit (insentient) entities which are the products, the Cit (sentient) entities which are not actual products, cannot be known. So how does the knowledge of the One lead to the knowledge of all? This question is set aside by the author on the ground that only One qualified entity can become the Material cause of the qualified products. Sentient living beings, strictly speaking, cannot become the kārya (products). But even this is possible through a modification of their nature brought about by the expansion and contraction of their knowledge which is called Dharmabhūtajñāna (Attributive Consciousness). At this point another question is raised by the critic: If the knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of all, then by knowing Brahman one should be able to know the liberated souls such as Ananta and Garuḍa whose knowledge is never contracted, they being the Nityasūris (ever-liberated souls) waiting upon the Lord in different capacities. The author replies that what is normally meant is that the knowledge of the universe is conveyed by the words “idam” and “sarvam”. So even if [[P130]] Garuḍa and other ever-liberated souls are not known through “ekavijñāna” there is no harm in it.
Śrīnivāsa then goes into a detailed discussion of various scriptural passages and concludes that only the qualified Brahman can become the Upādāna and Upādeya. Only then the knowledge of the One can lead to the knowledge of all other things. To start with, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka texts, “He for whom the Earth forms the body; Avyakta forms the body; Ātman forms the body; Akṣara forms the body” etc. clearly point out that Cit and Acit constitute the body of Brahman. Then we have to realise that all words referring to the body must culminate and terminate in the Self which is qualified by those entities. Then terms like Sat, Brahman etc. which are noticed in passages discussing causality should all be taken to refer to a specific Deity namely, Nārāyaṇa. Then scriptures like the Śvetāśvatara point out that the word “Brahman” refers to One who is qualified by the Cit and Acit entities. The Śvetāśvatara text (I.25): “Bhoktā bhogyaṁ preritāraṁ ca matvā, sarvaṁ proktaṁ trividhaṁ Brahmam etat” spells out the [[P131]] Tattvatraya (Cit, Acit and Īśvara) which constitutes the world-phenomenon.
Therefore even in the passage: “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante” etc., all the words refer to qualified entities. The world which comes out from the Brahman (upādeya) in the form of Cit and Acit in its gross state is also implied in this process. So both the Upādāna and Upādeya are qualified. All other passages like “Tat tejaḥ aikṣataḥ, Āpaḥ aikṣanta” etc. refer to Tejas, Water, etc. as having the Saṅkalpa (to create). This clarifies the point that Brahman who has these Elements as His body is possessed of the Saṅkalpa to create. Otherwise how can Tejas, Water, etc. which are insentient can ever be expected to desire to become many? In other words Brahman Who is qualified by that substance which has a previous state of existence, becomes the Material Cause in relation to Himself as qualified by that very substance which assumes the subsequent state of existence. The Chāndogya text reads: “ahaṁ imāḥ tisraḥ devatāḥ anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi”. It becomes possible for Name and Form to get related to the Lord when He enters the [[P132]] Elements with the help of the Jīva who is His own self. In our normal experience we see that a father does not enter his son to give him a name and form. But the scripture declares: “Tat sṛṣṭvā tad eva anuprāviśat” (Having created that, He entered that itself). This makes the point clear that only after entering the Elements the Lord divided the entities as Sat (the living) and Tyat (the non-living i.e., the insentient). All these go to prove that qualified Brahman alone becomes Upādāna and Upādeya. Thus the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of every thing else.
Another point clarified by the author is that a Material Cause should undergo modifications to evolve as a product. Being eternal, Brahman and Jīva do not undergo any essential change and hence there is no Upādānatva for them. However, a kind of change in the form of the expansion and contraction of Attributive Consciousness will take place in the individual self. This will not be there in the case of the Lord whose knowledge never contracts.
The point to be noted is that Upādānatva can accrue only to an existent entity but not to a non-existent entity. Acit can become a product by undergoing a change in its essential nature (svarūpa). [[P133]] In the case of Cit and the Brahman there can be a change in their characteristics (svabhāva) only. The scripture also explains that an existent entity (sat) cannot come out of something which does not exist (asat). Utpatti (origin) is nothing but the attainment of a different state of existence (avasthāntarāpatti). The Grammarians also speak about modifications that take place in a material cause. Patañjali says: “Gold which is in a particular (ornamental) shape may become a nugget. This nugget is melted to make a necklace. Again the necklace is melted to make “svastika"-shaped ornament. Again a lump of gold can be shaped as kuṇḍalas (ear-rings). It is only the form that keeps changing but not the substance. The substance remains as it is.”
When a Jīva who is eternal and impartite assumes a change in his characteristics through Attributive Knowledge, he becomes an effect. His becoming a product of creation is nothing but the expansion of his Attributive Knowledge which was, prior to creation, in a contracted form. It cannot be contended that indirectly the qualities of the body such as happiness, misery etc. will also affect the soul. The question is whether the body is [[P134]] inseparable from the soul and is dependent on the soul for its existence, or whether it is separable and thus is independent. For instance, suffering belonging to the body may be taken as affecting the soul also because body is an ‘inseparable attribute’ (apṛthak-siddha viśeṣaṇa) of the self. It is not so in objects such as a stick and an ear-ring which a man may wear, but which are separable from him. Thus the Brahman may become a Material Cause in the primary sense through the medium of Cit and Acit which form His body. Here again there is a twofold control exercised by the Lord - control through the subtle Cit and Acit, and control through the gross Cit and Acit. But in any case, it is the Lord alone who controls the universe.
One more objection crops up at this stage: If a qualified entity becomes the Material Cause for another qualified entity then there will be mutual admixture of the natures of the three categories viz., Cit, Acit and Īśvara. The answer is “no”. When a cloth is woven with threads of different colours like white, black and red, it is those threads alone that form the Material Cause of those portions of the cloth that have specific colours. There is no room for any [[P135]] confusion arising out of the mixture of variegated threads. Likewise here also, when the Lord is in one qualified form (having the subtle Cit and Acit as His body) He becomes the Material Cause for another qualified form of His (having the gross Cit and Acit as His body). There is no room for confusion here. So the Cit-aspect becomes the Upādāna for the Cit-product; the Acit-aspect becomes the Upādāna for the Acit product and the Brahman-aspect becomes Upādāna for the Brahman-part of creation.
In the Chāndogya passage (VI.8.4-6): “sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ” the expression “sanmūlāḥ” (having their source in Sat) only conveys the idea that Sat which means the Lord, qualified by Cit and Acit becomes the Material cause of the living beings. The Upādānatva of the Lord is therefore by becoming the substratum for a state of existence which is “sadvāraka” (through a medium). This is the interpretation given by Sudarśana Sūri in his commentary on the Śrībhāṣya on the relevant Upaniṣadic text, says Śrīnivāsa..
In the Ārambhaṇa-section (Br. Sū. II.1.15-20) both the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra have pointed out that cause and [[P136]] effect are not mutually different. This can be explained only by taking the Cause as Viśiṣṭa (qualified). In the light of this we have to conclude that the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of everything else, only when they both are taken as “qualified” in the form of the Upādāna and the Upādeya. The aphorism “Prakṛtiśca pratijñā-dṛṣṭānta- anuparodhāt” (Br. Sū. I.iv.23) (Brahman is also the Material Cause because there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it) points out that God is both the Material and Efficient Cause of the universe. Only then the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of the other. The examples given there such as clay and pot, etc., become significant only on such an interpretation.
The author then explains the Chāndogya passage “uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ..” (VI.1.3) (Did you seek to know about the Sovereign Ruler?) Here the word “ādeśa” means the “Sovereign Commander” but not “instruction”. The Grammarians also point out that the verbal root “diś” prefixed by “āṅ” indicates “praśāsana” (command); but when it is prefixed by “upa” it means “upadeśa” (instruction). The author sets aside a prima facie [[P137]] view that “diś” means only “pronunciation” (uccāraṇa). But the word “praśāsana” means control. In this connection the author throws light on semantics. He says that the usage of words is two-fold: (a) that of the cultured (educated) people (ārya) and (b) that of the uncultured (uneducated) (anārya). When both these usages come up for application in one and the same context, the usage of the cultured (educated) persons (āryas) alone is taken as valid. For instance the word “pīlu” by popular consent, means a “tree” but in the usage of the uneducated it means an elephant”.4 Both the meanings are of course correct but the former is primary and the latter, secondary. When there is an occasion for the application of both, the meaning of “tree” gains precedence over the other meaning, i.e., “elephant”.
Now the word “ādeśa”, by convention, means only “command”. When the suffix “ghañ” is added, it means “the one who commands”, i.e., “the commander”. Commanding is the distinct and unique feature of the Lord. This commanding takes place by His entering into the hearts of the living beings. So the [[P138]] Lord becomes the commander only in a qualified way, i.e., when He enters the Jīvas as their Inner Controller. The passage, “antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānāṁ sarvātmā” (Tai.Āraṇyaka III.29) supports this view. This is corroborated with the help of the “Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa” of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka already alluded to. Otherwise, if the Lord commands like a king, being “outside” the people whom he controls then there is no need to say that He “enters” the Jīvas. The qualified (viśiṣṭa) Lord alone controls the living beings. So the Chāndogya statement that knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all, concerns only the Lord with attributes. On this analogy, even passages where the “anupraveśa” of the Lord is not explicit, as for instance in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text “etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane Gārgi! sūryā-candramasau vidhṛtau tiṣṭhataḥ” (III.8.9) one has to understand that the Lord’s “anupraveśa” is implicit. The aphorisms “akṣaram ambarāntadhṛteḥ” (Br.Sū. I.iii.8) (The Supreme Lord is declared as the support of what is even beyond ākāśa = Prakṛti) and “sā ca praśāsanāt” (Ib. I. iii.9) (That power of supporting things beyond ākāśa is due to His supreme prowess) declare that for supporting [[P139]] Ether, Water etc., the Lord displays His power of rulership. This again depends upon His entering into the Elements only after which He controls and supports them.
At this point another question is raised by the opponent: “Are both the cause and effect qualified (viśiṣṭa)?” The author answers in the affirmative. He says that this can be proved by means of “śrutyarthāpatti” (Presumption arising from the incompatibility of what is heard in the scriptures).5 So both Kāraṇa and Kārya must be accepted as qualified. The word “idam” (this) of the Upaniṣad (Chāndogya VI.2.1: sad eva somya idam agra āsīt) should therefore be conceived as indicating a “qualified” entity. When we say that “Devadatta is dark in complexion, youthful and having red eyes”, all the features which belong to his body ultimately do qualify the self of Devadatta also.
The critic has one more objection: “The Śrutis speak of the immutability of the Brahman. But when He becomes the universe, modification is inevitable. How can this be accounted for?” In [[P140]] reply Śrīnivāsa states that to become a product, an already existent entity will undergo a series of states and stages. When Brahman becomes the effect, He will also attain different stages of existence – not directly, but through the medium of Cit and Acit. Undergoing modification is twofold: (a) sadvāraka (through a medium i.e., indirectly) and (b) advāraka (without a medium, i.e., directly). When an insentient matter like clay undergoes modification in its very nature (svarūpa) it is without any medium. A pot for instance, when exposed to heat will attain a different colour. This modification has taken place not in its svarūpa but in its svabhāva (characteristic). A mango becomes ripe and undergoes a necessary modification in its svabhāva. Coming to living beings who are all embodied, they pass through different stages or states of existence such as leanness, fatness, boyhood, youth, old age etc., through the body itself. In addition, the person concerned also thinks/says thus: “I am lean”; “I am fat”, “I am a boy”; “I am a youth” and the like. All these references will go as far as the soul itself which abides in the body. In the case of great sages like Saubhari who assumed (fifty) different bodies by giving up the [[P141]] stage of being singular in number, such a change has to be traced to the body itself.
In the case of Brahman who attains different states of existence through the medium of Cit and Acit which form His body and thus constitute His inseparable attribute (apṛthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa), the change that takes place is primary but not secondary. By saying so we are not going against the scriptures which declare the Lord as free from modifications. Brahman can also be said to undergo different “stages of existence” when He becomes the antaryāmin with Cit and Acit in their gross form. It is also to be understood that when Brahman undergoes change through Cit and Acit the defects found in them do not affect Him at all.
Another point discussed here is that an embodied person like Devadatta becomes a “qualified” entity. Features like fairness of colour and youth which belong to his body can also apply to Devadatta in a primary sense. In the same way in the case of the Lord who has Cit and Acit as His body, it is only as a “qualified person” that He becomes the cause. Consequently all these states of existence pertaining to His body will apply to Him, a [[P142]] “qualified” Being. This has been explained in detail by the author with quotations from the Śrutaprakāśikā. Sudarśana says that the essential nature of a person can never be a pure, unqualified substantive. Only when it is qualified (viśiṣṭa) it becomes the essential nature of that person. For instance, the essential nature of a pot is not mere clay. It is something qualified by “pot-ness”. The attribute which enters into the nature of an entity is not a mere attribute. It is an attribute that has invariably become associated itself with the substantive.
All words which denote the body should culminate in Brahman who is the ultimate import of all words. There is between the bodies and the Lord, the relationship between the controlled and the controller, which results in the body-soul relation. That is how Mahat, Ahaṁkāra etc. which are different stages of existence of Prakṛti, constitute the Lord’s body and thus form the essential nature of the “qualified” Brahman. It is in this sense that Brahman forms the Upādāna Kāraṇa. This can be verified through several Pramāṇas. But the changes found in Cit and Acit do not take place in the essential nature of God. Therefore we have to understand [[P143]] that it is His body consisting of Cit and Acit which forms the material cause.
Although Brahman becomes the Upādāna of the world (Upādeya), one cannot see the quality of “Brahmatva” in the world as one can see clay-ness or gold-ness in products like pots and ear-rings. The answer to this doubt can be given with reference to the Ārambhaṇa-section of the Brahmasūtra (II.1.15-20). The Upādāna and the Upādeya are both qualified (viśiṣṭa) and hence there is no contradiction here.
Another objection that may come up is that if the product is accepted as the “body” of the Brahman, then by the same token Brahman also should become the body of Himself. This lands one in the fallacy called “ātmāśraya” (self-dependence). On the strength of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which declares Earth, Water etc. as the body of the Lord, we can understand that only a product like Earth and Water can become the body of the Lord and there is no contingency of Brahman becoming the body of Brahman Himself. Here we have to keep in mind that words like Sat, Cit and Īśvara are called “niṣkarṣaka” (distinguishing terms). All other [[P144]] words like śarīrin and Ātman are called “niṣkarṣaketara” which cannot point out the entities distinctly. In the reference to Earth as the body of God, the word śarīrin does not refer to any qualified entity and so there is no defect of self-dependence. The critic points out that the Siddhāntin has explained the word “ākāśa” in the text “ākāśād eva sarvāṇi bhūtāni samutpadyante” as referring to the Paramātman through etymology, which is not correct. But the Siddhāntin says that Brahman with mere “ākāśa” as His body does not become the Material Cause. He becomes the Upādāna only when He has the “qualified ākāśa” as the body.
The resourceful critic comes up with another objection now that Cit and Acit when they form God’s body, do not have the capacity to become inconceivably large. Therefore the One qualified by such a body cannot be referred to as Brahman. The Siddhāntin answers that this is a ridiculous argument. The “pravṛtti-nimitta” of a pot for example is “ghaṭatva”. Even then the word “ghaṭa” automatically refers to that entity which is qualified by “ghaṭatva”. So there is nothing wrong in holding that when Cit and Acit are mentioned as bodies, they refer to the “qualified” Brahman alone as He is related to them in the capacity of their soul. Brahman thus becomes the general cause of [[P145]] everything in this world. Based upon the scripture “satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ Brahma” (Tai. Ānanda. 1) we take up “satyatva” etc. as becoming the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman. It automatically points to Brahman as the qualified entity. Expressions in Grammatical Coordination become justified only in this manner. It is not correct to say that the universe cannot be considered as the body of God. We have already answered that based upon the “pravṛtti-nimitta” (cause or ground for using a particular expression) one can understand the meaning of every entity through primary significance itself. Words like “sthūla” (fat) and “nīla” (blue) although they are adjectives (viśeṣaṇa), they are also capable of referring to qualified entities (viśiṣṭa) viz., a fat person and a blue-hued object respectively.
Another objection crops up at this point. Words referring to the great Elements like Earth and Water do not come within the purview of the definition of body. The word “pṛthivī” used in the “Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa” of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka is not the simple Element but only the Element which has been evolved as a result of Pañcīkaraṇa (quintuplication), says the critic. But the author says that there is no proof in support of such a contention. [[P146]]
There are people who do not agree with the doctrine that the words referring to the ‘bodies’ of Devadatta and Yajña-datta for instance, culminate and terminate in the Supreme Self (Paramātman). The author tells such critics that they must first educate themselves about texts like: “dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā” (Muṇḍaka III.1.1) and “pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarva eva guhāśayasya” (Āpastamba XX.4). Here it is clear that all the living beings constitute the body of God. The Lord alone controls them after entering into them. So all the creatures become the body of God directly. The material bodies of these creatures, however, become the Lord’s bodies indirectly.
Another question is as to how Earth, Water etc. can form the body of God and become the means of “enjoyment” (bhogopakaraṇa) for Him because He has already realised His desires in full (avāpta-samastakāma). He has nothing to accomplish through those bodies, observes the critic. This question is preposterous, says Śrīnivāsa. Even the liberated souls are said to have realised their desires in full. So says the Chāndogya [VII.26.2]: “sarvaṁ ha paśyaḥ paśyati; sarvaṁ āpnoti sarvataḥ” (The wise one sees every thing and attains everything in full). The [[P147]] Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad (I.1.) says: “sa ekākī na rameta” (He, being alone, may not feel happy). This means that before creation, the Lord had no means to divert Himself and that He assumes Earth etc. as His body with a view to divert Himself. So it must be understood that assumption of bodies is not for the sake of His own enjoyment but for the purpose of performing certain acts through the bodies of the jīvas so as to exhaust their past karmans.
Now comes up another objection: Since the Jīvātmans are atomic (aṇu/sūkṣma) subtle and impartite, the Lord cannot enter inside those Ātmans. As such they cannot form His body. Śrīnivāsa replies that what is meant by the Lord’s being inside the Jīvas is that He has with those Jīvas a very intimate relationship (dṛḍha-sambandha). This is what is meant by being the Lord’s being the “antaryāmin”. This “inner pervasion” (antarvyāpti) in relation to Earth, Water, Self, etc., is nothing but having a strong and abiding relationship with those entities in such a way that controlling them from inside becomes feasible and possible.6 For an all-pervasive [[P148]] principle like God, entering within entities by giving up the space outside does not become possible.
The Chāndogya passage declares that the Lord entered the three Elements Earth, Water and Fire with the Jīva who is same as Himself: “anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya..”. He then wanted to classify them in terms of Names and Shapes (nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi). Now the question is as to how can the Lord become the agent of “nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇa”. The answer is quite simple. The word Jīva may mean the Jīva alone in a very general sense. But the statement: “yasyātmā śarīram” has already been interpreted to mean that the Jīva also becomes the body of God. So when the Lord enters the Elements he does so through the medium of the Jīvas who constitute His body. Therefore there is no difficulty in understanding the act of “nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇa” in relation to the Lord.
Thus the Chāndogya declaration that “the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of everything” (ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam) has been conclusively established by the preceding arguments. When it is said that the knowledge of Brahman leads to [[P149]] the knowledge of the world, this will not happen unless both Brahman and the world are of one and the same essence. Śrīnivāsa explains the text “vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam” (Chāndogya VI.1.4) (Modification and name are attained by clay for the purpose of speech only. It is all clay only) following Rāmānuja’s interpretation found in the Śrībhāṣya (under II.1.15) and the Vedārthasaṅgraha.7
There is another passage: “kartāram īśaṁ puruṣaṁ Brahmayonim” (Muṇḍaka I.1.3) which unequivocally declares that the Lord is the Nimitta Kāraṇa ("kartāram") and the Upādāna Kāraṇa ("yoni"). One cannot contend that the word Yoni only means a Kāraṇa as in the expression “śāstrayonitvāt” (Br. Sū. I.1.3). If that is so, then the word “kartāram” which conveys the same meaning, will become redundant. This idea can be confirmed by the subsequent portion of the same scripture: “yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ca” (Muṇḍaka I.1.6) (Even as a spider makes and withdraws its web). The illustration of spider (ūrṇanābhi) ably justifies the point that the Lord Himself is both [[P150]] the Material and Efficient cause. Bādarāyaṇa has also used the word “yoni” in the aphorism, “yoniśca hi gīyate” (Br. Sū. I.4.28) (Brahman is also the Upādāna Kāraṇa because he is declared to be the source of the world). The word “yoni” is popularly used in the sense of Upādāna only. Although in some passages like “apsu yonir vā aśvaḥ” (The horse is having its origin in waters) and “yajamāno vā agner yoniḥ” (The sacrificer is indeed the source of Fire), the word “yoni” just means a cause in general but not a Material Cause. Still we have to go by the meaning of the word as understood from a majority of instances. We cannot give up the more popular meaning just because a word is used in a different way in a few instances.
Śrīnivāsa then quotes passages from Manu “āsīd idaṁ tamobhūtam….vividhāḥ prajāḥ” (I. 5-8a) from which it is evident that before creation Tamas alone was the body of the Lord and that it was indistinguishable. The Lord became its soul. Then everything became manifest and manifold according to his infallible Will. Śrīnivāsa says that we have to take into account all [[P151]] such passages which speak of the causality of Brahman and conclude that Brahman alone is the Upādāna Kāraṇa.
One has to apply the maxims: “sarvaśākhāpratyaya-nyāya” and “sarvavedāntapratyaya-nyāya” here. What is meant is this: Different branches of Veda speak about rituals like Agnihotra with different characteristics. We have to gather all such scattered references, correlate them and conclude that Agnihotra and such other rituals have all the characteristics mentioned in different contexts in different recensions of the Veda. Śabara in his commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtra (II.iv.32) observes: “sarva-śākhā-pratyayaṁ, sarva-brāhmaṇa-patyayaṁ ca ekaṁ karma codyate” (The ritual ordained in different recensions and different Brāhmaṇas is only one). The ritual is not ordained for the sake of a single person (na caikaṁ prati śiṣyate).
Likewise we have what is called the “Sarvavedāntapratyaya Adhikaraṇa” in the Brahmasūtra (III.3.1-5). According to this, Meditation (upāsanā) taught in all the Vedāntas is one only because there is no distinction regarding the injunction relating to it in all the Vedāntas. The Bheda and Abheda Śrutis have to be [[P152]] properly interpreted keeping the “body-soul-relation” in view. All the Vedānta passages have their sole import in Brahman being the Upādāna Kāraṇa. That Brahman is the Upādāna can again be established on the basis of the text: “kāraṇaṁ tu dhyeyaḥ” (Atharvaśikhā) (The cause has to be contemplated upon). The word “kāraṇa” here refers to Brahman as the Upādāna and Nimitta. According to this scripture one has to contemplate on the Cause. Contemplation results in “sākṣātkāra” (direct vision). This results in liberation. All this is not possible unless Brahman, the object of contemplation and direct perception is not the Nimitta and Upādāna in one.
Śrīnivāsa also applies the “six principles” by which the import of passages in the Sadvidyā section of the Chāndogya can be ascertained. He points out that the pramāṇas viz., Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya, Pakaraṇa, Sthāna and Samākhyā are helpful in confirming the same idea. He quotes profusely from the Śrutis and Brahmasūtra in support of his contention. He concludes the discussion and incidentally the work itself, by saying that a close examination of the term “Nārāyaṇa” used in the Mahopaniṣad, [[P153]] Manusmṛti and other texts confirms the view that Lord Nārāyaṇa alone is the Upādāna and Nimitta Kāraṇa of the universe. This is the concluded opinion of all the Vedāntas. [[P154]]
4 BRAHMAN AS THE UPĀDĀNA AND NIMITTA
In the preceding chapter an attempt has been made to provide a detailed account of the arguments advanced by Śrīnivāsa to prove that Brahman is both the Upādāna and the Nimitta Kāraṇas of the world. In the present chapter the same point is being studied in relation to the views held by other systems of thought like Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Advaita and Dvaita. The Kāraṇa-vākyas found in different Upaniṣads point to the causality of Brahman in two different ways: (a) as the Upādāna Kāraṇa and (b) as the Nimitta Kāraṇa. In later works on Viśiṣṭādvaita such as the Yatīndramatadīpikā of Śrīnivāsadāsa an additional point is added that Brahman is also the Sahakāri Kāraṇa (Co-operative Cause). Since Brahman is accepted as all-pervasive and also as the Inner Controller (antaryāmin) of every thing, the presence of Brahman must be accepted in all actions leading to the creation of objects. For example, when a lump of clay undergoes modifications and becomes a pot, pitcher, etc., clay is called the Upādāna Kāraṇa. The potter is the Nimitta Kāraṇa (Efficient Cause). The wheel, [[P155]] stick etc. are known as the Sahakārī Kāraṇas (Co-operative Cause). When the Lord creates the universe He forms the Material Cause, the Efficient Cause and also the co-operative Cause (trividha-kāraṇam). He is present in Kāla (Time) as the Antaryāmin. All actions take place in Time. Even in the Chāndogya passage “sadeva somya idamagra āsīt” (My dear, all this was existent before, as “Sat”), the word agre refers to Time. Even before creation Time existed. Lord is the Antaryāmin of Time also. Thus in the Śrīvaiṣṇava system of thought, God is referred to as Trividhakāraṇa (threefold cause).
Śrīnivāsa has quoted profusely from Scriptures in support of his contention that God is the Material Cause and the Efficient Cause as well. These passages are: “tad ātmānaṁ svayam akuruta”; “yad bhūtayoniṁ paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ”; “yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ca”; “brahma vanaṁ brahma sa vṛkṣaḥ āsīt”, etc. The example of the spider and its web is quite illustrative. When the spider weaves its web it becomes the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). When it draws the material from its own body it becomes the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa). The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika [[P156]] system speaks of the absolute distinction between the material cause and its products and argues that if they are identical, then there will be no need of an agent at all (nimitta-kāraṇa). But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, material cause never differs from its effects. A pot is not different from clay. A cloth is not different from the yarn.
The Sāṅkhyas recognise that there is clay in a jar and yarn in a piece of cloth. But this is actually based upon the identity of the material cause and its product, viz., clay and jar.
Śrīnivāsa contends that one and the same substance undergoes changes in its form and all these changes are also associated with different names. When it is in the form of clay, it is the causal state of a pot. But when the pot is generated out of clay, it is treated as an effect. A lump of gold undergoes many changes in its form and all the changes it assumes have different names also. But all these changes take place in the material cause only because of the activity of an agent. This cannot be overlooked, says Śrīnivāsa. So the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system cannot do full justice to the role of an agent. All the effects are only different states of existence of [[P157]] matter. Thus the material cause is uniformly recognised in all its effects. This is a universal phenomenon.
Śrīnivāsa has taken the Sadvidyā-section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad to explain this phenomenon. Uddālaka asked his son Śvetaketu: “Did you enquire of your Guru about the Paramount Ruler of the universe (ādeśa) by hearing about Whom everything becomes heard; by knowing about Whose nature everything becomes known; and by realising Whom everything becomes realized?” What the father implied here is that the knowledge of God would lead to the knowledge of everything else in the universe. Three illustrations are cited here: (a) a lump of clay, (b) a mass of gold and (c) a block of iron. By knowing the clay all its transformations will become known. By knowing a mass of gold, all the modifications of that metal become known. Likewise, by knowing a block of iron all the things wrought of iron become known. In spite of the diverse changes that these three entities assume, they are still recognised as clay, gold and iron respectively. This shows that the material cause and its effect are identical. [[P158]]
The motive of Uddālaka behind citing these three illustrations in the context of mentioning the Ādeśa (Supreme Commander) or Paramount Ruler is this: By knowing the Ādeśa one can know the whole universe which is His creation. In other words, the Paramount Ruler is the Material Cause of the Universe. But the distinction between God becoming the universe and clay and gold becoming pot and ornaments is this: The transformation that the Lord undergoes is not identical with the transformation that clay or gold undergoes. The Pariṇāma-theory should not be taken too literally because Brahman is described in the scriptures as immutable. But a material cause has to undergo modifications to be able to produce an effect.
The reaction of a Viśiṣṭādvaitin to this view is this: The Lord has Cit and Acit as His body. In the causal state i.e., before creation, this body will be in a subtle condition (sūkṣmāvasthā). This subtle condition of the Lord’s body transforms into the gross state (sthūlāvasthā) so as to become universe in its manifest condition. This is what is meant by the change that Lord undergoes in becoming the universe. But the possession of body [[P159]] in the form of Cit and Acit does not automatically account for the creation of the universe.
In the case of a lump of clay it is the potter who helps the process of the production of a pot. Likewise here also we have to account for an Efficient Cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). Śrīnivāsa, points out that Brahman Himself becomes the Nimitta Kāraṇa when He possesses the desire ’to become the many’, to quote the Chāndogya: “tad aikṣata”. The verb “īkṣ” which normally means “to see”, implies “to will” or “to desire”. “Desire” to create makes the Lord the Efficient Cause. Even in the case of a pot, the potter who has the desire to make the pot becomes the efficient cause. That God is the material cause has already been admitted on the basis of Śrutis and the Brahmasūtras. The universe has Brahman alone as the Upādāna and Nimitta Kāraṇas. No other principle can be conceived to be the Upādāna or Nimitta. Rāmānuja in his Vedārthasaṅgraha explains this position in a very clear manner. He says that in our ordinary world of experience the material cause and the efficient cause are seen to be mutually different. They are not identical. But in so far as the creation of [[P160]] the universe is concerned, Brahman alone constitutes both the causes.
“But why is it so?” is the question of the critic. Rāmānuja answers that it is due to the inconceivably supreme wonderful mysterious powers of the Lord (sarvaśaktiyuktatvāt upādānakāraṇaṁ, taditara-aśeṣopakaraṇaṁ ca brahmaiva).8 It is beyond the comprehension of human mind and beyond the scope of logic. The mysterious powers of the Lord are inscrutable and inconceivable to the human beings. The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (II.8.9) raises questions:
“kiṁ svid vanaṁ ka u sa vṛkṣa āsīt,
yato dyāvā-pṛthivī niṣṭatakṣuḥ?
manīṣiṇo manasā pṛcchate du yat,
yadadhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayat”
(What was the wood, what was the tree, from which they shaped the heaven and earth? O wise ones, search in your minds as to which things He presided over and as to who supports the worlds). [[P161]]
The Śruti itself answers these questions in its own unique style, silencing all such doubts that may rise in the minds of ordinary men.
“Brahma vanaṁ brahma sa vṛkṣa āsīt,
yato dyāvāpṛthivī niṣṭatakṣuḥ |
manīṣiṇo manasā vibravīmi vaḥ
brahmādhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan ||”
(Brahman was the wood, and Brahman was the tree from which He shaped heaven and earth; you, wise ones, I tell you, He stood on Brahman (Himself), supporting the worlds.
This is a powerful declaration of the cosmic secret. Rāmānuja says that the oneness of the material and efficient causes is questioned in this scripture on the ground of the common conception of causation, and is supported in answer, on the ground of the uniqueness and uncommon power of Brahman (brahmaṇaḥ sarva-vilakṣaṇatvena).
The Brahmasūtra under I.4.25 reads “sākṣāt cobhayāmnānāt” (Because the Lord is directly revealed in the scriptures to be both the Upādāna and Nimitta).
Rāmānuja explains this aphorism thus: “atra hi sraṣṭuḥ brahmaṇaḥ kim upādānaṁ kāni copakaraṇānīti lokadṛṣṭyā pṛṣṭe, [[P162]] sakaletaravilakṣaṇasya brahmaṇaḥ sarvaśaktiyogo na viruddha iti brahmaivopādānam upakaraṇaṁ ceti parihṛtam | ataścobhayaṁ brahma”
Translated, it means: “Here, a question has been raised from the view point of the ordinary world as to what formed the material and what things became the implements for Brahman as He created the world. This question has been answered by declaring that since the Brahman is distinct and different in every way from all other things, He Himself becomes the matter as well as the implements. So Brahman is both (the Material and Efficient Cause).”
This passage is quoted by our author also. Logic has its own limitations and reasoning has its own place. They are incapable of revealing the secrets of God. Scriptures alone provide the key to this question.
According to Advaita, Brahman should be the material cause of the universe. But pure Brahman cannot be the cause. So this system accepts that Brahman qualified by Māyā alone constitutes the cause. The scripture, “satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ Brahma” (Tai. Up. II.1) states that Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity. [[P163]]
This is what is called Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa (Essential Definition). The passage “yato vā imāni bhūtāni” (Tai. Bhṛgu. 1) refers to the Brahman who is the source of creation as “yat”. This Brahman cannot be the pure Nirguṇa Brahman. That which is the source of the universe should actually be both the Nimitta and Upādāna. The Advaitin contends that this is possible only from the viewpoint of Vivarta-vāda (theory of apparent transformation) because Brahman’s causality in relation to the universe can only be by Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa (Accidental Definition). The world, though different from the Brahman, is not actually different from It because it is unreal. That is why Brahman is referred to as “advitīya”. The omniscience, omnipotence etc. of the Cause of the universe cannot be applied to Pradhāna (Matter) etc. which are insentient. Although the world is unreal, it can still be defined and discussed. For example, a crow can become the Upalakṣaṇa (indicator) of a house. Strictly speaking, there is no essential connection between the crow and the house. Another example is the silver that appears in the shell (śukti-rajatam). Although the silver is unreal, still it appears in the locus, shell alone. Though [[P164]] there is no real relation between the Brahman and the universe it is deemed to have an unreal, fictitious relationship. This is due to adhyāsa (superimposition). Therefore with the “causality of universe” which is merely superimposed on Brahman, the essential nature of Brahman which is pure and without a second (advitīya) can still become an object of enquiry.
The Advaitin argues that creation is unreal and that this can be proved with the help of pramāṇas like Śruti, Smṛti, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Arthāpatti. The Śvetāśvatara text “māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt” (IV.10) speaks about the unreality (māyā) of creation (Prakṛti). The Gītā (VII.14): “mama māyā duratyayā” (My māyā is difficult to cross) also proves this point. Perception which grasps the non-existence (abhāva) of pot and the like is also in support of the unreal nature of creation. Even as the shell-silver is realised as unreal by expression and experience, “nedaṁ rajatam” (This is not silver). The judgement “asti ghaṭaḥ” (The pot exists) which refers to the presence of pot in the limiting adjunct (upādhi) referred to as “asti” can also be sublated at a [[P165]] later time by the statement “ghaṭo nāsti” (The pot does not exist). So the world is unreal.
Inference like the following can also prove the unreality of the universe, points out the Advaitin.: “The difference between the world and Brahman is unreal and imagined because the world is insentient, and also because it is a product like shell-silver, or like the appearance of two moons.”
Arthāpatti (Presumption) can also prove the unreality of the world. The origin and destruction of the world cannot be accounted for unless it is unreal. This is so because the universe and its objects are noticed to come into existence and to get destroyed, on the ground of their being devoid of Brahman and being different from Brahman. The point to be noted here is that the phenomenon of creation of the world is “unreal” only from the viewpoint of the Ultimate Reality.
According to the Advaitins, reality is threefold: (a) pāramārthika (ultimate reality). Brahman is the only example for this; (b) vyāvahārika (conventional reality). The world and our experiences here belong to this category. So long as there is no [[P166]] dawn of reality, viz., the realization of Brahmanhood, the world and its experiences are considered to be; (c) prātibhāsika (phenomenal reality). Shell-silver, rope-snake are the illustrations. Thus according to the Advaita system of thought the entire universe with its peculiar configuration, infinite variety of living beings – known and unknown, seen and unseen, are all unreal from the viewpoint of the ultimate reality, viz., Brahman.
In so far as the relation of the Brahman with the universe is concerned, the pure Brahman cannot be its material cause. Since there cannot be two different material causes for one and the same product, it has to be accepted that Māyā (illusory power) and Brahman both together constitute a single material cause like the two strands of a rope. Both Māyā and Brahman are equally important in the projection of the conventional world. Brahman lends to the creation: (a) its existence (sattā) and (2) its apparent nature (svarūpa). Māyā is useful in imparting to this world its insentient character (jāḍya) and modification (vikāra). The aphorism: “prakṛtiśca ……” (Br.Sū. I.4.23) proves that Brahman constitutes both the Upādāna and the Nimitta Kāraṇas of the world. [[P167]]
Nowhere Māyā is referred to as the exclusive cause. That is why it is accepted in Advaita that Brahman qualified by Māyā alone can constitute the causal factor. Neither Brahman alone nor Māyā alone can independently become the cause of the universe. Māyā is a “viśeṣaṇa” (adjective) qualifying the substantive, Brahman. But the relation between an adjective and substantive appears to be real in practical experience. But it is not so in the case of the Brahman, reminds the Advaitin. Hence he calls Māyā as an Upādhi (limiting adjunct) of Brahman. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (II.5.15) states: “Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate” (Indra, i.e., the supreme Ruler is realised as having a multiplicity of forms through His māyās). Therefore Māyā alone is responsible for the world-phenomenon. But it cannot function independently. Neither can Brahman independently form the cause. They both together form the cause of the world, concludes the Advaitin.
Śrīnivāsa argues that the Advaita view cannot hold ground. The word “māyā” according to Viśiṣṭādvaita means a real, positive, wonderful, mysterious power of the Lord. The word “māyā” is given in Lexicons as meaning ‘knowledge’ also. (Cf. [[P168]] Nirukta: māyā tu vayunaṁ jñānam). In the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I.19.20) the word “māyā” is used in the sense of a real power, capable of creating real experiences.
“tena māyā-sahasraṁ tat Śambarasya āśugāminā
bālasya rakṣatā deham ekaikaśyena sūditam ||”
(All the thousand mysterious powers employed by the demon Śambara were nullified, one by one by that speedy discus which was protecting the body of the boy [Prahlāda]).9
Rāmānuja quotes this passage in his Śrībhāṣya under I.1.1.
Explaining the aphorism “māyāmātraṁ tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt) (under Br. Sū. III.2.3) (The creation in dreams is nothing but a marvel [i.e., the result of the mysterious power of the Lord] because the jīva’s satyasaṅkalpatva is not fully manifested in its essential form in the state of saṁsāra), Rāmānuja cites the Rāmāyaṇa passage (I.1.25): “janakasya kule jātā devamāyeva nirmitā” (The one born in the family of King Janaka is the wonderful power of the Lord which assumed a body, as it were), to support his contention that the word māyā does not [[P169]] indicate something unreal or illusory. He says: “māyāśabdo hi āścaryavācī” (The word māyā means “wonder” or “marvel”).
The reality of the universe which is proved by Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śruti cannot be easily discounted. Rāmānuja argues in his Vedārthasaṅgraha that the world in which we are living is not eternal (nitya). But it is real (satya) in so far as our experience goes. The change of dress is real. It is not something unreal or imaginary. The fact that we had our forefathers were alive in the past is real, although they are non-eternal and are thus, not alive at the present moment. Thus Rāmānuja contends that the reality of the universe need not be linked with the eternality of the universe. This is an epoch-making declaration of Rāmānuja. If the world is considered unreal just because it is non-eternal, then all our experiences in this world and of this world become sublated. The relation between the teacher and the taught also becomes null and void on this interpretation of the Advaitins. Even scriptures on whose authority Śaṅkara builds his mansion of Advaita crumble into nothingness if the world-experience is discounted as unreal. [[P170]]
The following passage from the Vedārthasaṅgraha10 may be quoted in this context: “tasya vaibhava-pratipādana-parāṇām eṣāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyādīnāṁ vivaraṇe pravṛttāḥ kecana, nirviśeṣa-jñāna-mātram eva brahma; tacca nitya-mukta-svaprakāśam api, tattvamasi-ityādi-sāmānādhikaraṇya-avagata-jīvaikyam; Brahmaiva ajñaṁ, badhyate, mucyate ca; nirviśeṣa-cinmātra-ātireki-īśeśitavyādi-ananta-vikalpa-svarūpaṁ kṛtsnaṁ jagat mithyā; kaścit baddhaḥ, kaścin muktaḥ itīyaṁ vyavasthā na vidyate; itaḥ pūrvaṁ kecana muktā ityayam artho mithyā; ekam eva śarīraṁ jīvavat; nirjīvāni itarāṇi śarīrāṇi; tacca śarīraṁ kim iti na vyavasthitam; ācāryo jñānasya upadeṣṭā mithyā; śāstrajanya-jñānaṁ ca mithyā; etat sarvaṁ mithyābhūtena eva śāstreṇa avagatam” iti varṇayanti ||
(Some engaged in the explanation of these passages like the proposition expressing identity, descriptive of the glory of Brahman put forth the following explanation: Undifferentiated consciousness alone is Brahman. It is eternally free and self-luminous. Still its identity with the individual self is made known through [[P171]] propositions positing identity such as ‘That thou art’. Brahman itself, being ignorant, gets bound and is (subsequently) released. Apart from the undifferentiated consciousness, the whole universe, consisting of endless plurality exhibiting differences like that between Īśvara and the creatures, is unreal. That there is some one who is liberated and some one that is bound is an arrangement that does not exist. That some have attained liberation before now is not true. One body alone is ensouled, the other bodies are soul-less. It is not determined which that body is. The teacher who imparts knowledge is just a phenomenal appearance. The knower (in all cognitions) is also a phenomenal appearance. The scripture is also unreal. The knowledge arising out of the scripture is also unreal. All this is known from the scripture itself which is unreal.)
It is therefore evident that on the strength of scriptures one has to accept Brahman as constituting both the material and efficient causes of the universe. This is, no doubt, something unusual because in our day-to-day life we see the Material Cause to be different from the efficient cause. E.g., clay and potter. But this [[P172]] phenomenon can be justified only on the basis of the peculiar and mysterious powers of the Lord. Thus He constitutes both the causes. This cannot be either denied or questioned. Inscrutable are the ways and powers of God. “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”11
According to the Dvaita system propounded by Śrī Ānandatīrtha (popularly known as Madhvācārya) the Creator of the Universe is Lord Viṣṇu who is also known as Nārāyaṇa, Puruṣottama, Īśvara, Bhagavān, Kṛṣṇa and the like. He is a Being with a character (Saguṇa) and is in that sense a Personality. He pervades everything and is not anthropomorphic. He has no particular material form but can manifest in any form, being the centre of all power, will, auspiciousness, goodness, beauty, grace, etc. He can more appropriately be described by the word “Saguṇa”, than by the word “Nirguṇa” (an impersonal, amoral Being). The term Nirguṇa conveys us the idea of an impersonal, inanimate and blind force like electricity and other similar forces of [[P173]] Nature rather than of a “Sat-Cit-Ānanda” which is the term applied to Brahman in the Upaniṣads. The Brahmasūtra (I.1.2) says: “janmādyasya yataḥ” (That, out of which the origin etc. of the world takes place, is Brahman). The early Sāṅkhyas who consider Prakṛti (Primordial Nature) and Puruṣa (Individual souls) as the independent reals, consider these two alone as sufficient to account for the creative process and have totally eliminated God from their system.
The problem of the Vedāntins is to make Him free from the imperfections and evils of the world created by Him out of Himself while admitting that He is the sole cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world. Madhva solves this problem by his theory of reality as having two aspects – the one Independent (svatantra) or God, and the other, Dependent (asvatantra). The Asvatantra includes Prakṛti, Jīva, and other eternal entities. The Dependent are not created by Him from Himself in any sense that is described in other Vedānta schools or from a Nihil as in Christianity. These eternal dependent entities are not generated by Him. They co-exist with Him eternally, supported by His Will and entirely controlled by Him. In this [[P174]] aspect, this school comes closer to Rāmānuja’s definition of “body”. These entities are dependent upon God in their pristine nature and in all transformations that they may have.
The question that would rise at this point is as to how does God exercise His control over these co-existent eternal entities. Madhva solves this problem by the theory of Parādhīna Viśeṣāpatti – the attainment of partial modification owing to the dependence on another. This needs some clarification:
Ontological entities are of two types – some are absolutely originated and destroyed while some others are eternal. Prakṛti, individual souls, time, space and the Vedas are the eternals.
Change in creation is also of two kinds in respect of these two types of entities. The non-eternal types come into existence in their entirety, undergo changes in nature and ultimately, get destroyed. But in the case of eternal substances the creative process consists in generating new temporary traits without modifying the substratum which is co-eternal with the creator. For instance, Prakṛti produces Mahat and the subsequent categories when its [[P175]] equilibrium of the three qualities gets “disturbed” (stirred up) by the Will of the Lord to create. But when the creative process terminates at the end of the cycle, the eternal substance Prakṛti remains in its pristine form, and again brings forth the world when the new cycle commences. Change in the individual soul who is by nature, full of knowledge and bliss is brought about by Avidyā (ignorance). He then gets bound to various kinds of bodies. When ignorance is removed by the grace of God, the Jīva abides in his own basic nature which cannot be touched by the changes that take place in the physical bodies.
So creation in the case of eternal entities means only the generation of some new traits in the unchanging substratum with which its essential attributes are internally unified. Generation of such new traits cannot be taken as the generation of the whole. They are purely temporary while the locus with its inherent and essential attributes remains unaltered.12
Now the problem that would rise is that the Omnipotence of God can be fully justified and demonstrated only when He is held [[P176]] to be creator of every thing including the so-called eternal entities like Jīva and Prakṛti. Madhva, like other thinkers, does not accept such a hypothesis. Although God is all powerful to do so, still He has set a limit for Himself and has chosen the way of eternal creation with eternal entities co-existing with Himself, all by His own Will.
If one contends that the Omnipotence of God makes Him capable of creating the world out of “nothing”, then one has to face a volley of logical and metaphysical problems which become too numerous to be answered. The question that would naturally arise is that of God’s status and nature before He started this creative activity, involving evil and suffering. “Is He God first and creator next, or is He God and creator simultaneously?”13 If one says that He is creating out of nothing then it is implied that there is beside Him, nothing. According to the followers of Madhva, the majesty and excellence of God are far better served by the theory of eternal creation with entities co-eval with Him, and supporting them by His free and unfailing Will, rather than by conceiving creation as an outcome of His own whims and fancies. [[P177]]
Thus, according to the Dvaita system of thought, Prakṛti, Jīvas and other eternal entities are collectively and in every minute detail, under His absolute control, eternally. The creative process consists only in the generation of certain temporary characteristics in eternal substances, and in causing the eternally succeeding cycles of projection and dissolution necessary for the fructification of the karmans of the individual souls involved in this process. He supports the world systems (fourteen or even more) and He supports and controls them in every detail by pervading them with an infinitesimal fraction of His infinite Power.
According to some, the self-body analogy of Rāmānuja cannot adequately express the idea of the omnipotent Will of God in creating the world. Thus for instance, the self cannot “create” the body. If the Brahman is taken as the Upādāna and the Efficient Cause of creation, this inadequacy seems to be all the more serious. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin’s position is quite clear. The body-soul analogy is only by way of demonstrating the cosmic system as an organism. It is not intended to be exhaustive and all-comprehensive in its connotation. It cannot be applied to every [[P178]] aspect of the God-universe relation. The sheer Will of God as creative cause is an instance in point. Rāmānuja also realises that this “body-soul” analogy cannot be applied to all instances. For example, the inseparable existence (apṛthaksiddhi) of the world does not hold good in the reverse order. That is to say, God cannot be the inseparable attribute of the world, His ‘body’. Rāmānuja sees the creative power of God as the most outstanding divine attribute which is not shared by any self.
Further, the word “upādāna” translated normally as the Material Cause, may be a little misleading. It suggests the presence of some pre-existent material which is used for the creation of the universe. Eric J. Lott prefers to translate this word as “substantial cause” or “internal cause”.14
In any case, any Vedāntic school trying to preserve the supremacy of God should ascribe the existence of the world to the self-existence and supreme prowess of God. If the souls and matter are eternal without beginning and end, then one has to be careful to explain their eternal derivation and eternal dependence upon the Lord. It was precisely to bring out the eternal dependence of the [[P179]] world on God that Rāmānuja has employed the body-soul relation. This analogy again takes its force from the Upaniṣadic description of the Lord being the Upādāna and Nimitta Kāraṇas. This brings us to the end of this chapter. The following chapter tries to bring together in a cogent manner, all the ideas expressed in relation to God being the material and instrumental cause of the universe. [[P180]]
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5 CONCLUSION
Before concluding this study it is worthwhile to look at the general background against which works of this kind appeared so that a proper assessment of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy which they represent could be made. It is to be noted that both the Eastern and Western writers, in their general approach to Vedāntic studies, had, for quite a long time, felt that Vedāntic thought is represented only by the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. Accordingly, whenever Paul Deussen and Max Muller (who lived in the 19th century) spoke of Vedānta, they meant only Śaṅkara’s system. Richard Garbe went to the extent of saying that Rāmānuja, in dissenting from Śaṅkara’s monistic interpretation of the Vedānta Sūtras, introduced views “which are alien to the true Vedāntic doctrine”.15 Even scholars like Das Gupta entertained such an opinion. Das Gupta, for instance, wrote: “So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by Śaṅkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedānta [[P181]] Philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by Śaṅkara.”16
Fortunately enough, there have been attempts made by scholars like V.S. Ghate and George Thibaut to show that Rāmānuja and other theistic writers were also Vedāntins and that their systems also deserved the appellation “Vedānta Philosophies”. Thibaut’s introduction to his translations of the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the Brahma Sūtras showed that Rāmānuja’s theistic approach can claim to be a “more faithful interpretation” than Śaṅkara’s. He thinks that it is likely that when Rāmānuja refers to the much earlier theistic commentators on the Sūtras, like Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka and Dramiḍa, he shows a genuine indebtedness to these early Vedāntins, and is not merely making a formal claim to an ancient legacy.
Indian scholars like Prof. P.N. Srinivasachari and Dr K.C. Varadachari have succeeded to a remarkable degree in proving to the world of scholars that Rāmānuja’s system lays as great a claim to Vedāntism as Śaṅkara’s. The fact that Rāmānuja was followed [[P182]] by Philosophers like Nimbārka, Vallabha and Rāmānanda, and in more recent times, by Svāmi Nārāyaṇa whose systems exhibit a profound influence of Rāmānuja’s thought right from philosophy down to the organisation of their sects, is a vindication of the fact that Rāmānuja was representing an ancient, authentic tradition of theism. His stress on Bhakti to a loving personal God viz., Śrīman-Nārāyaṇa, and his personal initiative to admit the lowest strata of society into temples, made Rāmānuja a hero and champion of the cause of the down-trodden. That his Philosophy was unequivocally admired and propagated by the succeeding line of Ācāryas is a matter to be reckoned with.
The Siddhāntacintāmaṇi of Śrīnivāsa II is a monograph which tries to revitalise and reassure the infallibility and validity of the glorious tradition of Rāmānuja’s Siddhānta. It is dedicated exclusively to establish the concept that Brahman is both the Efficient and Material Cause of the universe. As pointed out earlier, the contribution of the Surapuram writers to the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion and Philosophy is immense both in terms of quality and quantity. The contribution of Śrīnivāsa II in particular is significant. [[P183]]
His works listed in the opening chapter along with those of his predecessors and successors make a formidable presentation.
The Advaitic view that there are two Brahmans – the Saguṇa and the Nirguṇa is self-contradictory. It has been criticised by all other Vedāntins, notably the Bheda-abheda-vādins who maintain the monistic view of the Absolute as Sat or Saguṇa Brahman. While Bhāskara believes the Reality of Brahman as formless, but not characterless, Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka refute the idea of Nirguṇa or Attributeless Brahman. They also refute the concept of the Niravayava or formless Brahman. Bhāskara denies the idea of an indefinable Māyā which affects the very source of reality and makes the Jīva, a figment of Māyā. But he traces the world to the self-conditioning nature of the Absolute which is called Satyopādhi or “real limiting adjuncts” and not Mithyopādhi or “unreal limiting adjuncts”. If we substitute real change (pariṇāma) to Upādhi then we arrive at the Bheda-abheda version of Yādavaprakāśa according to which the aspects of identity and difference are equally real. [[P184]]
The philosophical transition from Nimbārka to Rāmānuja is a transformation or development from Bheda-abheda to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Brahman is alogical. It transcends reason. Vedāntas often present the idea through metaphor, symbology, analogy. If the Advaitins employ the rope-snake analogy, Bhāskara cites the illustration of Ākāśa in its unconditioned and conditioned aspect, or the spider and its web. Yādava presents the illustration of the sea and its waves. Nimbārka employs the example of the contraction and expansion of the body of a snake. Rāmānuja accepts the analogy of light and luminosity or the relation between the body and the soul as the most befitting comparison which brings out the nature of Brahman and its relation to the universe of Cit and Acit.
According to Rāmānuja Brahman is differentiated by Cit and Acit which form His body. Before creation Brahman can be referred to as one without a second (ekam evādvitīyam). At that time there was no differentiation in terms of name and form. The [[P185]] Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says: “Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by name and form.”
According to all the theistic schools of Vedānta at no point of time there is an absolute entity called Avidyā. According to Rāmānuja Brahman has for His body the Cit and Acit in their subtle and gross states. All imperfections, limitations and changes belong to the Cit and Acit components which are the modes of God. They never belong to Brahman. Rāmānuja believes in Satkāryavāda and denounces Asatkāryavāda. The world cannot come out of nothing. Sat is pre-existent but not non-existent. But the state is so subtle that it is practically non-existent. In the Pralaya state there is no distinction of name and form. The cause and effect are non-different. The relationship is internal and organic.
Effectuation cannot be an illusion. It reveals the inner purpose of the divine nature. Brahman as the cause is both the Upādāna and the Nimitta. The world is non-different from Brahman because it is the effect or upādeya of Brahman. However, Brahman is not [[P186]] affected by the changes and His nature remains pure and perfect. Even then He realises His nature only by Anupraveśa (entering into matter) with Jīva. Only then the “nāma-rūpa” distinction takes place. It is to the credit of Viśiṣṭādvaita that it traces the imperfections of creation, to the finite self only (jīva). God is immanent in the soul as its antaryāmin. But the modifications of matter and the imperfections of the self do not touch God. This position fits in with the grammatical rule of co-ordination (sāmānādhikaraṇya). Every word that refers to the individual soul should connote the Supreme Being also. The term “śarīra” connotes the “śarīrin” or the self which is ultimately Brahman Himself. Thus the main thesis of the Sadvidyā section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is proved satisfactorily. If one knows the cause, the effect also becomes known. By knowing Brahman who is the one without a second, the world consisting of Cit and Acit in its state of effect also becomes known.17
As pointed out earlier, the most important tenet of Viśiṣṭādvaita is the relation between God and the world consisting of Cit and [[P187]] Acit. This is its differentia (Pradhāna Pratitantra Siddhānta). It may be described as the most significant name because Vedānta Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa is also known as “śārīraka śāstra”. It satisfies the requirements of logical consistency, the Mīmāṁsā exegesis, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics and above all, religious awareness.
Śrīnivāsa based his work on this key concept. Śarīra or body is defined by Rāmānuja as a substance (dravya) which a conscious self can completely support and control for its own purposes and which is related to the soul in a subordinate status.18 The self (jīva) abides in the Absolute. He lives in it, moves in it and has his being in it. He depends upon It for his form (svarūpa), his existence (sthiti) and his functioning (pravṛtti). Brahman sustains the jīvātman as its inner controller and uses that jīva for His own satisfaction. This is also the relation of Ādhāra and the Ādheya (the supporter and the supported), Niyantā and the Niyāmya (the controller and the controlled), Śeṣin and the Śeṣa (the independent and the dependent). These may also be referred to as the metaphysical, moral and aesthetic aspects of Reality. These [[P188]] aspects may be analysed for purposes of understanding but they cannot be separated. The concept of Śarīra-śarīri-bhāva can be taken only as the most appropriate analogical explanation of the vital intimacy between man and God.19
It may be noted that Rāmānuja has adopted the pariṇāmavāda (or the satkāryavāda) of the Sāṅkhya School. He points out that the cause is pre-existent and the effect is only a continuity of the cause. A substance assumes different shapes in succession. That is the basic requirement of a material cause. What passes away is the substance in its previous state only. What comes into existence is the same substance in its subsequent state as a product. Pariṇāma is therefore, a constant unfolding of what is enfolded.20 What has been latent becomes patent. The Upādāna Kāraṇa is the immanent cause. For example, the vital breath (prāṇa), though one, has a variety of biological dimensions both in terms of its form as well as function. One and the same mind also has a number of psychic presentations. Devadatta may change day after day. But [[P189]] he is essentially identical with himself. Thus continuity in creation is physical, biological, psychical and historical. There is no contradiction between one state and another. Development, as an effect, thus brings out the inner substantial value of a thing. Prakṛti is subject to this kind of pariṇāma and there is no contradiction between one state of change and another. It is a constant flux without any permanent stability. The body is subject to mobility, metabolism and so on. One form of energy is transformed into another. Thus every activity, every phenomenon at the physical as well as the psychical level, is taking place as cause and effect.
This idea of constant flux is opposed to the Buddhist theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), where there is no stable substance as the foundation of the series of changes. The Jīva, however, does not undergo this kind of constant flux in his essential substance because he is different from his body. In the empirical state of worldly existence, his knowledge is obscured and limited by his karman called Avidyā.
Rāmānuja explains that the word Avidyā means the work ordained on a person by scripture in relation to one’s varṇa and [[P190]] āśrama. In the Laghupūrvapakṣa of his Śrībhāṣya (under I.1.1) he states that “vidyā” (spiritual knowledge) dawns upon a person who performs his āśrama-duties as laid down in scriptures.
The Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad (mantra 11) states:
“vidyāṁ cāvidyāṁ ca yastad vedobhayaṁ saha |
avidyayā mṛtyuṁ tīrtvā, vidyayā amṛtam aśnute ||”
This mantra, according to Rāmānuja means: “He who knows both vidyā and avidyā together, first destroys, by means of the avidyā (work), the effects of the past work (or karman) which are obstructive to the origination of knowledge and then attains the Brahman”.
Rāmānuja also quotes the following verse from the Viṣṇupurāṇa (VI.6.12) to justify his interpretation of the word Avidyā as the varṇāśrama duties enjoined upon a person:
“iyāja so ‘pi subahūn yajñān jñāna-vyapāśrayaḥ |
brahmavidyām adhiṣṭhāya tartuṁ mṛtyum avidyayā ||”
When translated, it means: “Having the knowledge of the Brahman as the object in view, he also relied upon scriptural [[P191]] knowledge (of works) and performed numerous sacrifices in order that he might destroy the effects of the past karman by means of (the present) avidyā (work)”.21
It is thus clear that the term Avidyā according to Rāmānuja means the duties ordained according to one’s birth and station in life, but not “ignorance” as interpreted by Śaṅkara and his followers.
The Jīva falsely identifies himself with the body and becomes subject to a series of psycho-physical changes. That is why he is bound by saṁsāra. While the changes in matter are changes in its essential nature, the changes brought in by Jīva upon himself are the effects of his past karman which form the basis for his present, leading to the future.
Accepting Brahman both as both the Material and the Efficient Cause of the universe does not mean that Brahman is infected by [[P192]] the imperfections of the world. The expression “ekam eva” of the Chāndogya emphasises the point that God is the Material Cause. The word “advitīya” clarifies that He is the Nimitta Kāraṇa as well. Prakṛti (Acit) is pariṇāma-ridden while the Puruṣa (Jīva) or Cit is karma-ridden. The Supreme Brahman identified with Puruṣottama by Rāmānuja in the introductory portion of his Śrībhāṣya is the “all-self” (sarvātmā) who is absolutely free from the modifications of matter and the imperfections of Jīva. He is superlatively transcendental, pure, perfect and holy.
Erudition of the author
Śrīnivāsa has, in the course of this work, displayed his amazing scholarship in several branches of learning. He has quoted profusely from Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya, Gītābhāṣya and the Siddhitraya of Yāmuna, his predecessor. He has referred to the Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Vedānta Deśika. Innumerable are the references he makes to Grammatical works like the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, the Pradīpa of Kaiyaṭa, the Prakriyāmañjarī of Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgaramuni and the Padamañjarī of Haradatta. His proficiency in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā [[P193]] of Jaimini is evident from every page of this work. The number of Nyāyas he has quoted from this work is quite large and the analysis of ritualistic portions of the Veda he has made is outstanding. He has also quoted passages from a few poetic compositions.
Above all, his erudition in the Vedānta system is unparalleled. He has quoted profusely from a number of Upaniṣads such as Atharva Śikhā, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, Mahānārāyaṇa, Muṇḍaka Śvetāśvatara, Subāla and Taittirīya. He has also quoted several passages from the Śrutaprakāśikā of Sudarśana Sūri, which is a commentary on Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya. He has also occasionally referred to his own works like Sāradarpaṇa and commentary on Kaiyaṭa Bhāṣya. This all-round scholarship has placed Śrīnivāsa in a very covetable position as he tackles the Advaita, Bhedābheda and the Dvaita systems in the course of this work.
Period of decadence
Our author lived in the 17th century. That was perhaps the period of decadence in originality in all fields – literature, religion [[P194]] and philosophy. Perhaps the era of originality in the field of Viśiṣṭādvaita came to an end by the 13th century itself when the most outstanding post-Rāmānuja writers, Piḷḷai Lokācārya and Vedānta Deśika writing their monumental works supporting Rāmānuja Darśana in Tamil and Sanskrit, made it a formidable fort impenetrable by rival schools of thought. The later period which also produced great writers and thinkers was only marked by efforts for the consolidation and consummation of the gains of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy. All the works which appeared from the 14th up to the 19th century, one may say, represent only such efforts. Their authors explained, commented, analysed and expounded the earlier works. Originality in terms of writing ground-breaking works was almost absent during this period.
Another kind of development in the Śrīvaiṣṇava writings of of the post-13th century is the emergence of works belonging to the two sects – the Southern (Teṅgalai) and the Vaḍagalai (Northern) each one trying to refute the other on certain minor differences noticed in the works of the two leading Ācāryas Piḷḷai [[P195]] Lokācārya and Vedānta Deśika.22 Sharp differences arose between these two sects on such issues as the nature of God’s mercy, whether it is spontaneous or conditional, the position of Śrī (Lakṣmī) – whether She belongs to the category of individuals (jīvakoṭi) or to that of the Lord Himself (Īśvarakoṭi), the nature of Kaivalya, the nature of Prapatti (whole-hearted surrender), the nature of Lord’s pervasion (vibhutva) etc. in the Siddhānta. Works like the Aṣṭādaśabheda-vicāra of Varavaraguru of the 19th century try to explain the nature of the eighteen doctrinal differences that were noticed in the works of the Ācāryas of both these texts by later writers. There is also a Tamil exposition of this work by Koil Kandāḍai Aṇṇan Tiruveṅkaṭācārya.23
It is highly refreshing to note that Śrīnivāsa II turned his attention to more important and interesting themes of the Siddhānta rather than to the sectarian feuds based upon minor differences of opinion. It should also be pointed out that these so-called “doctrinal differences” were the outcome of “interpretation” [[P196]] rather than any serious basic differences in the original works themselves.24
Why monographs/smaller tracts?
Writing smaller treatises and monographs became the order of the day, if one may say so. This was mainly because the adherents of other systems such as Advaita and Dvaita (particularly Vyāsarāja) staged a come back and began to attack the basic tenets of Viśiṣṭādvaita. So it was the duty of the post-13th century writers to repulse such attacks and prove the invulnerability of the system of Rāmānuja from time to time. That is why we find a number of short treatises /monographs like the present one trying to take up one particular concept and make it the central theme of the work. The post-13th century writers on Viśiṣṭādvaita are justified in writing such tracts. The Yatīndramatadīpikā of Śrīnivāsadāsa who lived in the 16th century is one such work. He was a disciple of Mahācārya, the famous author of Caṇḍamāruta on Vedānta [[P197]] Deśika’s Śatadūṣaṇī. He also wrote Vādagranthas like Sadvidyāvijaya, Advaitavidyāvijaya, Brahmavidyāvijaya and Gurūpasadanavijaya. The Śrībhāṣya Upanyāsas of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, also a disciple of Mahācārya is another work of this class. The Vādagranthas of Anantāḻvān also represent the same approach. These writers took great efforts to reinforce the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy and restore it to its position of pristine glory.
Modern writers
It is imperative that those who want to study the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy should make an in-depth study of the contributions of post-13th century writers with as much regard and interest as they show to the works of the Pūrvācāryas. The frontiers of knowledge are ever receding. Viśiṣṭādvaitins have the sacred duty of safeguarding the system by writing new works supporting the contributions of stalwarts like Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, Piḷḷai Lokācārya and Vedānta Deśika.
In the light of this, the great contributions made by Abhinava Deśika Sri Uttamur Viraraghavacharya Svami of the present [[P198]] century come as waves of fresh breeze to revitalise, resuscitate and revive the dormant, if not, morbid doctrines and the tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. Mm. Anantakrishna Śāstrigal, a great Advaita scholar, tried to refute the commentary of ‘Caṇḍamāruta’ of Mahācharya on Vedānta Deśika’s Śatadūṣaṇī, and prove that the hundred dūṣaṇas (defects) pointed out by Vedānta Deśika against the Advaitic concept of Avidyā are actually so many ornaments for Advaita. Abhinava Deśika Sri Uttamur Svāmī wrote the Paramārthabhūṣaṇa in reply to the Śatabhūṣaṇī of Mm. Ananta Krishna Śāstrigaḷ.
Scope for further studies
The contribution of Śrīnivāsa II the author of the Siddhāntacintāmaṇi to Viśiṣṭādvaita is thus highly valuable from the viewpoint of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition. His style is very powerful and his language is marked by long compounds which are characteristic of the Vāda-granthas. The Surapuram Śrīvaiṣṇava family to which Śrīnivāsa belongs, has done yeomen service in re-establishing Viśiṣṭādvaita in its own light and glory. [[P199]]
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This is perhaps a reference to the work Vyāvahārikasatyatva-khaṇḍana-sāra by Aṇṇayācārya II. See p. 39 above. ↩︎
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Cf: Tarkasaṅgraha, Pratyakṣa Pariccheda, p.14: “tadubhaya-bhinnaṁ kāraṇaṁ Nimittakāraṇam” ↩︎
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p. 101 ↩︎
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Lexicons gives the following meanings for the word “pīlu”: arrow; atom; insect; elephant; stem of the palm; flower; group of palm trees; a kind of tree. ↩︎
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The Upaniṣadic text “tarati Śokamātmavit” means “One who knows the Self crosses misery”. Unless the self is “presumed” to be eternal, one cannot be expected to get beyond this world and attain the state of liberation (which is free from misery and is full of bliss). This is an instance of what is called Śrutyarthāpatti (Presumption arising from the apparent inconsistency of the scriptural meaning). ↩︎
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It may be noted that the critic here is an advocate of the Vaḍagalai sect. +++(actually, The reverse!!)+++ For a detailed account of the eighteen doctrinal differences between the Teṅgalai and the Vaḍagalai sects, see Dr M. Narasimhachary, Basic Concepts of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, pp. 26-29. ↩︎
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See Vedārthasaṅgraha (Eng. tr. by Dr S.S. Raghavachar), p. 10 ↩︎
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Vedārthasaṅgraha, pp. 32-33 ↩︎
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The reference here is to the real powerful weapons used by Śambara against the child devotee Prahlāda. He was commanded to do so by his master, Hiraṇyakaśipu. ↩︎
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See pp.4-5. The translation is by Dr S.S. Raghavachar. ↩︎
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Cf. Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Scene, Act 1. p.1035 (The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. Ed. Peter Alexander. The English Language Book Society and Collins, London and Glasgow, Reprint, October 1964). ↩︎
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See Bhakti Schools of Vedānta by Swami Tapasyananda, pp.152-156 (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, 1990). ↩︎
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Bhakti Schools of Vedanta, p. 158 ↩︎
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God and the Universe … p. 166 ↩︎
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Vide Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. XII. p. 597 ↩︎
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See A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. 429 ↩︎
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The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita by P.N. Srinivasachari, pp. 78-81 ↩︎
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Cf. Śrībhāṣya II.1. 9: “yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṁ …” etc. ↩︎
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Cf. The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, pp. 95-96 ↩︎
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Cf. ibid. p. 103 ↩︎
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Śrībhāṣya with English translation (Vol.I) by Prof. M. Rangacharya, pp. 21-22 ↩︎
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See History of Sri Vaishnavism in the Tamil Country (Post-Ramanuja) by N. Jagdeesan. p. 171 ff. ↩︎
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See History of Viśiṣṭādvaita Literature by V.K.S.N. Raghava, p.79 ↩︎
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See M. Narasimhachary, “Interpretation As a Means of Understanding Tradition: A Śrīvaiṣṇava Perspective”, ISKCON Communication Journal (Oxford, UK), Vol. 8. No.2, March 2001 (pp.25-35). ↩︎