Nor must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not instruct Śūdras, and so on, because the text, ‘he is not to teach him sacred things,’ forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned–from texts such as ‘Thou art that’–that Brahman is their Self, and thus are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the prohibition quoted does not
therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman may thus spring up in the mind of Śūdras and the like, owing to instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all prohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the Śūdra’s mind does not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he learns the truth about Reality. For the case of the Śūdra does not herein differ from that of the Brāhmaṇa; the latter also does not at once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in the mind of the Brāhmaṇa as soon as meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped by meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person produces the required cognition in the mind of the Śūdra. For meditation means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at something visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned, whence it follows that the Śūdra also is qualified for it, while he would not be qualified for an activity having an ‘adriśhṭa,’ i.e. supersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the Veda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the desire of knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a Śūdra also (viz. in some other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic instruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed by meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to an end.–The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road. The mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception
and inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the Śūdra the theory that there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self-luminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience, and that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is superimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted meditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle, and thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there is really no use to be discerned in the Vedānta-texts, suggesting as they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected with manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of Śūdras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear.
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–To this the following objection will possibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the beginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and the Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of perception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is the Veda, and hence we cannot do without it.–But this objection is not valid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and Inference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the observation that there are various sects of philosophers. Sānkhyas, and so on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And when such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the way allowed by the Śānkaras themselves) lead on to
the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-changing, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be learned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of that nature.–
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