THE VEDANTA-SŪTRAS WITH THE SRI-BHASHYA OF RĀMĀNUJĀCHĀRYA Translated into English BY M. RANGACHARYA, M.A. AND M. B. VARADARAJA AIYANGAR, B.A., B.L. VOLUME II. (Pushed with the financial assistance of the Ministry of Education, the Government of India.) THE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., NUNGAMBAKKAM :: MADRAS-6. All Rights Reserved.] 1964 [Price Rs. 12:50 nP. First Edition-April 1964. VIDYA PRESS, 16, SUNKUWAR STREET, MADRAS-5. PREFACE It has taken more time than we expected to bring out the second volume of this work. Every care has been taken to see that the translation is accurate and clear. The additions and alterations necessary to make the translation full and complete are enclosed within brackets. The Analytical Outline is for the most part our work. Many footnotes have also been added by us. The footnotes are based largely on the indispensable Srutaprakāsika, the Bhavaprakāšikā and the lucid commentaries of Rangarāmānuja on the Upanishads. The indexes have also been prepared by us. We are grateful to the Government of India for sanctioning a grant to help in the publication of this work. To the late Sri M. Patanjali Sastri and other members of the Sanskrit Board who must have recommended the grant, our thanks are due, and are gladly rendered. In the elucidation of the difficult technical arguments in this work, we have received invaluable help from Sanskrit scholars. Particular mention has to be made of Sri Karappangadu Venkaṭācharya Swami, who has spared many hours to explain Ramanuja’s ideas and clear patiently doubts and difficulties. We have to acknowledge thankfully the help given by Sri T. E. Varadachariar, Sri M. C. Krishnan and and Sri T. E. Seshadri in seeing the book through the press. The printing of Volume III has already started. April 1964. M. R. SAMPATKUMARAN, M. B. NARASIMHA IYENGAR. CONTENTS

Preface
An Analytical Outline CHAPTER I, PART II
Adhikarapa I (SARVATRAPRASIDDHY- ADHIKARANA-Sutras 1 to 9) Adhikarana II (ATTRADHIKARAŅA: Sutras 9 to 12) Page i-xcvi 1 17 21
Adhikarana III (ANTARADHIKARAŅA: Sutras 13 to 18) 31
Adhikarana IV (ANTARYAMYADHIKARANA: Sutras 19 to 21) 44
Adhikarana V (ADṚISYATVADIGUNAKADHI- KARANA-Sutras 22 to 24) 51
Adhikarana VI (VAISVANARADHIKARANA: Sutras 25 to 33) 65 CHAPTER 1, PART III
Adhikarana I (DYUBHVADYADHIKARANA: Sutras 1 to 6) 82
Adhikarana II (BHUMÄDHIKARAŅA : Sutras 7 and 8) 90 ?
Adhikarana III (AKSHARADHIKARAŅA: Sutras 9 to 11) 107
Adhikarana IV (IKSHATIKARMĀDHIKARAŅA: Sutra 12) 115vi
Adhikarana V (DAHARĀDHIKARAŅA: Sutras 13 to 22) Page (i) The teaching about Dahara 120 (ii) Prajapati’s teaching 134
Adhikarana VI (PRAMITĀDHIKARAŅA: Sūtras 23 and 24) 144
Adhikarana VII (DEVATĀDHIKARAŅA : Sūtras 24 to 29) 147
Adhikaraņa VIII (MADHVADHIKARAŅA: Sutras 30 to 32) 162
Adhikarana IX (APASUDRĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 33 to 39) 166
Adhikarana VI (PRAMITADHIKARANA: Continued: Sutras 40 and 41) 184
Adhikaraṇa X (ARTHĀNTARATVĀDIVYA- PADESĀDHIKARAŅA: Sūtras 42 to 44) 187 CHAPTER I, PART IV
Adhikarana I (ĀNUMĀNIKĀDHIKARAŅA: Sūtras 1 to 7) 195
Adhikarana II (CHAMASĀDHIKARAṆA : Sūtras 8 to 10) 213
Adhikarana III (SANKHYOPASANGRAHADHI- KARANA: Sūtras 11 to 13) 228
Adhikarana IV (KĀRAṆATVĀDHIKARAŅA: Sūtras 14 and 15) 236
Adhikarana V vii (JAGADVACHITVADHI- KARANA: Sūtras 16 to 18)
Adhikarana VI (VÄKYANVAYADHIKARAŅA: Sūtras 19 to 22) (i) The teaching of Yajnavalkya (ii) Theories of identity
Adhikarana VII (PRAKRITYADHIKARAŅA: Page 242 255 265 Sutras 23 to 28) (i) The Chhandogya on creation 275 (ii) The theory of evolution 287
Adhikarana VIII (SARVAVYAKHYANADHI- KARAŅA: Sūtra 29) CHAPTER II, PART I
Adhikarana I (SMṚITYADHIKARAŅA: Sutras 1 and 2)
Adhikaraņa II (YOGAPRATYUKTYADHI- 296 299 KARAŅA: Sūtra 3) 307
Adhikarana III (VILAKSHAṆATVĀDHI- KARANA: Sūtras 4 to 12) (i) The Brahman is unlike the world 309 ་ (ii) Definitions of the body 319 (iii) Inconclusiveness of logic 328
Adhikaraga IV (SISHTAPARIGRAHÄDHI- KARANA: Sūtra 13) 330
Adhikarana V (BHOKTRAPATTYADHI- KARANA: Sūtra 14) 332 vili Page
Adhikarana VI (ARAMBHAṆÄDHIKARAŅA: Sutras 15 to 20) (i) Kāņādas on cause and effect 337 (ii) The Advaitin’s reply 340 (iii) Two schools of Advaita 347 (iv) Kāṇādas’ reply 362 (v) Rāmānuja’s criticism of Kaṇāda 375 (vi) Views of Sankara, Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa 385 (vii) More objections and replies 391
Adhikaraņa VII (ITARAVYAPADE SADHI- KARAŅA: Sutras 21 to 23)
Adhikarana VIII (UPASAMHARADARSANA- DHIKARANA: Sutras 24 and 25)
Adhikarana IX (KRITSNAPRASAKTYADHI- KARAŅA: Sutras 26 to 31)
Adhikaraņa X (PRAYOJANAVATTVĀDHI- KARANA: Sutras 32 to 36) 398 400 416
Transliteration 421
Abbreviations 423
Index to Quotations 425
Glossarial Index of Sanskrit words and proper names 435 Errata 464 AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE CHAPTER I, PART 2. The first part of the first Chapter of the Vedanta- Sutras is generally concerned to show the Brahman as the cause of the world. Thereafter, in the remaining three parts of the Chapter, it is sought to be proved that nothing other than the Brahman can be the cause of the world. Alternative theories about the cause of the world are taken up and refuted. Rāmānuja begins his commentary on the second part of the Chapter with a brief summary of the teachings of the first part. He reminds us that ritualistic works grant transitory results and that knowledge about and worship of the Brahman yield infinite and eternal results. Those who understand this from a study of the ritualistic part of the Vedas begin to feel the desire for final release from the circle of births and deaths as the highest object of human pursuit. Accordingly, they try to know and worship the Brahman. Vedantic passages form the means of knowing the Brahman. Scriptural texts, such as “From whom, indeed all these beings are born” (Taitt. Up. III. 1. 1.) etc., establish the Highest Brahman alone to be the cause of the great bliss of salvation and also the only cause of the origin, preservation and destruction of the whole world. The Brahman has also been shown to be distinct from the innumerable individual selves and the prakṛiti (i.e., non. intelligent things). Moreover, the Brahman is also the Internal Self of this world made up of the prakṛiti and the individual selves. II S.B. ii il SRI-BHASHYA In the second, third and fourth parts of the first Chapter, he goes on, it is proved that a few Vedantic passages that appear to describe the prakriti or the individual self as the possessor of some auspicious qualities do not actually indicate it to be the Highest or the cause of the world. It is only the Highest Brahman who is shown as the home of all the auspicious qualities which are mentioned in each of such passages. Among them those that seem to refer to some individual self or the prakriti in indistinct terms are discussed in the second part; those that appear to speak of these things in more distinct terms in the third part; and those that apparently deal with such things directly are discussed in the fourth part. The second part consists of thirty-three aphorisms which are given below:-
In all this (it is the Brahman Himself that is meant to be declared) because (it is He alone) that is prominently taught.
Because also the attributes intentionally mentioned (immediately in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to the Highest Self).
The individual self is not, however, (meant to be declared herein) because it is inappropriate (to apply these attributes to him).
Because also the agent and the object (of worship) are (separately) mentioned (in the context).
Because (also) there is (in the context) a difference (in declension) between the words (which respectively denote the Brahman and the individual self).
Because also the Smriti says the same thing.
If it be said that, because He has a very small abode and is declared to be (small in accordance with) that, (the being referred to in the context is) not (the SupremeAN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE iii Self), it is not right to say so; because He is to be so realised; (because again) He is like the ether of space also.
If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied it cannot be so; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corporeal association).
The eater (of the Brahmana and the Kshatriya is the Supreme Self) because (the whole of) the movable and immovable (world) is implied (by the expression ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kashatriya ‘).
Because also of the context (here relating to the Brahman), and also (of what has been stated earlier).
Indeed, the beings that have entered into the cave are the two selves, (viz., the individual self and the Supreme Self); because it is seen (to be so in that context).
Because also of the characteristic attributes (of both the individual self and the Supreme Self being mentioned in the context).
He who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the Brahman), because (of all the attributes mentioned in the context) being appropriate (only in relation to Him).
Because also, existence etc. (within the eye) are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self).
On account also of the declaration, by itself, of His association with (supreme) happiness (that Person within the eye is the Supreme Self).
For that same reason also, that (akasa or ether of space which is denoted by ‘kha’) is the Brahman.
(The Being within the eye is the Brahman), because also the path (which commences with light and leads to the final release and) which is allotted to him who iv SRI-BHASHYA has studied the Upanishads, is described here (in the context).
Other things (than the Brahman) cannot be (the Person within the eye), because they do not (always) exist therein, and because also it is impossible (for them to possess the qualities attributed to Him in the context).
The Internal Ruler (spoken of) in the passages severally named adhidaiva, adhiloka etc. (is the Brahman); because His attributes are declared therein.
That which is dealt with in the Smriti (of Kapila) and also that which is the embodied being do not form (the Internal Ruler); because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context).
Indeed, both (the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas) declare in their scriptures that this (i.e., the individual self) is different (from the Internal Ruler).
That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned in the context.
Because also the context mentions the characteristic attribute (of), and the distinction (between the pradhāna or matter and the purusha or the individual soul on the one hand and the Supreme Self on the other), that (Akshara, who is the source of all things) is not those other two things (viz., matter and soul).
Because also (His universal) form is described (in the context under reference, that Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes is the Supreme Self).
Vaisvānara’ (means the Supreme Self); because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification. AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE
What is thus recognised (in the context here as constituting the body of Vaisvānara) gives rise to an inference (that’ Vaišvānara’ means the Supreme Self).
If it be urged that (Vaišvānara) is not (the Supreme Self), for the reason, among others (that there is no use) of the word (‘Agni’ or ‘fire’ in grammatical equation therewith) and also for the reason that he (Agni) is firmly seated within the body, it is replied that it cannot be so because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qualified that is taught (here), and because (also) it is impossible (for the digestive heat of the stomach to possess the qualities attributed here to Vaišvānara); moreover, some read of him in their scriptures as the Person (Purusha).
For these very reasons, (Vaivānara) is not the deity (sun), nor the element (tejas).
Jaimini holds that there is nothing wrong even (in holding) that (the word ‘Agni’) denotes directly and of itself (the Supreme Self).
Asmarathya holds that it is for the purpose of easy comprehension (that the infinite and unlimited Brahman is looked upon as measured by space).
Badari holds that it is for the purpose of worshipping (Him that the Brahman is so described).
Jaimini holds that it is intended to make (the prāṇāhuti) assume the character (of the agnihotra sacrifice); for the scripture shows it to be such.
They (i.e., the Chhandogas) also declare Him (to be) in it. These thirty-three aphorisms are divided into six adhikaraņas. The first of these is called Sarvatra- prasiddhyadhikarana. It may be noted here that this vi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 links up with the Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa, which closes the first part of the Chapter. There it has been laid down that whenever particular individual selves or particular non-intelligent things are mentioned in association with the characteristic attributes of the Supreme Self, what is intended to be taught is the continued meditation of the Brahman as forming the Inner Self of those particular intelligent and non-intelligent entities. When Indra describes himself as the praṇa and as immortal and enjoins meditation on himself as life and immortality, he is teaching the worship of the Supreme Self who has for His body the praṇa as well as the individual self of Indra. This principle of interpretation, however, seems to fail when applied to a passage like Chhand. Up. (III. 1), where He who has the prana for his body is mentioned in terms suggestive of the individual self. The question is raised and answered in the opening adhikarana of the second part. In the passage under consideration, it is first declared that all this indeed is the Brahman; and His worship is enjoined on one who has become tranquil. Then again it is stated that man is characterised by worship and that he should perform worship. Thereafter, characteristics like being man-made, having life as the body, light as the form and a small abode, and being atomic are mentioned in connection with the Brahman. It looks as if these characteristics could not be applied to the Brahman. The problem here is that the Brahman is mentioned both at the beginning and towards the end of the passage. The description of the Brahman as given at the beginning seems to conflict with the attributes later mentioned. One way of dealing with the difficulty is to suppose that two different upā sanās are enjoined. The first relates to the Brahman: but in regard to the second, the doubt_may arise whether the object of worship there, who is described as the Possessor of the qualities of being mind-made etc., AFFARY 4 Adhik. I, Sut. 1-8] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE vii is the individual self or the Supreme Brahman. This doubt is stated and answered by Sankara in his commentary. Rāmānuja also adopts this position in regard to the passage in the first of his two alternative commenta- ries to this Sūtra. Assuming two upāsanās, the purvapakshin points out that, in the second, manas and praṇa are connected with the Brahman mentioned later. But they can be only the instruments of the individual self. Indeed, they have been negated in relation to the Supreme Self in other scriptural passages. Therefore, this Brahman must be different from Him of whom it has been declared that all this indeed is the Brahman. The earlier declaration enjoins the worship of the Supreme Self for achieving tranquillity; then the worship of the individual self is laid down to one who has become tranquil. The individual self, however, is called ‘Brahman’, but in a secondary sense. " As against this, Rāmānuja supports the conclusion stated in the Sutra: “In all this (it is the Brahman Himself that is meant to be declared) because (it is He alone) that is prominently taught.” (Ved. Sut. I. 2. 1.) He argues that the earlier injunction merely mentions that the Brahman who is the Self of the world, is to be worshipped. The later injunction recalls the earlier one and specifies the qualities of the Brahman also: He is capable of being grasped only by the pure mind, He supports and controls life, and so on. Then Rāmānuja gives an alternative interpretation which he prefers. Here he is following Bodhāyana’s Vṛitti, which he quotes. Now the whole passage is taken as dealing with only one subject. The advantage thus derived is clear. The word, ‘sarvatra’, in the Sûtra can point to ‘sarvam’ in the scriptural text; and tranquillity is to be attained not after, but before the worship. But this view too is criticised. If the Brahman is all, He becomes tainted by evil. The individual selves are everywhere inviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 various embodiments according to their karma. They may be regarded in this sense as creating, sustaining and dissolving the world. The word ‘Brahman’ is sometimes used to refer to them also. Mind, life, etc., are associated with them. Thus it is appropriate to understand the whole passage as referring to the individual self. Rāmānuja denies that the statement, that all this indeed is the Brahman, because it is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him and lives by Him, can apply to the individual self. The selves are different from one another, and no individual self can be the all, or can be deemed to be the creator, sustainer or destroyer of the world. The criticism is thus set aside; and the unity of the Chhandogya passage is shown to be supported by Bodhayana. In the other aphorisms in this section, further objec- tions to this conclusion are set forth and refuted. It is first pointed out that the attributes under reference can appropriately belong only to the Supreme Self, and that even the slightest connection with them cannot be predicated of the individual self even when emancipated. Moreover, later in the passage, the worshipper is said to attain unto the Brahman after departing from this world. This can only mean that the individual self is the worshipper and the Supreme Self the object of attainment-and not that the bound soul is the agent of worship and its own state of freedom the object of attainment. Further, when it is stated that the Brahman is the Self within the worshipper’s heart, the individual self is pointed out by the genitive case and the Supreme Self by the nominative case. In a similar context in the Agnirahasya a difference in declension is observed between the nouns indicating the worshipper and the Supreme Self as the object of worship. The Bhagavadgita also declares the individual self to be the worshipper and the Supreme Self to be the object of worship. His residing within the heart and being described as smaller than a grain of rice or barley do not mean that Adhik. II, Sut. 9-12] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE ix He is minute in His essential nature. The attribution of minuteness to Him is only for purposes of worship. This is made clear by the fact that there is mention only of His unconditioned greatness in the passage. That out of His abundant mercy He has chosen to reside within our heart does not mean that the experience of pleasure and pain befalls to Him. We experience pleasure and pain because of our being subject to karma. He is untainted by karma and is the Sovereign Lord. Hence the scripture compares the individual self and the Supreme Self to two birds on a tree, the former eating fruit and the latter shining in splendour without eating. It is thus demonstrated that the Chhandogya passage under reference (III. 1) enjoins the meditation of the Brahman as being mind-made, having life as the body and possessing such attributes. (Pages 4-21). If the Supreme Self is exempt from the experience of karma, as is made out from the metaphor of the two birds on the tree, the doubt arises whether He forms, as is claimed, the subject of the Kathopanishad. There He is said to have the Brahmana and Kshatriya for His food, death for His condiment and rita (or the fruits of karma) for His drink. This problem is dealt with in the next section, the Attradhikarana consisting of four aphorisms (9-12). It is asked about Him: “Who can definitely know how He is?” In the first Sutra, the eater of the Brahmaņa and the Kshatriya is declared to be the Supreme Self, who destroys the movable and immovable things in the world during the state of universal dissolution. “Food” is figuratively understood as that which suffers destruction, while the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya stand for the movable and the immovable things. Death is the condiment for the Cosmic Destroyer, for while helping in the destruction of the world, it also comes to an end. II S.B. iii X SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 The implied purvapaksha argument is that objects of enjoyment can also be metaphorically indicated by food. The individual selves are eaters’ of and ‘food’ to one another, and may therefore be the purport of the text. Condiment being subordinate to food, death may be regarded as not hindering such enjoyment. After all, the selves are immortal, and death cannot destroy them. In this view, however, the special meaning of ‘condiment’ is not brought out, and the metaphor becomes weak and partly useless. Moreover, the context in which this text occurs obviously refers to the Supreme Self, who is described as great and omnipresent and attainable only through His grace. If it is objected that the eater and another are presently said to drink in the reward of works, having entered a cave, and that therefore the eater must be the individual self and his companion the prāṇa or the intellect, the reply is that the two are the Supreme Self and the individual self. Earlier, the Supreme Self has been described as having entered the cave of the heart, and in a later passage, the individual self, denoted under the name of aditi or the eater of the fruits of karma, is also stated to be in that cave. The goal of the individual self, the other end of his path, is declared to be the seat of Vishņu or the Highest Lord. Thus the drinking of the rita by the Supreme Self cannot be taken as literally true. A group in which a few carry umbrellas, may be referred to as the men with umbrellas. The experience of the fruits of karma is thus attributed to the Supreme Self, even though He is exempt from it. Alternatively, the Supreme Self is the agent of the drinking in a causative sense: He causes the individual self to drink the rita. The last Sutra of the Adhikarana then proceeds to ive an additional reason to confirm the identity of the. Adhik. III, Süt. 13-18] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xi Eater. It is to the effect that throughout the context the individual self and the Supreme Self are differentiated and defined by the attributes of being the worshipper and the worshipped, the attainer and the attained. The objection that the subject under consideration is only the individual self on account of the question raised in an early passage as to its post-mortem existence is effectively answered. The question is put by Nachiketas to Yama, and answer to it is requested as the third boon from the god of death. The two earlier boons have assumed the existence of the indi- vidual self after death. So the third boon, requesting knowledge about whether or not the departed individual self continues to exist, can only relate to the state of final release. It can only mean : “Let me know the essential nature of final release and the means of attaining it.” In this connection, Rāmānuja makes a survey of the Kathopanishad as a whole. The story of Nachiketas is told-how an angry father gifted him away to the god of death, how he was kept waiting in the place of the god and how thereupon the god felt obliged to give him three boons. Various theories about the state of final release are referred to briefly, and Rāmānuja declares that, according to those well versed in the Vedanta, final release is the natural experiential realisation of the Supreme Self by the individual self on the removal of the latter’s ignorance. It is pointed out that Yama teaches Nachiketas that the Brahman is hidden within and cannot be seen, and that His worship in the proper manner leads one to the supreme abode of Vishnu. (Pages 21-31). If the Eater is the Brahman who dwells within the cave of the heart and is difficult to be seen, how can the Person within the eye whose worship is taught to Upakosala (in Chhand. Up. IV. 10-15), be identified with the Brahman? It is more reasonable to suppose this Person to be the reflected image, or the sun-god who is declared in the scripture to reside in the eye, or the individual self whose xii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 looking at the eye. This doubt is now presence in a body is ascertained by For of him it is said that he is ‘seen’. cleared in the six aphorisms (13-18) of the Antarādhikaraṇa. It is shown conclusively that the Person within the eye also is the Brahman. He is so described only to fix Him. in an abode for purposes of meditation; and He is seen by adepts in yoga. Upakosala is taught twice about the Brahman. He is a devout disciple, impressed with a sense of the evils of samsara and eager to learn about the Brahman. To relieve his dejection when his preceptor goes on a journey without giving him instruction, the preceptor’s Fires teach him something about the Brahman, and the preceptor later completes the teaching. The Fires first teach that the Brahman is life, that He is supreme happiness and that He is the ether of space. According to the preceptor, the Person who is seen within the eye is the Self, is immortal, is fearless and is the Brahman. All blessed things go to meet in Him. He is the Giver of good things and the Shining One. The Brahman first taught by the Fires is again taught by the preceptor and identified with the Person in the eye. The qualities attributed to Him are appropriate only in regard to the Supreme Self. Moreover, we know from other scriptural texts that the Brahman dwells in the eye as its Internal Controller. This view is criticised on the ground that there is a break in the context between the first and the second teaching given to Upakosala. The Fires teach severally something about themselves. One who worships them in the way indicated is assured of worldly results such as good health, long life etc. Thus between the initial teaching about the Brahman and the subsequent instruction by the preceptor, there intervenes the subject of the worship of the Fires whose fruits are worldly and antagonistic to theAdhik. III, Süt. 13-18] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xiii realisation of the Brahman. Hence the preceptor’s teaching may well be about a different subject. This criticism is refuted by Rāmānuja who points out that the Brahman with His characteristic attributes is mentioned by both the Fires and the preceptor. The Fires speak of Him as characterised by supreme happiness and the preceptor describes Him as One in whom all desirable things gather together. The intervening worship of the Fires forms an auxiliary part of the worship of the Brahman. The results attributed to it may be taken as mere panegyric (arthavada), or preferably, as helpful to the worship of the Brahman. The context bears this out. Upakosala is taught when he is in sore distress about his preceptor’s delay in teaching him about the Brahman; he has no hankering for worldly joys. Moreover, the Fires specially say that the preceptor will teach him about “the path”. This is obviously meant to indicate that their teaching is not complete. Indeed, they have no intention of superseding the preceptor, which is highly improper. Just to console him, they describe the essential nature of the Brahman and leave it to the preceptor to complete the teaching. The path which begins with “light” and by which the departing soul travels to attain final release is described to Upakosala by his preceptor along with what leads up to it, namely, the worship of the Brahman. It is unreasonable to suppose that the preceptor has to teach about the path alone without teaching about the Brahman. Another criticism is also answered by Rāmānuja. It is to the effect that the Fires teach Upakosala only pratikopāsanā. That is, he is asked to regard as the Brahman worldly happiness and the ether of space, which are not the Brahman. According to Ramanuja, this is inappropriate, because Upakosala is anxious to win Kiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 spiritual emancipation and not the transitory results that accrue from pratikopāsanā. When Upakosala says that he knows about the praṇa being the Brahman and not about happiness or the ether of space being the Brahman, he is not asking for instruction in a new pratikopāsanā. What he wants to know is whether the Brahman is to be regarded as the controller of happiness and the ether, or whether He is to be regarded as happiness which is unlimited and infinite (like the ether of space). In reply the Fires actually declare: “Whatever indeed is happiness, that same is the ether of space. What indeed is the ether of space, that same is happiness.” The teaching that the worship of the Person within the eye leads to the well known path beginning with light re- enforces the conclusion that He is the Brahman. This is irrefutably established by the fact that other suggestions about the Person are untenable. Neither the reflected image, nor the sun-god, nor the individual self has any permanent position in the eye; and the qualities attributed to the Person can never apply to any of them. (Pages 31-44). In the course of the discussion about the true identity of the Person within the eye, reference has been made to the Internal Ruler who dwells within the eye. It has been assumed that this Internal Ruler is the Brahman. Possible arguments against this assumption are now examined and refuted. Incidentally, it may be noted that while the first three adhikaraṇas of the second part have been concerned with the Brahman as located in infinitesimal homes like the interior of the heart or the eye, hereafter the theme diverts to the Brahman in some kind of relation with the universe as a whole. In the three aphorisms (19-21) of the Antaryamyadhi- karaṇa, a well known passage from the Brih. Up. (III. 7) is Adhik. IV, Sut. 19-21] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xv discussed. Here the Brahman is described as the Internal Ruler or Controller in the deities like those of the earth, water, fire, mid-air, air, the sun, space, the moon, stars, sky, darkness and light, in all beings, in the individual self, and in the things relating to the individual self such as life, speech, etc. He is pointed out as dwelling unknown in each of them, controlling each of them and having each of them as His ‘body’. A comparison between the two versions of the text, those of the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas, makes it clear that the Internal Ruler controls the individual self also, who is mentioned expressly in one recension and by a synonym in the other. The identity of the Internal Ruler with the Brahman is questioned because towards the end of the passage He is described as the seer without being seen, the hearer without being heard and so on; it is also added that there is no other seer or hearer etc. The Brahman’s knowledge is not dependent on senses like eyes and ears. It is obvious that some individual self or the individual self in some sense is the seer, hearer, etc. The Brahman is excluded by the denial of any other seer, hearer etc. This broad position taken by the critic is not without its own difficulties. Subtle arguments have to be provided to explain how any individual self can be the Internal Ruler of all things in the world and also of the person who is addressed. These are not explicitly stated. One of the various deities, or an individual self with special mystic powers, or some one else may be intended by the critic. Perhaps the best way of explaining this point of view is that the teaching that the Internal Ruler of the earth or fire or some other thing is also the Internal Ruler of the person addressed merely means that all the Internal Rulers belong to one class–the species of individual selves. However, Rāmānuja disposes of this criticism with the help of several arguments. He quotes a parallel passage xvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part 2 from Sub. Up, which identifies the Internal Ruler with Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Self. The immortality which is attributed to the Internal Ruler, is independently due to His own intrinsic nature, and this is the characteristic attribute of the Brahman only. He is said to be the seer, the hearer and so on, not because He is dependent on the senses for His knowledge. On the contrary, His perceptive realisation is due entirely and independently to His own. intrinsic nature. The statement that there is no seer, hearer, etc. other than He, merely shows that there is no other controller to control Him. He possesses the power of being omniscient and of willing the truth. Moreover, when the Internal Ruler is pointed as the Self of the person addressed, the individual self of the person is in the genetive case and its Self in the nominative case. The two therefore cannot be identical. Indeed, the individual self is as little worthy of being regarded as the Self or the Internal Ruler of all as non-intelligent matter. Thus, in both the recensions of the passage dealing with the Internal Ruler, it is made clear that He is the Supreme Self and that He is quite distinct from the individual self. (Pages 44-51). The Internal Ruler has been described as one who sees without being seen. Because of His power to see, He may well be the Supreme Self. Can the same thing be said about the invisible Akshara mentioned in the Mund. Up. as the source from which the universe evolves? There is no reference here to such a quality as seeing which implies intelligence. This problem is dealt with in the next section, the Adṛisyatvā diguṇakā dhikaraṇa, which consists of three aphorisms (22-24). The purvapaksha relies particularly on a statement in the Upanishad that there is some one higher than the superior akshara. Obviously, ‘akshara’ here cannot mean the Brahman; the context suggests that it refers to Adhik. V, Sut. 22-24] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xvii the prakriti in its undifferentiated condition. In earlier passages also, the term should mean the same thing. When it is said to be invisible, it is denied to be gross matter, but affirmed to be something akin to it, namely, matter in a subtle, undifferentiated state. Thus, it would appear that the prakriti is here declared to be the cause of the universe, and not the Brahman. (The entity higher than the akshara may, in this view, be taken to be the individual self.) The Sutras reject this position by pointing out that the invisible Akshara is endowed with attributes which make Him out to be the Brahman. Rāmānuja explains that by knowing this Akshara everything is said to be known. He is the source of the universe. Omniscience is clearly attributed to Him, and His tapas consists of knowledge. In the circumstances, the word ‘akshara’ must be used in a different sense in the later passage where it can denote only matter in its subtle state. A study of the attributes of the Akshara and of the way in which He is distinguished from both matter and the individual self in the Upanishad fully supports this conclusion. Ramanuja undertakes a fairly detailed survey of the Upanishad as a whole. A lower and a higher science dealing with the knowledge of Brahman, an indirect and a direct way of approach to Him are mentioned first. Then the invisible Akshara is described to be the source from which the universe of intelligent and non- intelligent things evolves. His omniscience is referred to, as also His unconditioned reality. Next, the performance of rituals by those desirous of worldly results and that by seekers of emancipation are differentiated. The yogins, it is pointed out, perceive the Akshara near at heart. He is higher than the individual self who is beyond the undifferentiated prakriti. His worship is the highest kind of loving devotion, and it results in the emancipation of the individual self, when it becomes like unto the Brahman. II S.B. ivxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 Thus the invisible Akshara mentioned at the beginning of the Upanishad can only be the Brahman. A final argument is that the Akshara is described as having a universal form. The celestial world of fire is His head, the sun and the moon are His eyes, the whole uni- verse is His heart, and so on. This form can belong only to the Supreme Self who is the Internal Self of all. 51-65.) (Pages The universal form attributed to the Akshara in Chhand. Up. (V) with clear that the word, Mund. Up. is associated in the Vaišvānara, and it is not ‘Vaisvinara’, means there the Supreme Self. For it is a common term which is known to have at least four meanings. It may stand for the sun-god, the element fire, the digestive ‘heat’ of the stomach and the Supreme Self. Any one of these meanings, it is urged, can apply in the context, and the meaning of ‘Vaisvānara’ cannot be determined there decisively to be only the Supreme Self. This question is answered in the nine aphorisms (25-33) of the Vaisvanaradhikaraṇa, the last section of the second part of the first Chapter. The first Sutra of the Adhikaraṇa sets the doubt at rest. Vaišvānara’ may be a common term having more than one meaning. But in this particular context in the Chhand. Up. it is used in association with special attributes which make out what is indicated by the word to be the Supreme Self and none else. To demonstrate this, Rāmānuja surveys the teaching about Vaisvānara in the Upanishad. Aupamanyava and four other sages meet together and start an enquiry, “Who is our Self, and what is the Brahman?” They seek the help of Uddâlaka, a worshipper of the Atman known as Vaišvānara. Confessing to incomplete knowledge, he takes them to King Asvapati as the most competent teacher for them all. Ašvapati questions them and instructs them. The subject of their investigation is, Who is our Self and what is the Adhik. VI, Süt. 25-33] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xix f Brahman?’ He speaks to them about the Self known as Vaisvānara. Thus the Upanishad here uses the word ‘Vaisvānara’ in the place of Brahman’. Moreover, towards the close of the teaching, the worshipper is assured of the destruction of his sins and the experience of the Brahman. These results can accrue only if Vaivānara is the Brahman and not otherwise. The form of Vaivānara is also recognised to be one associated with the Brahman in the Sruti and the Smriti alike. In the Mund Up. it is said of Him that the celestial world of fire is His head, the sun and the moon are His eyes, the air is His breath, the earth is His feet, and so on. The Supreme Self is similarly described in the Mahabharata also. Alvapati informs the six sages who have come to him that Vaisvānara has for His head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder and feet the celestial world, the sun, air, the sky, water, and the earth respectively. At this stage, a further objection is possible Asvapati’s teaching fin is parallels in the Brih. Up. and Sat. Br. There Vaisvānara is called ‘Agni’ or fire. Ašvapati himself teaches in connection with the worship of Vaišvānara that the heart, the mind and the mouth are to be regarded as the three household fires. Here Vaišvānara, existing within the heart, is made to assume the character of the three fires. He is also indicated to be the recipient of the offering of food made to the prana (or the principal vital air) in the praṇahuti ceremony. In the Sat. Br., Vaišvānara is described as a fire placed within the worshipper. All these suggest that ‘Vaisvanara’ has the significance of ‘gastric fire’. Therefore, its meaning cannot be determined to be the Supreme Self and nothing else. The reply to this is that even while having the charac- teristics of the gastric gastric fire, Vaišvănara has other characteristics also. He has the three worlds for His body. This cannot apply to mere gastric fire. The proper XX SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 2 construction therefore is that Vaišvānara is the Supreme Self having the gastric fire for His body. The worship of the Supreme Self so qualified is taught here. This is supported by Sri Krishna’s statement in the B. G. that He becomes the digestive fire in all beings and by the Sat. Br. calling Vaisvänara as ‘Purusha’ or ’the Person’, a term referring particularly to the Supreme Self. The arguments disproving Vaiśvānara to be mere gastric fire also show that He cannot be the sun-god or the element fire. Jaimini puts forward an alternative view about the equation of Vaišvānara with Agni. Vaiśvānara is declared to be Agni, and ‘Agni’ has been taken to mean ’the Supreme Self having the digestive fire for His body’. Now, Jaimini points out that the word, ‘Agni’, in its etymological significance, stands for ‘one who leads all to the end of the goal’. This can mean only the Supreme Self, even as ‘Vaisvānara’, on a similar analysis, denotes Him only as the Leader of all. To a possible criticism that Vaiśvānara, by reason of His having the three worlds for His body, need not necessarily be the Supreme Self, but may be the element fire or a god, the answer is given by Asmarathya. The infinite Brahman is conceived to be measured by space to help easy comprehension on the part of the worshipper. But, the objector continues, Vaisvānara has a material body: this makes it likely that he is a minor god. Badari replies to this point. The Brahman is here associated with a material body for purposes of worship. In the very context where His body is described, it is also pointed out that He is really immeasurable. Evidently, therefore, a form of worship for the attainment of the Brahman is taught here. Again, it is recalled that in the worship of Vaiśvānara, one is asked to look upon one’s chest as the altar, the heart, mind and mouth as the three household fires and so Chap. I, Part 3] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxi on. This is in harmony with the conception of Vaišvānara as the gastric fire and not as the Supreme Self. Jaimini, again, comes forward to reply. Vaišvānara is worshipped every day with offerings of food in the prāṇāhuti ceremony. The worshipper is asked to regard his chest etc. as the altar etc. in order to make the prāṇāhuti performed by him assume the character of the agnihotra sacrifice. This is made clear by the parallel passage in the Sat Br., where the worshipper is asked to identify the different parts of his body with different parts of Vaisvānara regarded as having the three worlds for his body. Then he looks upon his chest as the altar, his heart as the garhapatya fire, and so on. Next, he performs the prāṇāhuti, looking upon it as the agnihotra sacrifice. Thus in the worship of the Supreme Self under the name of Vaisvānara, the prāṇāhuti is an essential element. It is now clear that Vaisvānara is the Supreme Self and none else. (Pages 65-81). CHAPTER I, PART 3 After dealing, in the second part of Chapter I, with all the important scriptural passages suggesting, through indistinct characteristics, either the individual self or the prakriti as the cause of the world, the Vedanta-Sutras proceed in the third part to take up other passages where the indications for the individual self or the prakriti are clear and distinct. This part consists of ten adhikaraṇas and forty-four aphorisms. The Sutras in this part are given below:
The abode of the heaven, the earth etc. (is the Supreme Self), because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself. xxii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3
Because also that (Being) is taught to be that which is to be approached (in worship) by the released (souls)— (He who is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the Supreme Self).
Neither the anumana (or what is capable of being established by the logical process of inference), nor (the jiva who is) the possessor of life (is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc.), because there are (in the context) no expressions signifying either.
Because (His) differentiation (from the individual self) is taught (in the context).
From the context (here, it comes out that the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the Brahman).
On account of the (mere) existence and (also) on account of the eating (of the fruits of karma, which are both predicated in the context here, the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the Brahman). .
What is denoted by the word, Bhuman’ (which means the Great One’, is the Brahman), because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the samprasāda (or the individual self).
Because also the attributes (given in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to Him).
Akshara’ (means here the Supreme Brahman), because it is declared (in the context) to be the support of what is beyond the ambara (or ākāśa, i.e., the prakṛiti).
And that (power of supporting what is beyond the ākāśa) is due to (His) supreme power.
Because also otherness is negated (in relation to the Akshara).
The object of the action of seeing is He (i.e., the Supreme Self), on account of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self).Chap. I, Part 3] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxiii
The ’little ether’ (within the heart denotes the Brahman) because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context refer to Him).
On account of (the individual selves) going to (and returning from) it, and on account (also) of (its being indicated by) the word (‘Brahma-loka’), (the daharākāsa is the Brahman); accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures, and there are also grounds of inference (in this behalf).
Because also His (i.e., the Brahman’s) greatness as the support (of the world) is found (mentioned) in relation to this (dahardkasa).
And because also it is well known (that the word, ‘Akāśa’, means the Brahman).
If it be said that, owing to there being a reference to another (than the Brahman), it is he (i.e., that other, namely, the individual self, who is the daharākā ša), it is replied that it is not so; because of the inappropriateness (of the qualities of the daharākāśa being attributed to the individual self).
If it be said that it (viz., the idea of the daharākasa being the individual self) results from a subsequent passage, it is replied that it is not so; for that (individual self which is mentioned later in the context) is, on the contrary, what has its essential nature made manifest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of karma).
And the reference also (to the individual self) is made (in the context) with a different object in view.
If it be said that, owing to that, owing to its (i.e., the daharākasa’s) being declared in the scripture to be little, (it is not the Brahman, then it is replied thereunto that) this (objection) has been already answered.
Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the daharākāśa or the Brahman). xxiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3
The Smriti also declares (to the same effect).
He who is (spoken of as being) limited in size (to the size of a thumb is the Brahman), because the scripture itself declares (to that effect).
This (limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb) is, however, in relation to the heart (of man), as man (alone) is qualified (to worship and meditate on Him).
Bādarayana is of opinion that that (viz., the act of worshipping the Brahman) obtains (among those who are) above (i.e., among the gods and others) also; because such a thing is appropriate.
If it be said that it (viz., the corporeality of the gods, etc.) gives rise to an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works, it is replied that it is not right to say so; because manifold adoption (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings).
If it be said that it is in relation to the scripture that that (inconsistency) arises, it is replied that it is not so, because (the gods and) all (other things) are born by means of that (viz., the scripture), as may be made out directly and indirectly.
And it is for this reason that it (i.e., the Veda) is eternal.
Because also there is a continued identity in respect of the names and forms (of things), there is nothing which is inconsistent with a revolution (of creation), because it is so seen revealed in the Srutis and is also declared in the Smritis.
In regard to the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived to be the honey etc., Jaimini speaks of the absence of fitness of the gods etc. (to be worshippers), because such a thing is impossible.
Because also it is in relation to the Light (that such worship by the Vasus etc., is taught to be performed). Chap. I, Part 3] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE XXV
Badarāyaṇa, however, says that there is such a fitness (on the part of the gods etc., to adopt the form of the worship of the Brahman known as the Madhuvidya): for so it is.
Because it is shown (in Chhand. Up. IV. 1-2) that, owing to his having heard their disrespectful remarks (i.e., of the swans) and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher), grief arose in him (i.e., Jānasruti, who is hence called “Südra” and not because he is a Sūdra by birth).
Because also it may be made out (from the context) that he (Jānašruti) is a Kshattriya.
Because also there are in the later portion (of the context) bases of inference arising from Chaitraratha (being a Kshattriya).
Because certain religious ceremonies are mentioned (as needed for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman) and because the absence of these (ceremonies) is mentioned (in relation to the Sudra).
Because also of the undertaking (of the teaching in the case of Jābāla) after making sure of its absence (i.e., of the absence of his belonging to the Sûdra caste).
Because (in the case of the Súdra) there is prohibition in relation to the listening to, learning to recite and understanding (the Vedas).
Because also it is so declared in the Smritis.
(He whe is of the size of the thumb is the Brahman) on account of trembling (at Him being predicated in relation to the whole world).
Because the splendour (of the Brahman) is seen (mentioned in the context, He who is of the size of the thumb is the Brahman). II S.B. v xxvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3
What is denoted by the word ‘Akasa’ (is the Brahman) because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self).
Because of the teaching of difference (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) in the states of deep sleep and death (the individual self is different from the Supreme Self).
On account of the words, “Lord” etc. (being found in the context, the Supreme Self is distinct from the individual self). The first section of the third part goes by the name of Dyubvādyadhikarana, and consists of six aphorisms. It is connected with the last two adhikaranas of the first part. In the second of these, Vaišvănara, who has the heaven for His head and the earth for His feet, is shown to be the Supreme Self. Now the enquiry is about some one else, who appears to be the individual self, and who is at the same time described to be the support of the heaven and the earth. The reference is to the Mund. Up., extensively discussed in the previous section, the Adṛisyatvā diguṇakā dhikaraṇa. There the invisible Akshara has been identified with the Supreme Self for a variety of reasons. He too has been declared to have the heaven for His head and the earth for His feet. The doubt now put forward can arise after the acceptance of the Akshara as the Brahman. In a passage subsequent to the one describing the Akshara in His universal form, the Upanishad describes the heaven, the earth, the mind and the vital airs as inwoven in the Atman. It then goes on to say that the blood-vessels are united in him in the same way in which the spokes are fitted into the nave of a wheel, that he moves within and that he is born in many ways. These are clear indications that the Atman under reference is the individual self. A break in the Adhik. I, Süt. 1-6] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxvii context can reconcile the reference earlier to the invisible Akshara as the Supreme Self and to the individual self as the Atman here. But the acceptance of the individual self as the theme here may shake even the earlier determination of the invisible Akshara as the Supreme Self. This purvapaksha position is not without weaknesses of its own. It has to resort to some special pleading to show the individual self as the support of the heaven and the earth. The Sutras, however, put forward other independent and conclusive arguments. In the first aphorism, it is pointed out that in the very passage which refers to the supporter of the heaven and the earth, there is an expression which unmistakably points to the Brahman. He in whom the earth and the heaven are inwoven is also the setu of immortality. The word, ‘setu,’ which usually means a dam, here stands for a bridge. This meaning may be obtained either by an etymological analysis which derives the word from the root, si, to bind together, or from the fact that the bridge has some resemblance to a dam. Once this is granted, then the association of the Supporter of heaven and earth with the blood-vessels, the mind and the vital air has to be understood in a different way. Elsewhere in the scriptures the Supreme Self is said to be seated within the heart where all the blood-vessels unite. Being the support of all, He is also the support of the instruments of the individual self such as the mind. He may also be said to be born in many ways, because of His numerous incarnations. The next aphorism refers to another fact which shows the Support of the heaven and the earth to be the Supreme Self. This Person is described in the Upanishad as being worshipped by the released souls. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the Support of the heaven, the earth etc., can be the individual self any more than it can be the prakriti. Moreover, He is taught to be different from thexxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part 3 individual self in a later passage, where He as the Lord and the individual self as grief-stricken are described as sitting on the same tree. Thus, there is no break in the context to justify the purvapaksha. The argument is finally clinched by the simile of two birds on a tree, one eating the pippala fruit and the other shining in splendour without eating at all. Only the shining bird, which does not eat, can be the support of the heaven, the earth etc., and it is the Brahman. The principle of interpretation thus upheld is that in a context dealing with the Supreme Self, so long as continuity is maintained, there is no scope for the intrusion of the individual self. But Chhand. Up. (VII) is a context which seems to deal with the individual self in unbroken continuity. By the same token, the bhuman or the ‘great one’ mentioned there ought to be the individual self, and knowledge thereof accepted as redeeming. Thus, the next section, Bhumādhikaraṇa, comprising Sutras 7 and 8, arises. It has two other links also with the Mund. Up. dealt with in the previous section. Association with praṇa attributed in the earlier section to the Supreme Self, here has to be attributed to the individual self. He who is called Satya (or Truth) in Mund. Up. may be the Supreme Self; but the same word appears merely to refer to truthful speech here. The Sitras now show that the Bhuman is the Brahman, being pointed out to be greater than the samprasada or the individual self. Ramanuja briefly surveys the entire seventh Prapa thaka of the Chhand. Up. in order to state the purvapaksha clearly and refute it. Nārada, discontented even after studying the scriptures and seeking instruction about the Atman, is here taught by Sanatkumāra. He is asked to worship, one after another in the order of increasing importance, various pratikās as the Brahman. The list begins with ’name’ and ends with ‘desire’. Greater than desire is the prana. There is no direction to worship the prāṇa as the Brahman. It can be Adhik. 11, Sut. 7-8] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxix made out that by ‘prana’ the individual self is meant here, even though the simile of the spokes and the nave used in the Kaush. Up. (III. 9) is used here. There it refers to the Supreme Self, here only the individual self is meant, as the prāna is presently identified with the embodied individual self, represented by a father, mother, sister etc. The purvapaksha contention is that the individual self is the central theme of this part of the Upanishad. There is no question asked about whether there is anything greater than the präna. Nothing again is declared to be so. So the rest of the passage too deals with the individual self, who is later on described as the ‘great one’ and knowledge about whom is declared to lead to liberation. Rāmānuja controverts this position by explaining that Sanatkumāra, without being asked any question, himself teaches Nārada about something greater than the prana. He calls this Truth; and by Truth, the Brahman is meant. For it is this Truth which is later described as the Brahman. Moreover, in the next section of the Upanishad, Satya is differentiated from the individual self. The purvapaksha can be maintained only by explaining away the reference to Satya as having to do merely with speaking the truth as an element in the meditation on the praṇa. But in the context, what is taught is the proclamation of Satya as transcendent. Moreover, Satya is shown to be different from the prana by the disjunctive particle ’tu’ (‘but’ or ‘however’). The person who declares the praṇa to be transcendent is thus distinguished from the person who declares Satya to be so. The Vṛittikāra also upholds the view that the Bhuman is the Brahman, because He is mentioned later than the individual self in the series beginning with ’name’. Sanatkumara’s later teaching fully bears this out. After stating that only the worshipper of Satya can truly proclaim the object of his worship to be transcendent, he XXX SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 goes on to describe the various stages in the worship of Satya. Mental reflection, faith, devotion and volitional effort are taught. These are intended to be stimulated by the statement that His nature consists of bliss. Then this blissful Brahman or Satya is defined as the Great One, “(on seeing whom) one sees nothing else, (on hearing whom) one hears nothing else, and (on knowing whom) one knows nothing else.” This means that, while experiencing the Brahman, who has the nature of unsur- passed bliss, nothing else is experienced. Indeed, nothing other than He exists, as there is none who is equal or similar to Him, or whose existence is not dependent on Him. That men experience the world as full of pain and limited in happiness is due to their karma which makes them experience the world as distinct from the Brahman. When one is freed from the influence of karma, the same world is experienced as having the Brahman for its Self and becomes bliss. Biliousness makes milk disagreeable, while health enables one to appreciate its taste. The teaching is concluded by showing that the true worshipper attains emancipation. The next Sutra re-affirms the identity of the Bhuman by pointing out that the attributes given in the context are appropriate only in relation to the Supreme Self. Incidentally, the argument that the worship of the individual self is taught in the closing passage is refuted. The attributes mentioned include that of independent self- sustentation, of being the Self of all, and of being the producer of everything from the prana downwards. This last attribute disproves the prana mentioned earlier to be the Atman whose worship is taught here and knowledge about whom enables one to cross the sea of samsāra. Worship of the Supreme Self under the conception of the ego is taught, but not the worship of the individual Adhik. III, Süt. 9-11] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxxi self. The worship of the Supreme Self in His essential nature and also as the Internal Ruler of the individual self is also indicated. Thus the Bhuman is shown to be the Supreme Self. (Pages 90-107). The Satya of the Mund. Up. has been shown to be the same as the Bhuman of the Chhand. Up. Now, further doubts are raised about the significance of the word, ‘Akshara’, which occurs in the Mund. Up. in two different contexts. The invisible Akshara there has been held to be the Brahman, but in a later context it is also allowed to denote matter in its undifferentiated condition (Chapter I, Part 2, Adhikaraṇa 5). In Bṛih. Up. (III. 8), where Yajnavalkya answers some questions of Gärgi, the Akshara appears again to mean undifferentiated matter or the individual self, and there it is even described as the cause of the world. If this is accepted, even the identification of the invisible Akshara with the Supreme Self may require re-examination. Satya, mentioned later than the praṇa, is held to be greater and different; similarly, the Akshara in Brih. Up. (III. 8) mentioned as that in which what is said to be beyond the ākāśa (or subtle matter) is inwoven has to be shown to be the Supreme Self here. Gārgi asks in what that which is beyond the heaven and below the earth, that which is between the two, that which is past, is present and is the future, are inwoven like warp and woof. The answer is that all things are inwoven in the ākāśa. This is taken by the purvapaksha to be the ether of space, which is the first to evolve among the five great elements. The akshara in which it is in turn inwoven is matter in its primordial undifferentiated condition. Alternatively, the ākāśa may mean primordial matter, which may be conceived, even like the Brahman in the previous Adhikarana, to be established in itself. This view is further sought to be supported on the ground that the word, ‘akshara’, means the Supreme Self only in the xxxii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 scriptures and that its sense as primordial matter is earlier apprehended. The Sutra replies to this argument by pointing out that the Akshara in the context is taught to be the support of ambarānta, of what is beyond the ākāśa or the ether of space. Now, that which is beyond the ambara is the undifferentiated prakriti, whose support must in reason be something different from itself. It must be noted that, when all things are said to be inwoven in the ākāśa, the latter means not the air-filled sky’, but matter in its subtle condition. The Akshara as the support of this akasa can only be the Supreme Self. This meaning of Akshara is plainly derived from its etymology, which refers to what is indestructible. There is no need to go to the scriptures for this. A further objection is now raised; if the ākāša is the undifferentiated matter, then the Akshara may well be the individual self, which is the basis of non-intelligent things, which has the attributes mentioned in the context, and which is known to be indicated by the word quite as well as undifferentiated matter or the Supreme Self. The answer to this is given in the next aphorism, where it is pointed out that the power of supporting what is beyond the ākāśa is due to the supreme power of the Brahman. All things are subject only to His command, and such authority does not belong to the individual self even in its state of emancipation. Yajnavalkya refers later to this supreme power of the Highest Self. Moreover, this Akshara is said to see while remaining unseen, and to be indeed the only seer. Obviously the individual self cannot be described in these terms. Nothing else exists other than the Brahman in the sense that nothing else has independent existence. The further teaching that all religious acts proceed from the commands of the Akshara point out its identity with the Supreme Self. (Some of the attributes such as all-pervasiveness cannotAdhik. IV, Süt. 12] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxxiii belong to the individual self, according to Rāmānuja), Thus the Akshara taught to Gargi is the Supreme Self. (Pages 107-114). The Unseen Seer has been taken to be the Brahman here and earlier. In a passage in the Pr. Up. it is stated that a certain type of meditation leads the worshipper to the Brahma-loka, where he ‘sees’ the Highest Person, How can the Highest Person referred to here be the Brahman, who is incapable of being seen? This question is debated in the next section which goes by the name of Ikshatikarmadhikaraṇa. It consists of only one aphorism, the 12th. The context relates to the teaching given to Satyakāma by the preceptor, Pippalāda. More than one kind of meditation on the mystic syllable Om is taught here. He who meditates on the syllable of one matrā attains the world of men, while the antariksha or the middle world is attained by the meditator of the syllable of two mātrās. Meditation on the syllable of three matras leads the worshipper to the Brahma-world, where he sees the Highest Person, who is higher than the individual selves in their totality. These selves are themselves regarded as high or eminent on account of their superiority to the body, the senses etc. In the circumstances, the Highest Person can be none other than Brahma, the four-faced creator. How the creator acquires this character is not explained here by Rāmānuja. But from his other works it can be made out that during the dissolutions of the universe, known as naimittika or occasional, the individual selves in the dissolved world and their sense organs etc. are gathered in Brahma. Now, after thus inferring Brahma to be the Highest Person here, the attributes mentioned in relation to him are to be accordingly interpreted. He is said to be calm, free from old age, free from death and free from fear. He is the Highest. One who worships him is freed from sin. Though these attributes appear proper II S.B. vi xxxiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 only in relation to the Supreme Self, they are to be applied to the creator with necessary modifications or changes in emphasis. His extremely long life, for instance, may be taken to justify his being described as immortal. There is nothing in the nothing in the context, context, however, to justify all this forced interpretation. The scriptures elsewhere say that the Supreme Self can be seen and experienced by the released selves or the transcendental seers. What is said here about the Supreme Self being seen therefore does not contradict the teaching of the scripture. Hence the attributes of being free from death etc. have to be understood in their primary sense and as pointing to the Supreme Self. The description of the Highest Person here as higher than the superior individual selves has really to be taken as ‘higher than him who is higher than the individual selves in their totality’. That is, He is higher than Brahma the creator, who himself is only an individual self, subject to karma. Thus three kinds of meditation are taught to Satyakāma. One leads to a mundane result, another leads to an other- worldly result. But meditation with the help of the syllable Om of three matras, which itself denotes the Highest Brahman, leads the worshipper to attain Him, to enter His world and to see Him. (Pages 115-120). The Person lying in the city, that is, the cave of the heart, is thus shown to be the Brahman, and the expression, ‘Brahma-loka,’ is taken to indicate His supreme abode. In the Chhand. Up. (VIII), these expressions occur in a context suggestive of doubts about their significance. We are told of a lotus-like home in the city of the Brahman, and of a little ether’ (or dahara-ākāśa) inside it. The seeking and attainment of what is inside the little ether’ is enjoined. Here the doubt arises whether the little ether is the ether of space, the individual self or the Supreme Self. This is the problem tackled in the next section, the Daharādhikarana consisting of ten aphorisms (13-22). Adhik. V, Sut. 13-22] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxxv Since something is said to be inside the little ether, how can it be the Brahman? Hence the need for an attempt to see whether the daharākāśa is the ether of space. If the city of the Brahman is taken as the body, then the lotus-like home within it is the heart, and the daharākāŝa is the ether of space as limited by the heart. The Supreme Self is inside the daharakasa, and His quest may be taken to be enjoined. Such a view, it may be urged, fits in with the well known meaning of ākāśa as the ether of space. Moreover, whatever is the magnitude of the elemental ether of space is declared to be the magnitude of the daharākāsa. Again, heaven and earth, fire and air, the sun and the moon, stars and lightnings are all said to be inside it. Here are indications linking the little ether inside the heart with the ether of space. The attributes of the upreme Brahman later on given may very well be taken to apply to Him as residing inside the daharākāśa. The first Sutra concludes that the Little Ether within the heart denotes the Brahman, because the reasons found in subsequent statements in the context refer to Him. The Daharākāsa Itself being the Brahman, what is inside It is taken to be the collection of auspicious qualities later enumerated. Rāmānuja explains this position first by criticising the pūrvapaksha view and later by a survey of the entire passage enjoining the worship of the Daharākāśa. The references to the ether of space, it is pointed out, are not intended to indicate its identity with the Little Ether inside the heart, nor even, strictly, to institute a comparison between the two, as the Brahman, denoted by the Daharākāśa, is obviously greater in magnitude than the ether of space. The purpose of the teaching here is merely to deny littleness to the so called ‘Little Ether’. The teacher first describes the Daharākāśa as being inside the lotus-like home (i.e., the heart) within the xxxvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 Brahma-pura (i.e., the body conceived as the city of the Brahman). Meditation on the Daharākāśa and what exists within It are enjoined. In reply to a question about what is inside the Little Ether, he compares It to the ether of space and declares that It forms the support of the whole world. All things desired by the worshipper, whether available here or not, are found in It. Although existing within the heart which is a part of the body which is subject to decay and death, the Daharākāsa, being very subtle and the supreme cause of all things, does not undergo any modification whatever. It is for this reason called Satya or the Fundamental Reality. Another name given to the Daharākāśa now is the ‘Brahma-pura’. Earlier, this expression has been taken to mean ’the city of the Brahman’ and identified with the body. For His lotus-like home, the heart, is said to be within this Brahma-pura. But now the term is used in a different sense. Inside It are all desirable qualities. It is indeed the Self, devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, desiring the truth and willing the truth. The ‘Brahma-pura’ here therefore means the Brahman, and has to be understood as ’the city which is the Brahman’. Thus it is made out that the Daharākāśa is the Brahman, and His auspicious qualities are said to be inside It. The quest and meditation enjoined relate both to the Daharākāsu and the auspicious qualities. There is the authority of the Väkyakāra for the view that what exists. within the Daharākāśa is the collection of desirable qualities. The identification of the Brahma-pura with the Brahman points to similar expressions found elsewhere in the scriptures. In the Chhand. Up. itself, we have a reference to the Brahma-loka seeming like a buried treasure. People walk over the treasure without knowing of its existence; all beings, though moving in the direction of Adhik. V, Sut. 13-22] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxxvii the Brahma-loka, do not win it, as they are ridden upon by ignorance. The second aphorism of this section identifies the Brahma-loka also with the Daharākāśa, and thereby supports the original identification of the Daharākāśa with the Brahman. The figure of ignorant men walking over a hidden treasure is interpreted by Rāmānuja in two ways, and each interpretation is supported by other scriptural passages. It is a well-known scriptural teaching that all individual selves rest in the Brahman during deep sleep. The Chhand. Up. itself refers to this; and in the Brih. Up., it is taught in a passage where the Brahman is called the Brahma-loka. The movement of the individual selves towards the Brahman in the simile of the hidden treasure has to be understood as movement towards the state of rest in the Brahman during deep sleep. Alternatively, the hidden treasure is the Internal Ruler. All beings move unknowingly over Him at all times. The movement in regard to the individual selves is a movement in time, whereas the movement of the ignorant men is a movement in space. In both the cases, those who move are ignorant. The Brih. Up. deals at some length with the Internal Ruler and the ignorance about Him of those whom He rules. Even without reference to other passages in the scriptures, the mere figure of the hidden treasure is by itself capable of showing that the Daharākāśa is the Brahma-loka, that is, the Brahman Himself. Further proof of the identity of the Daharākāśa with the Brahman is furnished by a later passage in the Chhand. Up., which refers to It as the bridge, the support of all these worlds so that they may not get into confusion. This corresponds to a similar teaching given in the Brih. Up., which also elsewhere speaks of the Akshara as the support of the sun and the moon. The Daharākāśa tooxxxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 is said to be the support of the sun, the moon, the stars and the lightnings. Again, it is not correct to say that the word, ‘ākāśa," is well known to stand only for the ether of space. Its use in the sense of the Brahman is equally well-known. The scriptures often refer to the Brahman as the Akasa, the Shining One; whenever indeed the Akasa is found associated with the characteristic qualities of the Supreme Self, it has to be understood as referring to Him. Having thus shown in four aphorisms that the Daharākāśa cannot be the ether of space, the Vedanta- Sutras now proceed to deal with the alternative view that it may be the individual self. The first argument is set out in the fifth aphorism of the section. It is to the effect that in a later passage in the Chhand. Up., there is a reference to the individual self in terms suggestive of an identification with the Daharākāśa. Here the individual self is called samprasada. He is described as rising up from the body, reaching the Highest Light, and then manifesting himself in his own true form. Then the passage goes on: “He is the self, said he (i.e., the teacher). He is immortality, he is the fearless, he is the Brahman.” The qualities attributed to the Daharākāśa are here associated with the individual self. They may be inapplicable, so far as the ether of space is concerned, but not in regard to the individual self. The term ‘ākāśa’ can also stand for the individual self, which shines with knowledge, is untaintable in essence and so on. Ramanuja’s answer is that the qualities attributed to the Daharākāśa cannot apply to the individual self. For instance, it cannot be said of the individual self that he is devoid of sin. It is implied that the fearlessness and the immortality mentioned in the passage above cited are those of the Highest Light and not of the individual self. Adhik. V, Sut. 13-22] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xxxix A further objection is now met. A later passage of the Chhand. Up. is devoted to the teaching given by Prajapati. Here the very same qualities attributed to the Daharākāsa earlier are associated with the individual self. Prajapati teaches that the individual self “is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth”. Moreover, “he is to be sought after “; one “who understands and knows that self attains all worlds as well as all desires. " 1 Indra hears of this teaching and seeks further elucidation from Prajapati. He is taught how to distinguish the self from the body and from the dream image and how the self persists in dreamless sleep. Complete dissociation from the body is then shown to be the essential nature of the individual self. Indra also learns about the pure state of the self in moksha. The conclusion of the teaching is thus set out: “He who understands and knows that self. attains all worlds as well as all desires; thus said Prajapati indeed.” Thus the daharākāśa can very well be made out to be the individual self, who is shown in Prajapati’s teaching to possess all the qualities attributed to it. It is the meditation on the individual self which is thus claimed to be taught in the Dahara-vidyā. Rāmānuja refutes this contention primarily with the help of two arguments. There is a radical difference between the qualities attributed to the Daharākāśa and those attributed to the individual self in Prajapati’s teaching In the former case, the qualities are unconditioned. But the individual self has its essential nature concealed by ignorance. Only after release from the bondage of karma its essential nature becomes manifest, and it becomes distinctly characterised by these qualities. Moreover, there are some other qualities of the Daharākāśa, which can never belong to the individual self even in the state of emancipation. These include the attribute of being the bridge, that of being the support of all the worlds etc. SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 The question is now raised why there should be a refer- ence at all to the individual self under the name of sampra- sāda in the earlier passage dealing with the Daharakāśa. If the latter were the Brahman, this is quite unnecessary, as there will be no injunction to meditate on the individual self. The seventh aphorism of this section gives the reply that the reference to the individual self has a different object in view. The Daharākāşa is the Supreme Light, and has the power to redeem the individual self. This is the purpose kept in view in the reference to the samprasada in the passage dealing with the Daharākāśa. Meditation on the individual self is enjoined by Prajapati, and its fruits are the same as those of the meditation on the Daharākāśa of which it forms a part. The size of the Daharākāśa is said to be minute, not because it is the individual self, but because the Supreme Self is to be so realised. This has already been explained in the Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikarana, the opening section of the second part of the first Chapter of the Vedanta- Sutras. The littleness of the Little Ether is not natural and unconditioned, as may be seen by the other characteris- tics which unmistakably show It to be identical with the Supreme Self. Again, the individual self is said, only after attaining the Supreme Light, to be characterised by the qualities attributed to the Daharākāsa. This means that it becomes similar to the Supreme Self in the state of moksha. Else- where in the scripture also, it is taught that the wise man, shaking off merit and demerit, attains the highest degree of equality with the Supreme Self. We have thus another proof that the Little Ether is not the individual self. Śri Krishna also teaches in the B.G. that the released self attains sameness of nature with Himself. The two aphorisms dealing with the resemblance between the individual self and the Supreme Self, and with the corresponding teaching in the Smṛiti, are thus seen to be linked with the eight earlier aphorisms. They do not Adhik. VI, Sut. 23-24] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE * constitute, as suggested by others, a new section, referring to a passage in the Mund. Up. to the effect that everything shines after the Brahman and that by His light all things are lighted up. (Pages 120-144). Wherever the self is said to be of a small size, the Sutras tend to hold that the Supreme Self is meant, so conceived for purposes of worship and meditation. But there are passages in Kath. Up. which refer to a person of the size of the thumb. This person seems unmistakably to be the individual self. How is this to be reconciled with the method of interpretation hitherto followed? The sixth section, called the Pramitadhikaraṇa, is concerned with this problem. According to Rāmānuja, this section has four aphorisms, 23-24 and 40-41. In between, aphorisms 25-39 deal with three topics that arise by the way. Thus, the subject of this Adhikarana is interrupted after aphorism 24 and resumed again in aphorism 40. It is disposed of in a way at first, certain incidental problems arising from it are discussed, it is raised again in a different form and finally settled once for all. (Other commentators like Sankara follow a different division into adhikaraṇas.) The purvapaksha points out that the person who is of the size of the thumb is the lord of the past as well as of the future in the sense that his karmas have determined his past and will determine his future. He is also the lord of the body. In the Svet. Up. it is definitely stated that the person who is of the size of the thumb is the lord of life, that he is associated with will and egoity, and that he wanders about through his karmas. Rāmānuja’s answer here is that the statement about the Person of the size of the thumb being the lord of to-day and tomorrow uses the term ’lord’ in its unrestricted sense. Hence He is the Supreme. Lord. Later in the Upanishad, His worship also is enjoined. Nor can the individual self II S.B. vii < t xlil SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 be deemed to rule over his past or future in any unrestricted sense. His control over his fate is subordinate to the control exercised over him by the Supreme Lord. Why then is the size of the thumb mentioned? It is for the purpose of facilitating worship. The Supreme Self exists in the heart of the worshipper for this purpose, and since the heart of man is of the size of the thumb, the Lord also exists there as of that magnitude. Since men alone are qualified to worship the Lord, the varying sizes of the hearts of animals do not matter. Moreover, it is nowhere stated that the individual self is of the size of the thumb. It is really atomic, and in the very passage from the Svet. Up. cited earlier, it is stated to be of the size of the point of a goad. (144-147). An incidental problem is now taken up. If men are qualified for the worship of the Lord, on account of the fact that He exists in the heart limited to the magnitude of the thumb, are the gods disqualified from His worship? This question is discussed in the next section–which is really a sub-section. It goes by the name of Devata dhikaraṇa, and consists of five aphorisms, 25-29. The first of these states that Badarāyaṇa is of opinion that it is proper to regard the gods as worshipping the Brahman. This refutes the view that they are not so qualified. The purvapaksha is based on the argument that the gods possess neither bodies nor the state of the soliciting suppliant. Without these, they cannot become worshippers. Underlying this view of the nature of the gods is the conviction held by some of the followers of the Purva- Mimāmsā. They take seriously only the injunctions in the scriptures enjoining rituals and duties. The other parts of the Vedas serve no purpose except being helpful to the performance of the injunctions. The injunctions merely connect the gods with the objects aimed at. There is noAdhik. VII, Süt. 25-29] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xliii need to assume gods with bodies in connection with them (any more than to assume their existence in regard to the performance of other religious activities like the practice of austerities or the giving of gifts in charity). Ramanuja explains the reply of Badarayana to this view. The gods are definitely described in the Upanishads, the Vedic mantras and arthavādas to have bodies and organs of sense. Being subject to karma, they too suffer from misery. They also have some knowledge about the auspicious qualities of the Lord. Thus they are qualified to become soliciting suppliants. There is no point Moreover, rituals To regard the arthavada as a mere panegyric intended to stimulate the performance of karma, and to refuse to take it seriously is not right and proper. in describing a non-existent excellence. yield fruits only because gods are pleased with them, and award the fruits. To invent an apurva to connect the ritual of the past with the result of the future is unnecessary and not sanctioned by the scriptures. If the gods have bodies, what happens when many sacrificers invoke them at the same time? The next aphorism answers this question by saying that each god can adopt many bodies simultaneously. The further objection is then raised that gods with bodies have necessarily to be mortal. It is pointed out in reply that, though as individuals they are not eternal, they represent, each of them, an eternal species. The Vedic word, ‘Indra’, for instance does not refer merely to a particular individual like a proper noun describing a man. On the other hand, it is like the word, ‘ox’. It refers to a species and not to an individual. When a particular Indra ceases to be, the Creator creates another Indra of the same kind with the help of the Vedic word, ‘Indra’. By revolving it in his mind, he learns the generic nature of Indra. All this is made clear in the Vedas and also in Smriti works like the Mahabharata and the Vishnu- purāṇa. xliv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 The references to the bodies of the gods may be thus accounted for without violating the principle that their bodies denote mortality. But there are references in the mantras and the arthavādas to sages and seers described as the authors of the mantras. It will have to be accepted, if these references are taken seriously, that the Vedas came into existence in time. The answer to this is that, as in the case of the gods, the name of every sage also represents a species. Now, the question is asked: if the final dissolution of the universe is accepted periodically, how can the Vedas survive it? Sūtra 29 gives the answer that there is a continued identity in names and forms. The Divine Lord remembers at the end of the process of universal dissolution the universe in its original configuration. Then He creates the universe as before, reveals the Veda which has been existent in a certain order of syllabic succession and teaches it to the four-faced Brahma the creator, who creates the world consisting of gods, men etc. as before. The eternity of the Veda means that it is preserved in the same order of syllabic succession, and not that syllables or words are eternal. It is eternally kept in God’s mind and taught to every Brahmā. It is thus proved that gods and others like them possess the fitness to worship the Brahman as they have the character of being a soliciting suppliant and the capability needed for such worship. (Pages 147-162). Some kinds of worship prescribed in the Vedas have the gods themselves as the objects of worship. An enquiry is now started whether the gods can adopt such types of worship as those enjoined in the Madhuvidya. The eighth section consisting of three aphorisms deals with this and goes by the name of Madhvadhikaraṇa. In the first of these, the opinion of Jaimini is given that such worship is impossible. The reference is to a passage in the Chhand. Up. (III), in which the sun is Adhik. VIII, Süt. 30-32] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xlv described as the honey of the gods. The region of mid- air is the honeycomb which rests on the horizontal bamboo of the heavens. After elaborating this metaphor, the Upanishad states that various kinds of oblations generate nectar which flows into various parts of the sun and affects it in different ways. One engaging in meditation about one of these kinds of nectar as a form of worship of the Brahman is said to become in due course one of the gods enjoying it. Ultimately, he attains the Brahman. Jaimini thinks that a god cannot be asked to meditate on himself as enjoying a particular kind of nectar for the purpose of being re-born in the same position. The next aphorism gives another reason in support of Jaimini’s position. It is that the gods are described else- where in the scriptures as worshipping the Supreme Self as the Light of lights. Obviously, therefore, it is only this kind of worship of the Supreme Self that is enjoined on the gods. But Badarayana thinks differently. He is convinced that the gods too are qualified for such types of worship as the Madhuvidya. A god can certainly worship the Brahman existing within himself as the Internal Ruler. He can also desire to attain the same position in another cycle of creation. Indeed, the Madhuvidya teaches two types of worship-that of the Brahman in the condition of effect and that of Himself in the condition of cause. Meditation on the sun-god etc. is the worship of the Brahman as produced effect. The worship of the Internal Ruler of the sun-god etc. is the worship of the Brahman as cause. This view of Badarāyaṇa about the fitness of the gods for the Madhuvidya is also supported by the Vrittikara. (Pages 162-166). The gods have been thus shown to be capable of worshipping the Brahman in the ways described in the scriptures, because they possess bodies and have the character of soliciting suppliants. Moreover, the xlvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb attributed to the Supreme Self in the scriptures is because the human heart is of this size, and He exists there for the purpose of being worshipped. Thus, all human beings without distinction of birth or rank seem to be entitled to the types of worship taught in the scriptures. Even those excluded from the study of the Vedas can learn about the Self and the ways of His worship in various other ways. The Samvarga-vidyā in the Chhand. Up. (IV) is taught by Raikva to Janašruti, who is addressed as a Sūdra. This view is rejected in the next section of seven aphorisms (33-39), where the traditional caste restrictions on the study and adoption of the various forms of worship are upheld. Only those entitled to study the karma-kāṇḍa of the Vedas and perform the rituals prescribed there can adopt the ways of worship in the jñāna-kāṇḍa. As regards Jānašruti, he is shown to be a Kshattriya in the first three aphorisms. He is addressed as a $ūdra, not because he belongs to that caste, but because he is full of grief about his ignorance in relation to the Brahman. Then it is pointed out that Vedic studies have to be preceded by a ceremony of initiation, well-known to be restricted to the first three castes only. Satyakāma Jābāla is taught about the Brahman only after his preceptor has made sure that he is entitled by birth to the ceremony of initiation. Caste restrictions have been placed on the study of the Vedas, and these have been declared in the Smritis. Rāmānuja however points out that the Advaitins in reason cannot uphold such restrictions. They deny all connection between the performance of rituals and the rise of knowledge about the Brahman. Nor can they insist on such knowledge being impossible except through the teachings of the Upanishads. Thus this section is concluded (pages 166-184), and it also brings to a close the digressions in the Pramitadhikaraṇa. Adhik. VI, Sūt. 40-41] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xlvii The sixth section about the worship of the Person who is of the size of the thumb is continued. The identity of this Person with the Supreme Self has been established on the ground that He is described as Isana, the Lord. But if the term is understood as referring to lordship in relation to the body, then the individual self becomes indicated. This doubt is now dispelled by Sutras 40 and 41. The answer relies on the fact that between two references to the Person of the size of the thumb, there is mentioned Prana before whom the world trembles. This Prana is identical with the Person, and the great fear in which the whole world holds Him shows Him clearly to be the Supreme Self. Elsewhere, the scripture makes it clear that only the Supreme Self can possess this kind of sovereignty dreaded by all. Another intervening passage between the references to this Person mentions One in whose presence the sun, the moon and the stars fail to shine and by whose light every- thing is lighted up. Such splendour can belong only to the Brahman. This very passage is given in the Mund. Up. in reference to the Brahman. Other Vedantic texts also describe the Brahman as Supreme Light. (Pages 184-187). It may be remembered that the Pramitādhikaraṇa arose because of the determination of the identity of the Daharākāsa with the Supreme Brahman. Towards the end of the portion dealing with the Daharākāśa, the Chhand. Up. speaks of the ākāśa in a way suggestive of the released individual self. The question has to be settled whether this ākāśa is different from the Daharākāśa, and if not, whether the earlier conclusion about the Daharākāśa can continue to stand. In the tenth and last section (aphorisms 42 to 44) of this third part of the first Chapter, this discussion is taken up. This section is called Arthäntaratvädivypadeśādhikaraṇa. The passage which is claimed to identify the ākāśa with the released individual self says that it is axlviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 3 differentiator of names and forms and what is between these names and forms. Immediately before this, the well blessed individual self is said to shake off the body and all sin and attain the eternal world of the Brahman. The released individual self is the differentiator of name and form in the sense that he is the instrument of the Brahman in such differentiation. Or he is the bearer of names and forms in the condition of bondage. He is the ākāśa because he is associated with undiminished light. As Prajapati’s teaching about the individual self has come after the teaching about the Daharākāśa, the context has been broken, and there can be no objection to the released indivídual self being mentioned here. Sūtra 42 gives the reply by stating that the Akāşa, being taught in the context to be different from the individual self, is the Supreme Brahman. The differentiator of names and forms cannot be the individual self, either in the state of bondage or of final release. In the former state, he is subject to karma, while in the latter he is excluded from the activity of creation etc. Everywhere in the scriptures, the Supreme Self is described as the Differentiator. He is this, because He has the qualities of being free from sin and of willing the truth. The immediate context not merely mentions the released self, but also the Brahman whom he attains. Nor is there any break in the earlier context. Prajapati’s teaching deals with the worshipper of the Daharākāsa, and It is now pointed out in conclusion to be the object of attainment. All this reasoning presupposes difference between the released individual self and the Supreme Self. But there are scriptural statements which deny such difference, and others actually declare the identity between the individual self and the Supreme Self. This is indeed the teaching of Advaita, against which Rāmānuja has argued at length under Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 1). Now he takes Sutras 43 and 44 as supporting the view that the individual self is different from the Supreme Self. Chap. 1, Part 4] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xlix The first aphorism points out that this differentiation is taught in the descriptions of the states of deep sleep and death. The reference is to the Brih. Up. (IV. 3) where the individual self in deep sleep and death is mentioned. In the former condition he is embraced by the Supreme Self and is not aware of anything. In relation to death, it is stated that he is ridden upon by the omniscient Supreme Self and goes away, giving up his body. A little later, the same Brih. Up. speaks of the Supreme Self as the Lord of all, the ruler of all, the support of the world and so on. These attributes cannot belong to the individual self even in the state of final release. The teaching of oneness between the individual self and the negation of duality has to be understood in the way already indicated. They point to the fact that the Supreme Self is the Self of all. He is the cause of which all things are produced effects. Thus, the Ākāša, which is the differentiator of name and form, is distinct from the individual self and identical with the Brahman. ((Pages 187-194). CHAPTER I, PART 4 This brings us to the end of the third part of the first Chapter. In the fourth and last part, all important passages in the scriptures which seem to point directly to something other than the Brahman as the cause of the world are discussed. It consists of 29 aphorisms divided into eight sections, which fall into two groups, as we shall see presently. The Sutras are given below:
If it be said that according to some the ānumānika (or the pradhana) also is the cause of the world, it is replied that it is not so; because what is understood in the context by the word, ‘avyakta’, is not the pradhana or material Nature, but it is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body; and the scripture declares accordingly. II S.B. viii 1 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4
The subtle (avyakta or the unmanifest elementary matter) is the body; because it (i.e., the body) is fit to be of use.
It (viz., the avyakta here) is useful because it is subject to Him.
Because also that (viz., the avyakta here) is not stated to possess the character of that which has to be known (for the attainment of final release).
If it be held that it (viz., the scriptural context) speaks (of the avyakta having to be known for the attainment of final release), it is not right to say so; because, according to the context, it is the Omniscient One (that is referred to therein as such).
Accordingly, this exposition and question (in the context here) relate only to the three.
Also, as in the case (of the term) mahat’ (the term, ‘avyakta’, has to be construed otherwise than in the system of Kapila).
(The word, ‘aja’, cannot mean the pradhāna in the context here) because there is no special characteri- sation (in the context so as to make it signify the pradhana), as there is in the case of the word, ‘chamasa’ or ‘cup’.
Indeed, it (i.e., the aja) has the Light for its because some declare it in their scriptures source, accordingly.
Because, however, the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world), there is nothing contradictory (in it); as in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other such things.
Even accepting the number (to be the same as that known to the Sankhyas), still, they (i.e., the principles of the universe according to the Sankhyas) are not (taught here); because they are different (from those that are given Chap. I, Part 4) AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE li in the context here), and because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number).
They (i.e., the pañchajanāḥ) are the praṇa and the rest, as appears from the complementary passage (in the context).
According to some (the meaning of the word, ‘pañchajanāḥ,’ is determined) by means of the word, ’light’, although ‘food’ is not (mentioned in the passage here).
(The Brahman) is the only cause of the world, because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of the ether etc.
(The Brahman is the cause of the world) because of (His) being drawn in (here in the context).
(The Brahman is the only cause of the world) because (the word ‘karman’ in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him).
If it be said that the characteristics of the individual self and those (indicated by the mention) of the principal vital air are mentioned (here in the context)-that has been already dealt with.
Jaimini, however, thinks that they (i.e., the characteristics of the jiva) relate to the other (viz., the Brahman); because of the question and answer (in the context relating to Him); and thus (i.e., of this opinion) are some others also.
(The person pointed out as the object of the spiritual sight etc. in the context is the Brahman Himself) because of the purport of (all) the passages (therein).
Asmarathya is of opinion that it (i.e., the denoting, in the context, of the Supreme Self by the words denotative of the individual self) is a proof of the proposition (that by a knowledge of a certain one thing the knowledge of all things results). Lit SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4
Auḍulomi is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self); because he (i.e., the individual self), at the time of final departing (from the body), gets into the state (of identity with the Brahman).
Kāśakṛitsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also), because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the ndividual self).
(The Brahman is) also the material cause (of the world) because (in the context) there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it.
(The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because also of the teaching relating to His thinking and willing (to the effect that He will become manifold and be born).
(The Brahmar is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) also because He is directly revealed in the scriptures to be both.
(The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because (also) of His making Himself into the world (being taught in the scripture).
(The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because of the evolution (relating to Him as taught in the scriptures being peculiar).
(The Brahman is also the material cause) because also He is declared (in the scriptures) to be the source (of the world).
By means of the foregoing (reasoning), all other (similar passages) have been explained, have been explained. At the commencement of his commentary on the fourth part of Chapter I, Ramanuja makes a fewAdhik. I, Sut. 1-7] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE liii introductory remarks, summing up what has been taught so far. The Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the creation etc., of the world. He is to be enquired into and realised as the means for the attainment of final release. He is free from the slightest trace of what is evil and is full of auspicious qualities. He is the Internal Self of all and possesses unlimited sovereignty. Rāmānuja goes on to say that the fourth part is devoted generally to disproof of Sankhya claims for support to their doctrines in the Vedas. Their inter- pretations of certain texts as teaching the avyakta to be the cause of the world are set aside. One such instance occurs in relation to the Kath. Up., and it is dealt with in the first section of the fourth part. It is known as the Anumānikadhikarana, and it consists of seven aphorisms, 1 to 7. It is This discussion is linked up with the last section of the third part, where the individual self is shown to be different from the Supreme Self. Now, in the Kath. Up., there is a statement that the purusha (or the self) is superior to the avyakta and that there is nothing superior to the purusha. “That is the highest limit, that is the final goal.” urged that pure Sankhya doctrine is here propounded. There is recognition here only of two primary entities-the undifferentiated matter which evolves and produces the universe and the intelligent individual self. No other entity such as the Supreme Self is here recognised. The Sankhya scheme is accorded further support from the earlier statement that the avyakta is superior to the ‘great thing’ or mahat. The first Sutra refutes this position by taking note of the purport of the whole passage. There is an elaborate metaphor here of a chariot with its horses, reins, charioteer, rider in the chariot and so on. Later, what are represented by the chariot and other things are mentioned again directly, stripped of metaphor, in a liv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part 4 particular order of increasing importance. Everything formerly referred to finds a place in the second list except only ’the body’. In the corresponding place, however, the term ‘avyakta’ is found. Thus ‘avyakta’ here can mean only the body. It is superior to the individual self which is great in its capacity as the agent; for the self cannot act without the help of the body. The Purusha who is superior even to the body is the Supreme Self, because everything has its activities dependent on His will. The context makes it clear that the rider in the chariot or the individual self is the worshipper who reaches the other end of the path, the highest abode of Vishnu. The metaphor of the chariot is intended to teach self-control for the purpose of reaching this objective. The second list is based upon the order of importance with reference to steps in self-control. The senses, their objects, the mind, the faculty of intellection, the individual self, the body and the Supreme Self are mentioned in order so that the mind may be detached from the objects which attract the senses, and impelled to do so by the self working through the determination of the faculty of intellection; the body is to be subdued to the purposes of the self and refuge is to be sought with the Supreme Self. The actual steps of self- control are detailed immediately afterwards. This order of importance cannot be harmonised with Sankhya ideas. No cause-and-effect relationship on the lines of their evolutionary theory can be found here. It is only in the case of one link in the chain, the superiority of buddhi to manas, that this can even be plausibly suggested. Moreover, the Sankhyas have to understand the phrase, ‘mahān ātmā’, not as the great individual self, but as the material principle of mahat, regarded in some sense as the ätman or the pervader. This is a very unnatural rendering. The Sankhyas now raise the question: why is the body referred to as the avyakta? The next aphorism Adhik. I, Süt. 1-7] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lv answers this by pointing out that the body as a modification of the avyakta, useful for the purposes of the individual self, can be referred to under the name of its cause. The Sankhyas thereupon claim to have gained a point: the Vedanta, too, seems to accept the avyakta as the source of the material universe! Yes, says Sūtra 3, but only as having the Supreme Self for its self. Rāmānuja proceeds to quote the scriptures, the B.G. and the V.P. in support of this. The fourth aphorism further argues that the Sankhyas are out of court because nowhere is it said in the Kath. Up. that knowledge of the avyakta is essential for final release. This knowledge, as well as knowledge of its modifications and of the individual self is necessary according to Kapila and his followers. Such a statement about the avyakta from a later passage in the Upanishad is pointed out, where something to be known is described as devoid of form, sound etc. and as superior to the mahat. The next aphorism shows that this statement occurs in a context dealing with the Supreme Self. The term ‘mahat’ here means only the individual self earlier described as ‘great’. Sutra 6 goes on to explain that the entire context in the Upanishad deals not with the avyakta, but with three topics and three only. These are the Supreme Self as the object of attainment, loving devotion as the means of attainment and the aspiring worshipper as essentially immortal and potentially omniscient. Rāmānuja surveys the teachings of the god of death to Nachiketas in this light; they answer questions about what is different from other ends, what from other means and what from other agents. Finally, it is urged in Sitra 7 that just as the expression ‘mahat’ in marān ātmā’ cannot mean the material principle, mahat, of the Sankhyas, similarly the avyakta declared as superior to the individual self is different from the entity known under that name to the Sankhyas. The avyakta can mean only the body in this .context. (Pages 195-213). lvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 Be it so, say the Sankhyas, but what about the ajā mentioned in the Svet. Up. as producing numerous offspring? It is evidently the pradhana or the avyakta. It is described as unborn and independently engaged in creation. There is no word, like the ‘body’ in the Kath. Up., to give aja here a different meaning. This question is answered in the second section, Chamasādhi- karaṇa, consisting of aphorisms 8 to 10. Sutra 8 states that there is no special characterisation in the context to make the aja signify the pradhana of the Sankhyas. A contrast is suggested with a passage in the Brih. Up. where the word, ‘chamasa’ (or ‘cup’) is used to indicate the skull. This is done by representing the skull as an inverted cup. Rāmānuja first quotes from the Chulika and Garbha Upanishads to demonstrate that the Supreme Person has the avyakta or pradhāna under His control, being its self. Then passages from the Svet. Up. are also quoted to the same effect. Finally, the relevant passage about the ajā is taken up. It speaks of three unborn entities, two male and one female. She is red, white and black, and she produces numerous offspring like herself. One of the males continues to love her, while the other has stopped loving her after some time. Rāmānuja concludes that there is no topic, context or particularising attribute which makes out the aja here to be the pradhana of the Sankhyas. It is not necessarily independent, and there is nothing to show how it is to be distinguished from the two other unborn entities. Not only are there no reasons in favour of the Sankhya interpretation; there are reasons to the contrary justifying the view of the Vedanta. In the M. När. Up., the same passage about the three unborn entities occurs with slight variations. Here the context is the creation of the universe by the Supreme Self. The unborn female is thus seen to be the pradhana having the Brahman as its source and self. Adhik. II, Sut. 8-10] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lvii The word, ‘aja’, has its meaning controlled by a similar sentence in another scriptural passage, just as the meaning of ‘chamasa’ is determined with the help of a comple- mentary passage. This is set out in the second aphorism, where the Brahman is referred to under the name of ‘Light’. The question is then raised: how can anything unborn have its source in ‘Light’? Sutra 10 answers this objection. In the context of creation, the pradhana can be described both as unborn and as having the Light for its source. At the time of universal dissolution, it exists in a subtle condition, becoming indistinguishable from the Brahman. Since even then it is not destroyed, it is unborn. When creation takes place, it gets differentiated, its quality of sattva and others become manifest; having become modified into the elements known as tejas, water and heat, it exists as red, white and black in colour. In its causal condition, it is unborn; but in its condition as effect it has Light or the Brahman for its source. An analogy is suggested in the Sutra. In the Madhu- vidya the worship of the sun is taught in the condition of cause as well as that of effect. In the former state, he neither rises nor sets, but in the latter he does both. He is thus uncaused as well as caused. The same applies to the case of the ajā. Rāmānuja then explains why he differs from Sankara in the interpretation of the passage about the aja. How can it refer to a single entity consisting of the elements of tejas, water and earth? Obviously, the ajā cannot be a combination of the elements, nor the Brahman in the condition of effect, for then it cannot be one. Nor can it be the Brahman as the cause, as He cannot be characterised by the three colours. If it is something else, the prakṛiti regarded as His effect, then we have a near approach to Rāmānuja’s position. He would prefer, however, to take the aja to be the prakṛiti as the source of the three elements. II S.B. ixlviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 He is also unwilling to take the aja as a she-goat and see an elaborate metaphor here. He feels that the prakṛiti cannot, with propriety, be represented figuratively by a she- goat, and institutes a contrast between the two to prove his point. They differ in regard to fertility, intelligence and a number of other important features. Thus it is concluded that the passage about the aja shows the prakriti to have the Brahman for its Self, and not as an independent entity, as claimed by the Sankhyas. (Pages 231-228) The Sankhyas now cite a passage where the arguments of the previous section cannot apply in their view. In the Brih. Up. (IV. 4), it is stated that one who knows the self or ātman in whom the five panchajanas and the element of ether are established, becomes immortal. The Sankhyas contend that this passage teaches the twentyfive principles of the universe according to their system. A parallel passage has been used to suggest that the aja is not the independent prakriti. But nothing of the kind is available, in their view, to explain away the specific reference to their twentyfive principles. This claim is dealt with in the next section, the Sañkhyopasangraḥādhikaraṇa, consisting of aphorisms 11 to 13. A great deal here depends on the meaning of the expression, panchajanaḥ. The Sankhyas interpret it to mean ‘groups of five’. They say that five groups of five are mentioned. Rāmānuja takes the word in the sense of members of a group of five’. Thus where the Sankhyas see twentyfive entities, Rāmānuja sees only five. 4 Grammar does not justify the Sankhya position. Panchajanaḥ’ as a collective word should be in the feminine gender, whereas it is in the masculine here. Only the irregularity of Vedic texts can be pleaded in excuse. Moreover, it is difficult to divide the Sankhya principles into five groups on any logical basis. Further, in addition to the twentyfive principles, the ether and the self are Adhik. III, Sut. 11-13] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lix mentioned in the context. Thus the Sankhya case fails, even if twentyfive things are assumed to be referred to. The next aphorism explains what these five members of a group of five are. In a complementary passage in the same Upanishad, it is declared: “They understand Him (i.e., the Brahman) to be the prāṇa of the prāṇa, the eye of the eye, the food of the food, the mind of the mind.” Thus there is a reference here to the five senses and the mind as depending on the Brahman. The prana refers to the tactile sense, and the food to those of smell and taste, the eye and the ear, of course, pointing to sight and hearing. The Sankhyas object, saying that this complementary passage has two versions, those of the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas. In the former, there is no mention of ’the prana of the praṇa’; thus, the five senses as explained above are not enumerated. S tra 13 answers this objection by referring to the immediately preceding passage. Here the gods are said to worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well. The Brahman is the Light on which some other lights are dependent. Clearly, these secondary lights are the senses, which bring external objects to the light of consciousness. The three senses that are later mentioned are illustrative, and their full tally has to be completed by the correspond- ing passage in the Madhyandina version. Thus the five panchajanas are the senses. Even if they were to be taken to refer to the twentyfive principles of the Sankhyas, these principles are clearly stated to under the control of the Brahman. (pages 228 to 235) The Sankhyas at this stage take up a more general question in reference to a passage in the Brih. Up. The point that is raised is that scriptural texts do not speak with one voice about the cause of the world, Both existence (sat) and non-existence (asat) are said to have lx SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 been in the beginning. In view of the inconclusiveness of the scriptural texts, it is not possible to determine definitely from them that the Brahman is the sole cause of the world. But this is not the case with the pradhana of the Sankhyas, which may be established definitely as the cause of the world both from the scriptures and with the help of independent reasoning. The next section, the Karaṇatvadhikaraṇa, consisting of aphorisms 14 and 15, deals with this argument. In the Brih. Up. (I.4.), the creation of the world is declared to proceed by means of the differentiation into names and forms of something which is originally undifferentiated (avyākṛita). The reference can only be to the evolution of the unevolved pradhāna. Once this is grasped, the sat and the asat, existence and non-existence, are seen to be the pradhana in its evolved and unevolved conditions. The objection that the cause of the world is sometimes called the Brahman and the Atman is not serious. These terms mean respectively that which is big and that which pervades. Both these descriptions apply to the pradhana. The activities of seeing etc., sometimes associated with the cause of the world, have to be understood in a figurative sense. They refer to the state of this cause when creation is imminent. Sutra 14 refutes the Sankhya thesis by pointing out that earlier aphorisms have proved the Brahman to be the sole cause of the world by establishing Him as the cause of the ether etc. Rāmānuja quotes scriptural texts to show that they describe creation only after referring to the omniscience of the Creating Agent. The pradhāna, being inert and non-intelligent, cannot be such a cause of the world. But what about the description of the cause of the world as asat and avyäkṛita? In the next aphorism it is Adhik. V, Sut. 16-18] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxi pointed out that the Brahman is drawn in to the context there. The Brahman is clearly mentioned both before and after the statement in the Taitt. Up. that in the beginning there was non-existence. Earlier, He is stated to be the creator and the Self of all. Later, reference is made to His being the Ruler of the world and to His unsurpassable bliss. Similarly, the Brahman is involved also in the passage about the avyakṛita in the Brih. Up. It may be made out therefrom that the Brahman, prior to creation, is avyakṛita, having the undifferentiated material Nature for His body, and that in creation He differentiates Himself through names and forms. The words, “Brahman” and Atman,’ need not be interpreted in a secondary sense. It is of course implied that the essential nature of the Brahman remains unchanged always and that the creation and dissolution of the universe merely bring about modifications in His ‘body’. (Pages 236 to 241.) Granted that the Brahman or the Atman is not the pradhana, but something else in association with which the pradhana evolves; what is there to show that it is not the individual self? The Brahman has been differentiated from inert matter, but not from the individual self. The Kaush. Up. (IV) is cited to show that creation is brought about by the individual self presiding over the pradhana in virtue of his association with karma. The Sūtras (16-18) controvert this stand in the next section called the Jagadvachitvadhikaraṇa. The Upanishad tells the story of the discussion about the Brahman between the sage, Bālāki, and King Ajātasatru of Kāši. Bālāki offers to teach the King, and proceeds to suggest that the Brahman may be the purusha in the sun, or in the moon, or in lightning etc. Ajàtasatru disagreeing, the teacher becomes the pupil and asks for instruction. The King points out that the supreme object of knowledge is the creator of the purushas mentioned by the sage “He whose karma indeed this is”. lxii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 The Sankhya contention here is that the Brahman who is to be known and who is described as the creator is the individual self. The world is created on the basis of the various kinds of karma of different individual selves. They become objects of enjoyment to one another through their karma, and creation takes place to work out the karma. Knowledge of the real nature of the individual self, as distinct from the pradhana, is needed for liberation, and this is taught here. Sutra 16 replies that the word ’ ‘karma’ in the phrase, “whose karma indeed this is”, merely means ‘produced effect. It therefore denotes the world as an effect produced by the Supreme Self. Ramanuja argues that ’this’ in the above phrase can only stand for the visible universe. He also urges that there is no needless repetition of ideas in referring first to the creation of the purushas and then to the world. The whole world is taught to be the produced effect of the Brahman, who is the creator of the purushas mentioned by Bālāki. In being His produced effects, all things-the superior and the inferior intelligent things as well as the non-intelligent things-are equal. The Sankhyas however rely not merely on the usual meaning of the word, ‘karma’, as the impress left by good and evil deeds. They also argue that later sentences in the passage prove that the individual self is the subject here. Bālāki and Ajāta satru are said to strike a person who is fast asleep. The question is asked as to where the self is in a sleeping or dreaming person. The answer is to the effect that in deep sleep, when there is no dreaming, the self resides in certain veins near the heart; speech and other senses become one with the principal vital air, and all of them rest in the self. Still later, it is stated that, like a rich merchant amidst his friends and relatives, the individual self enjoys and is enjoyed by other selves. All this indicates that the Brahman who is the subject of discussion here can only be the individual self.Adhik. V, Süt. 16-18] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxiii Rāmānuja deals with these arguments under the next two aphorisms. The reference to the individual self and the principal vital air are explained on the basis of the rule of interpretation used in regard to the teaching given to Pratardana. This has already been dealt with in the Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 32). When an intelligent individual self or a non-intelligent thing is mentioned in association with the distinctive attributes of the Brahman or in grammatical equation with Him, then His worship is intended to be taught as having that self or non-intelligent thing for His body. Rāmānuja points out that the Brahman is admittedly the subject of discussion from the outset. In the middle of the passage, we have a reference to the Creator of the purushas in the sun, the moon etc., and of the world. At the conclusion, it is declared that one who knows this teaching gets rid of all sins and attains superiority and overlordship in regard to all things. The Brahman being thus determined to be the subject here, the characteristics of the indiuidual self and of the principal vital air have also to be interpreted as relating to Him. Thus the union of the senses and the self with the principal vital air’ can only be taken to be the resting of the individual self in the Brahman during deep sleep, when all the activities of the senses cease. The Brahman is meant by the word ‘prana’, which usually refers to the principal vital air. Sutra 18 refers to an opinion of Jaimini that the individual self is mentioned here, so that by means of questions and answers, the essential nature of the Brahman who is other than the individual self can be taught. Rāmānuja surveys the entire dialogue to bring this out. Bālāki’s ideas about the Brahman are found inadequate by Ajātasatru. So the Brahman is defined as the creator of the purushas in the sun, the moon, etc, and of the world. Then the Brahman is shown to be different from the individual self and the latter from the principal vital air. lxiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 Bālāki and Ajātasatru fail to wake up a sleeping person by addressing him by the names of the vital air; but he is awakened by being prodded with a stick. Then Ajātasatru asks about the positions of the self during dreaming and deep sleep. He himself answers the question by pointing out that He in whom the individual self rests during deep sleep and from whom he emerges on waking is the Prāṇa. It is made out from other scriptural passages that this Prāṇa can be none other than the Supreme Self. Indeed, another version of the dialogue between the King and the sage is available in the Brin. Up. (II. 1). Here the individual self is said to rest during deep dreamless sleep in the Akasa within the heart, who is well known to be the Supreme Self. Thus, the Sankhya interpretation of the passage describing the positions of the individual self during dreams. and deep sleep is refuted. The self resides in the veins near the heart only before deep sleep, that is, during dreams. So the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātasatru does not in any way help the Sankhyas to establish the cause of the world to be the pradhana presided over by the individual self. (Pages 242 to 255) It has been possible to interpret the teaching of Ajātasatru as relating to the Brahman because the word, ‘karma’, has two meanings, one applicable to the individual self and the other to the Brahman. But the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa of the Brih. Up. (II & IV) refers to a self who has to be known, after associating him with husband, wife, son etc. He is also associated with birth and death. Obviously, this self can be none other than the individual self, say the Sankhyas. This problem is debated in the Vakyanvayadhikaraṇa, consisting of four aphorisms (19 to 22). The Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa deals with the teaching given by the sage, Yajnavalkya, to his wife, Maitreyi, on the eve of his renouncing the world and becoming a sannyasin. Adhik. VI, Süt. 20-22] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxv The Upanishad says that, when he seeks to partition his property between his two wives, one of them, Maitreyi, ascertains from him that there is no hope of attaining immortality through wealth. She then prays for knowledge of the means for the attainment of immortality. He begins his teaching by the statement that the husband becomes dear to the wife, not on account of his desire, but in accordance with the desire of the self. After citing some more examples, he points out: “My darling, everything becomes dear, not indeed in accordance with the desire of everything, but in accordance with the desire of the self.” He proceeds to teach that this self has to be meditated upon. When he is known, all the world becomes known. There are other references apparently making him out to be the individual self in the context. Of the self who is aught, it is said that he is altogether a mass of knowledge, and that he rises up from external elements and perishes after them. After death, he has no (individualised) know- ledge. At the end of the teaching, he is described as the knower. It may be asked: by knowing the individual self, how can everything become known? The answer is that the essential nature of all the individual selves is uniform. The distinctions of gods, men, beasts etc. are due to their bodies which are modifications of matter. Thus from knowing the truth about one’s own self, knowledge of all selves, that is, of the whole world, results. Such knowledge leads to emancipation; hence Maitreyi is taught thus to help her in her quest for immortality. Sutra 19 controverts this position. It is the Brahman who is taught to Maitreyi as the object of saving know- ledge. Only thus can the mutual relationships among the component parts of the relevant passages become perfectly consistent. Only the Supreme Self can be the means of II S.B. x lxvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 attaining immortality, because it is so taught everywhere in the scriptures. The truth about the individual self has to be understood only as being helpful towards the knowledge of the Brahman. Even though all individual selves are similar, knowledge of the essential nature of one of them cannot lead to knowledge of all things; for there is matter also in the world. Only the knowledge about the Brahman can lead to knowledge of all things. The husband, wife etc. are said to become dear on account of the will of the Supreme Self, in accordance with His desire to reward His worshippers. To trace such love to the individual self is illogical, because the Self recom- mended to be known is to be known as dissociated from what is dear and after giving up all dear things. Even if it be supposed that the husband becomes dear not for fulfill- ing his desires but for the satisfaction of the individual self of his wife-even then the saving knowledge can only be that of the Supreme Self. He alone is unconditionally and unsurpassingly dear to the individual self. He alone has to be ‘seen’, and not the objects known as husband, wife, son etc., which are mixed up with miseries. One thing, however, still remains to be explained. If the quest of the Supreme Self is the teaching given to Maitreyi, how can He be described, as He is, as rising up from the external elements and perishing after them? The reply is that the individual self is mentioned there but as denotative of the Supreme Self. The views of Asmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kašakṛitsna are set out in three aphorisms, 20-22, about the sense in which identity is indicated between the individual self and the Brahman. Asmarathya urges that since knowledge of the Brahman results in the knowledge of all things, all things are His produced effects. Hence all words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also. This view is liable to be criticised on the ground that the individual self, being birthless and needing efforts to achieve emancipation, Adhik. VI, Süt. 20-22] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxvii So cannot be a produced effect of the Brahman. Audulomi points out that because the individual self, when finally departing from the body, attains unto the state of the Supreme Self, the latter is denoted by the words denoting the former. This view has its own difficulties. It cannot account satisfactorily for the absence of the state of the Brahman in the individual self before its final departure from the body. This absence cannot arise from the nature of the individual self; were it so, the distinction has to persist so long as the essential nature of the individual self exists. Nor can the absence be explained as conditional in a real or unreal sense to the individual self. In the former case, the individual self is the Brahman Himself, even before the final departure from the body. If the conditional distinction is unreal, it is impossible to determine to whom the state of the Brahman belongs at the time of the final departure from the body. We have therefore a third explanation. Kasakṛitsna holds that the words denoting the individual self are denotative up to and inclusive of the Brahman also, because He abides there as its self. This view is regarded by Rāmānuja as having the approval of the author of the Sutras. Ramanuja now proceeds to show how the entire Maitreyi Brahmana can be understood as dealing with the Brahman as the Self and cause of the world. Thus, first of all, the worship of the Supreme Self is taught as the means for the attainment of immortality. For this purpose, the mind and the senses which form the auxiliary instruments of worship have to be restrained. To encourage worship and self-control, the Supreme Self is taught to be the material and the instrumental cause of the world. The individual self has the nature of unlimited intelligence, though in the condition of samsara this intelligence is contracted. In the state of final release, there is no suchlxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 contraction. This self has the Brahman for its self. Hence all things are seen by one with true vision as the Brahman, who however remains untouched by the evils of the world. It is only through worship of the Supreme Self and His grace that He may be known thus and immortality gained. Thus here too the Brahman is shown as the cause of the world. (Pages 255-275) In the six sections of this pāda, replies have been given to objections raised to the Vedanta by those Sankhyas who do not admit of the existence of God. The arguments in the first three sections were directed against the possibility of the pradhana being reckoned as an additional cause. Later sections refute arguments about the pradhana being the sole cause of the world. Now another school of Sankhyas come forward. They admit the Brahman to be the efficient or instrumental cause, but deny that He can be the material cause. In the next section, the Prakṛityadhikaraṇa (aphorisms 23-27), their arguments are dealt with. The purvapaksha cites some scriptural texts which are understood as indicating that the pradhana is the material cause of the world, when presided over by the Lord. This is indeed the general trend of the teaching of the scripture, though it may not specifically describe the pradhāna as the material cause. Moreover, we always find the instrumental and material causes to be different, as is the case, for instance, with the potter and the clay which form the two causes of the pot. Sutra 23 relies on a well-known passage in the Chhand. Up., which sets out a proposition and gives examples in illustration. The proposition is to the effect that through the knowledge of a certain thing all things become known. The father of Svetaketu asks him whether during his studies he has learnt about the Adesa (i.e., the Ruler or Controlling Entity), by knowing whom whatever Adhik. VII, Sut. 23-27] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE Ixix is unknown becomes known. Three illustrations are given-lumps of clay, gold and iron. By knowing any one of these lumps, all things made of it become known. These examples prove the Brahman to be the material cause of the world. Since He is described as the Ruler or Controller, He is also the instrumental cause. References in the scriptures to the prakriti as the mother of modifi- cations, its evolution and its involution merely show that in the state of pralaya the Brahman has the prakṛiti in a subtle condition for His mode, and that in the state of creation, He has the same prakriti in a gross condition for His mode. That there are different material and instrumental causes for things like pots does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the world too should have its material cause different from its instrumental cause. Disabilities attaching to the clay and the potter are not present in the Brahman. The clay is not intelligent, and the potter lacks the capacity to undergo modifications and to will the truth. But the Supreme Brahman can be both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, as He is distinct from all other things, omniscient and omnipotent. The next three aphorisms, 24 to 26, cite scriptural passages in support. The Chhandogya and Taittiriya Upanishads speak of the Brahman willing to become manifold. The latter also says that He made Himself into the manifold world. In the Taitt. Br., we read that the Brahman is the wood and that He is also the tree out of which He fashioned the world. Here the doubt arises how the Brahman can become the manifold world consisting of intelligent and non- intelligent things and yet remain untouched by its evil. Sutra 27 says that this is possible because of the Brahman having a peculiarly evolving nature. Ramanuja explains that the Brahman is the Self of the world, consisting of intelligent souls and non-intelligent matter. Though there 1xx SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 is a periodical recurrence of creation and dissolution, of evolution and involution, all the substantial modifications appertain to matter and all the wrong aims of life to the individual selves. The Brahman remains distinct from matter and the individual selves, even during the state of dissolution when they cannot be distinguished from Him. Whether during creation or dissolution, they merely form the auxiliary instruments of His play. Scriptural passages are cited in support of all this, and some later aphorisms of the Ved. Süt. are also referred to. Thus, it is shown that the Brahman is unstained by the evils of the world, even though He is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. (Pages 275 to 295). The next section has only one aphorism. It claims that the Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the world by the arguments advanced so far and the explana- tions given of scriptural texts. What is meant is that the cause of the world has to be understood as the Brahman, even when the reference thereto in any scriptural text is made without mention of the distinguishing characteristics of the Brahman. (Pages 296-297). The first Chapter of the Ved. Sit. is thus concluded. So far, one hundred and thirtyseven aphorisms have been traversed, divided into thirty five adhikaranas. All these sections, with the exception of three, deal with one topic- the Brahman as the cause of the world. Scriptural texts dealing with the cause of the world are shown to apply to the Brahman. Some other texts which are concerned with what is worthy of worship are also shown to apply to the Brahman identified as the cause of the world. The three exceptions consist of the sections dealing with I. 1. 1, I. 1. 4 and I. 3. 33-39. The first of these is introductory, and along with the next section mentioned, it takes the Brahman for granted. The other section treats Chap. II, Part 1] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxxi of the caste restrictions on the study of the scriptures. Thus thirtytwo sections in the first Chapter seek to establish the Brahman as the cause of the world. CHAPTER II, PART 1. In the first Chapter, the Brahman has been shown to be distinct from matter and from the individual self, both in the state of moksha and that of samṣāra, full of auspicious qualities, devoid of even the slightest trace of evil or imperfection, the purport of the Vedanta and the cause of the world. This conclusion is demonstrated to be unassailable from every possible objection in the second Chapter. Particularly, it is now confirmed that the Brahman is the cause of the world, and not anything else. The first part of the second Chapter consists of the following 36 aphorisms, divided into ten sections.
If it be said that (in case the Vedanta is accepted as teaching the Brahman to be the cause of the world) the Smriti (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplementing the Vedanta, it is replied that) it is not right to say so; because such (a view) will lead to the evil of other Smritis not finding scope.
Because, however, of there having been no percep- tion (of the pradhāna as the cause) on the part of others (like Manu etc.)
By means of this (reasoning), the Yoga (system of Hiranyagarbha also) is contradicted.
(The causality of the Brahman in relation to the world) cannot be predicated, because of this (world) having an entirely distinct character (from Him); and (its having) such a character is made out from the scripture.
(Where non-intelligent things are mentioned as possessing consciousness) it is, however, the presiding deities that are taught, because it is made out to be so by means of the qualifying attribute and of the movement (of those deities) subsequent (to creation). lxxii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1
But it (i.e., the fact that the cause is distinct from the effect) is directly seen.
If it be said that (in case the distinction between cause and effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like).
The re-absorption (of the world into the Brahman), as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings), will lead to the attribution (of modification etc. to the Brahman) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the Vedanta teach- ing of the oneness of cause and effect).
There is, however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the Brahman is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available.
(The Brahman is the cause of the world) also because of the fallacies in his (objector’s) own view.
(The view that material Nature is the cause of the world cannot prevail) also because (mere) syllogistic reason- ing (in support of it) is devoid of solid ground.
If it be said that it (i.e., material Nature) has to be inferred (as the cause of the world) otherwise (than in the manner of other schools), in that manner also there occurs the possibility of getting no freedom (from the evil of instability of mere syllogistic reasoning).
By means of this (reasoning), the other unaccept- able views are also explained.
If it be said that, because it (i.e., the possession of the body) makes Him get into the condition of the enjoyer (of pain and pleasure), there is non-distinction (of the Brahman from the individual soul), it (i.e., distinction) is possible as in the world.
The identity (of the world) with Him is made out from the passages beginning with the words, ‘ārambhana’ etc.Chap. II, Part 1] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE Ixxiii
Because during the existence (of the effect) also, there is perception (of the causal substance).
Because also of the existence of the other thing (i.e., the effect in the condition of cause).
If it be said that there is no (identity of the cause with the effect) because of the description (of the effect) as non-existence, it is replied that it is not so, for the reason (that such non-existence is) by way of another attribute, as is seen from the remainder of the (scriptural) passage in question, from logical reasoning and from other words in the scripture.
As in the case of the cloth.
As in the case of the vital airs, etc.
It may indeed be said that, owing to the other (i.e., the individual self) being described (as identical with the Brahman), there will result (to Him) the evils of not doing what is good (to Himself) etc.
As in the case of stones etc., it (i.e., becoming the Brahman) is inappropriate (in relation to the individual self).
If it is denied (that He is the sole cause), because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the Brahman), it is not right to say so. For it (i.c., creation) resembles (the production of) milk.
He (in creating the universe) is like the gods etc. (who create by their mere will what they desire) in (their own) world.
It may be said that it (i.e., the above view) leads either to the whole (indivisible Brahman becoming the divisible world) or to the contradicition of the scriptural texts relating to the indivisibility (of the Brahman).
However (the causality of the Brahman does not lead to either of these conclusions), because of the scripture, as it (i.c., His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on the scripture. II S.B. xi Ixxiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1
Thus, even in regard to the individual self (there is no ascription of the attributes of non-intelligent things), because they (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful.
Because also there are errors in his (ie., the objector’s) own view.
And because also He (i.e., the Supreme Deity) is revealed in the scriptures as associated with all (powers).
If it be denied (that the Brahman is the cause), owing to His having no organs (and body), this objection has already been answered.
(He is) not (the cause of the world), because it (i.e., creation) has a purpose.
Mere play (is all His purpose in the creation of the world etc.), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world.
There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him), because it (i.e., creation) is dependent (on karma). The scripture says accordingly.
If it be said that there is no karma (or results of works before creation) because (of the declaration in the scriptures) of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the Brahman prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because they (i.e., both the selves and karma) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non- distinction) is appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginningless- ness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures.
(The Brahman is the cause of the world) because of His having all the qualities (required for being such a cause). The first section of the first pada of the second Chapter goes by the name of Smrityadhikaraṇa. It consists only of two aphorisms. The claims of the Sankhya system of Kapila as an authoritative guide to the interpretation of scriptural texts, are here examined and Adhik. I, Süt. 1-2] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxxv refuted. It may be remembered that the last section of the first Chapter points out that all scriptural texts bearing on the cause of the world have to be understood as establish- ing the Brahman to be such cause. The Sankhya now comes forward and says that the principles of interpretation adopted so far have proceeded on the erroneous basis of ignoring the insight and authority of the great sage, Kapila. A Smriti which contradicts a clearly understood scriptural passage, has to be rejected, of course. But the Smriti of Kapila, which expounds the Sankhya system, offers authoritative guidance in the interpretation of obscure and contradictory scriptural texts. As it is almost exclusively concerned with metaphysics, it has no scope elsewhere than in dealing with such matters as the cause of the world etc. Thus, the scriptural texts which seem to support the Vedanta view have to be understood in harmony with the Sankhya thesis, and not the other way round. The support given by the Smritis of Manu and others to the Vedanta is of no avail, because those Smritis have scope elsewhere and are authoritative only in regard to ritual and conduct. The reply is given that the philosophical portions of the Smritis of Manu and others are also authoritative. They deal with the Lord and His relations with the world in order to provide a basis for the duties and rituals which they enjoin as constituting His worship. If Kapila has some authority, Manu and others are even more authorita- tive. The supporters of the Vedanta are many, while Kapila is only one. Stray scriptural texts which seem to support Kapila have therefore to be harmonised with the many which reveal the Brahman to be the cause. More- over, Manu and others have had no perception of the truth as seen by Kapila. So Kapila’s perception is based on error. The established conclusions of the Vedanta cannot be disturbed by Kapila’s speculations. (Pages 299-307). The next aphorism, which constitutes a section by itself, similarly refutes the Yoga system, attributed to 1xxvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 Hiranyagarbha, even though a Supreme Lord is here admit- ted and the yoga of devotion accepted as the means for the attainment of final release. For the Lord is here merely the instrumental cause and not the material cause of the world, which is held to be the pradhāna as an independent entity not having the Lord for its self. The meditation of Yoga therefore has for its objects the individual self and the Lord not properly understood. (Pages 307-308). The authority of the Smritis of Manu and others is then attacked on the ground that they defy reason in teach- ing the intelligent Brahman to be the cause of the non- intelligent world. For the characteristic quality of the cause which differentiates it from other entities, has to persist in its produced effect also. The Brahman is devoid of evil, omniscient and the sole seat of all auspicious qualities. How can He be the cause of the imperfect, impure and inanimate world, whose charac teristics are the opposites of His? The scripture itself makes Him out to be so different from the world. And the interpretation of the scripture has to be in accordance with reason. This problem occupies the next section, known as the Vilakshaṇatvādhikaraṇa. The argument that the Brahman can be accepted to be the material cause of even non-intelligent matter because consciousness may be regarded as latent there, fails. For whatever is never manifest at any time is not latent, but non-existent. The Brahman having a nature which consists of knowledge, bliss and sovereignty, its characteristic quality of intelligence does not persist in the produced effect of the world. Hence there is a fundamental dis- similarity between the Brahman and the world, which makes it impossible for the former to be the cause of the latter. The birth of the intelligent scorpion from the non- intelligent cowdung and the non-intelligent cobweb from the intelligent spider can be explained on the basis that the relation of cause and effect exists among the non-intelligent part of the source and what is derived from it. Adhik. I, Süt. 1-2] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 1xxvii Scriptural passages which describe non-intelligent things like the earth, the waters and the prāṇas as speaking, desiring, competing and so on, refer only to the deities presiding over those non-intelligent things. They do not disprove the radical difference between the intelligent Brahman and the non-intelligent world. But what about well-known instances in our experience where the effect is dissimilar to the cause? The intelligent insect is produced from the non-intelligent honey, and similarly the scorpion from cowdung. The distinguishing attributes of the causes, honey and cowdung, are not seen to persist in their respective effects, insects and scorpions. Why should not then the non-intelligent world be produced from the intelligent Brahman? That, says the Vaiseshika, would be accepting the asat-karya-vāda, the view that the effect is not existent in the cause. The birth of the world in that case will be from non-existence. Not so, replies Sutra 7. What is claimed is only that there is no invariable rule, that like gives birth to like. Oneness of substance between the cause and the effect is by no means denied. Hence it is maintained that the Brahman, who is the cause, undergoes modifications in the form of the world, which is distinct from Himself. But, if there is oneness of substance between the Brahman and the world, and if they become indistinguish- able during pralaya, all the evils of the world have to be necessarily associated with the Brahman. Then the Vedaanta pasages will become mutually inconsistent. It may of course be said that the world forms the body of the Brahman and that its evils do not taint Him. But the intelligent and non-intelligent things cannot form the body of the Brahman in any sense. The body is dependent on the vital breath, and is the substratum of sense-organs that form the means for the experience of pleasure and pain resulting from karma. But the Brahman is not associated with the vital breath or sense-organs, and is free fromlxxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 subjection to karma. Nor is it helpful to define the body as the ground of experience; for the definition is applicable to many other things like palaces. Moreover, the eternal and spontaneous experience of bliss by the Brahman is not dependent on any ground of experience. Two other possible definitions of the body are also objected to. If the body is said to be something whose essential nature, existence and activity are dependent on its self, then it applies to puppets and not to diseased or dead bodies. Again, it may be said that what is controlled and sustained by and is solely subservient to the glory of another is the body of that other. But this definition is too wide in that it is applicable to the category of action and such others. Hence it is argued that scriptural passages become mutually inconsistent, if the view is taken that the world is the body of the Brahman. Even if such a relation between the world and the Brahman were possible, the possibility of evil cannot avoided by the Brahman. Sūtra 9 denies this conclusion by pointing out that examples illus- trative of the position that the Brahman is untainted by the evils of world both in the states of cause and effect are available. It is well known that childhood, youth, old age etc., which belong to bodies, are not associated with souls. Similarly, knowledge, happiness etc. belong to souls and are not associated with bodies. When the Brahman is spoken of as contracting and expanding during dissolution and creation respectively, it is His body which suffers these changes. His purity is not affected by its evils. There is no inconsistency in the scriptural passages proclaiming His auspicious qualities and at the same time describing the world as His body. The definition of the body given by the Vaiseshika is imperfect in that it cannot apply to the earth as the body of the Brahman, to the bodies of released souls, to the Chap. II, Part 1] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE Ixxix chosen bodies of the Brahman, to the bodies of immovable beings and to the bodies acquired by curses. A satisfac- tory definition would run: “That substance which, in regard to all things as can be accomplished by it, is completely and always capable of being controlled and supported by an intelligent soul, and which has its essential mature solely subservient unto the glory of that intelligent soul-that substance is the body of that intelligent soul.” In a diseased body, something obstructs the power of control of the soul. The dead body is a body only nominally. It is called so on account of its having been once a body. Moreover, the Sankhya theory about the cause of the world is riddled with difficulties. The self is regarded as free of modifications and of the nature of pure intelligence. Creation is said to be due to the superimposition of the attributes of the pradhana on the self owing to proximity. If mere proximity can bring this about, even the freed souls must become entangled. Nor can we have any modifica- tion of the pradhāna being responsible for creation, for modifications are said to be the effects and not the cause of creation. So the pradhana cannot be proved to be the cause of the world. Further, logical reasoning on which the Sankhya relies is notoriously inconclusive. The speculations of Kapila, Patanjali, Gautama and Kaṇāda, as well as those of the Buddhists, are contradictory, one of another. If it is suggested that arguments of a different kind can be advanced to sustain the Sankhya thesis, and that these will be free from the errors of those mentioned above, the answer is that even these may be disproved by some cleverer logician. The inconclusiveness of logical reasoning continues to be a major obstacle to the establishment of the conclusion that the pradhana is the cause of the world. Thus the Brahman, even though different from the world, is still its cause and source. (Pages 309-330). 1xxx SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 4 In the next section, which consists only of Sutra 13, it is pointed out that other unacceptable views are also disposed of by the refutation of the Sankhya. These include those of the Vaiseshikas, the Naiyayikas, the Jainas and the Buddhists. Even though all of them believe in the atoms as the cause of the world, their atomic theories are mutually contradictory. So mere logic cannot satisfac- torily account for the world, nor can it be taken as dis- proving the Brahman to be the cause of the world. (Pages 330-332). The objection that the Brahman, being different from the world, cannot be its cause, has been sought to be over- come by bringing in the relationship of body and soul between the two. Now, the Sankhya asks the question: if the Brahman is the possessor of a body, He cannot avoid, any more than the individual self, experiencing the pleasures and pains arising from such possession. The reply to it is given in Sutra 14, which constitutes a section by itself, the Bhoktrā pattyadhikaraṇa. The point now brought forward is to be distinguished from what has been already disposed of under Ved. Süt. (I. 2. 8). There it has been shown that the Brahman, by reason of His being present in the heart as the object of worship, does not experience the pleasures and pains of the worshipper. The reasons for the Brahman and the individual self being present inside the body of the worshipper are different. Here it is argued that, if the Brahman is associated with a body as its lord, then, just as in the case of an embodied individual self, He cannot avoid experiencing pleasures and pains. Scripture is quoted to show that such experience is inevitable so long as there is possession of a body. The Sutra replies to this. The experience of pleasures and pains by the individual self is due to the harmony or disharmony of the humours of the body. This results, not from his possession of a body, but from his past karmas Adhik. VI, Sut. 15-20] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxxxi in the form of merit and demerit. The quoted scriptural passage applies only to a body acquired under the influence of karma. Elsewhere, scripture refers to the bodies of the freed souls, and they do not experience pleasures and pains like bound souls. Is it then necessary to say that the Supreme Self, who is devoid of evil and has not the slightest trace of contact with karma, cannot be tainted by imperfec- tion or misery, even though He has the whole universe for His body? The Sutra refers to the analogy of experience in the’ world. This may be taken to point out what happens when a king’s orders are obeyed and transgressed. Rewards and punishments follow, but the pleasures and pains arising from these do not result to the king because he has a body. Dramiḍa in his Bhashya says that the Lord is like a king who is protected from discomforts even in an uncom- fortable place, who gets enjoyable things and who protects his subjects. Thus the Lord is not affected by the evils of the world. The essential nature of the Lord is not affected by the creation or the dissolution of the universe. Sankara, Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa take the distinction mentioned in the Sutra to be that between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment. By examples like those of the ocean, the wave and the foam, this distinction is sought to be established. Rāmānuja points out that none of these schools can consistently make this objection and answer it. (Pages 332-337). The two sections following the Vilakshaṇatvādhi- karana were either complementary or incidental. We have now to go back to it. There a reply has been given to the objection of the Sankhya that the Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because it is different from Him. It has been pointed out that the world is in one sense identical with the Brahman. This is based on the assumption that the effect is only the cause transformed II S.B. xii lxxxii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 and that therefore there is identity between cause and effect. Now this assumption is challenged by the followers of Kanāda. Their criticism is examined in the next section, the Arambhaṇādhikaraṇa, consisting of aphorisms 15 to 20. While the main critic in this section is the Vaiseshika school of Kanāda, Rāmānuja allows the discussion to cover a wide range. The theories of Sankara, Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa about cause and effect are also considered. Even differences of opinion among the followers of Sankara are noticed. The grand debate starts with a statement of Kaṇāda’s views about the fundamental difference between cause and effect. The Advaitin replies that there is nothing other than the cause, all effects being unreal. Certain difficulties in this position are sought to be explained by those followers of Sankara who locate ignorance in the individual self. They are in turn criticised by other followers of Sankara who locate ignorance in the Brahman. Kaņāda replies to these, and re-affirms his position. Rāmānuja then proceeds to refute him with the aid of scripture and logic. Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa are also refuted as holding untenable views. We have thus a critical enquiry which recalls the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa in Chapter I, proceeding sometimes on parallel lines and sometimes striking out new paths of reasoning. The theory of the identity of cause and effect is attacked by Kaṇāda on eight grounds. He points out that the notions of cause and effect are different. So too are the words descriptive of them. Again, their shapes are not the same, and in number they vary. The form of the pot is not that of clay; and while threads are many, the cloth is one. Moreover, the effect exists at a time subsequent to the cause. They cannot both exist at the same time. The effect is produced by work done on the cause by an agent. This work will be unnecessary if the cause and the effect are identical. Cause and effect also serve different purposes. Clay cannot fetch water from a well, nor can aAdhik. VI, Sūt. 15-20] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 1xxxiii wall be built with a pot. Finally, if the effect is existent in the cause, there will be no non-eternal things. Some possible objections to this position are also disposed of in advance. The theory that the activity of the agent helps in the manifestation of an effect previously latent in the cause is shown to have logical difficulties. For instance, the world is a collection of manifest things or effects. Their causes must be other manifest things, and they too would require other manifest things, and so on ad infinitum. If the manifestation of the effect has an origin, it is tantamount to saying that the effect is non- existent in the cause. The activity of the agent becomes meaningful, only if it is regarded as bringing into existence a non-existent effect from a cause which has a fitness for producing that effect. (Pages 337-340). The Advaitin here comes forward to attack the Vaiseshika. He declares that the effect is identical with the cause because nothing other than the cause really exists. Every effect and the way in which it is practically realised are founded. on ignorance. For instance, pots, dishes etc., made from elay are unreal, because they are excluded from perception one after another. The clay alone is real, because it persists all through. Similarly, the Brahman who is pure existence devoid of attributes, is alone real. The universe which is His effect is unreal. Again, unreality being that which is liable to be stultified by knowledge, the world is neither a real entity like the Brahman, nor a non-entity like the horns of a hare. Moreover, what is called the effect is incapable of logical definition. It is not possible to say that the effect is produced by the causal substance either in its unmodified condition or after the assumption of any particular condition. Nor is the logical difficulty overcome by suggesting that the unmodified cause, in association with a particular time,, place or instrumental cause, produces the effect. All the differences between the cause and the effect lxxxiv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II,Part 1 listed by the objector have an erroneous basis, as when silver is mistakenly perceived in the mother-of-pearl. Hence, the effect, regarded as something other than the cause, is unreal. The whole world, being an effect other than the Brahman, its cause, is unreal. This conclusion is supported by the scripture, and hence would prevail against perception, were that necessary. But perception also has pure existence for its object. (Pages 340-347). Greanted that the world is unreal, how to account for the individual self? The Brahman Himself having assumed the condition of the individual self, the latter is not unreal. But then the pains and pleasures of all are not experienced by each individual self. Moreover, there are distinctions between the individual self and the Lord, between the bound and the released selves, and so on. A school of Advatins, who locate ignorance in the individual self, now come forward to explain the position. The distinctions among individual selves are determined by particular limiting adjuncts. A conditional impurity attaches to them, and they become the abodes of ignorance. The state of the individual self and the stream of illusion are beginningless. The analogy is given of one face being reflected in gems, swords, mirrors etc., which may be big or small, pure or impure, and so on. (Pages 347-349). Another school of Advaitins, who locate ignorance in the Brahman, criticise this view as an attempt to seek the favour of dualists. Is ignorance to be located in the fictitious form of the individual self, or in the Brahman as having this form? It cannot be the former, because all things other than the Brahman are unreal and non- intelligent, and ignorance can be located only in something which is intelligent. Again, how can ignorance create the form of the jiva, and at the same time be located in the Brahman qualified by this form? Adhik. VI, Sūt. 15-20] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxxxv If a single ignorance is responsible for the existence of all individual selves, the rise of true knowledge in one individual self will bring about the emancipation of all. The assumption of varieties of ignorance corresponding to each individual self does not save the situation. The ignorance which produces the individual self cannot be in it, but must be elsewhere, that is, in the Brahman. To say that the ignorance in a prior individual self manufactures a posterior individual self leads to the momentariness of the individual self and other difficulties. Moreover, the rise of true knowledge will then mean the destruction of the essence of the individual self. The analogy of the reflected face regards the mirror as the limiting adjunct. The appearance of smallness and other evils cannot result to the face or its reflection, because both these are non-intelligent. The appearance of manifoldness must result to the Brahman. As He is one indivisible uniform mass, He cannot see the individual selves without the help of ignorance. These difficulties cannot be overcome by making a distinction between maya and avidya, and attributing māyā, the means of deceiving others, to the Brahman, and avidyd, the means of self-deception, to the jiva. There is no point in the Brahman having maya, if He cannot see others, and He cannot see others except with the help of avidya. Other attempts to distinguish mayd and avidya also fail. Nothing is gained by saying that māyā shows unreal things to be unreal, while avidya is the cause of false perception. Nor is there any point in the view that avidya gives rise to the perception of things at once unreal and undesirable, while māyā does not lead to the perception of undesirable things by the Brahman. Moreover, an eternal and unreal maya is of no use to the Brahman. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Brahman Himself, divided into various parts by the beginningless avidyā associated with Himself, perceives manifoldness as existent within Himself. The definite lxxxvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 distinctions of the bound and the free, the teacher and the pupil etc., arise from illusion as in the case of dream- perception. It is enough if there is one avidya to account for all fictitiously assumed things. This conclusion is set out in four syllogisms. All distinctions such as that between bondage and freedom or that between oneself and another, are manufactured by ignorance and are unreal like dreams. One’s soul animates all bodies, which are all manufactured by ignorance. All intelligent things are one’s own self. After thus answering the Advaitins who locate ignorance in the individual self, the other school of Advaitins go on to attack Kaņāda on two other grounds. If the individual selves are many, all of them should have been liberated; for the past periods of time known as kalpas are infinite. Being differentiated, the selves possess the quality of number, and like pots etc., they must be deemed to be non-intelligent. The second objection is that the existence of anything other than the Brahman affects His infinity, which is declared in the scriptures. Being limited as a thing implies origination and destruction, and these will have to be predicated of the Brahman. Hence it is concluded that the Brahman, under the influence of beginningless ignorance, becomes the seat of the superimposition in the form of the world. Nothing other than the Brahman being real, the world is identical with Him. (Pages 349-362). The school of Kaṇāda now proceeds to reply in detail to the second group of Advaitins. At the outset, attention is invited to one of the seven objections advanced by Rāmānuja against Advaita under the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa. It goes by the name of Tirodhānānupapatti, and points out that the Brahman, who is devoid of attributes and is mere self-luminousness, cannot have His luminosity concealed, without suffering the destruction of His essential nature. Adhik. VI, Sut. 15-20] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 1xxvii It is wrong to argue that effects are unreal because they are excluded from consciousness, one after another. The logical exclusion of a thing seen at one place and time from another place and time does not stultify its reality. Nor is it right to maintain that effects, being perceived for a limited time between their birth and their destruction, are not describable either as entities or as non-entities, and are hence unreal. The unreality of a thing can be proved only by the stultification of its perception at the time and place it has been perceived and not at any other time and place. In the latter case, it is shown to be non-eternal, and not unreal. How is the effect produced? An unmodified cause in association with time, place and such auxiliaries, produces the effect. This association with time, place etc. is dependent on other causes like God’s will, karma eto., and not on the cause or its modification. In an effect like the mystic crass of gold, the cause or gold is certainly seen. But the effect is also established to be different by differences in ideas, words, etc. relating to cause and effect. The syllogisms of ihe Advaitin are now attacked. One soul cannot animate all bodies, because the experi- ences of all are not found in one; and to attribute variety in experience to the non-intelligent internal organ of sense is improper. Bodies are not manufactured by ignorance, because they are unstultified and therefore real. From matter being uniformly non-intelligent, all intelligent selves cannot be said to be identical, because their experi- ences are different. One’s own self cannot ensoul all bodies, because Advaita has no use for concepts like “I’, ‘you’ etc. If all things other than pure intelligence are unreal, then all efforts to win release are futile. The knowledge prompting it is itself ignorance, or is located in a knower manufactured by ignorance, or is derived from a teacher1xxxviii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 or a scriptural sentence similarly produced. The Brahman who is thus sought to be known cannot but be unreal. To say that the pure attributeless Brahman is self- luminous does not prove the Advaitin’s case. Conscious- ness is said to be self-luminous only because perception brings external objects to the light of consciousness. Nor can the Brahman be the witness of ignorance or the projector of ignorance; it is only a particular knower who can witness or project. The Advaitin’s argument about real effects springing from unreal causes is undermined by his allowing only limited and empirical reality to them. The Brahman, even though known from knowledge relating to unreal things, cannot be said to be real because there is no subsequent stultification. For knowledge based on error cannot establish anything to be real. If the negation of the attributes of the Brahman is later than their affirmation, the negation of even the attributeless Brahman by the nihilist is later still. The scripture has already been shown not to support Advaita. So, too, perception. Hence it is clear that knowledge is in a real knower and that it proves particular things. Part of this knowledge rests on an erroneous basis, and such error is real. Only thus can we distinguish the real from the unreal, or have any practical transactions. Taking the world to be an unreal superimposition, the Advaitin seeks a real basis for it in the Brahman. Errors, however, can arise even from an unreal basis as from unreal misleading causes etc. This particular argument therefore is not of much use. The existence of many individual selves has been denied on the ground that they should all have been redeemed because there have been an infinite number of kalpas in the past. But then the selves are also infinite in number. They possess the quality of number only in Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE lxxxix relation to the limiting adjuncts of space and time. Differentiation does not make them non-intelligent, because it cannot endow them with the attributes of a different class of things. Distinction among pots does not make them cloth. The limitation of the Brahman as a definite thing does not detract from His infinity. Variations of things in regard to limitations of time and place are not connected with their limitations as things. Hence the existence of other things does not negative the association of the Brahman with all time and place, which is arrived at by other means. Moreover, the Advaitin himself has to accept the distinction of the Brahman from ignorance, and thereby concede that He is limited as a thing. To speak of the absence of limitation as a thing is indeed to speak of the horns of a hare. So the Vaiseshika concludes that the effect is real and different from the cause. The world, being an effect of the Brahman, is different from Him. (Pages 362-375). This is the purvapaksha, which this section seeks to controvert. Sutra 15 cites a well known passage from the Chhand. Up. in refutation. In the context, Svetaketu is taught by his father about the Brahman. Asked whether he has learnt from his teacher about that Ruler by knowing whom everything becomes known, Svetaketu feels nonplussed. He wonders how by knowing one thing everything can become known. The examples of clay and pots, of gold and ornaments, of iron and scissors etc. are brought to his notice. Here the knowledge of the material cause is seen to result in know- ledge of all its effects. But Svetaketu still remains unconvinced. He sees only the difference between clay and pots, and not their identity. So, he is further taught that pots are real as clay. For the sake of practical use, the clay is made to assume a certain shape, and in this condition it is given a name. Thus we have the pot. But II S.B. xiii KC SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 really the pot is only clay. It is not that the pot is unreal and the clay alone is real; but the pot is a state or condition of clay. This is taught to Svetaketu in the statement: “Modification, (as also) name, is attained (by clay) for the sake of speech (followed by action); it is all real only as clay.” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 4). Other passages both before and after bear this out. The Vaiseshika argument that the pot is realised as destroyed even while the clay is in existence is set aside on the ground that production and destruction are merely particular conditions of the causal substance. This accounts for differences of ideas and words between the cause and its effects. The activity of the agent is also seen to have scope, as on it depends the attainment of a parti- cular condition by the causal substance. This view also explains how the effect is existent in the cause. The effect is accepted to be real, as against the advaitin, but it is non-different from the cause. The example of the clay and the pot is applied to the Brahman and the world. The Supreme Brahman, during pralaya, has for His body the intelligent and non- intelligent things in a state so subtle that they cannot be distinguished from Him. Then, there is creation, when He has for His body the intelligent and non-intelligent things in a gross condition and differentiated by names and forms. Differentiation by means of names and forms takes place by the entry into the non-intelligent thing of the individual self which has the Brahman for its self. The Brahman also remains as the self of the non-intelligent thing associated with the intelligent self. Thus all the modifications and the erroneous aims of life are in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form His body; and the Brahman remains devoid of evil and a mine of auspicious qualities. It is in this sense that non-indentity is negatived and identity taught as between the world which is the effect and the Supreme Brahman who is the cause. (Pages 375-384). Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xci Rāmānuja then proceeds to deal with the views of Sankara, Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa about the scriptural statement of identity between the world and the Brahman. Sankara holds that such identity results through the effect being unreal. The cause alone is real, and it endures as the basis of the unreal effect. Rāmānuja says that this view does not accept identity in the strict sense. Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa admit the effect to be real and identical with the cause. The former believes that the identity between the individual self and the Brahman is natural, while the distinction between them is due to limiting adjuncts. As between the Brahman and the non-intelligent things, both identity and distinction are natural. This amounts to saying that no entities exist other than the Brahman and the limiting adjuncts. Hence the Brahman Himself must be regarded as undergoing modifications in the form of evil, and this is against the scriptures which maintain distinctions between Him, the intelligent self and the non-intelligent thing. Yadavaprakasa thinks that Pure Existence is the causal Brahman. In creation a part of Him changes into the intelligent selves, non-intelligent matter and the controlling Lord. All these are made up of Pure Existence; and so there is identity between the Brahman who is the cause and the world which is the effect. Ramanuja declares that this view is against both reason and scripture. He quotes from the Upanishads, the Mahabhārata, the Manu Smriti and the Vishņu-Purāņa to show that Pure Existence can be none other than Nārāyaṇa, who is full of auspicious qualities. Moreover, existence has to be regarded as an attribute of things: it cannot be either a substance or a cause. Thus identity is established between the Brahman who is the cause and the world which is the effect, in the manner set out by Rāmānuja, and in no other way is it possible. (Pages 375-391). The Vaiseshika now raises a xcii SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 fresh objection. Differences in words and ideas occur both when a single substance undergoes changes of state and when we deal with different substances. In Sutra 16, it is pointed out by way of reply that differences of state alone can be indicated when the effect is recognised in the causal substance. Nor can the cause and the effect be said to be two entities of the same class because two entities are not seen at one time. If they are two substances, the re- cognition of the cause in the effect is not possible. In the scorpion produced from cowdung, though the cause is not seen, the substance of earth which forms the first cause of cowdung is seen. In smoke, fire is not seen because fire is not its cause, but only wet fuel: and the odour of fuel is perceived in the smoke. Moreover, the effect is also recognised in the cause both in the world and in the scriptures. Looking at pots, we say that they were clay earlier in the day. The scripture says that all this world was only Sat in the beginning. From these, the non-existence of the effect at an earlier time may be made out. The scripture also declares that Non-existence was in the beginning. But non-existence is only an attribute. The pots were non-existent earlier in the sense that the clay was then in a different condition. The Non-existence from which the scripture derives the world is only the Brahman with His body in a subtle, undifferentiated condition. Sutras 19 and 20 further make the point clear by citing two examples. Just as the threads become the cloth having a different name and form, and just as the element of air becomes the fivefold vital air in the body, so too the Brahman becomes the world. The identity between the Brahman and the world thus established is questioned further by the Vaiseshika in the next section, the Itaravayapadeśādhikarana comprising aphorisms 21 to 23. If the Brahman is identical with the individual self, why does He create a world in which that self suffers misery? Understanding identity in the advaiticAdhik. VII, Süt. 21-23] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xciii sense, he argues that the difficulty above-mentioned applies to the views of Bhaskara, of those who believe the individual self to be associated with ignorance and of those who believe the Brahman to be so associated. The next two Sutras give the reply. The Brahman is taught also to be different from the individual self in the scriptures. It is the latter who is liable to be afflicted by miseries. Even as the inanimate stone cannot be regarded as having the same nature as the Brahman, the individual self also cannot be said to be so. But, as already established in the aphorism referring to Kāsakritsna’s views about the abidance of the Supreme Self in the individual self (I. 4. 22), there is a grammatical equation between two distinct entities on account of the one being the self of the other. Thus the world posesses the character of the effect of the Brahman and also the character of being identical with Him. Rāmānuja then proceeds to reply to the advaitins’ interpretation of this adhikaraṇa. They too grant that the Brahman is here spoken of as different from the embodied self. The question then arises whether the Brahman who is different is associated with or dissociated from ignorance. Rāmānuja argues that neither alternative can be satisfactorily established. Indeed, the purport of the whole section is to establish the relationship of cause and effect between two entirely distinct things. (Pages 398-405). Granted that the Brahman is the cause of the world; how can He create without having a collection of materials and instruments to help Him in the work? Even a skilful potter or weaver cannot make a pot or a piece of cloth without having the potter’s wheel, the loom etc. The only difference between a capable agent and others is that he can produce things with the help of instruments and materials, while others cannot do so even when provided with them. This doubt is disposed of in the ensuing xciv SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 section, known as the Upasamhāradarŝanādhikaraṇa (aphorisms 24-25). creation resembles the Milk is transformed into instruments or materials. The answer shortly is that production of curds from milk. curds without the help of any Similarly, the gods in their worlds create what they want merely by their will. Even so the Supreme Person creates the whole universe by His will. (Pages 406-408). The example of the transformation of milk into curds suggests another objection to the Sankhya. When curds are produced from a given quantity of milk, the whole of the milk undergoes the change. So, when the world is created by the Brahman, the whole of the Brahman must be used up in the world. If it is said that only a part of the Brahman is so used up, it goes against the scriptural texts which make out the Brahman to be indivisible. It may be said that the Brahman having the intelligent selves and the non-intelligent matter in a subtle condition as His body becomes the Brahman with the intelligent and non- intelligent things in a gross condition as His body. Even here, it cannot be denied that part of the embodied Brahman forms the effect and has undergone changes. This question is the subject of the ninth section, Kritsnapra saktyadhikarana (aphorisms 26-31). The answer to this is that the Brahman is stated to be both indivisible and the cause of the world in the scriptures. What is stated there has to be understood exactly according to the statements made. In a matter where the sole means of knowledge is the scripture, and which is outside the range of worldly experience, logical objections arising from such experience are irrelevant. Non-intelligent things are different from one another; and they are all different from the intelligent selves. Just as varied qualities are seen in these, even so the Brahman who is different from all things else has peculiar qualities of His own. They are above all logical contradictions, and they account Adhik. X, Süt. 32-36] AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE xcv for His producing the world, and yet remaining indivisible and unchangeable. But the objections raised by the Sankhya against the Vedanta affect him. How can the indivisible pradhana produce the world? It consists of sattva, rajas and tamas, or is produced by them. In the former case, the indivisible sattva etc. cannot produce gross effects. If they are said to produce the pradhana, then the latter ceases to be the ultimate cause. Moreover, the analysis of the world into 24 principles will also be set aside, and additional principles admitted. (Pages Thus the Brahman alone can be the cause of the world. All the wonderful powers needed for this are specifically declared by the scriptures as associated with Him. Even without organs of sense, He can act. 408-414). But why should He act? He has obtained all desires; and none does anything except to realise some purpose for himself or others. The Brahman has no purpose to serve, so far as He is concerned; and by creating a world full of misery, He is not serving any purposes of others. This problem is discussed in the tenth and last section of this pāda of Chapter II in aphorisms 32 to 36, constituting the Prayojanavattvādhikaraṇa. Sūtra 33 declares that creation etc. are mere sport for the Brahman. A great king can almost be described as one who has all his desires satisfied; still he plays with balls and such other things. In a similar way the Brahman indulges in play. Even if this be granted, the objector goes on, the Brahman, viewed as the cause of the world, ceases to be perfect on other grounds. Inequalities in creation indicate either partiality or cruelty on His part. That would be true, Sutra 34 answers, if creation were the result of caprice. But the Brahman creates having in view the karmas of individual souls. Now the further objection is raised that there can be no individual souls nor karma during pralaya. The xcvi SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 4 Brahman alone then exists. No, says Sutra 35. In pralaya there is no differentiation by name and form. But both the souls and the streams of karma are beginningless. This is declared in the scriptures. So, it is concluded that the Brahman possesses all the qualities needed for being the cause of the world, and is the cause. (Pages 416-420). The Brahman having been established as the cause of the world in the first Chapter of the Vedanta-Sutras, the first part of the second Chapter deals with criticisms of this conclusion. In the first two sections, the views of two respected authorities, Kapila and Hiranyagarbha, which at variance with the Vedanta, are canvassed and set aside. In the other eight sections, different arguments against the Brahman being the cause, mostly based on independent reasoning and logic, are examined and refuted. The Sutras are now ready to take the offensive in the philosophical debate. 11 eft: 11 SRI-BHASHYA CHAPTER I PART II ADHIKARANA I. SARVATRAPRASIDDHYADHIKARANA. It has been stated in the first part (of the first chapter in the first adhikaraṇa) that in order to enter successfully upon (the study of) the Science (of the Brahman), a person who has learnt the Vedas and obtained that knowledge of the true nature of (ritualistic) works, which results from the study of the Karma-Mimāmsā, has to realize (first) the finite and impermanent character of the results of mere works (performed without knowledge of the Brahman); then he has to feel the desire for final release which has the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit, and is called into existence by (the knowledge of) the true. nature of the Brahman and His worship, both of which are, at first sight, made out from Vedantic passages to be capable of yielding infinite and eternal results; and then he has to understand well that the power of words is to denote such things as are naturally and of themselves under- stood,414 and (thence) to conclude definitely that Vedantic passages certainly form the means of knowing the Highest Brahman: and then he may begin the study of that Mimāmsā of the Embodied, (i.e., of the Brahman), which
See Vol. I. pp. 215-229, wherein the Prabbaharas who object to this view are refuted2 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Port II, treats of the proper ways and means to be adopted in arriving at such (a conclusion). It has also been declared (therein in the second adhikarana) that the scriptural passage beginning with- “From whom, indeed, all these beings are born” (Taitt. Up. III. 1. 1.)-teaches (us) to know the Highest Brahman to be the only cause of the great bliss of salvation and also (the only cause) of the origin, preservation and destruction of the whole world, which is made up of countless and varied moveable and immoveable things that may be classified as the enjoyer, the instrument of enjoyment and the home of enjoyment. We have maintained (in the third adhikarana) that the Highest Brahman, who is the only cause of the world, is capable of being known solely by means of the Scripture, for the reason that He cannot be known by al the other means of knowledge. We have further stated (in) the fourth adhikarana) that, even though Vedantic pass- ages (describing the Brahman) are not connected with any activity or cessation from activity (on our part), the position, that the Scripture (which, according to the Mimāmsakas, is solely concerned with enjoining particular forms of activity or cessation from activity) forms the means of proving the Brahman, is satisfactorily established by the accordant interpretation (of those same Vedantic passagest as referring to the Highest Brahman, who constitutes, by His very nature, the highest object of human pursuit. We have also explained (in the fourth adhikaraṇa) that the Brahman, who is to be known by means of the Vedanta as forming the sole cause of the whole world, is, on accoun of the association (with Him) of ‘seeing’ (ie., thinking, or willing) and other such attributes (mentioned in the later aphorisms of the adhikarana), undoubtedly a particular intelligent Being who is a distinct entity from the Pradhana (i.e., material Nature) which may be made out by the logical process of inference (to be the cause of the Adik. I, Sut. 1] OBJECTOR’S VIEW 3 world, when so considered). Again, we have also estab- lished (in the sixth adhikaraṇa) that He (viz., that particular intelligent Being) is an entity distinct from that other entity which is denoted by the word ‘jiva’, (i.e., the individual soul) and which is subject (as such) to the two conditions of bondage and release; because, among other things, He possesses, of His own nature, (that) bliss and (that) omniscience which are unsurpassed in excellence, and is the cause of fear and of freedom from fear to all individual souls, and He wills the truth, and constitutes the Internal Self of all intelligent and non-intelligent beings. We have also explained (therein in the seventh adhikarana) that He possesses a divine form which is peculiar to Him, is non-material and is not caused by karma 415 (as the result of past actions). We have upheld (in the eighth and ninth adhikaraṇas) that it is He alone who is, as if well-known, pointed out to be the cause of the world by means of ‘Akāśa’, ‘Prāṇa’, and other such words (denoting particular non-intelligent things) and who is possessed (thus) of characteristics different from those that belong to all other intelligent and non-intelligent things. We have maintained (also in the tenth adhikaraṇa) that what is denoted by the word Light, and is (said to be) possessed of that unsurpassable splendour which is peculiar to the Highest Reality, is none other than Himself; because that (Light) is recognised to be in association with the highest heaven. We have further declared (in the eleventh and last adhikaṛana) that the Highest Person, who forms the means of attaining that immortality which is peculiar to Him who is the Final Cause (of all things by reason of His being able to give it to others), is Himself denoted by ‘Indra’ and other words, in accordance with the import of the Scriptures.
The idea is that the indivi- dual self gets materially embodied for the purpose of enjoying the good, and suffering from the bad results of activities gone through in previous births, while the divine form of the Lord is not at all due to any such cause. 4 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II Therefore, it has been, in this manner, pointed out (in the first part of the first chapter) that He who is taught in the Vedanta is none other than Nārāyaṇa, who is beyond the sphere within which all other means of knowledge (than the scripture) operate, and who is quite distinct from all things other than Himself by reason of His being an ocean of infinite noble qualities, such as the quality of willing the truth, etc., etc. Hereafter, in the second, third and fourth parts, (first of all) a doubt is raised to the effect that, although what is taught in the Vedanta is none other than the Brahman, nevertheless, a few Vedantic passages certainly (seem to) relate to the exposition of the true nature of certain things which may be brought under the heads of the Pradhana (ie., material Nature) and the kshetrajña (i.e., the individual soul); and then by way of removing that (doubt), it is pointed out that the Brahman (Himself) is (alone) the mine of all those auspicious qualities which are mentioned in each of such passages. Among such passages, those that refer with indistinct characteristics to the soul and such other things are discussed in the second part; those that refer with distinct characteristics to (such) things, in the third part; and those that seem to deal directly with those various things (are discussed) in the fourth part. Sutra 1. सर्वत्रप्रसिद्धोपदेशात् Sarvatraprasiddhopadeśāt. (33) In all this, (it is the Brahman Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught. It is declared in the Chhandogya :-“Now, indeed, (this) person is characterised by worship. Just as a person’s Adhik. I, Süt. 1] OBJECTOR’S VIEW 5 worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next. Let him perform worship. He is manomaya (i.e., mind-made); He has life (prana) for His body, light for His form &c., &c.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1 & 2. et. seq.)415 Here it is understood that the object of the worship enjoined in the statement-“Let him perform worship” is indicated in the sentence-” (He is) manomaya; He has life (prāṇa) for His body.” It being so, the doubt arises whether He, who possesses the qualities of being manomaya (mind-made) etc., is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self.417 Why? Because mind and life (prāṇa) form the implements of the individu- al self; and because also they are negated in relation to the Supreme Self in the passage-“Indeed, He is without life, without mind.” (Mund Up. II. 1. 2.). Moreover, the Brahman indicated in the earlier part (of the passage under reference) by the statement-“All this, indeed, is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1) cannot be connected here as forming the object of worship; because that
The context here is Chhand. Up. (III. 14. 1 to 4): “All this, indeed, is the Brahman, because all this is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him; let him perform worship being tranquilled, Now, indeed, (this) person is made of worship. Just as a person’s worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next. Let him perform worship. He is mind-made, has life for His body, light for His form, wills the truth, is like the ākās’a, is all- action, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropri- ated all this (set of qualities) and is speechless and unanxious. He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or than a mustard seed, or than a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed; He is my Self within the heart whe is greater than the earth, greater than the regions of space, greater than Heaven, great- er than all these worlds. He is all-action, is all desires, all olours. all tastes, has appropri- ated all this (set of qualities) and is spechless and unanxious; He is my Self within the heart, He is the Brahman. After departing from this world, I attain unto Him. He who has this conviction, to him there is no doubt. So said Sandilya, (so said) Saṇḍilya “.
This purvapakshin here and later may be a follower of Nirisvara Sankhya. He may be regarded as putting forward a hypothetical objection without himself accepting the interpreta. tion of the text suggested by him. 6 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II (statement) is made with the object of giving the teaching of the Brahman being the Self (of all)-(the teaching) which is the means of acquiring that tranquillity which is helpful in the performance of the worship enjoined in the statement-“Let a man meditate, after being tranquilled.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1.) And again, it is not right to say that, for the reason that the worship enjoined in the statement-“Let him perform worship “–requires an object of worship, the Brahman, though mentioned in a different (portion of the) passage, has to be taken as being referred to (here), because there is (really) no such desideratum, inasmuch as He who possesses the quality of being manomaya, etc., is mentioned in the self-same passage (as forming the object of worship); and because also both the desiderata418 are capable of being well-supplied by a mere change in the grammatical case in reference to that which is pointed out in the statement-“He is manomaya; he has life (prāṇa) for his body”-to be nothing other (than what is referred to in the passage itself, viz., the individual self). It having been thus determined that it is (merely) the individual self which (is referred to here), it is finally arrived at that the word ‘Brahman’ also, mentioned in the concluding part (of the passage) to the effect-“This is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 4)-is used as a term of respect to denote the individual self itself. If it be so held, we reply-“In all this (it is the Brahman Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught” (Ved. Sut. 1. 2. 1). That which possesses the attribute of being
The two desiderata are (i) the need for a worshipper for performing the worship enjoined in the scripural injunction, and (ii) the need of an object of wor- ship for an injunction to worship.Adhik. X. Sūt, 1] REFUTING THE OBJECTOR 7 m ind-made’ and other such attributes is the Highest Self Why? ‘In all this’, that is, in the Vedanta, it is only in relation to the Highest Brahman that the well-known attributes of being ‘mind-made’ etc., are taught. Indeed, the attribute of being ‘mind-made’ and other such attributes are (all) well-known as belonging to the Brahman, as, for instance, in the following passages :-“He who is mind-made is the Lord who has life for His body” (Mund. Up. II. 2. 7); “It is ākāśa (or ether) that is within the heart. In that (ākāśa) there is that Person who is mind- made, who is immortal and brilliant as gold” (Taitt. Up. I. 6. 1): “He (the Lord) is apprehended by the heart, by steady wisdom, and by the mind. Those who know Him become immortal” (Kath. Up. VI. 9); “He (i.e., the Lord,) is not apprehended by the eye nor even by speech.” (Mund. Up. III. 1. 8); “But He (the Lord) is apprehended by the pure mind “.(?) Similarly, (they are made out to be His) in the follow- ing and other passages-“He is the Life of life” (Ken. Up. 1. 2.); “Now indeed the omniscient Self who is Prāņa Himself firmly takes hold of this body and makes it rise up” (Kaush. Up. III. I.); “All these beings certainly enter into the Prana (to be absorbed into it), they are evolved out of the Prana” (Chhänd. Up. I. 11. 5.). To be ‘mind-made’ is to be capable of being apprehended by the purified mind. To have life for the body is to be the support of life as well as to be its controller. And this being the case, the word ‘Brahman’, also occurring in the passage “This Self exists within my heart……He is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3 & 4.)-is undoubtedly used in its primary and natural significance. The passage- “Indeed, He has no life, no mind” (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2)- denies, in relation to the Brahman, that He has such know. ledge as is dependent upon the mind, or has such existence as is dependent upon life. 8 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1. Part II. Or (the sutra may be interpreted thus):419 In this very context, by means of the passage” All this, indeed, is the Brahman, because it is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him and lives by Him: tet a man meditate, being tranquilled.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1)-meditation is enjoined to the effect that, after acquiring tranquillity, one should meditate on the Brahman as the Self of all. The sentence-“Let Him perform worship” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1) is a re-statement, made with the object of authoritatively declaring the qualities of that same (Brahman). And the qualities that have to be so authori- tatively declared are the quality of being ‘mind-made’ and other such qualities. Therefore, the meaning of the whole passage (under reference) is to the effect that one should worship the Brahman, who is the Self of all as the possessor of the attribute of being ‘mind-made’ and of other such attributes. Here the doubt arises whether it is the individual self or the Supreme Self that is pointed out in this passage by the word ‘Brahman.’ It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? Because it is only that (self) which can be appropriately denoted by means of the grammatical equation with the word ‘all’. Indeed, what is pointed out by the word ‘all’ is the whole world beginning with (the four-faced) Brahma (and going) downwards to a clump of grass. And the individual self may certainly acquire the character of the four-faced Brahmâ and other objects, consequent upon the (operation of the) limiting conditions due to such special karmas
Ramanuja now gives an alternative commentary on the sutra. Till now he hasbeen put- ting forward in his own words th: point of view adopted by Sankara in his commentary on this aphor- ism. Now he offers an explana- tion which has the support of Bodhayana, the Vrittikara, Here the entire section, Chhandogya Upanishad (I.I. 14) is taken as the context, where as to Sankara the opening sentence deals with a different topic. It may be added that Ramanuja gives only the second explanation in Vedanta- Sara and Vedantadipa, his two other commentaries on the Vedanta-sutras. Adhik. I, Süt. 1] VRITTIKARA’S VIEW 9 as are caused by the beginninglessly old ignorance (or avidya). But, in relation to the Highest Brahman who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is devoid of sin and free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil, such as ignorance, etc., it is not appropriate to predicate the characteristic of (His) being all things, which (necessarily) implies (His being) the abode of all that is evil. Occasionally, the word ‘Brahman’ is found to be used to denote the individual self also. It is for this reason alone that the Highest Lord is here and there specially mentioned with a qualification, as in the instances of Paramātman (the Highest Self) and Param Brahman (the Supreme Brahman). Moreover, the individual self, when freed from all limiting conditions, acquires greatness (brihattva, so as to make him become fit to be denoted by the word ‘brahman’), because the Scripture says:-“He (i.e., the freed individual self) also becomes fit for infinity (i.e., immortality).” (Švet. Up. V. 9). As the origin, preservation and destruction of the world are due to his (i.e., that self’s) own karma, when he is subject to ignorance (or avidya), it is appropriate to describe him as the cause (of the world), in accordance with the (scriptural) statement-” All this is born out of him, is absorbed into him, and lives by him.” (Chhānd. Up. III. 14. 1.) Hence the meaning (of the passage under discussion) is this: This individual self is, of his own nature, the brahman, when his essential nature comes to be unconditioned; and owing to the beginninglessly old ignorance (or avidya), he is found to exist in the form of gods, animals, men and immovable things. To this it is replied “In all this (it is the Brahman Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught.” (Ved. Sut. I. 2. 1.). “In all this,” that is, in the whole world pointed out by the statement-“All this (is the Brahman) indeed”-what is declared by the word ‘Brahman’, as forming the Self of that (world), is the Highest Brahman Himself, but not the II. S.B.-2 10 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Part II " individual self. Why? “Because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught “–because, by reason of the statement that ‘(all this is) born in Him, is absorbed into Him and lives by Him’, it is taught, as if well-known, that all this, indeed, is the Brahman’. It is said that the whole of this world, which has the Brahman for its Self, is indeed the Brahman, for the reason that it is born out of the Brahman, is absorbed into the Brahman, and is dependent upon the Brahman for its existence; it is understood here that that (Being) is the Brahman who is prominently taught in the Vedanta to be the source of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world. And that Being is the Highest Brahman Himself. Accordingly, in connection with the passage which begins with " (He) from whom indeed all these beings are born, by whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they go when they perish, do you desire to know that (Being) well; that is the Brahman (Taitt. Up. III. 1. 1.)-it has been shown by means of the statement beginning with “Let him know the Ananda (or Bliss) to be the Brahman; indeed it is only from the Ananda that all these beings are born” (Taitt. Up. III. 6. 1.) that the origin, preservation and destruction of the world proceed from the omniscient Highest Brahman, who is associated with that unsurpassably excellent bliss which is mentioned in the former anuvāka (or chapter of the Taittiriyopanishad known as the Anandavalli ‘). Similarly, in the (scriptural) passage-“He is the cause. He is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (i.e., of the jiva or the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior” (Svet. Up. VI. 9.)-the Highest Brahman Himself who is the lord of the individual self, which (in its turn) is the lord of the senses, is taught to be the cause (of the world). Thus, everywhere, it comes out prominently that the Highest Brahman Himself is the cause (of all things). Hence the identification (of the world with the Adhik. 1, Sut 1] VRITTIKARA’S VIEW 11 Brahman) becomes appropriate, inasmuch as it is born out of the Brahman, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him, and has Him, in consequence, for its Self. Therefore, the Scripture itself enjoins that, after acquiring tranquillity, one should worship the Highest Brahman, who has all things for His modes (of manifestation), who has the All for His body, and who is the Self of all; and so it (first of all) declares that the Highest Brahman forms the Self of all things, and then it teaches His worship. As a matter of fact, the Highest Brahman, who exists in the condition of cause as well as in the condition of effect, has the intelligent and the non-intelligent things existing in their subtle and gross states for His body, and is, accordingly, the Self of all (those things) at all times. That the Highest Brahman is the opposite of all evil and the home of all auspicious qualities, is not contradicted in establishing an identity of this kind; because the evils inherent in the body, which is a (mere) mode (of His manifestation), cannot be said to affect the Self to whom that mode belongs. On the contrary, it has been already pointed out that this (two- fold characterisation of the Brahman as above given) certainly adds to His excellence by attributing (to Him thereby) an unsurpassable sovereignty. What has been stated above (by the purvapakshin) to the effect that it is appropriate for the individual self to be identical with all things-that is not right; because individual selves which are different in each body cannot possibly be identical with one another. It will be established in connection with the aphorism-“Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc., of) the world etc.,” (Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 17)-that, in the case of him also who is released (from material bondage), even though his essential nature has become unconditioned, that identity with the world which is dependent upon his being the cause of the origin, preservation and destruction of the world, cannot be possible. It is not also correct to say that, because the origin, preservation and destruction of the12 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. world are determined by the karma of the individual self, therefore he alone is the cause thereof; for, even though his karma may affect (the details of creation etc.,) the Lord alone is the (sole) cause of the (whole) world. Therefore, it is the Highest Self Himself who is here denoted by the word Brahman. Wise and learned men highly value this same interpretation of this aphorism. For example, the Vrittikara (Bodhāyana) says thus:-“The passage, beginning with ‘All this, indeed’ (Chhānd. Up. III. 14. 1) means that the Brahman who is the Self of all is the Lord (i.e., the Highest Ruler).” Sutra 2. विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च Vivakshitaguḥopapatteścha. (34) Because also the attributes intentionally mentioned (immediately in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to the Highest Self). Moreover, the attributes mentioned in the passage– “He is mind-made, has life for His body, has light for His form, wills the truth, is the essence of ākāśa, is all actions, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated (to Himself) all this (set of attributes), is speechless and unanxious” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 2)-are appropriate only in relation to the Highest Self. He is mind-made’ means that He is capable of being apprehended solely by the purified mind. Indeed, He is apprehended only by that mind which is purified by means of such worship of the Highest Self as is accomplished with the help of the seven420 means, such as discrimination, freedom, etc. By this it is brought out that, owing to His being the
Vide Vol 1. p. 10 Adhik, I: Sūt. 2) ATTRIBUTES EXPLAINED 13 opposite of evil and being also the only abode of auspicious qualities, (the Brahman) possesses such an essential nature as is quite distinct from that of all other things; for it is only tainted things that are capable of being apprehended by tainted minds. ‘He has life for His body’ means that He is the supporter of the lives of all beings in the world. He who has life for His body, that is, He in whom life is contained, to whom it (ie., life) is obedient and subordinate-He is life-bodied. It will be established later on that the connotation of the term ‘body’ (sarira) lies in its signifying the quality of being contained, obedience and subordination. He has light for His form’ means that He has a resplendent form. The meaning is that He is associa- ted with unsurpassable splendour, because He possesses such a divine form as is non-material and peculiar to Himself, and possesses (also) unexcelled auspiciousness. ‘He wills the truth’ means that His will is never frustrated. ‘He is the essence of ākāśa’ means that His true nature is subtle and pure like that of ākāśa (or ether); or He is the essence of ākāśa for the reason that He is the Self of that ākāśa also which is the source of all other things.4 1 Or again He is like ākāśa, for the reason that He shines of Himself and illuminates other things also. ‘He is all actions’: an action is that which is performed: ‘He is all actions’ means that the whole world is His handiwork. Or ‘He is all actions’ means that He is One to whom all actions (religious as well as secular) belong. ‘He is all sweet desires’: ‘desires’ means all those things that are desired, and they are the things to be enjoyed and also the auxiliaries of enjoyment, etc. The meaning is that He possesses all kinds of them in perfect purity. ‘He is all odours, all tastes.’ The meaning here is this:-Since material sweet odours, tastes, etc., are negated in relation to Him, in the
1 he äkäs’a is the source of all other things in the sense that in the evolution of the materi- al world, it comes earlier than the four physical elements. 14 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1. Part II. passage which begins with-” He is characterised neither by sound, nor by touch” (Kath. Up. III. 15) 422-He posses- ses such odours and tastes as are non-material, peculiar to Himself, taintless, unsurpassed in excellence, auspicious, and to be enjoyed by none other than Himself, and are of all kinds. ‘He has appropriated all this’ means that He has appropriated to Himself (abhyatta) the aforesaid collection of (all) auspicious attributes up to and inclusive of tastes. In regard to the expression abhyatta (which means ‘has appropriated’), it has to be understood that the affix kta (which usually forms the passive participle) is used in the agential sense in the manner in which it is so used in the example bhuktā brāhmaṇāḥ-’ the Brāhmaṇas have eaten.‘423 In the word avāki (speechless) vāka means talk; and He who has it not is aväki (speechless). In answer to the question why He is so, it is replied that ‘He is unanxi- ous.’ As He has acquired all objects of desire, He is without any thing to be anxious about; therefore He is without anxiety. speechless), that is, that, being supreme in sovereignty, He does not care a straw for the whole world, consisting (of all things) from the four-faced Brahma down to a clump of grass, and is (thus) silent through self-satisfaction. These aforesaid attributes mentioned (immediately in the context here) are (therefore) appropriate only in relation to the Highest Self. For this very reason, He does not speak. nor
Kath. Up. (111. 15) runs thus: “That eternally indestruc- tible One which is characterised neither by sound nor by touch, nor by form and colour, similarly by taste, nor by smell; which has no beginning and no end; which is higher than the mahat (or the individual self)- realising that One, one is freed from death.” He is avāki (or The meaning is
This is justified on the ground of usage, or because bhuktam (what is eaten, food) with the affix ach, will give us bhukta in the sense of ‘one who has eaten on the analogy of arrasa. (Vide Panini, V. 2 127)

Adhik. I, Sut. 3] SOUL LIKE GLOWWORM 15 अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः Sutra 3. Anupapattestu na sariraḥ (35). The individual self is not, however, (meant to be declared herein); because it is inappropri- ate (to app y these attributes to him). The meaning is that to those who reflect well on Him, who is such an ocean of auspicious qualities, there cannot arise the doubt that, in the context (under discussion), the individual self is treated of; because even the slightest trace of the smallest modicum of the attributes under reference cannot appropriately be predicated in relation to the indivi- dual self, who is almost like unto a glowworm, who has the potentiality to be associated with the infinite misery which is necessarily consequent upon his being associated with the body, and who is found to exist in (both) the conditions of bondage and emancipation.424 Sutra 4. कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च Karmakartṛivyapadesachcha. (36) Because also the agent and the object of (worship) are (separately) mentioned (in the context). In the passage–” After departing from this (world), I attain unto Him” (Chhand. Up. III, 14. 4.)-the Highest Brahman is declared to be the object of attainment, and the individual self to be the attainer (thereof).425 Hence the attaining individual self is the worshipper, and the Highest Brahman who is to be attained is the object of worship. Accordingly, it is clearly made out that this (Brahman) is surely different from the attainer (thereof). 424. The purport here is to show that the attributes in ques- tion apply as little to the emanci- pated self as to the bound self. 425. The objector interprets this text as referring to two states of the soul. In the state of bondage, it is the agent, and its object of attainment is the state of freedom. 16 Sutra 5. SRI-BHASHYA शब्दविशेषात् S’abdaviseshāt. (37) [Chap. I, Part II Because (also) there is (in the context) a difference (in declension) between the words (which respectively denote the Brahman and the individual self). In the scriptural statement “He (eshah) is my (me) Self within the heart” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3 & 4)-the individual self is pointed out by the genitive (me), whereas the object of worship (is pointed out) by the nominative (eshah). Thus again, in a similar context,+26 in relation to the individual self and the Supreme Self, there occurs in the scriptures (ie., the Agni-rahasya) of the Vājasaneyins a difference (in the declension) of the words used to denote them; as, for instance, in the passage” He who is within the individual self (antaratman) and is (minute) like a grain of rice or barley or like a canary-seed or the kernel of a canary-seed, He is the Person (Purusha) that is brilliant like gold (hiraṇmaya) and is also like smokeless light”. (Sat. Br. X. 6. 3. 2.) Here the individual self is pointed out by the word ‘antaratman’ (which must be regarded as) having the locative case-ending; and the object of worship (is pointed out) by the words ‘Purusha’ and ‘hiraṇmaya’ having the nominative case-ending. Therefore the Highest (Brahman) Himself is the object of worship. Sutra 6. स्मृते श्र Smritescha. (38) Because also the Smriti (says the same thing). He (i.e., the Brahman) is different from the individual self for this reason also. The Smriti declares in the 426. Here too Sandilya’s teaching is given.Adhik. I, Šūt. 7] GOD’S SMALLNESS 17 following passages 427 the individual self as the worshipper and the Supreme Self as the object of worship:-" And I am seated in the heart of all beings. Memory and knowledge and (their) removal proceed from Me." (B. G. XV. 15); “That wise man who knows Me thus to be the Highest Person” (B. G. XV, 19); “The Lord is established, O Arjuna, in the region of the heart of all beings; and (from there) by means of His wonderful powers, He causes the revolving of all the beings that are mounted within the mechanism (of the body). Seek refuge with Him alone.” (B. G. XVIII 61. & 62). अर्भकौक स्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाञ्च नेति चेन्न निवाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च Sūtra 7. Arbhakaukastvät tadvyapadesachcha netichenna nichāyyatvādevam vyomavachcha(39) If it be said that, because He has a very small abode and is declared to be (small in accordance with) that, (the Being referred to in the context is) not (the Supreme Self), it is not right to say so; because He is to be so realised, and (because again) He is like the ether also. ‘To have a very small abode’ means ’to be in a very small place.’ ‘To declare (to be small in accordance with) that’ is to attribute smallness (to him). On account of his existing within the small space of the heart in accordance with the passage-" He is my self within the heart" (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3. & 4.); and on account also of the declaration of minuteness as his essential characteristic in accordance with the passage which begins with “(he is) 427. in B.G. Also see Vol 1, Note 21. 428. The word apohana, which is here translated as ’ removal ‘, II. S.B-3. also means sometimes the process or faculty of reasoning’. See Ramanuja’s commentary on the Gită, 18 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Part II. 19 smaller than a grain of rice or barley” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3)-(the being referred to in the context here) is not the Highest Self, but is merely the individual self. According- ly, since in the passage-“The wise perceive him to be all- pervading, very subtle and to be the source of all beings (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6), and in other (such) passages, the unconditioned nature of the Highest Self is brought to light, the individual self is (hence) declared to be merely of the size of the point of a goad. If it be so held, it is replied that it is not so. In fact, it is only the Highest Self that is minute like an atóm, inasmuch as He is taught (here) to be so realised; to be so rli sed’ is to be so understood, or rather to be so worshipped; but not on the other hand to be understood to mean that atomic minuteness does, in fact, belong to His essential nature. He is taught to be ’like the ether also ‘. That is, His natural greatness is also described in this very context in the passage–” He is greater than the earth, greater than the regions of space, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds." (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3.) Hence the attribution of minuteness ( Him) is intended only to serve as a help for worship. Accordingly, (in the context here), by means of the passage- All this, indeed, is the Brahman, because all this is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him: being tranquilled, let him worship." (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1)-worship is enjoined to the effect that one should worship the Brahman who, owing to His being the cause of the creation and destruction of all beings, and owing also to His quickening them with life by entering into them as the Self of all things, is the Self of all. Then, by means of the passage “Now, indeed, (this) person is made up of worship. Just as a person’s worship is in this world, also after death will he be in the next.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1) it is declared that the attainment of an object (of worship) is in accordance with the worship (itself). SO Adhik, I, Sut, 7.] GOD’S SMALLNESS 19 Afterwards, by means of the statement-“Let him perform worship (kratu)” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1), (the injunction about) worship is reiterated with the object of authoritatively declaring the attributes (of the Being that is to be worshipped). Thereafter, by means of the passage “He is mind-made, has life for His body, light for His form, wills the truth, is the essence of ākāśa, is all actions, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities), and is speechless and unanxious (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 2.)-all such attri- butes of His essential nature as are authoritatively said by the scripture to belong to Him, who is characterised by the sovereignty of the (whole) world, are also mentioned. Then (again) by means of the passage-“He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or than a mustard seed, or than a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed” (Chhand Up. III. 14. 3.)-it is stated that, for purposes of worship, the abode of the Highest Person, who is the object of worship, as constituting the Self of that (worshipper himself) and as possessing the minuteness of an atom, is to be found within the heart of the worshipper. Then by means of the passage-” He is my Self within the heart, (who is) greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds: He is all actions, is all desires, all odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities), and is speechless and unanxious" (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 3 & 4.) the finally realisable form of the Being, who is to be worshipped within the heart, is pointed out. Then by means of the passage-“He is my Self within the heart, He is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 4)-continued meditation is enjoined to this effect, viz., that the Brahman, who has the above-stated characteristics, has, out of His highest mercy and with the intention of saving us, condescended to be near unto us within our heart. Then there is affirmed, by means of the passage- After departing from this world, I attain unto Him’ "" 20 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 4) the realisation of the certain convic. tion that the attainment (through worship of any object desired) is in accordance with the worship (itself). And then (finally) by means of the statement-“He who has this conviction, to him there is no doubt” (Chhand. Up. III. 14- 4)-it is concluded that he, who has such a settled conviction regarding the attainment of the thing to be attained, need entertain no doubt as to his attaining (the object sought after). Hence it is for purposes of worship that He is declared to exist in a very small abode and to possess the minuteness of an atom. सम्भोगशतिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् Sūtra 8. Sambhogaprāptiritichenna vaišeshyāt (40) If it be said that (owing to His association. with the heart which is a part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corpo- real association). It may be said that, when it is admitted that the Highest Brahman also may exist within a body, in the same way in which the individual self does, there befalls (to Him) experience of pleasure and pain as a consequence of (His) association with the body. But this is not right: for the cause (which gives rise to such an association) is different. In fact it is not the mere existence within the interior of a body that gives rise to the experience of pleasure and pain. On the contrary, it is the subjection to the influence of karma in the form of merit and demerit (that consti- tutes the cause thereof). But this (subjection) is not possible in relation to the Supreme Self who is free from all sins, Adhik. II, Sut. 9] WHO IS THE EATER? 21 Accordingly, the scripture declares thus :-" One of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all." (Mund. Up. III. 1. 1. & Svet. Up. IV. 6) ADHIKARANA II- ATTRADHIKARAṆA. If the Supreme Self is no enjoyer, then, in that case’ the being who is taught to be the enjoyer must, in all places, be the individual self himself. Under such a supposition, he (the Sutrakāra, however,) says (thus) :– अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् Sūtra 9. Attā charācharagrahaṇāt. (+1) The eater (of the Brahma a and the Kshat- riya is the Supreme Self), because (the whole of) the movable (world) is implied (by the expression Brahmana and Kshatriya’). In the Katha-valli it is declared to the following effect:" He to whom the Brāhmaṇa (i.e., the movable things) and the Kshatriya (i.e., the immovable things), both constitute the food, and to whom mrityu (or Death) happens to be the condiment-who can definitely know how He is ?" (Kath. Up. II. 25.) Here the doubt arises whether the eater’ suggested by the terms ‘food’ and ‘condiment’ is the individual self himself, or is the Supreme Self.429 It is perhaps thought proper to hold that " 429. Sankara refers to amo- ther view that the eater’ is Agni. Those who argue that the ind v- dual self is referred to here take odanaḥ and upasechanam to mean respectively an enjoyable o.ject’ and something which is subordinate’. They look upon the souls embodied in the two sexes as objects of enjoyment to each other. And as the souls are immortal, death is subordinate to them even as the condimentis subordinate to fool; indeed death cannot stand in the way of their enjoyment, The Vedantin inter- prets the eater here as the destroyer’, and no: аз the enjoyer’.22 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. it is the individual self. Because, to be an enjoyer (of pleasure and pain) is due to the influence of karma, and because also it is appropriate only for the individual self to be under such (an influence). (In answer) to this, it is stated that “the eater (of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya) is the Supreme Self, because (the whole of) the movable and immovable (world) is implied (by the expression, ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya”)". The ’eater’ (here) is the Supreme Self Himself. Why? Because (that whole) of the movable and immovable (world) Is implied (by the expression ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’). Indeed, to be the ’eater’ of the whole movable and immo- vable (world) is possible only to Him. And this state of being the enjoyer (possessed by the Supreme Self) is not caused by karma; but on the contrary it means that character of the destroyer which belongs to Vishņu, who is the Highest Brahman and is the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world; because, in this very context, it is declared that “he (i.e., the individual self) reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Vishņu”. (Kath. Up. III. 9) Similarly, by the statement-" to whom mrityu (or Death) happens to be the condiment," the whole of the movable world, as suggested by the expression ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’ is to be understood here as constituting the food that is fit to be eaten. Indeed, a condiment is that, which, while it is itself being eaten, helps the eating of other things. Hence, as forming a condiment, Death also is eaten up; and so it seems clear that what is intended to be mentioned (here) is the eating up of the whole of the movable and immovable world that is flavoured with that (condiment) and is indicated by the expression, ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’. And this sort of eating is nothing less than (the world’s) destruction. Therefore this kind of being the enjoyer, which is the same as being the destroyer (of the world), belongs only to the Supreme Self, Adhik. II, Sut. 10] WITHIN THE CAVE 23 प्रकरणाच्च 4 Sūtra 10. Prakaranachcha. (42 Because of the context (here relating to the Bran man) and also (of what has been stated earlier). Moreover, the context here relates only to the Highest Brahman. Indeed, it opens the subject-matter thus:- Knowing Him to be the Self which is great and omni-pre- sent, the wise man does not grieve. This Self is not reached either by reflection (pravachana, which here means manana) or by steady meditation (medha or nididhyāsana), or by largely ‘hearing’ the scriptures. Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached. To him, this Self reveals His own form." (Kath. Up. II. 22 & 23). In fact, also by (the interrogation)- Who can definitely know how He is?’ (Kath Up. II. 25)—we are again reminded only of what was stated before, namely, that without His grace He is not easily knowable. " It may, however, be said again thus:-This person (i.e., the eater above-mentioned), as suggested by the ‘food’ consisting of the Brahmaņa and Kshatriya, is not the Supreme Self, who is free from all sins; because immediately afterwards (in the context) it is only the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, who is associated with a second something, that is mentioned in the passage Those who know the Brahman, having worshipped the five fires and per- formed also the trinachiketa rite, 4:0 declare that there are the two that ‘drink in’ (i.e., enjoy) the reward of works in the world of good deeds, that have entered into the cave (of the 430. According to Sankara, this is thrice kindling the fire called Nachiketa ‘, Rangara anuja makes it out to Le the recit I of f. three particular sections (or anuvák-s) of the Yajur-veda, Ses also Kulluba on Manu, 111, 185, 24 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part 11. heart), in the transcendentally excellent ether of which they reside, and that are as shadow and sunlight". (Kath. Up. III. 1) And that second something may be either the prāṇa (i.e. the principal vital air) or the buddhi. (i.e., the intellect). Indeed, the ‘drinking in’ of the rita is nothing other than the enjoyment of the fruits of karma; and this is not possible and appropriate in relation to the Supreme Self. But the principal vital air and the intellect, which are the instruments of the individual self, who is the enjoyer, are somehow or other (as instruments) capable of being associa- ted witht this act of drinking in’. Hence it is the individual self himself who is associated with either of them as the second thing that is dealt with (here). Therefore, the context (in which these passages occur) being one and the same, the eater’ mentioned in the previous passage ought also to be that individual self himself. To such (a supposition), it is said (in reply): तदर्शनात् gei afàzrarcarat fe aggfara 431 Sutra 11. Guham pravishṭāvātmānau hi taddarsanat. (43) Indeed, the beings that have entered into the cave are the two selves, (viz, the individual self and the Supreme Self); because it is seen (to be so in that context). It is not stated (in the context).that the two, who have entered the cave’ and are ‘drinking in’ the fruits of karma, are either the individual self and the principal vital air, or the individual self and the intellect. But, on the contrary, it is unquestionably the individual self and the Supreme Self that are declared to be those (two beings). Why? “Because it is seen (to be so in that context)”. In 431. kara and some others begin a new adhikarana he:e Adhik. II, Sūt. 11] WITHIN THE CAVE 25 the context, it is seen that it is only the individual self and the Supreme Self that are declared to have entered the ‘cave’. In regard to the Supreme Self, it is in fact (taught) thus:-“By means of that self-knowledge, which is derived from yogic self-concentration, the wise man comes to know that God, who is difficult to be seen and is hidden, who has entered into all beings and is placed within the ‘cave’ (of the heart), and who exists in the inmost recesses (of all beings as the Internal Controller of their souls) and is ancien; and then he gives up pleasure and pain”. (Kath. Up. II. 12). 4 In regard to the individual self also (it is) thus (taught in the context):-“That is aditi, which is with the prana (or the principal vital air) and is full of the ‘deities’ (or the senses), and which, having entered the cave’, abides therein, and which, in association with the elements, is again born in various ways “. (Kath. Up. IV. 7.) ‘Aditi’ means that which eats the fruits of karma’, and that is the individual self. ‘Is with the prāṇa’ means exists in association with the prana’. ‘And is full of the deities’ means ‘has all its enjoyment dependent upon the senses’. ‘Having entered the cave, abides therein’ means exists within the interior of the lotus of the heart’. In association with the elements, (he) is born in various ways’ means that in association with the gross elements such as the earth, etc., he (i.e., the individual self) is born in various ways in the form of gods, etc. This being the case, the teaching that the two drink in the rita (or the fruits of karma)’ has to be understood (figuratively), as in the instance-“Those with the umbrellas are moving on.“432 < 432. This illustration is intended to show that a whole collection of men may be pointed out by means of a prominent attribute belonging only to some few of the members thereof. In a collection of men, only some may carry umbrellas; and to a man at a distance that collection of men may be pointed II. S.B-4. out as a collection of men with umbrellas. Similarly, both the individual self and the Supreme Self forming a group are said to drink in, that is, to enjoy the fruits of karma, although the character of drinking in the fruits of karma belongs only to the individual self. 26 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part 1 Or the agency in the act of drinking in is appropriate in relation to both the individual self and the Supreme Self, as (respectively) constituting the thing that is controlled and the controller thereof (in relation to that act).433 Sutra 12. विशेषणाच्च Viseshanachcha. (44) Because also of the characteristic attri- butes (of both the individual self and the Supreme Self being mentioned in the context). In the context (under reference), everywhere it is only the individual self and the Supreme Self that are (respec- tively) stated to be associated with the characteristic of the worshipper and of the object worshipped, of the attainer and of the thing attained. In the passage-” After knowing the brahmajajña (or the individual self) to be divine and venerable, and after (also) realising (his true nature), then he attains this everlasting peace” (Kath. Up. I. 17)-the word ‘brahmajajña’ (lit the Brahman-born knower) means the individual self, because he is born out of the Brahman and is also intelligent. Here, ‘after knowing him to be divine and venerable’ means ‘after knowing the individual self, who is the worshipper, to possess the Brahman for his self’. In the passage-“May we be enabled to worship that Highest Brahman, who is a bank for sacrificers (to pass over), 3+ who is indestructible, who is the fearless other shore to those who desire to cross (the ocean of samsāra), and who is (capable of being attained through the fire-sacrifice known as) the nachiketa” (Kath. Up. 433. This explanation of the individual self being caused to drink the fruits of karma by the Supreme Self as the ordainer of karma-phala, seems to be pre- ferred by Ramanuja 434 Rangaramanuja interprets ‘bank’ as ‘support’, adding that God supports the sacrificers by giving them the fruits of sacrifices.Adhik. II, Süt. 12] STORY OF NACHIKETAS 27 < III. 2)-’ nāchiketa’ means that which is attainable by means of the rite known as the nachiketa’. In the passage beginning with-“Know the individual self to be the rider in the chariot, and the body itself to be the chariot” (Kath Up. III. 3)–the individual self, who is the worshipper, is mentioned. Similarly in the passage- “But that person who has understanding for his charioteer and the mind (or the internal organ of attention) for the reins, he reaches the other end of the path; and that is the highest seat of Vishņu” (Kath. Up. III. 9)-the individual self and the Supreme Selfare (respectively) mentioned to be the attainer and the object of attainment. (In the passage) also (under discussion) here-(Kath. Up. III. 1)-by means of the expression ‘shadow and sunlight’ only those two things (viz., the individual self and the Supreme Self) are declared to be (respectively) characterised by the attributes of ignorance and omniscience. It may, however, be said here that the passage- “After a man departs from this world, there is this doubt: some say that he is, while others say that he is not " (Kath. Up. I. 20)-opens with a question regarding the real nature of the individual self, and that in consequence the whole of this context has to be made out to refer to the individual. self. But it is not right to say so. Indeed, this question here is not due to any doubt regarding the existence or non- existence of the individual soul who is different from the body; for, if it were so, the asking of the two previous boons would be impossible and inappropriate. Accordingly, at the time when the father’s sacrifice at which the whole of his wealth was to be given away in gifts was approaching its completion, the son Nachiketas, who was the greatest among the faithful, thought that the sacrifice would lose its merit, in consequence of a deficiency in the gifts that had to be given away, and desired that the father’s sacrifice should become perfect even by the giving 28 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. away of himself. He then asked his father more than once “To whom will you give me away? 7?” (Kath Up. I. 4); and afterwards entered the abode of the god of death, in obedience to the words of his father, who was angered at the restraint put upon him by the son (to the effect of compelling him to give away even his own son as a gift). The god of death had previously left his house, and so could not be seen (at home); and therefore he (i.e., Nachi- ketas) waited there (at the door) fasting for three days. (The god of death) was frightened at his (i.e., at Nachiketas’s) fasting (thus); and by way of remedying (the undesirable consequenees arising to himself out of) that (fasting), offered three boons (to Nachiketas) to choose. Being exceedingly faithful, he chose as the first (of these boons) the kindly reconciliation of his father towards himself. Indeed, all this is impossible and inappropriate in relation to any one, who does not know the individual self to be distinct from the body (wherein it is). Then, as the second boon, he chose that worship of Agni, which forms the means of acquiring such fruits as are enjoyable by the individual self that has risen above the body. This also is not possible in relation to him who has not understood the self to be distinct from the body. Therefore, here, in this the third boon, which is chosen to the effect-” After a man departs from this world, there is this doubt: some say that he is, while others say that he is not as taught by you, let me know this: among the boons, this is the third boon” (Kath. Up. I. 20), this question is raised with the desire to know the nature of the Higher Self as well as of the lower self and (the nature) also of the worship of the Supreme Self, so that through this (knowledge), which forms the means (for the attainment of final release), the true nature of moksha (or final release), which consists in such an attainment of the Brahman Adhik. II, Sut, 12] THEORIES OF ‘MOKSHA’ 29 as constitutes the highest object of human pursuit, may well be understood. Consequently (the question raised in) “after a man departs, etc.,” is not intended to refer merely to the dissociation of the body (from the soul), but is on the contrary intended to refer to (its) complete release from all bondage, as in (this other scriptural passage which says)- “After departing (to final liberation), there is no (indivi- dually limited) knowledge any more “. (Brih. Up. II. 4. 12). This is the meaning :-When a man, who is eligible to attain moksha, becomes completely free from all bondage, there arises that doubt as to (his) being existent or non- existent (a doubt) which relates to his essential nature and is the cause of (much) difference of opinion among philoso- phical controversialists; for the removal of that (doubt), let me, as taught by you, know, that is, learn, the true character of his essential nature. Thus indeed do they (the philosophers) hold different opinions in many ways (in regard to the nature of final release). Some (i.e., the Buddhists) say that final release consists in the destruction of the essential nature of the soul, which is constituted purely of consciousness. Others (i.e., the Advaitins, say that it is) the disappearance ofavidyā (or ignorance) from an (enduring) entity which consists purely of consciousness. Others (i.e., the Naiyayikas) hold that it is the state of (the soul’s) complete self-isola- tion, consisting in the removal of all such (imposed) specific characteristics as knowledge etc., from the soul which is (in itself non-sentient) like a stone. Others (again, i.e., the followers of Bhaskara), who acknowledge (the existence of) a Supreme Self that is devoid of all evil, maintain that final release consists in that same (Self), which has become an individual soul in consequence of its association with limiting conditions, becoming Itself (again) through the disappearance of those limiting conditions. 30 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. But those, who are well versed in the Vedanta, say that final release is indeed the natural experiential realisation of the Supreme Self by the individual soul on the removal of its ignorance (by that soul) the essential nature of which is concealed in the avidya (or ignorance) made up of the beginningless karma, (the soul) the sole delight of which consists in the experiential realisation of the Supreme Self, and the essential nature of which is unlimited knowledge accordant (with such realisation), and which is, as consti- tuting His body, a mode of the Supreme Brahman who is the Self of all, is distinct from all (things) other (than Himself), is a mine of numerous auspicious qualities characterised by natural and unbounded excellence, who is altogether of the essential nature of endless bliss and know- ledge which are antagonistic to all evil, and who (again) is the only cause of the whole world. There (in the context in the Kathopanishad) the god of death (Yama) was asked by Nachiketas (to this effect)- “Let me, through your favour, know the essential nature of final release and the means of attaining it.” Then (the god of death) tested him by (first) pointing out (to him) that it was very difficult to understand (those things) and by (next) tempting him with the offer of various kinds of enjoyments. And after thus making out his fitness (to receive the instruction sought by him, Yama) taught him the discerning knowledge regarding the reality of the Higher Self as well as of the lower self, the worship of the Supreme Self, and (the nature of) final release, which (last) consists in reaching His abode, (imparting the instruction) by means of these (scriptural passages) which begin with (Kath. Up. II. 12)” Him, whom it is difficult to see, who is hidden within and has entered into (all things),” and end with “He reaches the other end of the road, and that (other end) is the supreme abode of Vishņu”. (Kath. Up. II. 9) He thereafter taught him (further) such (other) particular things (like Praṇavāgnividyā etc.) as were desired by him. Thus every thing here is quite appropriate. It is therefore Adhik. III, Sut. 13] PERSON IN THE EYE 31 conclusively established that the ’eater’ is no other than the Supreme Self. Sutra 13. ADHIKARANA III. ANTARĀDHIKARAṆA अन्तर उपपत्तेः Antara upapatteḥ. (45) He, who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the Brahna), because of (all the attributes mentioned in the context) 135 being appropriate (only in relation to Him). That is The Chhandogas declare in the scriptures, to the following efiect:-“He said that that Person who is seen within the eye-He is the Self, That is immortal, fearless, That is the Brahman”. (Chhand. Up. IV. 15. 1). Here there is the doubt whether the person pointed out as abiding in the eye is the same as the image reflected (in the 435: 1 he context here is the Chhan- dogya Upanishad (1V. 10-15). where the instruction of Upakosala in Brahma-vidya is described. For 12 years he lived with the te cher, Satyaka na Jalala, as a student. While his fellow-students were sent away as having com- peted their education, Upakosala was kept on as a student; but he was not taught the saving know- ledge about the Brahman ‘1 hen the teacher went on a journey, dsregarding the request of his wife to complete the teaching to Upakosala. 1. great distress of mind, the boy now began to fast. Thereupon, the three Fires of the preceptor came forward to con- sole him having been greatly pleased with h’s devoted services to them. They taught him, toge- ther and individually, about the Brahman and their relations to the persons seen within the sun, the moon and lightning. They added that his teacher would complete the instruction. Jabāla, on his return, found the boy with a face shining with divine knowledge. Не completed the teaching bogun by the Fires. His teaching commenced with a reference to the Person within the eye, identified Him with the Branman, and culminated in a description of the path leading emancipated souls to the Brahman.32 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1. Part II. eye), or whether that (person) is that particular deity which presides over the sense of sight, or whether that (person) is the individual self, or whether that (person) is the Supreme Self.436 It is perhaps thought right to hold that he is the image reflected (in the eye); because he is pointed out (in the passage under discussion) as though he were already well- known, and because also, by means of the word ‘seen’, he is mentioned (therein) to be directly perceivable. Or that (person) may be the individual self; because in relation to that (individual self) also, on account of his presence (in the body being seen) specially in the eye, the prevalent notion (that he is within eye) is quite appropriate. For, it is by looking well at the open eye, that they ascertain the stay and departure of the individual self within (and from) the body. Or, he who is established within the eye may be a particular deity (viz., the sun-god), as he is well-known (to be within the eye) in accordance with the scriptural passage” He (i.e., the person in the sun) is, through his rays, established in him (i.e., in the person within the eye)”. (Brih. Up. V. 5. 2). Since it is appropriate to point out only these as if they were already well-known, (he who is within the eye) is (obviously) any one of them. If it be so arrived at, we reply: “He who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the Brahman), because of (all the attributes mentioned in the context) being appropriate (only in relation to Him).” Why? Because (it is thus taught) in the scriptural passage-" He said-He is the Self. That is immortal, That is fearless, That is the Brahman. Him they call samyadväma (or One in whom all desirable things gather together), for all blessed things go to meet in Him: He alone is, indeed, Vamani (or the Giver of good things), 436, The first three theories about the person in the eye are said to arise respectively from popular no ions, scriptural texts and inference, Adhik, 111, Süt. 15] ‘BRAHMAN’ & ‘SUKHA’ 33 for He leads all beings to attain all good things: He alone is, indeed, Bhamani (or the Shining One), for He shines throughout all the worlds". (Chhand. Up. IV. 15. 1 to 5). And all those attributes (which are mentioned herein) are appropriate only in relation to the Supreme Self. Sūtra 14. स्थानादिव्यपदेशाश्च Sthānādivyapadeśāchcha. (46) Because also existence etc. (within the eye)457 are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self. Existence and (the power of) control etc., (as within the eye) are taught only in relation to the Supreme Self in the (scriptural) passage which begins with–“He who, dwelling within the eye, etc.,” (Brih. Up. III. 7. 18). For the same reason, it is He alone who is meant in the passage “That Person (who is seen) within the eye” (Chhand. Up. IV. 15. 1). Therefore, to be pointed out also as a being, who is well-known, is appropriate in relation to the Supreme Self. It is solely in accordance with this (view), that the mentioning of direct perception in relation to Him to the effect that He is seen’ is also appropriate, inasmuch as He is directly perceivable by yogins. Sutra 15. gafafayımanıta a Sukhavisishtābhidhānā deva cha. (47) On account also of the declaration, by itself, of His association with (supreme) happi- ness (that Person within the eye is the Supreme Self). 437. Sthana (abode) s taken as taken to refer to ‘control and sthiti (existence) because of su:tenance’. anavasthitekt in Sutra 18. Adi is II. S.B-5. 34 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part il. He who abides in the eye is the Highest Person for this reason also, namely, because the passage-“That Person who is (seen) within the eye” (Chhand. Up. IV. 15, 1)- is given in order definitely to fix, for the purpose of worshipping the Brahman, a place of abode for Him, who is associated with (supreme) happiness as mentioned in the context which is to the effect, “The Brahman is (supreme) happiness, the Brahman is ether” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5); and also in order to declare the attribute of being samyadvāma (One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such attributes (in relation to that same Brahman). The expression by itself’ indicates the indepen- dence of (this) argument438. It may, however, be said here that, since the form of worship taught by the (three) Fires439 is interposed in the middle (of the context here), the Brahman mentioned in the (beginning of the) context, to the effect that “the Brahman is (supreme) happiness” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5), cannot fall within the scope here. Accordingly, the Fires, after teaching the worship of the Brahman by means of the passage-“The Brahman is life, the Brahman is (supreme) happiness, the Brahman is ether” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5.), taught thereafter the worship of the Fires, by means of the passage beginning with-“Then, indeed, the Garhapatya Fire taught him” (Chhand. Up. IV. 11. 1). Moreover, it is not possible to say that the worship taught by the Fires forms an associated part of the worship of the Brahman; because (in relation to this fire-worship) it is 438, The arguments set forth in the two previous Sutras (13 and 14) require to be completed by their negative correlates in Sutra 18. The argument here stands by itself, identifying the Ferson in the eye described to Upakosala by his teacher with the Brahman described earlier to him by the Fires as happiness the ether of space.’. 439. Thes are (i) the Garhapa- tya or household fire, which is 1 and perpetually maintained by the householder and transmitted from father to son, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are light- ed; (ii) the Anvähärya cr the fire on the right altar used in the ceremony performed in honour of the ancestral manes every newmoon, and (iii) the Ahavaniya or the fire to the east of the sacrificial ground, taken from the householder’s perpetual fire for any sacrificial purpose. Adhik. III, Sut. 15] FIRE-WORSHIP 35 taught in the Scripture that the results arising therefrom consist in the attainment of full life, an uninterrupted familial succession, etc., which are all not included among the results produced by the worship of the Brahman and are (further) antagonistic thereunto. (To this), it is stated in reply (as follows):-In both the places (viz., in the commencement as well as in the conclusion of the context here), the word ‘Brahman’ is expressly mentioned as in the passage-“The Brahman is life” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5) and (also) in the passage- “That is immortal, That is fearless, That is the Brahman’ (Chhand. Up. IV. 15. 1). Moreover, in accordance with the statement made by the Fires to this effect-“Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with ’light’ and leading to final release)’’ (Chhand. Up. IV. 14. 1)-the teaching regarding the worship of the Brahman is considered to be incomplete before the Teaching of the path (of final release is given). Therefore, this worship which is taught by the Fires, and which occurs in the middle of (the teaching regarding) that (worship of the Brahman) is determined to be (itself) an associated part of the worship of the Brahman. (It is so determined) also for the reason that in the passage “Then indeed the Garhapaty Fire taught the aforementioned440 (Upakosala)” (Chhand. Up. IV. 11. 1),- fire-worship is taught only to him who had qualified himself to (receive the teaching regarding) the worship of the Brahman. Again, in the passage “Dear friend, this our worship, and the worship of the Self, (both have been taught) to you” (Chhand. Up. IV. 14. 1)-(both these kinds of worship) are together taught to Upakosala; and 440. The pronominal form enam (him) in the accusative case is used to refer to Up kosala her. According to Panini (1. 4. 34), the substitation of this form for imam or etam takes place only when the pronoun is re-employed. Thus enam here refers to one already mentioned earlier. The Upako- sla who is taught the worship of the Fires is the Upakosala to whom the Brahman has been taught, and who has thus qualified bimself for instruction in fire-worship. 36 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Part II. he, as mentioned in the passage-“I am full of diseases” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 3), was tormented, after having been hit by the hurtful action of various kinds of desires adverse to the attainment of the Brahman, by the (various) fears of samsära, such as conception in the womb, old age, death, etc. Accordingly, it is made out that this fire-worship forms an associated part of that worship of the Supreme Self, which (alone) yields the only result known as final release. It having been thus learnt that it (viz., fire-worship) constitutes an associated part (of the worship of the Brahman), the statement that it yields results (other than final release) is obviously an eulogistic arthavada111. Moreover, there is not mentioned here even a single result which is opposed to final release ;442 because, all those results which are mentioned in the passage-” When sinful deeds are destroyed, he attains the (higher) world, he attains to full life, he lives brightly; all those who are in friendly relation with him do not come to nothing: we hold communion with him in this world as well as in the other” (Chhand. Up. IV. 11. 2., IV. 12. 2 and IV. 13. 2)— may appropriately befall him who is qualified for the attainment of final release. ‘When sinful deeds are destroyed’ means ‘when he destroys such sinful acts (and influences) as are opposed to the attainment of the Brahman’; (and) ‘he attains to the (higher) world’ means ‘he attains the world of the Brahman on the removal of the sin which is opposed to that (attainment of the Brahman)’; (then) ‘he attains to full life’ means ‘he attains such a full life as is needed for the completion of the worship of the Brahman’; ‘he lives brightly’ means ‘he lives unattacked by diseases until the 441. Vide Vol 1, Note 28%. 442. This view seems to be preferred by Rāmānuja.Adhik. III, Sut, 15] PRECEPTOR’S TASK 37 attainment of the Brahman’: (and) ‘all those who are in friendly relation with him do not come to nothing’ means ‘his disciples and disciples’ disciples, etc., his sons and grandsons, etc., also surely become the knowers of the Brahman’. That such is the result of knowing the Brahman is declared elsewhere also in the scripture thus:- “None who is born within his family is without the knowledge of the Brahman” (Mund. Up. III. 2. 9, and Mänd. Up. III. 3.). Upavayantam bhuñjā mo’smimścha loke’mushmimcsha. (Here) vayam means ‘we’, that is, the Fires; tam means ‘him’ (i.e., the worshipper Upakosala); upabhuñjāmaḥ means ‘we protect him from all trouble’. Thus fire-worship forms an associated part of the worship of the Brahman, and so there is nothing wrong in its being mentioned alongside of that other (worship, viz., that of the Brahman): consequently the Brahman dealt with in the very beginning of the context (under reference), as being associated with (supreme) happiness, is (Himself) mentioned (here, as existing within the eye), for the purpose of defining a place of abode (for Him) for worshipping (Him), and also for the purpose of describing (His) attributes. It may here be again objected that what is made out by means of the statement-“Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with ’light’ and leading to final release)” ((Chhand. Up. IV. 14. 1)—is that it is only the path (commencing with ’light’ and leading to final release) which has to be taught by the venerable preceptor, inasmuch as (that) path alone (still) remained (to be taught by the preceptor); and that, consequently, cannot be said that what is intended (to be taught here) is the idea of assigning an abode and attributes (to the Brahman for the purpose of worshipping Him). it 38 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. The meaning of however, This (objection) is replied to thus. the passage “Your venerable preceptor shall, teach you the path (commencing with ’light’ and leading to final release)” (Chhānd. Up. IV. 14. 1)—is this. Without teaching the worship of the Brahman (to Upakosala), his venerable preceptor (Satyakāma Jābāla) went away; not having obtained that (teaching), Upakosala became highly grieved; in order to console him and save him, his venerable preceptor’s Fires, which were pleased with the service rendered to them (by Upakosala), taught him merely the essential nature of the Brahman and also the fire- worship which forms an associated part of that (other worship, viz., that of the Brahman). Then, after carefully considering the meaning of the scriptural passage “Indeed, that form of worship alone, which is learnt from a venerable preceptor, becomes perfect” (Chhand. Up. IV. 9. 3.)-(they, i.e., the Fires) thought within themselves that, in order to (enable him) to attain perfection (in worship), the venerable preceptor alone should teach him the Brahman as having the attribute of being samyadvāma (One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such qualities, and (should teach him) also a place of (His) abode for worshipping Him in it, as also the path commencing with ’light’ (and leading to final release). Accordingly, they (i.e., the Fires) said- “Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with ’light’ and leading to final release)”. The mention of the ‘path’ (here) is to show that a part of the worship (of the Brahman) still remained to be taught. It is for this very reason that the venerable preceptor also began (his teaching) with the passage-“I will teach you that, just as water does not cling to the lotus leaf, so also sinful deeds do not cling to (i.e., taint) him who knows this " (Chhand. Up. IV. 14. 3); and then he Adhik. III, Sut. 15] WORSHIP OF PRATIKA ‘? 39 taught that the Brahman is characterised by the auspicious attribute of being samyadvāma (or One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such auspicious attributes; and that He is to be worshipped within the space of the eye; and (at last he described) the path commencing with ’light’ (and leading to final release). Accordingly, the Brahman Himself who is, in the commencement of the context, described to be associated with supreme happiness in the passage-“The Brahman is supreme happiness, the Brahman is ether” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5). is mentioned here. Hence the Being abiding within the eye is the Supreme Self. Again, it may be asked: How do you know that what is referred to in the passage-‘The Brahman is (supreme) happiness, the Brahman is ether’ (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5)-is the Highest Brahman whom you describe here as abiding within the eye? On the contrary, it appears from the passage, which says that the Brahman is (supreme) happiness, and that the Brahman is ether’, that what is enjoined (therein) is simply to look upon the well known element of ether and upon worldly pleasure as the Brahman; because this (passage) is similar in character to the (scriptural) statements-’ Name is the Brahman’. (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 5.) and ‘Mind is the Brahman’, (Chhand. Up. VII. 3. 2).443 (In reply) to such a supposition he (the Sutrakāra) says:- a 443. The objection here is that the identification of happiness and the other of space with the Brahman is merely intended to tea:h pratikopāsanā, where thing which is not known to be the Brahman is meditated on as the Brahman. This view is supposed to derive some support from there being no mention of the Brahman at the conclusion of the teaching of the Fires to Upakosal in Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5. Sutra 16 now seeks to establish that Upakosala is taught the upasana of the Bral nan, which alone can lead to mo sha, and not pratikopāsana whose results are temporary. 40 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part II +14Sūtra 16. अत एव च स ब्रह्म Ata eva cha sa brahma. (48 For that same reason also, that (akāka or ether of space which is denoted by kha) is the Brahman. For whatever reason in the passage there, (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5)-where it is declared that what indeed is the ka (or supreme happiness) that itself is the kha (or the ether of space) the ether (or ākāśa) is declared to be characterised by supreme happiness, for that same reason that (very) ether which is denoted by the word kha is the Highest Brahman. What is said (in the Upanishadic context here) is this. When the Fires said-“The prana (i.e., the principal vita air or life) is the Brahman, the ka (or supreme happiness) is the Brahman and the kha (or the ether of space) is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5)-Upakosala stated in reply: “I know that Brahman which is life (or prāṇa), but I do not know that (Brahman) which is denoted by ka as well as by kha” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5). This is the meaning thereof:-It is certainly not the worship (of the Brahman) under such symbols as the principal vital air, etc., that is taught by the Fires (here); because their attempt is to teach me (Upakosala), who am afraid of the terrors of samsāra, which consists of birth old age, death etc., and am (also) desirous of winning final release. Thus what is taught is the Brahman Himself, who (in reality) forms the (only) object of worship. 444. This Sutra is commented on by Ramanuja and Nimbarka, but not by Sankara and Madhya. “That same reason’ is characteri- sation by supreme happiness, But the text for consideration here is “Whatever indeed is the ka, that itself is the kha,” and not, as in the previous Sutra, “The Brahman is ka, the Brahman is kha. 1 he word sah (thai) in the Sutra indicates, by its masculine gender åkåşa in tadakās’am, according to the Srutaprakasika, and prana in prano Brahma according to Ran, arāmānuja, Adhik. III, Sūt. 16] UPAKOSALA’S INTENTION 41 It being so, the Brahman has been mentioned here in the same grammatical equation 145 with the well known prāṇa (or life) and other things. And among these it is appropriate for the Brahman to be mentioned as prāna (or life) either because He supports the whole world, or because He is the controller of prāṇa (or life) by reason of His owning the principal vital air (or life) as His ‘body’. Accordingly, he (i.e., Upakosala) said “I know that Brahman which is prāṇa (or life)” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5). Similarly (supreme) happiness (or ka) and the ether of space (or kha) also constitute the attributes of the Brahman, because they (also) form His body and hence are subject to His control. Or (they) form His attributes, as, in consequence of their being determinative of each other’s significance, they (i.e., ka and kha) are intended to describe that essen- tial nature of the Brahman which consists of the bliss that is unsurpassed in excellence. It being so, in case they (i.e., ka and kha) are taken independently to form His attributes through constituting His body, then the Brahman will have to possess the character of being the controller of the plea - sures of the senses and of the element of ether; and consequently there will be no apprehension of His essen- tial nature (but only of His glory). But in case they (ie., ka and kha) are taken as being determinative of each other’s significance, then the Brahman (as denoted by them) will possess such an essential nature as consists altogether of infinite and indescribable bliss. Accordingly, with the intention of definitely finding out which of these (two) alternative views (is right), he (Upakosala) said-“But I do not know the ka and the kha.” Knowing this intention of Upakosala, the Fires said- “Whatever indeed is the ka, that same is the kha. What indeed is the kha, that same is the ka”. (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5). The meaning is that the nature of the Brahman as 445. For particulars alout the grammatical equation, vide Vol. 1, II. S.B-6. Notes 75 and 228.42 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. bliss is in itself infinite and indescribable. Consequently, that Brahman who, having life for His body, is characterised by prana (or life) as an attribute, He Himself is conclusive- ly shown in the scripture to possess the character of infinite and indescribable bliss, in the passage-” And they, verily, taught him (i.e., Upakosala) the prana (or life to be the Brahman), and the ākāśa (or the ether of space) to be the same (as supreme happiness).” (Chhand. Up. IV. 10. 5). Hence it is the Brahman, who is of the nature of infinite and indescribable bliss, that is mentioned in this very passage-“The Brahman is (supreme) happiness, the Brahman is the ether”. Consequently, it is the Highest Brahman alone that is therein dealt with in the context under reference; and it is He Himself who is declared here to have the eye for His abode. Therefore the Being within the eye is the Supreme Self. Sutra 17. gatqfavemufuq.arsa Srutopanishatkagatyabhidhānāchcha. (.)、 (The Being within the eye is the B ahman), because also the path (which commences with ’light’ and leads to final release and) which i; allotted to him who has studied the Upanishads, is described (here in the context). That path commencing with ’light’ (and leading to final release), which is taught in other scriptural contexts+45 as having to the meditated on by him who has under- stood the essential nature of the Highest Person, that is, by him who has studied the Upanishads, that (path) which, giving rise to the attainment of the Brahman, possesses the characteristic attribute of allowing no return journey (again 446. These include Chhand. Up. ing with light is dealt with in V. 10 1, Brih. Up. v1. 2. 15 and Vedanta Sutras, IV. 3. Kaush Up. 1.3. The ‘path beginn- Adhik. III, Sut. 18] REFLECTED IMAGE & SELF 43 to this world of samsāra)-(that) is taught to Upakosala, who has (already) learnt about the Person within the eye, (in the context) beginning with the passage-“They go to light, indeed, from light to day, from day to the bright half of the moon”, and ending with-"(They go) from the moon to the lightning. There is that superhuman person, and he leads them to the Brahman. This is the path of the gods, this is the path to the Brahman. Those who proceed on this path do not return to this human cycle (of samsara)”. (Chhand. Up. IV. 15.5 and 6.) Therefore also that Person who is within the eye is the Supreme Self. अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः Sūtra 18. Anavasthiterasambhavāchcha netaraḥ. (50) Other things (than the Brahman) cannot be (the Person within the eye, because they do not (always) exist (therein) and because also it is impossible (for them to possess the qualities attributed to Him in the context). Things like the image reflected (within the eye) do not always exist within the eye; and unconditioned attributes like immortality are not appropriate in relation to them. Therefore, things other than the Supreme Self, such as the reflected image (within the eye) do not deserve to be the Person within the eye. Surely, the image reflected (within the eye) is depend. ent upon the proximity of another person, and therefore it cannot possibly be invariably (within the eye). In order to co-operate harmoniously with the activity of all the senses the individual self has to be in a particular position (i. e., the heart) which is at the root of all the senses. Accord- -ngly, he does not exist within the eye. The deity (sun)

44 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. also does not abide within the eye; because, in the passage “He (ie., the person within the sun) is through his rays established in Him (i.e., in the Person within the eye)”. (Brih. Up. V. 5. 2)-he is said to exist (within the eye) by means of his rays, and because also it is possible for him, who is situated in another place (than within them), to preside over the senses. It is (also) altogether impossible for all these things (other than the Supreme Self) to possess unconditioned immortality and other such attributes. Therefore the Person within the eye is the Supreme Self. ADHIKARANA IV. ANTARYAMYADHIKARANA Under the aphorism-“Because also existence, etc., (within the eye) are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self)” (Ved. Sut. I. 2.14.)-it was assumed that existence and (the power of) control, etc., as within the eye, which are mentioned in the passage beginning with-“He who dwelling within the eye, etc.,” (Brih. Up. III. 7.18) belong only to the Supreme Self. And (on that assumption), it was established that the Person abiding within the eye is the Supreme Self. Now he (the Sutrakāra) proves that same (assumption to be true). अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् Sutra 19. Antaryamyadhidaivā dhilokā dishu taddharmavyapadešāṭ, (51) Adhik. IV, Süt. 19] INTERNAL RULER 45 The Internal Ruler. (spoken of) in the passages (severally) named adhidaiva, adhiloka, etc.,447 (is the Brahman), because His attributes are declared (t herein). , (Both) the divisions of the Vajasaneyins, (namely), the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas, declare in their scripture thus:“He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth from within-He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self.” (Brih. Up. III. 7.3.) Similarly -in all the deities such as (those of) water, fire, mid-air air, sun, space, moon, stars, sky, darkness and light; and in all beings; and also in the individual self, and in the things relating to the individual self, such as life, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, seed-a particular Being is pointed out as dwelling in each of them, as existing within each of them, as incapable of being known by each of them, as having each of them for His body, and as controlling each of them. And then it is declared-“He (i.e., that Being) is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self”. However, in the recension of the Madhyandinas, there are the following (additional) readings-“He who dwell- ing in all the worlds etc.,’ “He who (dwelling) in all the Vedas, etc.,” “He who (dwelling) in all the sacrifices etc.” 39 447. The context is Brih. Up. III. 7, known as the Antaryǎmi- brahmana, where in answer to Uddalaka’s questions Yajnavalkya explains that the Brahman is the Internal Controller of everything in the universe including the indi- vidual soul, The Upanishad bas two versions, that of the Kanvas and that of the Madhyandinas in Kan. Brik. Up. III. 7. 14, the listing of the deities in whom the Internal Controler is present, is concluded after mentioning those presiding over the earth, the waters, fire, mid-air, air, the sun, space, the quarters, the moon. stars, sky, dark ess and light. The conclusion of the topic is announced thus: Ityadhidaiva- tam (1 hus far the subject relating to the deities). The Madh. Brih. Up. 111. 7. has addition ally senten- ces about the presence of the Internal Controller in all the worlds and concluding with the statement, Ityadhilokam (1 hus far the subject relating to the worlds). Sankara’s reading of the Sutra, which omits adhiloka, does not clearly introduce the Madhyan- diņa version into the context, 46 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. Moreover, in place of the reading-“He, who dwelling within the vijñāna, etc.,” (Kan. Brih. Up. III. 7.22), there is the alternative reading-” He, who dwelling within the self etc.," (Madh. Bṛih. Up. III. 7.22) And there is this peculiarity also, that (in place of the reading esha te’ntaryamyamritaḥ) there is (the reading) sa te’ntaryām" yamritaḥ. Here the doubt arises whether that ‘internal ruler’ is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? Because in the remaining part of the (context wherein this) passage (occurs), namely, in “He is the seer, the hearer, etc.,” (Brih. Up. III. 7.23.), it is mentioned that that being’s knowledge is dependent upon the senses and because also he who ‘sees’ thus (i.e., through the senses) is himself taught to be the internal ruler, and again because other seers (than such an individual self) are declared to be non- existent in the statement." There is no seer other than he." (Brih. Up. III. 7.23). If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply:-" The Inter- nal Ruler (spoken of) in the passages (severally) named adhidaiva, adhiloka, etc., (is the Brahman), because His attributes are declared (therein)". (Ved. Sut I. 2.19). He who is declared to be the Internal Ruler in the scriptural passages named adhidaiva, adhiloka, etc., is that Nārāyaṇa who is free from all sins and is the Supreme Self. Both the expressions, adhidaiva and adhiloka, are mentioned (in this sutra), with the object of drawing attention to the fact that, in the recension of Mädhyandinas, the passages named adhiloka etc., are to be found in addition to the passages named adhidaiva, etc., which (latter alone) are found in the recension of the Kanvas. Accordingly, the meaning is this, that the Internal Ruler mentioned in both the sets of passages is the Supreme Self. Why? “Because His attributes are declared (therein).” Indeed, this is the attribute of the Supreme Self, that, beingAdhik. IV, Sut. 19] INTERNAL RULER 47 one only, He controls all worlds, all beings, all gods, etc. Thus, the question of Uddālaka begins with the passage- “He who controls this world and the next world and all these beings from within”, and ends with the passage– “Tell me about that Internal Ruler.” (Brih. Up.III. 7.1. and 2.) And the answer thereunto is given (in the context) beginn- ing with the passage-“He, who dwelling within the earth, etc.” (Brih. Up. III. 7.3). Consequently, to enter into all worlds, all beings, all gods, all Vedas and all sacrifices, and then to control them in all the various ways, and to form the Self of all, through having all things for His body-all this is not possible to any one other than the Highest Person who is omniscient and wills the truth. Accordingly, the following Upanishadic passages– “He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all” (Taitt. Är. III. 21.); “Having created it, He entered into that world; having entered into that (world), He became the sat and tyat” 448 (Taitt. Up. II. 6.1)-and others like them declare that the character of being the Ruler of all and of being the Self of all, etc., belongs only to the Supreme Self. Similarly, in the Subala Upanishad there is (the section beginning with) the passage-“In the beginning (i.e., before creation) nothing (i.e., no created thing) was existent; all these created beings were born from no (previously created) source and from no (previously created) basis.449 Only the Divine Lord Nārāyana (was). The sense of sight and the object of sight are Nārāyaṇa, the sense of hearing and the object of hearing are Nārāyaṇa”. (Sub. Up. VI.). There is that which, (i.e., another section following it which) begins with the passage-" The one eternal Being w is unborn is placed in the ‘cave’ within the body", and 448, Vide Vol. 1. Note 183. 449 This sentence can also be rendered thus. “In the beginning (ie., before creation), nothing (.e. no created thing) was ex stent- nothing which lacked a sou ce or which was without a basis; (then) all these created beings were born,” 48 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Part 1. therein it is said-"(He) whose body is mrityu, 450 who is moving within mrityu, whom mrityu does not know, He is the Internal Self of all beings, He is free from all sins, He is the Divine Lord, the only Nārāyaṇa". (Sub. Up. VII). Here the characteristic qualities of being the Self of all, of having all things for His body, and of being the controller of all, are attributed only to the Highest Brahman. More- over, such immortality as is independently due to one’s own intrinsic nature forms the characteristic attribute of the Supreme Self alone. Again, the quality of being the seer and other such (qualities) possessed by the Brahman are not dependent upon the senses, but are on the contrary independently due to His own intrinsic nature itself: they are due to the fact that He, in Himself, possesses the power of being omnisc- ient and of willing the truth. Moreover, the scripture declares the same thus: “He sees without eyes, hears without ears, without hands and feet He grasps things and moves quickly”. (Svet. Up. III. 19.). Further, the expressions ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’, and such others do not denote the knowledge born out of the senses like the sense of sight, but on the contrary (denote) the direct perception of colour (or form) and such other things. And this direct perception of colour (or form) and such other things is in the case of the individual self, the intelligence constituting whose intrinsic nature is enveloped by karma- born out of the senses like the sense of sight. But in the case of the Supreme Self, that (perceptive realisation) is entirely and independently due to His own intrinsic nature. Moreover, the passage-“There is no other seer than Him”-(Brih. Up. III. 7. 23)-says that there is no seer other than (i.e., equal or superior to) that seer, who is the 450. This word means prakriti or matter here. Adhik. İV, Šūt. 20] INTERNAL RULER 49 Controller mentioned in the previous passages. In a previous part (of the context) by means of the passages “whom the earth does not know”-(Brih. Up. III. 7. 3) “whom the self does not know”-(Mdh. Bṛih .Up. III. 7. 22.) and by means of other similar passages, it has been declared that He (i.e., the Controller referred to already) controls the earth, the self and such other controlled objects, (Himself being) altogether unperceived by them. That same idea is summed up in the statement-“He sees without being seen, and hears without being heard” (Brih. Up. III. 7. 23); and then by means of the statement, beginning with- “There is no seer other than Him” (Brih. Up. III. 7. 23), it is declared that there is no other controller to control Him who is the (only) Controller. In the sentences esha te ātmā (‘This is your Self’) and sa te ātmā (‘He is your Self’), the individual self is pointed out by the word te (‘your") which stands in a different grammatical case (from that of the words eshaḥ and saḥ which denote the Brahman), and (hence) the Internal Ruler who is taught to be the Self (of the individual self) cannot possibly be (such) an individual self. न च स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिल/पाच्छारीरश्व 451 Sūtra 20. Na cha smartam ataddharmībhilāpāch- chharirascha. (52) That which is dealt with in the Smriti (of Kapila) and also that which is the embodied being do not form (the Internal Ruler); because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context). 451. Sankara reads this Sutra without the last two words, Sari- rascha, which are transferred to the beginning of the next Sutra. Ramanuja’s version has the advantage of clearly showing that the pradhana is brought in only by way of illustration to indicate [1, 3 3 -7. that the attributes in question can apply as little to the individual self as to insentien: matter. Moreover, the tautology arising from the presence of both sarirah and enam in Sutra 21 is avoided. 50 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part II. “That which is dealt with in the Smriti (of Kapila)” is the pradhana (or material Nature). “That which is the embodied being” is the individual self. That which is dealt with in the Smriti (of Kapila, viz., the pradhana) and that which is the embodied being (viz., the individual self) do not formt he Internal Ruler; “because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context)”; that is, because attributes which cannot appropriately belong to them are mentioned (in the context). To possess, independently and by one’s own intrinsic nature, the character of being the seer of all, of being the controller of all, of being the Self of all and also to possess an altogether independent immortality, cannot in the least be the characteristic attributes of those two things (viz., the pradhana and the purusha). What is said is this. Just as the non-intelligent thing, pradhāna, that is, that which is dealt with in the Smriti (of Kapila), does not deserve to be omniscient, to be the controller of all, to be the Self of all, and to have other such attributes-so also the individual self (does not deserve to possess these attributes), because its characteristic attributes are other (than these). The appropriateness of the attribution of these attri- butes to the Supreme Self as well as the appropriateness of the non-attribution (of them) to the individual self was demonstrated by means of the two (preceding) aphorisms. Here he (the Sūtrakāra) gives another independent reason (to prove that the Internal Ruler is different from the individual self). उभयेsपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते anàsfa fa Sutra 21. Ubhaye’pi hi bhedenainamadhiyate. (53) Indeed both (the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas) declare in their scriptures that this (ie., the individual self) is different (from the Internal Ruler). Adhik, V, Sut, 22] INVISIBLE BEING 51 Both, that is, the Madhyandinas and the Kanvas, differentiate and classify this, that is, the individual self, along with such non-intelligent things as speech, etc., for the reason that it is (like them) subject to the control of the Internal Ruler; and (they) declare it accordingly in their scriptures. The Madhyandinas say “He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self within-He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self”. (Madh. Bṛih. Up. III. 7. 22). And the Kanvas say “He who dwelling in the vijñāna, etc.” (Kāṇva. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22). The meaning s that they declare in their scriptures this (the individual self) to be quite distinct from Him, for the reason that it is controlled by (Him) the Supreme Self. Therefore, it is conclusively proved that the Internal Ruler (dealt with here) is the Supreme Self, Nārāyaña, who is quite distinct from the individual self and is free from all sins. ADHIKARANA V ADṚISYATVĀDIGUŅAKĀDHIKARAŅA. भदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोः Sūtra 22. Adriśyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ. (54) That Being who is characterised by invisi- bility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context).“452 45%. The context is in Mund Up52 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part 11. The Atharvanikas read in their scriptures thus :-” And that is the higher knowledge (vidya) by which that Akshara (or Indestructible Being) is known-that (Being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has no family (or which has no name), which has no colour, no eyes, no ears: That which has no hands and no feet, and That which the wise see as the source of all beings, is the eternal, the omnipresent, the all-pervading, the extremely subtle, and the imperishable One". (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6.). Similarly, (they read) further on :-" He is higher than what is beyond the akshara (aksharat parataḥ paraḥ)". (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2.) Here the doubt is raised whether the akshara, possess. ing invisibility and other such attributes, and the Being, which is higher than what is beyond the akshara, are (respectively) the prakriti (i.e., material Nature,) and the purusha (i.e., the individual self), or whether it is the Supreme Self Himself (who is so mentioned) in both (the contexts). It is perhaps held to be right that they are the prakriti and the purusha. Why? Because in regard to this akshara here, there is no predication of any of those special attributes of an intelligent being, such as the character of being the seer, etc., as there is in passages like “He sees without being seen”. (Brih. Up. III. 7. 23). And in the statement–" He is higher than the superior akshara (aksharat parataḥ parah)" (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2), the individual soul, who is higher than the undifferentiated prakriti (or material Nature) which is above all modifications, is referred to as the samashti-purusha (or the aggregate of individual selves). What is said is this. The negation of visibility and the other qualities inherent in the non-intelligent earth and the other elements, which possess form (or colour) etc., in their gross condition, posits certainly that (other) non. intelligent thing which is in the subtle condition and is Adhik. V, Sūt. 22] HOW ‘AKSHARA’ CREATES 53 of the same kind as the earth and the other elements,453 And that (non-intelligent thing) is nothing other than the pradhana (or material Nature). Moreover, it is very well known that the quality of being higher than that (pradhāna) belongs only to the samashți-purusha (or the aggregate of individual selves). And the pradhana, abided in (or governed) by that (purusha) evolves all the modifications beginning with the ‘great principle’ and ending with the ‘particular principles ‘.454 Accordingly, here in this context, the following illustrative examples are given-" Just as the spider sends out and draws in its thread, just as medicinal herbs grow out of the earth, just as hairs on the head and on the body spring forth from a living person, similarly this whole universe is born out of the akshara". ‘55 (Mund. Up. I. 1. 7.). Therefore, in this context, it is only the pradhāna (or material Nature) and the purusha (or the individual self) that are taught about. 453. The purvapuksha here is based on the fact that akshara in Mund. Up. 1 1. 2 undoubtedly means the prakriti (or matter) in its undifferentiated condition. 1 t is therefore argued that the word is used in the same sense in I, 1, 6 also. Rāmānuja demonstrates that akshara is used to mean the Brahman in 1. 1. 6 and the prakriti in I 1. 2. The qualities negated of or attributed to the Akshara in I, 1.6 show Him to be the Brahman: The objector, however, points out that, by the negation of visibil ty and other qualities in I. 1. 6, the akshara is denied to be gross matter, but affirmed to be something similar or akin to it: and this something is matter in its subtle or ndifferen- tiated condition. The argument is something like sayin: that when a man says, This is not a dog,’ he means a cat or a wolf or some creature resembling a dog, and not a man or a mountain or something far dissimilar. T? 454. Vide Vol. I, Notes 91. 169 and 170, 455. The illustrations are intended to show that by knowing a material cause its effects are known. The spider, the soil and the liv ng person indicate respec- tively that the prakriti can evolve when governed by ind vidual souls, or when not so governed, or when they are merely present. As applied to the Brahman, they help us to under tand how one and the same thing can be both the mateiral and the efficient cause, and how the material cause need not be destroyed or concealed during the production of the effect. The spider suggests how the Brahman creates the universe out of Himself and dr.ws it within Himself during the process, of dissolution. From the example of the earth we see that the material cause can remain undestroyed and unconcealed even after producing the effect. The growth of hair and nails points out the possibility of the non-living springing from the living. 54 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I. Part I. If it be so held, we state in reply :-“That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)”. (Ved. Sut. I. 2. 22). He who possesses invisibility and other such attributes, as well as He who is higher than what is beyond the akshara (aksharat paratah parah) is the Highest Person Himself. Why? “Because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)”. 11 In the passage beginning with-“He who understands all and who knows all, etc.,’ (Mund. Up. 1. 1. 9), omnisc ience and other attributes, which belong only to Him, are mentioned. Thus in the passage, beginning with-“By which (vidya or knowledge) that Akshara is known”, (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6), the Akshara possessing invisibility and other such attributes is mentioned; then in the statement- The whole universe is born out of the Akshara” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 7)-it is further mentioned that the universe is evolved out of that (Akshara) and then, in the passage- “He who understands all, and who knows all and whose tapas456 consists of knowledge, from Him proceeds the undifferentiated creation, as also the world of matter and soul characterised by the differentiations of name and form” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 9)-the quality of omniscience and other similar attributes are attributed to that Akshara which is (thus) the source of all beings; afterwards, by means of the passage" He is higher (parah) than what is beyond the akshara" (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2), that same Akshara, which is the source of all beings and is omniscient and which is dealt with in the context here as possessing the attribute of invisibility, that alone is called the Highest (parah). Hence in the statement, aksharāt paratah parah, the word akshara in the ablative case does not denote that (other) Akshara (or Supreme Self) which is mentioned in the context as being possessed of invisibility and other such 456, Vide Vol. I, Note 345, Adhik. V, Sut. 23] “AKSHARA” IS GOD 55 attributes; because, owing to that Omniscient Being being the cause of the universe, and being (also) the Highest of all, none other than Him can possess the quality of being the Highest (paratva). Therefore, the word akshara here denotes the non- intelligent thing (matter) in its subtle elementary condition. विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ Sūtra 23. Viseshaṇabhedavyapadesābhyāñcha netarau.(55 Because also the context mentions the characteristic attributes of, and the distinction (between, the pradhāna or matter and the purusha or the individual soul on one hand and the Supreme Self on the other, that (Akshara who is the source of all things) is not those other two things (viz., m.tter and soul). For this reason also, that (Akshara which is the source of all beings) is not the pradhana (material Nature) and the purusha (the individual self). Indeed, the context distinc- tively qualifies (that Akshara by means of special characterising attributes). The meaning is that it distinguishes that Akshara, which is the source of all beings, from the pradhana and also from the purusha, by enuncia- ting and proving the proposition that, by knowing a certain One Thing (viz., this Akshara), all things become known, and (also) by other similar means. Similarly, the distinction of the Akshara from both of them (i.e., from the pradhāna and the purusha,) is mentioned in the passage “He is higher than what is beyond the akshara”, and in others following it. Accordingly, in the passage-" He taught his eldest son, Atharva, that science of the Brahman which is the foundation of all other sciences " (Mund. Up. I. 1. 1.)— 56 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part II. the science of the Brahman, which forms the foundation of of all other sciences,457 is dealt with in the context; undoubt. edly the higher science of the Highest Brahman (referred to in the context) forms the foundation of all other sciences. With the desire of knowing this above-mentioned science, which forms the foundation of all (other kinds of) sciences, and which had been learnt by Angiras in due order of succession from the line of teachers consisting of the four- faced Brahma (the creator), Atharva etc., the famous Saunaka, known as Mahāśāla (i.e., the owner of a great mansion), approached Angiras in accordance with the rules of discipline laid down therefor, and questioned him thus- “Reverend sir, by knowing which indeed does all this (universe) become known?” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 3). Bearing in mind that the science of the Brahman forms the foundation of all (other kinds of) science, and that in consequence, by knowing the Brahman all things become known, he (i.e., Saunaka) made his question relate to the essential nature of the Brahman. “He (i.e., the preceptor) said to him (i.e., Šaunaka): (It is) that (for attaining) which those who know the Brahman say that there are, in fact, two sciences to be known, namely, the undeniably higher one, and similarly, the lower (one)” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 4). “Two sciences have to be known” by him who is desirous of attaining the Brahman. The meaning is that there are two accepted kinds of knowledge which relate to the Brahman, and may respectively be characterised as direct and indirect. Of these, the indirect form (of knowledge) is obtained by means of the scriptures; the direct from (of knowledge) is obtained by means of (the process of mental concentration known as) yoga. Of these two (forms of knowledge), that which con- stitutes the means of (directly) attaining the Brahman is the 457. The implied argument here is that, as all things are included in the Brahman all sciences are included in the science of the Brahman.Adhik. V, Sut. 23] MEANS FOR ‘BHAKTI’ 57 direct form of knowledge; and this must assume the charac- ter of loving devotion, because it is particularly stated so in this same (context) in the passage-" Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached". (Mund. Up. III. 2. 3.).458 And what is required for the acquisition of that (loving devotion) is knowledge born of the scriptures and functioning along with the seven means known as discrimination, etc.,159 for it is declared (elsewhere) in the scripture to the effect that " Brahmaņas desire to know Him by reciting the Vedas, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting". (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 22) Moreover, the venerable Parasara says (the same things) thus:-“The means of acquiring it (viz., loving devotion), O great sage, are knowledge and religious works. And this knowledge is said to be of two kinds, namely, that which is born out of the scriptures and that which is produced by discrimination also “. (V. P. VI. 5. 60-61.) In the passage, beginning with-” Of these, the lower (knowledge) is the Rig-veda, the Yajurveda”, and ending with-" the Dharma-sastras “460 (Mund. Up. I. 1. 5.) that indirect form of knowledge is mentioned which is produced by means of the šāstras and forms the means of realising the Brahman; because the Vedas together with their auxiliary sciences,461 with the Itihasas and the Puranas, with the 458. Th’s po nt is made clear in Vol I. p. 18: “For it is indeed the dearest one that becomes worthy to be chosen. 1o whom- soever He is unsurpassingly dear, he alone is the dearest to ruim.” 459. These seven means are given in a quotation fron the Vakya-kara and explained in Vol. 1, pp. 20-21. “Functioning along with” is the rendering for anugrihitam, which literally means helped on by ‘. As the Śrutaprakásikă points out and the quotation immediately following II. S.B-8. from the Vishnu Purana makes clear, the independen’ c use for produc ng loving devotion to God’ seven means are an 460. Mund. Up. (I. I. 5) in Sankara’s version describes the lower science or knowledge as consisting of the four Vedas and the six Vedingas. It refers also additionally to the Itihasas, the Puranas and the Dharma-Sastras in Ramanuja’s version, 461. The auxiliary sciences are the Vedāngas, about which please see Vol. 1, Note 7. 58 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part I. Dharma-sastras, and also with the Mimämsäs, are the means of producing the knowledge relating to the Brahman. (What is taught) in the passage-” And that is the higher (vidya or knowledge) by which that Akshara is known (Mund. Up. I. 1. 5.)-is the ‘knowledge’ which is called worship, and has acquired the character of loving devotion and is peculiarly capable of giving rise to the realisation of the Brahman. 17 In the passage, beginning with “That which is invisible, which cannot be seized” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6), what is declared is the essential nature of the Highest Brahman, who is the object of both these kinds of knowledge, named indirect and direct. By means of the passage, beginning with-“Just as the spider sends forth and draws in its thread” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 7), what is stated is the evolution of the whole universe, made up of intelligent and non- intelligent things, out of that Akshara, which is the Highest Brahman having the above-mentioned nature. From the mention of the whole universe (visva)462 (here in the context), it is not merely (the world of) non- intelligent things (that is said to have been evolved out of It). In the passage “The Brahman grows by means of tapas ; anna is born out of Him; from anna are born life (or the principal vital air), mind, satya (i.e., the collection of all embodied souls), the various kinds of worlds, and immor- tality as a result of (ritualistic) works.” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 8)-the manner in which the whole universe is born out of the Brahman (as cause) is described. By means of tapas’ means ’ by means of knowledge’; because it is stated further on thus-“His tapas consists of knowledge.” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 9). Grows’ means ‘increases’. The meaning is that the Brahman becomes desirous of creating (the world), in consequence of possessing the mental state which is of the 462. Visva is taken ly the turvapakshin to mean only the world of non-intelligent things. This is refuted here. Adhik. V, Süt. 23] CREATION BY AKSHARA’ 59 nature of a resolution to the effect-May I become manifold’. (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3). « Anna is born out of Him." Anna (here) is that which is eaten (or enjoyed). The meaning is that the undifferen- tiated subtle elements, forming the objects of enjoyment to the whole world of enjoyers (i.e., souls) are born out of the Highest Brahman. And the whole totality of modified products like life (or the principal vital air), manas (or the internal organ of attention), etc., up to and inclusive of the ritualistic works, that form the means of attaining results in the form of svarga and of final release, is produced out of that same (anna). In the passage, 463 beginning with-" He who knows all and understands all" (Mund. Up. I. 1.9.), the quality of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, and other such qualities, which together form the auxiliary helps in the work of creation, are all mentioned. Out of the Brahman (in the condition of a cause), who is omniscient, wills the truth and is the Akshara, this (etat) is born, namely, the Brahman, who is in the condition of effect, and is differen. tiated by name and form and consists of the enjoyers and things to be enjoyed. statement-“This Being mentioned above is Up. I. 2. 1.)-declares the The eternally existent " (Mund. 463. This mantra, which has been translated on p. 51 may be thus paraphrased: “He who knows all things and understands all things thoroughly in all their modes and their full connotation, and whose inner mental effort of thinking and willing is of the form of know- ledge from Him who is the

Brahman in the condition of cause and who is characterised by the will to create, proceeds this undifferentiated creation which is the Brahman in the condition of effect, as also, evolving therefrom, the anna or the world of matter and soul characterised by differ- entiations of name and form”.
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[Chap. I, Part II.
unconditioned reality of the Brahman. There is the passage-“Whatever ritualistic works the seers saw in the mantras, those (works) became manifold in the treta (or the three Fires). Desiring the Truth (or the Real), do you adopt those (works).” (Mund. Up. I. 2. 1).464 The meaning is-you, who desire the indestructible (akshara) Person, who is the home of auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and the quality of willing the truth, and who is Himself the Truth, do (you), for the purpose of attaining Him, desist from (works yielding) other fruits, and perform all those (ritualistic) works which have been taught by seers in the Rig, the Yajus, the Saman and the Atharvan, and which are appropriate to the various conditions and stages of life, and have (further) become manifold in relation to the treta fires.
In the pasage, beginning with-“This is your path”, and ending with-” This is your world of Brahmā,
(the
464, Hereafter Mund. Up. I. 2 is taken up. The first mantra, except for the last sentence, is understood as describing the performance of rituals by one who is desirous of attaining the Brahman: “This Being men- tioned above is eternally existent. Whatever ritualistic works the seers saw in the mantras, those (works) became manifold in the treta (i.e., the three sacrificial fires). Desiring the Truth, do you adopt those (works).” The last sentence refers to those who desire other things than moksha: This is your world of Brahma, (the world) due to your merit and good works." This theme is contin:ed in I. 2. 2-10. Of these, the conclusion of I. 2. 6 is quoted, and then 1. 2. 7 is quoted in full. Then the teaching reverts to those who aspire after salvation: “Those wise men indeed who live in the forest, following the way of the (religious)
mendicant, who are tranquil and who are devoted to the Brahman and to faith in Him-they, passing through the doorway of the sun and free of all taint, reach the place where is the immortal Purusha whose nature (or divine body), is changeless (11). Having examined the worlds obtained by works, let a Brahmana acquire freedom from all desires, The changeless is not gained by the changeable; to know that, let him approach, with fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in the Vedas and has a sure footing in the Brahman. To him (ie., to such a pupil), who, with restrained senses and fully tranquilled mind, has thus approached him (i.e., the preceptor), that wise man (the guru) should speak of (i.e, teach) that knowledge of the Brahman by which the ever existent and indestructible Person is know. (12-13)’’
Adhik. V, Sut. 23]
WORKS & WISDOM
61
world) due to your merit and good works” (Mund. Up. I. 2. 1 to 6), the manner in which ritualistic works are to be performed is mentioned; (it is also mentioned therein) that, by omitting to perform any one of the ritualistic works enjoined either by the śrutis or the smritis, other similar works (connected therewith), though well performed, fail to produce their results, and that the wrong perform- ance (of ritualistic works) is equal to no performance at all. Then, by means of the passage, beginning with-" Frail indeed are these floats in the form of sacrifices. To those
who perform them, this knowledge of works, which is associated with the eighteen,463 is (really) inferior (in value). Those fools, who rejoice in the belief that this sacrificial work is itself the final good, again and again do they pass through old age and death." (Mund. Up. I. 2. 7), it is declared that those, who, being previously attached in mind to the results (of ritualistic works), and being also destitute of knowledge, perform ritualistic works which are lower (in their nature) have frequently to return to this world.
Then (again) by means of the passage, beginning with- “Those indeed who adopt tapas (i.c., the Brahman) and faith” (Mand. Up. I. 2. 11.), it is eulogistically declared that ritualistic works, performed without attachment to their results by one who possesses knowledge, are capable of leading one to the attainment of the Brahman. Then by means of the passage, beginning with “After examining the worlds” (Mund. Up. I. 2. 12), it is enjoined that he, who is not attached to the results of mere works, and is desirous of arriving at that knowledge which is helped on by works, as already stated, and forms the means of attaining the Brahman, should necessarily approach a preceptor.
465. These eighteen are probab- ly the sacrificer, his wife and the
II. S.B-9.
sixteen pitviks or priests required for certain elaborate sacrifices,62
SRI-BMASHYA
[Chap. Í, Part II.
Then46 by means of the passage, beginning with- “Now this is the Eternal Reality. Just as from a well lighted fire, etc.,” and ending with-“My dear friend, he loosens here the knot of ignorance (or avidya)” (Mund. Up. II. 1. 1 to 10.), it is clearly declared that the Akshara mentioned above, who (as mentioned above) is the source of all beings, the Highest Brahman and the Highest Person, forms, along with all the unexpressed (but implied) 467 attributes apper- taining to His own nature, the Internal Self of all beings, and is thus in the form of the universe, inasmuch as He has the universe for His body: (and it is also clearly declared therein) that the creation of the universe proceeds from Him.
Then, by means of the passage, 468 beginning with– “(The Akshara that is perceived by the yogins as) the near
466. Here Mund. Up. II. 1 is taken up.
“Now this is the Eter- nal Reality, Just as from a well- lighted fire sparks similar to it come out in thousands, even so, dear friend, from the Akshara proceed various kinds of beings, and they get dissolved in Him alone. (1). That Person is certainly divine, is unembodied, exists within and without, and is indeed unborn. He does not breathe, has no mind, is pure and is undoubtedly higher than what is beyond the aksharu. (2). The celestial world of fire is His head, His two eyes are the sun and the moon, His two ears the quarters, the Vedas are His uttered speech, His breath is all the moving air, His heart is the whole universe, His two fest are the earth. Indeed He is the Inter- nal Self of all beings. (4)…(He as) the Self is indeed all the universe. (His) work (of creation) is thought. He is the nectar to the (freed) soul transcending matter (brahman). My dear friend, he who realises Him as located in the cavity of the
heart–he loosens here the knot of ignorance. (10)”
467. The attributes described as ‘unexpressed’ really seem to be expressed here.
468. Ramanuja now sums up the rest of the Upanishad, starting with I1. 2. The following mantras may help to illustrate the several points in his outline: (1 hat Akshara) is near (being real sed by the yogins as present) in the cav.ty (of the heart) and is indeed the great object of attainment (for all). This (is to be known), that whatever vibrates (in wake- fulness), whatever breathes and whatever sleeps rest on Him. Know this. He is the support of whatever is gross and whatever is subtle. He is more to be honoured than the individual self. He is the most sought after by the people 2. 1). The pranava (or the sylla- ble Om) is said to be the bow, the individual self the arrow and the Supreme Brahman the target, With unswerving concentration should it be shot. Let him (i.e., the individual self) become one with
(II
Adhi. V, Sut. 23]
GOD DISTINGUISHED
63
(at heart)” (Mund. Up. II. 2. 1.), it is taught that that same Highest Brahman, who is the Akshara, is higher than even the purusha (i.e, the individual self) that is beyond the undifferentiated prakriti (or material Nature), who is seated in the highest heaven, whose essential nature is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, is to be worshipped in the cavity of the heart in a particular way; (it is also taught here) that worship is, in nature, the same as the highest kind of loving devotion, and that (in consequence) the worshipper obtains, after the removal of ignorance (or avidya), as the fruit (of his worship), the experience of the Brahman’ which (experience) is the same as becoming like unto the Brahman. Thus it (viz., the context here) is concluded.
Accordingly, there being the above-mentioned charac- terisation, and there being also the declaration of the difference (between matter, soul and God), the pradhana (material Nature) and the purusha (individual self) are not taught in this context. Indeed, the declaration also of the distinction of the Highest Brahman from them (ie., from the pradhana and the purusha), is found here in the following and other passages :-“That Person is certainly
Him like the arrow (with the target). (II. 2. 4). Hs who knows all (things) and understands all (things thoroughly in their full connotation), and to whom belongs this sovereign glory on earth-this Atman is established in the city of the Brahman in the Highest Heaven. (II, 2. 7). te is to le apprehended (only) by the (pure) mind, He is the Lord of life (which is His body), He is establ shed in the anna (ie., the body). Placing (on Him) the heart (i e., the mind), the wise see by concentrated medi- tation (which is the hi hest kind of devotion) that Immortal (Brahman) who shines as (pure) bliss. (11, 2 8). When He who is (the soul of) the highest and the lowest is seen, the knot of the heart is broken, doubts are all shatterted, and his karmas perish,
11.2,9) When the wise seer sees that Person, who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material uni- verse, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the Brahman). (II. 1. 3). Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man. freed from name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher than the highest. (III. 2. 8) He who knows the Brahman becomes (like unto) the Brahman. In his family there will be none without know- lodge of the Brahman. He crosses beyond sorrow, beyond sin. Freed from the knots of the cave (of the heart), he becomes immortal, (III. 2. 9).
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[Chap. I, Part II.
divine, unembodied, exists within and without, and is indeed unborn. He does not breathe, has no mind, is pure, and is undoubtedly higher than what is beyond the akshara”. (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2). The meaning is, that he, who is beyond the akshara, that is, beyond undifferentiated matter, is the collectively named purusha (or individual self), and He who is higher than even that (collective purusha), and possesses invisibility and other such attributes, and is (also) denoted by the word Akshara, is the Supreme Self.
The word Akshara may be derived from the root as-to pervade-(and may be understood) as that which pervades; or (derived) from the root kshar-to flow out or to come out from-(and may be understood) as that which has not come out of anything else as its modification. Therefore it is somehow or other possible469 even for undifferentiated matter to be denoted by the word akshara, either because it is pervasively present (in a subtle state) in all its own modifications, or because, unlike mahat etc., it does not flow out of any other things, so as to deserve to be called by a separate name (from that of that other thing).
Sūtra 24.
रूपोपन्यासाच्च
Rūpopanyasachcha. (56)
Because also (His universal) form is de- scribed (in the context under reference, that Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes is the Supreme Self).
469. Since akshara cannot here mean the Brahman, it is shown etymologically to be capable of referring to prakriti in two ways. In one case, the reference is to the pervasion of the gross, evolved matter that we see around us everywhere by the still unevolved
portion of subtle, primordia,! undifferentiated matter. Alterna- tively, the reference is to the fact that primordial matter is not evolved from anything else like each of its evolutes, beginning with mahat. For these evolutes, please see Vol. I, Note 169)
Adhik, VI, Süt, 25]
‘VAISVANARA’ IS GOD 65
There is this passage (in the context under reference)- “The celestial world of fire (agni) is His head, His two eyes are the sun and the moon, His two ears are the quarters, the Vedas are His uttered speech, His breath is all the moving air, His heart is the whole universe, His two feet are the earth. Indeed, He is the Internal Self of all beings” (Mund. Up. II. 1. 4). Such a (universal) form as this belongs only to the Supreme Self who is the Internal Self of all beings. Therefore, that (Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes) is the Supreme Self.
ADHIKARANA VI
VAIŠVĀNARĀDHIKARAṆA
वैश्वानरस्साधारणशब्दविशेषात्
Sūtra 25. Vaiśvānarassādhāraṇaŝabdaviśeshāt. (57)
Vaiśvānara (means the Supreme Self)’ because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification.
Beginning the context with the passage-“You now worship this Vaišvānara who is the same as the Self. Teach that same Being to us……” ((Chhand. Up. V. 11. 6.)-the Chhandogas declare therein as follows: “And he who worships this Vaisvānara, who is such and is measured only by the regions of space (such as heaven), and who is (really) immeasurable…” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 1).
Here the doubt arises whether the Atman, known as ‘Vaiśvānara’, may possibly be determined to be the
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[Chap. I, Part II.
Supreme Self or not.470 It is perhaps held that it is not possible so to determine it. Why? Because the word vaisvānara is seen to be used in four (different)
ignifications.
For example, it is used to denote the digestive heat of the stomach in this passage-“This ‘vaisvanara’ fire…is that by which the food that is eaten is digested. That which one hears, when one has the ears closed, is the noise thereof. When one is departing from this life, then one does not hear this noise”. (Bṛih. Up. V. 9. 1.). It is used to denote also the third of the (five) great elements in the following passage-“For the sake of the whole world, the gods made the ‘vaisvānara’ fire (or the element of light and heat) into the sun, who distinguishes the day (from the night)”. (R. V. X. 88. 12). And that (word vaiśvānara) denote a god in this passage-" May we be in the good graces of Vaisvānara. Indeed, he is the king who has a halo of glory (all around)". (R. V. I. 98. 1).
S
It is also used to denote the Supreme Self, as in the following passages-“Therefore, he threw himself into the Atman, the Fire within the heart, named ‘Vaisvānara.”(?) “This same Vaišvānara, known also as ‘Life’ and ‘Fire’ rises, having the whole universe for His body.” (Pr. Up. I. 7). Moreover, the characterising attributes, occurring in the opening passages of the context and elsewhere, are (all) capable of being understood in harmony with all these (significations).
If it be so held, it is stated in reply-" Vaiśvānara (means the Supreme Self), because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification". (Ved. Süt. I. II. 25.). Vaiśvānara (means) the Supreme Self. Why?
470. The objection here is to the effect that the true meaning of
• Vaisvan ara’ in this context cannot be determined. It may
have any one of its four meanings, The Upanishad has certainly used the word in some definite sense, 1 but we are unabe to determine it,Adhik. VÌ, Sūt. 251
SAGES ASK AŚVAPATI
67
""
“Because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification”. That which specially qualifies is " a special qualification (višėsha); and (so) the meaning is-
vaiśvānara is specially characterised by the particular attributes belonging to the Supreme Self.
because the common term
Accordingly (in the context here), the five well-known sages, Aupamanyava and others, met together and started an enquiry-" Who
our Self, and what is the Brahman?"-(Chhand. Up. V. 11. 1.); and then, as stated in the passage-“Indeed, reverend sirs, Uddālaka, son of Aruņa, now worships this Atman known as ‘Vaiśvānara’; well let us go to him” (Chhand. Up. V. 11. 2.); they came to know that Uddālaka had the knowledge of the Atman known as ‘Vaisvānara’, and went to him (to learn). And that Uddālaka learnt that they were desirous of knowing the Atman known as ‘Vaiśvānara’ and felt that he himself did not fully know that (Vaišvānara); and he thereupon told them-“Indeed, reverend sirs, that celebrated Asvapati, the king of the Kekayas, now worships the Atman known as ‘Vaisvānara’. Let us all go to him (to learn).” (Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 4.).
And they, with Uddalaka as the sixth, went to that Asvapati. And he respectfully received each of those great sages in accordance with his worthiness; and then by means of the passage beginning with-“There is no thief in my (kingdom)"-and ending with-” Reverend sirs, I am verily performing a sacrifice" (Chhand. Up. V. 11. 5.)—he drew their attention to the fact that they were entitled to receive gifts (at his hands) inasmuch as he was carrying out a sacrificial ceremony; (he) then made them understand that even those who know the Brahman have to avoid what is forbidden by law and do the deeds prescribed by law. 471
471. Arvapati pointed out that the taxes he had received from the good people over whom he was ruling were not tainted money.
Even the gedly could roce ve gifts from him. Moreover, as seekers of the Brahman, they had a duty to receive such gifts.
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[Chap. 1, Part 11.
He then said “I shall give as much wealth to each o you as I give to each of my ritvij priests. Please therefore stay here, reverend sirs.” (Chhānd. Up. 11. 5.) And they, being desirous of attaining final release and being (also) anxious to know the Atman known as ‘Vaisvānara’, said- “Teach us that same Atman”.
Therefore, it is made out that the Atman (or Self) known as ‘Vaiśvānara’ is the Supreme Self-(the Atman) who, after (their) approaching one who knew the Atman known as ‘Vaisvānara’, was questioned about by such as were anxious to know the Brahman forming the Self of all individual selves, as may be made out from (the subject stated at the commencement of their investigation)-" Who is our Self, and what is the Brahman?" (Chhand. Up V. 11. 1). The words, Atman and Brahman, occur in the commencement of the context here; and then everywhere (in the context) the words, Atman and Vaisvānara, are used (in their place); therefore also it is made out that the word, Vaisvānara, which is specifically used in the place of the word, Brahman, denotes none else than the Brahman.
Moreover, there is the passage-“He eats the food’ (i.e., enjoys bliss) in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 1.), and also the passage-“Therefore just as the fibre in the ishika reed, thrown into the fire, is burnt up, so also all his sins are burnt up.” (Chhand. Up. V. 24. 3). This result, as (it is) mentioned here, of the knowledge of the Atman known as ‘Vaišvānara’, (also). enables us to understand that the Atman known as
• Vaisvānara’ is the Highest Brahman.
The Vaisvānara (mentioned above) is the Supreme Self for the following reason also:
zad¤roagará zanfefa
Sūtra 26. Smaryamāṇamanumānam syāditi (58)
Adhik. VÌ, Sūt. 26]
VAISVANARA’S BODY
69
What is thus recognised 47 (in the context here as constituting the body of Vaisvanara) gives rise to an inference (that Vaisvānara means the Supreme Self).
Beginning with the sky and ending with the earth, the (corporeal) form of Vaišvānara is taught here, there being a reference to each member thereof in detail. And that form is, in the Srutis and Smritis, well-known to constitute the body of the Highest Person. That same form is here recalled to mind to the effect that that form is indeed the same as this form; that is, what is so recognised helps an inference, or, in other words, forms the basis of a logical inference. The word thus473 denotes the manner (in which the above said body of Vaiŝvānara is here recognised). The body, which is of this nature and is (here) recognised, forms the basis of the logical inference that Vaišvānara is the Supreme Self.
Indeed, in the S’rutis and Smritis, that body, which is of this nature, is well-known to belong to the Highest Person. It is declared thus in the Atharvana-“Agni (or the celestial world of fire) is His head, His two eyes are the moon and the sun, His two ears are the quarters, the Vedas are His uttered speech, all the moving air is His breath, His heart is the whole universe, His two feet are the earth. Indeed, He is the Internal Self of all beings.” (Mund. Up II. 1. 4). Here agni means the celestial world of fire, because it is mentioned in the scriptures-“That world, indeed, is agni.” ((Bṛih. Up. VI. 2. 9).
472. Sankara takes smarya- mânam in the sense of men- tioned in the Smritis.’ Ramanuja renders it as ‘remembered’ or recognised’. Compare Sutra 31 where smriti has the meaning of ‘continued remembrance consti- tut ng worship.
II, S.B-10.
or
reason.
473 Iti is sometimes used to indicate a cause Hence the explanation given here to the effect that the word is used in a different sense here.
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The sages also declare thus: “The seers say that His head is heaven, the sky is indeed His navel, His two eyes are the moon and the sun, His two ears are the regions of space; know that the earth is His two feet, and that He is in Himself unthinkable and is the leader of all beings.”(?) (They) also (say)-“He whose mouth is the fire, whose head is heaven, whose navel is the sky, whose two feet are the earth, whose eye is the sun, whose ear is the quarters,- to Him, who is the Self of the universe, (we) bow.” (M. B. XII. 46. 70).
Here also, (i.c., in the context under reference) heaven and such other things are mentioned as forming the head and the other limbs of Vaisvānara. Accordingly, by those great sages, Aupamanyava and the others, the king of the Kekayas was asked-“You now worship none other than the Atman known as Vaišvänara; teach us that same Being.” (Chhand Up. V. 11. 6.): and he became desirous of teaching to them the Atman known as Vaisvānara. From the fact that their specific question (relating to Vaiśvānara) would otherwise be inappropriate, he made out that they did know something, but did not also know something (else), about the Atman known as Vaišvānara; and then, with the object of learning what part they knew and what they knew not, he put questions to them one after another.
Then, on his asking-“Aupamanyava, who is the Atman you worship?” (Chhand. Up. V. 12. 1) he received the answer “Revered king, (I worship) nothing else than heaven.” (Chhand. Up. V. 12. 1). Thereafter, while trying to remove from him his idea that heaven constitutes the whole of the Atman known as Vaišvänara, he (i.c., the king Asvapati) taught him that heaven forms only the head of Vaiśvānara, and told him that heaven, which forms a part of Vaivānara, has the name sutejah, (or the beauti- fully brilliant one) which is significant of its quality (of beautiful brilliancy).
Adhik. VI, Sut. 27]
VAISVANARA’S BODY
71
Similarly, on Satyayajña and the others mentioning that they severally had, for their objects of worship, the sun, the air, the sky, the water, the earth, one for each, they were one after another taught that these (objects of worship) have the names, višvarūpa, pṛithagvartman, bahula, rayi, and pratishtha, which (names) are significant of the attri- butes 474 (respectively possessed by those objects of worship), and that the sun and the other objects of worship respectively form the eye, the breath, the trunk (sandeha), the bladder and the feet, so as to constitute the limbs of the Atman known as Vaivānara. The word sandeha means the middle part of the body.
Accordingly, that form, which is characterised by having the heaven etc., for the head, etc., in the manner stated above, belongs only to the Highest Person. There- fore Vaišvānara is undoubtedly the Highest Person Himself.
Again, he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) takes up for considera- tion the doubt that it may not be possible to establish conclusively (that Vaisvānara means the Supreme Self), and removes it thus:
argifq=sea:¤fagrare àfa da ANI दृष्टयुपदेशादसंभवात्पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते
Sūtra 27. S’abdā dibhyo’ntaḥ pratishthanachcha
neti chenna tathadṛishtyupadeśādasambhavāt purushamapi chainamadhiyate. (59)
474. Visvarupa igans that which makes the whole universe manifest: prithagvartman is that which has many different kinds of motion: bahula is that which possesses greatness (of size.), rayi literally means wealth, but here in relat on to water it may mean the ‘wealth’ of health resulting from the food produced with
the help of pratishtha is that which serves as a support. Vide Chhand. Up. V.
water:
13 to 18 Note that the form worshipped are primarily differ- entiated iy the different attributes associated with them. In Sat. Br. X, the same attributes are referred to under different names associat- ed with different parts of the head of Vaisvānara. Here the head is atishtha, the eye is brithag- vartman, the ether is bahula, the water in the face rayi and the chin pratishtha.72
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[Chap. I, Part II.
If it be urged that (Vaiśvānara) is not (the Supreme Self), for the reason, among others, (that there is the use) of the word (agni or ‘fire’ in grammatical equation therewith, and also for the reason that he (Agni) is firmly seated within the body, it is replied that it cannot be so; because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qua ified that is taught (here), and because (also) it is impossible (for the digestive heat of the stomach to possess the qualities attributed here to Vaisvānara); moreover, some read of Him in their scriptures as the Person (Purusha).
What has been already stated to the effect that it is conclusively established that Vaisvanara is the Supreme Self-that is not right; because the gastric fire also is meant to be referred to here, “for the reason, among others, (that there is the use) of the word (agni in grammatical equation therewith), and also for the reason that he (Agni) is firmly seated within the body.” Indeed, that word (so used here) is learnt from the scripture to be agni, inasmuch as it is in grammatical equation with Vaisvanara in the passage “This same agni (or fire) is Vaiśvānara” 475 occurring in that scriptural context of the Vajins which relates to the worship of Vaiśvānara.
In this context also (which is now under reference), there is the passage-“The heart is the garhapatya fire, the mind is the anvāhārya fire, and the mouth is the ahavaniya fire” 476 (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2); and in it, the Vaisvānara, existing in the heart, etc., is made to assume the character of the three fires. Then there is the passage beginning thus-“Therefore, that food which is first served, that is to be offered as in a sacrifice. He who offers in sacrifice that first offering, let him sacrifice it by
475. Vide Sat. Br, X. 6. 1. 11. 476, Vide Note 439, Compare also Pr. Up. 1. 7.
Adhik. VI, Sut. 27]
GASTRIC FIRE
73
saying praṇāya svāhā,” 477 (Chhand. Up. V. 19. 1). From this, it is made out that Vaisvānara forms also the recipient of the offering of food given to the prana (or the principal vital air). Similarly the Väjasaneyins declare in their scriptures that Vaišvānara exists within the person, as in this passage" Indeed, he who knows this fire, Vaišvānara, in this manner to have the nature of a person and to be placed within the person etc.’ (Sat. Br. X. 6. 1. 11).
Accordingly, that (Vaišvānara) is in grammatical equa- tion with the word agni (fire) and has assumed the character of the three fires; he forms the recipient of the offerings of food given to the praṇā (or the principal vital air), and he is also firmly seated within the body. For all these reasons, Vaišvánara’ is also made out to be that (fire) which belongs to the stomach’. Therefore, this (Vaisvānara) cannot absolutely mean the Supreme Self.
If it be so held, it is replied that it is not so; “because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qualified 478 that is taught (here)”; because the Vaisvānara who has been mentioned above as having the three worlds for His body, and who is the Highest Brahman, is taught (here) for pur- poses of worship as having the gastric fire for His body and to be thus in association with that (gastric fire). In fact, it is not the mere gastric fire that is (here) under- stood by the use of the word agni and by means of the other reasons (given above); but, on the contrary, it is the Supreme Self who is associated with the gastric fire (as His body, that is so understood).
If it be asked how this is arrived at, it is replied that (it is so arrived at) because it is impossible for
477. Tais means: May the food I offer become a sacrif eial offering unto the de ty presiding Over the principal vital air." (Vide Taitt. Ar. VI. 33)
478. The Sutra uses the worl drishti, which usually refers only to pratika worship. Here however the worship of the Brahman is meant,
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[Chap. I, Part II.
the digestive heat of the stomach to have the qualities attributed here to Vaisvānara. The meaning is that the mere digestive heat of the stomach cannot possibly have the three worlds for its body, and that in consequence the word, agui (fire), which is (here) made out to denote the digestive heat of the stomach, and is in grammatical equa- tion with the Vaišvánara known to have the three worlds for His body, denotes the Supreme Self Himself as having (that) gastric fire for His body and as having thus come to be associated therewith.
To the same effect it has been declared by the Lord thus:“Becoming the Vaisvānara 479 I dwell in the bodies of all living beings; and in conjunction with the praṇa and the apana, I digest the four 480 kinds of food”. (B.G. XV. 14.). The meaning is “(I do so) having the gastric fire for (My) body.” Hence it is the worship of that Being who is associated with that (gastric fire as the body) that is taught here.
(C Moreover, some", that is, the Vajasaneyins, “read of Him in their scriptures as the Person (Purusha)” in the passage “He who is that Person is this same Agni known as Vaiśvānara”. (Sat. Br. X. 6. 1. 11.). Indeed, the mere gastric fire cannot be the Person (referred to here). Surely, it is possible only to the Supreme Self to be the uncon- ditioned Person, such as is mentioned in the following and other passages:-“The Person (or Purusha) has a thousand heads…All this indeed is the Person.” (R. V. X. 90. 1 & 2.)
अत एव न देवताभृतञ्च
Sūtra 28. Ata eva na devatā bhūtañcha. (60)
For these very reasons, (Vaiśvānara) is not the deity (sun) nor the element (tejas).
479. Vide Vol. I, Note 409. 480. The four kinds of food what are known as khadya,
are
choshya, lehya and peya, that is, eatable, suckable, lickable and drinkable,
Adhi. VI, Sut. 29]
JAIMINI’S VIEW
75
For the same reasons as have been given above, 481 there is no room to hold that either the deity (known as the sun-god) or even the third of the (five) great elements is Vaiśvānara.
argıqwafadagiafa:
Sūtra 29. Sakshādapyavirodham Jaiminiḥ. (61)
Jaimini holds that there is nothing wrong even in (holding) that (the word agni) denotes directly and of itself (the Supreme Self.
It has been stated above that the word, agni, in grammatical equation with Vaiśvānara, denotes the Supreme Self, inasmuch as He has the gastric fire for His body and is in that way qualified by that (association with the gastric fire as His body); and (also) that, only as so qualified, the Supreme Self is to be worshipped. And the (venerable) teacher, Jaimini, is of opinion that the word agni also denotes, like the word Vaiśvānara, the Supreme Self Himself, directly and of itself, that is, without any intermediate process of reasoning, and that in con- sequence there is nothing wrong (in that view).
What is said is this :-This general term, Vaisvānara, also, which is qualified in a particular manner by the association of the special attributes of the Supreme Self, is determined to denote the Supreme Self Himself, inasmuch
481. These reasons are that Vaisvanara is described by the words, Atman, Brahman and Purusha, that His worship destroys all sins etc.
482. Sankara under this Satra shows how the words, Agni and Vaisvanara, can by themselves mean the Brahman. Raanuja thinks that only the word Agni Is referred to here. His point is that both in utras 27 and 19 Vaisvānara is equated with Ani
and through that equation identi- fied with the Supreme Brahman. Thus the etymological interpreta- tion of Vaisvanara serves only as an example for a similar interp e- tation cf Agni. It also follows from this that the attributes needed for the worship of Vaisvan ara as the Supreme Self have already been laid down in Sutra 29. Now only the meaning of the word is
given.
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[Chap. 1, Part II.
associated with the quality Similarly, the word agni
as He is, among other things, 483 of being the leader of all beings. also (etymologically) denotes the fire, on account of its being associated with certain particular qualities such as the quality of leading (all) to the end of the goal. Those very same qualities, as unconditioned and in their highest excellence, are properly found to belong to the Supreme Self. Therefore, in this context, it (viz., the word agni), being that which is qualified by (certain) particular qualities of the Supreme Self, denotes none other than the Supreme Self.
It may be asked how, as stated in the passage-(“He who worships) this (aforementioned Vaiśvānara), who is such and is measured only by the regions of space and is (yet really) immeasurable” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 1)-the Highest Brahman, who is infinite and unlimited, becomes measurable by means of the measure relating to the space which contains all the things between heaven and earth. (In reply) to this, he (i.c., the Sūtrakāra) says:
अभिव्यक्तेरित्याइमरथ्यः
Sūtra 30. Abhivyakterityä smarathyaḥ. (62)
Asmarathya holds that it is for the purpose of easy comprehension (that the infinite and unlimited Brahman is looked upon as measured by space).
The (venerable) teacher Asmarathya is of opinion. that the Supreme Self is conceived to be measured by
483. The ‘other things’ include His being the object of attainment of all. Similarly, in regard to Agni also, the quality of being pre-
eminently the object of attainment of all is primarily meant among other qualities not expressly mentioned, but implied by ‘such as’.Adhik. VI, Süt. 31]
BADARI’S VIEW
27
space to help easy comprehension on the part of the wor shipper. 484 The heaven is His head, the sun is His eye, the air is His breath, the sky is His trunk, the waters are His bladder, and the earth is His feet. Thus He is measured by the space which includes all things between heaven and earth. (To become so measured) can, in leed, appertain to Him-who pervades the whole universe and is Himself immeasurable-only to serve the purpose of easy com- prehension (on the part of the worshipper).
It may be asked why it is that the Highest Brahman is described to be a person with a head and the other various limbs. If it be so asked, he (i.e., the Sūtrakāra) says (in answer):
agegdafzfc:
Sūtra 31. Anusmṛiterbadariḥ (63)
Badari holds that it is for the purpose of worshipping (Him that the described).
Brahman is so
The (venerable) teacher, Badari, is of opinion that it is for the purpose of so worshipping (Him that the Brahman is thus described). 485 There is this passage-" And he who worships this (aforementioned) Vaišvānara, who is such and is (yet really) immeasurable, he eats the ‘food’ (i.e., enjoys bliss) in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves “.
48+. The opinion of Asmara- thya is cited with approval by the Sutrakära in reply to a possible objection that the Vais’va ara stated to be me: sured by the regious of space may deno.e not merely the Supreme Self but also the element, fire, or a god. Hence, the objector goes on, there can be no definitive determination of the me ning of Vaisvinara in the context as the Supre ne Self.
II. S.B.-11.
485. Badari’s opinion is here cited with approval to refute a possible argument that the Vais vanara who has a prakrita (or material) body may be a god. The description of Vaisvanara as a person is not for easy com- prehension, but for purposes of meditation.
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(
[Chap. I, Part II.
(Chhand. Up. V. 18. 1). Evidently a form of worship for the attainment of the Brahman is taught here. This Vaisvānara who is such’-means He who has the form of a person as mentioned before. ‘In all worlds, in all beings, in all selves,’’ whatever food,’ that is, whatever object of enjoyment exists-that, he (the worshipper) eats: that is, he enjoys that Brahman who exists everywhere and is in Himself the bliss which is unsurpassed in excellence. But that food which is ’eaten’ by all those individual selves who are subject to the
subject to the influence of karma and which is peculiar to each of them-that (kind of food ‘) is to be avoided by those who are desirous of attaining final release. Therefore, it is not that which is meant to be referred to (in the context) here.
If Vaisvānara is the Supreme Self, it may then be asked why the chest, etc., (of the worshipper) are (respec- tively) taught to be the altar, etc. On the contrary, such teaching becomes appropriate only when it is taken to refer to the gastric fire. (In answer) to this, he (ie., the Sutrakāra) says:
सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथाहि दर्शयति
Sūtra 32. Sampatteriti Jaiministathā hi darśayati. (54)
Jaimini holds that it is intended to make (the praṇāhuti486 assume the character (of the agnihotra sacrifice; for the scripture reveals it to be such.
The pranahuti ceremonial is a form of worshipping that Vaisvānara, who is Himself the Supreme Self, who has all things between heaven and earth for his body; and it has to be performed by the worshipper every day. The venerable teacher, Jaimini, holds that it is to make it assume
486. This word means a sacrifi- cial offering made to the five
prānas, as to which see Vol. I, No’e 388.
Adhik. VI, Sut. 33]
PRANAHUTI
79
he character of the agnihotra sacrifice that the chest, etc., (of the worshipper) are (respectively) taught to constitute the altar, etc.
The following scriptural passage-“If, without knowing his, (i.e., that the chest is the altar etc.) one offers the agnihotra sacrifice, it would be as if a man were to remove the live coals and pour the libation on the dead ashes. He, however, who offers this agnihotra sacrifice with a full knowledge of its true purport-he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves. Therefore, just as the fibre in the ishikä reed, thrown into the fire, is burnt up, so also all his sins are burnt up,” (Chhand Up. V. 24. 1 to 3) “reveals it to be such”; that is, it points out a result which ie appropriate only in relation to the worship of the Suprems Self, and also (points out thus) that the praṇāhuti assumes the character of the agnihotra sacrifice.
आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन्
Sūtra 33. Amananti chainamasmin. (65)
They (t.e., the Chhandogas)!also declare Him (to be) in it.
“Him”, that is, the Highest Person Vaiśvānara, who is characterised as having heaven, etc., for His head, etc. “In it “—that is, in the body of the worshipper. “They also declare Him to be (therein)”, to serve as the recipient of the prāṇāhuti, in the passage beginning with—” Indeed, the head itself of this Atman known as Vaiśvānara mentioned above is Sutejas (or the beautifully brilliant heaven).” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2.)
The meaning (of the scriptural context) here is this:- In the passage-” And he who worships this (afore- mentioned) Vaišvānara who is such and is measured by the regions of space and is (yet really) immeasurable" (Chhand.
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tUp. V. 18. 1)the worship of the Vaisvānara who has th ehree world for His body is enjoined; then in the passage beginning with-" In all worlds" (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 1), the result (of such worship) is taught to be the attainment of the Brahman; then in the passage beginning with- “Indeed, the head itself of this” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2), that prāṇāhuti is taught which is considered to be equivalent to the agnihotra sacrifice and thus forms an element in the worship of that same (Vaiśvānara).
Further, the fire, the sun, etc., form the limbs of that Vaiśvānara who has been taught already to be the object of worship; and they are respectively known by the names, Sutejas, Viśvarupa, etc.; and the context (here) identifies them with the body of the worshipper from head to foot.487 “The head itself (of this meditating self) is (Vaisvānara’s) Sutejas.” (Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that the head of the worshipper himself is the celestial world form- ing the head of the Supreme Self. “The eye (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara’s) Visvarupa.” (Chhand Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that it is the sun.
“The breath (of this meditating self) is (Vaisanara’s) Prithag- vartman”. (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that it is the air. “The trunk (of this meditating self) is (Vaisvānara’s) Bahula”. (Chhand Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that the trunk of the worshipper himself is the sky (or ākāśa) forming the trunk of the Supreme Self( “The bladder itself (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara’s.
4 7. The praṇāhuti ceremonial is here conceived of as an element in the worship of Vaisvānara. The worshipper’s body is therein regarded as vaisvanara’s Lody. Hence Chhand. Up. (V. 18. 2) has
to
be construed as follows: Indeed, the head of this (medita- ting) self is Vaisvanara’s Sutėjas: the eye (of this meditating self) is (Vaisvanara’s) visvarupa the breath (of this meditating self) is (Vaisvanara’s) prithagvart
man: the trunk (of this meditat- ing self) is(Vais’vānara’s) bahula: the bladder itself (of this medi- dating self) is Vaisvanara’s rayi: the feet themselves (of this meditating self) are the earth (in reference to Vaisvanara) the chest itself (of this meditating self) is the altar, (bis) hair are the barhis, his heart is the gărha- patya (fire), (his) mind is the anvaharya fire, and (his) mouth is the ahavaniya fire.’
Adhik. VI, Sut. 33]
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81
Rayi”. (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that his bladder itself constitutes the waters forming a part of His body. “The feet themselves (of this meditating self) are the earth (in reference to Vaišvānara).” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2). The meaning is that his feet themselves are the earth which forms His feet.
Accordingly, the worshipper worships in his own body the Supreme Self Vaiśvānara, who has the three worlds for His body and is near (at heart); then he looks upon his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth, as the altar, the sacred bed of kusa grass thereon, the garhapatya fire, the anvāhārya fire and the ahavaniya fire (respectively), which together form the auxiliary aids to the agnihotra sacrifice intended to propitiate the Supreme Self Vaisvānara, who is the recipient of the praṇāhuti; and then he regards the praṇāhuti itself to be an agnihotra sacrifice; and then here (at last) the scriptural passage beginning with “The chest itself is the altar, [the hair are the sacred bed of kusa grass, the heart is the garhapatya fire” (Chhand. Up. V. 18. 2).-teaches that he should worship the Supreme Self known as Vaisvānara by means of such a prāṇāhuti as has in this manner attained the character of the agnihotra sacrifice.
Therefore it is a demonstrated conclusion that Vaiśvā- nara is none other than the Supreme Self who is the Highest Person.CHAPTER I
PART III
ADHIKARANA I
DYUBHVADYADHIKARAṆA
grararaṁ zaqIZZIA
Sutra 1. Dyubḥvādyāyatanam svasaldt. (66)
The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.; (is the Supreme Self), because there is an expres- sion (in the context here particularly signifi- cant) of Himself.
The Atharvanikas read in their scripture thus: “He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the interspaces are inwoven, as also is (inwoven) the mind along with all the vital airs-know Him alone to be the Atman. Give up all other talk. He is the bridge (setu) leading to immortality. (Mund. Up. II. 2. 5). Here the doubt arises whether the being thus declared to be the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the individual self or the Supreme Self.
It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? That which forms the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is dealt with in a previous passage (in the context here); and that same being is again referred to by means of the word yatra (meaning ‘in whom’) having the significance of the locative case, in the subsequent passage which runs thus :-“In whom (yatra) the blood-vessels are united in the same way in which the spokes are fitted into the nave of a wheel-that same being moves within, and is born in many ways (Mund Up. II. 2. 6.) It is that being who is (here) mentioned to be the support of the blood-vessels.
33
Adhik. 1, Süt. 1]
‘BRAHMAN’ AS ‘SETU’
83
Then again, in the statement-” that same being moves within and is born in various ways”-it is further mentioned that he takes birth in many ways. This relation to the blood-vessels and this liability to be born in many ways in the form of gods, etc., are both the characteristics of the individual self only. In this very same passage (under discussion), there is the statement-" the mind also is inwoven along with all the vital airs." That character of being the abode of the fivefold vital air 4SS and of the mind (which is mentioned herein) is itself an attribute belonging only to the individual self.
It having been thus determined that that (being) has the characteristics of the individual self, the attribute of consti- tuting the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., and other such attributes have, somehow or other, to be harmonised (with the individual self so determined). 159
If it be so arrived at, we state in reply-“The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., (is the Supre ne Self), because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself.” (Ved. Sat. I. 3. 1.) The abode of things like the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Highest Brahman. Why? Because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Hi nself": because there are (in it) ’expressions peculiarly significant of the Highest Brahman. The statement-“He is the bridge (setu) leading to immortality “-is an expression peculiarly significant of the Highest Brahman. (Again) “He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of final release “. (Taitt. Ar. III. 12. 7). To this effect, it is He Himself that is declared everywhere in all the Upanishads to be the means for the attainment of immortality.
488, Vide Vol. 1, Not 388.
489. The Srutapraksika ex- plains that the indivi ual self, according to the Purv pakshin, may be the abode of heavn, earth,
etc., by virtu
of its own nature, by the force of karma, or by reason of it. omniscience in the state of moksu.
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[Chap. I, Part III.
Further, the word setu (may be taken to mean ‘bridge’, as it) is derived from the root si, which means to bind together. The meaning is that He is the bestower of immortality. Or, what is like a bridge is itself a bridge.490 Indeed, it is the bridge that enables us to reach the other shore of rivers, etc. The meaning is that He enables us to reach that immortality which is found on the other shore of the ocean of samsära. The word Atman (or Self) also, when it is unconditioned by limiting adjuncts, has its primary and natural significance so as to denote the Highest Brahman. Atman is, indeed, that which pervades. It is possible only for Himself to pervade all things other than Himself through being their controller. Hence that word. (Atman) is also an expression which signifies Him alone.
“He who knows all and understands all” (Mund Up. II. 2. 7.)-and other such statements occurring further on (in the same context) are also significant of the Highest Brahman. It is also possible for Him to be the support of the blood-vessels; because, beginning with the passage- “It is always hangin down from the blood-vessels joined on to it, and is like he partially opened bud of a lotus” it is (finally) declar d: “The Supreme Self is seated in the middle of that frame.” 421 (M. När. XI. 8 to 12).
17
The statement-“He is born in many ways “–is also appropriate in relation to the Highest Brahman; because, in the passage–“Al hough He is unborn, He is born in various ways; only wise men know His source” (Taitt. Ār. III. 13. 1),–it is declared that, in order to be capable of being approache. (in worship) by gods and other
usually
490. The word set means a dam which hi ders the flow of a river. Etymolgir lly, it is derived fron the root, s, to bind together (Unadi Sutra, 1.70). The etymological meaning is not supported by usage, bile the meaning given y usage as to be modified to suit the contex.
491. The idea conveyed by the passage referred to here is that the heart, wherein all the blood- vessels unite, is their support, and that within it there is a minute flame of fire, wherein the Supreme Self is seated, so that He also becomes thereby the support of the blood-vessels.
Adhik. I, Süt. 2] WORSHIPPED BY ‘MUKTAS’
85
beings, the Highest Person gets into association with the form, configuration, qualities and actions suited to each particular class of beings; and without in the least giving up His own nature, He is, of His own accord, born in many ways. The Smriti also says-” Although I am unborn and inexhaustible in My own nature, and although I am the Lord of all beings, still, taking up My own prakṛiti, I am born again and again by means of My own maya.” (B. G. IV. 6) 492. Moreover, it is possible only for the Supreme Self, who is the support of all, to be the support also of all the instruments of the individual self, such as the mind.
(The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is) the Highest Person for the following reason also:
मुक्तोपसृव्यपदेशाच्च
Sūtra 2. Muktopasṛipyavyapadeśachcha. (67)
Because also that (Being) is taught to be that which is to be approached (in worship) by the released souls) (He who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc, is the Supreme Self).
This Person, who forms the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is declared to be the object of attainment even to those who are released from the bonds of samsara; as for instance in the following passages :-“When the wise seer sees that Person who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the Brahman)”. (Mund. Up. III. 1. 3): “Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and
492. For the explanation of the word, mayà, as used in this
II. S.B.-12.
passage, vide 362-363.
Vol. I, pages
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[Chap. I, Part III
form, so also the wise man, freed from name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher than the highest”. (Mund. Up. III. 2. 8).
Indeed, it is only those, who are entirely freed from the bonds of samsara, that have shaken off merit and demerit and are taintless and are also without name and form. In reality, samsara is nothing else than the assumption of name and form, under the influence of that association with non- intelligent matter, which arises from the merit and demerit (of works). Therefore that Person, who is pointed out as the object of attainment to those, who have shaken off merit and demerit, who are without any taint, that is, who are devoid of any contact with prakṛiti (or material Nature), and who have attained the state of the highest equality with the Highest Brahman-(that Person) is the Highest Brahman Himself forming the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.
Having thus established, by means of certain expres- sions (in the context) peculiarly significant of the Highest Brahman, and by other means, that (the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.,) is the Highest Brahman Himself, he (ie., the Sutrakara) says that He (who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.) is the Highest Brahman Himself for this reason also, namely, that there are no expressions (in the context) peculiarly significant of the individual self,
नानुमानम तच्छाब्दात्प्राणभृच्च
Sūtra3.Nanumānamatachchhabdät präṇabhrichcha.(63) 493
ન
49. This Sutra is given as two by Sikaracharya thus. (i) Nanu- mãnamatachchhabdat and (i) Pranabhrichcha. The ro son given in atachchhabdát estab-
lishes the conclusions arrived at in both the statements. There is thus propriety in linking them together in one Sutra,Adhik. I, Sut. 3]
NOT NATURE
87
Neither the anumāna (or what is capable of being established by the logical process of infer- ence), nor (the jiva who is) the possessor of life (is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.): because there are (in the context) no expres- sions signifying either.
The meaning is that just as, in this context (under reference), the thing that is taught is not the pradhāna (or material Nature), for the reason that there is no expression signifying it, similarly the (jiva or) possessor of life (is not) also (the thing that is taught here).
Anumāna is derived from a root which means to measure, and is that which is measured; that is, it denotes the pradhana mentioned by others (to be the cause of the world). Or Anumana is that which is arrived at by the inferential process of logical reasoning.494
“Because there are (in the context) no expressions signifying either.” The meaning is that there are no expressions denoting either of them (i.e., either the pradhana or the individual self). Atachchhabdāt means “because there are no expressions signifying it”. As the indeclinable-compound-form (kno as the avyayibhāva) is used (among other things) to denote the absence of a thing (Pāṇini, II. 1. 6), (this compound word) is avyayibhāva in form.495
(The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is) not the individual self for the following reason also:
494. In splitting this Sutra into its component words, the portion nanumanam may be split up either as na + anumānām or na + anumanam, Bota anumana and anumana mean the frakriti, as explained in the text.
495. The avyayibhava is the indeclinable compound form and
is generally used as an adverb. It is also used whenever the absence of a thing is to be denoted as bere. The Srutaprakāšikā explains how the meaning required in the context cannot be obtained, if atachchhabdát is taken to be any other type of compound word like the tatpurusha or bahuvrihi,
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[Chap. 1, Part III
भेदव्यपदेशात्
Sūtra 4. Bhedavyapadesāt. (69).
Because (His) differentiation (from the individual self) is taught (in the context).
There is (in the context) this passage:-
“On the same tree, the purusha (i.e., the individual self), sits immersed (in grief): deluded by (prakriti which is) the object of enjoyment, he grieves. When he sees another, the Lord, to be gracious and well pleased, then he (also), relieved from grief, attains His (asya) greatness”. (Mund. Up. III. 1. 2 & Svet. Up. IV. 7.) By means of this passage and by means of other similar passages, this (Being, who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.,) is taught to be quite distinct from the individual self.
Anisaya,495 that is (in other words), under the influence of prakriti which forms the material world of enjoyments, the individual self, thus deluded, grieves. When he sees another, who is different from himself, who is the Lord of all and is gracious, and (sees) also the glory of this Being (asya) the glory which consists in controlling the whole universe-then he becomes free from misery.
प्रकरणात्
Sūtra 5. Prakaraṇāt. (0,
From the context (here, it comes out that the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Brahman).
495. Anīsaya is the instrument- al singular of anisa, which is here taken by Ramanuja to me an prakriti. The word literally means a person or thing under
the control of another. Prakriti is not sovereign or independent, as it is regarded as being ruled by the individual self and ultimately by the Brahman,
Adhik. I, Sūt. 6]
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89
It has already been well shown under the aphorism- “That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)” (Ved. Sūt. I. 2. 22)- that the context under the reference here relates to the Highest Brahman. Here, however, we have undertaken to remove (only) that doubt, which may possibly arise to the effect that there is a break in the context, for the reason that the subject-matter of the context (here) relates to the blood vessels and to the fact that He (the Brahman) takes birth in various ways and is also the support of the mind and the vital airs.
स्थित्यदनाभ्याञ्च
Sutra 6. Sthityadanābhyāñcha. (71)
On account of the (mere) existence and (also) on account of the eating (of the fr its of karma, which are both predicated in the context here, the abode of the heaven, of the earth, etc., is the Brahman).
There is the passage-“Two birds, which possess similar attributes and are inseparable friends, cling to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all.” (Mund Up. III. 1. 1). Here it is taught that one being eats the fruits of his karma, and that the other, without at all eating the fruits of karma, merely dwells shining with splendour within the body. Of these, that Being alone, who, without eating the fruits of karma, shines with splendour, who is omniscient and forms the bridge of immortality, and who is the Self of all-He alone deserves to be the abode of the heaven, of the earth, etc., but not that individual self who is eating the fruits of his karma, and feels miserable.
90
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[Chap. I, Part III.
Accordingly, it has been conclusively established that
the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Supreme
Self.
ADHIKARANA 11
BHŪMĀDHIKARAṆA.
भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात्
Sûtra 7. Bhūmā samprasādādadhyupadesāt. (72)
What is denoted by the word Bhuman (which means the Great One, is the Brahman), because He is taught (in the context, to be greater than the samprasada (or the individual se f).
The Chhandogas declare to the following effect-” That is the bhuman (the Great One), (experiencing) whom one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else. Again, that is the small one (alpa), (experiencing) whom one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 24. 1).
Now the word bhuman is built up so as to have an affix possessing the sense of an abstract noun. Accordingly, the word bahu is seen to be included in the group of words beginning with prithu. Therefore, the affix imanich is attached (to bahu) in accordance with the (grammatical) rule-“The affix imanich also is attached to the words belonging to the group of words beginning with prithu.” (Panini V. 1. 122). And then, in accordance with the (grammatical) rule-” (The first vowel in the affix imanich), when it comes after (i.e., is attached to) the word bahu, disappears, and bhu is substituted in place of bahu (Panini. VI. 4. 158)-the basal stem (bahu) and the affix (imanich) are combined into a new form, and the word
Adhik. II, Sut. 7]
‘BHUMAN’ ANALYSED
91
bhūman is obtained. Bhuman means greatness. And here the word bahu (meaning ‘great’) signifies magnitude, but not number; because it is mentioned to be a correlative of the word alpa (small), which occurs in the statement-"(Seeing) whom, one sees something else, … that is alpa (the small one)”. Moreover that (word bahu) is ascertained to denote not the mere attribute (of greatness), but an entity qualified by that attribute, because that (word) has to denote a qualified entity, which is a correlative of that (other) qualified entity which is denoted by the word alpa.
""
It is thus that this Bhuman occurs. Hence it means “the Great One.” And the being who is here found to be characterised by greatness is the Atman; because the context 497 here begins with the statement-“He who knows the Self crosses the ocean of misery. (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 3); then it teaches the knowledge relating to the Bhuman (the Great One), and then, in the statement- “The Atman indeed is all this” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 2.), it comes to an end with that same (word Atman).
497. The context here is Chhand. Up. VII. The sage Narada, after studying the Vedas and their auxiliaries, continues to feel spiritually disconteate. He therefore seeks instruction in the ‘Science of the Self’ from his elder brother, Sanatkumāra. The latter teaches first that what Narada has studied is Naman, and he is asked to worship Nåman as the Brah- man. Naman is here to be taken as a pratika for the Brahman, Then other objects are prescribed for worship as the Brahman in the order of increasing importance, till the prana or the ndividual self is reached. There is no direction to worship the rana as the Brahman. Nor is here any auspicious result declared for the worship of the prana. But one who knows the truth about the prāna is said to
become an
ativadin, a person who regards it as transcendent. Then Sanat-
kumara teaches, without any query from Ilarada: “But he who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of wors ip is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent.” (16. 1). Here ‘Truth’ means the Brahman; and later this Truth itself is described as Bhuran or the Great One. The purvapaksha here is that nothing higher is taught than the prana, and that this prana itself is later called bhuman: Moreover, there is no reference to the worship of the Brahman der the name of Truth. Sanat umara is said merely to enjoin tha speaking the truth is an element i the worship of the prána.92
SRI-BHASHYA
[Chap. I, Part III
Here the doubt is raised whether the being, who is characterised by the attribute of greatness, is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? For the follow. ing reason. It is made out from the statement-“I have indeed learnt the sastras thus. He who knows the self crosses the ocean of misery with the help of venerable teachers like yourself” (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 3)-that, Narada approached (the teacher Sanatkumāra) with the desire to know the atman. To him, various things commencing with naman (name) and concluding with prāṇa (life-breath), were taught as objects of worship. Among these, in regard to all those things that are mentioned prior to prāṇa, there are seen the following and other questions –Reverend sir, is there anything greater than name?’ (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 5.); and ‘Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than speech?’ (Chhand. Up. VII. 2. 2): and (there are also seen) the following and other answers, ‘Speech, indeed, is greater than name’ (Chhand. Up. VII. 2. 1); and ‘Mind, indeed, is greater than speech’ (Chhänd. Up. VII. 3. 1). But concerning prāṇā, we do not see (any such question or answer). Hence it is made out that the teaching regarding the atman extends only so far as to include prana. Therefore, what is here pointed out by the word präna is undeniably the individual self, which is always associated with the praṇa, but is not merely a particular kind of vital air.
The following and other statements–” Prāṇa is, indeed, the father, prina is, indeed, the mother" (Chhand, UP. VII. 15. 1) enable us to know that the Prana (mentioned here) is an intelligent entity. Further, there are to be found here words of reproach applied to any one who hurts his father and others when alive, on account of his proving a source of injury to them, as in the statement beginning with “(He is) a patricide, a matricide, etc. (Chhand. UP. VII. 15. 2). And there are no words of reproach given here, so as to be applied to him who severely
د,
Adhik. II, Sut. 7]
‘PRANA’ IS ‘BHUMAN
93
hurts those very persons when they are without Prāṇa. Hence what is pointed out by the word, präṇa, is certainly an intelligent being capable of feeling an injury. Even in the case of such individual selves, as have (through their sins) become immovable things devoid of the (fivefold) vital air (prāna) 499, it is seen that according as they have or have not the power of injuring, there is (in them the power to feel) an injury or the absence thereof. Hence it is definitely determined that he who is (here) pointed out to be capable of feeling an injury is surely the individual self.
Moreover, for this very reason, one should not be led away to believe that he, who is, with the help of the illustrative example of the spokes and the nave and other such (explanatory suggestions),497 indicated by the word, prāņa, is the Highest Brahman; because there is no logical scope to say that the Highest Brahman is capable of feeling pain, and because also the illustrative example of the spokes and the nave is appropriate only in respect of the individual self, for the reason that all the non-intelligent things, which are different from the individual self and constitute his objects of enjoyment and means of enjoyment, are dependent upon the individual self for their existing (in the condition in which they are). And it is this same (individual self), denoted by the word prāṇa, that happens to be the great one (bhuman); because there is no breach in the context before the expression, bhiman, occurs (therein), owing to the non-existence in the context of the question–‘Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the präna?’ and of an answer (thereto), to the effect, ‘This is, indeed, greater than the prana’.
498. Plants are said to have prana, but not in its fivefold form. Vide the commentary under Ved. sut. (II. 1. 9). Sinful souls are bel eved, in consequcace of their transgressions in life, to be born in the form of plants, trees and
other im novable objects.
II. S.B.-13.
+
499. The illustrative example referred to occurs in Kaush. Up. (III. 9), which is quoted and discussed under Ved. Süt. (I. 1. 30). The real point is that while prāna means the Brahman there, the same word means only the individual self here.

94 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III Moreover, it has been stated that he, who knows the prana thus, may say that his object of worship transcends all others. Then, in the statement–” Indeed, he speaks of the object of his worship as transcendent" (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1)–that very person (who thus knows the prāṇa as transcendent) is again referred to. Then, by means of the statement-" He who, by holding on to truth says that this is transcendent", (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1), it is taught that to speak the truth 500 forms an element in worship of prāṇa. Then, in the statement–" When, indeed, he understands, then he speaks the truth" (Chhand. UP. VII. 17. 1)-it is taught that that speaking the truth, which is obligatory (on all) is subordinate to the knowledge of the true nature of praṇa, which (knowledge) has been already pointed out to be the principal thing. Then, for the attainment of that (knowledge of the true nature of the prana), reflection, faith, devotion and effort are taught (as the necessary means). And then, for the purpose of inducing their practice, it is taught that the essential nature of the individual self pointed out (here) by the word prānā, as forming the object of attainment, is an experience of the nature of happiness. And then (finally), it is taught in the statement-" Indeed, the great one itself has to be specially desired and known" (Chhand. Up. VII. 23. 1) that that happiness is characterised by greatness (or immensity). Accordingly, that nature of the individual self himself, which is free from ignorance (avidyā), is taught (here) to be immense happiness. Thus there is also no contradiction of the commencement of the context, which begins with-“He who knows the atman crosses (the ocean of) misery.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 3.) Therefore, he who is associated with the quality of greatness, is the individual self. 500. In VII. 16. the verb is ativa dati, that is, ‘declares as transcendent’, but in VI. 17. 1, it is vadati, ‘speaks’. The meaning of the latter is given to the former by the purvapakshin, while Ramanuja would understand the latter in the sense of the former. Adlik. 11, Sut. 7] ‘FHUMAN’ IS FRAHMAN’ 95 For whatever reason the individual self is thus associated with the quality of greatness, for that same reason, in reference to the thing ‘I’, which is the individual self, the peculiar excellence of (that same) individual self is taught in the passage beginning with “I am myself indeed below, I am above,” and ending with “I am indeed all this.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 1). When it is thus definitely determined that it (i.e., the individual self, the other parts of the context have to be interpreted so as to agree with it. ‘great one’) is the If it be so held, it is stated in reply-" What is denoted by the word Bhuman (which means the Great One, is the Brahman), because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the samprasada (or the individual self). " (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 7). He who is characterised by the quality of greatness is not the individual self, but is the Supreme Self. Why? “Because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the samprasada.” Samprasada 501 is the individual self; because such Upanishadic usage (of the word, samprasāda) is well known, as for instance, in the following passage :-“Now this same samprasāda (or the individual self), rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light, and becomes manifest in its true nature.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 3.4 & 12. 3). The meaning is that He who is characterised by the quality of greatness and is denoted by the word Satya (or Truth), is taught (here) to be greater than the samprasada or the individual self. And that which is denoted by the word Truth’ is the Highest Brahman. 501. The word literally means whatever is pure and serene and is primarily used to refer to the state of sushupti or dreamless sleep, because it is free from the disturbances felt during wakefulness or dreaming. Some- times it may refer to the dreaming state as less disturbed than the wakeful one. Vide Chhand. Up. (VIII .6. 3) and Brih, Up. (IV. 3. 15).Thence it has come to denote the essential nature of the individual self in its unfettered condition. It is noteworthy that in VIII. 3 4, which closely follows the seventh prapathaka where the Brahman Is called Satya, samprasada is specifically distinguished from the Brahman whose name is Satya, 96 SRI-BHASHYA Chap. 1, Part. III What is said is this :-Just as, among those things (in the context), which, beginning with Name, end with the prāṇā, every one of them that comes later is stated to be greater than that which precedes it; even so those which (thus) come later have to be different entities from those that are mentioned earlier. Accordingly, that which is pointed out to be greater than the individual self referred to by the word prāṇā, and is denoted by the word Satya (Truth), is certainly a different entity from that (individual self itself). That which is pointed out by the word, ‘Truth’, is itself the Great One; and so it is the Highest Brahman Himself that is called the Truth (here) declared to be the Great One. The Vrittikara (Bodhāyana) says the same thing thus:-“In the passage beginning with– ‘But the Great One (or Bhuman) itself, indeed etc.’ (Chhand. Up. VII. 23. 1)–the Great One is the Brahman, because (that Great One) is itself mentioned later than the individual self in the series commencing with Name. " It may be asked how it is made out that Truth is (here) taught to be greater than what is pointed out by the word prāņa (ie., to be greater than the individual self). And it is stated in reply thus. In the passage-“This same person mentioned above, seeing thus, reflecting thus, knowing thus, declares that his object of worship is transcendent” 502 (Chhand Up. VII. 15. 4)-it is stated that he, who knows the prāṇā, deserves to give out that his object of worship is transcendent. Then the passage-” But he who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of worship is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1)-distinguishes, by means of the word ‘But’, that person, who, after knowing the Truth, declares that his object of worship is transcendent, from the previously mentioned person, who has also declared that his object of 502. ‘Seeing’, ‘reflecting’ and ‘knowing are expla ned respec- tively as sāksḥātkāra, manana and upåsană (or direct realisa- tion, reflection and worship through meditation).Adhik. 11. Süt. 7] ‘SATYA’ VS. ‘PRANA’ 97 worship (viz., the praṇa) is transcendent. For this same reason, in the statement-“But…. he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent “–he, who declares the prāṇa to be transcendent as an object of worship, is not again referred to (at all, as accepted by the purvapakshin). Therefore, it is made out that that Satyas which is the cause of this (person’s) declaration to the effect that his object of worship is transcendent, is greater than the prana, which (likewise) is the cause of the previously mentioned person’s declaration that his (own) object of worship transcends all others going before it. Again, what has been already stated (by the priva- pakshin) to the effect that only to him, who knows the prāna, the speaking of truth has been taught, so as to constitute an element (in the worship) contemplated in the context, and that hence there is no break in the continuity of the context as relating to the praṇa-that is not right. Indeed, by means of the word, ‘But’, another person who (being other than the worshipper of the prana) declares his object of worship to be transcendent, is certainly suggested (here). But that (suggestion) is not merely to the effect that the same person, who (holding on to the prāṇā) declares his object of worship to be transcendent, has himself to possess as an element (in respect of his worship of the prāṇā) the attribute of having to speak the truth (also). In the passage-“But he indeed is the performer of the agnihotra sacrifice, who speaks the truth” (?) and in other like passages, no other person than the performer of the agnihotra sacrifice is suggested; hence a forced interpreta- tion is (here) adopted to the effect that speaking the truth is enjoined as an essential element (in the performance of his sacrifice), on the performer of the agnihotra sacrifice, who happens to be the only person mentioned. But (in the passage under discussion) here the Supreme Brahman who is denoted by the word Truth (or Existence), is mentioned as prompting a different person (from the worshipper of the 98 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III prāṇa) to proclaim (Him) to be transcendent as an object of worship. And the word, Satya (which means Truth or Existence), is (often) used to denote the Highest Brahman, as in the following and other instances-“The Brahman is Existence (or Truth), Knowledge, Infinity.” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1). Thus he, who is firmly devoted to Him and declares Him to be transcendent as an object of worship, appro- priately happens to be greater than the previously mentioned person who holds a (different) thing (i.e., the prāṇa) to be transcendent. Therefore the ‘otherness’ (of the worshipper of Truth from the worshipper of the prana) is established by the natural and appropriate interpretation of the passage (in question) and should not be set at naught.” Indeed, to be an ativadin is to hold that one’s own object of worship is superior as an object of human pursuit to every other (object of worship). He who knows the prānā is (thus) an ativadin, because he holds and declares that the individual self, which is denoted by the word prāṇā and forms his own object of worship, is superior to all the other (specified) objects of worship, which begin with ‘Name’ and end with ‘Desire’. Even he (who thus declares the praṇa to be his transcendent object of worship) pursues (only) such an object as (really) has a higher than itself. Therefore he who declares the Supreme Brahman to be the highest as an object of worship, higher than which there is none to aim at,-he alone is the true ativādin. Accordingly, it is stated (in the context under reference) thus:-“But, he, who, by holding on to Truth (Satyena), declares that his object of worship is transcendent,—he indeed truly declares that his object of worship is transcen- dent.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1). The instrumental case 503 503. This word literally means by or with Satya’. but the instrumental case has here the power to denote a distinguishing characteristic, as in the case of the word Svetachchbatrena in the sentence, Svetachchhatrona rajānam adrakshit. The mean- ing here is that a person was made out to be a king with the aid of the white umbrella as a royal distinguishing mark, Adhik. 11, Sut. 71 UNASKED TEACHING 99 of the word, Satyena is used (here) “to denote a particular distinguishing characteristic”. (Pāņini. II. 3. 21). The meaning is that he, whose object of worship is tran- scendent, and who is himself (as a worshipper) specially characterised through Satya, that is, through the Supreme Brahman as (his) object of worship-(he declares rightly his object of worship to be the highest). It is for this very reason that the pupil (Närada) makes (here) the request- “Reverend sir, I, that same person, may I also become an ativādin through the characteristic of Satya”; and the teacher (Sanatkumāra) says-“Indeed, Satya itself has to be specially desired and known.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1). By means of the statement-” Out of the Atman comes the prāṇa" (Chhand Up. VII. 26. 3)—it is pointed out that what is denoted by the word, prana, is born out of the Atman. Therefore it is made out that the Atman dealt with in the beginning of the context (under reference here) in the passage-“He who knows the Atman crosses (the ocean of) misery” (Chhand. Up. VII. 1. 3)-is different from what is denoted by the word prāna. What has been already stated to the effect that, because the question-“Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the prāṇa?"—and the answer (thereunto)-” This is greater than the prana"-are both seen to be absent (here), it has to be understood that the atman, with which the context here is made to begin, is finally disposed of with the teaching regarding the prana, that is not right. In fact, it is not solely by question and answer that (one) thing is made out to be different from another, inasmuch as it is possible to make this out by other means of knowledge also; and such other means 504 of knowledge have been already given. 504. The other mean; of know- ledge are explained in the Śruta- prakašika to be (i) the word tu (but) in esha tu ativadati (Chhand. L. VIII. 16. 1) and (ii) the expression Prāna ätmataḥ (in VII. 26. . 100 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part. ill The idea of the pupil, who did not put the question- “Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the prāṇa?” is this. The non-intelligent things, beginning with Name and ending with Desire, have been taught (here) in the order in which every preceding thing is surpassed by every (immediately) succeeding thing, in consequence of its being greater (in value) as an object of human pursuit: moreover, in regard to (all) those things (so taught), it has not been mentioned by the teacher that the knower of each of the (succeeding) things (among them) is an ativadin: he (the teacher) has, however, considered that, in the case of him who has come to realise the essential nature of the (intelligent) individual self as pointed out by the word präna, the greatness of the object of his pursuit is transcendent; and in consequence, he (the teacher) has taught that he (who worships the praṇa) may (well) declare the object of his worship to be transcendent, as mentioned in the passage-“He indeed it is, who, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, may declare that the object of his worship is transcendent.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 15. 4). Hence the pupil (obviously) thought that the teaching regarding the Atman was (actually) concluded at this very point, and did not again put any further question. But the teacher, knowing tha this (prāṇa) also has a higher than itself, taught of his own accord that the Highest Brahman denoted by the word ‘Truth’ (Satya) constitutes the (altogether) unsurpassed object of human pursuit, by means of the passage–“Bu he, who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of worship is transcen- dent,-he indeed tru y declares his object of worship to be transcendent.” (Chand. Up. VII. 16. 1). After the Highest Brahman, who is in Himself the highest object of human pursuit, was (so) suggested, the pupil, too, with the object of knowing the truth regarding His essential nature and His worship, made a request to the effect-“May I also, reverend sir, become an ativädin by Adhik. II, Sut. 7] STEPS TO REALISATION 101 means of Satya.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1). Then, in order to attain that condition of an ativadin which is due to the direct realisation of the Brahman, the worship of the Brahman, which forms the means for the direct realisation of the Brahman, was taught in the statement–" But Satya indeed has to be specially enquired into (or worshipped). (Chhand. Up. VII. 16. 1). 21 Then mental reflection in relation to the Brahman, as forming the means of carrying out that (worship) was taught in the statement-" But reflection, indeed, has to be specially enquired into." (Chhānd. Up. VII. 18. 1.). Then, since reflection serves the purpose of fixing in the mind what has been already ‘heard’, it is understood that this teaching regarding reflection necessarily implies ‘hearing’. Accordingly, faith in the Brahman, which forms the means of ‘hearing’ (the scriptures), has been taught in the passage “But faith (or ardour) indeed has to be specially enquired into.” (Chhind. Up. VII. 19. 1). Then that kind of devotion to Him, which forms the means of attaining such (a faith), is taught in the passage-“But devotion indeed has to be specially enquired into.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 20. 1). Then in the passage-“But volition (or kriti)505 has indeed to be specially enquired into (Chhand. Up. VII. 21. 1)–that kind of volitional effort, which forms the means of practising that (devotion) and is of the nature of an internal stimulus giving rise to the activity connected with tht (devotion) is also taught. Then, for the purpose of realising (this) volition by way of the commencement of ‘hearing’ etc., it is taught in the passage-“But bliss (or happiness) indeed has to be 505. Rangarāmāja inter- prets kriti as a determination of the mind in a particular direction. This may be taken to be the same as giving direction to the will. Ramanuj himself explains kriti here as dyogaprayatna. The Srutaprakašika seems to take both II. S.B.-14. udyoga and prayatna as synony- mous. The prayatna here has necessarily to be internal: other- wise it cannot be kriti. Therefore we have taken udyogaprayatna as an internal stimulus giving rise to an external activity.102 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap, I, Part. III specially enquired into " (Chhand. Up. VII. 22. 1.)–that the Brahman, who is the (highest) object of attainment and is denoted by the word ‘Truth’, is to be known as having the nature that consists of bliss. Then, considering that that bliss alone, which is unsurpassed in greatness, constitutes the highest object of human pursuit, it is taught in the passage” But the Great One (Bhuman) indeed has to be specially enquired into” (Chhand. UP. VII 23. 1)—that that same Brahman, who has the nature of bliss, is (also) to be known as being of an unsurpassable greatness. Then (finally) the definition of that Brahman, who has the nature of the bliss which is unsurpassed in greatness, is given thus-“That is the Great One, (on seeing whom) one sees nothing else, (on hearing whom) one hears nothing else, (on knowing whom) one knows nothing else. (Chhänd. Up. VII. 24. 1). 33 The meaning is this: that while the Brahman, who has the nature of the bliss (or happiness), which is unlimited in excellence, is being experienced by (any) one, the enjoyer (of such an experience) sees nothing other than Him; because the whole of the totality of all things is included in the essential nature of the Brahman and in His greatness. Therefore it is that-while experiencing the Brahman, who has the nature of unsurpassed bliss (or happiness), and is associated with the attribute of greatness, which is another name for Lordship,-(therefore it is that then) one sees nothing other than Him, simply for the reason that nothing other than Him is in existence. 505 And then, as all that is capable of being experienced (by him who has thus realised the greatness of the Brahman) has wholly a blissful nature, he “knows” no pain. Indeed, that alone is bliss (or happiness) which, while it is being experienced, is agreeable to thman (who experiences it). 506. hat nothing other than the Brahman is in ex’s ence may be understood in two ways. (1) None equal or similar to Him is in existence. (ii) Nothing is ex stent whose existence is not dependent on Him. Adhik. II, Sut. 7] WHEN WORLD IS BLISS . 103 Again, it may, however, be asked, how that same world, which, while it is being experienced as a (thing) distinct from the Brahman, is seen to consist of pain and to be made up of limited happiness, can acquire the nature of happiness altogether, in case it is experienced as having the Brahman for its Self in consequence of its forming (the manifestation of) His glory. The reply (to this) is given thus-To those individual souls, who are under the influence of karma, the whole world, experienced as (a thing) distinct from the Brahman, happens to be full of pain and limited in happiness, so as to accord with the (respective) nature of the karma of every one of those (souls). Hence the experience of the world, as (a thing) distinct from the Brahman, as being limited in happiness, and as consisting of pain, is due to karma. Consequently, to him who is freed from the ignorance (avidya), which is (ultimately) of the nature of karma, that same world, falling within the experience of the Brahman as characterised by glorious greatness, becomes bliss (or happiness) altogether. For instance, the milk, that a person affected by biliousness drinks, gives him, in proportion to the degree of his biliousness, either very little pleasure or even the contrary of it. That same milk, however, invariably gives rise to pleasure in the case of him who is not (in any way) affected by biliousness. Again, just as an instrument used for the purposes of a pastime by the father (the king) is not capable of giving rise to any pleasure in the prince (who is the son), when he does not (himself) look upon it as such, but becomes very pleasing to him when he looks upon it as such; so also, the world certainly gives rise to unsurpassed bliss (or happiness) when viewed as an instru- ment of sport in the hands of the Brahman, who is by nature bliss unsurpassed in excellence and is the abode of innumerable auspicious qualities (also) unsurpassed in excellence, and (when viewed) as having Him for its 104 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III Self.507 Consequently, while experiencing the Brahman, who is associated with the sovereignty of the world and is by nature bliss unsurpassed in excellence, one sees nothing other than Him, nor does one ‘see’ any misery. ་ The remaining portion of the context (here) explains only this. There is the passage-“He, indeed, who, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, has the Self for his satisfaction, has the Self for his sport, has the Self for his enjoyment, and has the Self for his rapture-he is his own ruler, he is free to move as he likes in all the worlds. 508 But those who know otherwise than thus, they have other rulers to rule over them, they come by perishable worlds and are not free to move as they like in all the worlds.” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 2). To be one’s own ruler’ means ’to be independent of karma’; ’to have other rulers to rule over them’ means ’to be subject to karma’. Accordingly, there is this passage also–“He, who sees (that One), does not see death, nor disease, nor the quality of miserableness (in the world). Indeed, the seer sees all and attains all in all places. (Chhand. Up. VII. 26. 2.) Moreover, (the idea) that the Prahman has the nature of the bliss which is unsurpassed in excellence, has been dealt with in detail under the aphorism-“That which is denoted by the word Anandamaya (is the Brahman); because there is (in the context) the repetition (of various grades of bliss which culminate in the Anandamaya which forms the Highest)”. (Ved. Sūt. I. 1. 13). 507. Two kinds of association, leading to unpleasant and pleasant Experiences respectively, are here illustrated. Sweet milk becomes hateful to one associated with biliousness. The association of the plaything with the king makes it delightful to the prince. 508. The reference is to one who has worshipped the Bhuman and by means of nanana and upasana has outained direct 13 realisation. To him all kinds of joy are included in the bliss of the experience of the Atman Rati, krādā, mithuna and ananda are explained respectively as the satisfaction derived from the use of gerlands, sandal paste etc, the joy from gardens, the del ght from dall ance with women and the rapture from power and sovereignty. Adhik. II. Sut. 81 GREAT ONE IS ‘BRAHMAN’ 105 Thus, that Brahman, who is denoted by the word ‘Truth’ (or Existence) and is a different entity from the individual self pointed out by the word praṇa, is (here) taught to be the Great One. Therefore the Great One is the Highest Brahman. धर्मोपपत्तेश्व Sūtra 8. Dharmopapattescha (73) Because also the attributes (given in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to Him). Whatever attributes are declared in the scriptures in relation to this Great One, they are all appropriate only in relation to the Highest Brahman. 509 Natural and intrinsic immortality, as given in the statement-“This is immortal” 510 (Chhand. Up. VII. 24. 1); the attribute of independent self-sustentation, as given in the statement– “He is (established) in His own glory” (Chhand. Up. VII. 24. 1); the attribute of being the Self of all, as given in the passage beginning with-“He indeed is below”, and ending with–“He alone is all this” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 1); the attribute of being the producer of everything from the praṇa downwards, as stated in the passage 509. The reference here is to Chhand.Up. (VII. 24-26);” What- ever is the Bhuman, That is inmortal. Whatever is alpa, that is mortal.’ He (the disciple, asked): Reverend sir, wherein is Ite, the Bhuman) estab- lishe?’ ‘In Its own glory, or not (even) in the glory…He is below, He is above, He is behind, He is in front, He is to the south, He is to the north, He indeed is all this. Then therefore the teaching under the ego assumption. I am indeed below, I am above…I am indeed all this. Then therefore the teach- ing regarding (the Bhuman) as the Self. The Self indeed is below.. The Self is indeed all this…To that same person, indeed, who certainly sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, the prana comes out of the Self…the äkäs’a comes out of te Self, all this indeed comes out of the Sel alone.’” has 510. The Upanis ad tadamyitam, but the Sribhashya quotes as etadamrit.m, which phrise, bowever, occurs in VII. 3. 4. 106 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III beginning with–“Out of the Atman comes the präṇa " (Chhand. Up. VII. 26. 1); these and other similar attributes certainly belong to none other than the Supreme Self. Moreover, that teaching of (the Brahman’s) being the Self of all, which is given in the passage beginning with- “I am indeed below” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 1)-therein. is (also) declared the worship of that Brahman, who is characterised by the attribute of greatness, under the conception of the ego; because the thing (regarding the Brahman) under the conception of the ego is begun immediately afterwards (in the context) with the passage– “Then therefore the teaching under the ego-assumption “. (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 1). It is declared in the Antaryami- Brāhmaṇa (i.e., Brih. Up. III. 7) and elsewhere that the Self also of the thing ‘I’, which is the same as the individual self, is the Supreme Self Himself. Accordingly, the internal entity (of the individual self) includes the Supreme Self in its import, and so the word ‘I’ also has its significance extended so as to include the Supreme Self in its meaning, 511 Therefore the teaching regarding the worship (of the Brahman) under the conception of the ego relates to the worship of the Supreme Self as having the individual self for His body. The Supreme Self has all things for His body, and hence forms the Self of all; thus He is the Self of the individual self also. This same thing is mentioned in the passage beginning with “Then therefore the teaching 511. The point here is not that the ego is the Brahman, but that the Brahman is taught under the concept on of the ego. It is pointed out that the express on used is not ahamadeśaḥ, which may be taken to be teaching alout the ident ty of the ego and the Brahman, Lut ahankarādeśaḥ. This can only mean teaching under the concep- tion of the ego. That is, the individual self is to be regarded as the body of the Supreme Self. The word, the mental conception about what is sign fied by it and its ultimate meaning-all reach to the Supreme Self. According to the purvapaksha, of course, it is the individual self which is taught in VII. 25. 1.WHAT IS AKSHARA ‘? 107 Adhik. III, Sut. 9] regarding the Self”, and ending with–” The Self alone is all this”. (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 2). To explain this same point, it is stated, in the passage beginning with- “To that same person, indeed, who certainly sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, the praņa comes out of the Self, …the ākāśa comes out of that Self” (Chhand. Up. VII. 26, 1.) –that everything is produced out of the Supreme Self, who forms the Self of even the individual self. The meaning is that everything is born out of the Supreme Self, who is established as the internal ruler of the worshipper. Thus, for the purpose of firmly establishing the idea, that the Supreme Self has the individual self for His body, the worship (of the Supreme Self) under the conception of the ego has necessarily to be conducted. Therefore it is a demonstrated conclusion that He who is (here) characterised by the attribute of greatness is the Supreme Self. ADHIKARANA III AKSHĀRĀDHIKARAṆA भक्षरमम्वरान्तधृतेः Sûtra 9. Aksharamambarantadhṛiteḥ. (74) Akshara (means here the Supreme Brahman) because it is (declared in the context507 to be) the support of what is beyond the ambara (or ākāśa, i.e., the prakṛiti). In the context dealing with the questions put by Gārgi, the Vajasaneyins eclare to the follow ag effect in their acha- 512. The context here is Bril Up. 111. 8, where Gär i knavi challenges Yajnavalkya with questions about tle support of the heav n, the earth and all th ngs in the past, the present and the future. 108 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part itt scriptures” And he spoke in reply thus: This, verily, O Gārgi, is that Akshara which Brāhmaṇas say is neither gross nor atomic, neither short nor long, nor red, nor viscid, nor lustrous," and so on. (Brih. Up. III. 8. 8.) Here the doubt arises whether this Akshara is the pradhana (i.e., material Nature) or the individual self, or whether it is the Supreme Self (Himself).5 3 It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the pradhana. Why? Because, in the passage, “It is higher than what is beyond the akshara”, (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2), and in other such passages, the word, akshara, is seen used so as to denote the pradhana, and because also the attributes of not being gross, etc. may all be appropriately predicated in relation to that pradhāna. It may, however, be contended 51+ that in the passage– “(That is the higher knowledge) by which that Akshara is known.” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 5)-and in others like it, the word, Akshara, is seen to denote the Supreme Self also. But that is not the case here; because, between two things, one of which (viz., the pradhana) is arrived at by another means of knowledge (than the scripture), and the other (viz., the Brahman) arrived at by the scripture (itself), that suc! a 513. According to Sara, the question at issue her is whe- ther the Akshara is the Suprere Lord or the varnai.c., the onkara). In Rāmā .uja’ vie v it is difficult to maint in purvapaksha in view of ri. Up. 1.1 8. 8, which he quots at the beg naing of this adhika ana. He therefore proceeds to cal with some other views ai ut the Akshara to the effect tas it is the pradhana or the jiv These purvapakshas take the kasa in 111.8 4, wherein the heaven, the earth etc. are descrived S Leng woven like wurp and wef, to be the ether of sp ce. The kshtra, which is later, said in 11. 8. 8 to have akása woven into it, is pradhana or primordial matter. Alternatively, ākāśa may mean pri nordial matter, which may be regarded as being supported by itself or by the individual selt. Both these latter can be called akshara. 51. Here an objector comes forward to the objector. He may be the Vedantin or so ne one else who does not necessarily accept fully the Vedantin’s position here. The point here is that the word akshara is known to signify other things Besides pradhana. It may stand for the Supreme Self and also the individual se f. Adhik. II, Sut. 9] ‘AKSHARA IS ‘BRAHMAN’ 109 which is arrived at by that at by that other (non-scriptural) means of knowledge is first apprehended; and there is therefore nothing wrong in (our) accepting what is so apprehended (to be the thing denoted by the word akshara). Moreover, (in the context here) in the passage, which begins with." That which is above the heavens, O Gārgi, and that which is below the earth" (Brih. Up. III. 8. 6)- it is first of all declared that, in regard to all the things existing in the three (viz., the present, past and future) times, the Akshara, which forms their cause, is their support; then in the passage-" In what, indeed, O Gārgi, is the ākāśa woven, like warp and woof"? (Brih. Up. III. 8. 7), the question is asked as to what it is which, while forming the cause of (that) ākāśa, constitutes its support. And the Akshara which is then declared in the answer (thereto) as being the cause of all modified existences and as forming their support, and which is also arrived at by a means of knowledge other (than the scripture)-that is made out to be the pradhana. Therefore (this) akshara denotes the pradhāna. If it be so inferred, it is stated in reply thus :- Akshara (means here the Supreme Brahman); because it is (declared in the context to be) the support of what is beyond the ambara (or ākāśa, i.e., the prakṛiti)". (Ved. Sut. I. 3.9). Akshara means the Supreme Brahman. Why? Because it is (declared in the context to be) the support of what is beyond the ambara." The word, ambara, means ākāśa, and what is beyond it is what constitutes its other shore (or source); it is the undifferen- tiated prakriti which is beyond the ākāśa, because that is the (thing) supported; it is as much as to teach that this Akshara is the basis of that (undifferentiated pradhāna which is the source of the ākāśa). The meaning is this, that in this passage, namely,-“In what, indeed, is this ākāśa woven like warp and woof”–what is denoted by II. S.B.-15. 110 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III ākāśa is not the air-filled ākāśa (or the sky); on the other hand, it means the undifferentiated prakriti, which lies beyond it (and forms its source); therefore that Akshara, which is mentioned here as being the support of even the undifferentiated prakṛiti, cannot rightly be the undifferen- tiated prakriti itself. 515 It may, however, be asked how it is made out that what is denoted by the word ākāśa, is not the air-filled (sky). This is answered thus. In the following statement, namely,—“That which is above the heavens, O Gārgi, and that which is below the earth, and that which is between heaven and earth, and all these things which they call past, present, and future,” (Brih. Up. III. 8. 3, 4, 6, 7.)-that ākāsa, which is pointed out to be the basis of all modifica- tions existing in the three (viz., past, present and future) times cannot rightly be the air-filled ākāśa (or the sky); 516 because that also has to be included among the modifica- tions (referred to here). Therefore, it is made out that what is here denoted by the word, ākāśa, is the subtle element (the pradhana in its causal condition). Then in the question-“In what, indeed, is the ākāśa woven like warp and woof?"-it is asked what it is that forms the basis of even such a subtle element. Consequently, the Akshara, which is pointed out to be the support of that (subtle element), cannot appropriately be the pradhāna. Again, what has been stated above to the effect that the thing which is arrived at by another means of knowledge (than the scripture) is apprehended earlier than the other thing, which is arrived at by the scripture (itself)—that is not right; because the word Akshara imports its meaning through the power of its own etymology, and does not 515. This is precisely the view of the purvapakshin-that the primordial matter called the akshara is its own support. 516. The air-filled sky is moreover destroyed in the pralaya and cannot therefore be between all things, present, past and future, as stated in the context. Adhik. III, Sut. 9] WORD & MEANING :111 therefore stand in need of any other authority (in support thereof). While endeavouring to apprehend the relation (between a word and its meaning), by whatever criterion the essential nature of that meaning is made out, that same (criterion) is not (felt to be) needed at the time of the use thereof (in current speech). 517 If that be so, it may perhaps be said that what is denoted by the word, akshara, may be taken to be the individual self; because it is appropriate for it to be the basis of all the non-intelligent things, including the subtle element (pradhana in its undifferentiated causal condition); and because also the given attributes of not being gross, etc.,518 are applicable to it; and because, again, the word, akshara, is seen used to denote the individual self also in the following and other passages–519 The unlifferentiated thing (avyakta) is absorbed into the akshara” (Sub. Up. II.); “He whose body is the avyakta, whose body is the akshara” (Sub. Up. VII.); “The destructible are all the beings; the unchangeable is called the akshara” (B. G. XV. 16). 517. The argument here is that the word, Akshara, of itself de- notes through its etymology, the Supreme Brahman, inasmuch as it means etymologically that which is indestructible. In a case like this, no special criterion of any kind is needed to determine the meaning, as there is no question here of the word meaning anything apart from its etymology, or being used in any unusual sense. More- over, every time a word is used, its etymology need not be enquired into. When we refer to a man with a stick, he need not be actual- ly present before us. Only that meaning of a word is first apprehended which is best known, whether from etymology, usage, inference or perception. A word like dharma or isvara first suggests to us the scriptural sense only. The pradhana again is imperceptible, and-inference abou its existence dubious. No inference further can stand which conflicts with scripture. Finally, there is the abs rdity that the pradhana has to be regarded; as supporting itself. 51. One of the attributes of the individual self here referred to is that it is not atomic. (Brih ‘Up. III. 8. 8). The Nayayikas and the Sankhyas hold it to be so, though according to the Vedantin it is atomic. 519. Vide Note 185 of Vol. 1. Akshara here means the: indivi- dual self according to the purvapakshin. It means the individual self and subtle mixed together indistinguishably, according to the Vecantin. matter112 SRI-BHASHYA To this (objection), the reply is : सा च प्रशासनात् Sūtra 10. Sā cha prasāsanāt (75) [Chap. I, Part III And that (power of supporting what is beyond the ākāśa) is due to (His) supreme power.

In the passage beginning with-" Indeed, under the supreme command of this Akshara, the sun and the moon, O Gārgi, stand well supported; indeed, under the supreme command of this Akshara, heaven and earth, O Gārgi, stand well supported; under the supreme command, indeed, of this Akshara, O Gārgi, the twinkling of the eye, the muhurta, 520 the day and the night, the fortnight, the month, the season, the year, all these stand well supported."; (Brih. Up. III. 8. 9)-it is taught that that power of supporting even what is beyond the ākāśa results solely from the supreme power of that Akshara. ‘Supreme power’ means pre-eminent exercise of authority. And that above-mentioned power of supporting all things as subject to one’s command, cannot belong to the individual self in both of its conditions of bondage and release. Therefore, 51 it is the Highest Person Himself who is the Akshara that forms the Supreme Self. 520. Vide Note 85, Vol: I. 521. Though in Brih. Up. (1II. 8. 9), which is the subject matter of this sutra, there is no reference to ambaránta or what is beyond the ākāśa, the un mpeded sovereign power of the Akshara is described and illustrated. This means that the Akshara rules over everything including the ambaranta. The ākāśa mentioned earlier, the sun, the moon, the divisions of time, etc. are illustrative of the totality of things. Other texts in the Upanishad like IV. 4. 22. and V 6. 1 may also be alluded to here by implication. This sove- reign authority over all is located in the Highest erson in B.G. (XV.18) and other well known texts. Adhik. III, Sut. 11] ‘OTHERNESS’ NEGATED 113 भन्यभावव्यावृ तेश्च Sūtra 11. Anyabhāvavyāvṛitteścha. (76) Because also otherness is negated (in rela- tion to the Akshara). ‘Otherness’ means the character of being other (than the Brahman); it is the character of being the pradhāna, etc. That this Akshara is other than the Highest Person is negated in the remaining (i.e., the concluding) portion of the passage (under reference) thus-“That above- mentioned Akshara, O Gārgi, being Itself unseen sees, being Itself unheard hears, being Itself unthought thinks, being Itself unknown knows; there is no other seer than He, there is no knower other than He; in this Akshara’ indeed, O Gārgi, is the ākāśa woven like warp and woof.” (Rṛih. Up. III. 8. 11). Here, since the quality of being the seer, the quality of being the hearer, etc., are taught (as belonging to the Akshara), the character of being the non- intelligent thing pradhana is negatived in relation to that (same) Akshara. Moreover, from the teaching that He possesses the character of being the seer of all things, being Himself unseen by all, the character of being the individual self is negatived (in relation to the Akshara). Consequently, this negation of otherness’ (in relation to the Akshara) confirms the conclusion that this Akshara is the Highest Person. 522 522. The Brahman, called Akshara here, is differentiated from the pradhana because It is the seer, and from the individual self because It sees, while remain- ing unseen. This explanation generally agrees with that of Sankara here. But Brih. Uf. III. 8. 11, which denies the exist. ence of any other seer etc. than the Akshara, need not be taken to deny the existence of individual selves. Ramanuja develops ano- ther view also about the negation of ‘otherness’. 114 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III ‘The negation of otherness’ may also be explained thus:-The ’negation of otherness’ means the negation of the (independent) existence of other things. Just as this Akshara, being unseen by other things and being (Himself) the seer of other things, forms the support of all things other than Himself-similarly, there is nothing else (here) which, while being unseen by this (Akshara) and being also the seer thereof, forms the support thereof. 523 So says this remaining portion of the passage (in the context) beginning with “There is no seer other than He”; and it thus negates the (independent) existence of other things (in relation to the Akshara) and negatives in relation to that (same) Akshara the character of being the pradhana and also the character of being the individual self. Again, 524 from the the following passage–“Under the supreme command of this Akshara, O Gārgi, men, obey- ing, praise the givers of gifts; the gods, obeying, praise the sacrificer, and the pitris, (i.e., the manes of the dead) obeying, praise the darvi 525 offering” (Brih. Up. III. 8. 9)—it is made out that that Akshara, in accordance with whose commands. proceed all the religious acts consisting of sacrifices, gifts, offerings of oblations, etc., which are prescribed in the Vedas and in the Smritis, is the Highest Brahman who is the Highest Person Himself. And again, it is declared thus:-“He, indeed, O Gārgi, who, not knowing this Akshara, offers oblations in this world, performs sacrifices, and practises tapas (or penance, religious austerities, etc.) for many thousands of years–to him all that has an end; he, indeed, O Gārgi, who, not knowing this Akshara, departs this life-he comes to misery; but he, O Gārgi 523. The first thereof evidently refers to the Akshara the second may refer to the same, or to ‘all things’ mentioned earlier. 524. Cha (also) in the Sutra may imply either a reason connec- ted with supporting the amba ränta, or something new. The latter view is set out in this paragraph, 525. This refers to an oblation made with a wooden spoon or ladle. Adhik. IV, Sut. 12] RITUALS & ‘AKSHARA’ 115- who, knowing this Akshara, departs this life-he, indeed, becomes a Brahmana (i.e., attains the Brahman).” (Briht Up. III. 8. 10). From this, it is conclusively established that that Akshara, the ignorance relating to which leads to samsara and the knowledge relating to which leads to the attain- ment of immortality, is the Highest Brahman Himself. ADHIKARANA IV IKSHATIKARMADHIKARANA ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः Sūtra 12. Ikshatikarmavyapadesāt saḥ. (77) The object of the action of seeing is He (ie., the Supreme Self) on accouut of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self). In the context dealing with the questions put by Satyakāma, 5.6 the Atharvanikas declare in their scriptures to the following effect :-" But he, who, on the other hand, meditates on the Highest Person with the help of the syllable Om of three mātrās, attains unto the light of the sun; and as a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed indeed from sin; he is led up into the Brahmaloka (i.e., the world of the Brahman) accompanied with the singing of the sāman; he sees the Highest Person, who is seated in the ‘cave’ of the heart and is higher than the free self, who in his turn is higher than the embodied individual self". (Pr. Up. V. 5). 526. The context is Pr. Up (V), where Satyakāma, the son of Sibi, asks the preceptor, Pippalāda, some questions about the oйkāra. 116 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III Here, the two words denoting the acts of meditating and of seeing have a common object; inasmuch as such an act of seeing is the result of meditation, and inasmuch as the object of attainment has to be the same as the object of meditation in accordance with the rule-“As is a man’s work (of worship) in this world, (so will his attainment be after he has departed this life “)-(Chhand. Up. III.14. 1), and inasmuch again as the thing which forms the object of both (the words denoting the acts of meditating and seeing) is recognisably referred to (here) by means of the (same) expression, ‘Highest Person’. Here the doubt arises whether the Being referred to in this passage by the expression Highest Person is the four- faced Brahma (the creator), who is the lord of the egg-shaped universe and is of the form of the totality of the individual selves, or whether it is the Lord of All, who is the Supreme Person,527 It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is (Brahma who is) the individual selves in totality. Why? The context (here) begins with the passage-” Now, reverend sir, he among men, who meditates, till he departs this life, on the syllable Om, what is the world he will surely win thereby?” (Pr. Up. V. 1.); then it teaches that he who meditates on the syllable Om of one mātrā attains the world of men ; thereafter, it states that he who meditates on the syllable (Om) of two mātrās attains the middle world (antariksha); and lastly, the brahma-loka, which is mentioned to be the for 527. The purvapaksha Sankara here is that the Abara- Brah nan isto be meditated on and the Para-Brahman to be seen, while that of Yadavapral sa is that the object of dhyana is the bound soul and that of vision is the released soul. Pointing out the unreasonableness of having two different objects for the two actions, Ramanuja deals with another view that Brahma the creator is to be both meditated on and seen. Here Brahama is described as the jivas in their total ty, because daring naimittika-pra.ayas, jivas in the dissolve i worlds and their sense organs gathered in him. See Ramanuj ’s commentary on B.G. (VI11. 17-19), etc. the areAdhik. IV, Sūt. 12] CREATOR IS HIGHEST 117 object of attainment for him who meditates on the syllable Om of three matras, is made out to be that world which is beyond the middle world (antariksha) and belongs to the four-faced Brahma, who is all the individual selves in their totality. And the lord of that (brahma-loka), who is seen by whoever goes into that (loka or world), is none other than that four-faced Brahma (the creator). Moreover, the expression-528" who is higher than the higher individual selves in their totality “-(Pr. Up. V. 5)- is (thus) appropriate, inasmuch as the four-faced Brahma, –who dwells in the brahmaloka and is all the individual selves in their totality-is higher than the individual self ir its separateness, who becomes concrete (or embodied) with the body, the senses, etc., and is (only) higher than the body, the senses, etc. Therefore, the ‘Highest Person’, who is pointed out here, is the four-faced Brahma himself, who is all the individual selves in their totality. It having been thus definitely determined that it is the four-faced Brahma (who is the ‘Highest Person ‘), the attributes of being free from old age, etc. (given in the context here) have somehow or other 529 to be interpreted (in relation to him). If it be so arrived at, the reply is–” The object of the action of seeing (in the context) is He (i.e., the Supreme Self) on account of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self)." (Ved. Süt. I. 3. 12). The object of the act of seeing is He, that is, the Supreme Self. Why? Because it is so taught. Indeed, the object of the act of seeing is taught 528. The original runs thus ; etasmát jsvaghanāt parát param. The objector here takes parát as qualifying jiva ghanat: and the meaning is as given above. The Vedäatin however takes parât as a qualified word equivalent to a substantive: and the resulting meaning is: ‘who is higher than him who is higher than the indivi- H. S.B.-16. dual souls in their totality’. 529. The qualities enumerated in Pr. Up. (V. 7) are freedom from old age, from death and from fear. The astoundingly long life of Brahma may justify his being regarded as ever young and death- less. Compared with other souls in samsăra, he is fearless, 118 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III (here) to be the Supreme Self. Accordingly, in the sloka quoted in relation to the object of the act of seeing, there is this:-“Solely by way of the syllable Om, the wise man goes to Him who is calm, free from old age, free from death, free from fear, and is the Highest “. (Pr. Up. V. 7). The characteristics mentioned here, namely, to be the Highest, to be calm, free from old age, free from fear and free from death, certainly belong to the Supreme Self alone, as (it can be made out) from scriptural passages such as the follow- ing: “He (i.e., the Lord) is free from death. He is free from fear, He is the Brahman”. (Chhänd. Up. IV. 15. 1.) 530 The statement-” He is higher than him who is higher than this embodied individual self.” (Pr. Up. V. 5)-is also given to denote the Supreme Self, but not the four-faced Brahma, because he also comes within the meaning of the word jivaghana (i.e., the embodied individual self). Indeed, he is called jivaghana, who, in consequence of his karma, is an embodied being. In relation to the four-faced Brahmā also, this (condition) of being embodied is taught in the scriptures in passages such as the following:-" He (i.e., the Lord) creates the four-faced Brahma at first." 531 (Svet. Up. VI. 18.) This again has been stated above, namely, that the brahma-loka pointed out to be beyond the middle world (antariksha-loka), is seen to be the world of the four-faced Brahma, and that, therefore, he who resides therein (as its lord) is this four-faced creator. This is not right. In the passage which says-“He is calm, free from old age, free from death, free from fear” (Pr. Up. V. 7)-the object of the act of seeing is definitely determined to be the Supreme Self: therefore, the brahma-loka which is pointed out to be the (final) abode of (such a) seer does not deserve to be the perishable world of the four-faced Brahmā. 530. The reference may be to the characteristics mentioned in the sentence, or to those in the quotation from Chhand. Up. here. 531. The Upanishad text goes on: “and then communicates the Vedas to him.” This shows the limited range of the knowledge of the creator, and his being subject to karma and embodied, Adhik. IV, Süt. 12] LOWER BRAHMAN 119 Further, in accordance with the statement beginning with-" As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed, indeed, from sin; he is led up into the Brahma-loka (or the world of the Brahman), accompanied with the singing of the saman" (Pr. Up. V. 5.)-what is mentioned as the goal to be attained by him, who is freed from all sin, cannot be the abode of the four-faced Brahma (the creator). It is for this very reason that, in the (scriptural) sloka quoted (here), the following declaration is made concerning this same Brahma-loka-“That which the transcendental seers know is this”. (Pr. Up. V. 7). The ’transcendental seers’ (here) are the transcendental knowers. And that which is worthy to be seen by the transcendental knowers is the abode of Vishņu, since it is stated to be so in the following among other passages532"The transcendental seers always see that highest home of Vishņu" (Pr. Up. V. 10 and Taitt. Samh. IV. 2. 9. 4). Again, the world of the four-faced Brahma is not (immediately) above the middle world (antariksha); because there are, in the interval (between), many (other worlds), such as the world known as Svarga, etc. There- fore, in the reply given (to Satyakāma) to the effect-" This syllable Om is, indeed, O Satyakāma, that Brahman, which is the highest and the lowest; therefore, the wise man attains either of them by this means alone" (Pr. Up. V. 2) —that Brahman, who is pointed out to be the lower in His condition as effect, is divided into two kinds, one as belong- ing to this world and the other to the next; then it is stated that those who meditate on the syllable Om of one mātrā will obtain thereby the mundane result, which is the attain- ment of the world of men; then, again, it is stated that those who meditate on the syllable Om of two mātrās will obtain the other worldly result, which is indicated by the word antariksha; lastly, there is the teaching that the 532. Vide Chhand Up. VIII. and Nris. Up. 8. 3.4, 7.4; 8.3: 10.1; Maitri. Up.11.2; 120 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III Highest Brahman Himself is to be attained by those, who (constantly) meditate on the Highest Person with the help of the syllable Om of three matrās, which (itself) denotes the Highest Brahman. Thus the whole (of our argument) is consistent. Therefore the object of the action of seeing is the Supreme Self Himself. ADHIKARANA V DAHARĀDHIKARANA दद्दर उत्तरेभ्यः Sūtra 13. Dahara uttarebhyaḥ. (78) The ’little ether’ (within the heart denotes the Brahman), because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context refer to Him). The Chhandogas declare to the following effect in their scripture (ie., Chhandogya-Upanishad) :-“Now, in that small lotus-like home (i.e., the heart) which is in this city of the Brahman (viz., the body), inside of it, there is the little ether (or dahara-ākāśa); and what exists within that, that has to be sought after, that has, indeed, to be specially desired and known”. (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 1). Here the doubt arises whether this dahara-ākāśa (or ’little ether’) is one of the great material elements (viz., the spatial ether), or whether it is the individual self, or whether it is the Supreme Self (Itself) 533. 533. The grounds for the doubt are: (i) as something is inside the dahara-ākāṣa, it cannot be the Brahman: and (ii) as it is compared to the elemental ether, it cannot be the ether. Adhik. V, Sut. 13] ‘DAHARA’ IS ‘BRAHMAN’ 121 Which, indeed, is it that is appropriate (here)? It is one of the great material elements (viz., the spatial ether). Why? Because the word, ākāśa, is largely understood to denote the material element of ether, and because also from the statement-" What exists within, that, that has to be sought after “-it (viz., the ākāśa) is made out to be the support of something else which has to be sought after. If it be so held, it is stated in reply-” The ’little ether’ (within the heart) denotes (the Brahman), because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context, refer to Him)." (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 13). The dahara-ākāša (or the ’little ether ‘) here is the Highest Brahman. Why? “Because the subsequent statements”, that is, the reasons found stated in the passages coming afterwards (“in the context, refer to Him). " In the following passage-“This Self534 is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, and free from thirst, desires the truth and wills the truth” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1, 5)-the following qualities, namely, the quality of being the unconditioned Self, the quality of being devoid of sin, etc., the quality of desiring the truth and the quality of willing the truth are all declared to belong to the daharākāśa; and these give rise to the knowledge that the daharākāsa is the Highest Brahman. 534 In the passage beginning with “Now, to those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also His eternal auspicious qualities, to them there is free movement in all the worlds”, and ending with- “Whatever desires he (i.e., the released self) may indulge in, that will befall him (merely) through his will and will be 534. ‘This Self’ here means ’the unconditioned Self’. But the purvapaksha wrongly takes the word, Atman, (literally, the perva- der) as the ākāśa, which pervades the other four elements, or as the individual self which ‘pervades’ by its knowledge. The uncondi- tioned Self is here distinctly shown to have no evil qualities and to be full of auspicious qualities.122 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III fulfilled through that (will); and (thus) obtaining it, he becomes blessed” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 6 to 2. 10)—it is stated that he who knows the daharākāŝa attains the power of willing the truth: and this also gives rise to the knowledge that the daharākāsa is the Supreme Brahman. Moreover, in the passage “Whatever is the magnitude of this (elemental) ether, that is the magnitude of this daharākāśa within the heart” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 3.) there is given (between the daharākāsa and the elemental ether) the relation of a subject comparison to the thing with which it is compared; and this cannot be appropriate, if the daharākāsa is taken to be the elemental ether. It may, however, be said that this relation of a subject of comparison to the thing with which it is compared is founded upon the limitation due to the heart (as an enclosing organ). In such a case, it cannot be appropriate for the ākāśa limited by the heart to be the abode of all things including heaven and earth. It may be further objected (here) that even in the case where the daharākāśa is understood to be the Supreme Self, it is not (at all) possible for that ākāśa to be the subject of a comparison with the external elemental ether, because in the passage beginning with “It is greater than the earth, it is greater than mid-heaven” (Chhānd. Up. III. 14. 3.), it (viz., the daharākāśa) is declared to be greater than all things,535 But this is not right; because the passage (under notice) here is intended to negate, in relation to the daharākāśa, that littleness which would result to it from its being contained within the interior of the lotus-like heart; 535. The elemental ether is not really intended to be compared with the dahara-ākāśa as the former is not greater in magnitude than the Brahman. The purpor- ted comparison only negates the littleness of the dahara-ākāša. Adhik. V, Sut. 13] ‘DAHARA’ & ITS ‘GUNAS’ 123 as, for instance, the statement that the sun goes like an arrow is intended to deny slowness of motion in relation to the sun who really moves much more quickly (than the arrow). It may again be said thus. In the passage beginning with “This Self is devoid of sin” (Chhand. UP. VIII. 1. 5)—it is not the daharākāsa that is referred to; because in the statement-” Inside of it, there is the little ether (or daharāśa); what exists within that, that has to be sought after" (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1, 1)-what exists within the daharākāśa, and is different from it, is spoken of as the object fit to be sought after; therefore (in connection with the passage) here, it is proper to point out that what is described therein as ‘This Self which is devoid of sin’ constitutes that very object which is fit to be sought after. This would be so, provided the scripture itself did not differentiate the daharākāśa from what exists within it. But it (viz., the scripture) has differentiated (these). Accordingly, in the passage 536"Now (there is) that small lotuslike home which is in this city of the Brahman, (Brahmapura); that subtle ether (daharākāśa) which is inside of it and what exists within that (subtle ether), that (i.e., the subtle ether and what is inside it) has to be sought after" (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 1.)-the Supreme Brahman, as an object of worship, being conceived to be quite close (to the worshipper), the body of the worshipper is (first) pointed out by the word Brahmapura, then the heart, which is within that (body) and forms a member thereof, having the shape of a lotus and possessing a small size, is stated to be the home of the Supreme Brahman; then, for the 536. In this ky sentence Sankara uuderstands what exists within that’ as the dahara-ākāśa existing within the lotuslike home. Ramanuja, referring to the near- est possible an ecede it of ’that’, makes it clear that the quest and the upasana refer to both the ‘subtle € Ger’ and its host of qualities. Tat in the sen-tence can be garded as a divandva compound of sah and tat, re- duced to the form of a single word in the singular number. 124 SRI-BHASHYA Chap. I, Part. ili purpose of graciously assisting the worshipper, He who is omniscient and omnipotent and is the one ocean of tender love to all those who seek refuge (with Him), is referred to by the word, daharākāśa, as existing quite within that home and as being worthy to be meditated upon in a condition that is wholly fine; then the whole collection of qualities which are contained in Him, namely, the quality of being naturally free from all evil, that is, being devoid of sin, etc., the auspicious quality of being naturally unsurpassed in excellence, that is, willing the truth, etc., is pointed out in the statement-’ That has to be sought after ‘-to constitute the object which has to be meditated upon. Here in the statement- That has to be sought after ‘-the daharākāśa and the collection of qualities existing within it are both contemplated by the use of the word, ’that ‘; and it is taught that both of them have to be sought after. The meaning is this, that after the explanatory statement-Now (there is) that small lotus-like home which is in this city of the Brahman’-it is enjoined that the daharākāśa within that small lotus-like home and the collection of qualities within that daharākāśa have both to be sought after. It may (now) be asked how it is made out that what is denoted by the word, daharākāsa, is the Highest Brahman, that what is refer: ed to in the expression, ‘what exists within that’, relates to His qualities, and that there is a commandment given, which, contemplating both these by he use of the word, ’that,’ enjoins that both of them have to be sought after. Then listen with an attentive mind 537. i 537. Ramanuja nov makes a Survey of the whole of VIII. 1, showing the continuity of thought and paying special ttention to pronouns and their tecedents. After meditation on ti dahara- ākāśa and what is nside it is taught (1), the disciples ask for } particulars about what is inside the ’little ether’ (2). The teacher points out that the dahara-ākāśa is not little and that all things are contained in it. This he does by suggesting a comparison with the elemental ether: at the same time the attractiveness of the Adhik. V, Sut. 13] UNDECAYING DAHARA’ 125 In the statement-‘Whatever is the magnitude of the ele- mental ether, that is the magnitude of this ether (daharākāśa) within the heart’ (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 3)-it is declared that the daharākāśa is very great in magnitude; then, in the statement-“In this (asmin), which is wholly inside of it, are contained both heaven and earth, both fire and air, both the sun and the moon, lightnings and stars (Chhand. Up. VIII, 1. 3.)-the daharākāśa which is itself the subject under consideration is referred to by the word, ‘asmin’ (’ in this ‘), and it is declared that it (viz., the daharākāśa) forms the support of the whole world; then in the statement–” Whatever there is here as belonging to him (i.e., to the worshipper), and whatever is not, all that is contained in this (asmin)" (Chhand. Up. VIII.1. 3)— that very daharākāśa is thought of again by means of the word, ‘asmin asmin’ (‘in this’); and it is therein declared (further) that the daharākāsa possesses an unsurpassably enjoyable character by mentioning that whatever there is here in this world in relation to the worshipper in the way of a collection of enjoyable things, and whatever such enjoyable things there are not here, but are merely (included) within the range of his desires,–the whole of that totality of enjoyable things is contained within this above-mentioned daharākāsa; then it is said that, although this daharākāśa exists within the heart which forms a member of the body, and although the body is subject to old age, death, etc., it (viz., the daharākāśa) does not undergo any modification whatsoever, for the reason that it (viz., the daharākāśa) is very fine and former is also made clear (3). Before he can say more about the dahara-akasa, the pupils interrupt him hastily with a question about the effects on it of the decay and death of the body (4). In 5, the immortality of the dahara ākāśa is first taught, and then the thread of the teaching, interrupted by the hasty question in 4, is resumed from where it was left at the end of 3. The desirable II. S.B.-17. · qualities of the dahara-ākāša are now enumerated. All kāmas are included. in it like ponds in the sea, because it has the qualities given here. (Satya kama in 5 may mean that the means for the enjoyment of the Lord’s desires are eternal, or it may refer to His highest heaven.) Then the fruits of the meditation taught are described. (4-6). 126 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III minute owing to its being the Supreme Cause of all things538; then in the statement-“It is for this very reason, indeed, that this real entity is the Brahma-pura” (Chhand. Up VIII. 1. 5)-it is taught that that same dāharākāśa is what constitutes the real entity and forms the city known as the Brahman, which is the abode of the whole world; then in the statement-" In this (asmin) are contained all the desires (kāmāḥ)" (Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5) the daharākāśa is referred to by the word, asmin, and the qualities which are worthy of being desired (are referred to) by the word, kamāḥ, and it is pointed out (further) that those (qualities) exist within the daharākāśa; then this same idea of the daharākāśa being characterised by all such auspicious qualities as are worthy to be desired, as well as of its being the Self, is made clear by the passage which begins with “This Self is devoid of sin”, and concludes with-“He wills the truth” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 5); then in the passage beginning with-" Just as people here on earth follow “, and ending with–” For them, there is no free movement in all the worlds" (Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 6).-it is declared that those who do not know the eight qualities which are given here in the context, and do not also know the Self characterised by them and denoted by the word, daharākāśa, as well as those who perform religious rituals for the attainment of such enjoyable objects as are different from that (Self)-both these (kinds of persons) attain impermanent results and cannot possess the power of willing the truth; and then in the passage beginning with “Now those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also His eternal and auspicious qualities, for them there is free movement in all the worlds” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 6.)-it is said that those, who know the Self denoted by the word, daharākāśa, and the 538. The cause is always subiler than the effect and is not involved in the mod fications of the effect. The Supreme Cause is subtler than all other causes, being the Internal Controller of each of them. It is therefore de- scribed as Satyam, the Reality or Real Entity which does not undergo any modification.Adhik. IV, Sut. 14] ‘DAHARA’S’ QUALITIES 127 desirable qualities which exist therein and which consist of the quality of being devoid of sin, etc., obtain, solely through the grace of that Highest Person who is the ocean’ of all noble qualities, the fulfilment of all desires and the power of willing the truth. Therefore, it is definitely determined that what is taught here is that the daharākāsa is the Highest Brahman, that the collection of desirable qualities, beginning with the quality of being free from sin, exists within it (ie, the daharākāśa), and that both these things (viz., the Brahman and the qualities inherent in Him) have to be sought after and specially desired to be known. Accordingly, the Vākyakāra also makes this point clear in the passage beginning with- “The scriptural expression, ‘what exists within that’ (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 1), refers to qualities that are worthy of being desired”. In this very manner, for the foregoing reasons, the daharākāsa denotes the Supreme Brahman Himself. गतिशब्दाभ्यान्तथाहि दृष्टं लिङ्ग Sūtra 14. Gatiŝabḍābhyām tathāhi drishtam (79) lingam cha. On account of (the individual selves) going to (and returning from) it and on account (also) of (its being indicated by) the word (Brahma-loka), (the daharākāśa is the Brahman); accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures, and there are also grounds of inference (in this behalf). The daharākāsa is the Highest Brahman for the following reason also.539 In the passage-“Just as those who, 539. The question of sleep is discussed at greater length in Ved. Süt. III. 2. The argument here is that the daharākāśa, described as Brahmapura and Satya here, is called Brahmaloka in Chhand. Up. VII. 3.2 and Brih. Up. IV. 3. 33 and IV: 4. 23. In these latter passages, the indi- vidual soul is said to rest in the 128 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III not knowing the land (well), walk over it again and again and do not come upon the golden treasure hidden therein; so also these beings, in spite of their moving in that direction day after day, do not yet win this (etam) Brahma- loka, for they are ridden upon by ignorance” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 2)—the daha rākāśa, which is the subject under consideration here, is pointed out by the word, ’this’. The fact that all beings are therein said to move in that direction day after day, and the fact that that daharākāśa towards which they move is referred to by the word, Brahma-loka-both go to show that the daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman. It may be asked how these two things are capable of establishing that this (daharākāśa) is the Highest Brahman. To this the reply is given that “accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures. Elsewhere in the scriptures it is seen declared that, during deep sleep, all the individual selves go to the Highest Brahman day after day, as (for instance) in the following passage-“In this very manner, indeed, my dear child, all these beings reach the Sat, and do not still know that they are going to reach the Sat; and having returned from the Sat, they do not know that they have returned from the Sat.” (Chhand. UP. VI. 9. 2 and VI. 10. 2). Similarly, the word, ‘Brahma-loka’, also is (elsewhere) seen used to denote the Highest Brahman, as in the passage “Thus said he (i.e., Yajnavalkya): ‘Thou, supreme sovereign (Janaka), this (upholder of the individual Brahmaloka during deep sleep. This is taken as proving that the daha rakása is the Supreme Brahman. Ramanuja interprets Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 2. in ano- the way also, taking the Brahma- loka to be the Internal Controller, In the analogy of ignorant men walking over the hidden golden treasure, we have a movement in space above the treasure. The movement of the individual soul cannot be in space, but only towards a state or condition where the Brahman and the individual soul cannot be easily distinguished. Alternatively the movement of the soul can be in time: that is, it exists at all times. It may also be noted that Ramanuja quotes the analogy about the hidden treasure in full, in order to refute a possible objectiou that the soul rests in the space inside the heart and not in the Brahman. Adhik. V, Sūt. 14] ‘BRAHMA-LOKA’ IS ‘BRAHMAN 129 (Brih. selves during deep sleep) is the Brahma-loka” Up. IV. 3. 33 and IV. 4. 23). The movement (of the individual souls) to the Brahman is not seen in other texts (dealing with other things than the Brahman). But this very thing is (actually) declared in the scriptures, that all the individual selves remain in the daharākāsā, free from sorrow, during deep sleep, as at the time. of universal dissolution. And this is a sufficient basis for the inference that this (daharākāsa) is the Highest Brahman. Similarly, the word ‘Brahma-loka’ (in the context) being used with the significance of a grammatical equation (between) its component parts (Brahman and loka), so as to denote this daharākāśa (in the sense of the Brahman who is Himself the world to be attained), may, independently of any other authoritative employment (thereof), be taken to be sufficient basis for the inference that this (daharākāśa) is the Highest Brahman. To this effect says he (ie., the Sutrakāra)-” There are also grounds of inference (in this behalf). " According to the rule applicable to the compound word nishāda-sthapati (or the lord who is a nishäda or non-Aryan), it is more reasonable to adopt the karmadharaya word-composition here than the shashti. tatpurusha. (Vide Pur. Mim. VI. 1. 51 & 52.)540 Or, the passage-" They move (in that direction) day after day" (Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 2)-does not speak of the movement (of the individual selves towards the Sat) during the time of deep sleep; on the other hand, (it says that) 540 Jaimini discusses and settles the question who is the nishacia-stharati (the nishada- lord) entitled to perform the Vedic sacrifice called the Raudra He is not a lord of the nishadas; himself not being a nishada, but Lelonging to one of the classes entitled to study the Vedas: but he is a lord who is himself a nishada. The compound word has to be taken to be karmadharaya (or appositional) and not tat-burusha (or determinative). Wherever possible, compound words should e reg rded as positional, as the full force of the component terms is only then brought out. In the instance here, Brahmaloka has to be understood as ’the Brahman who is Himself the world to be attained’, and not as ‘a world belonging to or related to the Brahman. 130 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part. III they move day after day over the dahrākāsa, which is always existent as the Internal Self (of all beings) and which forms the highest object of human pursuit: that is, them- selves existing at all times and not knowing Him, they do not obtain Him, that is, do not attain Him. Just as those, who do not know the hidden golden treasure and the place wherein it is (hidden), although they may be always moving thereon, do not yet come by it, just so (is it the case here). Such is the meaning (here). This very same constant movement (of the individual selves) over the (hidden) daharākāśa, which is existent as the Internal Self (of all beings), (the movement) which belongs to all beings who are controlled by that (daharākāsa) and are ignorant thereof goes to show that that daharäkäsa is the Highest Brakman. Accordingly, elsewhere (in the scriptures) it is seen declared that the Highest Brahman who exists as the Internal Self (of all beings) is not realised by the beings who are controlled by Him and abide in Him. For instance, (it is declared) in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa (i.e., Bṛih. Up. III. 7) thus :-" He, who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, and who internally rules the self-(He is thy Internal Ruler and immortal Self)" (Madh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22); “He sees unseen, hears unheard” (Brih. Up. III. 7. 23). It is needless to see this declared elsewhere (also in the scriptures). This constant movement of all beings over Him who exists in the heart and is made out, from the illustrative example of the (hidden golden) treasure, to be the highest object of human pursuit-(the movement) which, having Him as its basis, belongs at all times to all the beings who are ignorant (thereof)-is itself a sufficient ground for the inference that this (daharākāśa) is the Highest Brahman.541 541. The point here is that the daharākāsa is identical with the Anturyāmin, and that what is true of the latter is also true of the former. Adhik. V. Sut. 16] ‘DAHARA’S’ GREATNESS 131 For the following reason also, the daharākāŝa is the Highest Brahman. yàu Afgatsegifenrgy3o9: Sūtra 15. Dhriteścha mahimno’s yāsminnupalabdheḥ, (80) Because also His (ie., the Brahman’s) great- ness as the support (of the world) is found (mentioned) in relation to this (daharākāsa). In the passage beginning with-“He, the Self, (is the bridge)” (Chhand Up. VIII. 4. 1)-the daharākāśa, which is the subject under consideration (here), is referred to. Then in the passage-" He is the bridge, the support of all these worlds, so that they may not get the into confusion (Chhand. Up. VIII. 4. 1)-(the state of) being the support of the world is declared (in relation to the daharākāśa). And this goes to show that the daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman. Indeed, to be the support of the world consti- tutes the greatness of the Highest Brahman, as it may be made out from the following and other passages:-" He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings, He is the bridge and the support of all the worlds so that they may not get into confusion. (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 22): “Under the supreme command of this Akshara (or the Imperishable Brahman), O Gārgi, the the sun and the moon stand well supported”. (Brih. Up. III. 8. 9). And this above-mentioned greatness which is known as the support (of all) and belongs to Him who is the Supreme Brahman is found to exist in relation to this daharākāśa. Therefore the daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman. प्रसिद्धेव Sūtra 16. Prasiddhescha. (81)132 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III And because also it is well known (that the word Ākāśa means the Brahman). Moreover, the word ‘Akāśa’ is well known to denote the Highest Brahman, as in the following and other passages" If this Akasa (i.e., the Brahman) be not Bliss, who indeed is there that can live and who that can enjoy?“542 (Taitt. Up. II. 7. 1); “All those beings are indeed born out of the Akasa above”. (Chhand. Up. I. 9. 1). The idea here is this, that the well known use (of the word (Akasa) when characterised by the qualities of being devoid of sin etc., (in the sense of the Brahman) is of stronger authority than its (other) well known use to denote the material element of ether. Thus indeed has the view that the daharākāśa is the material element of ether been refuted (in the preceding four Sūtras). Now, however, after raising the doubt that the daharākāśa is the internal individual self, he (i.e., he Sūtrakāra) proceeds to disprove it thus: इतरपरामर्शात्स इति चेन्नासंभवात् Sūtra 17. Itaraparāmarsāt sa itichenna sambha vāt. (8 2 If it be said that, owing to there being a reference to another (than the Brahman), it is he (viz., that other, namely, the individual self, who is the daharākāśa), it is replied that it is not so; because of the inappropriateness (of the qua- lities of the daharäkäsa being attributed to the individual self). 542. The verbs, anyat and prányát, (being the potential third person singular respectively of an and pran) refer to breath- ing. Rangaramanuja interprets them as expressive of enjoyment of barpiness in this world and of bliss ia moksha. $.nkara in his commentary on the Taitt. Up. takes them as referring to the activities of the apana and the prāna. Adhik. V, Sut. 17] ‘AKASA’ IS ‘JIVA’ 133 What has been stated above to the effect that, in accordance with the other parts of the context, the daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman-that is not right; because in the other parts of the context, it is that which is other than the Highest Brahman, that is, it is the individual self, which is directly referred to; as in the following passage-“Now this jiva rises up from this body, and, having reached the Highest Light, he (i.e., the released individual self) manifests himself in his own true form. He is the self, said he (i.e., the teacher). He is immortality, he is the fearless, he is the Brahman”. (Chhānd. Up. VIII. 3. 4). No doubt, it is not possible for the ākāśa, which, in the statement,-” Inside of it, there is the little ether (or daharākāśa)" (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 1.)-is taught to be within the lotus-like heart (of man), to possess the character of the material element of ether, inasmuch as (between these two ākāśas) there cannot be, among other things, the relation of the subject of comparison to the thing with which it is compared; nevertheless, it is proper to accept (in relation to the daharākāsa) that, in accordance with the other parts of the context, it has the character of the individual self. Moreover, the word, ākāśa, owing to its (import) being in association with luminousness and other such (qualities), is applicable only to the individual self. 543 If it be so held, the reply to it is this: “it is not so because of the inappropriateness.” This (daharākāša) is not the individual self; because the qualities of being devoid of sin, etc., cannot exist in relation to the individual self. 543. The purvapakha seeks to identify the samprasada in VIII. 3. 4. (which can only be the indivi- dual self) with the daharākāsa. It is argued that this samprasada is described as the Atman and the Brahman, as immortality and as II. S.B.-18. the fearless. But it is the Highest Light who is thus described-not the samprasada. The qualities of the daharākāśa are uncondi- tioned; those of the released soul are made manifest on its being emancipated. 134 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु Sūtra 18. Uttarācḥchedāvirbhūtasvarūpastu. 83) If it be said that it (viz., the idea of the daharākāśa being the individual self) results from a subsequent passage it is replied that it it is not so); for that (individual self which is mentioned later in the context) is, on the con- trary, what has its essential nature made mani- fest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of karma.) It may, however, be said that from a subsequent passage (in the context), that is, from the passage uttered by Prajapati, it is definitely determined that it is the individual self which is associated with the qualities of being devoid of sin, etc. What is (here) said is this :-The passage544 attributed to Prajapati (in the context) relates certainly to the indi- vidual self. Accordingly, Indra heard (from somebody) in the form of a tradition the utterance of Prajapati to the effect: “He who is the atman (or the self) is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth; he has to be sought after, he has to be 544, Ramanuja here sums up Chhand. Up. VIII. 7 to 12, where Prajapati teaches Indra the nature of the individual self. Indra learns to distinguish the self from the body which can be seen reflected in a mirror and from one’s own form as seen in dreams. In dreamless sleep the self seems to him to be almost extinct. Then Prajapati shows how the self is different from the senses and what its pure state in moksha is. The teaching of Prajapati is regarded as an anga, a subsidiary part, of the dahara- vidya, the teaching relating to the worship of the Brahman as the daharākāša. The fruits of the latter are prescribed for the former also. Adhik. V, Sut. 18] PRAJAPATI’S TEACHING 135 specially desired to be known; he who understands and knows545 that self attains all worlds as well as all desires " (Chhand. Up. VIII. 7. 1): he then approached Prajapati with the object of knowing the essential nature of the self (or ātman) that has to be sought after; then with the intention of finding out the capacity of his pupil, Prajapati gradually taught him (i. e., the pupil, Indra) the embodied individua] self as he is found in the conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep; then, on noticing that Indra did not find anything (in the self) worthy of acceptance in each of those (conditions), and that he was thus fit to receive the teaching regarding the essential nature of the pure self, he (i.e., Prajapati) said to him (Indra) thus-“This body, O Indra, is indeed liable to decay; it is subject to death; it is (simply) the abode of this incorporeal and immortal self” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 1); and it was explained to him (therein) that the body serves as an abode (for the self), that the self presides therein, and that this (self) whieh is unembodied is characterised by immortality as its nature; then in the passage “To him who remains with a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who remains without a body” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 1)-it is taught that he, who is associated with a body evolved in response to karma, has thereby to undergo miseries consisting of the experience of pleasures and pains, and that, when he is finally freed from the body, those miseries also come to an end; then in the passage” In this very manner, this same samprasāda (or the individual self), rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light, and becomes manifest in his true nature (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 2.)-(Prajapati) taught complete dissociation from the body to be the essential nature of the individual self. 545. “Understands” (which is how anuvidya has been rendered) signifies “has knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences about’’; knows 64 11 39 (or vijänāti) means ‘‘meditates on, performs dhyana about”. See Vol. I, p. 16, where this explana- tion is given. 136 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III Then, in the passage “He (i.e., the Lord) is the Highest Person; he (i.e., the released self) moves about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing and enjoying either in the company of women, or with vehicles, or in the company of relatives; he (in His presence) does not mind this body which has had birth” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 3.)- it is stated that the Supreme Light which is the object to be attained is the Highest Person, that the individual self, whose veil of ignorance has been removed, and who has attained unto the Supreme Light, obtains, in the world of the Brahman, all the objects of enjoyment desired by him, and that all the wrong aims of life, such as (the love of) the body which are due to karma and are inseparably associated with pleasure and pain, are not even thought of (there); then in the passage-“Just as the draught animal is yoked to the cart, similarly, prana (or the self characterised by life) is yoked to this body (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 3)– by means of the illustrative example of the yoking together of the draught animal and the cart it is explained that it is to that very thing (i.e., the individual self) which has the essential nature mentioned above, that there results, in the state of samsara, such an association with the body as is dependent upon karma. "” Then in the passage–“Now where the eye is fixed upon visible form, there is the person of the eye (i.c., the self);546 the eye itself is the instrument of vision; and he who knows, I smell this’, he is the self; the nose is the organ of smelling; and he who knows ‘I utter this,’ he is the self; the tongue is the organ of speech; and he who knows “I hear this “, he is the self; the ear is the organ of the hearing; and he who knows ‘I know this,’ he is the self; the mind is his divine eye” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 4 and 5)-it is clearly shown that the eye and the other 546. “The person of the eye” here stands for the individual self to whom the eye is an instrr. ment of knowledge. But the same expression in Chhand. Up. VI. 15. 1 stands for the Supreme Person. See Antaradhikarana, pp. 31-44 above.Adhik., Süt. 18] PRAJAPATI’S TEACHING 137 (sensory organs) are the instruments of sensation, that visibility, etc., are the objects of knowledge, and that he (ie., the self) is the knower (thereof); thus it is explained that, for these very reasons, he (i.e., the individual self) is distinct from the body, the senses, etc. Then by means of the passage-“This above-mentioned person, indeed, perceiving with this mind, namely, his divine eye, enjoys all those desires which are found in the world of the Brahman (or the Brahma-loka)” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12.5)—it is taught that that same (self), when he has shaken of the body and the senses, which are dependent upon karma, enjoys all desires through the divine, i.e., the spiritually natural knowledge denoted by the word, mind;547 then in the passage–“Indeed, the gods worship this above- mentioned self; from it, all the worlds have been obtained by them as well as all desires” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 6)—it is given that those, who have knowledge, realise the self to be possessed of the nature mentioned above; then it (viz., the context here) is concluded with the passage-“He who understands and knows that self, attains all worlds, as well as all desires: thus said Prajapati indeed” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 6.)–wherein it is taught that he, who knows the self to be possessed of the nature mentioned above, obtains in the result that experience of the Brahman which is characterised by the complete attainment of all worlds and all desires. Therefore, from this passage (which is attributed to Prajapati) it is made out that that which possesses the qualities of being free from sin, etc., and is mentioned in the very beginning (of the context) as the object to be known, is certainly the individual self. Thus it is possible for the individual self to possess the qualities of being free from sin, etc. Consequently, it being possible for the 547. The mind as the divine eye is mentioned twice in VIII. 12, 5-first in association with the ssif in the state of samsåra, and then in association with the released self. In the latter case the reference is to the dharma- bhuta-jñana of the self, its attri- bate of knowledge, expanded to fullest proportions. 138 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III individual self mentioned in the later portion of the passage relating to the daharākāsa to possess the qualities of being free from sin, etc., that (individual self) alone is definitely determined to be the daharākāśa (here). In reply to this (position), he (ie., the Sutrakāra) “For that (individual self mentioned later in the context) is, on the contrary, what has its essential nature made manifest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of karma)”. (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 18). In this passage which is attributed to Prajapati (here in the context), that individual self is mentioned which is of this nature, namely, that it possesses an essential nature characterised by the qualities of being free from sin, etc., (all) originally concealed by ignorance; which afterwards, becoming free from the bondage of karma and rising up from the body, attains unto the Highest Light; and which then, having its truly essential nature revealed, becomes distinctly character- ised by the qualities of being free from sin, etc. On the other hand, in the passage relating to the daharākāśa, it is the daharākāśa, whose essential nature is (ever) uncon- cealed and is associated with the qualities of being free from sin, etc., that has to be truly understood. 548 The attribute of being the “bridge”, of being the support of all the worlds, and other such attributes can, under no circumstances, belong to the individual self, even when it stands revealed in its essential nature; these (attributes) and the attribute of being the controller of the intelligent and non-intelligent things, as learnt from the 548. This paragraph brings out the force of tu (rendered as ‘on the contrary’) in the Sutra. The Sutrakara in effect says: “What is referred to is only the individual self whose essential nature has been made manifest, not the daharākāśa. Even the released in ‘ividual self cannot be the daharākāśa whose qualities are unconditioned.” In his commentary on Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 1, Ramanuja explains what is meant by the individual self having its essential nature made manifest on attaining the Supreme Light. Adhik. V, Sut. 19] ‘JIVA’S’ LIMITATIONS 139 etymological significance of the word satya 549-truth or existence-go to prove that the daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman. Under the aphorism beginning with-” Except in the matter of the activity relating to the creation, etc. of the world” (Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 17) 550-we shall establish that the attribute of being the “bridge”, of being the support, and other such attributes cannot at all belong to (the self) even when it has its essential nature revealed. If so, the question may be asked why it is that, in the passage relating to the daharākāsa, the individual self is mentioned at all in the statement beginning with “Now this same samprasāda (attains the Supreme Light) (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 2). To this objection,551 he (i.e., the Sūtrakāra) gives the answer as follows:- अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः Sûtra 19. Anyārthascha Paramarśaḥ. (84) And the reference also (to the individual self) is made (in the context) with a different object in view. 549. The etymology of Satyam is given in Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 5, where the word is analysed into sat, ti and yam. Sat is ex- plained as standing for intelligent sols and ti for non-intelligent matter. Yam signifies a control- ler. Thus Satyam means the Controller of the intelligent and non-intelligent things. Earlier, in VIII. 3. 4, the daharākāśa is named Satyam. 550. This is Ved. Sul (1V. 4. 17), and it runs as follows: “Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc. of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the Supreme Brahman) because of (the Supreme Brahman Himself forming) the topic of the context (here wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to): and also of the non- mention (of the released souls therein). 551. The purvapaksha argues that the reference to the sampṛa- såda here can only be with a view to teach that it should be the object of meditation: hence it must be identical with the daharākāśa. The reference is not called for either by way of answer to any question or by way of a subsidiary meditation. 140 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III (In the passage relating to the daharākāsa in the context here) it is stated that, in the same way in which the daharākāsa possesses the qualities of being free from sin, of supporting the world, etc., the released individual self, on attaining unto that (daharākāša), attains it own natural condition characterised by the auspicious qualities of being free from sin etc. Through this (statement) it is intended to teach that peculiar qualification of the Highest Person which constitutes the cause of such (attainment by the individual self); therefore it is that that the individual self mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajapati is referred to herein. Moreover, 552 in the passage attributed to Prajapati, the knowledge relating to the reality of the essential nature of the released individual self has been mentioned so as to be helpful to the worship and meditation relating to the daharākāsa; for the individual self who is desirous of attaining the Brahman, has necessarily to know his own. essential nature; because, owing to the fact that a person who is himself possessed of auspicious qualities, obtains the experience relating to the Highest Brahman, who is possessed of an incalculable series of auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, the knowledge relating to the reality of one’s own essential nature is included among the results flowing from the worship of and meditation on the Brahman. “He attains all worlds, as well as all desires " (Chhänd. Up. VIII. 7. 1): “He moves about there, eating, playing” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 3.)-these and other such results to be attained, which are all mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajapati, are also the same as the results that arise out of the meditation and worship relating to the daharākāśa. 552 This replies to a possible objection that no purpose is served in the context by the description of of the nature of the individual self, which cannot be an object worship. Adhik. V, Sut. 20] ALREADY ANSWERED 141 अल्पक्षतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् Sûtra 20. Alpasruteriti chetta duktam. (85) If it be said that, owing to its (i.e., the daharākāśa’s) being declared in the scripture to be “little”, (it is not the Brahman, then it is replied thereunto that) this (objection) has been already answered. It may again be said that in the scriptural statement- “Inside of it there is the ’little’ ether (daharākāŝa) “— (Chhand. UP. VIII. 1. 1.)-the scriptural declaration of a small magnitude appropriately belongs only to the individual self, who is compared to the point of a goad, 553 but is not applicable to the Brahman who is greater than all. What- ever answer has to be given to this objection has indeed been already given by the aphorism containing the expression, “because He is to be so realised”. (Ved. Sut. I. 2. 8). 554 Therefore, the daharākāsa is none other than the Highest Person, who is free from even the smallest taint of ignorance and all other evil, and who is an ocean of innumerable noble qualities such as knowledge, strength, sovereignty, heroism, power and valour, which are all natural to Him and are unsurpassed in excellence. But he who is pointed out in the passage attributed to Prajapati has the body due to karma, as made out from the following passage among others, “It is as if they struck him (the dream image), as if they chased him” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 553. Vide Svet. Up. (V. 8). 554. Completely refuted objec- tions cannot be raised for a second time in a work like the Ved. Su1. Hence Sut. 20 must be deemed to have in v ew doubts additional to those dealt with under 1. 2. 7. Ramanuja here indicates that these centre round the question whether II. S.B.-19. the ’littleness’ of the daharåkāša, as described in the rest of the context, may not be natural. The question is decided on the strength of the unm stakable characteris- tics of the Brahman attributed to the daharākāsa. The Inga is of more force than the prakarana.142 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III 10. 2) and who, owing to the subsequent attainment of the Supreme Light, has his essential nature revealed, marked by the qualities of being free from sin, etc.: thus this (individual self existing in the condition of final release) cannot be the daharākāśa. 2 For the following reason also, this (daharākāśa) is in this manner (different from the individual self). अनुकृतेस्तस्य च Sūtra 21. Anukritestasya cha. 86) Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the daharākāsa or the Brahman). This internal individual self which is freed of bondage. and which, owing to its resembling that daharākāśa which is the Supreme Brahman, obtains the qualities of being free from sin, etc., cannot be the daharākāsa. To resemble Him (tadanukāraḥ) is to become similar to Him.555 Thu s the finally released individual self is declared in the following passage to become similar to the Supreme Brahman: “When the wise seer sees that Person, who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (i.e., similarity with the Brahman)”. (Mund. Up. III. I. 3). Therefore, that which is mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajapati is the being that is similar, and that to which it has to be similar is the daharākāśa which is the Brahman. 555. In the Vedantasára, Ramanuja has explained anukriti as svachchhandavṛitti, moving or functioning according to desire. This is one of the distinguishing Supreme characteristics of the Brahman, and its acquisition bythe individual self is included in its becoming similar to Him. Adhik. V, Süt. 22] NO NEW TOPIC 143 अपि स्मर्यते Sûtra 22. Api smaryate. (87) The Smriti also declares (to the same effect. 556 Even he who is involved in samsara is declared in the Smritis to possess, when in the condition of final, release, such a resemblance to the Highest Brahman as is characterised by the highest degree of similarity (to Him), as in the following passage :-“Depending upon this knowledge, those who attain sameness of nature with Myself are not born at the time of creation and are not hurt at the time of dissolution (B. G. XIV. 2). 11 557 Some are of opinion that the two aphorismss namely, “Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the daharākāśa cr the Brahman)” (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 21) and “The Smriti also declares (to the same effect)” (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 22)-constitute a different adhikarana (or section) by themselves, and have been given (by the Sūtrakāra) for the purpose of establishing that the scriptural passage-” He shining, all this shines after Him, and by His light is all this lighted up.” (Kath. Up. V. 15 and Mund. Up. II. 2. 13)-relates to the Highest Brahman. But by means of two adhikaraņas, namely, the adhikarana beginning with the aphorism, Adrisyatvadigunako dharmokteḥ (Ved. Sut. I. 2. 22 to 24), and the adhikarana beginning with the aphorism, Dyubhvadyāyatanam svasabdat. (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 1 to 6), that context has been 556 In the Vedantadipa Rama- nuja takes api in the Sutra in the sense o cha (‘and’). But here the meaning suggested is ’even’. 557. Sankar has a new adhi- karana for Sutras 21 and 22. (Madhva also starts such an adhikarana). The cha in Sutra 21 suggests the continuation of the old adhikarana. Sankara tries to solve the difficulty by taking Cha to refer to the last line of Kath. Up. V. 15, in addition to the other lines describing the shining ‘after Him’. Ramanuja appears to feel that the word anukriti in the Sutra cannot be made to mean anubhāna without misreading or nisuuder. standing it. 144 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III explained to relate to the Highest Brahman; and in the aphorism-“That which is denoted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman) because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context)” (Ved. Süt. I. 1. 25)-and in other aphorisms following it, it is made out that the Highest Brahman possesses the form of splendour: therefore, as no previous objection can be appropriately raised (in regard to the passage here), that (position) is untenable. Moreover, (under such a supposition) there has to be a misinterpre- tation of the words of the Sūtras (here). ADIHKARANA VI PRAMITĀDHIKARAṆA. शब्दादेव प्रमितः Sūtra 23. S’abdā deva pramitaḥ. (88) He who is (spoken of as being) limited in size (to the size of a thumb is the Brahman) because the scripture itself declares (to that effect). “That "” It is declared in the Katha-Upanishad thus: person who is of the size of the thumb and who is the lord of the past, as well as of the future, sits at the centre within one’s own self, and hence does not feel disgusted; this (person) indeed is that (supreme object of attainment) (Kath. Up. IV. 12); “The person who of the size of the thumb, is (i.e., shining) like smokeless fire-he is the lord of the past as well as of the future; he is really to-day and will, as surely, be tomorrow: this (person) is that (supreme object of attainment)” (Kath. Up. IV. 13); “The person Adhik. VI, Süt. 23] THUMB-SIZED PERSON 145 who is of the size of the thumb is the internal self of all beings and is always well settled in (their) hearts; him one has with steadiness to draw out of one’s own body, like the inner stalk of the munja grass drawn out of its capsule. Let one know him as the brilliant and the immortal one “. (Kath. Up. VI. 17). Here the doubt is raised whether this person who is of the size of the thumb is the individual self, or whether he is the Supreme Self. What indeed is it then proper to hold? That it is the individual self. Why? Because elsewhere in the scriptures the individual self is declared to possess the size of the thumb, as in the passage-“The lord of life (i.e., the individual self) wanders about through his karmas; he is of the size of the thumb, and has a form brilliant in appearance like that of the sun; he is associated with will and egoity”. (Svet. Up. V. 8). Moreover, it is not declared elsewhere in the scriptures that the Supreme Self possesses merely the size of the thumb even for the purpose of being worshipped (as such). It being thus definitely settled that it (what is of the size of the thumb) is the individual self, the attribute of lordship will result to that (self), in so far at least as the body, the organs of sense, the objects of enjoyment and the means of enjoyment are concerned. 558 If it be so held, we state in reply: “Because the scripture itself declares (to that effect)” (Ved. Süt. I. 3. 23). He who is of the size of the thumb is the Supreme Self. Why? Because the scripture itself declares : He is the Lord of the past as well as of the future “-(Kath. Up. IV. 12 & 13). Further, it is not appropriate for the individual 558. Doubt arises over the identity of the thumb-sized person, because, (i) being small, he cannot be the Brahman, and (ii) being the lord of today and tomorrow, (ie., of all existing things and things to be) he cannot be the jiva. Self’ in ‘one’s own self’ in Kath. Up. IV. 12 may be taken to be the body. V1 7 lays down meditation on this person and the place with which he is associated. 146 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III self, who is subject to the influence of karma, to be the Lord of all, of the past as well as of the future. 559 If it be asked how then it is that the Supreme Self is of the size of the thumb, he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says in answer as follows:- cadyar g agwanfaaıcara Sūtra 24. Hṛidyapekshayā tu manushyādhikaratvāt. (8 This (limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb) is, however, in relation to the heart (of man), as man (alone) is qualified (to worship and meditate on Him). Inasmuch as the Supreme Self exists in the heart of the worshipper for the purpose of being worshipped (therein), and inasmuch as also the heart of whrshipper is limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, this limitation in magnitude (of the Supreme Self here) to the size of the thumb, in relation to that (heart), is appropriate. The character (supposed to be) possessed by the individual self, of being limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, is, because he exists in the heart, dependent also on that same (heart), inasmuch as that (self) is declared in the scriptures (ie., in Svet. Up. V. 8) to be only of the size of the point of a goad. Men are alone considered worthy to 559. The term, sabdt, in the Sutra, in the sense of an expres- sion of the Vedas, stands.for iśāna in Kath. Up. IV. 12 & 14. kāmā- nuja quotes bhutabhavyasya (ie., of the past and the future) only to draw attention to the narrow- ness with which the purvapaksha interprets sana. It has to be noted that if the purvapaksha is by linga (or inferential marks) the siddhanta is by sabda. Eva in the Sutra suggests that the sabda referred to, namely, sana, has more force than the linga the purvapaksha relies on, and that it is the reason on which the declaration in the Sutra is based. Incidentally, the purvapaksha errs in denying that the Supreme Self is never described as of the size of the thumb. Moreover, the jiva’s size is atomic, according to the Scriptures.Adhik. VII, Sut 25] GODS AND WORSHIP 147 be worshippers; accordingly, all men are qualified to adopt and follow the sastras; and hence owing to the reason that the (interior of the) heart of every man is of the size of his own thumb, there is nothing wrong in the position main. tained here, although asses, horses, serpents, etc., do not possess (a heart which is of) the size of the thumb. 560 What, however, remains undisposed of here will be concluded later on. ADHIKARANA DEVATÄDHIKARANA VII तदुपर्यपि बादरायणस्सम्भवात् Sūtra 25. Taduparyapi Bādarāyaṇassambhavāt. (90 B daraya a is of opinion that that (viz., the act of worshipping the Brahman) obtains (among those who are) above (i.e., among the gods and others) also; because such a thing is appropriate. For the purpose of justifying that the Supreme Brahman is limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, it has been stated above that the sastra (or science) relating to the worship of the Brahman is fit to be adopted and followed by men. Incidentally, in that connection, it is now enquired into whether the gods and others also have or have not the fitness to (study and practise) the science of the Brahman. What then surely is it proper to hold? That the gods and others have no (such) fitness. Why? Because they have not the requisite capability for it. 560. Sutras 24-40 constitute only one adhikurana according to Ramanuja: included within it are three subsidiary adhikaranas, consisting of Sutras 26-30, 31-33 and 34-38, and dealing with some questions that rise by the way. Ramanuja here says that he will take up the main thread again and complete the adhikarana in Sutras 39-40. Sankara divides these 17 Sutras into five main adhikaranas, consisting of Sutras 24-25, 26-33, 34-38, 39 and 40. 148 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part III In fact, the gods and others who are unembodied do not possess the requisite capability for conducting well that worship of the Brahman which is supported by the seven means 561 known as discrimination, freedom, etc. More- over, we find no authoritative means of knowledge to know that the gods and others possess bodies. Although, owing to the supposition that the power of words is to denote even such things as are naturally and of themselves under- stood, the Vedantic texts possess the character of being the means of knowledge in in relation to the Supreme Brahman; 562 nevertheless, there is not found (in Vedāntic scriptures) even a single sentence which is intended to establish that the gods and others possess bodies. The mantras and the arthavadas 563, on the other hand, relate to other things (than the possession of bodies by gods, etc.), inasmuch as they are auxiliary to the injunctions bearing upon karmas (or religious rites and duties), and do not therefore possess the power of proving that the gods and such others possess bodies. And the injunctions bearing upon karmas (or religious rites and duties) do not establish anything in relation to the gods, except the fact that they are connected with the object aimed at 564 by (those injunctions) themselves. For this very reason, it is not possible for them to possess also the character of the soliciting suppliant. Accordingly, owing to their not having the requisite capability, as well as the character of 561. Vide Vol. I, pp. 20-21 for the seven means. 562. See pages 215-229 and 287-292 of Vol. I. 563. See Note 232 of Vol. I. 564. The view of the purvapaksha here is that gods with bodies and powers are not implied Ly religi- ous rituals. There is no need to introduce such gods to accont for sacr fices, when they are not required for dana or tapas. The Scripture mentions them as con- nected wi h rituals, and rituals are needed to achieve the aims of the worshipper. It is no more correct to say that there is a god who is pleased by the sacrifice taan that an image is pleased with the worship offered to it. Moreover, since all the fruits of all rituals are conferred by the Brahman according to the Vedantin, why should he require minor gods also? The purvapak- sha here may be regarded as being set up by the Púrva-Mimām- sakas-not Jaimini and his true disciples, but atheistic’ misinter preters of his Sutras. Adhik. VII, Sut 25] GODS CAN WORSHIP 149 being the soliciting suppliant (in relation to the science of the Brahman), the gods and others are disqualified (for studying and following the science of the Brahman). If it be so held, we state in reply :-” Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that that (viz., the act of worshipping the Brahman) obtains (among those who are) above also (i.e., among the gods and others); because such a thing is appropriate “. (Ved. Sut. 1. 3. 25). “That obtains above also “. That, that is, the worship relating to the Brahman, obtains (among those who are) above also; that is, it is possible even for the gods and others. Such is the opinion of the venerable Bādarāyaṇa; because it is possible for them to possess the requisite capability, as well as the character of the soliciting suppliant. Surely, the character of being the soliciting suppliant results (to the gods and others), inasmuch as they are severely afflicted with the highly insufferable miseries known as adhyatmika etc., 565 and inasmuch as again, they have, in relation to the Highest Brahman-who is free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil and is possessed of myriads of innumerable and auspicious qualities unsur- passed in excellence-the knowledge that He is the object of enjoyment, etc., unsurpassed in excellence. And the requisite capability (for worshipping the Brahman) appropriately results to them in consequence of their possessing bodies, organs of sense, etc., which are highly active and efficient. Further, the fact that (the four-faced) Brahma (the creator) and other (gods) possess bodies, organs of sense, etc., is declared in all the Upanishads 556 in those contexts which relate to the creation of the world as well as in those contexts which relate to the worship of the Brahman. Accordingly, (in the context relating to creation), beginning with the 565. Vide Note 12, Vol. 1. 566. Particularly, the Chhan- II. S.B.-20. dogya, the Brihadaranyaka and some other Upanishads. 150 SRI-BHASHYA “3 [Chap. 1, Part III

passages “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1); and “It thought, ‘May I become manifold and be born’. It created tejas (or the element of fire)” (Chhand Up. VI. 2. 3)-it is stated that He (i.e., the Lord) differentiated all the non-intelligent things into the several conditioned existences known as the elements of the fire, water, and earth etc.; that then He willed to the effect- Entering along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form”. (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2); and that then He created the fourfold division of beings, beginning with (the four- faced) Brahma and ending with the immovable objects, so that they may possess bodies suited to the respective karmas (or effects of past actions) of those beings, and acquire names in keeping therewith.
In this manner, it is declared in the scripture, in all parts which treat of creation, that created beings belong to four divisions, namely, gods, animals, men and immovable objects. (And here) the division of beings into gods and other such beings is dependent upon their being associated with bodies, organs of sense, etc., which are fitted for the enjoyment of results rightly accruing from the particular karmas (of those gods and other beings) (the karmas) which obtain in the fourteen worlds 567 beginning with the world of (the four-faced god) Brahma-because the character of being a god etc. does not belong of itself to the individual selves (in their undifferentiated essence).
—— -
Similarly, (in the scriptural context which relates to the worship of the Brahman), it is clearly made out that gods and other such (beings) possess bodies, organs of sense etc., as from the following passage beginning with: “Both the
567. These are the seven worlds above, namely, bhus (the earth), bhuvas, svar, mahas, janas, tapas and satya; and the seven
below, namely, atala, vitala, sutala, rasitala, mahātala and páţă.a.
Adhik. VII, Süt. 25]
EULOGY OF GODS
151
gods and the Asuras came to hear that (teaching of Prajapati) indeed they said …….. Indra among the gods and Virochana among the Asuras went (to Prajapati): both of them, not recognising each other (through jealousy), went to Prajapati (as pupils) with (the customary) fuel in their hands indeed, they lived as celibate students for thirtytwo years and Prajapati spoke to them. " (Chhand. Up. VIII.
7. 2-3) etc.
From the following and other similar statements which are found in the mantras and the arthavādas also that are auxiliary to the injunctions bearing upon karmas (or religious duties and rites)” Indra has the vajra 568 in his hand;” (Taitt. Br. II. 6. 7. 2); “Therewith Indra took up his weapon, vajra” (Taitt. Sam. II. 4. 12. 38)—it is made out that gods (and others like them) possess bodies etc. and this (corporeality), not being opposed to other authoritative sources of knowledge, is itself certainly intended to be authoritatively taught (here). Further it is not possible to say that from (the mantras and the arthavādas) which are concerned with the exposition of what is to be done and eulogy (of the same), there is no intention to teach anything else because that (something else) is helpful to such eulogy etc., and because also without that (something else) eulogy would not be reasonably possible.

Indeed, the character of being an eulogy consists in the description of excellence, and in the absence of excellence, 569 the character of the eulogy as eulogy of itself, disappears. Moreover, by describing an excellence that is non-existent, there cannot arise a stimulation (for the performance of any work). Therefore, the arthavādas 563. Vajra is the ‘hunderbolt or the weapon of the god. Indra, said to have been formed out of the bones of the sage Dadichi. In the next quotation, he is said to raise this we pon with the help of the strengh given by the third part of Vishnu placed on the earth, 569. Perhaps we should take this to mean “in the absence of the description of excellence”. The next sentence is said to recall a statement in the Dramiḍatha- shya: “There can be no praise with the help of what is non- existent”.152 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III which stimulate (the performance of religious rites and duties) teach without doubt the existence of excellence (in gods etc.). And while the mantras, which are used in various karmas for the purpose of obtaining some benefit or other, give out what is to be done, they confer (such) benefit in relation to those (karmas), at the same time that they declare the special attributes such as the body etc., which are possessed by the gods and others like them. Otherwise, it would not be appropriate (for the mantras) to specify Indra and other (gods). Moreover, an attribute- less deity can hardly be conceived in the mind. It being so, they (i.e., the mantras and arthavādas) teach such attributes as are not arrived at by other means of knowledge, and then with the help of those (attributes), they (ie., the arthavādas) stimulate the (performance of) karmas, and they (the mantras) give out that (karma) which is characterised by (those) attributes. They (i.e., the mantras and the arthavādas) also re-state all the attributes already arrived at by other means of knowledge, and with their help give out (what is to be done) and offer stimulation (for the doing thereof). In case of contradiction (between the attributes arrived at by other means of knowledge and what is stated by the mantras and the arthavādas), they (ie., the mantras and the arthavādas) express figuratively, by means of the words denoting them (i.e., the aforesaid attributes), (other) uncontradicted attributes, and (thereby) carry out (stimula- tion and exposition). The commandment to perform a religious ritual is dependent on the power of the divinity (who is propitiated by the rite). The (religious) works that are prescribed (in the Vedas) as having to be performed by a person desirous of attaining certain ends, being themselves destructible moment after moment, presuppose a means, which is capable of accomplishing the attaining of Svarga and other such (desired) results, all of which come into existence at another (subsequent and remote) time. In the following and other Adhik. VII, Sut. 25] WHY INVENT ‘APURVA”? 153 passages to be found in the mantras and the arthavādas also, namely: “Indeed, Vayu (or the god of wind) is the. most quickly moving deity: him, with the portion due to him, does he (i.e., the sacrificer) approach: he (ie., Vayu) makes him (i.e., the sacrificer) attain prosperity” (Taitt. Sam. II. 1. 1. 1): “What he blesses through this oblation, may that be enjoyed, may that be increased: may the gods therefore be pleased with him (i.e., the sacrificer)” (Taitt Br. III. 5. 10. 5):-the teaching is given that the gods, propitiated by means of (religious) works, possess the power of granting rewards (for these works) and possess also the needed lordship for it: this, on account of its having to be a presupposition, agreeably falls into line with the purport of the (connected) context. From the root, yaj, which means to worship the gods’, it is made out that the (religious) work known as a sacrifice (or yāga) relates prominently to a deity which is worshipped thereby. " Therefore, on a careful consideration of all the scriptural contexts (consisting of the mantras, arthavādas and commandments), all that has to be presupposed by the injunctions (bearing upon karmas or religious works) comes thus to be known through these contexts themselves: hence the apurva etc., which are not mentally sensed at the time that the knowledge of the meaning (of the scriptural texts) arises, need not be resorted to either as that thing which has to be declared, or as that thing which has to be assumed, in relation to the injunctions bearing upon (religious) works, 570 Similarly, in the (Smritis or) law-books, itihāsas, and purāṇas, which are all based on the brāhmaṇas (or injunctions), mantras and arthavādas, all taken together, 571 it is quite clearly expounded in regard 570. The apurva invented by the Mimamsakas (about which, see Note 36 of Vol. I) is neither sanctioned by the Sruti, nor sup. ported by the Smriti. The Supreme Lord is the granter of all rewards. In regard to the performers of karmas, He works through the gods propitiated by the sacrifice or dana or tapas. 571. The Srutaprakāšikā points out that Sruti texts always to be inferred and those claimed to be lost are excluded here. 154 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part III to (the four-faced) Brahma and others as well as in regard to gods, Asuras, etc., that they all have the body, the organs of sense etc., and have also differences in nature, special seats, enjoyments, actions, and so on. Therefore, the gods also, inasmuch as they possess bodies etc., certainly have the fitness (to adopt and follow the science of the Brahman)* विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् Sûtra 26. Virodhaḥ karmaņitichenna nekapratipat- terdarśanāt. (91) If it be said that it (viz., the corporeality of the gods etc.) gives rise to an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works, it is replied that it is not right to say so: because manifold adop- tion (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings). If it be admitted that gods and others possess bodies, etc., there arises “an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works”, because it is not proper to hold when, for instance, in the following among other scriptural texts :572 “O Agni, bring Agni” (Taitt. Br. III. 5. 6); “O thou Indra, come, come with yellow horses” (Taitt. Ar. I. 12. 3)—Indra, who is only one, is simultaneously invoked to attend many sacrifices, he can, when he has a body, attend (all of them). Moreover, the scripture declares the attendance of Agni and other gods at various (sacrificial) places, as in the scriptural passage-” Whose sacrifice, indeed, do gods attend, and whose not? Among many sacrificers, he alone who receives them first-he alone worships them as soon 572. This passage is cited with reference to the invoking of Indra to attend sacrifices, because, in the context, Agni is invoked to bring the gods to the sacrificer, to bring Agni, Soma, Prajapati, Indra and others. The quoted words are also found in Taitt. Sam. II. 5.9. 4: “O Agni, bring Agni here, bring Soma here,’ he says; indeed, he summons the gods in order. ‘Bring here the gods, O Agni, and honour them with a fair sacrifice.”” Adhik. VII, Sut. 27] MANY BODIES 155 as it is tomorrow. 19 (Taitt. Sam. I. 6. 7. 1). Therefore, in case it is held that (gods) possess bodies etc., there arises an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works. If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so: “because manifold adoption (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings)” (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 26). Indeed, simultaneous adoption of manifold bodies is seen in the case of Saubhari and others, endowed with special powers. 573 शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां Sūtra 27. Sabda iti chennataḥ prabhavāt pratyakshānumanābhyām. (92) If it be said that it is in relation to the scripture that that (inconsistency) arises, it is replied that it is not so: because (the gods and) all (other things) are born by means of that (viz., the scripture) as may be made out directly and indirectly. (Here) the word ‘inconsistency’ is to be supplied (from the previous Sutra). Let it be that there is no inconsistency in relation to religious works from the adoption of many bodies (by any particular god). But in relation to the Vedic scripture (itself), there arises an inconsistency owing to the reason that that (scripture) imports a meaning which points to objects not always in 573. Saubhari was a sage who, after marrying the fifty daughters of King Mandhatri, lived happily with the n (V.P. iv, 2). Sankara cites here Brih. Up. III. 9, where 3003 gods are reduced to one. Ramanuja’s interpretation of this Passage differs. Alternatively, Snkara suggests that a god can 1eceive offerings in many sacri- fices at the same time, even as a worthy sage can receive respectful greetings from many simultaneous-. ly. Ramanuja thinks that where- ver the Vedic texts specifically say so, the gods personally come to the sacrifices to receive the obla. tions. (Normally, however, Agni conveys these to them). 156 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III existence. Indeed, it is unavoidable that Indra and other objects (denoted by the Vedic scripture) are transient in character, inasmuch as they are made up of parts, owing to the reason that they possess bodies. Therefore, as in the case of ‘Devadatta’ and other similar words, so also in the case of the Vedic words, ‘Indra’ and others, before the origin of Indra and other objects and after their destruction, there will be an absence of significance, or at least there will result a transitoriness in time (in relation thereto). 574 If it be so held, to such an objection, it is replied that it is not so: “because the gods and all other things are born by means of that (scripture)” (Ved. Sūt. 1. 3. 27)- that is, because Indra and other objects denoted by those very (Vedic) words, ‘Indra’ and others, are brought into existence again and again. What is said is this. As a matter of fact, unlike ‘Devadatta’ and other words of that kind, the Vedic words, ‘Indra’ and others, are not, in conformity with any convention, used to denote merely a particular individual: like ‘ox’ and other such words, they are used (without any convention) naturally to denote a particular genus. And therefore it is that after a particular Indra ceases to be, the Creator creates another Indra of the same kind with the help of those very Vedic words, ‘Indra’ and others, by revolving which in his mind he comes to know of the generic nature of Indra and of the other objects denoted by those (words): as for instance, a potter, by constantly revolving the word ‘pot’ in his mind, (produces) a pot of the same genus (as is denoted by the word ‘pot’). If it be asked how this is made out, the reply is: “As made out directly and indirectly.” (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 27). The meaning is that (it is made out) by means of the Srutis and 574. The purvapaksha here is that the Vedic scripture will be proved to be non-eternal, if its words refer to Indra and other gods who are subject to birth and death. Before the gods are born, or when they are dead, the words referring to them can have no meaning, or there is no point in pronouncing them.Adhik. VII, Sut. 28] VEDIC WORDS & CREATION 157 the Smritis. Indeed, the Sruti says: “Prajapati (or the lord of beings) by means of the Vedic scripture differentiat- ed the two things, namely, the existent (or the intelligent) and the non-existent (or the non-intelligent).” (Taitt. Br. II. 7. 6. 2). Similarly, there are the following and other Vedic passages: “He pronounced the word ‘bhūḥ’ (meaning the earth), he created the earth: he pronounced the word ‘bhuvaḥ’, (meaning the mid-heaven), he created the midheaven.” (Taitt. Br. II. 2. 4. 2). The meaning (of this) is that, after the pronunciation of (every) directly significant word, he recalled to his mind the configuration corresponding to the meaning of such particular word, and created the various things as associated with their own respective configurations (of generic attributes). . The Smriti also says: “The divine language of the Veda, which has neither beginning nor end, and from which are derived all living beings, was first sent forth by the Existent One. (M. B. XII. 238. 93). (It) says also: “Indeed, solely with the help of the Vedic words, He created the names and actions of all things separately in each case and also their different forms.” (V. P. I. 5. 63). Forms mean configurations, which almost amount to shapes. To the same effect is the following passage: “Solely with the help of the Vedic words, He created the names and forms of all beings, such as the gods etc., and explained (to them) their duties”. (Manu I. 21). Accordingly, although the gods and other such beings are admitted to possess bodies, it will not follow therefrom that the Vedic words are meaning- less and that the Veda has a beginning in time. अत एव च नित्यत्वम् Sûtra 28. Ata eva cha nityatvam (93) II. S.B.-21. 158 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part III And it is for this very reason that it (the Veda) is eternal. For whatever reasons, words like ‘Indra’, ‘Vasishta’, and others possess the power of denoting a god or a sage (ie., a corresponding genus of beings), and for whatever reasons, again, the creation of various things is brought about with the help of corresponding words (denoting them) so as to be preceded in time by the remembrance of the meanings of these (words),-for the same reasons, it is proper to hold that the Veda is eternal, even though it comes out, by means of the teaching in the following among other Vedic passages-“He begs a boon of the authors of the mantras (?) : “Salutation to the great seers who are the authors of the mantras” (Taitt. Ār. VII. 1); “The hymn (or sūkta) of Visvamitra begins with: ‘This is that Agni” (Taitt. Sam. V. 2. 4.)–that Vasishta and others possess the character of being the authors of the mantras, the character of being the authors of the kandas (or sections of the Yajurveda etc.) and also the character of being seers. 33 By means of these very Vedic words (of the mantras) such as “He begs a boon of the authors of the mantras “(?) -Prajapati (the creator) finds out after considera- tion the genus, power, etc., which characterise the very seers who are the authors of the several kändas, sūktas and mantras, and then creates them as possessing those very powers and as belonging to those very genera: and then assigns to them the work of composing those very mantras. They, also, being endowed by Prajapati with their powers, perform tapas suited thereunto, and afterwards, without studying in the least degree those very mantras etc., which are eternally established and which were revealed by every previous Vasishta and such other (seers),–they (i.e., the newly created seers) thus (newly) see and learn them (i.e., the mantras etc.) without any error relating either to accents or letters. For this reason also, it is proper to hold that Adhik. VII, Sut. 28] NO MAHA-PRALAYA 159 the Veda is eternal and that those (seers) are the authors of the mantras. 575 It may again be held as follows. It may perhaps be proper to maintain that, in so far as the creation of Indra and others, in connection with the naimittika pralaya (or a partial and occasional dissolution of the world) and such other cosmic conditions, is concerned, the creation, by Prajapati, of gods and such others, is brought about with the help of the remembrance of the various preceding ‘Indras and other such gods: which is due to the words constituting the Veda. On the other hand, in connection with the final dissolution of the universe, seeing that the creator, Prajapati, and the words, which are expressive of the modifications of the form of the material principle of egoity which is known as bhutadi, are both destroyed, how is it possible to say that Prajapati evolves creation with the help of the words previously learnt, or how again can the Veda, which is so destroyed, be said to be eternal? There” fore, he who maintains the eternity of Vedas, even when he admits that gods and other beings are embodied, has necessarily to accept the evolutional activity of the world as beginningless and unbroken like a stream. 576 To this (objection), he (the Sütrakāra) gives the answer thus: 575. The objection here is that the mantras and the arthavadas contain references to the authors of the mantras. The Vedantin, who interprets them literally, cannot but accept that the Vedas came into existence at a particular point of time. The Mimamsakas overcome the difficulty byregarding the mantras and arthavadas as of little or no significance, except in so far as they help ritual. In Ramanuja’s reply ‘for the same reasons’ may refer to eva of the Sutra, aud ‘By those very Vedic words’ to cha therein. in 576. The Mimāmsakas, order to uphold the eternity of the Vedas, deny that a maha-prala- ya or complete dissolution of the Universe occurs at any time. For the Vedas are words, words are sounds, and sounds, like all mate- rial things, are derived ultimately from bhutädi or the tămasa variety of ahankara. (See Ved. Sut. II. 2. 1). Naimittika-prala- yas or partial and occasional dissolutions of the universe are, however, accepted by them. 160 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III समाननामरूपत्वाश्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्व Sûtra 29. Samānanāmarupatvachcha vṛittavapyavirodhe darsanat Smritescha. (94) Because also there is a continued identity in respect of the names and forms (of things), there is nothing which is inconsistent with a Jevolution (of creation): because it is so seen revealed in the Srutis and is also declared in the Smritis. There is nothing inconsistent in respect of the accepted eternity of the Veda, even when there is a revolution of universal creation after a final dissolution of the world; simply because there is a continued identity in the names and forms of things as mentioned above. Accordingly, the Divine Lord, who is the Highest Person, remembers at the conclusion of the process of universal dissolution, the universe in its original configuration: then He resolves to the effect: “May I become manifold” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3) then He differentiates the totality of enjoyable things and enjoyers, which became completely absorbed in Himself but leaving their characteristic capacities untouched: then He creates as before the brahmaṇḍa (or the egg-shaped universe), beginning with the ‘great principle’ and ending with Hiranyagarbha: then He reveals the Veda which has been existent in a certain order of syllabic succession (known before) and teaches the same to Hiranyagarbha : then indeed He assigns to him as before the work of creating the world consisting of gods and other classes of beings: and He Himself stands as the Internal Self of that (Hiranya. garbha). Therefore, all that has been stated above is quite appropriate. Adhik. VII, Süt. 29] VEDAS IN GOD’S MIND 161 This indeed is what is meant by 577 the eternity and superhuman character of the Veda, namely, that it is in accordance with the internal mental impress due to the order in which it was pronounced on several previous occasions that that same particular order of syllabic succession is remembered and it is again pronounced in that same order of syllabic succession. The process (of pronouncing the words of the Veda in an eternally continued order of syllabic succession) is the same in our case as in the case of the Lord of all. But there is this much peculiarity (in the case of the Lord of all). The Highest Person Himself bears the Veda in mind in proper order entirely without the help of any internal mental impress (due to the previous rèpetition of the Veda). To the question how this is made out to be as stated above, he (the Sūtrakāra) gives the answer: “Because it is so seen revealed in the Srutis and is also declared in the Smritis.” (Ved. Sut. I. 3. 29). What indeed is seen revealed in the Vedic scriptures is this:-“He creates the four-faced Brahma first: and then communicates the Vedas unto him.” (Svet. Up. VI. 18). The Smriti, attributed to Manu, also says the same thing in the context which begins with: “This (universe) existed in the shape of darkness.” (Manu, I. 5): then continues: “He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from His own body, first with a thought created the waters and placed His seed in them. That (seed) became a golden egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun in that (egg), He Himself was born as Brahma the progenitor of the whole world.” (Manu, I. 8-9). 577. Ramanuja here tells the Mimāmsakas: “What you claim about the Vedas being eternal can in reason only amount to this.” The eternity of the Vedas cannot be proved by supposing syllables or words to be eternal; for this argument will equally establish the eternity of any human composition: So it can rest only on an eternal order of succession of syllables. But the Mimarnsakas cannot think of an order of succession in space and time, on account of their doctrine that sound is eternal and all-per- vasive. Ramanuja’s point is that the Vedas, being kept in God’s mind eternally and being taught to every Brahma, are seen to be superhuman (i.c., without any human author or beginning in time) and eternal (i.e., without any end in time).162 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III To the same effect are the following purāņic passages: “In the navel of the Lord, who was asleep there, a lotus was born, in that lotus, O thou of great fame, was born Brahmā, who is well versed in the Veda and the auxiliary sciences, and he was told by Him, ‘O thou of great intelligence, do thou create the beings of the world.”(?) Again, there is the passage: “The Highest Lord is Nārāyaṇa, and from Him was the four-faced Brahma born.” (?). The same thing is again taught in the passages beginning with " I shall not describe the first creation,”(?) and also these pass- ages: “Having created the waters known as Nara, I dwelt within them: therefore is my name Nārāyaṇa. In each period of time known as a kalpa, I sleep therein so that, when I am asleep, a lotus may grow out of My navel. O thou good goddess, in My navel, as I am so situated, the four- faced Brahma is born, and to him I say: ‘Do thou create the beings (of the world).”(?) Consequently, it is an established conclusion that the gods and other beings like them possess the fitness to adopt and follow the science of the Brahman, inasmuch as they have the character of being a soliciting suppliant and also the capability (needed for that science). ADHIKARANA VIII MADHVADHIKARANA मध्वादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः Sūtra 30. Madhvādishvasambhavādanadkikāram Jaiminiḥ. (95) In regard to the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived to be the honey etc., Jaimini speaks of the absence of fitness (of the gods etc., to be worshippers), because such a thing is impossible. Adhik. VII, Sut. 30] GODS & MADHUVIDYA’ 163 It has been stated above that the gods and other such. beings possess the fitness needed to study and adopt the science of the Brahman (in general). The enquiry now undertaken is whether or not they have any similar fitness in relation to those (particular) kinds of worship in which the gods themselves form the object of worship.578 What then is the conclusion? Jaimini is of opinion that there is no such fitness in them in relation to those forms of worship in which the object of worship is con ceived to be honey etc. Why? “Because such a thing is impossible”. Indeed, it is not possible for a different sun- god, Vasus etc., to come into existence to be worshipped by the sun-god, Vasus etc., and in relation to the already existing Vasus and others, the character of being a Vasu. etc. cannot form the object of attainment: for such (as character) is already attained (by them). In those scriptural contexts, which begin with: “Thi sun is indeed the honey of the gods,” (Chhand. Up. III which is the first of

1): and then say: “On that nectar, these, the Vasus live,” (Chhand. Up. III. 6. 1.): and then go on to mention: “He who thus knows (i.e., worships) this nectar, he becomes one of the Vasus, indeed, with Agni as their leader, and then he directly realises the nectar and always feels satisfied,” (Chhand. Up. III. 6. 3)—it is declared in connection with the form of worship in which
In Chhand. Up. III. 1.2 the sun is described as the honey of the gods. The mid-air is the honeycomb which rests on the horizontal banboo of the heavens. The light-rays are the waters drawn by them, which are like the embryonic bees in the holes in the honeycomb. The Vedas, with the itihasas and puranas and the Upanishads, are the bees. Seva- ral kinds of rituals are the flowers. The oblations generate nectar which flows into a part of the sun, and makes it red, white, dark, very dark, or agitated in the centre. The Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the Maruts and the Sadhyas are said to live on these different kinds of nectar. One engaging in meditation about one of these kinds of nectar (as a form of worship of the Brahman) will become in due course one of the gods enjoying it and will ultimately attain the Brahman. The purvapaksha here is that a Vasu, for instance, cannot be asked to meditate on himself as enjoying the nectar in the sun, and that too for the purpose of becoming what he already is. 164 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III the object of worship is conceived as nectar that the sun- god goes by the name of nectar (or madhu), inasmuch as he is the receptacle of the sweet and delightful liquid, which is obtained by means of the rays of the sun and is produced out of the karma (or religious works) dealt with in the Rigveda and other Vedas etc: that the parts of the sun-god, (so understood) which are enjoyed by the Vasus etc., possess the characteritic of being an object of worship, and that being a Vasu etc., is the object of attainment at the same time. ज्योतिषि भावाच्च Sūtra 31. Jyotishi bhāvāchcha. (96) Because also it is in relation to the Light (that such worship by the Vasus etc., is taught to be performed).. In the passage, “The gods worship Him indeed who is the Light of lights, and who is immortal life as well,” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 16) it is declared that the gods have to worship the Light, that is, the Highest Brahman. The worship relating to the Brahman is common to both gods and men hence the statement (here) which gives the character of worshippers to the gods, shows that the gods do not practise any other worship (than that of the Brahman as Light). Therefore in relation to those (forms of worship wherein the object of worship is conceived as nectar, etc.), Vasus and others (i.e., gods) do not possess the needed fitness. warg argcionsfa fa Sûtra 32. Bhāvantu Bādarayaṇo’sti hi. (97) Adhik. VII, Sut. 32] BADARAYANA’S VIEW 165 Badarāyaṇa, however, says that there is such a fitness (on the part of gods etc. to adopt the form of the worship of the Brahman known as the Madhuvidya): for so it is. The venerable Badarāyaṇa is of opinion that even the Adityas, Vasus and other gods possess the fitness needed for these (forms of worship wherein the object of worship is conceived as nectar etc.). “For so it is “, that is to say, through the worship of the Brahman, who is realised as existing within themselves,579 it is possible for the Adityas, Vasus etc. to desire the attainment of the Brahman subse- quent to their attainment of the character of a Vasu, etc. Moreover, in relation to those who are already Vasus, the attainment of the character of a Vasu may possibly become an object worthy to be desired even in another kalpa. Here (in this context) what is enjoined is the worship of the Brahman as existing in both the conditions of cause and effect. (In the context) which begins with, “The sun is indeed the honey of the gods,” (Chhand. Up. III 1. 1) and concludes before, “Then having risen above that” (Chhand. Up. III. 11. 1), the Brahman is thought to be worshipped as existing in the condition of certain peculiar produced effects such as the sun-god, Vasus etc. In the passages beginning with, “Then having risen above that,” (Chhand. Up. III. 11. 1.), the same Brahman is taught to be worshipped as existing in the condition of cause and as constituting the Internal Self of the sun-god. Therefore he who worships the Brahman thus as existing in the conditions of both cause and effect, attains in another kalpa the character of being a Vasu etc., and then at the end of that (kalpa), he reaches that same Highest Brahman existing in the condition of cause.
The worshipper is the embodied jiva, and the object of his worship is the Brahman exis- ting within him as the Antaryā- II. S.B.-22. min. In the Indra-pranadhika- rana (Ved, cut. 1.1.29-32), a simi- lar lesson is taught, but the atten- dant circumstanccs are different. 166 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III In this passage” And indeed to him who knows the science of the Brahman (Brahmopanishat), the sun does not rise and does not set. For him there is day, once and for all.” (Chhand. Up. III. 11. 3)-the whole of the Madhuvidya (or the form of worship where the object of worship is conceived as nectar) is declared to possess the character of the Brahmopanishat (i.e., science of the Brahman) and it is also declared therein that the character of being a Vasu etc. is attained therefrom (as the result of such worship) ending in the attainment of the Brahman. For these two reasons, it is made out that the worship enjoined in regard to the parts of the sun, which constitute the objects of enjoyment to the Vasus etc., relates to the Brahman Himself who is realised as existing in the condition of these (Vasus, etc.). Therefore, this kind of worship is possible for the sun-god, Vasus, etc. to practise. 19 The Brahman alone, being in the result the object of worship, the passage which says: “The gods (worship) Him who is the Light of lights, (Brih. Up. IV. 14. 1), is seen to be appropriate. 580 Accordingly, the Vrittikara (Bodhāyana) also says: “Indeed, it is possible for the gods etc. to practise the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived as nectar etc., because it is the Brahman Himself who is in view and is realised everywhere (i.e., in all forms of worship). "” ADHIKARANA IX APASŪDRADHIKARAṆA शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यते हि Sūtra 33. Sugasya tadanādaraśravaṇāt tad ādravaṇāt suchyate hi. (98)
Here is the reply to the interpretation of Brih. Up. IV. 14. 1 given in Sutra 31. The purvapaksha is that the gods can worship the Brahman in the form of Light only. The reply is that what they worship is the Brahman only and nothing else. The quo- tation from the Vrittikara empha- sises this and also replies to the view that Madhuvidya only en- joins the worship of the sun.Adhik. IX, Sut. 33] FITNESS FOR WORSHIP 167 Because it is shown (in Chhand. Up. IV. 1-2) that, owing to his having heard their disrespect- ful remarks (i.e., of the swans), and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher’, grief arose in him i.e., Janasruti, who is hence called “sūdra” and not because he is a sûdra by birth). The enquiry set on foot here is whether or not a Sudra has the fitness needed to (study and adopt) the science of the Brahman. What then is the proper conclusion? That he has such (fitness). Why? For the reason that (such) fitness is determined by the characteristics of being a soliciting suppliant and possessing the needed capability, and it is therefore possible for a Sudra to possess those (characteristics, i.e., fitness and capability). Although owing to his unfitness to worship the sacrificial fire and to have the knowledge (of the Vedas needed therefor), a Sûdra has no fitness for the performance of religious rites which have to be accomplished through those fires and the knowledge (of the Vedas needed therefor) nevertheless, inasmuch as the worship of the Brahman is solely a function of the mind, a Súdra certainly has the fitness needed for (practising) that (worship). Even though this worship presupposes the performance of religious rites mentioned in the sastras, what is presupposed here being the performance of various religious rites suited to the various conditions and stages of life in the case of the Sudra also, the service rendered by him in accordance with his condition in life to the higher classes, constitutes the (sastraic) action (so desired). In the statement, “Therefore the Sùdra is unfit for sacrificing, " (Taitt. Sam. VII. 1. 6)–what is explained is that unfitness (of his) for the performance of religious rites and other works to be achieved through the sacrificial fire and the knowledge (of the Vedas required therefor), which is alone logically established. 168 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III It may, however, be asked how he who has not studied the Veda and has not learnt the Vedanta and who is (consequently) ignorant of the essential nature of the Brahman and (is ignorant) also of the forms of His worship, can possibly practise the worship of the Brahman. (In answer to this) it is stated that even he who has not studied the Veda and has not learnt the Vedānta texts, may, at least through learning the itihasas and purāņas, acquire the knowledge relating to the essential nature of the Brahman and to His worship. And permission is given to the Sudra also to learn the itihasas and purāņas, as in the following among other passages: “Having the Brahmana in the forefront, let all the four castes be taught.” (M. B. XII. 335. 48). Again, in the itihasas and purāṇas, Vidura and other (Súdras) are seen to be devoted to the Brahman. Similarly, in the Upanishads also, in the portion in which the form of worship is described wherein the Brahman is taught to be worshipped as the All-absorber (i.e., in Chhand. Up. IV. 1-3), it is found mentioned that a Sūdra also possesses the fitness for the (study and adoption of the) science of the Brahman. The teacher, Raikva (in the context), addresses his anxious pupil, Jānašruti, indeed, as a Šūdra, and then teaches him the science of the Brahman in the passage beginning with: “You have brought these (as gifts), O Šūdra, and through them, as through a mouth, have you made me speak.” me speak.” (Chhand. Up. IV. 2. 3.). Therefore, a Sûdra also may possess the fitness (needed) for the (study and adoption of the) science of the Brahman.581
What is dealt with in the Sutras is only a problem raised in the Samvarga-vidya. Additional purvapaksha arguments also are here envisaged. Ramanuja goes on to reply to them all, upholding the traditional caste restrictions on the study and adoption of the upāsanās en joined in the Upanishads. But he does not bar the gates of Heaven to anyone. Elsewhere he has taught ways of approach to God, open to all with- out any distinction of caste or sex, Adhik. IX, Sut. 33] UPASANA INJUNCTIONS 169 If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply that a Sûdra cannot possess the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman), because he has not the capability (needed for the study and adoption thereof). As a matter of fact, he who does not know the essential nature of the Brahman and also the various forms of His worship, and who is (moreover) disqualified for (the practice of) such essential features of such worship as recitation of the Vedas, (performance of) sacrifices etc., cannot possess the capability (needed) for the performance of (such) worship. And he who is not endowed with (this) capability, even though there may be present (in him) a longing (for the acquisition of such capability), does not gain fitness (on that account). And (this) lack of capability arises from lack of study of the Veda. And just as the injunctions in regard to religious rites (such as sacrifices), on account of the acquisi- tion of knowledge by study (of the Veda) in accordance with the injunction prescribing (such study) in the case of the three (higher) castes, are in harmony with the knowledge (of such rites) and the means of knowledge (relating there- to such as the study of the Veda etc.), and not with others (i.e., the knowledge possessed by other castes and the means relating thereto)-even so, in regard to the injunctions relating to the worship of the Brahman.582 And because only such knowledge as is gained through a study which is in accordance with the injunctions relating to the study of the Veda, constitutes the means for the worship of Brahman, the Śûdra lacks capability for the worship of the Brahman. ·
Rāmānu ja has here in m ad the exceptions allowed by the Purva Mimāmsā. The Nishida-sthapati and the Ratha- kara, though not belonging to any of the three qualified castes, are permitted to perform certain rites and recite certain mantras in connection therewith, No such exceptions are enjoined in regard to the Brahma- Mimämsä. The injunctions here are in respect of the members of the three qualified castes who have studied the Vedas and otherwise acquired the necessary fitness. 170 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III Itihasas and purāņas assume the character of being (the) means for (the worship of the Brahman) only in so far as they develop the Veda, and not independently. And the knowledge gained by the Sûdra through hearing itihāsas and puraņas is intended for the destruction of sins, and not for the worship for the Brahman. Vidura and such others were possessed of the knowledge (relating to the worship of the Brahman) on account of such know- ledge gained by them in previous births not having been forgotten, and (they) attained this kind of birth (in the Šúdra caste) through the force of past karma-such is (the reason for) their being worshippers of the Brahmau. If it is argued that in the Samvarga-vidyā (Chhānd. Up. IV. 1-3) the use of the vocative ‘Sudra’ in regard to the disciple indicates the fitness of the Sudra (to study and adopt the science of the Brahman), it is replied as follows: “Because it is shown (in the context) that, owing to his having heard their disrespectful remarks (i.e., of the swans) and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher), grief arose in him (i.e., Janasruti, who is hence called Sudra, and not because he is a Súdra by birth).” (Ved. Sūt. I. 3.33) On account of Jānašruti Pautrāyaṇa, through lack of knowledge of the Brahman, having listened to scornful words spoken by swans, and thereupon resorting to Raikva, who had knowledge of the Brahman, it is indicated that grief arose in him. That is why he is called as ‘Sudra’ and not because of his belonging to the fourth caste. For he who grieves is a Sudra. The root, Such, to grieve, takes on the suffix ra (Uṇādi Sūtras II. 21), and the root becoming elongated, cha becomes dha: and thus ‘Südra’,583 Hence sorrowfulness is alone indicated by the of the word, ‘Südra,’ and not caste. use 583 The Unadi Sutras, quoted bere for the derivation of the word, Sudra, are regarded as second only to Panini in authority by the Srutaprakasika. The derivation, Śrutat durah, (far from the Vedas) given on the basis of Nirukta, explains the usual meaning of the word. Adhik. XI, Sut. 33] JANASRUTI SCORNED 171 Jāna ruti Pautrāyaṇa was a generous giver of wealth and generous giver of food. One of two sages, who were pleased with the piety of this first among the pious and were desirous of rousing in him the desire for the knowledge of the Brahman, flying near him at night in the form of swans, said to the other: “O fair-eyed (swan), the glory of Jānasruti Pautrāyaṇa has spread like the day. Go not near him lest it should burn you.” (IV.1.2) The other swan, having heard in this manner the speech in praise of Jānašruti, replied: “How can you speak of him, being as he is, as if he were Raikva Sayugvän”? (IV.1.3) That is, how can you speak of him, Jānašruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva Sayug- văn, who knows the Brahman and is endowed with the most excellent qualities ?584 That Raikva, the knower of the Brahman, is alone endowed with the most excellent quali- ties in the world. What excellence is there in Jānasruti who does not know the Brahman, even though he may be endowed with great piety? Can the glory born of his qualities, burn me like the glory of Raikva? (Such seems to be) the meaning. Asked “Who is this Raikva?” by the other swan, who was spoken to in this manner, (this swan) said: “He in whose works and knowledge are con- tained all the works whatsoever done by good men and all the knowledge of all conscious beings, he is Raikva.” 585 Jāna śruti, having heard that speech of the swan, implying dispraise of himself on account of lack of know- ledge of the Brahman, and on account of possession of that
Sayugván, according to the usual reading of the Upani- shad and Sayuktván, according to some editions of the Sribha- shya. The word may mean (1) one who has a cart and (ii) one whose qualities are excellent. 585 Ramanuja is here para- phrasing Chhand. Up. IV. 2. 2. He takes Yastaci veda, yat sa veda to mean: ‘Whoever knows any.hing, that he (i, e., Raikva) knows.’ in Vol. 1. p. 17, the same passage has been quoted in the sense of ‘He who is the knower of that (Brahman and that (Brah- man) whom he knows’. Ranga- rāmānuja reconciles the two interpretations by referring to two readings of the Upanishad text-sa mayaitad uktam and sa mayaitad uktaḥ. The interpreta- tion here is based on the latter reading which refers to the person who is described, and that in Vol. I to the former reading which refers to what is said.172 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. III (knowledge), couched in praise of Raikva, at that very moment sent his door-keeper to seek and find out where Raikva was. When he learnt (where Raikva was) and came back, he (Janašruti) himself approached Raikva to be taught by him: and making a present to Raikva of six hundred cows, golden coins, mules and a chariot, requested him thus: “Venerable sir, whatever deity you worship, teach me that deity.” (Chhand. Up. IV. 2. 2) The meaning is: Teach me that supreme deity, whom you worship. And Raikva, who knew the three worlds through the greatness of his own yoga, understood that Jānāšruti was full of grief when he heard the speech of the swans, which, owing to his having no knowledge of the Brahman, con- tained disrespectful remarks in relation to him: he (Raikva) also understood that he (Jānašruti) immediately afterwards made preparations with the object of attaining the know- lenge of the Brahman. Then, learning that he had the fitness (to study and adopt the science of the Brahman), Raikva thought that, without service (as a disciple) for a long time, he (Janašruti) was rendering such service by the bestowal of wealth, and that the knowledge of the Brahman would become firmly fixed in him by his (Jānasruti’s) bestowal of wealth to the full extent of his power: then with the object of favouring him (Janašruti), he (Raikva) brought to his notice, by addressing him by means of the word ‘Südra’-that his being filled with sorrow clearly indi- cated his fitness for receiving the teaching (about the Brahman): and then said as follows: chariot be yours, O Súdra,
In Chhand. Up. 1V.2 3, Raikva tells Janasruti: Ahahåret- và Sudra tavaiva saha gobhi- rastu. This is taken as ‘Aha haretvå, in the sense of ‘O fie, the necklace and the chariot’. Håra (necklace) with itva (chariot) gives the compound word haretva. J. Muir in his Original Sanskrit Texts, Vol. III. objects to this interpretation on the ground that “although itva might Le the nomi- native of itvån, going, no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of ‘chariot’.” He also “Fie! necklace and together with the cows.“586 gives a suggestion of Prof. Gold- sucker to the effect that the words might be split up as Ahahr are tva, the tra being taken as the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun tva, meaning ‘someone’ The sen ence under consider ation may then mean:“O friend, some woman belongs to the, O Sudra, Let ber be (i.e., come along) with the COWS. The further argument is that this interpretation is suppor 11 ted by Janasrati taking his daughter to Raikva. Adhik. IX, Sut. 33] RAIKVA TEACHES 173 The meaning is this: “Let this chariot be with yourself along with your cows. By giving me this much, knowledge of the Brahman will not become firmly fixed in you, who are filled with sorrow, arising out of the desire to know the Brahman. 92 Then, that Jānašruti gave cows and other kinds of wealth to the full extent of his power and also a maiden (to Raikva) and then approached (Raikva) to receive the teaching from him. And that Raikva, again, declaring his (Jānasruti’s) real fitness (to know the Brahman), addressed him by means of the word, ‘Sudra’, and told him thus: “You have brought these as gifts, O Sûdra, and through them as though a mouth have you made me speak.’ (Chhand. Up. IV. 2. 5). He told Janasruti: You have brought to me as a gift all this, that is, wealth to the full extent of your power: through this very means, even without attending (as a disciple on a master) for a long time, you have made me give utterance to the langu- age relating to the teaching about the Brahman, as desired So saying, he (Raikva) taught (the Brahman to by you. Jānašruti). Therefore, what is indicated by the word ‘Súdra’ is nothing more than (Janašruti’s) grief for the purpose of declaring his fitness to receive the teaching (of the science of the Brahman), but it is not his belonging to the fourth class (of Súdras, that is so indicated here). क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्व Sutra 34. Kshattriyatvagatescha.

Because also it may be made out (from the context) that he (Janasruti) is a Kshattriya.
This Jānasruti is characterised as the lord of gifts by saying: “He is the giver away of much wealth.” (Chhand.
II. S.B.-23.
174
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[Chap. I, Part. III
Up. IV. 1. 1): and he is made out to be the giver away of very large quantities of prepared food by means of the passage beginning with: “In his house, much food is cooked,” and ending with: “On all sides, they eat of his food of this kind.” 587 (Chhand. Up. IV. 1. 1): owing to these, and owing also to the fact of his having sent his door keeper (to search for Raikva) as mentioned in the statement, “Indeed, he got up from his bed and spoke to his door- keeper” (Chhand. Up. IV. 1. 5); and owing, again, to the fact of his having been the ruler of a country, as may be learnt from his gifts of many villages; it is made out that Jānašruti is a Kshattriya and that he could not belong to the fourth class (of Sûdras).
It has thus been pointed out that from the story occurring in the beginning (of this context), he (Jānasruti) may be made out to have been a Kshattriya. From the story occurring in the conclusion also of this context, it may be made out that he is a Kshattriya. Accordingly says (the Sūtrakāra) :
उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात्
Sutra 35. Uttaratra Chaitrarathena lingat. (100)
Because also there are in the later portion (of the context) bases of inference arising from Chaitraratha (being a Kshattriya and leading to the conclusion that Janasruti is also a Kshattriya).
In the conclusion of the context dealing with this very Samvarga-vidya, which is taught to Janasruti, mention is
587. The text reads: “Sarvata evam et ad annam atsy anti. The Upanishad reading is: “Sarvata eva me annam atsyanti.” The latter means: “On all sides they will eat my food,” This is what
Janas’ruti was thinking, when he constructed rest-houses, providing free boarding and lodging. Ramanuja may be paraphrasing instead of quoting.
Adhik. IX, Süt. 35] KAPEYA & CHAITRARATHA 175
made of a Kshattriya under the name of Chaitraratha, otherwise known as Abhipratārin: through him (so ascertained to be a Kshattriya), it is made out that he, Jānašruti, is a Kshattriya. How? By means of the passage beginning with: “Once, while Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal, a religious student begged of them,” and ending with: “O thou religious student, we do not worship that being” (Chhand. Up. IV. 3. 5 to 7)-it is made out that Kāpeya, Abhipratārin and the begging religious student are all mentioned as being connected with the Samvarga-vidya’ And among these, Abhipratarin is a Kshattriya and the other two are Brahmanas. 588
In respect of this (Samvarga-) vidya, the Brāhmaṇa may be seen to be connected with it (so as to have the privilege of practising it), and among those who are other (than the Brahmaņa), only the Kshattriya and not the Súdra may be seen to be so associated with it. Therefore, it is proper that Janaśruti also, who is other than the Brāhmaṇa Raikva who is connected with this (Samvarga-) vidya, is also undoubtedly a Kshattriya: but does not belong to the fourth class (of Sūdras).
In the context here it is declared that Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya and that he is the same as Chaitraratha: and it may be therefore asked how this Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya and how he is the same as Chaitraratha. To this (objection), he (ie., the Sutrakāra) says (in answer) thus: “Because there are bases of inference”. From the
588, Janagruti learns from Raikva the worship of the Brah- man as the Samvarga or the All- absorber. Air and the life-breath are taught to be meditated on as embodiments of the Brahman so characterised. Then the story is told of two other students of this vidya, Kapeya and Abhipratārin. While they are being served at dinner, a mendicant religions
student comes to them, As they do not offer him any food, he gets angry and boastful. He speaks of his worship of Brahma the creator as the All-absorber, and demands food as a devotee practi- cally identical with the deity. Abhipratarin corrects him,pointing out the Brahman to be the All- absorber.
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association of Abhipratārin with Kapeya as mentioned in the statement, “Once while Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhi- pratārin Kākshaseni (were being waited on) etc.” (Chhand. Up. IV. 3. 5)-taken as a basis for inference, it is made out that this Abhipratārin is associated with Kāpeya. Elsewhere (in the scriptures) also, by means of the statement: “The Kāpeyas, indeed, made Chaitraratha perform that sacrifice” (Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa, XX. 12. 5)-it is declared that he who is so associated with Kāpeya is Chaitraratha. Similarly, in the passage, that from this, Chaitraratha, a chief of the Kshattriyas is born, 589 (Taṇḍdya-Brāhmaṇa, XX. 12. 5) (it is declared) that Chaitraratha is a Kshattriya. Therefore, it is made out that Abhipratärin is the same as Chaitraratha and is also a Kshattriya.
It has in this manner been pointed out that there are no bases of inference to establish that the Sùdra has any such fitness (for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman)-which is opposed to reason. Now he (the Sūtrakāra) says that the Srutis and the Smṛitis support the fact that, as established by reason, the Sûdra is unfit (to study and adopt the science of the Brahman).
संस्कार परामर्शात्तदभावाभिलापाश्च
Sutra 36. Samskaraparāmarsat tadabhāvābhilāpā-
chcha. (101)
Because certain religious ceremonies are mentioned as needed (for the study and adop- tion of the science of the Brahman) and because the absence of these (ceremonies) is mentioned (in relation to the sûdra).
589. The Kapey as were the priests who helped King Chaitra- ratha to perform a dviratra sac- rifice, which later came
to be known by his name. The argu- ment is that Kapeya’s Kshattriya
friend, Abhipratarin, in Chhand. Up. IV. 2 must be this King. The second quotation from the Tandya. Brahmana refers to Chaitra- rathin, and not to Chattr aratha.Adhik. IX, Sut. 38]
SATYAKAMA’S CASE
177
In the contexts relating to the teachings bearing upon the science of the Brahman, the religious ceremony of upanayana (or initiation into Vedic studies) is mentioned (as necessary) as in the following among other passages: “I shall perform the upanayana ceremony unto you”. (Chhand. Up. IV. 4. 5): “He (Uddālaka Āruņi) performed the upanayana ceremony unto him (Saukeya)” (Sat. Brāh. XI. 53. 13). And the absence of upanayana and other such religious ceremonies is mentioned in relation to the Súdra in such passages as the following: “In the case of the Sûdra, there can be no serious trespass (on account of failure to perform prescribed rituals), and he is not worthy to receive sacraments.” (Manu, X. 126):
“The fourth caste has one birth only.” (G. Dh. S. X. 5): “And he is not worthy to receive the sacraments.”(?)
तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्रोः
Sótra 37. Tadabhāvaчirdhāraṇe cha pravṛitteḥ. (102)
Because also of the undertaking (of the teaching in the case of Jābāla) after making sure of its absence (i.e., of the absence of his belonging to the s dra caste).
According to the passage, “He who is not a Brāhmaṇa is not capable of saying this so plainly,” (Chhānd. Up. IV. 4. 5)-it is only after making sure that the pupil, Jābāla, is not a Sûdra that the teaching of the science (of the Brahman) is proceeded with 590 (in his case): therefore also the Sudra is not fit (to study the science of the Brahman).
श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात्
Sútra 38. Sravaṇādhyayanārthapratishedhāt. (103)
590. In Chhånd. Up. IV. 4, the teacher, Gautama, asks a young boy who seeks instruction, about his lineage. The boy frankly says that his mother does not know it. His name is Satyakama, and his mother’s name is Jabala. Pleased at this candour, Gautama exclaims
that only a Brahmana could have spoken the truth thus. Then the initiation ceremony for the boy is performed by Gautama. Later, Saty akama learns the worship of the Brahman as made up of six- teen ‘parts’ or ‘aspects’.
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Because (in the case of the Súdra) there is prohibition in relation to the listening to, learn- ing to recite and understanding (the Vedas).
Listening to the Vedas, learning to recite them and the practising of those things that are taught therein are all prohibited in the case of the Súdra, as in the following passages: “For a Sùdra is indeed a moving cemetery, therefore thé Veda should not be learnt in the neigh- bourhood of a Sudra.” (Vas. Sm. VIII. 9): “Therefore the Sudra is bahupaśu and is unfit to perform sacrifices”(?)
The word bahupasu 591 means (here) that he resembles cattle (in not being qualified for the study of the Vedas). In the case of one who cannot even hear (the Veda taught), it is not possible to learn to recite (the Vedas), to understand their meaning and to practise the things that are taught therein. Therefore, all these (last-mentioned things) are undoubtedly prohibited (in the case of the Südra).
स्मृतेश्च
Sútra 39. Smṛitescha. (104)
Because also it is so declared in the Smritis
(In the case of a Šūdra) the prohibition in relation to listening to (the Vedas) etc., is also declared in the Smritis, as in the following passages : Now then, if he hears the Veda, his ears should be filled with (molten) lead and lac : if he utters it, his tongue should be cut off: if he carries it in his mind, his body should be broken to pieces. (G. Dh.S. XII. 3): “And he should not be taught any rules of conduct, and he also should not be taught any religious rites.” (Manu, IV. 80)
591. The word bahupa su ordi- narily means one who possesses many heads of cattle: and asthese help in the performance of sacri- fices, this sense of the word makes
the Sudra fit to study the Veda and perform sacrifices. In the context, the word is used in a different sense.
Adhik. IX, Sut. 39]
VEDAS NOT NEEDED
179
Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the Sudra has has not the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman).
However, those who maintain that the Highest Reality is the Brahman alone, who is pure, attributeless Intelligence : that all else is unreal: that the bondage (of the soul) is also unreal and is capable of being removed solely through that knowledge which relates to reality as it is and is derived out of scriptural texts: aud that such removal constitutes of itself (moksha or) final release-they592 cannot say that the Südra and such others are unfit to know the Brahman because even he unto whom the upanayana ceremony is not performed, who has not studied the Veda and has not learnt the Vedanta, may have, produced in him, the know- ledge relating to the Reality as it is by means of some such sentence as declares that the Highest Reality is the pure attri- buteless Brahman alone and that all else is superimposed on Him and(hence) unreal: because also the bondage (of the soul) may be removed by this much alone. And it is not possi- ble to impose the restriction that the origination of know. ledge has to take place solely by means of the scriputral sen- tence, “That thou art,” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 1. etc.), and other such (sentences), and not through any other (i.e., non-scriptural) sentences: because knowledge is not subject to the control of any man593 for the reason that knowledge arises in him even when he does not like to have it, provided there are the requisite means for its production.
Further it cannot be said that freedom from bondage results, only when the knowledge of the Reality as it is arises through the Vedic
592. The ref rence is to the Advaitins who believe moksha to be the direct result of meditation on the scriptural texts affirming the identity of the Brahman with the self. The argoment here is that having rejected the Karma- kanda, they allow no scope for the supersensuous (adrishta) effects of rituals and Vedic recitation and study in qualifying one for mok- sha.
Hence they may as well say
statements :
because when
that the Janakanda is also unnecessary.
593. There is an implied con- trast here between jñana and bhakti as the means for the attain- ment of final release. Knowledge arises, whenever the necessary conditions for its rise are fulfilled, Perception, inference etc. are not dependent on the will and pleasure of the knowing agent. Bhakti, however is the result of effort.
180
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[Chap. I, Part. III
the knowledge of the Reality as it is, arises by this or that sentence, there is (seen) the disappearance of illusion (or avidya): that is because pure knowledge may arise even out of purely human utterances to the effect that the Highest Reality is the Brahman, who is pure, attributeless Intelli- gence and that all else is unreal: and because also illusion is removed through that much alone. For instance, even out of trustworthy human testimony, the illusion relating to the false perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., is removed in the case of a Brahmana as well as in the case of a Sûdra. In this same manner, there may arise in the case of a Südra also the knowledge of the Reality as it is, with the help of the traditional utterances of those who know the Veda and through the knowledge (so derived) the illu- sory apprehension of the world (by him) may become removed.

Moreover, it is not possible to say that, owing to the injunction contained in the passage, “And he should not be taught any rules of conduct, and he should not also be taught any religious rites” (Manu, IV. 80), those who know the Veda do not teach the Südra and such others: because those who have, through the scriptural sentence, “That thou art,” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7. etc.) and such others, understood594 that the Brahman is the self and take their stand on the crown of the Veda and are hence free from (such) limitations and qualifications (as determine the fitness for the performance of religious functions), are not, in consequence, bound down by any prohibitory regulations. Or knowledge may, indeed, be produced in Sudras and such others by means of the utterances of those few who trans- gress all prohibitory laws (bearing hereon). 594. Ramanuja here echoes the language of a verse from Sures’- vara’s Naishkarmyasiddhi, which. runs thus: “The sage, having burnt away all darkness by the fire of the knowledge of the Brahman, stands at the crown of the Vedas. How can he be a servant of the Vedas?” This refers to the sage rising above all the do’s and dont’s affecting the average man. “The crown of the Vedas’ usually means the ‘Vedanta’. Here there is a sugges- tion of the sage trampling down the Vedas. Naishkarmya-siddhi had attracted the attention of Yamuna earlier. Adhik. IX, Sut. 39] MEN’S WORDS CAN SAVE 181 Moreover, it cannot be urged that, unlike the removal of the illusion relating to the false perception of the silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., the illusory apprehension of the world by the Sudra is not removed immediately after that knowledge of the reality is born (in him), which is due to (instructive) human utterances: the reason being, that the illusory apprehension of the world by the Brāhmaṇa is not removed immediately after he hears the sentence, “That thou art” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7 etc.), and such others. It may, however, be said that it is only after the innate impression of duality is removed through steady meditation (as practised in yoga) that the Vedic sentence, “That thou art,” and such others generate the knowledge that removes (ignorance). (But) a human utterance also operates in the same manner in the case of the Sudra and such others, and thus there is (here) no peculiarity. Steady meditation is, indeed, the process of mentally conceiving that thing, which is to be denoted by the sentence which says that the self is the same as the Brahman. This (steady meditation) alone removes the erroneous impression (of distinctions), and hence you say that the injunction bearing upon steady meditation aims at a directly producible result. The study and repetition of the Veda are useful only in producing the desire to know (the Brahman): accordingly, when the desire to acquire true knowledge is (anyhow) produced in a Śûdra also, then through steady meditation etc. he gets rid of the erroneous innate impression (of distinctions), and (true) knowledge is in consequence born in him by means of human utterances. By means of this very (knowledge), the bondage that is unreal is also removed. Or perhaps it may be said as follows. With the help of perception, supported by reasoning, and (also) with the help of inference, 595 the Sudra and also such others may 595. The reference is particu- Jarly to wo arguments of the Advaitins known as Pramāṇa- anupapatti and Prameya-anupa- patti: (i) Perception apprehends the attributeloss Brahman and II. S.B.-24. not differentiation. (ii) Differen- tiation cannot be logically defined, being neither the essential nature of things, nor a qualifying attri- bute. See Vol. 1, pp. 37-39.182 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III first definitely learn the character (of the Brahman) as being the witness of ignorance or (avidya), and also learn that the world consists of the various and wonderful kinds of superimpositions conceived as the knower and the known, which are all due to that (avidya), and learn further that all these are superimposed on the Internal Self, which is the self-luminous, pure and attributeless Intelligence : then they get rid of the erroneous innate impression (of distinctions) in connection with the above-mentioned Internal Self through continuous meditation (on Him as He is in reality): then they directly realise that same Internal Self, and are thereafter finally released (from material bondage)—thus no useful purpose is seen to be served here by means of the Vedantic sentences which relate to (the Brahman’s) endless and false attributes not related to this world, such as (His) wonderful sovereignty, (His) wonderful powers of creation, etc.: therefore, it is really good to hold that the Sudra and such others alone possess the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman). Since the Brāhmaṇas and others also may, in this same fashion, derive the knowledge of the Brahman, the poor and pitiable Upanishads, too, (owing to their uselessness) might be (deemed dead and) given the (funereal) oblation of water. Again, it is not possible to say as follows: that it is only when it is pointed out by someone (or something) to a person wandering in error in the matter of practical realisations naturally obtaining in this world–that the practical realisations obtaining in the world are all illusory, and that the Highest Reality is indeed such and such, that there arises (in him) the desire to acquire true knowledge, which is learnt with the help of perception and inference, and therefore the revealed scripture which points out this (true knowledge), has to be accepted as necessary. The reason for this is that to those who are frightened by the errors of samsara, even the Sankhyas and others596 offer 596. The others are the Naiyayikas, Buddhists, Jains etc. Adhik. IX, Süt. 39] VEDAS NOT NEEDED 183 explanations of the reality with the help of perception and inference, and thus generate in them that desire to know (the Brahman), which is due to perception and inference. And when such a desire to know (the Brahman) is born (in men), it can be clearly discerned with the help of percep- tion and inference themselves which are entirely distinct in their nature, that the eternal, pure, self-luminous, and unchangeable Intelligence without a second is alone real, and all else is superimposed thereupon. Moreover, in regard to the self-luminous Real Entity of this kind, it cannot be admitted that there is any other attribute which has to be learnt from the scripture. For in your opinion, the scripture is that which removes whatever forms the superimposed other-ness of things (in relation to the Reality). Further the Upanishads cannot be accepted as being necessary for obtaining the knowledge relating to the blissful nature of the really existent Self: because that (Self’s) character as an intelligent entity, which is logically excluded from all other things not having the same nature with itself, constitutes by itself the blissful nature (mentioned here). 597 On the other hand, in the case of the person who holds the view that the knowledge which is enjoined by Vedantic teachings as constituting the means for obtaining final release is of the nature of worship; that that (worship) consists in pleasing the Highest Person, who is the Highest Brahman; that (the manner of) such pleasing is to be learnt solely from the sastras; that the sastra relating to worship accepts, as the means for its own realisation, only that knowledge, which, being produced by the Veda which has been studied by one who has been 597. Bliss, according to the Advaitins, is logical exclusion from unhappiness. The Brahman is bliss because He is logically excluded from whatever is material, and is of the nature of chit. 1 here is therefore no need for a separate argument to prove that the Brahman is bliss. 184 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part. III purified by religious ceremonies such as upanayana etc., is helped by discrimination, freedom and other means 598 (for its accomplishment); and that, finally, the Highest Person, who is pleased with a worship of this kind, frees the worshipper from (material) bondage, after previously destroying his ignorance born of karma through giving him the natural knowledge that appertains to the reality of his own self-(in the case of a person who maintains such a view) it is appropriate for him to hold that, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, the Sudra and such others have not the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman). ADHIKARANA V1509 PRAMITADHIKARANA Having thus concluded the above incidental and sub incidental discussions (regarding the fitness of the gods and of the Sûdra for the study and adoption of the science of the Brahman), he (the Sūtrakāra) gives another reason which leads again to the view that He, who is of the size of the thumb and forms the subject under discussion here,600 possesses the character of the Highest Person as made out from His being the lord of the past and the future. 598. See Vol. I, p. 20. 599. Adhikarana Vl, interrup- ted by di ressions from p. 147, is resumed now. (00, Sankara begins a new Adhikarana here, the purvapak- sha there being that prana is the vital air. In Ramanuja’s view this doult cannot arise because of Kath. Uo. IV. 12 and VI. 17. The doubt here is that, in spite of all that has been said, the thumb- sized Person, described as išana in Kath. Up. IV. 12. & 13, may be the individual self, sovereign in relation to the body. The answer is that in Kath. Up. VI. 2 & 3, everything is said to tremble at him. So he must be the Brahman. Hence Rāmānuja says that a view once established and then shaken by a further doubt is here re- established. The object of this Sutra is ultambhana. The Sruta- prakäsika justifies the digressions and their inclusion in Chap. 1 and not in Chap. III. of the Ved. Sut. on the ground that they too help to establish the Brahman being the cause of the universe, Adhik. VI, Sūt. 40] FEAR OF GOD 185 कम्पनात् Sûtra 40. Kampanat (105) (He who is of the size of the thumb is the Brahman) on account of trembling (at Him being predicated in relation to the whole world). Between these two passages, namely, “The Person who is of the size of the thumb. . . . . . sits at the centre within one’s own self” (Kath. Up. IV. 12), and “The Person who is of the size of the thumb is the Internal Self of all beings” (Kath. Up. VI. 16), is found the passage: “The whole of this world-whatever there is-which is (existent) in Prana and has proceeded therefrom, trembles, on account of great fear from Him who is like vajra (i.e., a powerful weapon) uplifted. Those who know this, they become immortal. Through fear for Him, the fire burns, through that fear the sun shines, through that fear, air and Indra (run, i.e., perform their duties) and Death runs as the fifth (i.e., performs its duties)” (Kath. Up. VI. 2 & 3). Here it is declared there is shaking, that is, trembling, on account of the great fear that is due to Him, by the whole world, together with the god of fire, the sun-god and others, who are all existent in the Person who is of the size of the thumb and is denoted by the word Prāna: and who have also proceeded out of Him. The meaning is that, owing to the great fear that, if His commands are transgressed, some- thing (serious) will happen, the whole world shakes as (one would) under an uplifted powerful weapon, inasmuch as this (passage) must have the same meaning with this other : “Through fear of Him, the fire burns.” (Kath. Up. VI. 3). The words, ‘mahat bhayam vajram udyatam’—which are all put in the first (or nominative) case, have (here) the significance of the fifth (or ablative) case. 601 60. These four words have been construed as ablatives, and rendered as if the text was: mahataḥ bhayāt vajrāt udyatāt. Taken as nominatives, they would mean; “He is a great terror (like) the uplifted vajra.” Rāmānu ja rejects this interpretation as less suitable. 186 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I, Part. III And such is the nature of the Highest Person: because from the following passages” Indeed, under the supreme command of this Akshara, the sun and moon, O Gārgî, stand well supported.” (Brih. Up. III. 8. 9): “Through fear of Him, the wind blows; through that fear the sun rises; through fear of Him fire and Indra (perform their duties) and Death runs as the fifth.” (Taitt. Up. II. 8. 1)- it is understood that it is only the Highest Brahman, who is the Highest Person, that can possess this kind of Sovereignty (that is dreaded by all). For the following reason also, He who is of the size of the thumb is the Highest Person : catfaqzfara Sutra 41. Jyotirdarsanat (106) Because the splendour (of the Brahman) is seen (mentioned in the context, He who is of the size of the thumb is the Brahman). Between these two passages (Kath. Up. IV. 12 & VI, 17) relating to Him who is of the size of the thumb, there is the passage: “There the sun shines not, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less fire. He shining, all this shines after Him, and by His light is all this lighted up.” (Kath. Up. V. 15). From this it is seen that there is mentioned in relation to Him who is of the size of the thumb that splendour, which is peculiar to the Highest Brahman, which eclipses all (other) brilliance, which forms the cause of all (other) light and is also helpful to them. This very passage which is found in an Upanishad of the Atharva-veda (viz., the Mundaka Upanishad, II. 2. 10), is there given in reference to the Highest Brahman.Adhik. X, Süt. 42] WHO IS ‘AKASA’? 187 Moreover, it is declared everywhere in the Vedanta that to possess the character of Supreme Light (or the Greatest Splendour) belongs to the Highest Brahman, as, for instance, in the following among other passages:- “Having reached the Highest Light (i.e., the Brahman), he (i.e., the released soul) manifests himself in his own true form”. (Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 4); “Indeed, the gods worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 16); “Now, that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven” etc.- (Chhand. Up. III. 13. 7). ADHIKARANA X ARTHĀNTARATVĀDIVYAPADESĀDHIKARAṆA आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् Sútra 42. Akāso’rthāntaratvā divyapadeśāt. (107) What is denoted by the word Akasa (is the Brahman), because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self). In the Chhandogya Upanishad, it is declared to the following effect: “Indeed, the Akasa is a differentiator (or creator) of name and form, and what is between these (viz., name and form). That is the Brahman, That is immortality, That is the Self.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 14. 1). Here the doubt arises whether he who is pointed out by the word, ākāśa, is the released individual self, or whether He is the Supreme Self. 602 What then is the conclusion? 602. According to Sankara, the doubt here is whether the ākāśa referred to in the context refers to the Brahman or to elemental ether, Ramanuja seems to feel that such a doubt has been settled once for all in the Akāśādhi- karana (I. 1. 23) Now the purvapaksha is that the released self can be held to be the differen- tiator of name and form, because in the state of bondage he was the instrument of the Brahman in this differentiation. Or nirvahitri may merely mean one who bears, i.e., is the vehicle of name and form. His omniscience links him with undiminished light. 188 SRI-BHASHYA ,, [Chap. I, Part III " That it is a released individual self. Why? Because it is a released individual self that is dealt with in the immediately connected context in the passage: “Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed like the moon from the mouth of Rāhu, (i.e., from an eclipse), I shake off the body, and then I, the well blessed individual self, attain the eternal world of the Brahman. (Chhand. Up. VIII. 13. 1): 603 and because also the expression, what is between these (viz., name and form),” refers to that indivi- dual self who is freed from name and form in the statement, “The ākāśa is the differentiator of name and form “–it is that same (released individual self) that is intended to be denoted in its former condition (of bondage). Indeed, it is he that formerly had the forms of gods, etc., as well as their names. The present (free) condition of that same (individual self), as freed from name and form, is itself mentioned in the statement-“That is the Brahman, that is immortality”. And the word ākāśa may be appropriately applied even to that (released individual self), inasmuch as he is associated with undiminished light. It may, however, be said that this (passage), being complementary to the passage relating to the daharākāśa (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1 to 6), that same dahārakāśa is made out to be this (Akāśa here), and that it (viz., the daharā- kāśa) has been already determined to be the Supreme Self. It is replied that it is not right to say so, because the passage attributed to Prajapati (Chhand. Up. VIII. 6 to 12) intervenes (between the passage under discussion and that relating to the daharākāśa). And in the passage attribu. ted to Prajapati what is declared is the individual self’s condition ending in his state of final release, and immediate- ly thereafter, that very individual self in his state of final 603. Sankara understands the simile about the horse to refer to the animal shaking off dust from its hair. Ramanuja’s inter- pretation of the passage is given clearly in the Vedanta-Săra (111. 2. 20). Rahu and Ketu, in mytho- logy, are two demons who swallow the sun and the moon now and then and cause eclipses. In Indian astronomy, they represent the nodes of the moon. Adhik. X, Sut. 42] ‘AKASA’ IS ‘BRAHMAN’ 189 release is dealt with in the passage-“Shaking off sin, etc.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 13. 1). If it is so arrived at, it is stated in reply-” What is denoted by the word, Akasa (is the Brahman), because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self) “. (Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 42). What is denoted by the word, Akāśa, is the Supreme Brahman. Why? “Because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing from the individual self”. Surely, it is taught in the passage- “Indeed, the Ākāśa is the differentiator of name and form.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 14. 1)—that it (viz., the Akāsa) is a different thing (from the individual self). To possess the capability to differentiate names and forms shows that the Ākasa is a different thing from the individual self, which exists in both the conditions of bondage and final release. In the condition of bondage, he (viz., the individual self) is himself subject to the influence of karma, and hence assumes names and forms. He cannot, there- fore, differentiate names and forms. In the condition of final release, he (ie., the individual self) cannot at all possess the capability to differentiate names and forms, inasmuch as it is impossible for him to have any activity relating to the (creation etc. of the) world. 604 On the contrary, it is learnt from the scripture itself that the characteristic of differentiating names and forms belongs to the Lord, who is the mighty agent in the creation of all the worlds, as from the following, among other passages: “Entering in along with this individual self, which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentia- tions of name and form.” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2): “He who understands all and who knows all and whose tapas consists of knowledge-from Him proceeds the un. differentiated creation as also the world of matter and soul 604. See Ved. ut. (IV. 4. 17). II. S.B.-25. 190 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap I, Part III characterised by the differentiations of name and form. " (Mnnd. Up. I. 1. 9): “The omniscient Lord, who creates all beings, gives them names, and calling them (by these names) ever continues to be.” (Taitt. Ar. III. 12. 7). Therefore, this differentiator of names and forms is none other than the Highest Brahman, who is a different entity from the individual self whose names and forms have to be differentiated. The expression-” what is between these (names and forms)” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 14. 1.)505-explains this same thing. For whatever reason this akasa is between names and forms, that is, is untouched by them and constitutes a distinct entity, for that same reason, it (viz., the Akāśa or the Brahman) is the differentiator, that is to say, He differentiates (them) through His possession of the qualities of being free from sin, and of willing the truth. Here the expression, other things, includes in its import the character of being the Brahman, the character of being the Self, and the character of being immortal. Unconditioned greatness and other such (qualities) appropriately belong only to the Supreme Self. Therefore the Akasa here is undoubtedly the Supreme Self. What has been stated above to the effect that in the passage “Shaking off this body, etc.”-(Chhand. Up. VIII. 14. 1) the released individual self is dealt with in the immediately connected context-that is not right; because in the statement-“I attain the world of the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 14. 1)–the Highest Brahman Himself is dealt with in the immediately connected context. Although the Highest Brahman is pointed out here to be the object of attainment to the released individual self, who is the 605. Here te yadantara of the Upanishad his been construed as yat te antara in the translation. Yat of course refers to Akasa and yasmāt kāraṇat is implied. This is also angaramanuja’s rendering. The Sribhashya text suggests n alternative interpretation, yasmit (karanat) (saḥ ākāśaḥ) te antară. Adhik. X, Sut. 42] ‘ADVAITA’ AS ‘PURVAPAKSHA’ 191 attainer (thereof), nevertheless, as the attainer, who is the released individual self, cannot possess the quality of being the differentiator of name and form, the Highest Brahman Himself who is the object of attainment (to him) has here to be understood (to constitute the subject of discussion). Moreover, the daharākāsa, which constitutes the subject under discussion, is here referred to in recognition under the designation of ākāśa: and also the passage attri- buted to Prajapati relates to the description of the essential nature of the worshipper (of that daharākāša): therefore, the daharākāśa itself which forms the object of worship is summed up as the object of attainment. To hold so is thus appropriate. Again, the word ākāśa is hardly seen used anywhere to denote the individual self. Therefore, the ākāsā here (in the passage under discussion) is the Supreme Brahman. Again, it may be said as follows:-606 There is no other self (or atman) which constitutes a different entity from the individual self; because oneness is taught (in the Vedanta) between the Supreme Self and the individual self), and because also duality is denied (in respect of them). The individual self himself in his pure condition (of final freedom) is known under the names of the Supreme Self, the Supreme Brahman and the Supreme Lord. Hence what is (here) mentioned as the world who is the Brahman (or the brahmaloka), that is to be attained, is not a distinct thing from the attainer (thereof), who is the released 606. Sankara begins a new adhikarana here for Sutras 43 and 44, the question at issue there being whether certain passages in Brih. Up. deal with the Self in the state of samsara or with the Self beyond samsara Ramanuj acontinues the same adhikarana because, among other things, the word vyapadesát has to be taken over into Sutra 43 from the previous one. The purva- paksha for Ramanuja here is Advaita, based on (i) Śruti texts declaring oneness between the Brahman and the individual self like “That thou art” (Chhånd. Up VI. 8.7), and (ii) texts denying duality 1:ke “There is nothing here that is many and varied” (Brih. Up. IV. 4, 19). Ramānuja has argued at length against Advaita under I. 1. 1. Here the Sutras themselves are regarded as refuting Advaita.192 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III individual self and forms the subject under discussion here. Therefore, that same (individual self) deserves to be the ākāsa as the differentiator of name and form. To this (objection), he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says in answer: gyagenealйta Sûtra 43. Sushuptyutkrāntyorbhedena (108) Because of the teaching of difference (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) in the states of deep sleep and death (the individual self is different from the Supreme Self). The phrase ‘because of the teaching’ (vyapadesat) has (here) to be supplied (from the previous Sutra). Because the Supreme Self is taught to be a distinct entity from the individual self in the conditions of deep sleep and death, the Supreme Self certainly exists as a distinct entity from the individual self. Accordingly, there is the teaching in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad of the Vajasaneyins about the individual self, who forms the subject matter of the context in the passage beginning with: “What is the self? He is that person who is (luminous) in the proximity of the prāṇas…. and wholly consists of knowledge” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 3. 7). He is (taught to be) not aware of anything in the condition of deep sleep, and to be embraced by the omni- scient Supreme Self, as stated in the passage: “When he is embraced by the omniscient Self, he does not know any- thing that is external, nor anything that is internal.” (Brih. Up. IV. 3. 21) Similarly, in relation to the condition of death also, it is declared thus: “He is ridden upon by the omniscient Self, and goes away, giving up his body.” (Brih. Up. IV. 3. 35). And that (individual self) who does not know anything, while he is in the condition of deep sleep or death, he cannot at that same time be possibly embraced or ridden upon by himself when he is omniscient.

Adhik. X, Süt. 44] “THE LORD OF ALL’ 193 Neither (can he be embraced or ridden upon) by another individual self; because it is not possible for this (other self) also to possess the quality of omniscience. For the following reason also, he (i.e., Sutrakara) says that the Supreme Self is an entity distinct from the individual self. Sutra 44. पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः Patyādisabdebhyaḥ (109) On account of the words, ‘Lord’ etc. (being found in the context, the Supreme Self is distinct form the individual self). This Supreme Self, who embraces (the individual self), is mentioned under the designation of the Lord etc., as in the following passages occurring later on in the context: “He is the Lord of all, 607 the controller of all, the ruler of all: He does not become greater by means of a good act, neither indeed does He become lesser by means of a bad one : He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings. He is the bridge and the support of all the worlds, so that they may not get into confusion. Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him by reciting the Vedas… Knowing Him alone, one becomes a muni (or meditating sage): wishing to attain Him alone as the object of all attainment (the sannyasins or) those who 607. The Upanishad text has “He is the lord of all” (sarvasya adhipatiḥ) after two other phrases. Ramanuja places it first in his quotation because the Sutra refers to it by he word ‘pati’. The com- pound word patyadi can be con⚫ strued both as a bahu vrihi and a tatturusha. In the former case, it includes all that comes after the word ‘pati’: In the latter, all that goes before. So the whole passage is relevant. Moreover, the Sutra uses pati instead of adhipati to call attention to patim visvasya (M. Nar, XI. 3) where the identity between the Brahman and Nārāyaṇa is declared. This is indicated by Ramanuja starting his commentary here by referring to the Supreme Self as Paramat- man, a term which is associated with the passage in M. Nar. 194 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part III practise renunciation give up their worldly life.” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 22); “He is indeed the great unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth-He who is free from old age, free from death, free from fear, and is the Brahman.” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 24 & 25). And these characteristics of being the Lord, the support of the world and the ruler of all, and other such ones, cannot in any manner whatsoever belong to the individual self, even in his condition of final freedom. Therefore, the Ahasa, which is the differentiator of name and form, constitutes a distinct entity from the finally released individual self. The teaching of oneness (between the Supreme Self and the individual self), on the other hand, is based upon His being the Self of all; because all things which are made up of the intelligent and non-intelligent objects, are all produced effects, of which the cause is the Brahman. And it has already been established (under Ved. Sut. I. 2. 1 etc.) that this (subject) is dealt with in the following among other passages : “All this indeed is the Brahman: all this is born in It, absorbed into It, and lives in It.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1). The negation of duality also follows from that same (relation of oneness between the Brahman as cause and the universe as effect). 608 Thus it (viz., our argument here in I. ii and I. iii) is flawless. 608. Accor.ling to the Advaitin, however, the relation of oneness subsists between the Brahman and the individual self. PART IV ADHIKARAŅA I ÄNUMĀNĀDHIKARAṆA engarfazadðarfafa da शरीररूपक विन्यस्तगृहीते दर्शयति च Sútra 1. Anumānikamapyekeshamiti chenna sarira- rupakavinyastagrihi ter darŝayati cha. (110) If it be said that according to some the ānumānika (or ‘Pradhana’) also (is the cause of the world), it is replied that it is not so; because what is understood (in the context by the word, ‘avyakta’, is not the pradhana or material Nature, but it) is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body: and the Scripture declares accordingly. It has already been stated (in Ved. Sut. I. 1) that the Brahman who is the cause of the creation etc. of the world, and who has to be enquired into and realised as the means for the attainment of final release, which possesses the characteristic of the highest object of human pursuit, is entirely distinct from the pradhana and other non- intelligent things, as well as from the intelligent individual selves both in their conditions of cause and of final release; (in I. 2) that He is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil; that He is omniscient, omnipotent, and wills the truth; that He is characterised by all auspicious qualities; and (in I. 3) that He forms the Internal Self of all and possesses unlimited sovereignty. Now, the supposition is raised (in I. 4.) to the effect that in some of the recensions of the Veda there also occur certain pass ages, which, in the way of explaining the 196 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I, Part IV pradhana, the purusha etc., that have not the Brahman for their self and are so established in the science pro- pounded by Kapila, go in the direction of indicating that the pradhana may be stated to be the cause of the world; and then this (supposition) is disproved for the purpose of firmly establishing that the Brahman forms the only cause of the world. In the Katha-Valli it is declared as follows:–” The objects of the senses are indeed superior to the senses; and the mind is superior to the objects of the senses; and the faculty of intellection is superior to the mind: the great self is superior to the faculty of intellection: the avyakta is superior to (that) great thing (self): the purusha is superior to the avyakta: there is nothing superior to the purusha that is the highest limit: that is the final goal.’ (Kath. Up. III. 10 & 11). Here the doubt arises whether or not it is pradhana, which has not the Brahman for its internal self and is established as such in the science propounded by Kapila, that is here denoted by the word, ‘avyakta’. "” It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is (that) pradhana. 609 Why? Because in the (above) statement-” The avyakta is superior to (that) great (self); the purusha is superior to the avyakta “—it is that same (pradhāna) that is brought out (by the word ‘avyakta’) for the reason that 609. The doubt raised in the Sutra is about the meaning of the word ‘avyakta’ in Kath. Up. JII. 10. (Whether the Brahman or the pradhana is there described to be the material cause of the universe is a further and conse- quential question.) The purva- paksha is that ‘avyakta pradhana’ while Rā nānuja holds that the word stands for the body. The purvapaksha arguments are: 1 means (i) The word ‘avyakta’ generally means the pradhana: (ii) The statement in Kath. Up. III. 10 that the avyakta is superior to the mahat is in accordance with the Sankhya view that the avyakla (or pradhana) is the cause of mahat (one of its evolutes). (iii) The Sankhyas who do not believe in God hold the purusha or the indi- vidual self to be the highest entity; as set out in Kath. Up. III. 11.Adhik. I, Süt. 1] ‘AVYAKTA’ IS ‘BODY’ 197 its position in the system (of Kapila) is recalled (by the above statement), and because also in the statement-” There is nothing superior to the purusha; that is the highest limit, that is the final goal”-there is the negation of any real prin. ciple over and above the purusha constituting the twentyfifth (principle). 610 It is thus arrived at that the avyakta (i.e., the pradhana) is the cause of the world. It is this same thing that is mentioned (in the Sutra) thus :–“If it be said that according to some the anumānika (or the pradhana) also (is the cause of the world) etc. (Ved. Sit. I. 4. 1). ‘According to some’, that is, in the recensions of the followers of certain Vedic schools, the anumānika, that is, the pradhāna, also is declared to be the cause of the world. "” If it be so held, the answer thereto is that it is not (right to say) so. Here the pradhāna, that has not the Brahman for its internal self, is not denoted by the word ‘avyakta’. Why? “Because what is understood (in the context by the word ‘avyakta’ is not the pradhāna or material Nature, but it) is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body.” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 1) That is, because that which is metaphorically described as the body is understood by the word ‘avyakta’ (here). The meaning is that it is because in connection with the self, the body, the faculty of intellection, the mind, the senses and the objects of the senses, which are all metaphorically described to possess the characteristics of the chariot-ider, the chariot, and other things, the body which is metaphorically described to be the chariot, is denoted by the word ‘avyakta’. 611 610. See Vol. I, Notes 39 and 169. 611. Ramanuja carefully follows the Sutra in taking sarint as a viseshana and rupaka-vinyàsta II. S.B.-26. as the viseshya. This helps the Sutra to refer to all things meta- phorically represented in the context. 198 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV What is said is this: 612-Indeed, at the beginning (of the context here) in the passages beginning with-” Know the (individual) self to be the rider in the chariot and the body itself to be the chariot. Know the faculty of intellection also to be the charioteer and the mind itself to be the reins. The senses are called horses, and the things within their shpere of operation are called their objects.” :-and ending with-“He reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Vishnu.” (Kath. Up. III. 3-9).-the worshipper who desires to reach the highest seat of Vishnu, which is at the other end of the path of samsara, is metaphorically described to be the rider in the chariot and such other things to be the chariot and its accessories; 613 then it is stated that he in whose control the chariot and other things are–he alone reaches the highest seat of Vishnu which is at the other end of the path of samsara; and thereafter in the passage beginning with :-(“The objects of the senses are indeed) superior to the senses.” (Kath. Up. III. 10)-it is pointed out in connection with the body and the other things mentioned above, which are metaphorically described to be the chariot etc., which things, in the course of their being brought under control, are more important than others (in the same course). It being so, the perceivable objects metaphorically described as things falling within the sphere of the operation (of the senses) are, in the course of those (senses) having to 612. The order of importance of the several things mentioned in Kath. Up. III. 10 & 11 is with reference to steps in self-realisa- tion and God-realisation. The presence of the objects of the senses draws the senses to them. Even their absence does not help in self.control, if the mind is attached to them. This attach- ment can be prevented by the determination of the buddhi. The buddhi is an instrument of the oul, who is the agent. But this gency depends on the soul having a boy. And the body can sub- serve the interests of the sout through God’s grace. The moral discipline consists of control of the mind, resolution of the buddhi, strengthening the sout’s desire for defeating the senses, controlling the body by eating food which develops the sattvaguna and seek- ing refuge with God, 613. Rathanga has been trans- lated as ‘accessories of the chariot’ to suit the context here. Its ordinary meaning is ‘wheel’. Adhik. I, Sut. 1] BODY, SOUL & GOD 199 be under control, more important than the senses, which are metaporically described to be horses; because even he who has brought his senses under control, cannot easily restrain the senses when the perceivable objects are near. More important than these (perceivable objects) is the mind which is metaphorically described to be the reins; because when the mind is bent upon the objects of sense- perception, even the non-proximity of (those) objects of sense-perception is of no use (in controlling it). The faculty of intellection, which is metaphorically described as the charioteer, is more important than (that) mind also; because in the absence of (the required) resolution even the mind is of no use. The (individual) self described metaphorically as the rider in the chariot is more important than that (faculty of intellection)-also owing to his superiority in his capacity of an agent. All these things (mentioned above) are indeed subject to the will of the self himself, and therefore it is that he is characterised as being great. The body which is metaphorically described as chariot is more important than that (self) also; because all the activities which serve as the means of realising the ends of life aimed at by the individual self, are dependent upon that (body). More important than even that (body) is the Supreme Person, who forms the Internal Self of all beings, controls them from within, and is the goal of attainment (in relation to the goal of samsāra): because all the things mentioned above, up to and inclusive of the individual self, have their activities dependent on His will. He, indeed, it is, who, as the controller (of all beings) from within, is the accomplisher of the act of worship. For, it will be stated later on under the aphorism-“It (viz., the self’s character of being the agent) is indeed due to Him who is the Highest (Brahman); because the scripture declares accordingly.” (Ved. Süt. II. 3. 40)-that the individual self’s quality of being the agent is dependent upon the Supreme Person. It is He Himself who forms the 200 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV culmination of the several means which have to be adopted for the purpose of accomplishing the worship that consists in bringing (all the above-mentioned things) under control. This same thing is thus declared: “There is nothing superior to the (Supreme) Purusha; that is the highest limit; that is the final goal.” (Kath. Up. III. 11). (Brih. Similarly in the Antaryami-Brāhmaṇa Up. III. 7), in the passage beginning with “He who dwelling in the self”-(Madḥ. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22)—and in other similar ones, it is stated that He directly perceives all things and controls them all; then in the passage “There is no seer other than Him.” (Brih. Up. III. 7. 23)—a controller other than Him is denied to exist. In the Bhagavad-gītā also, it is declared thus: “Here (we require) the abode, similarly the agent, the various kinds of instruments and then the various kinds of distinct activities, and the deity (or daivam) as the fifth (among the causes of work).” (B. G. XVIII. 14). In this passage, the word daivam (or deity) denotes the Supreme Person Him- self; because it is thus declared (also in the Bhagavad-gitä): “And I am also seated in the heart of all beings, and from Me proceed memory, knowledge and forgetfulness.” (B. G. XV. 15). And to win Him is the same as to seek refuge with Him. To that effect runs the passage: “O Arjuna, the Lord exists in the region of the heart of all beings, and (from there) by means of His wonderful powers He causes the revolutions of all beings that are mounted upon the mechanism (of the body). Seek refuge with Him alone.” (B. G. XVIII. 61-2). In this foregoing manner (the mind and) the senses and other things which are metaphorically described as the rider in the chariot and other things in accordance with the passage beginning with, “Know the (individual) self to be the rider in the chariot.” (Kath. Up. III. 3)—are again identified by words directly denotative of themselves in the Adhik. I, Süt. 1} NO BASIS FOR SANKHYA 201 passage beginning with “The objects of the senses are indeed superior to the senses” (Kath. Up. III. 10); but not the body which is metaphorically described to be the chariot; since in this manner it remains (unidentified), it is ascertained that it is denoted by the word ‘avyakta’. Therefore, there is here no room whatsoever for the pradhana that is established in the system of Kapila. Nor is there any recognition here of the method adopted in that system. Because, according to the passage, “The objects of the senses are, indeed, superior to the senses”, the objects of the senses, such as sound etc. are spoken of as being more important than the senses. Indeed, sound and other (objects of sense-perception) do not, according to that system, form the causes of the senses. The statement, “And the mind is superior to the objects of the senses,” (Kath. Up. III. 10.) is not also in agree- ment with that system for the very reason that it (viz., the mind) is not the cause thereof.614 Similarly, the statement, “The great self is superior to the faculty of intellection’ (Kath. Up. III. 10)—is not also appropriate: because it is admitted (by them) that the word, ‘buddhi’ (meaning the faculty of intellection), denotes the ‘great principle’ (or mahat). It is not possible for the ‘great principle’ (or mahat) to be superior to the ‘great principle’ (or mahat) itself. And to characterise the ‘great principle’ (or mahat) by the word, atman (or self) is also not appropriate. 615 Therefore, only those things which are metaphorically described (in Kath. Up. III. 3 etc.) are what are understood (in the passage under reference). 614. Ramanuja omits here any reference to the statement: 16 The buddhi is superior to the manās”. This is probably because the San- khyas can argue that buddhi as mahat is the material cause of manas through sätt vika ahankära. But this argument fails because, in respect of the various other things in the context described as 27 superior and inferior to one ano- ther, this relationship of cause and effect cannot be predicated even by the Sankhyas. 615. The Sankhya argument will take the word atman to mean a pervader and argue that undiffer- entiated mahat pervades differen. tiated mahat.202 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV The “And the scripture declares accordingly. scripture also declares the same thing in the passage: “The Self is hidden in all beings and does not reveal Himself. He is, however, directly perceived by subtle seers by means of their sharp intellect. The wise man should restrain his speech within the mind, he should restrain that (mind) within the faculty of intellection belonging to the (individual) self; he should restrain the faculty of intellection within the great self; he should restrain that (self) within the ever-peaceful (Supreme) Self.” (Kath. Up. III. 12 & 13). It is taught here that that Highest Person is incapable of being perceived directly by those who have not conquered their external and internal organs (of action and sense); and accordingly, the manner in which the senses etc., which are metaphorically described as horses etc., may be brought under control is thus stated. 616 Yachchhed vāǹmanasī= He (i.e., He (ie., the wise man) should restrain his speech within the mind. The meaning is that the organs of activity which are headed by the organ of speech, and the organs of sense should all be restrained within the mind. In the word, vak, the accusative case- suffix disappears in accordance with the grammatical rule: ‘(In the Veda) the affix su sometimes takes the place of the case-endings of words, sometimes the case-endings disappear etc.” (Panini, VII. 1. 39). In the word, manasi, which is in the locative case, the lengthening of the final vowel, i, is in accordance with Vedic usage. 46

Tadyachchhet jñāna ātmani He shall restrain that (mind) within the jñana in the self; that is, he should restrain that mind within the faculty of intellection of the 616. The control of speech (i.9., the senses) in the mind-note that vanmanasi does not mean ‘speech and mind’-consists of making them indifferent to functioning in a way contrary to what is desired by the mind: that of mind is to make it carry out the resolve of the buddhi to the cffect that the experience of the senses is not worthy: that of the buddhi sto make it resolve on self-realisation: and that of the soul is the realisa- tion of its utter dependence on God. (Srutaprakāšikā). Adhik. I, Süt. 2] WAY OF SELF-CONTROL 203 self. Here buddhi (or the faculty of intellection already mentioned above) is denoted by the word jñāna. The locatives, jňane and atmani, are distinct and are not grammatically equated. The meaning is that it (viz., the mind) should be restrained in the jñana (or faculty of intellection), which is existent in the individual self.

=
Jňānam ātmani mahati niyachchhet He shall restrain the faculty of intellection within the great self: that is, the faculty of intellection should be restrained within the great self that forms the agent. Tadyachchhet santa atmani He shall restrain that within the (ever) peaceful Self. That agent (viz., the individual self) should be restrained within the (ever peaceful and) Supreme Brahman, who controls all things within. The neuter gender in regard to the word ’tad’ (which has here the word atman in the masculine for its antecedent) is due to a permissible interchange (of gender in grammar). The meaning is that the rider in the chariot, who is of the description given above, has for his goal the abode of Vishnu.
It may be asked how the word ‘avyakta’ (meaning ‘unmanifest’) can denote the manifest body. In answer to this (objection), he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says:
azorg aggcara
Sútra 2. Sukshmantu tadarhatvāt. (111)
The subtle (avyakta or the
unmanifest
elementary atter), however, (is the body), because it (i.e., the body) is fit to be of use.
Indeed, the undifferentiated and subtle elementary matter, when it assumes a specific condition, becomes the body; and this undifferentiated matter is, in the condition of its constituting the body, denoted here (in the context) by the word ‘avyakta’. “Because it is fit to be of
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That is, because that same non-intelligent and unmanifest matter, having undergone a modification, deserves to be, like the chariot, the means of accomplishing the objects of human pursuit. 617
If it be acknowledged that the subtle elementary matter is the subtle and unmanifest one (or auyakta), then what is the objection to the acceptance of that (avyakta or pradhana) which is established in the system of Kapila? Indeed, in that (system) also, the (ultimate material) cause of all beings is itself called the avyakta. In reply to this, he (viz., the Sutrakāra) says thus:
तदधीनत्वादर्थवत्
Sutra 3. Tadadhinaṭvādarthavat. (112)
lt (viz., the avyakta here) is useful because it is subject to Him.
The subtle elementary matter is useful in that it is subject to the Supreme Person, who forms the Supreme Cause (of all things).
What is said is this. It is not that we do not altoge ther admit this avyakta (or undifferentiated matter) as wel as its several mo fifications; on the contrary, (we do not admit them) as unassociated with Him as their Self, owing to their constituting the body of the Highest Person. Simply because they have Him alone as their (internal) Self, prakriti (or matter) and other such things accomplish their purposes; otherwise, in relation them all, there will be no distinctions of nature, continued existence and activity.
617. The argument here is a reply to an impl ed question if ay- yakta in III. 11 means the body by
virtue of sarira in III. 3, why not vice versa? Why not take sarira in 111, 3 to mean avyakta?
Adhik. I, Sūt. 3] ‘PRAKRITI’ UNDER GOD
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Because it is not at all so admitted (by the followers of Kapila), the method worked out in (their) system is set at naught.618
It is well known that in the Vedic scriptures and in the Smritis-in the sections dealing with the creation and absorption of the world as well as in the section dealing with the greatness of the Supreme Person, prakṛiti, its modifications, and the purushas (or the individual selves) are all described as having Him for their Self. For instance, there is the passage:-” The element of earth is absorbed into the element of water… The material elements in the subtle condition are absorbed (back) into the bhutadi:19 the bhitadi is absorbed (back) into the mahat; the mahat is absorbed (back) into the avyakta; the avyakta is absorbed (back) into the akshara; the akshara is absorbed (back) into the tamas; the tamas becomes one with the Supreme Lord.” (Sub. Up. II). To a similar effect is the passage:-“He whose body is the element of earth….whose body is the element of water….whose body is the element of heat… whose body is the element of air… whose body is the element of ether…whose body is the material principle of egoity… whose body is the intellect… whose body is the avyakta…whose body is the akshara… whose body is mrityu…He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Nārāyaṇa.” (Sub. Up. VII. 1). The same thing is stated in the following passage :-“This prakriti of Mine is divided into eight parts in the form of the element of earth, of water, of fire, of air, and of ether, the mind, the buddhi
618. According to the Vedanta, the nature, continued existence and activity of the prakriti and its evolutes are dependent on the Supree Person. Kapila believes the prakriti to be entirely independent.
619. Bhutádi strictly denotes tamasa ahankara, or a division of the material principle of egoity
II. S.B.-27.
arising from the quality of tamas inherent in the prakriti. There are two other divisions of ahan- kara-raiasa and sätt vika. Bhu- tádi here obviously denotes all the three divisions of ahankara produced from mahat. See V.P. II. 32. 6. For further explanation about the Sub. Up. passages, see Notes 90, 91, 184 and 185 of Vol. I.
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(or mahat) and the ahankara (or the material principle of egoity). This is My lower prakṛiti. Know that to be My higher prakriti, which is other than this (lower one) and which consists of individual selves. By it, this world is supported, O thou mighty-armed one (Arjuna). Know that all (created) beings have these (two prakritis) for their source. I am the source as well as the destruc- tion of the whole world, O Dhananjaya, there is nothing else higher than Me. All this (creation) is strung on Me like a number of gems on a thread.” (B.G. VII. 4-6). To the same effect is this passage also, namely,-“Vishnu is the manifest (prakṛiti), as also the unmanifest; He is the purusha (or the individual self), and is Time itself.” (V.P. I. 2. 18). And the following passage also says the same thing thus:-“The prakriti (i.e., material Nature), which has been spoken of by Me as possessing a manifest and unmanifest nature, and the purusha (i.e., the self), are, both of them, absorbed (back) into the Highest Self. And the Highest Self who is the support of all and the Highest Lord is celebrated under the name of Vishnu in the Vedas and in the Vedanta.” (V. P. VI. 4. 39 & 40). 620
ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च
Sûtra 4. Jñeyatvāvachanāchcha (114)
Because also that (viz., the avyakta here) is not stated to possess the character of that which has to be known (for the attainment of final release).
If that (pradhana or material Nature), which is established in the system (of Kapila), is intended to be meant
620. Yadavaprakasa has inter- preted this Sutra to mean that the soul is subject to the body in regard to action; and that there- fore the declaration of the superiority of the avyakta (or the body) to the soul becomes meaningful. Thus the Sutra is
taken to reinforce I. 4. I. by furnishing an additional reason. Ramanuja can concur in this view. But he chooses to interpret differ- ently because there is need for a Sutra to establish that the prakriti bas the Brahman for its Self,Adhik. 1, Sut, 5] SAVING KNOWLEDGE
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here, then it would also have been considered desirable to teach that it has to be known (for the attainment of final release); because the followers of (that) system (of Kapila), who uphold the view 621 that final release results from the knowledge of manifested and unmanifested (matter), as also (from the knowledge) of the knower (or the individual self), admit that all (these) have to be known (for the attainment of final release). And this (avyakta) is not mentioned (here) as a thing that has to be known (for the attainment of final release). Therefore that (avyakta) which is established (as the pradhana by Kapila) is not meant here (in the context).
açaifa da urât fè ancora
Sútra 5. Vadatitichenna prājño hi prakaraṇāt. (115)
If it be held that it (vis., the scriptural con- text) speaks (of the avyakta having to be known for the attainment of final release), it is not right to say so; because, according to the con- text, it is the Omniscient One (that is referred to therein as such).
It may, however, be held that this scriptural passage, namely,” That eternally indestructible one, which is characterised neither by sound nor by touch, nor by form and colour, nor similarly by taste nor by smell: which has no beginning and no end; which is higher than the mahat -realising that One, one is freed from the jaws of death.” (Kath. Up. III. 15),-states immediately afterwards that the avyakta has to be known (for the attainment of final
621. The Sankhya view is that final release results from the distinction between matter and spirit (prakriti and purusha) being fully understood.” Matter itself has to be comprehended both as the primordial source and its various modifications. Thus the knowledge of the avyakta (or
pradhana, the primordial undiffer- entiated source of the material universe), the vyakta (its various modifications like mahat etc.) and jña (the knower or the individual soul) is enjoined. Vide Isvara- Krishna’s Sankhya-Kärikäs (2) with the commentary of Vachas- pati Missa,
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release). 622 But it is replied that it is not so. Indeed, the Omnisicient One, who is the Highest Person Himself, is declared in the sloka here to be object of realisation; because it is the Omniscient One Himself who forms the subject-matter of the context here thus :-” But that person who has understanding for his charioteer and the mind (or the internal organ of attention) for the reins, he reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Vishnu.” (Kath. Up. III. 9). “The Self is hidden in all beings and does not reveal Himself; He is, however, directly perceived by subtle seers by means of their sharp intellect.” (Kath. Up. III. 12). For this very reason, what is negatived in the statement-“There is nothing superior to the purusha,” (Kath. Up. III. 11)-is not an entity over and above the twentyfifth (entity in the system of Sankhya which is the individual self and is called purusha). And the attribute of not being characterised by sound, and other such attributes are well known to belong to the Supreme Person, in accordance with the scriptural passage, “That (being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized”. (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6). Moreover, what is taught in the statement- “It is superior to the mahat (i.e., the great one or the self)” (Kath. Up. III. 10)—is assuredly the superiority in relation the individual self already dealt with in earlier statement, “The great self is superior to the faculty of intellection.” (Kath. Up. III. 10).
saraña #agqzaTA: A
Sutra 6. Trayāṇāmevachaivamupanyasaḥ prasnascha.
Accordingly, this exposition and question (in the context here) relate only to the three.
Indeed, in this context here, it is only in relation to these three, namely, the means of attainment, the object of
622. Kath. Up. III. 15. is here understood as referring to the avyakta. Sound, taste, etc., do not belong to primordial, un- differentiated matter, but only to
its evolutes like mahat, being the cause of the latter. Other implied purva paksha arguments are dis- posed of below.
Adhik.I, Sut. 6] THE THREE TOPICS
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66
attainment and the attainer, that the exposition is seen; the exposition is seen to relate to what has to be known; the question also is seen to relate to the same but not to the avyakta (i.e., pradhāna) or any other such thing.623 Thus, Nachiketas, who was desirous of attaining final release, was given three boons by the god of death; as the first among the boons he obtained what conferred on him fitness for the attainment of the objects of human pursuit, namely, the favourable disposition of his father towards (Nachiketas) himself; then as his second boon, he chose that knowledge which relates to the Nachiketa fire and forms a means of attaining final release, in accordance with the passage: god of Death, you who are so (wise) know the fire relating to svarga (or final release which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit). Teach that unto me who have faith. Those who have gone into the world of svarga (or final release) attain immortality. This I choose as my second boon.” (Kath. Up. I. 13). Here the word, ‘svarga’, stands for final release, which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit ; because in the above statement, “(Those who have gone to the world of svarga) attain immortality,” he who is in that world is declared not to undergo birth or death; because also later on in the same context (i.e., in Kath. Up. I. 26), the disapprobation of (ceremonial) works yielding transitory results is seen; and because again there is this reply given (to Nachiketas), namely, “He who learns the three trinachiketa anuvākas, who performs the three (sacrificial) works, who obtains by means of the three fires (beatific) union (with God) and thus transcends birth and death, I
623. Ramanuja’s view here may not appear to differ much from Sankara’s, according to which Agni (or the fire sacrifice), the jiva and the Brahman are the three under reference. Rāmānuja, however, prefers to analyse the three topics as the attaining jiva, the object of attainment consisting of the Brahman as well as the pure
state of the jiva, and the means of attainment, consisting of the upasana and the fire-sacrifice as an element in it. This analysis is claimed 10 be precise, while Sankara’s appears to make no reference to the means of attain- ment, which is very much in
evidence in the context.
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desire to learn this taught by you.” 624 (Kath. Up. I. 17). In the following passage, namely, “After a man (finally) departs from this world, there is this doubt; some say that he is, while others say he is not. As taught by you, let me know this. Among the boons, this is the third boon. " (Kath. Up. I. 20)-after introducing the question in relation to the essential nature of final release, the third boon is asked in reference to the essential nature of the object of attainment, to the essential nature of the attainer, and to the essential nature of the worship which, as helped on by ritualistic works, forms the means of attainment (thereof).
Having been thus questioned on final release, he (ie., Yama or god of death) examined his fitness to receive the teaching relating thereunto and then taught him thus: “By means of that self-knowledge which is derived from yogic self-concentration, the wise man comes to know that God, who is difficult to be seen and is hidden, who has entered into all beings and is placed within the ‘cave’ (of the heart), who exists in the inmost recesses (of all beings as the Internal Controller of their souls) and is ancient; and then he gives up pleasure and pain.” (Kath. Up. II. 12). After he was thus taught in general terms, Nachiketas became pleased; and in order further specially to examine the essential nature of the Lord who has been pointed out in the statement-” (He) comes to know (that) God, “–and forms the object of attainment; the essential nature also of the individual self which is the attainer and which has been pointed out in the statement–” By means of that self- knowledge, which is derived from yogic self-concentration”
as that which has to be previously known; and the
624. A fire-sacrifice taught earlier by Yama is named after Nachiketas to honour his gallant quest after truth (1.16). Here three amuvakas of the Yajur Veda are referred to as ’trinachiketab’, The three ‘works’ are explained as sacrificial worship, learning the Vedas and giving gifts. The
three other traditional duties or functions of the Brahmins-officiat- ing at the sacrifices of others, teaching and receiving gifts–are renounced by this aspirant. He is supposed to effect a sandhi or union with the upasana, which ultimately leads him to God.
Adhik. I, Süt. 61 PRAISE OF PRANAVA’
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essential nature of the worship which relates to the Brahman and which has been pointed out in the statement-" The wise man comes to know (that God)… and then gives up pleasure and pain,"-(in order specially to examine these three) he again questioned thus: “That which is other than dharma (or the ordinary means) and adharma (or th ordinary ends), that which is other than the present, the past and the future, say if thou seest that.” (Kath. Up. II. 14), 625
Accordingly, when questioned about these three things which are altogether different from all other ends, from all other means and from all other agents either in the past or in the future or in the present, then (in the way of reply), the syllable Om is first praised and what is denoted by it, the essential nature of the object of enjoyment; and what is included in it, the essential nature of the attainer; and what forms the means of attainment, namely, its own vocal form as a word (Om)–all these were again explained in general terms. Thus it is the syllable Om that is taught in the passage:“That end which all the Vedas declare, which all penances proclaim, and desiring which celibacy is observed, that I shall briefly tell you. It is the syllable Om.” (Kath. Up. II. 15) After teaching him thus, and after praising the praṇava (or the mystic syllable Om), again,
625. This verse may also be interpreted thus: “That (medi- tation on God) which is other than dharma and adharma (i.e., the means respectively for papa and punya), that which is different from this present, the past and the future (i.e., God in whom is includ- ed the individual soul), say if thou seest that.” Among the verses of Kath. Up. referred to below, the following may be noticed. The (potentially) omniscient one (j.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor dies. It is not (produced) from something, and it did not become something. It is unborn, immortal, eternal (without having an origin)
$1
and ancient. It is not killed when the body is killed, If one thinks to kill, considering one to be killer, and if one, being killed, thinks that one is killed, both these do not know (the truth). He is not the killer, nor is he killed" (II. 18. 19). “He is subtler than the most subtle and greater than the greatest. He is the soul of this individual self and placed in the cave (of the heart). One who gives up rituals for the satisfaction of selfish desires, sees Him who makes one great, through the grace of (that) Supporter, becomes free trom grief.” (20).212
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the essential nature of the individual self who is the attainer, is however given (as a matter of course) in the passage beginning with: “The (potentially) omniscient one (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor dies.” (Kath. Up. II. 18).
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The essential nature of Vishnu who is the object of attainment and forms the Highest Brahman is taught in the passage beginning with: “He is smaller than the smallest”, and ending with “Who can definitely know how He is ?” (Kath. Up. II. 20-25): in the middle, in the passage, begin- ning with “This Self is not reached either by reflection, or by steady meditation, or by largely hearing the scripture’ (Kath. Up. II. 23), it is further stated that worship which forms the means of attainment possesses the character of loving devotion. In the passage beginning with: “There are the two that drink in’ (i.e., enjoy) the reward of works,” (Kath. Up. III. 1), it is taught that, owing to the object of worship being mentioned as existing in the same place. with the worshipper, worship is easy to perform; then in the passage beginning with “Know the self to be the rider in the chariot,” and ending with, “The wise say that the path (to the Self) is hard” (Kath. Up. III. 3-14)– the methods of performing worship are declared, (and it is also declared that) the worshipper attains unto the highest abode of Vishņu; and finally, it (viz., the context here) is concluded with the passage: “That One is characterised neither by sound nor by touch.” (Kath. Up. III. 15). Therefore it is only those three things which are expounded and questioned about as things that have to be known. Accordingly, what is to be understood (by the term ‘avyakta’) in the context here is not the pradhāna accepted by the followers of the system (of Kapila).
Sútra 7. Mahadvachcha.
महद्वच
Also, as in the case (of the term) ‘mahať’ (the term ‘avyakta’ has to be construed other- wise than in the system of Kapila).
Adhik. II, Sut. 8) KAPILA DISPROVED
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In the statement, “The great self is superior to the buddhi (that is, the faculty of intellection).” (Kath. Up. III. 10), it (viz., the ‘mahat’ meaning ‘great’) is in the same grammatical equation with the word ätman (or self); hence it does not mean the ‘great’ material principle (ie., the mahat or buddhi) which is established in the system (of Kapila). In the manner in which this is so, in that same manner, owing to the fact of its having to be superior to the self, the term ‘avyakta’ also does not denote that pradhāna, which is established in the system of Kapila. Such is the settled conclusion.
ADHIKARANA 11
CHAMASĀDHIKARAṆA
चमसवदविशेषात्
Sutra 8. Chamasavadavišēshāt. (117)
(The word, ‘aja’, cannot mean pradhāna in the context here) because there is no special characterisation in (the context so as to make it signify the pradhana), as there is in the case of the word, ‘chamasa’ (or ‘cup’).
Here also the method adopted in the system (of Kapila) is disproved, but not the essential nature of prakriti (or matter), of mahat (or the ‘great’ principle), of ahankara (or the material principle of egoity) etc., as having the Brahman for their (internal) Self; because Śrutis and Smritis declare them as having the Brahman for their Self.
It is declared in the scriptures as follows: “That (prakriti) which is the mother of all modifications, which is non-intelligent, which is eightfold in nature, which is ajā (or unborn) and indestructible,-that is thought of by
II. S.B.-28.
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Him: and presided over by Him, it is made to expand and is then made to evolve: presided over by Him alone, it produces and serves the ends of the purusha (or the individual self). It is the cow without a beginning and an end, it is the mother and source of all beings: it is white, black and red (at the same time): it is the Lord’s milch- cow of all desires: ignorant children drink of her who is characterised by an impartial disposition (in yielding them milk according to their karma); but the Lord alone drinks of her according to His free-will, holding her under subjection. That great and divine Lord, through His thought and act (of creation), forcibly enjoys her who is the milch-cow belonging to all in common and who is made to yield milk (for enjoyment) by those who perform sacrifices.” (Chulika Up. 3-7): “The avyakta (or the non- manifest), which is counted as the twentyfourth (among the ultimate entities of the universe) is spoken of as the vyakta (or the manifest, when evolved).” (Chulikā Up. 14). The essential nature of the prakṛiti and of the other principles is mentioned here.
That Supreme Person whom the above-mentioned prakriti and the other (ultimate entities) have for their (internal) Self, is also (therein) declared thus: “Some say that He is the twentysixth principle: others that He is the twentyseventh principle: the followers of Atharvasiras know the Purusha (or Person) as capable of being grasped by the intellect and devoid of (evil) qualities.” (Chulika Up. 14). Again, there are other Atharvaṇikas who read in their scriptures thus: “The original states of prakriti (or matter) are eight, while the modifications there of are sixteen.” (Garbha Up. III. 7). 626
626. Ramanuja here seeks to show that the Sankhya position Jacks support both from the text under consideration and from other scriptural passages. First, the Chulika Upanishad, otherwise known as the Mantrikopanishad, and the Garbha Upanishad are quoted. The Chulika passage (3-7)
describes creation by elaborate figures of speech. Prakriti is eight- fold, because it evolves into mahat, ahankara and the five elements. Compare B. G. VII. 4. After this stage in creation (which is samashți or general), individual souls are given uitable bodies (when creation becomes vyashți or
Adhik. II, Süt. 8]
THREE ‘UNBORN’
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The Svetasvataras also declare the essential nature of the prakriti, of the individual self and of the Lord to be as follows: “The Lord supports the whole of this world, which is both manifest and unmanifest, and is composite, being made up of the destructible (prakriti) and the indestructible entity (i.e., the individual self): and the individual self, which is not master of itself, gets into bondage, owing to its condition of being the enjoyer, and after knowing the Lord, is released from all sins.” (Svet. Up. I. 8).
“The two unborn, the intelligent and the ignorant, (are) the Lord and the non-lord: one ajā (unborn) is indeed intended for the enjoyment of the enjoyer (or the individual self): the Infinite Self has a universal form and is surely not an agent: when one realises all these three, then that is the (attainment of the) Brahman.” (Svet. Up. I. 9): “The destructible is the prakriti: the immortal and the indestructible is the hara (ie., the individual self): and the Lord alone rules over the destructible (prakriti) and the individual self: through repeated meditation of Him, through the practice of yoga and through the direct realisation of Him as He is (in union with the real entities), ignorance is completely removed at the end.” (Svet. Up. I. 10). Similarly, it is said thus: “The Vedas, sacrifices, religious ceremonies, preparatory and purificatory rites, things in the past, things in the future, and all such things as the Vedas mention–out of (all) this, He who is the owner of the mayä (i.e., the Lord) creates this world, wherein another being (i.., the individual self) is bound down by māyā.” (Svet. Up. IV. 9): “Know then
particular). The three colours of the cow, white, black and red, refer to sattva, tamas and rajas respectively. The impartial dis- position of the cow is due to her yielding milk according to the karma of each soul. The ritual of sacrifice yields results in the form of milk. Chul, Up. 14 may mean that the vyakta, which is the effect, is identical with the cause, the avyakta. Another reading of the Upanishad, avyaktam
vyaktam eva cha, suggests that both the vyakta and the avyakta are to be known. For the 24 principles, see Note 169 of Vol. I. The 25th principle is the purusha or the individual soul. Some take kåla or time to be the 26th and the Brahman to be the 27th, Others, who include time in the first 24, take the Brahman to be the 26th. For the 8 original states and 16 modifications of prakriti, see Note 170 of Vol. I.
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that prakriti is māyā, and the great Lord, the Māyin, (i.e., the possessor of māyā); indeed, the whole of this world is filled with what constitutes His limbs.” (Svet. Up. IV. 10). Later on again, there is given the following passage also to the same effect: “He is the Lord of the prakṛiti (Nature) and of the individual soul, and is the regulator of the qualities (of sattva, rajas and tamas). He is the cause of samsara, of final release, of existence and of bondage. " (Svet. Up. VI. 16). 617
The Smriti also (declares the same thing) thus: “And know that the prakṛiti and the purusha are both beginning- less and also know that (unwholesome) emotions and (wholesome) qualities are born out of the prakṛiti. The prakriti is said to be responsible for giving rise to the idea of agency in relation to the (body which is an) effect and to (the senses which are) the cause (of activity), while the purusha is said to be responsible for giving rise to the idea of the enjoyer in relation to pleasure and pain. The purusha, when in association with the prakṛiti, does indeed experience (pleasure and pain which are) the results of the qualities born of the prakṛiti (such as sattva or goodness etc.): the cause of his births out of good and bad wombs is his attachment to (pleasures which arise out of) the qualities (of sattva etc.)” (B. G. XIII. 19-21): “The essential qualities known as goodness, passion and darkness are produced out of the prakṛiti (i.e., known by their effects in the evolution of prakṛiti): they bind down to the body the embodied and undecaying (individual soul), O you the strong-armed one!” (B. G. XIV. 5). To the same effect are the following passages: “All created beings, O son of Kunti, enter into My prakriti at the end of each kalpa, 628 and at the beginning of each kalpa, I again send
627. In Svet. Up. I. 8, the unmanifest is the soul and the manifest is matter. In I. 9, the intelligent one is the Lord and the ignorant one the soul. The next mantra names the soul as hara, the abductor, because it seizes the
prakriti for enjoyment. Māyā in IV. 9 means the prakriti, which is the cause of wonderful and varied creation. The limbs of the Lord in IV. 10 stand for the souls.
628. See Note 246 of Vol. I.Adhik. I, Sut. 8]
WHO IS ‘AJÄ’?
217
them forth. Transforming My own prakṛiti, I send forth again and again the whole of this collection of beings, which is itself not free, inasmuch as it is under the influence of prakriti.” (B. G. IX. 7 & 8): “Presided over by Me, prakriti gives birth to all this movable and immovable creation. Indeed, for this reason, it is, O son of Kunti, that the world goes on undergoing transformation.” (B. G. IX. 10). 629 Thus, the prakṛiti and the other (principles), which are all in the system of Kapila held not to have the Brahman for their Self, are (as such) disproved.
In the Svetasvatara Upanishad, it is revealed thus: “There is one unborn female being (aja) which is red, white and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself: there is another being (aja) who loves her and is close to her: there is still another male being (aja) who, after having enjoyed her, gives her up. (S’vet. Up. IV. 5). Here the doubt arises whether what is mentioned in this mantra is merely the prakriti that is established in the system of Kapila, or whether (it is the prakṛiti) that has the Brahman for its Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the pure and simple one (i.e., the prakriti of the system of Kapila). Why? Because in the (above) statement-“There is one unborn female being (ajām ekām) “-this prakriti is spoken of as not being a produced effect, and because also, in the state- ment–” which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself “-that (prakriti) is spoken of as
629. The Gitä passages also describe creation. In XIII. 19, vikārāḥ is taken to mean emotions like desire and hatred which cause bondage. The gunas are redeem- ing qualities like lick of pride etc. Both these are caused by the soul’s association with the body. In XIII. 20, karya is the body and karana the eleven senses. It is the body which acts, but the soul is the
experiencer of pleasure and pain. In XIV. 5, the production of the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas from the prakriti has to be taken to mean that they become manifest in the later stages of evolution of the prakriti. For they are its essential and inseparable attributes-See Ramanuja’s com- mentary on the Gilă,
218
independently herself, 630
SRI-BHASHYA
creating many
[Chap. I, Part IV
offspring similar to
If it be so arrived at, it is thus stated in reply: “(The word ‘aja’ cannot mean the pradhana in the context here) because there is no special characterisation (in the context so as to make it signify the pradhana) as there is in the case of the word ‘chamasa’.” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 8). That is, because the word ‘ajā’ means that which is not born, and hence, the attribute of more ‘unbornness’ is denoted by it, and there is not found any peculiar characterisation (in the case of that word ‘aja’) so as to enable us to under- stand thereby that it is that ‘aja’ (or pradhāna) which is established in the system (of Kapila) as not having the Brahman for its Self.
(f As there is in the case of the word ‘chamasa’.” For example, in the mantra, which begins with the statement– “The chamasa has its mouth turned downwards and its bottom upwards” (Bṛih. Up. II. 2. 3), what is made out by the word ‘chamasa’ (etymologically) is that the chamasa is something which possesses the character of an instrument fit to be used in eating food, and hence, by this much alone, no particular kind of chamasa is meant to be pointed out; because words which are etymologically significant cannot have the power of definitely denoting any specific meaning without the help of the topics (capable of being indicated), contexts and such other things (relating to inter- pretation like particularising attributes). In the above case, by means of the complementary passage beginning with “That is this head: it is this chamasa indeed which has
630. There are two arguments here: (i) whatever is unborn cannot be a produced effect, and hence the prakriti cannot be the effect of the Brahman; (ii) the sanach suffix in srijamānā indicates, according to Panini’s grammar, an independent agent. Sankara’s purvapaksha is that the prakriti evolving into tejas, water and
prithvi is not meant here, but only the primordial prakriti. The gloss called Bhamati on his commentary sets out the position in a way which brings it near Ramanuja’s: is the independent prakriti meant here, or that which is the maya energy of the Lord and is the cause of the evolution into tejas etc?
‘LIGHT’ AS SOURCE
219
"”
Adhik. II, Sut. 9]
its mouth turned downwards and its bottom upwards,’ (Bṛih. Up. II. 2. 3), the conclusion is positively arrived at that the head is conceived to be the chamasa here. Similarly, here also in the case under discussion the mean- ing of the word ‘aja’ has to be determined solely through the aid of the topics (capable of being indicated), the context and other such things (relating to interpretation). And no (related) topic (capable of being indicated), or context, or any other such thing is seen to exist, so as to be the means of making us understand here that aja (or pradhana), which is established in the system of Kapila.
Further, it (viz., Kapila’s ajā) is not made out here to possess the power of being the creating agent independently and of itself; because it is merely the power of being the creating agent that it is understood to possess, in accordance with the expression here, namely, “which produces numerous offspring.” Therefore, by means of the mantra under reference here, what is pointed out is not the ‘aja’ (or pradhana) which has not the Brahman for its Self. 631
He (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says in the following manner that there are special reasons for understanding in the context only that ajā (prakṛiti) which has the Brahman for its Self.
ज्योतिरुपक्रमा तु तथाह्यधीयत एके
Sútra 9. Jyotirupakramā tu tathāhyadhiyata eke. (118)
Indeed it (viz., the aja) has the Light for its source, because some declare it in their scriptures accordingly.
631. In Brih. Up. II. 2. 3. the skull is referred to metophorically as an inverted cup. The inversion differentiates it from cups in general. In Svet. Up. IV. 5, the prakriti is referred to merely as unborn. There is nothing to indicate how it is to be distinguish-
ed from the other unborn antities mentioned thers and whether or not it is independeut. The agent of an action in grammar is not necessarily free, independent or sovereign. Hence srijarnānā can- not prove the Sankhya thesis.
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"”
The word indeed (tu) imports emphasis. 632 This aja has indeed the Light for its source. The Light (mentioned here) is the Brahman, because that word is well-known (to denote Him) in the following among other passages :- “The gods (worship) Him who is the Light of lights. (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 16); “Now that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven….” (Chhand. Up. III. 13. 7.) “It has the Light for its source”. The meaning is that it (viz., the aja or prakriti) has the Brahman for its cause. Because some declare it in their scriptures accordingly. The word because (hi) denotes a reason; the reason here being that some, namely, the followers of a recension of the (Yajur) Veda, the Taittiriyas, declare it in their scriptures that this aja (or prakriti) has the Brahman for its cause.
"”
Thus, in the passage” The Self who is smaller than the smallest atom and greater than the greatest is ever present in the ‘cave’ (of the heart) of this created being. (M. Nār. VIII. 3)-the Brahman, as an object of worship, is declared to dwell ever in the ‘cave’ of the heart; then in the passage beginning with-“Out of Him proceed the seven pranas”. (M. När. VIII. 4),-it is stated that all the worlds, as well as the four-faced Brahma and others, have their origin in Him: then in the passage-“There is one unborn female being (aja) which is red, white and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself there is another male being (aja), who, after having enjoyed her, gives her up” (M. Nar. IX. 2),-what is mentioned is that ajā (or prakṛiti), which, forming the source of all things, is itself born out of Him.
The meaning is this: that inasmuch as the whole totality of things other than Him are born out of Him, they
632. The word tu is a disjunctive particle, generally meaning ‘but’, ‘on the contrary’ etc. Hore it suggests that the statement that the aja has Light for its source is based on authority, unlike the
statement that this aja is in- dependent. Moreover, the negative conclusion of the previous Sutra is reinforced by a positive one here.
Adhik. II, Sut. 9] BRAHMAN’S POWER
221
are (here) being taught to have Him for their Self; and it is in this context that it (viz., the aja) is mentioned: hence it has to be understood that that aja also, which produces many similar offspring, which is enjoyed by the individual self that is under the influence of karma (or the results of works), and which is given up by the other individual self of wisdom (that is, the freed soul), is, like the prāṇas, oceans, mountains, and other things, born out of the Brahman and has (like them) the Brahman for its Self. 633 Therefore, just as a specific kind of chamasa (or cup) is made out (to be the meaning of the word ‘chamasa’) from the comple- mentary passage (above mentioned), (so also) the word ‘aja’, which is controlled in meaning by a sentence of the same character, given in another recension of the Veda and tend- ing to have (this) meaning naturally brought to mind-is definitely determined to denote that which has the Brahman for its Self.
In the beginning of the context under reference here also, there occurs the passage, “Is the Brahman the cause?…. They (the seers) who have adopted the practice of contemplation, have seen the Lord’s own power (i.e., the prakṛiti), which is hidden by means of its own qualities (of sattva, rajas and tamas)” (Svet. Up. I. 1-3); here the aja is made out to be a power of the Supreme Brahman
633. In M. Når. Up. the same mantra as Svet. Up. (IV. 5) is found with a sligut variat on– ‘Dabvin prajā n janayanti’n sarūpā n’ instead of ‘Dahvih prajah Sṛ jamanām sarūpāḥ’. Ramanuja’s point is that in M. Når. Up, the mantra is found in the context of the creation of the world by the Supreme Brahman. First, His nature is described: He is greater than the greatest and subtler than the suodest. Then the seven pranas (or the five senses together with manas and buddhi) are said to be born out of Him. Similarly, the seven fires, the fuel and other ingredients of sacrifice,
II. S.B.-29.
the r
the seven tongues of flame, the seven worlds, the seas, mountains, r.vers, and plants are all born out of Hin. He remains as internal soul. He is the four-faced Braha among the gods, the first among poets, the hawk among birds of prey. After saying all this, the M Når. Up. refers to the aja of three colours. Then it goes on to spek of the Brahman being the fierce sun of summer, the wind in the sky, the priest on the sacrificial altar, the guest in the hong etc. Thus the context in the M. Når. Up. makes it clear that the aja is born of the Brahman an as Him for its soul,222
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Himself; later on (in the same context), in the passages- “Out of this, He who is the owner of the maya (i.e., the Lord) creates this world wherein another being (viz., the individual self) is bound down by māyā.” (S’vet. Up. IV. 9); “Know then that the prakriti is maya and the great Lord. the Mayin (ie., the possessor of the māyā)”. (Svet. Up. IV. 10); “He who presides over every cause (of the world).” (.Svet. Up. IV. 11) 634 ;-(in these passages) the same aja (or prakriti) itself is dealt with.
For these reasons, in the mantra under reference here, there is not the least reference to the idea of any independent prakriti as established in the system (of Kapila).
It may, however, be asked, how then under these circumstances this prakriti, which has the Light for its source and possesses the red, white and black colours, can be said to be unborn (or aja), or how that which is unborn (or ajā) can have the Light for its source. In answer to this, he (i.e., the Sütrakara) says thus:
कल्पनोपदेशाचं मध्यादिवदविरोधः
Sutra 10. Kalpanopadesachcha madhvādivadavirodhaḥ.
(119).
Because, however, the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world), there is nothing contradictory (in it); as in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other such things.
634. The primordial prakriti and its various evolutes like mahat etc. which are the ‘causes’ of the world that we see around, are referred to here. Some editions of the Sribhishya quote the passage as
66
‘yo yonir yonim. This is probably a misquotation If it were right, we should translate: He who is the source (presides over) the source etc.”.
Adhik. II, Sut. 10] CONTEXT OF CREATION 223
The word ‘however’ (‘cha’) here is intended to remove the doubt raised. It is nothing contradictory for. this prakriti to be unborn (or aja) and at the same time to have the Light for its source. Why? “Because the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world).” ‘Production’ is ‘making’, that is, ‘creation’. The meaning is that the teaching relates to the creation of the world. For instance, the word ‘production’ (kalpana) is used in the sense of creation 635 in the passage: “The creator (i.e., the four-faced Brahma) created (akalpayat) the sun and moon as before.” (M. När. V. 7). Here also (i.e., in the context under reference), the creation of the world is taught in the passage: “Out of this, He who is the owner of the maya (i.e., the Lord) creates this world.” (Svet. Up. IV. 9); the meaning is that the Lord of all who is the owner of the māyā, creates the whole world out of this cause (i.e., the prakṛiti) in its subtle condition, wherein it is inseparable from Himself.
The existence of this prakriti in both the condition of effect and the condition of cause is understood from this teaching here relating to creation. Indeed, at the time of universal absorption, it (viz., the prakṛiti) enters into the state of the Brahman (in the condition of cause) 636 and, without the differentiation of name and form, exists in a subtle condition. At the time of universal creation, however, it has its qualities of sattva or goodness etc., made manifest, possesses the differentiations of names and forms, is capable of being denoted by the word ‘vyakta’ (or
635. Kalpana is taken by Śnkara to men an imaginary mental con- ception, regarding something as something else. He goes on to argue that the aja is the prakriti in the image of a she-go it. kāmānuja interprets kalpana as creation on the autoority of velic usage.
The
author of the Sutras was steeped in the Vedas so that he sponta neously used words in their Vedic
sense, Prakāšikā.
explains the Śruta.
636 The prakriti cannot become the Brahman. But in pralaya, it beco nes one with the Brahman so as to be indistinguishable from Him. Compare Sub. Up. (II): “The tamas becomes one with the Lord.” In other words, the Brahman who has the prakriti for His body, attains the causal state during praiaya.
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‘manifest’) and other similar words, and having become modified into the elements known as tejas (or the element of light and heat), water and earth, it exists as red, white and black in colour: thus its causal condition is the ajā (or unborn one), and its condition as effect has Light for its source; therefore, there is nothing contradictory (here).
“As in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other things. For instance, the sun-god, who, in the condition of cause is altogether one with the Lord, is made into honey in the condition of effect in order to be enjoyed by the Vasus and the other gods, for the reason that he is the abode of the nectar, which is produced by means of the religious works mentioned in the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama-Veda and the Atharva-Veda; moreover, he is made to rise and set (in the same condition of effect); and yet, in relation to him, there is no contradiction in his having been made into honey and made to rise and set. This has been taught in the madhu-vidhya 637 in the passages which begin with “This sun-god is indeed the honey of the gods” (Chhānd. Up. III. 1. 1) and ending with “Then, having risen above that (condition of effect), he (i.e., the sun-god) does not rise, does not set, is ekala altogether and remains in a neutral condition.” (Chhand Up. III. 11. 1). The word ’ekala’ means that he has a uniform nature.
Therefore, by means of the mantra under reference here, that aja (or prakṛiti) alone is denoted which has the Brahman for its Self; but that (ajā or pradhana) which is postulated in the system of Kapila is not denoted thereby : this is the demonstrated conclusion (here).
6 7. In the Madhu-vidya taught in Chhand. Up. (III) and explained in the Madhvadhikarana (Ved Sut. 1. 3. 30-32), the wors up of the sun is taught in both the conditions of cause and effect. In the condi- tion of cause, he becomes one with the Brahman. This is how the
contradiction between the sun de- scribed in one place as rising and setting and in another as never r sing nor setting is reconciled. See page 165 above. 1 he aja in the condition of cause is one, while in the condition of effect it is red, black and white, etc.
Adhik. II, Sut. 10] ADVAITA POSITION
225
There are, however, others (i.e., the Advaitins) who say that, in the mantra under reference here, the aja that is mentioned is a single entity characterised as consisting of the elements of tejas, water and earth. They have to be questioned 639
whether the elements of tejas, water and earth merely constitute that only entity of the aja which is characteristically made up of the elements of tejas, water and earth; or whether it is the Brahman Himself (as effect and) in the form of the elements of tejas, water and earth (that is that aja); or whether it is something else (i.e., the primordial prakṛiti) which is the cause of the elements of tejas, water and earth (that is the same aja).
In the first alternative, the scriptural statement, “There is one ajā” (Svet. Up. IV. 5) will be contradicted, owing to the elements of tejas, water and earth being more than one in number. And it should not be urged here that, although the elements of tejas, water and earth are more than one in number, they nevertheless possess the character of being together one, in consequence of the (wellknown) process of tripartition : 639 for, even in this process of tripartition their manifoldness does not disappear; and because also in the scriptural statements, “These are the three deities” 640 (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 2 & 3 etc), and “I make each one of them tripartite” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3), the process of tripartition is taught in relation to every one of these.
The second alternative itself admits two alternatives, namely, whether the one entity, aja, is the Brahman Himself who has undergone the modifications known as the
638. If the aja stands for the three elements, it cannot be ekā or one. The same is the case, if it denotes the Brahman in the condi- tion of effect. The Brahman as the cause cannot be characterised by the three colours. If it is argued that the reference is in- directly to Hin and directly to the prakriti as His effect, then this is
saying almost the same thing as Ramanuja. Lastly, why should the aja be taken to denote the three elements first and then the prakriti through then? Better to refer the eby to the prakriti, which is the cause or source of the three elements.
639. See Note 166 of Vol. J. 640. See Note 248 of Vol. I.
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elements of tejas, water and earth, or whether it is the immodifiable (Brahman) existing in His true nature (that is the same aja). The first alternative is disproved, merely because manifoldness does not disappear. In the case of the second alternative also, there is contradiction of the scriptural statement, “There is one aja which is red, white and black.” (Svet. Up. IV. 5). It is impossible even to say that the Brahman, as He exists in His true nature, is characterised by the elements of tejas, water and earth as attributes. 641
Under the third alternative also, it has to be accepted that, by the word ‘aja’, the elements of tejas, water and earth are first pointed out, and then through those elements their causal condition has to be inferred. It is better to say that the word ‘aja’ denotes only that (prakṛiti) which is declared in the scriptures as forming the causal state of the elements of tejas, water and earth.
Again, it is held (by the same Advaitins) that what is taught by the word ‘aja’ is that that prakriti is presented in the image of a she-goat. This also is inappropriate, because such (an image) is useless. 642 For instance, in such scriptural statements as “Know the self to be the rider in the chariot (and the body to be the chariot)” (Kath. Up. III. 3.), figurative representations of the chariot, etc., in relation to the body, etc., are made with the object of showing that they possess the characteristic of being the
641, This explanation accounts for the aja being eka, but it can- not explain how this ‘unborn one’ can be red, black and white. Moreover, it also contradicts the interpretation of the previous Sutra by the Advaitins, There ‘jyotirupakrama’ was taken as ’the group of things (i.e., the elements) starting with light’, or in other words, the elements of light, water and earth. The ‘unborn one’ cannot mean the three elements there, and the Brahman here.
642. The contention here is that an expression has to be under- stood figuratively only when its conventional ΟΙ etymological meanings are in appropriate. The figurative interpretation should make for special propriety and help in understanding connected words. These conditions are satis- fied in the case of the self bein; regarded as the rider in the chariot and the sun being regarded as honey. But they are not satisfied here,Adhik. 11, Sut. 10] ‘AJA’ AS SHE-GOAT
227
means for reaching the Brahman. For instance, again, the sun-god is presented in the image of honey for the purpose of showing that he is (as such) capable of being enjoyed by the Vasus and the other (gods). To conceive of this prakriti as a she-goat is of no such use anywhere; not only is it of no use whatever, but it is hostile also (to what is said in the context about it). It (viz., the prakṛiti) is the cause of the whole world; to all the intelligent souls themselves, which are tied down to it from beginningless time, it forms the means of experiencing all pleasures and pains and also of attaining final release; and it is non- intelligent: accordingly, it is certainly wrong to suppose the prakriti (which is of this nature) to be like it (ie., a she- goat) merely for the purpose of showing it to have the nature of a she-goat, which is capable of giving birth to only a few offspring, which, for a time, is accidentally associated with a single intelligent individual soul, which is the means of obtaining some very small benefit of some particular kind (like milk), and which, being capable of giving up those with which it, itself incapable of serving as the means for being given up, is associated, is an intelligent soul, 6!3
And moreover, it is not good to assume a variety of meanings in relation to the word aja in the expressions, “There is one aja”, “There is one aja”, and “There
ajā is (still) another aja” (Svet. Up. IV. 5.) If it be said that in all these cases the characteristics of the goat will have to be assumed, then, it would be exceedingly unreasonable to suppose it (viz., the prakṛiti) to be such a goat as is capable
643. Ramanuja here institutes a contrast between the prakriti and the goat, to show that the latter cannot be used in a metaphor to represent the former. The brakriti produces all the things and creatures in the world: the goat has only a few young ones. former helps all the souls to experience all pleasures and pains: the benefits from the latter consist of a little milk etc. The former is
The
unintelligent: it cannot give up the intelligent souls with which it is associated : nor can it prompt them to give it up. The goat is an intelligent crea ure an n! if it is meant here, it has to egarded as something car bi being given up by othe s. Moreover, the goat as an inte lige at creature can give up its sociates, if it wants to do so,
e A
o
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of coming into association again with that wise man who, as implied in the statement-“There is still another male being, aja, who, after having enjoyed her (the aja) gives her up.” (Svet. Up. IV. 5),–has finally and altogether given up the prakriti with him (the wise man) or with someone else. 614
ADHIKARANA III
SANKHYOPASANGRAHADHIKARAṆA
न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाश्च
Sutra 11. Na sankhyopasangrahadapi
nānābhāvādatirekachcha. (1:0)
Even accepting the number (to be the same as that known to the Sankhyas) still, they (i.e., the principles of the universe according to the Sankhyas) are not (taught here); because they are different (from those that are given in the context here), and because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number).
The Vājasaneyins declare in their scriptures thus :- “He in whom the five pañchajanas 645 (are established) and the element of ether is established, (is the Selt); he who is other (than the gods), (viz., a man), who knows such Self to be the immortal Brahman, becomes immortal.” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 17). Here the doubt is raised whether this
644. Are all three unborn ones, one female and the other two males, to be regarded as goats? If so, how can a she-goat be finally given up. as the prakriti is given up by the freed soul?
645. The term pañchajanas is regarded by the Sankhyas as meaning “groups, each of which
consists of five.” The five groups of five are: (i) the senses, (i) the o gans of action, (ii) the five elements, (iv) the five rudimentary elements, and (v) the remaining five principles of the Sankhyas. According to Ramanuja, the term stands for “sense organs”-tvak or skin, eye, ear, anna or nose and tongue, and mind.
Adhik. III, Süt. 11]
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mantra aims at teaching the principles postulated in the system of Kapila or not. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it aims at teaching the principles postulated in the system (of Kapila). Why? Because from the word, ‘pancha- janas’, as qualified by the word ‘five’, the twentyfive principles (which are known to the Sankhyas) are made out.
What is said is this. The compound word ‘pancha- janaḥ’ denotes an aggregate; that is, a number of collections consisting of five principles each are the panchajanāḥ: like the word ‘pañchaphūlyaḥ’ (which denotes a number of collections, each consisting of five small bundles of straw). The difference in the gender of the word ‘pañchajanāḥ’ is due to Vedic usage. 646 And if it is asked how many such collections there are (here mentioned), then those collections are made out to be five, from the first word ‘five’ which qualifies the word ‘pañchajanāḥ’, in the same way as in the expression, ‘pañcha pañchaphulyah’ or ‘five collections of straw each of which is made up of five small bundles’ (where we have the qualifying numeral ‘five’ attached to a term meaning ‘a collection of five bundles ‘). Thus the expression, ‘five pañchajanāḥ’ is to be understood as denotative of twentyfive principles, and when it is asked what they are, they are made out, in consequence of the context relating to final release, to be only the prakṛiti and the other principles which are all proved in the Smriti (of Kapila), as being objects worthy to be known by all those who are desirous of attaining final freedom. 617 The well known theory of the followers of Kapila is indeed thus given :-“The primordial prakriti (or material Nature) i. which is the root of all things, is unevolved; the principles beginning with the ‘great’ principle are seven, and they are
646. The correct form of the word AS a Samahira-dvigu ought to be pañchajani’ in the feminine gender whereas it is masculine as given above.
647. According to the Sankhya, the true nature of the primordial matter (avyakta), that of its
II. S.B.-30.
modifications (vyakta), and that of the individual self (ja) have to be understood in order to achieve final release. Since saving knowledge is mentioned in the Upanishad passage, the latter should deal with all the three things referred to above.
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both evolvers and the evolved; the purely evolved things are sixteen; the purusha (or the individual soul) is neither the evolver nor the evolved.” 648 (Sankhya-Kārikā. III). Therefore it (viz., the mantra under reference here) aims at teaching the principles enunciated in the system (of Kapila).
6
If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus:-” Even accepting the number (to be the same as that of the principles known to the Sankhyas)…” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 11). Even assuming that the expression pancha pañchajanaḥ’ denotes the number twentyfive, the principles mentioned in the system (of Kapila) do not thereby suggest themselves to the mind. Why? “Because they are (nānā) different (from those given in the context here).” That is, because these pañchajanāḥ, as qualified by the number pañchan (‘five’), are distinct from the principles which are proved in the system (of Kapila). From the scriptural expression here- “He in whom the pañcha pañchajanaḥ (are established) and the element of ether is established “-it is borne in upon the mind that these principles, owing to their having for their support the Brahman who is pointed out by the word ‘He’, have indeed the Brahman for their Self. In the scriptural statement-” he who is other (than the gods, viz., a man) who knows such Self to be the immortal Brahman, becomes immortal.” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 17.)—from the reference indicated by the word ‘such’, what is pointed out by the word ‘He’ (in the earlier part of this passage) is made out to be the Brahman. Therefore, the pancha- janaḥ (here mentioned) are different from those (of the
648. What is s i here is his. The primordial prakriti s the un produ-ed basis of the world. Out of this are evolved seven other prin- ciples, which, while they are them- selves produced, are also the pro- ducers of other principles. These seven are mahat, ahankara and the five taxmåtras or subtle bases of the five elements. Out of these are evolved sixteen other principles-
the five elements, the five organs of action, the five senses and the internal org in of sense or manas. These do not, through any further modification, give rise to other produced principles. Then ther is the purusha or the soul, which is neither a produced thing nor a producer, neither modified nor modifiable,
Adhik. III, Sut. 11]
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231
Sankhyas), and so they are not the ones proved in the system (of Kapila).

“And because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number)”. The principles mentioned here in the context are further in excess of the principles postulated in the system of Kapila. The Supreme Self indicated by the word ‘He’ and the element of ether are the two in excess here. Therefore, in accordance with the passage-“Some say that He is the twentysixth principle; others say that He is the twentyseventh principle” (Chulika Up. 14)-it is the Highest Person, who is the Lord of all things and who is the support of all the principles well known in the scriptures, that is taught here. The word even in the expression, “Even accepting the number…” (Ved. Sit. I. 4. 11), is intended to show that even the suggestion of twentyfive principles cannot possibly be made by the expression ‘pañcha pañchajanāḥ’. How? Because there are no five collections, each of which is made up of five (principles). 649 Indeed, in relation to the principles postulated in the system (of Kapila), there are no generic attributes and other such things which are connected with five things at a time and cause the addition of that number, (‘five’ to a sub-divided group of those principles). 649. The twentyfive principles of the Sankhyas can with some difficulty be divided into five groups of five (i) the five senses, (ii) the five organs of action, (iii) the five subtle bases of elements, (iv) the five elements and (v) the remaining five principles, namely, primordial matter, mahat, ahankara, manas and the soul. But there is the difficulty here that in the passage under reference, one of the five elements, ether, and the atman are mentioned in addi- tion to twentyfive principles. The Sankhya explanation says that they are mentioned on account of their importance and distinctive qualities. Au alternative quintuple division is also referred to in the Śrutaprakašika. Here primordial matter is taken to be made up of three substances-sattva, rajas and tamas. Thus the twenty five principles become twentyseven, and there is no double mention of the ether or the self. The five groups are (i) sattva; rajas, tamas, mahat and ahankara; (ii) the four elements, (i.e., all of them except ether) and the sense of smell; (iii) the four remaining senses and manas; (iv) the five subtle bases of elements; and (v) the five organs of action. Both the divisions are illogical.232 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV It should not be urged that from the groupings,-namely, the five organs of activity, the five senses of knowledge, the five great external elements, the five rudimentary elements of matter and the five that remain over, there is reason surely for prefixing the number ‘five’ before each of these sub-divisions: for the reason that, owing to the separate mention of the element of ether (in the mantra under reference here), there can be no grouping of the great elements so as to constitute a group of five. Therefore, the compound word, ‘pañchajanāḥ’, refers to no kind of collections; on the other hand, it means a specific name in accordance with the grammatical rule: “A word denoting direction in space or a word denoting number is compounded with other words when the compound word so formed signifies a name.” (Panini. II. 1. 50). Otherwise, the word, ‘pañchajanāh’, will have to undergo a change of gender (and become pañchajani). There are some things that are called panchajanaḥ, and they are qualified by the numeral ‘five’ in the expression, ‘paňcha panchajanah’, which resembles the expression ‘sapta saptarshayaḥ’ (‘seven seven-rishis’) 650 To the question what indeed are those that are called panchajanaḥ, he (ie., the Sūtrakāra) gives the following answer : प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् Sutra 12. Prāṇādayo vākyaseshāt. (121) They (ie., the pañchajanāḥ) are the prāņa and the rest, as appears from the complement- ary passage (in the context). seven 650. The expression, 66 seven-rishis" is from V.P. ‘Seven-rishi’ is taken to refer to a member of the group of seven rishis. So we can have reference to one or more of such members. Adhik. III, Sut. 13] WHO ARE ‘PANCHAJANAS’? 233 From the complementary passage-namely, “They understand Him (i.e., the Brahman) to be the praṇa of the prāṇa, 651 the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear and the food of the food, the mind of the mind…”. (Madh. Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 18)—the prāṇa and the other things which are dependent upon the Brahman are themselves made out to be the five panchajanāḥ. Again, it may be objected thus. The mantra, begin- ning with “He in whom the pañcha panchajanāḥ “, (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 17), is common to both the Kanvas and Madhyandinas; but in the complementary passage begin- ning with “They understand Him to be the prāṇa of the prāṇa” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 18), the expression, the food of the food’, is not found in the reading of the Kanvas; it is not therefore possible to say in their case that the expression ‘pañcha pañchajanāḥ’ denotes the prāṇa and the other things here. To such an objection, he (ie., the Sutrakāra) gives the following reply: ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने Sútra 13. Jyotishaikeshāmasatyanne (422). According to some (the meaning of the word pañchajanaḥ is determined) by means of the word, ’light’, although food’ is not (mentioned in the passage referred to here). In the reading according to some, that is, according to the Kanvas, food’ (anna) is not made mention of; yet, by means of the word, ’light’ (occurring in the context),652 the things called ‘pañchajanaḥ’ are made out to be (so 651. The prana here means the sense of touch. 652. The word ‘jyotis occurs twice in Brih. Up. (IV. 4. 16), once in the accusative and again in the genitive case. The word in the genitive case is here referred to. According to Sankara, the refer- ence is to the other word in the accusative case, which denotes the Brahman. His explanation is that in the place of anna, the Kanvas include the Brahman to make up the five panchajanas. Ramanuja takes a different view. 234 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV many) senses (of knowledge). The complementary passage (under reference) is intended to point them out. " What is said is this. In the mantra, namely, “Indeed the gods worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 16), which occurs just before the one beginning with “He in whom the five pañchajanaḥ (are established)” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 17), the Brahman is mentioned to be the Light of lights; it being so, some lights’ are made out to exist which have their functions dependent upon the Brahman; and these are made out to be the senses of knowledge (indriyas), which bring external objects to the light of consciousness, because there is in the statement beginning with “He in whom the five pañchajanāḥ (are established)” the mention of a specific (numeral) attribute in relation to what is (otherwise) undetermined. In the passage beginning with-” (They understand. Hina to be the praṇa) of the prāṇa” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 18), it is the sense of touch that is meant by the word prāṇa in the expression, “of the prana”, because the sense of touch is associated with the element of air, and because also the principal vital air is incapable of being pointed out by the word, ‘jyotis’ (or ’light’). The word, ’eye’, in the expression, ‘of the eye’, (occurring therein) refers to the sense of sight; the word, ’ear’, in the expression, ‘of the ear’, refers to the sense of hearing. The word ‘anna’ (food) in the expression ‘of the food (annasya)’, by reason of its being used in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition, 653 comprises in its meaning both the sense of smell and the sense of taste; the sense of smell is understood by this word (anna) because it (ie., the sense of smell) is associated with the element of earth, 653. The word anna is here made to denote two things as if it were u ed twice. Such use of a word is called tantra in the text. Tantra means the doing of an act only once but in such a way that it may simultaneously be of use in more than one case. An example is the placing of a lamp in the midst of an assembly so that it may be of use to every one of its members at the same time. See Pür. Mim. Sut. XI. Adhik. 111, Sut. 131 ‘PANCHAJANAS’ & SENSES 235 which also is denoted by the word ‘anna’; and by it the sense of taste also is understood inasmuch as it (viz., the word ‘anna’) signifies that through which food is eaten. The word ‘mind’ in the expression, “of the mind’, refers to the mind. Since both the sense of smell and the sense of taste are here denoted together and at the same time (by the use of the word ‘anna’ in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition), the statement that they (viz., the instruments of knowledge referred to herein), are five in number is also not to be contradicted. These illuminating instruments of knowledge up to and inclusive of the mind are what is pointed out by the word, ‘pañchajanāḥ’. In order that this may hold true, both the sense of smell and the sense of taste are understood here at the same time by the use of a word (‘anua’) in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition. Accordingly, in the passage beginning with “He in whom the five pañchajanas (are established) and the element of ether (akasa) is established” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 17), it is declared that the instruments of knowledge, which are pointed out by the word “pañchajana’, and the great elements which are suggested by the word ākāśa (or ether) are all established in the Brahman; and hence it is taught that all the principles are dependent upon the Brahman: therefore, the twentyfive principles postulated in the system (of Kapila) are not dealt with (here). Consequently, whether the number here is accepted (to be a measure of the principles of the Sankhyas) or not, it is a well established conclusion that nowhere in the Vedanta is there any acceptance of the principles postulated in the system of Kapila. 654 654. If the twentyfive principles of the Sankhya are to be taken as being referred to here, they are referred to only as dependent on the Brahman. Alternatively, the twentyfive are not referred to at all. Ramanuja also appears to be dismissing here the view of Yadavaprakasa, who takes the next aphorism to refer to M. Når. (XXIII. 1) where another reference to five groups of five is supposed to be found. No such cases can help the Sankhyae in the light of the reasoning here. 236 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV ADHIKARANA IV KĀRAṆATVĀDHIKARAṆA कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः Sutra 14. Karaṇatvena chākaṣādishu yathavyapadishtōkteḥ. (123) (The Brahman) is the only cause of the world, because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of ether, etc. Those, who maintain the theory that the pradhana (or material Nature) is the cause of the world, again raise the following objection (here). In the whole Vedanta, it is not declared that the creation (of the world) proceeds out of (only) one thing; therefore it is not right to say that the Brahman is the sole cause of the world. Thus, in the scriptural passage, “Existence, alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1), creation is declared to be based upon (an already existing) sat: and it is also (declared to be) based on (an already existing) ’non- existence’ (asat) in the passage, “Non-existence, indeed, this was in the beginning.” (Taitt. Up. II. 7. 1). Elsewhere also it is declared thus: “Non-existence (asat) alone, this was in the beginning; it became existence (sat), and then it developed into being.” (Chhand. Up. III. 19. 1). Therefore, it being undetermined in the whole Vedanta who the (only) creator (of the world) is, it is not possible definitely to arrive at the conclusion that the Brahman is the sole cause of the world. On the contrary, it is possible to determine definitely that the pradhana is the sole cause (of the world). In the passage beginning with “Indeed, this was then undifferentiated (avyākṛita)” (Brih. Up. I. 4. 7), it isAdhik. IV, Sut. 14] ‘PRADHANA’ IS CAUSE 237 declared that the world is absorbed into the avyakṛita (or undifferentiated) pradhana: then (in the same passage) by means of the statement, “It has been now differentiated by means of names and forms” (Brih. Up. I. 4. 7), the creation of the world also is declared to proceed out of that same avyākṛita. The avyākṛita is indeed the unevolved; it is not differentiated by means of names and forms; that is to say, it is not yet manifest. This unevolved (or unmanifest) thing is surely the pradhana itself. And this (pradhāna) is essentially eternal and is the seat of modifications; there- fore, in relation to it, the use of the two words, ‘sat’ (or ’existence’) and ‘asat’ (or ’non-existence’), which occur in the scriptural passages that mention the cause of the world, is not contradictory, as it is contradictory in relation to the Brahman. After the undifferentiated (pradhāna) has thus been definitely determined to be the cause (of the world), the activities of ‘seeing’ etc., 655 which are associated with what forms the cause (of the world), have to be taken to denote the ready fitness thereof to do the work of creation. The words, ‘Brahman’ and ‘Atman’, also (which are applied to such a cause) denote the pradhana itself, in consequence of their respectively meaning the quality of greatness and the quality of being all-pervading. Therefore, what is mentioned in Vedanta passages to be the cause (of the world) is the pradhana itself, which is proved by means of revealed tradition as well as by means of reasoning.656 655. “Seeing” in the sense of “willing” is mentioned in Chhand. Up. (VI. 2. 3) as preceding creation by the Brahman. A parallel passage is Taitt. Up. (II.6) which speaks of the Brahman as desiring to become manifold, indulging in tatas or thought and exerting Himself in creation. In Brih. Up. (1. 4. 7), there are references to His seeing, hearing and thinking. Such activities are included along with “seeing” here. 656. The purvapaksha objection here is that the Brahman cannot II. S.B.-31. change or evolve from an an- differentiated to a differentiated condition, while pradhana does so. The answer from Rāmānuja’s standpoint is that creation and dissolution involve modifications in Chit and achit and not in the Brahman. becomes Brahman While the avyäkrita differentiated, the does not change. Ikshana relates to the Brahman as the nimitta-karana, while the differentiation is in respect of the ‘body’ or modes of the Brahman as the material cause. 238 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV “(The If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus: Brahman is the only cause of the world) because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of the ether, etc.” (Ved. Süt. I. 4. 14.) The word ‘cha’ (in the aphorism here) has the sense of ’tu’ (and means “indeed”). It is possible to determine definitely that the world is produced out of the Supreme Brahman alone, who is omniscient, who is the Lord of all, who wills the truth, and who is free from even the least taint of all that is evil. He (ie., the Brahman), as already taught, is the Brahman who has been declared in the aphorism, “(The Brahman is that) from whom (proceed) the creation, etc. of this (universe)” (Ved. Süt. I. 1. 2), and in other aphorisms, 657 to be characterised by the qualities of omniscience, etc. Because He alone (ie, the Brahman Himself) is mentioned (in the context) to be the cause of the element of ether, etc. In the following, among other passages” From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence.” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1), and “It created tejas”. (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3.)-the omniscient Brahman Himself is declared to be the cause (of the world). Accordingly, the omniscient Brahman Himself, who constitutes the subject-matter introduced in the passage- “The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity . . . . He (ie., the released soul) attains with the ‘intelligent’ (or omniscient) Brahman all the auspicious qualities.” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.)—is referred to in the expression: “From that same (Self) indeed…” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.) Similarly, the omniscient Brahman Himself, who is pointed out in the statement-" It thought, ‘May I become manifold’" (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3)-is referred to in the statement, “It created tejas”. (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3). It has to be 657. Sankara takes the Sutra to refer to the Vedanta texts by the phrase, “as already taught”. Ramanuja thinks that the refer- ence is to previous Sutras. His view appears to be that since the Sankhyas also rely on Vedanta texts, it becomes necessary to refer to earlier Sutras where these texts have been properly interpreted. Adhik. IV, Sat. 15] BRAHMAN’ DRAWN IN 239 understood thus in all the passages relating to creation. 658 Therefore, it is definitely determined that the world has the Brahman for its only cause. It may, however, be objected that in the passage, “Non-existence (asat), indeed, this was in the beginning (Taitt. Up. II. 7. 1), non-existence alone is taught to be the cause (of the world), and that under this circumstance the question may be asked, how it may be determined definitely that the Brahman Himself, who is omniscient and wills the truth, can be the cause (of the world). To this objection, he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) gives the following answer: समाकर्षात् Sutra 15. Samākarshāt. (124) (The Brahman is the cause of the world) because of His being drawn in (here in the context). The omniscient Brahman Himself, who consists of bliss and wills the truth, is drawn into the passage beginning with, “In the beginning this was non-being” (Taitt. Up. II.7). (It could be asked) how? (We have to consider the context wherein it is stated :) “The Self consisting of bliss is different from this (self) consisting of understanding. He wished, ‘May I be many’. … . He created all that the world is. Having created (it), He entered into it. Having entered into it, He became 659 sat and tyat.” (Taitt. Up. II. 5 to II. 6) etc. In this scriptural passage it is stated that the Brahman who consists of bliss and wills the truth, 658. This Adhikarana is taken to cover a host of scriptural texts relating to creation, especially those where pradhana appears to be definitely mentioned and meant as the creating cause. Here what is pointed out is that the scripture always describes creation only after referring to the omniscience of the creating agent, Examples of such passages given by the Srutaprakašika include Ait. Up. (I. 1.), Mund. Up. (I. 1. 9) and A. M. Når. (1). The argument is that the pradhana, lacking omniscience and indeed any know- ledge whatsoever, cannot fulfill this role. 659. For the meaning of ‘sat’ and ’tyat’, see Note 183 in Vol. I. 240 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV is the Creator of all and is the Self of all, having entered into them all. Thereafter, this stanza, beginning with, “In the beginning this was non-being”, (II. 7. 1) occurs. Therefore, this stanza, “In the beginning this was non- being,” supports the thesis already set forth by making the Brahman the witness of everything. In the passage beginning with, “Through fear of Him the wind blows " (Taitt. Up. II. 8. 1), the very same Brahman is drawn into the context, and then the quality of His being the Ruler of all, the quality of His possessing unsurpassable bliss and other such qualities are mentioned therein. Therefore the mantra under reference here relates only to Him. At that time (ie, before creation) there being no differentiation of name and form, there is no existence (of Him) in association with them; therefore the Brahman Himself is denoted by the word ’non-existence’ (asat). This is the very method of disposal to be adopted in the case of the following passage also:” Non-existence alone, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. III. 19. 1 and VI. 2. 1). It has been stated above that in the passage, “Indeed this was then (avyākṣita) or undifferentiated” (Bṛih. Up. I. 4. 7.), the pradhana itself is declared to be the cause of the world. It is replied that it is not right to say so. In this passage also the Brahman Himself, who has the avyākṛita (or undifferentiated material Nature) for His body, is dealt with, because in this passage,-namely, “This aforesaid (Brahman) has entered into these beings up to the very tips of their finger-nails… Doing the act of seeing, He is called the eye; doing the act of hearing, He is called the ear; doing the act of thinking, He is called the mind (manas)… Let him worship Him as the self itself…” (Bṛih. Up. I. 4. 7)-by means of the word ’this’ (saḥ) in, “This aforesaid (Brahman)”, He who is pointed out (before) by the word avyakṛita (or Undifferentiated) is followed up as the Ruler after He has entered (into the world); and because also, in accordance with the scriptural Adhik. IV, Süt. 15] ‘BRAHMAN’ CREATES 241 statements, “Having created that, He entered into that same (world)” (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1), and “Entering in along with this individual self which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of name and form” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2), the Omniscient and Highest Brahman who is the Creator, is well known to evolve the differentiations of name and form by entering into (the world of) effect. In the passage, “He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born and is the Self of all” (Taitt. Ar. III. 21), the act of entering. into (things) is stated to be for the purpose of controlling them (from within); therefore this kind of entering into things is impossible in the case of the non-intelligent pradhāna. Therefore the avyākṛita (or undifferentiated one) is the Brahman who has the avyakṛita (or un- differentiated prakriti) for His body. In the statement, “It has been now differentiated by means of names and forms”. (Bṛih. Up. I. 4. 7), it is declared that this very Brahman (avyākṛita), who was not differentiated by means of names and forms, who is omniscient and wills the truth, has of Himself and through Himself differentiated Himself into names and forms. If such is the case, the activities of ‘seeing’ etc., mentioned in the context, will surely have their real and natural significance (as predicates in relation to the Brahman). The words, ‘Brahman’ and ‘Atman’, also cannot in any manner whatsoever appropriately relate (here) to the pradhana, inasmuch as it does not possess the quality of unsurpassable greatness as well as the quality of pervading (all things) for the purpose of controlling (them from within). 660 Therefore, it is a well settled conclusion that the world has the Brahman solely for its cause. 660. The purvapaksha is that, since differentiation has to be understood in a figurative or secondary sense in regard to the Brahman, there is no harm in understanding ‘seeing’ etc, in a similas way in regard to the pradhana. It is pointed out here that, while the purvapaksha inter- pretation of such passages is foreed, that of the Vedanta is natural and appropriate.242 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV ADHIKARANA V JAGADVACHITAVĀDHIKARAṆA जगद्वाचित्वात् Sutra 16. Jagadvāchitvāt. (125). (The Brahman is the only cause of the world) because (the word ‘karman’ in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him). The Sankhya again raises the following objection (here). No doubt the Vedanta passages declare an intelligent being to be the cause of the world; nevertheless, other than the pradhana and the purusha, which are postulated in the system (of Kapila), nothing which is the cause of the world comes out from those passages to be the object of knowledge. Accordingly, in the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaŝatru, the Kaushitakins read in their scriptures that the purusha (or the individual self), who is the enjoyer himself and the cause (of the world), is the object of knowledge in the context beginning with, “I shall teach you the Brahman,” and ending with, “He, indeed, O Bālāki, who is the creator of these purushas, and whose karma indeed this is-he has surely to be known” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18). It is determined that the Brahman who is taught to be the object to be known, is the enjoying (or experiencing) purusha who presides over prakriti by reason of his association with karma, as described in the statement, “whose karma indeed this is.” It (viz., the object of knowledge here) is none other, because that (other, namely, the Brahman) is not admitted to be associated with karma (or the innate impression of works). And this karma, which is characterised as merit (punya) and demerit (apuṇya), accrues only to the individual soul. Adhik. V, Sut. 16] ‘JIVA’ IS CAUSE 243 It should not be urged that by etymologically interpret- ing the word ‘karma’ here to mean ’that which is produced’, the expression ’etat karma’ (or ’this karma’) denotes the (phenomenal) world, which is presented to consciousness by perception and all the other means of true knowledge, and that, since it is he, whose work the whole world is, who has to be known, an entity different from the individual soul is itself to be understood here: for then the two separate descriptions, " He, indeed, O Bālāki, who is the creator of these purushas” and “whose karma, indeed, this is”, would become purposeless. And further there is the reason that both in ordinary usage and in the Vedas the word ‘karma’ is well known to denote only that karma which is of the nature of merit (punya) and demerit (papa). Moreover, since the world is created on the basis of the various kinds of karma of the various ’enjoyers’ thereof, the expression, “(He) who is the creator of these purushas,” is appropriately applicable only to the enjoying individual self. Therefore, the meaning is this. He (i.e., the individual self) who is the cause of these purushas, that is, of those who dwell in the orb of the sun and elsewhere, who constitute the objects of enjoyment and the auxiliary implements of enjoyment in relation to the individual selves, and to whom (conceived as the cause of the world) belongs the karma which is characterised as merit and demerit, and which forms the means of his being such a cause-“he has surely to be known”: that is, his essential nature (in his pure state) has to be known as being distinct from prakṛiti. 661 661. The Sankhya view is that the individual selves become the objects of enjoyment to оде another through their karma, and that creation takes place for the working out of this karma. Know- ledge of the real nature of the self as distinct from prakriti is required for liberation. They rely on the customary or conventional meaning of the word, ‘karma’. The individual self alone is associated with karma in this sense. It is the self in its pure state who has to be known. But this self is pointed out by reference to its whilom association with karma. 244 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV Similarly, later on in the context, it is said: “Both of them (viz., Bālāki and Ajātašatru) went near a purusha (or person) who was fast asleep… then he (Ajātasatru) struck him with a stick”. (Kaush. Up. IV. 18). The act of going near a person who was fast asleep, the act of striking him with a stick and such other acts (which are here mentioned) are all such characteristics as indicate altogether the enjoy- ing individual self. Similarly, further on also in the context, the enjoying individual self himself is dealt with as in the passage:-“Just as a rich merchant enjoys (life) in the company of his own people, or just as his own people enjoy the rich merchant-in this very same manner this intelligent self enjoys (its enjoyments) in the company of these selves; in this same manner (also) these selves enjoy that (self)”. (Kaush. Up. IV. 20). Similarly, the things asked in the question, “Where, indeed, O Bālāki, was it that this person slept? Where was he then? and whence did he come?” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18), were unknown to him (i.e., Bālāki). Therefore, Ajātasatru himself spoke to him thus:-“There are the veins called hitas: when a man is in deep sleep, then he resides in them; then he sees no dream-image; then it has attained union with this prana itself (asmin prāņa eva); then speech enters and becomes absorbed therein along with all names, the mind (or manas) enters and becomes absorbed therein along with all thoughts; when he wakes up, then, just as from a flaming fire sparks proceed in all directions, in the same manner, the pranas proceed towards their respective quarters from this self, from the prāņas proceed the devas (or senses), and from the devas proceed the lokas (i.e., knowledge or objects of knowledge)” (Kaush. Up. IV. 19). That is, he (Ajātaŝatru) says that this very individual self who exists in the conditions of dreamless sleep, dream. ing and wakefulness, and who forms the abode into which speech and the other senses enter and out of which they Adhik. V, Süt. 16] SANKHYA VIEW 245 emerge (this self) is the thing which forms the basis of dreamless sleep, 662 in accordance with the statement “Athāsmin prāṇa eva ekadhā bhavati". (Kaush. Up. IV. 19). The word ‘asmin’ (lit. ‘in this’) means in the individual self. The word ‘prāṇa’ here is necessarily denotative of the state of one who is the support of the prana; because in the expression ‘when he wakes up’, that which is pointed out by the word, ‘prāṇa’, is said to become wakeful; and because also the principal vital air as well as the Supreme Lord cannot possibly have the dreamless and waking states. Or the locatives, ‘asmin’ and ‘prāṇa’, may denote the different locations (so as to mean, ‘in the prāṇa which is in this’). The totality of speech and the other instruments of the mind have become one with the prana itself, which is in this (asmin) self. There- fore, although the word ‘prana’ denotes the principal vital air, the individual self alone is dealt with in this context; because the vital air is of itself an instrument of the individual self. 663 Thus the Brahman, which has been introduced as the subject matter to be dealt with in the very beginning of the context here, is the purusha (or individual self); consequently, the Lord who is other than him, is not shown (to be the subject of discussion here). The activities of ‘seeing’ etc. also, which are the characteristic qualities of intelligent beings and which are associated with what forms the cause of the world, are appropriate predicates only in relation to this (viz., individual self). Therefore, the 662. According to the Sankhyas, Ajataratru’s query in Kaush. Up. (IV. 18.) is about the position of the individual self during deep, dreamless sleep. In IV, 19, he himself explains that all the activi- ties of the senses etc. then come to rest in the soul and cease. (What is translated as “it has attained union” refers collectively to these activities.) The word ‘prāṇa’ first mentioned in singular number is the self. When mentioned for the second time in plural number, it denotes the five vital airs. II. S.B.-32. Ramanuja’s interpretation of the passage is quite different; and it is stated later on. 663. Sankara takes the subject of this Adhikarana to be whether it is the individual self, the principal vital air, ΟΙ the Brahman who is described as the object to be known in Kaush. Up. (IV, Ramanuja thinks that the cboice is confined to the individual self and the Brahman. The reference to the prana is really a reference to the self, whose instru- ment it is. 246 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV pradhana, which is presided over by this (purusha or individual self), is itself the cause of the world. If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus: “(The Brahman is the only cause of the world), because it (i.e., the word ‘karma’ in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him).” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 16). He who is mentioned in the context here is not the purusha (or individual self), who is subject to the influence of merit and demerit, who is a very insignificant creature, who is the ‘knower’ of the body, and who, by reason of the superimposi- tion on himself of the qualities of the prakṛiti, forms the source of its modifications; 664 on the other hand, He who is mentioned here is the Supreme Person, who is free from even the least taint of all that is evil such as avidyā (or ignorance), who is the inexhaustible mine of crowds of innumerable auspicious qualities, and who is the only cause of the whole world. Why? Because in the expression, ‘yasya vaitat karma" the word ‘karma’ (‘work’), which is associated with the word ’etat’ (’this’), denotes the world which is an effect produced by the Supreme Person. Indeed, the word ’etat’ (’this), which has its significance uncontracted by the subject-matter, context or other aids to interpretation, denotes in a general way the whole world which is directly presented to consciousness by perception and the other means of true knowledge, and which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things. And the meaning of the word ‘karman’ here is not the karma which is characterised as merit and demerit. 665 66 664. The Sankhya view is that the self is inactive, but that its presence stimulates the activities of the prakriti. The superimposi- tion is of the prakriti’s agency on the self. 665. If the purvapaksha relies on the conventional and customary meaning of ‘karma’ in “whose karma indeed this is”, Ramanuja relies on the word, ’this’ (etat). Taken in its unrestricted sense ’this’ indicates the visible universe It is a strained interpretation to suppose that it merely draws attention to the role of the innate impression of good and bad deeds in making the self the cause of creation. Hence ‘karma’ has to be understood here in its etymo- logical sense of “what is produced’ and not in its conventional sense of ’the innate impression of good and evil deeds’.Adhik. V, Süt. 16] ‘KARMA’ IS ‘WORLD’ 247 "” Thus, the purushas (or individual selves) who are resident in the orb of the sun and other places and who are pointed out by Balaki to be the Brahman in the very beginning of the context here, which opens with the statement, “I shall teach you the Brahman (Kaush. Up. IV. 1)-(those purushas) are not the Brahman intended to be taught; and hence in the statement, “That is surely wrong; do not argue” (Kaush. Up. IV. 1 to 17), he (Ajātasatru) takes exception to him (i.e., to Bālāki), who speaks about things which are other than the real Brahman; in order to teach him (Bālāki) the Brahman who was not known to him before, he (i.e., Ajātasatru) introduces into the context the following statement, which begins with: “He, indeed, O Bālāki, etc.” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18). The persons who are resident in the orb of the sun and in other places and who are associated with karma which is characterised as merit and demerit, and those other persons also who are similar in kind to these (former)-(they) were all known to that (Bālāki) himself; hence the word ‘karma’ here is intended to bring into mind a particular person who was not known to him before; it does not denote merely merit and demerit, just as it does not denote mére activity (on the part of the principal vital air); on the other hand, it denotes the whole world as a produced effect. In this manner, indeed, is the thing which was not known before taught (to Bālāki), 666 Moreover, if the teaching here is that the unknown purusha (or individual self) whose inherent nature is only accidentally associated with karma (or the innate impression of works), has to be known, then a secondary (or indirect) 666. Kaush. Up. (IV) relates how the sage, Balaki, comes to King Ajatas atru of Kasi and offers to teach him the Brahman. He proceeds to suggest the worship of the purusha in the sun, in the moon, in lightning, in thunder, in ether, in air etc.,one after another, The king considers none of them to be the Brahman. When Balaki is unable to say anything more, the king points out that the supreme object of knowledge is the creator of the purushas mentioned by the sage. The entire universe is His handiwork. He is the Brahman. 248 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV significance 667 will have to be adopted (in relation to the word ‘karma’); further, mere association with karma (or the innate impression of works) being the sole characteristic of the essential nature of the thing to be known (as given here), that (thing to be known) may well be learnt merely through (saying) this much, that ‘he whose is the karma, has to be known’; and in consequence the word, ’etat’ (’this’), in the expression, “he whose karma indeed this is”, becomes useless. 668 Moreover, the object with which the descriptive expressions-“He who is the creator of these” and “He whose karma indeed this is “-are separately given, is this. He who is the creator of those persons (purushas), who have been mentioned by you (Bālāki) as being the Brahman, and He whose produced effects they are-why is He (further) particularised here? (It is to show that) He whose produced effect the whole world is, and in being whose produced effects all things, namely, the superior and inferior intelligent things, as well as non-intelligent things, are equal,-He is the Supreme Cause and the Highest Person that has to be known. Although the production of the world is based upon the karma (or the innate impression of works) belonging to the individual selves, yet the individual self is itself incapable of creating its own objects of enjoyment and auxiliary implements of enjoyment etc.; on the other hand, it only enjoys all such things created by the Lord as are in accordance with its karma (or innate impression of works); therefore, it cannot appropriately possess the power of being the creator of purushas (or individual selves). €67. In Kaush. Up. (IV. 18), the self which has to be known is described as “he who is the creator of these purushas and whose karma indeed this is”. The Sankhya wiew is that this teaches the quest after the self in his pure state, though the reference is to his being in association with karma. The oblique way of referring to the pure self by his past association with karma is criticised here. 668. “This’ in ’this karma’ becomes superfluous, if the intention is merely to refer to the past asso- ciation between karma and the self. Adhik. V, Sut. 17] PRATARDANA RULE 249 Consequently the Supreme Brahman who is well known in the whole Vedanta to be the supreme cause, is Himself taught in the context here to be the object that has to be known. जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तदूव्याख्यातम् Sútra 17. Jivamukhyaprāṇalingānneti chettad vyakhyātam. (126) If it be said that the characteristics of the individual self and those (indicated by the mention) of the principal vital air are mentioned (here in the context)-that has been already dealt with. Now what has been stated above to the effect that, through the characteristics of the individual self and also through the characteristics which distinctly mention the principal vital air, 669 the enjoying individual self itself is dealt with in the context here, and not the Supreme Self- that has been already dealt with. The method of disposal adopted in regard to this objection has been given already in connection with the worship taught to Pratardana. 670 What is said is this. It has been stated there (i.e., in connection with that worship) that, where after a careful consideration of the beginning as well as the conclusion of a context, a certain sentence is definitely determined to relate to the Brahman, there the other indications, mentioned in the same context, have to be explained in accordance with that determination. In the very beginning 669. Rauja takes care to point out that the Sitra refers not to the characteristics of the princ pal vital air, but only to a characteristic of the self, indicated by the mention of the vital air as its instrument. 670. See Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 29 32) (where Kaush. Up. III is the subject of discussion) and Rama- nuja’s commentary thereon. 250 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV of the context here, also, the Brahman has been introduced as the subject-matter of discussion in the sentence, “I shall teach you the Brahman.” (Kaush. Up. IV. 1). In the middle also (of the same context), it has been declared that, in the expression beginning with “(He) whose karma (work) indeed this is” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18), what is pointed out is not the mere purusha (or individual self), but the Brahman Himself who is the only cause of the whole world. Again, in the conclusion (of this very context), namely, “He who knows this gets rid of all his sins and then attains that complete self-lordship, 671 which consists in superiority and overlordship in relation to all things (Kaush, Up. IV. 20), there has been declared that result which is invariably associated with the worship of the Brahman, which consists in self-lordship and which comes after the destruction of all sins. Therefore, the passage under reference here having been thus definitely determined to deal with the Brahman, the characteristics mentioned therein as indicative of the individual self and of the principal vital air have also to be interpreted as relating to Him (ie., to the Brahman). 672 Indeed, in connection with the worship taught to Pratardana, the characteristics mentioned there as indicative of the individual self and of the principal vital air have 671. It is the salvation of soul- emancipation and God-attainment which is described here. Getting rid of sins, and evils like old age, death etc., which are their conse- quence, the emancipated soul becomes superior to those entan- gled in the world. It becomes like unto the Brahman who is the overlord of the universe. Its complete self-lordship means that it is free of bondage and dependence, and capable of willing the truth. Compare Chhand. Up. (VIII. 1. 5 & VIII. 7.1). 672. The rule of interpretation used in regard to the worship taught to Pratardana (Vol. I p. 387) says that when an indivi- dual self or non-intelligent thing is mentioned in association with the distinctive attributes of the Brah- man, or is grammatically equated to Him, then His worship is intended to be taught as having that self or non-intelligent thing for His body. Here the soul is said to become one with the prāṇa during deep sleep. As the Brahman alone can be such a resting place, His worship as having the prāṇa for His body is here taught, Adhik. V, Sut. 18] JAIMINI’S VIEW 251 been declared to relate to the Brahman, in order that the threefold worship (of Him) as taught therein may be carried out well. 673 In the context here also, in the statement, “Then he attains union with this prana (athāsmin prāņa evaikadha bhavati)”, there is a grammatical equation possible between asmin and präņa; and it is improper to assume different locations as their denotation. Moreover, the word ‘prāṇa’ has already been definitely determined to denote the Brahman Himself; consequently, the characteristic which indicates the prana and which is intended to be helpful in the worship of the Brahman as having the praṇa or principal vital air for His body, is appropriately mentioned here. To the question, how such characteristics as belong to the individual self may relate to the Brahman, he (i.e., the Sūtrakāra) gives the following answer :- अन्यार्थन्तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके Sutra 18. Anyarthantu Jaiminiḥ prasnavyākhyanābhyamapi chaivameke (127). Jaimini, however, thinks that they (i.e., the characteristics of the jiva) relate to the other (viz., the Brahman), because of the question and the answer (in the context relating to Him); and thus (ie., of this opinion) are some others also. The word ’tu’ (‘however’) is intended to show that, by mentioning the individual self, the possibility of the passage (under reference here) relating to him, is excluded. “They relate to the other “. The teacher, Jaimini, thinks 673. The threefold worship of the Brahman consists of medita- tion on His essential nature, meditation on Him as having the individual selves for His body and meditation on Him as having the prakriti for His body. See Vol. I., p. 386.252 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV that the mention of the individual self is made (here) with the object of teaching the essential nature of the Brahman who is other than the individual self. Why? “Because of the question and the answer (in the context, relating to Him)”. First of all, as mentioned in the statement beginning with “Both of them (viz., Bālāki and Ajātasatru) went near 674 a purusha (or person) who was fast asleep” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18), he who was fast asleep and whose prāņa was wide awake, did not respond when he was addressed by the names of the praṇa, 675 and he was awakened by means of a stroke with a stick; by means of these two acts, the individual self, who is other than the prana etc., was roused from sleep; and then it is that the question which is given thus- “Where, indeed, O Bālāki, did this person (purusha or the individual self) lie down for (dreaming) this? Where was he (during deep dreamless sleep)? And whence did he come?” (Kaush. Up. IV. 18)-is seen to relate to the teaching of the Brahman who is other than the individual self. The answer also which runs thus-” When a man, is in deep sleep, he sees no dream image; presently he attains union with this prana (i.e., the Brahman) itself…. the prāņas (i.e., the individual selves) proceed towards their respective quarters from this self; from the prāņas proceed the devas (or senses); and from the devas (or senses) proceed 674. The Sanskrit word which has been translated as ‘went near”’ is ajagmatuḥ in the Sribhashya bere as well as under I. 4. 16. Kaush. Up. (IV. 18), which is being quoted, reads iyatuḥ. Both the words have more or less the same meaning. In Brih Up. where the same story of Balaki is given, the correspond- ing description of awakening the sleeping man uses ajagmatuḥ. 675. The Upanishad states (IV. 18) that Ajatas atru addressed the sleeping man as brihat (the great one), pandaravāsas (the white-robed one), Soma (the moon) and rajan (the king). The Śruta- prakašika explains, on the strength of other Vedic passages, that these names refer to the prana. Adhik. V, Süt. 18] QUERIES SHOW GOD 253 For the lokas (i.e., knowledge of the objects of knowledge).” (Kaush. Up. IV. 19),-certainly relates to the Supreme Self who is a different entity from the individual self. 675 He in whom the individual self dwells in dreamless sleep, and is quite serene owing to the absence of stain due to the varied experience of pleasure and pain that is associated with the states of wakefulness and dreams, and attains the condition of being at home with himself; and from whom, he (ie., the individual self) emerges for the purpose of enjoying enjoyments; such an One is the Supreme Self. Accordingly, as stated in the passages, “My dear child, He is then (i.e., during deep sleep) in union with the Sat (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 1); and “When he is embraced by the prajña ātmā (Omniscient Self), he does not know anything that is external nor anything that is internal.” (Brih. Up. IV. 3. 21)-He who is well known to be at the basis of deep sleep, is the Omniscient (prājña) and Supreme Self, who is a different entity from the individual self. Therefore, by means of the question and answer (in the context here), it is definitely determined that the mention of the individual self is made therein with the object of teaching that Supreme Self, who is a different entity from the individual self. It has been stated above that both the question and answer (referred to) relate to the individual self, that further the seat of (the soul during) deep sleep is the veins themselves, 676. Ramanuja gives here his own interpretation of the dialogue between Ajatas atru and Balaki, setting aside the Sankhya vew reported under Sutra 16. Balaki’s notions about the Brahman are in adequate and imperfect. Ajata- s’atru defines and describes the Brahman in Kaush. Up. (IV. 18.) He then proceeds to distinguish Him from the individual self and the latter from the principal vital air. He goes with Balaki to a sleeping man and tries in vain to rouse him by calling him with the names of the vital air. This shows II. S.B.-33. the self to be different, not merely from the senses now in repose, but also from the ceaselessly active vital air. Then questions about the positions of the self during dreaming and deep sleep are raised and answered in IV. 18-19. (Etat asayishta lay down for this. But etat in etadabhut and stadagat means ‘he (the individual self)’, despite difference in gender, Alternatively, etat in all the three places may be roughly taken as ‘when’ and denoting three different periods of time.) 254 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV and that the whole range of the instruments (of the mind) has become one within the individual self itself, which is pointed out by the word, ‘prana’. All this is not right, because the veins form the seat of (the soul during) dreams, 677 and because also, as already stated above, the Brahman Himself constitutes the basis of deep sleep, and because, again, both the individual self and the totality of speech and the other senses, which form his auxiliary instruments, are separately mentioned in the context as having become one with the Brahman Himself who is pointed out by the word, ‘prāṇa’. “And thus (i.e., of this opinion) are some others also”. In this very dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaŝatru (as described in the Brih. Up.), the Vajasaneyins distinguish from him (i.e., the individual self), who goes to deep sleep and consists of wakeful consciousness, the Supreme Self who forms the abode of that individual self in the following scriptural passage: “Where was this purusha (or individual self) who consists of wakeful consciousness, then, and whence did he come?” (Bṛih. Up. II. 1. 16); " When he, this purusha, who consists of wakeful consciousness, was sleeping this (deep sleep), then (he), taking (with him) the knowledge derived from the senses along with the mind, sleeps within the ākāśa which is within the heart.” (Brih. Up. II. 1. 17). The word, ‘ākāśa’, is well known to indicate the Supreme Self: (as, for example, in) “There is within that small ākāśa etc.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 1.)678 677. The relevant passage in Kaush. Up. (IV. 19) runs : “(He, the individual self) is then (tada) in them (ie., the veins called hitas), when (yada) he is in deep sleep, he sees no dream-image, subsequently (atha) attains union with this praṇa itself.” The Sankhyas connect the tada with the subsequent yada: thus the self is taken to be in the veins during dreamless sleep. But this view has to explain away the force of atha. Ramanuja’s point is that atha implies a state different from and subsequent to that marked by the self’s presence in the veins. Since this later state is said to be dreamless, the earlier one is shown to be marked by dreaming. 678. The Brih Up. also reports the dialogue between Ajatas atru and Balaki (in II. 1), but with some variations. In the passage corresponding to Kaush, Up. (IV. 19), it is made clear that the indivi- dual self is with the Brahman during deep, dreamless sleep. This is a further refutation of the Sankhya view that the self then remains in the veins. Adhik. VI, Süt. 19] KAPILA REFUTED 255 Thus it is seen that the mention of the individual self here is for the purpose of teaching the Supreme Brahman, who is different from it and who is omniscient. It is there- fore definitely established that nowhere in the Vedanta is the causality (of the universe) attributed to the individual self who is established in the system (of Kapila), or to the pradhana presided over by him, as from this sentence, the Supreme Brahman alone, who is different from the individual self and who is the cause of the entire universe, is to be known. ADHIKARANA VI VAKYANVAYĀDHIKARAṆA वाक्यान्वयात् Sutra 19. Vākyānvayāt (128). (The person pointed out as the object of spiritual sight etc. in the context is the Brahman Himself) because of the purport of (all) the passages (therein). he (ie., the Here (in this adhikarana) also 579, Sutrakāra) raises the doubt that, because here and there in the context (under reference here) there are seen to occur passages dealing with the purusha (person or individual self) who is established in the system of Kapila, it is indeed impossible to postulate any one as the Lord; and then he (ie., that same Sutrakāra) dispels it. In the Brihadaraṇyaka (Upanishad), in the section called the Maitreyi-Brāhmaṇa, (i.e., Chapters II and 679. In this Adhikarana as well as in its predecessors in this Páda, the opponents are the Sankhyas who do not admit of God. Ramanuja here hints that disputa- tion with them is finished for the time being and that in the next Adhikarana the opponents are the so called theistic school of the Sankhyas. 256 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV IV), there are declarations made, which begin with the passage, “My darling, the husband becomes dear (to the wife), not indeed in accordance with the desire of the husband: but the husband becomes (so) dear in accord- ance with the desire of the Self,” (II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6) and end with the passage, “My darling, everything becomes dear, not indeed in accordance with the desire of everything, but everything becomes dear in accordance with the desire of the Self. The Self, indeed, has to be heard, reflected and steadily meditated upon. O Maitreyi ! when the Self, indeed, has been seen, heard, reflected on and known, all this becomes known, my darling.” (Brih. Up. IV.5.6). Here the doubt arises whether the purusha taught in this passage as being the object of (spiritual) sight is that very purusha who is established in the system of Kapila, or whether he is the Lord of all, who is omniscient and wills the truth. It is perhaps thought fit to hold that it is the purusha (taught by Kapila). Why? Because in the beginning, middle and end (of the context here), surely, by reason of association with attachment to husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle, etc., the individual self itself is made out (to be the subject-matter thereof); in the middle (of that same context) also, from the association with birth and death, as stated in the passage, “He is altogether a mass of knowledge, rises up from these (external) elements and then perishes after them; after death, there is no (individualised) knowledge” (Brih. Up.II.4.12), that very (purusha) is made out (to be the subject-matter); similarly, in the concluding part (of this context) also, in accordance with the passage, “By what, my darling, should one know the knower?” (Bṛih. Up. II.4.14), that same individual self, who is the knower, is taught (to be the subject-matter), and the Lord is not (so taught). Therefore, it is definitely determined that this passage aims at propounding the parusha who is established in the system (of Kapila).Adhik. VI, Süt. 19] SIMILAR SOULS 257 It may, however, be said that, inasmuch as the commencement of the context here is made with the passage, There is, indeed, no hope of immortality through wealth” (Brih. Up. II.4.2 & IV.5.3), the whole of the passage in the context here is made out to have in view the teaching of the means for the attainment of immortality; and so it may be asked how this context can have for its object the teaching of the purusha (of Kapila). To this, the reply is that for that very reason, (80 indeed, the proof of the individual self (as conceived by Kapila) is (undertaken) in the context here. As a matter of fact, in the system (of Kapila), the very knowledge of the truth of the essential nature of the individual self, who is freed from the superimposition of the properties of non- intelligent matter, is spoken of as being the means for the attainment of immortality. Therefore, here (in the context under reference) the essential nature of the individual self which is freed from matter, is taught by means of the statement beginning with, The self has indeed to be seen’, (to be the means) for the attainment of immortality. 6 The essential nature of all the individual selves which are freed from matter is uniform; therefore, by means of the knowledge of the truth of one’s own self which is freed from matter, all the individual selves themselves become known; consequently, through the knowledge of the (individual) self, the knowledge of all things appropriately results. In all beings, beginning with gods and ending with the immovable things, the essential nature of the individual self possesses a uniform mode of knowledge; therefore, the teaching of the oneness of the self is given in the statement, “All this, whatever there is, is this self” (Brih. Up. II.4.6 & IV.5.7); and because the 680. ‘For that very reason’, namely, that the context deals with the means of obtaining immortal- ity. The Sankhyas bel eve that the realisation of the truth about the essential nature of the self leads to immortality. 258 " SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV material embodiments of the gods, etc. possess the nature of non-self’, the existence of any other nature (than its own) as established above) is denied (in regard to the self in view of such a nature tending to evil), in the statement commencing with “All things abandon (or scorn) him” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7) Moreover, through the negation of manifoldness, as is given in the statement, ‘Indeed, where there is duality, as it were’, it is the manifoldness of the self which undoubtly is essntally of a uniform nature-a manifoldness which is due to the distinctions of the modifications of matter known as gods- that is declared to be false. Also the statement which begins with “That which is this Rig-Veda, is, indeed, the breath of that Great Being” (Brih. Up. IV 5), appropriately fits in (here in the context), because the origination of the world is due to the instrumentality of the individual self as the presiding deity over matter.681 It having thus been definitely determined that this passage (under reference here) deals with the individual self, all the Vedanta passages, owing to their having to import the same meaning as that (passage), propound the very individual self who is established in the system (of Kapila). Consequently, the prakriti (matter) itself, presided over by that (self), is the material cause (of the universe), and the Lord is not (that cause). If it be so held, we state in reply as follows:-” (The person pointed out as the object of spiritual sight, etc., in the context context is the Brahman Himself), because of the purport of all the passages (therein)” (Ved. Süt. I. 4. 19). In all the passages (in the context under reference) here, the Lord of all things is Himself taught (to be the subject-matter). How? Indeed, it is only thus (by so construing the passages) that the mutual 631. The Rig Vedia is regarded as a body of sound, and as arising from the influence of the individual selves on matter, leading to crea- tion and evolution. Adhik. VI, Süt. 19] MEANS OF IMMORTALITY 259 relationship among the component parts of the passages here becomes perfectly consistent. When it was affirmed by Yajnavalkya, “There is, indeed, no hope of obtaining immortality” (Brih. Up. II. 4.2 & IV. 5.3), then, Maitreyi, after disregarding wealth, etc. for the reason that they do not form the means of obtaining immortality, as stated in the passage-“That by means of which I do not become immortal, what am I to do with that; what you, my lord, surely know, do teach me that very thing.” (Brih. Up. II.4.3)-prayed for (the knowledge of) the very means which leads to the attain- ment of immortality. This Self who is then taught to her as being worthy of direct realisation, owing to His being the means of that (immortality), is, undoubtedly, the Supreme Self; because, in the following and other similar passages-” Knowing Him alone, one transcends death" (Svet. Up. III.8); “He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of immortality.” Taitt. Ar. III.12.7)-immortality is declared to have for its only means the knowledge of the Supreme Self. The true knowledge of the essential nature of the individual self, who forms the glory of the Supreme Person and who is the attainer (of immortality), has to be understood as being helpful to the knowledge of the Brahman that forms the means of final freedom, and not as being an independent means of itself. Therefore, here"(in’ the context under reference), in the passage beginning with ‘He (ie., the Self) has to be seen’ (Brih. Up. II.4.5 & IV.5.6.), the Supreme Self Himself is taught to be the means of immortality. Similarly, in the passage beginning with “That which is this Rig-Veda, is, indeed, the breath of this Great Being” (Brih. Up. II.4.10 & IV.5.11), the attribute of being the cause of the whole world is declared; and it 260 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV cannot accrue to any person who is other than the Supreme Person, and who is either subject to the influence of karma, or is freed from, bondage or is merely a person of no activity 652. In the statement beginning with ‘Through the sight of the Self indeed’ (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5), the proposition that through knowing the One Self, all selves become known is given; and it is rightly applicable only in the case of the Supreme Self who is the Self of all (other selves). What has been already stated above to the effect that, owing to the selves having a uniform nature, knowledge of all the selves (and of all inanimate beings) is stated to result through the knowledge of (any) one self, that is improper: because, in the absence of the knowledge of the inanimate world (of non- intelligent matter), the knowledge of all things does not exist. And with the object of proving the (said) proposition, the context begins with the statement, “This is the Brahmin (caste), this is the Kshattriya (caste)” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7), and ends with the sentence, ‘All this, whatever there is, is this Self’ (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 6. 7); here, the world which is proved by direct percep- tion and the other (means of knowledge) and which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things, is pointed out by the word ’this’; the teaching then given regarding the oneness of the Self, to the effect that all this is the Self, appropriately fits in only in relation to the Supreme Self. Indeed, the world which is denoted by the word ’this’ and which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, cannot cannot become identical with identical with the person (i.e., the individual self), who is associated with non-intel- ligent matter, or who is finally freed from that (matter), or who exists in his true (revealed) form. For this very 632. According to the Vedanta, the individual self is either in a state of bondage, or is freed from it. In either state, he cannot become the cause of the creation of the universe. According to the Sankhyas, the individual self is merely a witness of the changes undergone by matter, and is himself devoid of all activity, intellectual or other. Such a self cannot create. Adhik. VI, Sut. 19] BRAHMAN CAUSES LOVE 261 reason,683 disparagement also of the knowledge of all things, as dissociated from Him, is made in the passage, All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things apart from the Self’. (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6. & IV. 57). Similarly, in the first Maitreyi Brahmana (ie., Brih. Up. II. 4), the auspicious qualities of greatness etc., revealed in the statement, “The Great Being is infinite and unfathomable (or inexhaustible or out of reach)” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 12), appertain only to the Supreme Self. Therefore, He alone is dealt with here (in the context under reference). What has been stated above to the effect that, inas- much as the individual self who is associated with the love of husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle, etc. is, in the beginning of the context here, undoubtedly declared to be the object of investigation, the passage (under discussion) here has that (self) itself for its subject-matter-that is improper : because, if in the sentence, ‘In accordance with the desire (kama) of the self (atman), (all things become dear)" (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5. & IV. 5. 6), by means of the word ‘atman’. the individual self is denoted, then it will give room to want of logical connection 684 of that (sentence) with the following sentence: “The Self (Atman) has to be (directly) seen” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6). It is clearly ascertained (here) that the teaching contained in the sentence, “In accordance with the desire (kama) of the Self (Atman), all things become dear”, is given as being helpful to the direct perception of the (Supreme) Self (Atman) as the 683. For this very reason’, namely, that the Brahman is the Self of all, Every thing is the Brahman because it has the Brahman for its Self. To regard any thing as not having the Brahman for its Self is to regard it in a wrong light and to court continuance in samsara. This view is in contrast with tha: of the Sankhyas set down earlier. To them everything is the self because all in lividual selves possess a uniform mode of knowledge. By II. S.B.-34 the same token, to regard them as varied on account of their different embodiments is wrong and spiritu- ally disastrous. Ramanuja agrees that all souls are similar, but he denies the Upanishad teaches this here. 684. The object of investigat on will then have to be what is desired by the individual seif, and not the individual self. Hence the two sentences here will not agree in meaning.262 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV object (of investigation), as stated in the sentence, ‘The Self (Atman) has to be seen.’ (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5 & IV 5. 6) The phrase, ‘In accordance with the desire (kama) of the Self’, means “in abundant fufilment of the desire of the Supreme Self”: kāmas (desires) are those things which are coveted; in other words, it means that it is for the sake of the full accomplishment of the desires of the Self (Atman), that all things become dear. Moreover, if it be said that the husband, etc. become dear for the sake of the fulfilment of the desires of the individual self, the essential nature of the individual self does not become the object of investigation. Indeed, what is dear is itself the object of search, but not that essential nature of what is the principal thing (viz., the individual self) in relation to (the subordinate thing, namely) what is dear-an essential nature which is dissoci- ated from what is dear. For whatever reason, the husband, etc., become dear for the sake of the fulfilment of the desires of the individual self, for that same reason, completely giving up the husband and all other dear things, that essential nature of the individual self which is dissociated from all those (dear things) has to be sought after this is inconsistent. On the contrary, if it be said that the dearness of the husband, etc., is not due to their being subservient unto the husband, etc., but that the dearness of the husband, etc., is due to their being subservient unto the individual self (atman),-then those things (viz., the husband etc.) themselves will have to be accepted as being subservient unto themselves.625 If there be a want of logical connection of the sentence ‘All things become dear in accordance with the desire of the atman (self)’, with the next (sentence),86 the a splitting up of the whole passage will be the result. Even if it be admit ted that there is (here) a splitting up of the (whole) passage, 605, Bac use this is inconsisten! with the v ew that one has d rectly 10 perce ve the individual self, after giving up all other things. ($rutaprakašika!. 686. The next sentence is: “The self has to be seen.” Adhik. VI, Sut. 19] WILL OF BRAHMAN 263 it is not seen that the earlier sentence is of any use. Therefore, in whatever manner it is ascertained that the self has to be sought after, completely giving up the husband and all other dear things, in that manner is to be explained the meaning of the whole passage (here). The aforesaid (meaning) is given thus. In the sentence beginning with “There is indeed no hope of attaining immortality through wealth,” it is stated that wealth etc. form no means for the attainment of immortality, which has a nature that is eternal and free from all evil and is bliss, unsurpassed in excellence: then (it is stated that) the dearness which is experienced of wealth, son, husband, wife etc., which is surpassed in excellence, is mixed with misery and is transient, is not due to the essential nature of the husband, etc., but is due to the Supreme Self who has a nature of bliss unsurpassed in excellence; therefore, it is taught (in the context here) that whoever, being of Himself possessed of bliss unsurpassed in excellence, brings about in regard to others also a condition of being the abode of a modicum of dearness, that Supreme Self Himself has to be directly seen. Hence the meaning is this. There is the passage: “The husband becomes dear, not, indeed, in accordance with the will (kāma) of the husband” (Bṛih. Up II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6). In fact, the husband, wife, son, wealth, etc. do not become dear in accordance with their own will to this effect, namely, “I become dear to this (or that) thing for my own benefit.” On the other hand, (they become dear) in accordance with the will of the Self, that is to say, for the fulfilment of the Supreme Self’s desire, which consists in giving to His worshippers a reward which is dear to them (in return for the worship offered by them.)687 687. Kima in the passage here is taken to be ‘will’ or ‘sankalpa’: whereas in the Sankhya view stated earlier, it is ‘desire’. Feople and things are dear, according to the desire of the individual self, say the Sankhyas. They become dear on account of the will of the Supreme Self, the Vedanta holds. 264 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV Indeed, the Supreme Self being worshipped by means of religious works, brings about in regard to (His) worshippers dearness as existing in each particular thing severally, in accordance with each individual religious work and invariably subject in each case to the limitations of place, time, kind and degree; because the scripture declares: “Indeed, He alone causes bliss” (Taitt. Up. II. 7). Each particular thing is not essentially of its own nature dear or non-dear. To the same effect is given the following: “One and the same thing gives rise to pleasure (at one time), and again gives rise to pain. Because one and the same thing produces anger (at one time) and tranquillity (at another time), therefore there is nothing that has in itself the nature of pleasure.” (V. P. II. 6. 46- 47). Even though the sentence, “But (all things become dear) in accordance with the desire of the atman (self)”, be taken to deal with the individual self, the sentence, ‘The Atman (Self) has to be seen’, has, however, to deal with the Supreme Self Himself. In this case, the meaning is this. Because, for the sake of fulfilling the desires of the husband, etc., the husband, etc. are not accepted as being dear by one who is subject to their influence, but are independently accepted by him as being dear for the sake of fulfilling the desire of the individual self; therefore, that Supreme Self Himself who is unconditionally, stainlessly and unsurpassingly dear to the individual self,- He alone has, indeed, to be seen,688 and not the objects known as husband, wife, son, wealth etc., which are associated with the results of pleasure and pain and are mixed up with miseries, and whose several characteristics are dependent upon the Supreme Being. 688. Here Ra anuja is is setting out a view which, though having his formal approval, is still not to his liking. Persons and things are dear to the individual self, accord- ing to his desire. But the self is free to like or dislike as he pleases. The true nature of the self will become dear on account of ts blissfulcess. The Supreme Self, by the same token, will become supremely dear on account of His supreme blissfulness, Adhik. VI, Sūt. 20] ASMARATHYA’S VIEW 265 In this context (under reference) here, however, the Supreme Self Himself is denoted even by the word 689 denoting the individual self; therefore, in both the sentences, “But (he becomes dear) in accordance with the will of the Atman (Self)” and “The Atman (Self) has, indeed, to be seen”, the two words, ‘Atman’ and ‘Atman’, denote the same thing in both the places in the manner aforesaid. He (ie., the Sutrakara gives the following two aphorisms) to show that even according to other schools (than his own) 690 the Supreme Self is denoted by the word (denoting the) jiva (or the individual self occurring in the context here). „favıfaàfög¤13ATET: Sútra 20. Pratijñāsiddher lingam Asmarathyaḥ. (129) Asmarathya is of opinion that it (i.e., the denoting, in the context, of the Supreme Self by 689. Ramanuja has SO far answered all the points except one, raised by the purvapaksha, and it is this single point which is dealt with in the ensuing three Sutras. The texts at the begining and end of the con’ext here, and indeed the Maitreyi-Brahmana as a whole have been shown to relate to the Supreme Self. But one statement in Brih Up. (II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13) still offers some difficulty It speaks of a mass of knowledge (vijñāna- ghana or prajñānaghana) rising up from the external elements and then perishing after them. This spiri- tual entity is also called the atman: and as it is associated with birth and death, it seems to be the indivi- dual self. If it is taken to be so, the other references to the atman in the context also may have to be so understood, This difficulty is dealt with in the three Sutras that follow, where three different theores are put forward to show that the Supreme Self is referred to even here. 690. Asmarathya, Audulomi and Kās akritsna explain in three different ways how the apparent reference to the individual self in Brih Up. (II, 4. 12. & IV. 5 13) is really a reference to the Supreme Self. Asmarathya’s views might have inspired Yadava- prakasa. (See, Vol. 1, Note 235). Bhaskara and S nkara may derive support from Audulomi, the former holding the limiting con hitions to be real and the latter mareal. Ramanuja is of opinion that only Kasakritsna bas the support of the Sutras, since he is not criticised and is referred to last. 266 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV words ordinarily denotative of the individual self) is a proof of the proposition (that by the knowledge of a certain one thing the know. ledge of all things results). This is the characteristic (means) of the proof of the proposition that the knowledge of all (other) things results through the knowledge of a certain one thing-namely, that, through the words denoting the individual self, the Supreme Self is denoted: the teacher Asmarathya is of this opinion. If i cannot be that this individual self, on account of its being a produced effect of the Supreme Self, is the Supreme Self Himself, then, owing to its being distinct from Him, the knowledge relating to it will not result through the knowledge of the Supreme Self. In the passage, “The Self, indeed, this one only, was in the beginning”, (Ait. Up. I. 1.) oneness (of all things with the Supreme Self) is ascertained to exist before the creation of the world; in the following and other similar passages- “Just as from a well-lighted fire thousands of sparks similar to it in nature take their birth, similarly, my dear child, manifold beings are born out of the Indestructible One and go to Him alone (at the time of destruction)” (Mund. Up. II. 1. 1),-the individual selves are declared to take their birth from the Brahman and are also declared to be absorbed in Him alone; for these reasons the individual selves, owing to their possessing the character of being the produced effects of the Brahman, are made out to possess oneness with the Brahman. Therefore, the Supreme Self is denoted by means of the words which denote the individual self. cenfqwa gaurarfectgolfa: Sutra 21. Utkramishyata evam- bhāvādityauḍulomiḥ. (130)Adhik. VI, Šūt. 21] AUDULOMI’S VIEW 267 Audulomi is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self), because he (i.e., the individual self) at the time of final departing (from the body) gets into the Brahman). state (i.e., of identity with the What has been already stated above (in Ved. Sit. I. 4. 20) to the effect that, through the oneness of the individual self with the Brahman, owing to its being a produced effect of the Brahman, the proposition that the knowledge of all things results through the knowledge of a certain one thing, has to be proved, and that for that purpose the Brahman is denoted by the words which denote the individual self-that is improper. Because, in the passage beginning with “The intelligent being (ie., the individual seif) is neither born, nor dies” (Kath. Up. II. 18), birthlessness is declared to exist (in relation to the individual selves); because also the creation of the world is admitted to be due to the enjoyment of the fruits of the ancient karmas (or the effects of works) of the individual selves; because, again, unequal creation would otherwise be inappropriate; and because, also, inasmuch it is impossible for the individual self, which is a produced effect of the Brahman to avoid, even like the ethereal space (which is also a produced effect of the Brahman) and similar things, the attainment of final release which is characterised as getting into the state of the Brahman, the practising of the prescribed means for the attainment of that (final release) would be meaningless; moreover, the attaining of the cause (ie., the Brahman), as in the case of pots (attaining unto the condition of the causal clay) oeing of the nature of destruction, will come to possess the character of being an undesirable aim of life. The appropriateness of the arguments bearing upon the 268 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV origination and absorption of the individual selves will be explained at length later on.691 Hence, according to the passages-" This serene being (i.c., the individual self), rising up from this body, attains unto the Supeme Light and is revealed in his true form" (Chhand. Up. VIII. 3. 4), and “Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man, free from name and form, reaches the Divine Person who is higher than the highest” (Mund. Up. III. 2. 8), he (i.e., the individual self), when finally departing from the body, attains unto the state of the Supreme Self. Therefore the teacher Auḍulomi is of opinion that the Supreme Self is denoted by means of the words denoting the individual self. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः Sutra 22. Avasthiteriti Kasakritsnaḥ. (131) Kasakritsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also) because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the individual self). What has been stated above (in the Ved. Sut. I. 4. 21) to the effect that, inasmuch as the individual self, which is finally departing from this body, gets into the state of the Brahman, the Brahman is denoted by the words denoting that individual self-that also is not right; because it does not admit anyone of the alternative views (that alone are possible in regard to its nature). It may be asked whether the non-existence or absence of that state (of the Brahman) in relation to the individual self before it finally departs from this body is natural or conditional to it; and in this (latter) case, also, whether it is real or unreal. 691. See, for instance, the discussious under Ved. Sut. (II, 3 18 & IV. 3. 1). Adhik. VI, Sut. 22] BHASKARA CRITICISED 269 If it is natural, the state of the Brahman cannot appertain to it (i.e., the individual self); because, owing to its distinction (from the Brahman) being due to its essential nature itself, so long as its essential nature is actually existent, that (distinction) will never cease to exist. Again, it may be said that the essential nature also ceases to exist simultaneously with the distinction. If so, as that (essence) itself ceases to exist, it cannot get into the state of the Brahman, and there will result the error of that (state) being no aim of life and other similar errors. If it (ie., the absence of the state of the Brahman) is real and conditional, then even before (departing finally from the body), it (i.e., individual self) is the Brahman Himself, and therefore it is not proper to insert the qualifi- cation given in the aphorism: “Because he (ie., the individual self) at the time of finally departing (from the body) gets into that state (i.e., of identity with the Brahman)” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 21). According to this view, there is indeed nothing else than the Brahman and the limiting conditions, and it is impossible for the indivisible Brahman to undergo divisions and other (modifications) through limiting conditions. Therefore, the distinction (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) is solely due to limiting conditions: consequently, it (i.e., individual self) is the Brahman Himself even before finally departing from this body.692 If the (above) conditional distinction be unreal, it has to be stated to whom at the time of final departure from the body this state of the Brahman belongs. If it be said that it belongs to the Brahman Himself who has His own essential nature concealed by the limiting condition of ignorance, it is replied that it is not right to say so; because in the case of one whose essential nature is eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, it is not possible to 692. Bhaskara’s position is here stated and refuted. II. S.B.-35 270 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV postulate concealment by means of the limiting conditions known to be the when the essential of ignorance. Concealment is well cessation of the luminosity of a thing, nature of that thing is actually existent. If it be accepted that luminosity itself is the essential nature of the thing (Brahman), then there will be either the absence of the concealment (thereof), or the destruction of the essential nature (itself).693 Thus, as he (i.e., the individual self) has his own essential nature eternally revealed, so at the time. of finally departing from this body, nothing special accrues to him from the attainment of the state of the Brahman. Therefore, the qualification (inserted in the aphorism), “after the time of finally departing from this body”, is certainly useless. The passage beginning with-" he, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light" (Chhand. Up. VII. 3. 4 & VIII. 12. 3)-does not then (i.e., while finally departing from the body) predicate the assumption of the state of the Brahman in regard to one who never had that state before; on the other hand, (it predicates of him) the manifestation of the already existent essential nature. In fact, he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says the same thing under the following and other aphorisms: “Having reached the Highest Light (i.e., the Brahman), he (i.e., the released soul) manifests himself in his own true form, on account of the use of the word sva (i.e., one’s own) in the context” (Ved Süt. IV. 4. 1). Thus, according to the following passages-“Entering in, along with this individual self which is the same Myself, (I evolved names and forms)” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2); “He who, dwelling in the self is within self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who internally rules thy self,-He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self” (Madh. Bṛih. Up. III. 7. 22); “He who is 693. Sankara’s position is here sated and criticised. Compare what is said on the same lines in Vol. I, p. 142. Adhik. VI, Süt. 22] KASAKRITSNA’S VIEW 271 moving within the akshara, whose body is the akshara, whom the akshara does not know, He is the internal self of all beings, He is devoid of all senses, He is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa” (Sub. Up. VII. 1.); and “He who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all” (Taitt. Ar. III. 21)-(according to these passages), He (i.e., the Brahman) abides as the Self in the individual self which forms His own body.694 Therefore, the Brahman is denoted by the words denoting the individual self. The teacher, Kasakritsna, is of this opinion. And it has been already explained, in connection with the scriptural passage, “I evolve the differentiation of name and form” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2)695, that the words denoting the individual self are certainly denotative of the individual self up to and inclusive of the Supreme Self and not merely of the individual self pure and simple. If in this manner, through the relation of the soul and the body, the identity (between the Brahman and the world) is propounded, then all the scriptural passages,-viz., those which deal with the Supreme Brahman’s qualities of being free from sin, of being omniscient etc.,; those which explain that, in regard to the individual self which is ignorant and suffering from misery, final freedom results from the worship of the Brahman; those which speak of the creation and destruction of the world; and those which aim at teaching the identity of the world with the Brahman-(all these) become well established and expounded. This is the very view of Kasakṛitsna, which the Sutrakāra has accepted. The meaning here is this. When Maitreyi questioned him as to what means for attaining 694. It may be noted that Kasa- kritsna’s explanation that there is avasthiti or abidance by the Supreme Self raises for Ramanuja the question: where does He the abide? To Sankara the problem appears to be: how does He abide? 695. See Vol. I, p. 175 and p. 337. Ramanuja agrees with Kas akritsna’s views.272 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV immortality was, Yajňavalkya stated, in his reply beginning with “The Self, my darling, has indeed to be seen (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6), that the worship of the Supreme Self is the means for attaining immortality. 696 Then, in a general manner, he gave the characteristcs of (the Brahman who is) the object of worship in the sentence beginning with “When the Self, my darling, is seen, all this becomes known indeed” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 7 & IV. 5. 8). And by means of the illustrative examples of the kettledrum etc., (he explained in a general way) the duty of restraining the mind and the other senses which form the auxiliary instruments of worship. 697 Then, in the passage beginning with “Just as, out of fire (kindled) from wet fuel, (various kinds of smoke proceed)” (Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 10 & IV. 5. 11), and “Just as the ocean is the sole reservoir of all waters,” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 11 & IV. 5. 12), he (Yajnavalkya) respectively taught at length that the Supreme Brahman, who is the object of worship, is the only cause of all the worlds, and that it is obligatory (on us) to restrain the whole group of the senses which are the sources of (our) activities in regard to all the objects of sense. 698 Then, in the passage beginning with “Just as a 696. This is elaborately demon. stra’ed in what is known as the Laghu-siddhanta or ‘Small Con- clusion’ under Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 1) in Vol. I, pp. 13-24. 697. The examples of the kettle- drum, the conch and the vīņā are given in Brih Up. (II. 4. 7 to 9 & IV. 5. 8 to 10)). First Yajnavalkya says: “Just as it is not possible to stop the sounds issuing from > kettledrum when it is being beaten, and the sounds can be stoppel by restraining the kettledrum (from being beaten), or by restraining the drummer (from beating it), (even so, it is impossible to restrain the mind and the senses when they are in contact with the objects of the senses: but they can be controlled by keeping the ?? objects of the senses away from them or by restraining them from getting interested in these objects of the senses). The blowing on the conch and the playing on the stringed musical instrument known as the vina are then similarly dealt with 698. The Brahman is taught to be both the material and the instru nental cause of the world in II. 4. 10: “Just as out of fire kindled with wet fuel, various kinds of smoke proceed, even so (all) this is the breath of this Great Being.” (All) this’ is elaborately expanded to include the four Vedas, the Itihasas, the Puranas, the Upanishads, the Smritis, the Sutras, the various sciences, the commentaries and the Adhik. VI, Sut. 22] ‘JIVA’ IN ‘MOKSHA’ 273 lump of salt (has no interior or exterior)” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 5. 13), with the object of encouraging the activities which relate to the adoption of the means for the attainment of immortality, he demonstrated that the Supreme Self who abides in the form of the individual self, possesses the sole nature of unlimited intelligence. Then he spoke of that same being of the nature of unlimited intelligence, taking up, in the condition of samsara, the modifications of external elements in the passage beginning with “He who is indeed a mass of intelligence rises up from these (external) elements and perishes after them” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13). Then in the sentence, “There is no (individualised) knowledge after death (in the final body)” (Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 12. & IV. 5. 13), he stated that in the condition of final release there is no contraction of the natural and unlimited intelligence of the soul. Hence there is then no such knowledge of the material embodiments of the gods etc., arising from the individual self blending itself as one with the collection of external elements (ie., its bodies). 699 Then again in the passage beginning with “Where there is duality as it were” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15), holding that the direct perception of sub-commentaries. In IV. 5. 10, a few more items are added to the list: sacrifices, fire-oblations, food, drink, this world and the next, and all creatures. Smoke is regarde as having for its material cause wet fuel and for its instru- mental cause the heat of the fire. The creation by the Brahman is as easy as the exh ilation of breath. Self-restraint is taught in some detail in II 4. 11 and IV. 5. 12. The sea continually receives waters from everywhere, but is never so full as to be incapable of receiving more. Similarly, the senses, the mind and the organs of action come into contact with countless experiences, but are never satisfied. The implication is that they have to be controlled to facilitate the worship of the Brahman. 699, In IV. 5. 13, we are taught: " Just as a mass of salt has no interior or exterior, is wholly a mass of (salty) taste only, even so this Self has no interior or exterior, is everywhere in the form of the mass of intelligence (called the individual self), and (as such) rises from these external elements and parishes after them. There is no (individualised) knowledge after death (in the final body).” This corresponds to II 4. 12; which, however, begins differently, referring to dissolved salt becom- ing one with water and describing the Great Being as infinite in nature and limitless in qualities. What has been rendered as “(individualised) knowledge is samjita, which means here the delusion of identifying the body with soul. 17 274 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV manifold beings as not having the Brahman for their Self, is due to ignorance, he negated, for one who has all ignorance destroyed and who experiences the whole world as having the Brahman for its Self, the direct perception of distinction, on account of there being no entity apart from the Brahman.700 And then he said, “By whom one knows of this, by what is one to know Him?” (Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 14 & IV. 5. 15) “By whom “, that is, by the Supreme Self, who abides as his own self, the individual self has his knowledge imparted to him and thus knows everything: he (the individual self), “by what is he to know Him? By nothing whatever (except through His grace). Thus he (Yajnavalkya) propounded that the Supreme Self possesses the character of being difficult to be comprehended. Then, in the sentence beginning with “This aforesaid Person is comprehended as not this, not this” (Brih. Up. IV. 5. 15), thinking that the Lord of all things, who, while being possessed of a nature which is entirely distinct from all intelligent and non-intelligent things, yet has all things for His body, abides as the Self of all things, he declared that He is untouched by any of the evils which are found in the intelligent and non-intelligent things that form His own body,701 Then, in the passage, “By what is one to know the (Ommiscient) Knower (the Brahman)? Thus, Maitreyi, have you deserved to be taught as aforesaid. This much indeed, my dear one, is immortality” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 5. 15), 700. The passage is as follows: “Where there is indeed duality (or the sense of being independent from the Brahman) as it were, then one smells ano: her, then one sees another, then One hears another, then one speaks to another, then one thinks of another, then one knows another, Where indeed to one everything becomes the Self only, then by what (independent organ) can one (independently) smell what (inde- pendent thing)?…” (II, 4. 14). The corresponding IV. 5, 15 is slightly different. Distinctions based on the dental of the Brahman be ng the Self of all things are denied here. 701. This sentence, found only in IV. 5 and not in II. 4, runs thus: " bis aforesaid Person is comprehended as not this. not this. This Self is incapable of being perceived and is not perceived, is incapable of heing broken into bits and is not broken, is incapa- ble of being attached (to material things) and does not get attached, is unbound and does not suffer, and does not perish.” (IV. 5, 15). Adhik. VI, Süt. 23] THEISTIC SANKHYA 275 he taught by what is one to know the Supreme Person, who is different from all things and who forms the only cause of the whole universe-except through worship in the manner stated above? (He taught) thus that this very worship (of the Brahman) is the means for attaining immortality and that the attainment of the Brahman is declared to be immortality. Consequently, it is an established conclusion that inaamuch as the Supreme Brahman Himself is expounded in the context (under reference here) the Supreme Brahman Himself is the cause (of the world): and that the purusha (or the individual self) and prakṛiti (matter), presided over by that (purusha), are not (that cause). ADHIKARANA VII PRAKRITYADHIKARAṆA प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् Sútra 23. Prakritischa pratijñādṛishṭānuparodhāt. (132) (The Brahman is) also the material cause (of the world) because (in the context) there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it. The follower of Sankhya who does not admit a Lord (of all things) having been thus refuted, the follower of another school of Sankhya who admits a Lord (of all things) raises the following objections. Indeed, the Vedanta propounds the Omniscient Lord (of all things) as the cause of the world through associating Him with the attributes of seeing (i.e., of thinking) etc. Nevertheless, it is made clear that the pradhāna (matter) itself is propounded to be the material cause of the world by the same Vedanta itself. Indeed, the Vedanta does not teach the Lord of all things, 276 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV who is omniscient, who is immodifiable, and who presides over all things, as the cause of the world (solely by Himself and) without the help of the pradhāna, which is presided over by Him, is non-intelligent and subject to modification. Accordingly, the following scriptural passages teach that He is immodifying and that the prakriti presided over by Him is subject to modification:-” He is without parts, without action, tranquil, devoid of blemishes and untainted” (Svet. Up. VI. 19); “This aforesaid Great Self is indeed devoid of birth, devoid of old age and devoid of death” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 24); “She (prakriti) is the mother of all modifications, is non-intelligent, is eight- fold in nature, has no birth and is indestructible” (Chulikā Up. 3); “It (prākṛiti) is thought of by Him; presided over by Him alone, it is made to expand and then made to evolve; presided over by Him alone, it gives birth to the world and serves the ends of the purusha (i.e., the indi- vidual self)” (Chūlikā. Up. 4); “The cow (i.e., matter) has no beginning and end, is the mother and source of all beings (ie., the author of general creation and of secondary creation)” (Chūlikā. Up. 5). Similarly, it is declared in the following scriptural passages that the Lord, only by presiding over the prakriti (matter) which is the material cause, creates the whole universe :-“Out of this (prakriti) the Possessor of māyā (or prakṛiti) creates the universe” (Svet. Up. IV. 9); “Know then that māyā is prakṛiti and that the Possessor of maya is the Great Lord” (Svet. Up. IV. 10). The Smriti also says the same thing in the following passage :– “The prakṛiti, presided over (and thought over) by Me, gives birth to all movable and immovable things” (B. G. IX. 10). Thus, even though it may be argued that it is not declared in the scripture that the pradhana is the material cause, the essential nature of the pradhana and its being the material cause of the world when presided over by theAdhik. VI, Sut. 23] CAUSES ARE MANY 277 Lord are both established, as the scriptural passages which declare the Brahman to be the cause of the world cannot be otherwise understood, In fact, in the world very great difference is seen to exist in this way between the material and the instrumental cause. It is invariably observed that clay, gold, etc., which are non-intelligent, form the material cause of pots, bangles, etc.; and that potters, goldsmiths etc., who are intelligent, form the instrumental cause thereto. And the production of effects is invariably seen to require many agencies. Thus, by disregarding the invariable rule relating to the difference between the instrumental cause and the material cause and the invariable condition which makes the production of effects dependent upon many agencies, the Vedanta passages cannot possibly establish that the one and the same Brahman is both the material cause and the instrumental cause. Therefore, the Brahman is only the instrumental cause and not the material cause (also). The material cause, however, is the pradhana (matter) presided over by Him.702 If it be so held, it is stated in reply: “(The Brahman is) also the material cause (of the world), because (in the context), there can be no stultification of the proposition and of the examples illustrative of it” (Ved. Sut. I. 4. 23). (He is) also the prakṛiti, i.e., is also the material cause. The meaning is that the Brahman is not merely the 702. The theistic Sankhya is now dealt with for the first time. The pradhana, he says, is the material cause: it is distinct from the Brahman, and does not have the Brahman for its Self. The Brahman is the instrumental cause only. He cites some scrip- tur al texts and calls in support the gener al sense of the Vedas. Moreover, in the world, the material cause is always different II. S.B.-36 from the instrumental cause. The reply establishes the Brahman to be both the material and the instrumental cause from the examples given in Chhand. Up. (VI. 1. 4-6). Scriptural texts against the Sankhya are quoted, and the general sense of the Vedas correctly interpreted. The Brahman being unique, the condi- tions of the world do not apply to Him. 278 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV instrumental cause; the material cause also Brahman Himself. is the Why? Because (in the context in Chhand. Up. VI) there can be no stultification of the proposition and of the examples illustrative of it. Indeed, the proposition and the examples illustrative of it (as given in the context) do not contradict each other, (as may be seen) thus. Surely, the proposition deals with the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of a certain one thing, as stated in the passage: “You are motionless (i.e., stupid). Did you ask for that Controlling Entity (adesa) by which what is not heard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought and what is unknown becomes known?” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 3); and the examples illustrative of it deal with knowledge of produced effects as resulting from knowledge of their causes, as in the following passages: “My dear child, just as through (knowing) one lump of clay, all that is made up of clay becomes known” (Ibid. VI. 1. 4); “My dear child, just as through (knowing) a lump of gold (all that is made up of gold becomes known)” (Ibid. VI. 1. 5); “My dear child, just as by (knowing) a lump of iron (all that is made up of iron becomes known)” (Ibid. VI. 1. 6); and “Just as by (knowing) one pair of nail scissors (all the instruments become known)” (Ibid. VI. 1. 6). If the Brahman were merely the instrumental cause of the world, then through knowing Him the whole world will not become known. In fact, through knowing the potter etc., pots etc. do not become known. Therefore, there would be contradiction between the proposition and its illustrative examples. If the Brahman alone is the material cause of the world, then just as through knowing the material causes like a lump of clay, a lump of gold and a lump of iron, there results the knowledge of their (respective) effects such as pots and dishes, bracelets and crowns, hatchets and axes, similarly, through knowing the Brahman who constitutes the material cause of all the Adhik. VI, Sut. 231 MEANING OF ‘ADESA’ 279 world, the whole universe, which is the produced effect, becomes known. The effect is nothing else than the cause itself passing into a different condition, and not a different substance. Thus, by means of the illustrative examples of the clay and its modifications etc., which exist in the form of cause and effect, the proposition (under reference) is proved. Therefore, it is definitely determined the Brahman is the material cause also (of the world). What has been already stated above to the effect that the distinction in nature between the instrumental cause and the material cause is made out from the scripture itself this is not right. For what is made out therefrom is the identity between the instrumental and the material cause, as in the following passage :-“Did you ask for that Adesa by knowing which all that is not heard becomes heard?” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 3). The word ‘adesa,’ means that by which (others) are directed, he by whom commands are given. For it is stated in the Sruti: “Oh Gārgi, under the supreme command (prasāsana) of that Akshara (the sun and the moon are held apart) “. (Bṛih. Up. III. 8. 9). The subject (of the predication of commanding) is intended to be denoted (here by the word ‘adesa’) as being the immediate cause most efficient (in the action of commanding), 703 (So the text about the a desa means): Did you ask for (knowledge of) that Ruler by knowing whom what is unheard becomes heard? That is 703. Adesa has been taken by Sankara to mean upadesyam, that which is to be taught. Ramānuja understands it to be that by which commands are given. The word is formed from the root dis with the preposition à and the suffix ghan. This suffix cannot be used in respect of a word formed to mean something standing in a nominative relation to the verbal root. Sankara uses the accusative and Ramanuja the instrumental case in deriving the meaning. Sankara relics on the suffix; the roo’, however, is given an unusual meaning; and to refer to the Brahman as something to be taught does not distinguish Him in any way. Ramanuja relies on the root meaning, which also helps to characterise the Brahman distinct vely as the Supreme Commander. But he is obliged to identify the means of commanding with the commanding agent. See Rangarananuja’s commentary on Chhand. Up. (VI. 1. 1) for an elaborate grammatical discussion, 280 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV to say, by hearing of Him who is the supreme ruler and the presiding deity, even what is unheard becomes heard. Thus, oneness is definitely made out to exist between the instrumental and the material cause. (This is also made out) because, from the passage, Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only (without a second)” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1), oneness (between the instrumental and the material cause) is ascertained to exist before the creation of the world, and because also, from the use of the expression, “without a second”, another presiding deity (than the Brahman) is denied to exist in relation to the world. It may however be asked how, if it were so (i.e., if the Brahman were also the material cause), it is appropriate for the prakṛiti (matter) through being devoid of beginning and end, to possess eternality and also to possess the character of being the material cause of the world, as stated in the following and other similar passages : (i.e., matter) is the mother of all modifications Up. 3); “The cow (i.e., matter) is without beginning and end” (Chulikā Up. 5). “She (Chulika It is replied to as follows. In that case also, the Brahman, who is undifferentiated by names and forms and who exists in the condition of cause, is Himself denoted by the word prakriti,’ because there is no separable entity existing apart from the Brahman. The following scriptural texts also are to the same effect: “All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things as apart from the Self” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7); “Where, to one, all things become the Self, indeed, then by what (independent organ) should one (independently) see whom?” (Brih. Up. IV. 5. 15 & II. 4. 14.) There is also the further reason that the scriptures declare as follows: “All this indeed is the Brahman” (Chhand Up. III. 14. 1); “All this has Him for its Self” (Chhãnd. Up. VI. 8. 7). Thus, Adhik. VI, Sut. 23] ‘BRAHMAN’ AS CAUSE 281 it is made out (from these texts) that the whole world, both in its condition of cause and in its condition of effect, has the Brahman for its Self. What is said is this. It is declared in the scriptural passage, beginning with “He who is moving within the earth, whose body is the earth, whom the earth does not know” and (ending with) “He who is moving within the avyakta, whose body is the avyakta, whom the avyakta does not know… .. He who is moving within the akshara, whose body is the akshara, whom the akshara does not know” (Sub. Up. VII.); (and) in the passage beginning with “He who, dwelling in the earth, is inside the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, (and) who internally rules the earth” and (ending with) “He who, dwelling in the (individual) self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self and who internally rules the self, He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self” (Madh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 3 to 22) ;- that the Supreme Brahman is always the Self of all things, owing to His having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body; that He is sometimes differentiated by names and forms and sometimes undifferentiated by names and forms; that when He is differentiated by names and forms, then He is Himself said to be manifold and to be in the condition of effect; and that when He is undifferentiated by names and forms, then He is said to be one only without a second, and the cause. That condition of cause, which thus belongs to the Supreme Brahman who has always all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, and which is undifferen- tiated by names and forms, is described in the following and other similar scriptural passages: “The cow (i.e., matter) is without beginning and end” “It (i.e., matter) is the mother of all the modifications and is ignorant” (Chulika Up. 3); and “It (i.e., matter) is unborn, is one” (Svet. Up. IV. 5.) (Chulikā Up. 5) ;282 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV It may, however, be said from the scriptural passage relating to the dissolution of the world, viz., “The mahat is absorbed into the avyakta, the avyakta into the akshara” (Sub. Up. II), that the avyakta is made to possess origination and destruction. Similarly, it is also stated in the Mahabharata: “Oh thou best among the twice-born, the avyakta characterised by the three qualities (of sattva, rajas and tamas) was born out of that (M. B. XII. 342. 32); “Oh Brahmin, the avyakta is fully absorbed into the Purusha who is destitute of actions (M. B. XII. 347. 31),704 "” This is nothing wrong, because what is denoted by the word ‘avyakta’ and is conditioned by the three qualities (viz., the prakṛiti or matter) is a produced effect of the Brahman who has the non-intelligent thing (i.e., matter) for His body. The passage, “When there is tamas, then there is neither day nor night…” (Svet. Up. IV. 18), declares that even at the time of universal dissolution, the non-intelligent thing (i.e., matter) having the Brahman for its Self exists in a very subtle condition.705 Hence the non-intelligent thing, which forms a mode of the Supreme Brahman who is the cause of the world, and which is very subtle, is undoubtedly eternal. Therefore the Brahman Himself, who has that (non-intelligent thing) as His mode, is dealt with in the passage, “The cow (i.e., matter) is without beginning and end” (Chulikā Up. 5), and other similar texts. And for this very same reason (i.e., because the tamas exists even during pralaya) the tamas is declared to become one (with the Lord) and not to be dissolved (or absorbed) in the following scriptural text: “The akshara 704. Both the citations from the Mahabharata are from the Mokshadharma section of the Santi-parvan. In the first, Narada is being taught by Nārāyaṇa at Badari; the same sage is addressed by the Lord in Svetadvipa in the other werse. 705. This non-intelligent thing in an extremely subtle condition is known by the name of avibhakta- tamas. See Note 185, Vol. I. Adhik. VI, Süt. 23] ONENESS WITH ‘BRAHMAN’ 283 is absorbed into the tamas, the tamas becomes one with the Supreme Lord” (Sub. Up. II.) By means of the expression, “becoming one”, is denoted the existence in a condition undifferentiated by names and forms of the Brahman who has for His mode the non-intelligent thing (i.e. matter) in an extremely subtle state, as denoted by the word ’tamas’. …… To the same effect are the following and other scriptural texts: “There was tamas, intelligence was in the beginning concealed by tamas .. By power, it was born out of tamas. It is one.” (R.V. X.129. 3. & Taitt. Br. II.8. 9).706 The following passage attributed to Manu also says the same thing: “This was in the condition of tamas, incapable of direct perception, devoid of characteristics, uninferable and altogether incapable of differentiated knowledge, as if it were in a condition of dreamless sleep” (Manu. I. 5.); and in fact immediately after the text, “Out of this, the Possessor of maya creates the whole of the universe” (Svet. Up. IV. 9), are declared those texts which deal with the immodifiability (of the Brahman).707 It has been already objected above that one and the same thing cannot possess the character of the instrumental as well as that of the material cause. Further, an effect is incapable of being produced through only one agency, because it is observed to be so as a general rule in the world. Therefore, the Vedanta passages can no more establish the origination (of the world) out of only one being than (we can make sense) out of the (inconsistent) sentence, “One should sprinkle with fire”. 706. The passage in Taitt. Br. (II. 8. 9) speaks of creation from out of tamas. In the Rig Veda we have the same passage, except for tabasastat in the place of tamasastat. The reference is to the tapas of the Brahman before creation, 707. See Svet. Up. (IV. 11), which refers to the Brahman as He who presides over every cause (of the world), in whom all things gather and become one (at dissolution) and from whom they emerge and disperse (during creation).” 284 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV To this, the following reply is given. Everything can be properly predicated in relation to the Supreme Brahman, who is entirely distinct from all other things, is omnipotent, is omniscient and is one only. In regard to non-intelligent things like clay etc., owing to their possessing no intelligence, there can be no association with the quality of being the presiding agent. Potters etc. who preside over (operations on clay, etc.) have no capability to undergo varied modifications (like material causes), nor have they the power to will the truth. (For these reasons) there is (in such cases) the rule from observation (that there must be more than one cause for an effect). Consequently, the Brahman Himself is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world. अभिध्योपदेशाच्च Sútra 24. Abhidhyopadesachcha (133) (The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because also of the teaching relating to His thinking and willing (to the effect that He will become manifold and be born). For the following reason also, the Brahman Himself is both (the material and the instrumental cause of the world): namely, because, in the following passages, “It desired (i.e., thought), ‘May I become manifold and be born’ (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1), and “It saw (i.e., thought), ‘May I become manifold and be born’” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3), the teaching given relates to the Supreme Brahman, who is the creator, thinking and willing to the effect that He will Himself become manifold. Indeed, what is taught here is that creation is preceded by (His) thinking and willing thus: “I will Myself become manifold in the form of the Adhik. VII, Sut. 25] THE TREE & THE WOOD 285 varied intelligent and non-intelligent things, and be born accordingly”. साक्षाश्चोभयाम्नानात् Sutra 25. Sakshachchobhayāmnānāt (134) (The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) also because He is directly revealed in the scriptures to be both. This teaching (viz., that He is both the causes) is definitely determined not only with the help of “the proposition and the examples illustrative of it”, and of “the teaching relating to His thinking and willing” (set forth above) and other such things (as may be mentioned later). That the Brahman alone possesses both the character of the instrumental cause and the character of the material cause is directly revealed in the scriptures, as in the follow- ing passages: “Which indeed is the wood and which, indeed, is that tree out of which they fashioned Heaven and earth? O wise men, question your mind as to which things He presided over-He who bears the worlds. The Brahman is the wood, the Brahman is that tree out of which He fashioned the Heaven and earth: the Brahman who supports the worlds presides over Himself with His mind, I tell you, O you wise men” (Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9).708 708. Te previous two Sutrās have relied on the general sense of the Vedas. Now and in Sutras 26 and 28, specific texts are cited in favour of the, position taken by the Vedanta. Sankara takes the text referred to here to be Chhand. Up. (1.9.1.) The text quoted by Ramanuja is apt and very much to the point. Here certain disciples ask their teacher: Where was II. S.B.-37 "” the universe before creation? What is its material cause? What are the instruments used by the Lord in creation?” The teacher answers: “The Brahman is the place, He is the material cause, He presides over Himself in the form of instruments.” Note that a plurality of creators is not intended by the plural number of the verb in the question. 286 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 1, Part IV Indeed, if it is asked (by way of objection to the Brahman being both the causes) from the point of view of ordinary people in this world, what the material is for the Brahman who is the Creator and what His auxiliary implements for creation are, the answer is given in disproof, that inasmuch as it is nothing wrong for the Brahman, who is entirely distinct from all other things, to be in association with omnipotence, the Brahman Himself is both the material cause and the auxiliary implements (of creation). For this reason also, the Brahman is both (the material and the instrumental cause of the world). आत्मकृतेः Sútra 26. Atmākṛiteḥ (135) (The Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because (also) of His making Himself (into the world is taught in the scripture). .. In regard to the Brahman, who at the beginning of the context is taught to be desirous of creating (the world), as in the passage, “He desired, May I become manifold and be born’” (Taitt. Up. II. 6.), it is made out from the (subsequent) passage, “Therefore He Himself made. Himself (into many)” (Taitt. Up. II. 7), that He possesses both the quality of being the Creator and the quality of being the object of creation. Therefore, He Himself multiplies Himself into the world. Consequently, it is ascertained (therefrom) that to Him alone belongs both the character of being the material cause and the character of being the instrumental cause (of the world). The Supreme Self, when undifferentiated by names and forms, is the agent (of the act of creation); He Himself, being differenti- ated by names and forms, is the effect (or object of the act of creation in the form of the world). Thus there isAdhik. VII, Sūt. 27] EVIL IN EVOLUTION? 287 nothing wrong in His being both the agent and the object of creation. Inasmuch as He Himself made Himself into that (form of the world), He is both the instrumental cause and the material cause (of the world). The Supreme Brahman is devoid of even the slightest trace of the evil that is found to exist in all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, and He is the sole abode of all knowledge and bliss unsurpassed in excellence, according to the following passages of the scriptures: “The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity” (Taitt. Up. II.1.1.); “The Brahman is bliss” (Taitt. Up. III. 6. 1): “He is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 5); “He is without parts, without actions, tranquil, devoid of evil and untainted” (Svet. Up. VI. 19.); “This aforesaid Person is indeed the Great Self, who is free from birth, free from old age and free from death” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 25.). Here he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) raises in regard to Him. the doubt as to how, through thinking and willing to become manifold, there can happen to Him the evolution of manifoldness in the form of the wonderfully infinite world which is the abode of all wrong aims of life and is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things. And he dispels (that doubt) as follows: परिणामात् Sútra 27. Pariņāmāt (136) (The Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the word) because of the evolution (relating to Him as taught in the scriptures being peculiar). That is to say, because of His having a peculiarly evolving nature. The nature of the evolution which is taught here is such that it does not bring about imperfection 288 SRI-BHASHYA in the Supreme [Chap. I, Part IV Brahman. On On the oontrary, it undoubtedly assigns to Him unobstructed sovereignty. Such is the idea,709 The modification (or evolution here under reference) is indeed taught to be of this character. The Supreme Brahman is the opposite of all that is evil and the sole seat of all auspicious qualities. He is entirely distinct from all other things (than Himself). He is omniscient, and He wills the truth. He has all His desires fulfilled; He is bliss unsurpassed in excellence; owing to His possessing as His body the whole of the totality of intelligent and non-intelligent things, which form the instruments of His play, He is their Self. When the world, which forms His body, becomes reduced at dissolution, through a succession of causes beginning with the tanmatras (rudimentary elements), ahankara (the principle of egoity) etc., to an extremely subtle, non-intelligent thing that is denoted by the word, ’tamas’, and when (this) tamas, on account of its assumption of a very subtle state which cannot be separately pointed out even as His body, has passed into the state of oneness with Himself: then the Brahman, who has such a tamas for His body, thinks and wills to the effect, “May I, as before, have for (My) body the world of intelligent and non-intelligent things differentiated by names and forms”. Then, in the reverse order of dissolution (of the principles constituting the world), He modifies His own self so as to have the (created) world for His body. This is the modification taught in all the Vedanta texts. That the whole world forms the body of the Brahman and that the Brahman forms its Self is indeed taught in 709. The reference to evolution may, on the face of it, seem an objection to the view that the Brahman is the material cause. So Ramanuja explains that the Sutra refers to the nature of the Brahman Himself. He at once proceeds to make it clear that this evolution is peculiar to the Brahman and does not indicate any imperfection in Him, Adhik. VII, Sut. 27] INTERNAL CONTROLLER 289 this very manner thus in the Brihadaraṇyaka (Upanishad): “He who, dwelling in the earth is within earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who internally controls the earth, He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self… (He) whose body is the waters… whose body is the fire… whose body is the mid-heaven … whose body is the air . . . whose body is the heavens … whose body is the sun. . . whose body is the directions in space… whose body is the moon and the stars… whose body is the ethereal space . . . whose body is the tamas… whose body is the light. . . whose body is all the beings… whose body is the prana (vital air)… whose body is the speech… whose body is the eye.. whose body is the ear… whose body is the mind… whose body is the skin… whose body is the under- standing” and ending, according to the recension of the Kanvas, with: “He whose body is the seed…”. According to the recension of the Madhyandinas, however, there is this difference, namely, that in the place of the expression, “(He whose body is the) understanding”, there is the passage, “He whose body is the (individual) self”: and there is this in addition, that the worlds, the sacrifices and the Vedas form the body of the Supreme Self. In the Subalopanishad also, it is first declared that the earth and the other entities form the body of the Supreme Self, and then it is declared that the entities not mentioned in the Vajasaneyaka (i.e., Brih. Up.) form His body and the Brahman forms their Self, as in the following passage :-” He whose body is the intellect… whose body is the material principle of egoity… whose body is the mind… whose body is the avyakta… whose body is the akshara… who moves within the mrityu, whose body is the mṛityu, whom the mrityu does not know, He is the Internal Self of all beings, is devoid of sin, is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa.’ (Sub. Up. VII). 290 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV Here, by the word, ‘mrityu’, is denoted the extremely subtle thing which is denoted by the word ’tamas’; because in that same Upanishad, the order of succession (at dissolution) is thus recognised :-“Avyakta is absorbed into the akshara, the akshara is absorbed into the tamas.’ (Sub. Up. II). Inasmuch as it is at the root of the evils arising on account of its veiling the knowledge of all the individual selves, that tamas itself is indeed capable of being denoted by the word ‘mrityu ‘.710 In the Subalopanishad itself, it is declared, as in the following passage, that all the entities undergo absorption into Brahman Himself, as they have Him as their Self, on account of their forming the body of the Brahman :– “The element of earth is absorbed into the element of water; the element of water is absorbed into the element of fire: the element of fire is absorbed into the element of air: the element of air is absorbed into the element of ether: the element of ether (is absorbed) into the senses: the senses (are absorbed) into material elements in the subtle condition: the material elements in the subtle condition (are absorbed back) into the bhutādi: the bhutādi is absorbed (back) into the mahat (or the ‘great’ principle): the mahat is absorbed into the avyakta: the avyakta is absorbed into the akshara: the akshara is absorbed (back) into the tamas: the tamas becomes one with the Supreme Lord.” (Sub. Up. II). He (that is, the Sitrakara) says later on under the aphorism: “If it be said there is no karma (or results of works before creation) because of the declaration in the scriptures of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the Brahman prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because 710. Both the words, ’tamas’ and ‘mrityu’, mean ‘matter’. The former, which literally signifies ‘darkness’, appropriately refers to matter: for matter veils know- ledge. Mrityu usually means ‘death’: as matter is responsible for the disasters and bondage of samsåra, it can be very well called ‘mrityu’. Adhik. VII, Sut. 27] EVOLVED WORLD 291 both (the selves and karma) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) is appropriate and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures” (Ved. Sut. II. 1. 35)-that, even in the condition of non-differentiation, all the intelligent and non-intelligent things exist in association with the innate impressions of karmas (or effects of works). In this manner, in relation to the Brahman who has as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, which are in an extremely subtle condition and are one with the Supreme Self owing to their being incapable of being pointed out separately from Himself; who is (thus) one without a second; who is possessed of bliss un- surpassed in excellence; who is omniscient; and who wills the truth-modification, in the form of the world and preceded by thinking and willing to the effect that He will become manifold through having as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross state when they are capable of being differentiated into names and forms, is declared 711 in the following scriptural passages:- -“The Brahman is existence, knowledge, infinity” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1); “Different from this, indeed, which consists of knowledge is the other, the internal Self which consists of bliss” (Taitt. Up. II. 5.1); “He causes bliss indeed” (Taitt. Up. II. 7. 1); and “He desired, May I become manifold and be born’; He performed tapas; after performing tapas, He created all this, whatever there is; having created it, He entered into that same thing; having entered into it, He became the sat and the tyat,712 the defined and the undefined, the possessor of a home and the homeless, the intelligent thing 711. The evolutionary nature of the Brahman (Sutra 27) is intended to explain how He could have made Himself into the world as declared in Sutra 26. The discussion thus has its basis in that declaration in Taitt. Up. (11.7.1). So Ramanuja quotes extensively from that text, It is to be noted that the Chhandogya authority for the Brahman being one only without a s cond (VI. 2. 1) is deliberately Omitted as outside the present context. 712. See Note 183, Vol. I,292 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV and the non-intelligent thing; while being the unchangeable (individual self or satya) and the changeable (matter), He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1). " Here, by the word ’tapas’ is denoted knowledge which relates to the complete thinking over about that configura- tion of the world which was created before; because the scripture declares so in the following and other similar passages: “His tapas consists of knowledge” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 9).713 The meaning is that after completely thinking out that configuration of the world which was created before, now (that is, subsequently) also, He created the world as having that same configuration. In this very same manner, indeed, does the Brahman create the world of only one and the same nature in all the periods of time known as kalpas, as declared in the following scriptural passage: “The Creator created the sun and moon as before, as also heaven and earth and the mid-heaven and Svarga (M. N. Up. V. 7); as well as in the following passage taken from the Smriti: “Just as the manifold seasonal characteristics during the seasons appeared in similar conditions during the (next) reversion (of the seasons), similarly the various (types of created) beings also (reappear) at the beginning of the periods of time known as yugas” (V. P. I. 5. 65). Therefore, the meaning is this. The Supreme Self, who is of Himself possessed of a nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, in consequence of His owning as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form the auxiliary instruments of His mere play and are almost in a state of non-existence owing to their being extremely subtle in nature, consists of all those things (in the state of pralaya). With the object of adopting wonderfully invented toys for His play, He transforms 713. See also Note 345, Vol. I. Adhik. VII, Sut. 27] NO EVIL TO ‘BRAHMAN’ 293 Himself, as having each particular thing as His body, in the order of succession relating to the aggregate creation of the matter and individual souls forming His body, and ending with the great external material elements. And consisting of those things, He again assumed the form of the world, which begins with the gods and ends with immovable things and in which are mixed up the varied intelligent and non-intelligent things that are denoted by the words, ‘sat’ and ’tyat’, respectively. In the passage, “He entered into that same thing; having entered into it, etc.” (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1),714 what is stated is that the Supreme Self Himself, who, in the condition of cause, existed as the Self, existed as the Self, in the condition of effect also, of the changing substance which is produced as effected, and thus became each particular (produced) thing. In regard to this transforma- tion in the form of the world, which consists of the combination of the Supreme Self, the intelligent (individual soul) and the non-intelligent (matter), all the wrong aims of life appertain undoubtedly unto the intelligent part of the body of the Supreme Self and all the substantial modifications belong to the non-intelligent part similarly circumstanced. For the Supreme Self, to be the (produced) effect is to be the Self as the controller of those two parts existing in that condition (of effect). The Supreme Self, however, who, owing to His being the controller of those two parts which form His body, constitutes their Self, is not touched by the wrong aims of life associated therewith as well as by the modifications (relating thereto). Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss, and being always of a uniform nature, He exists in association with the mere sport of revolving the world. The same thing is said in the passage: “While being the unchangeable (individual self or satya) and the 714. The Śruta prakāšikā points out that the creation of the world by God and the anupravesa (or the entering by Him into the II. S.B.-38 created world) must be both deemed to be simultaneous, and that this is the purport of Ramanuja’s explanation here. 294 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV changeable (matter), He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature”. (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1). The meaning is that the Brahman remained unchanged, although He underwent modifications in the form of the varied intelligent and non-intelligent things: being devoid of even a little of all that is evil, and being possessed of unlimited knowledge and bliss, He existed with one and the same nature. All the intelligent and non-intelligent things, when they assume their subtle state, as when they are in the gross state, form the auxiliary instruments of the mere play of the Supreme Brahman. Creation etc. are His play. This has been so taught by the venerable Dvaipayana, Parasara and others, as in the following and other similar passages:-“One should know that all this, which begins with the avyakta and ends with particularity (i.e., the earth) and is associated with modification and growth, is the mere play of Hari (God) and is destructible.” (?); “Of Him who is like unto a playing child, listen to the activities” (V. P. I. 2. 18); “He resembles a child by reason of his toys”. (Vayu Pu. Utt. XXXVI. 69). And he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) says later on (the same thing) under the aphorism: “Mere play (is all His purpose in the creation etc. of the world), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world.” (Ved. Sūt. II. 1. 33). According to the passage, “Out of this the Possessor of māyā creates the whole of this world, wherein the other (i.e., the individual self) is bound down by māyā’ (Svet. Up. IV. 9), although the Brahman undergoes modifications in the form of the world, all the substantial modifications appertain unto the non-intelligent part which forms His mode, and all the wrong aims of life appertain unto the individual self which (also) forms His mode. To make this discrimination, the teaching given relates to the distinction (from the Brahman) of matter and the individual self, which form the body of the Brahman, even when, owing to their having assumed an extremely subtle state, (i.e. prior to creation) they are incapable of being Adhik. VII, Süt. 28] SOURCE OF THE WORLD 295 pointed out as such and are one with the Brahman. Because it (ie., this passage) has to have oneness of meaning with the following and other similar passages : “Therefore, He made Himself (manifold).” (Taitt. Up. II. 7). To the same effect is the following passage attributed to Manu: “After thinking and willing (that He might become manifold) He became desirous of creating various kinds of creatures; He created only waters in the beginning and put His seed therein.” (Manu. I. 8.) For this very reason, the scriptural passages which deal with the Brahman being free from evil as well as with His being free from modification, are also appropriate. Consequently, the Brahman Himself is the instrumental cause as well as the material cause (of the world). योनिश्व हि गीयते Sutra 28. Yonischa hi giyate (137) (The Brahman is also the material cause) because also He is declared (in the scriptures) to be the source (of the world). For the following reason also,715 the Brahman is the instrumental cause as well as the material cause of the world-for the reason, that in the following passages He is declared even to be a yoni (or source of the world): “The Brahman is the creator, lord, purusha and yoni.” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 3); and “The wise perceive Him to be the yoni of all beings.” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 6). That the word ‘yoni’ denotes the material cause is made out from the complementary passage: “Just as the spider sends forth and draws in (its web). (Mund. Up. I. 1. 7). • · 715. This Sutra, also like Sutras 25 and 26, is concerned with specific scriptural texts declaring the Brahman to be both he material and the instrumental "” cause. It is placed last probably because the Mundaka texts cited now refer to the subject inciden- tally (III. 13), or incompletely (I. 1. 6). 296 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. I, Part IV ADHIKARANA VIII SARVA-VYAKHYANADHIKARAŅA एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः Sútra 29. Etena sarve vyākhyātā vyākhyātāḥ (138) By means of the foregoing (reasoning), all other (similar passages) have been explained, have been explained. ‘By means of the foregoing’ means ’through the whole body of the group of arguments stated in all the four parts (of the first chapter)’. ‘All’ means the particular passages which in all the Vedanta scriptures aim at dealing with the cause of the world. They have been explained as dealing with the Brahman, who is entirely distinct from all intelligent and non-intelligent things, who is omniscient and who is omnipotent.716 716. A new Sutra or Adhi- karana, which relies on previous reasoning or conclusions, has to justify itself by dealing with some additional doubt. Here such a doubt is raised and solved. The theme of the first chapter is to establish that the Brahman is the cansa of the would. This is sought to be proved by a critical examination of all the passages in the scriptures concerned with the subject. They fall more or less into eight types. (1) Some indicate the cause of the world by words like ‘Sat’, ‘Brahman’ and ‘Akshara’ which may denote matter, the individual self, or the Brahman. (ii) & (iii) There are sentences using words like ‘kshetrajña’ and ‘gau’, which respectively denote the individual self and matter exclusively. (iv) In some cases we have words like ‘atman’ which ean denote either the individual self or the Supreme Self. (v) In a few other cases there are found ambiguous words which may denote particular individual selves or particular modifications of matter, as for instance in the Vaisvanara passages. (vi) & (vii) Then again there are passages with words denoting particular individu al selves (like Indra) and those with words denoting particular modifi- cations of matter (like ākāśa). (viii) Finally, words exclusively indicative of the Brahman are also found used, as in the Antaryami-Brahmana. In allAdhik. VIII, Sut. 29] END OF CHAPTER 297 The repetition of the expression, “have been explained,” is intended to mark the close of the chapter, these cases, the prima facie view sought to prove something other than the Brahman to be the cause of the world on the ground that characteristics of this other thing are indicated or implied. The unmistakable characteristics of the Brahman to be found therein dispelled these objections. Now the problem is: what about passages where the cause of the world is mentioned barely, without being associated with the characteristics of the chit, the achit or the Brahman? The answer to this doubt is that the Brakman is to be regarded as being indicated in every such case, as the Brahman alone has been established to be the cause of the world. The grutaprakašika ex- plains at very great length where and how the principles of Inter- pretation and steps of reasoning already set out are to be applied. CHAPTER II ADHIKARANA 1 SMRITYADHIKARAŅA स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् Sutra 1. Smṛityanavakā šaprasanga iti chennanyasmṛityanavakāsadoshaprasangat (137) If it be said that (in case the Vedanta is accepted as teaching the Brahman to be the cause of the world) the Smriti (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplement- ing the Vedanta, it is replied that) it is not right to say so; because such (a view) will lead to the evil of other Smritis not finding scope. In the first chapter, it has been stated that the Supreme Brahman is an entity distinct from non-intelligent matter, which falls within the range of direct perception and other means of proof (i.e., logical inference); and (distinct) also from both the intelligent individual self that is associated (in samsāra) with that (non-intelligent matter) and the intelligent individual soul which is dissociated from it (in moksha); that He is devoid of even the slightest trace of all that is ignorance and of all other wrong aims of life; that He is the infinite and sole abode of the quality of being knowledge and the quality of being bliss; that He is 300 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I possessed of an ocean of noble qualities which is infinite; that He is the sole cause of the whole universe; that He is the internal Self of all beings; and that He is capable of being known by means of the Vedanta. Immediately afterwards the second chapter is introduced with the object of showing that this teaching (of the first chapter) is unassailable from any and every (possible or imaginable) point of view. First of all, then, he (i.e., the Sūtrakāra) raises the doubt that in consequence of their opposition to the Smriti of Kapila, the Vedanta texts do not deal with that (Brahman taught earlier). And he dispels that (doubt). How can it be said that the scripture deals with other things (than the said Brahman), because it contradicts the Smriti (in general)? For it is declared in the following aphorism that the Smriti, which is opposed to the scripture, has to be disregarded: “Where, however, there is contradiction (of the Smriti with the Sruti), it (i.e., the Smriti) is to be disregarded; (where, however, there is no such contradiction, then there arises the presumption that a scriptural text forms the basis of the Smriti.)” (Pür. Mim. I. 3. 3).717 True (that it is so declared). In regard to scriptural sentences like, “After touching the udumbara stick, one should begin to sing” (?), it is possible to determine definitely the meaning solely by means of these sentences themselves, and therefore the Smriti, which is opposed to such (sentences) has to be disregarded altogether. But here (in the case under reference), owing to the real entity taught in the Vedanta 717. The usual illustration given of the contradiction between Śruti and Smriti texts is indicated in part by Ramanuja, The Śruti injunction is that there should be singing of Saman hymns after touching a post made of the wood of a kind of fig tree (udumbara). This is contradicted by a Smriti text which requires: “The whole of the udumbara should be covered over (with cloth)”. In view of the clear injunction of the Sruti, the Smriti has to be disregarded. Adhik. I, Sut. 1] KAPILA’S GREATNESS 301 being difficult to comprehend, there will be no definite determination that such and such is the meaning, if there is contradiction (of the scripture) with the Smriti composed by the great sage (Kapila). And thus it is nothing wrong to propound with the help of the Smriti that the scripture does not deal with that (i.e., the Brahman). What is said is this. The great sage and seer, Kapila, accepts as they are in reality all the religious rites such as the agnihotra, the new moon and full moon sacrifices and the jyotish!oma, which are dealt with in the earlier part (of the Vedanta) as forming the means for attaining all prosperity. He is spoken of in the scriptures, Smritis, Itihasas and Purāņas, as being faithful (and authoritative) in such passages as “Kapila was born as a sage.” (Svet. Up. V. 2.) Without the help of the supplementary exposition composed by him in the form of a Smriti (for elucidating the Vedanta) as a result of his being the knower of the highest good and all the means of attaining it, it is not possible for persons of little knowledge and dull intellects to determine definitely the meaning of the Vedanta. And if what is made out (from the Vedanta) is merely the popular verbal meaning (thereof), the whole of the Smriti of the Sankhyas will have no scope (in leading to the real meaning thereof). For these reasons, it has necessarily to be accepted that the very meaning, well known to be taught by the Smriti (of Kapila), is itself the teaching of the Vedanta. It should not, however, be urged that under such circumstances, room will be given for the evil of excluding the Smriti of Manu and other Smritis which deal with the Brahman as the sole cause (of the universe). For those (Smritis) which support and supplement the earlier part which deals with religious duties, have their scope undoubtedly (in helping one to understand the Veda). The whole of this (Smriti), however, aims at establishing the truth (of the Pradhana as the cause of the universe). II. S.B.-39302 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I And hence if it is not accepted to be so, it will surely have no scope (in helping one to understand the Veda). Therefore, he (i.e., the Sutrakāra) raises this doubt, namely, “If it be said that (in case the Vedanta is accepted as teaching the Brahman to be the cause of the world), the Smriti (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplementing the Vedanta)…. (Ved. Sut. II.

1.).718 11 To this it is replied that it is not right to say so, because such a view will lead to the evil of excluding Smritis other than that of Kapila from being accepted as guides to the Vedanta. Indeed, other Smritis like that of Manu declare the Brahman to be the sole cause (in relation to the world). Manu says thus: “This was in the condition of tamas……. Then the self-existent divine Lord, being possessed of that splendour which consists of the knowledge of His will operating on the great external elements, being unmanifest became manifest as the dispeller of darkness. After thinking and willing to the effect that He would become manifest, He, with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures out of His body, created the waters alone at first and therein put His seed.” (Manu I. 5-8.)719 In the Bhagavadgitā, also, there is the following passage to the same effect: “I am the source as well as the destruction of the whole world” (B. G. VII. 6.); and
The argu nent is based on a general principle of interpre- tation that an injunction which has no other scope than the matter under consideration, is to be deemed applicable there, in preference to other injunctions which may press their claims here, while having scope elsewhere. (Savakaja niravakasayoḥ nirava- kaso baliyan). The work of Kapila has scope only in metaphysics, while those of Manu etc. are claimed to deal primarily with duties and rituals and incidentally with metaphysics. The reply is that the works of Manu and others cannot be said to be primarily interested only in duties etc.
The passage from Manu is cited to indicate that the duties later laid down are intended to be of the nature cf the worship of the Lord, who is the cause of the universe. Manu starts with a discourse on the Lord as a necessary preliminary to an account of the duties and rituals which constitute His worship. Adhik. I, Süt. 1] WHAT ‘SMRITIS’ SAY 303 “I am the source of all beings and everything proceeds from Me.” (B. G. X. 8.) Again, in the Mahabharata, there are the following passages to the same effect: “Whence was all this world, immovable and movable, created? and to who does it go at dissolution? Tell me all about this, grandfather.’ (M. B. XII. 180. 1.) Having been thus questioned (by Yudhishthira), he (Bhishma) said: “Nārāyana has the world for His body. He consists of countless selves and He is ancient.” (M. B. XII. 180. 11). Similarly, there is the passage: “O thou best among the twice-born (i.e., Nārada), the avyakta characterised by the three qualities (of sattva, rajas and tamas) was born out of that (Purusha) (M.B. XII. 342. 32)-and also the passage: “O Brahmin (Narada), the avyakta is fully absorbed into the Purusha, who is destitute of actions” (M.B. XII. 347. 31). The venerable Parāśara also says the same thing in the passage: “The world was born out of Vishnu and is existent in Him alone. He is the preserver and controller of the world. And He is Himself the world.” (V.P. I. 1. 35)720 "” Apastamba also says the same thing in the passage beginning with “All the living beings are themselves the body of Him who is in the interior of all beings, who is incapable of being killed and who is free from sin” (Ap. Dh. I. 22. 4), and ending with “Therefore all beings spring from Him as (His) bodies; He is the source; He is everlasting; He is eternal.” (Ap. Dh. I. 23. 2) 721 If the definite determination of the teachings of the Vedanta is arrived at with the help of the Smriti of Kapila, then the great evil of lack of scope of all these
See Note 704 for the quotations from the Mahabharata, and Note, 107, Vol. I, for the passage from the Vishnu purana.
The passage from Apa- stamba not merely describes creation from the Brahman; it also teaches the relationship of body and soul between Him and the world, 304 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 other Smritis (as aids and supplements) to the Vedanta will accrue. The meaning is this. No doubt, inasmuch as the Vedanta passages aim at establishing the entity which is beyond the range of the competency of direct perception and all other means of knowledge, therefore, for the purpose of elucidating that entity, there is need of support- ing and supplementing again the meaning (of the Vedanta) for the beginners whose knowledge is very little. Neverthe- less, lack of scope should not accrue to many Smritis, which, following the teaching of that (Vedanta), have been composed by those who are most faithful and authoritative, and which have been promulgated for supporting and supplementing that meaning. Therefore, the Smriti of Kapila, whose teaching is opposed to the scripture, has to be disregarded. To support and supplement (the Vedanta) means to elucidate the meaning taught in the Sruti. And that is not possible to bring about by means of a Smriti, whose teaching is opposed to the scripture.722 Moreover, the scope for these other Smritis does not arise from their elucidating the section in the earlier part (of the Vedanta) relating to the religious duties, because these (Smritis) lay down the religious duties as constituting the worship of the Supreme Person who is (also) the Supreme
The main purvapaksha arguments are: (i) that the obscure and contrad ctory Vedanta texts have to be understood only in the light of the Smriti of Kapila, which has no scope any. where else, and of the stray texts which support them; (ii) that Kapila is a sage whose teachings are authoritative; (iii) and that Manu and others who teach differently are authoritative only in respect of the duties and rituals enjoined by them. The answer is (i) that while Kapita is a sage with some authority, Manu and others are most authoritative; (ii) that, as against the single Smriti of Kapila, there are many Smritis by Manu and others; (ii) that the teachings of these are authoritative not merely in respect of duties and rituals but also in respect of philosophy and metaphysics. (iv) that the stray texts on which the Sankhya relies are those which are apparently at variance with the numerous other texts so far interpreted in accordance with various principles of interpretation by the Vedanta-Sutras; and (v) that even these stray texts have to be understood in harmony with the rest. Adhik. I, Sut. 1] WORKS ARE WORSHIP 305 Brahman. If they do not propound the Supreme Person, who forms the object of worship, it is not possible for them to propound the religious duties which constitute His worship. Accordingly, it is taught in the following passages of (these) Smritis that all works possess the characteristic of constituting the worship of the Supreme Person: “He, out of whom proceeds the activity of beings and by whom all these is pervaded, by worshipping Him by means of his own religious works, man obtains perfection (B. G. XVIII. 46); “Even in the case of bathing and other actions, one should contemplate upon the Lord Nārāyaṇa. One thus obtains the world of the Brahman and does not return to the world again” (Daksha-smṛiti); and “O Lord, there are these people who are devoted to their own religious duties; and when You are worshipped by such people, they transcend all this maya, so as to obtain their own final freedom.” (V.P. V. 30. 16). Moreover, the scope for these (Smritis) does not arise, from their propounding the religious rites which form the means of obtaining the fruits of samsara in this and the other world. For the essential nature of those works also is to constitute the worship of the Supreme Person. To this effect, it has been said: “And they, too, who are devoted to the worship of other deities and who are endowed with faith, even they, O son of Kunti, worship Me alone, though not in conformity with the scripture. I am also indeed the enjoyer as well as the Lord of all sacrifices. They do not however know Me in reality. Therefore, they fall.” (B. G. IX. 23. 24). To a similar effect is the passage: “Oh! ‘You, the Undecaying One, consist of all the gods; daily You are worshipped by means of sacrifices. You are the only eater of the offerings to the gods and of the offerings to the manes. You bear the forms of both the gods and the manes.” (V. P. V. 20. 97). 306 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I What has been already stated above to the effect that because “Kapila was born as a sage” (Svet. Up. V. 2f, he has been spoken of as being faithful and authoritative, and that therefore it is right to determine the meaning of the Vedanta in accordance with that (Smṛiti)-this is not right. For Brihaspati has been spoken of in all the scriptures and Smritis as the finest example of those who are unsurpassed in the knowledge; therefore, can room be given for the determination of the meaning of the scripture with the help of the system of materialism promulgated by him? It may again be objected that, inasmuch as Kapila possessed through the power of his yoga the knowledge of the truth of things, therefore, the meaning of the Vedanta has to be determined according to his Smriti. Therefore, he (the Sutrākāra) makes the following reply thereto : इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः Sútra 2. Itareshām chānupalabdheḥ (140) Because, however, of there having been no percepts (of the pradhana as the cause) on the part of others (like Manu etc.) The word ‘cha’ (which usually means “and”) has here the sense of the adversative particle, ’tu’ (which means but’, ‘however’, or ‘on the contrary’) and is intended to dispel the doubt raised above. The ‘others’ 723 are Manu and many others who, through the greatness of yoga, had direct perception of the truth of the higher
According to Sankara this Sutra refers to ‘other’ princi- ples than the pradhana of the Sankhya, namely, mahat etc., which are not known from the world or from the Vedas. These ’effects’ being imaginary, their cause, the pradhana, also is imaginary.Adhik. II, Sut. 3] TEACHING OF ‘YOGA’ 307 and lower realities, and are celebrated in the scriptural text, “Whatsoever Manu said, that is medicinal " (Taitt. Samh. II. 2. 10. 2), as having given utterance to words which form the medicine to the world (for the disease of samsara). They have no perception of true knowledge as seen by Kapila. Therefore, the perception of Kapila, which is opposed to scripture, is based on error. Consequently, it is an established conclusion that the meaning of the Vedanta as aforesaid is incapable of being disturbed by means of that (perception of Kapila). ADHIKARANA II YOGAPRATYUKTYADHIKARANA. एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः Sútra 3. Etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ. (141) By means of this (reasoning), the yoga (system of Hiranyagarbha also) is contradicted. “By means of this (reasoning),” that is, through the method adopted for rejecting the Smriti of Kapila, the Yogasmriti (of Hiranyagarbha) also is contradicted. What then is the additional doubt here to answer which the argument (used in the previous Adhikaraṇa) is to receive extended application by analogy? It is this that in the Yogasmriti (of Hiranyagarbha) a (Supreme) Lord is admitted, and the yoga (of devotion) described in the Vedanta as the means for the attainment of final release is (also) mentioned therein; and the teacher, Hiranyagarbha, is competent to promulgate the whole of the Vedanta. 308 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 For these reasons, it is but right by means of his Smriti to support and supplement (the Vedanta).724 The answer (to this), however, is as follows. (In that Smriti) is the doctrine by which the pradhana (or material Nature) which does not have the Brahman for its Self, is upheld to be the (material) cause of the world. The (Supreme) Lord is accepted to be merely the instrumental cause. The yoga (mentioned therein), which consists of contemplation and which is capable of being defined solely in relation to the object of contemplation, is not based upon the Veda, inasmuch as the individual self and the Lord, who form the objects of contemplation (therein), are devoid, the one of the character of having the Brahman as the self and the other of the quality of being the material cause of the world and all other auspicious qualities. The teacher, Hiranyagarbha, who is also an individual self, is capable at times of being subdued by the qualities of passion (rajas) and darkness (tamas). For these reasons, the Yoga-smriti also, like those Purāṇas composed by Him which are based upon passion and darkness,725 is based upon error. Consequently, by means of this (Smriti), it is improper to support and supplement (the Vedanta).
Hiranyagarbha is here. taken to be Brahma, the four faced creator. His authority is questioned on the ground that he too, like any other individual self, is liable to be overcome by rajas and tamas. The meditation taught by him is not of the kind required by the Vedanta. Sankara argues that while part of the teaching of the Yogasmriti is acceptable, another part relating to the pradhana being the cause of the world, has to be rejected.
All the puranas are deemed to be the works of Brahma. But they fall into three divisions, according to the guna of prakriti-sattva, rajas or tamas -dominant at the time of composition in Brahma. Only those composed under the influ- ence of sattva are held to be authoritative. Adhik. III, Süt. 41 ‘BRAHMAN’ Vs. WORLD ADHIKARANA III VILAKSHṆATVĀDHIKARANA. नविलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् Sútra 4. Na vilakshṇatvādasya tathātvam cha -309 sabdat (142) (The causality of the Brahman in relation to the world) cannot be predicated because of this (world) having an entirely distinct character (from Him); and (its having) such a character is made out from the scripture. Again, those who argue in support of the contradiction (of the Vedanta) by the Smriti (of Kapila) raise the following objection depending upon logical reasoning. It has been already stated above, in refuting the Smriti of the Sankhyas, that the world is the produced effect of the Brahman. This position ‘cannot’ properly result (from the Vedanta), because ’this’ world, which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, is arrived at, by means of direct perception and other means of proof, to be (largely) inanimate, impure, subordinate and full of misery, and (thus) entirely distinct in character from the Brahman, who, as admitted by you (the Vedantin), is omniscient, the lord of all, the opposite of all evil and the sole seat of bliss.726 It is not merely through direct perception and other means of proof that the entirely distinct character of the world (from the Brahman) is arrived at.
The Smritis of of the to authority Manu and others is here attacked on the ground that, in teaching the Brahman to be the cause of the world, they are unreasonable. For there is no similarity between the Brahman and the world, as may be seen by II. S.B.-40 He Bee the attributes of the one being the opposites of those of the other. Kapila’s Smriti conforms reason by denying the dissimilar Brahman to be the cause and accepting the similar pradhana in His place. 310 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I character’, namely, its being distinct, is made out also from the scripture. 66

In the following and other similar passages-“Know- ledge and non-knowledge” (Taitt. Up. II. 6); … even so, these subtle material elements are made to depend upon the subtle intelligences and the subtle intelligences are made to depend upon the Pṛāņa” (Kaush. Up. III. 9); “On the same tree the individual self sits immersed in grief, and being ignorant and powerless, he feels sorry (Svet. Up. IV. 7); “He who is not the Lord is the individual soul and is bound down in consequence of his being the enjoyer” (Svet. Up. I. 8)-the qualities of being not intelligent, miserable, etc. are pointed out in relation to the world which is indeed a produced effect. Whatsoever is indeed the produced effect of another thing, that (produced effect) is not distinct from that other thing, just as pots, necklaces etc. are the produced effects of clay, gold etc. (and are non-distinct from clay, gold etc.). Therefore, the world which is distinct from the Brahman cannot possibly have the character of a produced effect of His. Consequently, in accordance with the Smriti of the Sankhyas, only material Nature which is similar in character to the produced effect (i.e., the world) deserves to be the cause (thereof). Moreover, though the scriptutre, which is an indepen– dent (means of knowledge), deals with the things that transcend the senses, logical reasoning has necessarily to be adopted (here). For all the means of knowledge will become the cause of determining the true meaning of some matters here and there (i.e., in cases of ambiguity), only when they are supported by logical reasoning. Logical reasoning is indeed well known to be that knowledge which in any particular matter determines the means of establishing it either by explaining it in relation to the essential nature of the thing (to be proved), or to Adhik. III, Süt. 4] LOGIC & SCRIPTURE 311 the apparatus (of proof), and determines the nature and necessary details of the procedure to be adopted in regard to that (means of proof), and is synonymous with purpose- fully assumed apprehension. 727 The need of this (logical reasoning) is equal for all the means of knowledge. The scripture, however, possesses especially the character of being a means of knowledge that is dependent on the knowledge of expectancy, juxtaposition and compatibility. It needs logical reasoning throughout in all cases, and it is stated by Manu: “He who studies with the help of logical reasoning knows duty and not the other (who makes no such study).” (Manu, XII. 106) And that is why the establishment of the meaning of the scripture with the help of logical reasoning is referred to by the Sruti in statements like “It has to be meditated upon”. (Brih. Up. II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6), 728 It may, however, be objected (by the followers of Yadavaprakasa) that when it is definitely determined through the scripture that the world has the Brahman for its sole cause, then the persistence of consciousness in the world, which is the produced effect, has to be accepted; that just as an intelligent being has no manifestation of consciousness in the states of dreamless sleep and swooning, similarly the consciousness which is really existent even in pots and other similar things is unmanifest; and that the distinction of things as the intelligent and the non-intelligent is due to this reason. 727. The two modes of logical reasoning are illustrated in the Śruta-prakäsikā. When the akása is determined to be in- capable of ocular perception on account of its having no form, we have a case of determining the essential nature of a thing. When the scriptural injunction not to kill is determined to refer to cases other than those of victims in en joined sacrifices, the apparatus of proof is involved, 728. Manu’s statement is quoted with a significant omission, so as to support the Sankhyas. The reference is only to such logical reasoning as is in support of the scripture. The whole stanza is quoted later under Ved. Sut. (II. 1. 12).312 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 It is not right to say so, because the non-manifestation at all times (of a thing) proves only (its) non-existence. Therefore, even the association of the faculty of consciousness with those things (ie., pots etc.) is refuted, for he who attributes to a thing which at no time or place shows the power of producing an effect, the power of producing that effect-let him grow eloquent in the assemblies of the sons of barren women on their mothers” capacity to bear children. Moreover, it is (first) proved from the Vedanta texts that the Brahman is the material cause of the world. From this, it is determined that pots and similar things possess potential consciousness, or that they possess unmanifested consciousness. From this conviction, (in turn) it is determined that the Vedanta texts establish the Brahman to have the character of being the material cause of the world. In arguing thus, there arises the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. It is certainly quite impossible to predicate the relation of cause and effect between two things distinct from each other. What then is meant by similarity in character between material Nature, and its modification, owing to the absence of which (similarity) you speak of the impossibility of establishing the Brahman as the material cause of the world? Surely, there is no similarity in respect of all attributes (between them), because (in such a case) the relation of cause and effect is impossible (between them). Indeed, in pots, dishes etc., which are the effects of a lump of clay, the persistence of the character of the lump of clay etc. is not seen to exist. Again, it may be said that similarity (between them) is in respect of some attribute or other, and that such (a similarity) is possible between the world and the Brahman in respect of existence and other such attributes (like substantiality etc.). To this, it is replied thus. By means of whatever characteristic quality, the entity which forms the cause is Adhik. III, Suūt. 4] · CAUSE & EFFECT 313 differentiated from other entities, the persistence of that characteristic quality even in the produced effect of that (cause) is the similarity in character between the cause and the effect. Indeed, through whatever characteristic, gold is differentiated from clay etc., the persistence of that characteristic is seen to exist in ear-rings and other produced effects of that (gold). And the Brahman is of that nature which is the opposite of all evil, and which consists of knowledge, bliss and sovereignty, and the world has a nature opposite to that (of the Brahman). Therefore, it does not have Him for its material cause. It may, however, be again said that even in the case of dissimilarity (between two things), the relation of cause and effect is (sometimes) seen to exist (between them). For instance, out of the intelligent individual soul, non- intelligent things like hair on the head, nails, teeth and hair on the body are born. Again, for example, out of the non-intelligent cowdung, the intelligent scorpion is born, and out of the intelligent spider the non-intelligent cobweb is born. It is not right to say so. For even in these cases, the relation of cause and effect exists among the non-intelligent parts.729 It may again be objected as follows. Even in regard to those things which are accepted to be non-intelligent, association with the power of consciousness is declared in the scriptures as in the following passages : “The earth spoke to him” (Taitt. Samk. V. 5. 2. 10); “Indeed, the waters desired” (Taitt. Br. III. 1. 5); “Indeed, these prānas, competing with one another for their own importance, went to Brahma (the four-faced creator)” (Brih. Up. VI. 1. 7) Those who are well-versed in the 729. The arguments here are close to those of the Vedanta. They concede the possibility of life springing from non-life under exceptional circumstances. The stock examples are the production of the scorpion from cowdung and of worms from honey. 314 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I Puranas maintain that rivers, oceans, mountains etc. also possess consciousness.730 Therefore, there is no distinction in nature between the Brahman and the world. To this, he (the Sutrakāra) gives the following reply. afuærfagqqtareg fastargafarang अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् Sutra 5. Abhimānivyapadesastu viseshānugatibhyām (143) (Where non-intelligent things are mentioned as possessing consciousness) it is, however, the presiding deities that are taught, because it is made out to be so by means of the qualifying attribute and of the movement (of those deities) subsequent (to creation). The word, “however " (tu), is intended to remove the objection raised. The deities presiding over the earth etc. are denoted by the words earth etc. in the passages like “Indeed, the earth spoke to him.” (Taitt. Samh. V. 5. 2. 10). A particular quality is a qualifying attribute. The earth etc. are mentioned as qualified by the word “deity”. In the passage, “Indeed I enter into these three deities” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2), the elements of fire, water and earth are qualified by the word “deity “. deity”. There are also the following passages to the same effect: “Indeed, all the deities competing with one another for 730, The earth in the context protests to Prajapati against piling fire for the sacrifice. The deities of the water are stated to yearn for controlling the waters of the ocean. The senses, on the advice of Brahma, discover the principal vital air to be the most important among the n. In its absence, the body becomes putrid. (Brih. Uo. VI. 1.7 appears to have ‘Brahm’ in the place of ‘Brahmaṇam’ as quoted.) Adhik. III, Sut. 6] ‘BRAHMAN’ Vs. WORLD 315 their own importance. … Those deities, taking bliss to be seated in the prana…..” (Kaush. Up. II. 14).731 “Subsequent movement” is subsequent entry. In the passage beginning with “Agni (the god of fire), becoming speech, entered the mouth; the sun-god becoming the eye entered the eye-sockets; Vayu (the god of air), becoming the praṇa, entered the nostrils” (Ait. Ar. IV. 2. 4.), the subsequent entry of Agni etc. as the presiding deities over speech etc. is declared. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the world, which, owing to its being non-intelligent, is entirely distinct in nature from the Brahman, to be the produced effect of the Brahman. Consequently, in accordance with the Smriti (of Kapila) that is supported by logical reasoning, the causality of material Nature in relation to the world is expounded in the Vedanta. If it be so held, it is replied to as follows:- Sútra 6. Drisyate tu दृश्यते तु (144) But it (i.e., the fact that the Brahman or the cause is distinct from the world or the effect) is directly revealed in the scriptures. The objector’s view turns back through the word, “but”. What has already been stated above to the effect that, owing to the world being entirely distinct from the Brahman, it cannot possibly have the Brahman as its cause -that is not proper, because the relation of cause and 731. In Chhand. Up. (VI. 3. 2), the material elemen’s are indicated by mention of their presiding deities. Similarly, when elements are mentioned elsewhere, the deities can be meant. The prānas in Kaush. Up. (II. 9.) are the senses. The passage quoted from this Upanishad appears to have variant readings. ‘Età ha vai devata’ is found in many editions for ‘sarva ha vai devata’. ‘Taddevāḥ’ occurs for ’te devāḥ’ as quoted, 316 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I effect is seen to exist even between two things which are entirely distinct from each other; in fact, insects etc. which are entirely distinct from honey etc. are seen to take their birth out of those (honey etc.). Was it not indeed stated above that, owing to the rela- tion of cause and effect existing only between non-intelligent parts, there is similarity between them? True, it was so stated. By that much, the similarity accepted by you is not established between cause and effect. If somehow or other there be such a similarity, all things will come to be similar with all else. And this leads to the risk of the birth of all things taking place out of all things. Hence the similarity you have accepted is the persistence of the characteristic.. which forms the cause of distinguishing one thing from another. But this invariable restriction is not seen to exist in regard to the birth of worms, etc. out of honey etc. Thus it is not inappropriate even for the world which is distinct from the Brahman to be the produced effect of the Brahman. Indeed, the persistence of the peculiar attribute which forms the cause of distinguishing them from other things is not seen to exist in the case of the causes, honey and cowdung, and their respective effects, insects and scorpions, as it is seen in the case of the causes, clay and gold, and their effects, pots and coronets (respectively). असदिति वेन प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् Sutra 7. Asaditi chenna pratishedhamätratvāt (145) If it be said that (in case distinction between the cause and effect is accepted then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because, what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like).Adhik. III, Sut. 8] ONE IN SUBSTANCE 317 If the Brahman, who is the cause, is distinct from the world which is the effect, then, owing to the cause and the effect being distinct substances, the world which is the effect cannot exist (as itself) in the Supreme Brahman who is the cause. Thus, the birth of the world will be from non-existence. If it be so argued, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Indeed, in the previous aphorism (II. 1. 6), what was intended was merely the rejection of an invariable rule of similarity between cause and effect, and not of the effect as a substance being distinct from the cause. This position, however that the Brahman Himself, who is the cause, undergoes modifications in the form of the world which is distinct from Himself is not given up. Indeed, between the insect and its cause, the honey, even when there is distinction, there exists oneness of substance as there is between ear-rings and gold.732 Here, he (the objector) raises an objection. अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् Sutra 8. Apitau tadvat prasaṁgā dasamañjasam (46) The re-absorption (of the world into the Brahman) as in that case i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings)733 will lead to the attribution (of modification etc., to the Brahman) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the Vedanta teaching of the oneness of cause and effect). 732. The Vedantin underst inds sat-karya vada, the view that the effect is only the cause trans- formed, to mean that there is one- ness of substance be:ween cause and effect. Similarity (salak- shanya) of the kind implied by the Sankhyas may or may not be present. 733. Tadvat’ (“as in that case”) of the Sutra is explained II. S.B.-41 in three ways in the Sruta- prakāšikā. (i) As in the case of the illustrative example of gold and earrings set out under the previous Sutra. (ii) As in the case of the world, so too fn the Brahman, there is the possibility of evil being present. (iii) Tadvat may indicate the possessor of these (evils of the world), as this is implied by the possession of the world. 318 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I By re-absorption’ is meant the creation etc. preceded by absorption, because (the teachings relating to) creation etc. are seen as being preceded by the teachings relating to the condition of absorption in the following and other similar passages: “Existence, alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1.); and “The Self alone, this one only, was in’ the beginning” (Ait. Up. I. 1. 1). If oneness of substance between the cause and effect is admitted, then, when creation out of and absorption into the Brahman and such other things take place in regard to the world, the Brahman Himself will come to be in association with those conditions (of the created and absorbed world). Therefore, all the wrong aims of life themselves, which are found to exist in the effect, will have to get attached to the Brahman, just as the peculiarities existent in the car-rings are existent also in the gold (which is their cause). In such a case, all the Vedanta passages will become quite inconsistent in teaching oneness of substance between cause and effect. For, according to the following passages, there is the possibility of mutually hostile (passages) being made to refer to one thing only (and not different things as they ought to): “He understands all and knows all " (Mund. Up. I. 1. 9); “He is devoid of sins, devoid of old age, devoid of death” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1.5); “He has neither work nor implements of work. There is none seen equal to Him and none superior to Him” (Svet. Up. VI. 8); “One of the two eats the sweet pippala fruit (Svet. Up. IV. 6); “The individual self, who is not the Lord, is bound down in consequence of his being the enjoyer” (Svet. Up. I. 8); and “He feels sorry, through not being the Lord” (Svet. Up. IV. 7). "” Again, it may be argued thus. The Supreme Brahman Himself, who owns all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as body, possesses the condition of the cause as well as that of the effect. All the blemishes are found to Adhik. III, Süt. 8] WHAT IS A ‘BODY’? 319 exist in the intelligent and non-intelligent things. Hence, there is no possibility of the attribution (of the blemishes) to the Brahman, who is the soul, either in the condition of cause or in the condition of effect. This is not right, because the relation of cause and effect is impossible between the Brahman and the world, and because, if such a relation were to exist, it will be impossible for all the blemishes, consequent on connection with the body, (not to exist) in the Brahman. L It is not possible for the intelligent and non-intelligent things to be the body of the Brahman. The body indeed is a particular collection of earth and other elements, which is sustained by its dependence on the vital breath with its fivefold functions, and which is the substratum of the sense organs that form the means for the experience of pleasure and pain that is of the form of the fruits of karma.734 For the condition of the body is well known to be of this kind both in the Smriti and the Vedas. But in regard to the Supreme Self, it is declared in the following and similar texts that He is free from karma and the experienee of its fruits, that He is free from experience which is dependent on the sense organs, and that He is free from having the vital air: “He is devoid of sins, devoid of old age” (Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5); “The other one shines without eating” (Svet. Up. IV. 6); “He is without hands and feet, but He moves quickly and seizes (things): without eyes He sees, without ears He hears” (Svet. Up. III. 19); and “He is without the vital air, He is without the mind” (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2). Hence, in regard to Him, the condition of being the body cannot be predicated of intelligent and non-intelligent 734. This is more or less a paraphrase of the definition of the body given by Gautama in his Nyaya-Sutras (1. 1. 11) to the effect that it is the substratum of physical activities, the senses and the experience of pleasure and pain. 320. SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 11, Part I things. Moreover, the state of being the substratum of sense organs and such other things cannot arise in respect of grass, twigs, etc., which are non-intelligent things in their individual forms or in respect of the elements in their subtle state in their collective form. The condition of being a collection of the earth and other elements cannot arise in respect of elements in their subtle state. And because all this cannot arise in respect of the intelligent thing, which is solely of the form of knowledge, much less can there be the possibility of its being the body. There can be no condition as body on the basis that to be the body is to be the ground for experience. For it is well known that the condition of body is not present in many grounds of experience like palaces, etc. If it be said that, while it exists, there should be experience of pleasure and pain, and this alone is the ground of experience (mentioned as constituting the body), it is not correct. For it is well established that when another body becomes the ground of experience in the form of pleasure and pain arising from entry into the other body, (that other body) is not the body of the soul which has entered it. Moreover, in regard to the experience of the Lord whose unsurpassed bliss is eternal and spontaneous, there cannot be any dependence on intelligent and non-intelligent things as the ground of experience. By means of this (argument), the objection that what is merely a means of enjoyment has the character of the body has been answered. Again, it may be argued as follows. On the desire of whatever (other) thing is dependent the essential nature, existence and activity (of a thing), that (latter) thing is the body of that other (former) thing.735 And so, as all 735. This is more or less identical with Ramanuja’s own definition of the body given under the next Sutra. Certain prelimir nary objections such as that it cannot apply to diseased or dead bodies or to puppets etc. arc raised bere. Adhik. III, Sut. 8] WHAT IS A ‘BODY’? 321 things have their essential nature, existence and activity dependent upon the Lord, it is possible for them to constitute the body of the Lord. This opinion also is not better (than the previous one), because, among things which are well known to have the character of the body, their essential nature is not dependent on the will of the particular intelligent souls (associated with them. For a diseased body does not have its activity dependent on the will of that (soul). Again, the dead body does not have its existence dependent upon the will of that (soul). Moreover, dolls and other things, whose essential nature, existence and activity are dependent on the will of intelli- gent individual souls, are well known not to form the body of those (souls). The intelligent individual soul which is eternal, has not got its essential nature dependent on the will of the Lord. So, there is no possibility of its forming His body. Moreover, it should not be urged that what is restrained solely by another, supported solely by another and is subservient solely unto the glory of another-that is the body of that other: because this (definition of the body) is too wide in that it is applicable to the category of action and such others. And it is predicated of the Lord that He is not possessed of a body by means of the following passages among others: “He is bodiless in bodies” (Kath. Up. II. 2.); and “He is without hands and feet, but He moves quickly and seizes (things): without eyes He sees, without ears He hears” (Svet. Up. III. 19). Therefore, there results mutual inconsistency among the Vedanta passages, on the view that the Brahman is the cause of the world, inasmuch as there is no relation of the body and the possessor of the body between the world and the Brahman; and even if such (a relation) were possible, the possibility of evil appertains to the Brahman.322 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I To such (an argument), the answer is:- न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् Sūtra 9. Na tu drishṭantabhāvāt (146) There is, however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the Brahman is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available. There is, indeed, no such inconsistency, because even where one and the same thing is associated with two conditions, examples illustrative of the separate existence of good and evil (in those conditions) are available. The word “tu” (however’) points out the impossibility of the accrual (to the Brahman) of even the trace of any contact with evil 736 What is stated is this. There is no inconsistency at all, even when there is association with the two conditions of existence as cause and effect, which are of the nature of contraction and expansion respectively, for the Supreme Brahman who, for the reason that He owns the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, forms their Self. Because the contraction and expansion appertain unto the intelligent and non-intelligent things, which form the body of the Supreme Brahman. 736. The previous Sutra has criticised the view that the Brahman is the cause of the world on the ground that in the state of apiti (or dissolution) the evils of the world must attach themselves to the Brahman. Here that criticism is refuted. There is no Inconsistency between the Brahman being the cause of the world and His being untouched by evil. Ramanuja now seeks to explain why in addition to the negative particle (na) the Sutra has a d sjunctive particle (tu). While na condemns the previous aphor sm, tu draws attention to the relation of body and soul between the world and the Brahman: this relationship is enough to account for the Brahman being pure, Another view is that na denies the inconsistency alleged 10 the previous cutra and tu the possibi- lity of evil accruing to the Brahman on the basis of an analogy. Adhik. III, Süt. 9] SOUL VS. BODY 323 Indeed, it is well known that the evils existent in the body do not appertain unto the soul and the auspicious qualities of the soul do not appertain unto the body. For instance, childhood, youth, old age, etc., which belong to the bodies of gods, men and other embodied souls, are not associated with the soul; and knowledge, happiness, etc., which are existent in souls, are not associated with the body. Then, again, the statements, “A god is born”, A man is born”, and similarly “He is indeed a boy, a young man and an old man”, have a primary significance. He (the Sutrākāra) will teach under the aphorism beginning with “While going to another than that (ie., than this body)…” (Ved. Sut. III. 1. 1), that it is the individual soul, only as associated with the body made up of the subtle rudimentary elements, that assumes the conditions of gods, men, etc.737 Again, what has been already stated to the effect that it is inappropriate for the world, which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things and which is existent in the gross as well as the subtle condition to stand in the relation of the body to the Supreme Brahman-that is (merely) the display of the bad logic evolved out of his own brain by one who has not understood the groups of Vedanta passages in the light of sound reasoning. Indeed, all the Vedanta passages declare that all intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in their gross and subtle states, stand in the relation of the body to the Supreme Self. Surely, in the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa (i.e., Bṛih. Up. III. 7.) in the recension of the Kanvas and in the recension of the Madhyandinas, both of which belong to the school of Vājasaneyins, in the passage beginning with, “He who stands in the earth……He whose body is the earth”, all the non-intelligent things are individually pointed out; 737. The point here is that the expansion and contraction, experienced during creation and dissolution respectively, by the universe, which is the Brahman’s body, may be spoken of as appertaining unto the Brahman Himself. 324 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I and in the passages, “He who stands in (the self who is of the nature of) knowledge….. He whose body is knowledge (ie., the self)” and “He who stands in the self…. He whose body is the self”, the intelligent thing (or the individual self) is separately pointed out, and all such particular things are declared to form the body of the Supreme Self. In the Subalopanishad also, in the passage beginning with “He who moves within the earth, whose body is the earth”, it is quite similarly declared that both the intelligent and non-intelligent things existing in all conditions constitute the body of the Lord. And then it is declared that He is the Self of all beings in the passage: “He is the eternal Self of all beings, is devoid of sins, is the divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa” (Sub. Up. VII). ઃઃ The Smritis also declare the same thing in the following passages: “The whole world is Your body (Rām. VI. 120. 29); “That water is the body of Vishnu " (V.P. II. 12. 37); “All that, indeed, is the body of Hari” (V.P. I. 22. 37); “All those things are His body” (V.P. I. 22.84); and “After thinking and willing (to the effect that He would become manifest), He (with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures) out of His own body…” (Manu. I. 8). The meaning is (that He desired to create the universe) out of His own body, consisting of the subtle elements. In the ordinary world also, the word ‘body’ has not obtained, like the words ‘pot’, etc., the significance of invariably denoting substances of the same kind or form, but is seen used in its non-secondary significance to denote things having forms quite distinct from one another, such as worms, insects, fireflies, snakes, men and animals. Therefore, the definite determination of its natural and primary significance has to be arrived at solely in accordance with its use in all cases. And the definition of Adhik, III, Sut: 9] GOD’S BODIES 325 its significance given by you, such as that it is the means of enjoyment of the fruits of karma, is not in accordance with its general use in all cases. For that (definition) does not extend to the earth, etc., which are stated above to form the body of the Lord. Moreover, this definition cannot extend to the bodies/ of the Lord which are chosen of His own free will and the bodies of the finally released souls which are to be understood from passages like the following: “He (the released soul) is one”. (Chhand. Up. VII. 26. 2). For, in regard to them, there is no occasion for the experience of the fruits of karma. The chosen bodies of the Supreme Person are not particular combinations of earth and the other elements, because the Smriti says: “The body of the Supreme Self is not a particular combination of the elements.” (?). Therefore, the definition of the body as a combination of elements, is narrow. The character of having its support dependent upon the fivefold activity of the vital air does not extend to the bodies of immovable beings. For, even though there is the existence of the vital air in immovable things, there is no existence as the supporter of the body after being modified fivefold. In the case of Ahalya and others, the character of being the abode of (active) senses and of being the means of enjoying pleasure and pain, does not extend to (their) bodies of stone, wood, etc. (regarded as) arising out of karma. 738 739. The well known story of Ahalya, the lovely wife of the sage, Gaatama, is referred to nere. On her seduction by Indra she was cursed to become invisible according to Välmīki (Rām. I. 48) and to become a stone according to the Puranas. The two versions can be reconciled by supposing that Ahalya became invisible in her own form when she became a II. S.B.-42 stone. In that condition, capacity to know and feel must have been dullened. Still, she expiated her sin by suffering. The body of stone was not for her the means of experiencing her karma, but only of undergoing the suffering brought about by the curse. Hence the definition of the body under reference does not apply to her case. $26 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1. Therefore, this is the definition of the body which is to be accepted. That substance which, in regard to all things as can be accomplished by it, is completely (and always) capable of being controlled and supported by an intelligent soul, and which has its essential nature solely. subservient unto the glory of that (intelligent soul),-that (substance) is the body of that (intelligent soul).739 The non-perception of control in regard to diseased bodies etc. is due to the obstruction of the actually existent power of control, as in the case of the non-perception of heat etc. in fire etc., owing to an obstructing cause. The dead body: has begun to disintegrate even at the time of separation from the soul and in the next moment goes to pieces. There is description here as a body on account of its being a part of a combination completely formed earlier (as a body). Therefore, inasmuch as all things are completely controlled and supported by the Supreme Person in regard to what they can do and have their essential nature solely subservient unto His glory, all intelligent and non- intelligent things form His body. Statements like “He is bodiless in bodies” (Katha. Up. II. 22) relate to the negation in His case of bodies arising from karma, because it is declared in the scriptures that He has all things for His body as aforesaid. 739. This definition of the body is central to Ramanuja’s system of thought. For in his view the fundamental relation between God and the universe of matter and individual selves is that of soul and body. Every element in this definition examined essenti d. has been critically and shown to be ‘Body’ and ‘soul’ are shown to be reciprocal terms; the intelligent soul is called chetana to differentiate it from dharma- bhuta-jñána which also in a sense controls the body; again the support given to the body by the soul is not like the support given to a parasite by the body; the body is a substance and not an action or quality; it is contro led at all times as long it lasts by the soul, unlike the servants of a king who are controlled in a less comprehensive way; the control over the Body is exercised in respect of the things which the body can do; and the body has the capacity for being controlled, though the control may be more or less complete under varying circumstances.Adhik. III, Sut. 10] NATURE NOT CAUSE 327 In the succeeding sections also (e.g., Adhikarana VII) this will be expounded. By the two aphorisms-” The res absorption (of the world into the Brahman) as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings) will come to be therefore inconsistent (with the Vedanta teaching of the oneness of cause and effect)” (II. 1.8) and “There is however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the Brahman is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available " (II. 1. 9)-the teaching established in the section beginning with “Owing to the other (i.e., the individual self) being described (as identical with the Brahman…” II. 1. 21) is indicated. स्वपक्षदोषाच Sutra 10. Svapakshadoshachcha (148) (Ved. Sut. (The Brahman is the cause of the world) also because of fallacies in his (objector’s) own view. It is not merely because the argument that the Brahman is the cause of the world is free from fallacies that it is accepted. It alone has to be accepted, because the argument that material Nature is the cause of the world is full of fallacies and has to be rejected. Indeed, according to the view that material Nature is the cause of the world, the coming forth of the world is not properly explained. For, according to that view, the coming forth of the world is based on the superimposition of the attributes of material Nature, through the proximity of material Nature, upon the individual soul, who is subject to no modifications and is essentially of the nature of pure intelligence. It has here to be investigated, of what nature is that proximity to material Nature, which forms the cause of the 328 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I superimposition of the attributes of material Nature on the individual soul, who is subject to no modifications and is of the nature of pure intelligence. Is it merely the existence of material Nature, or is it any modification belonging to it, or is it any modification actually existent in the individual soul? Surely it is not (any modification that is) existing in the individual self, because such (a modification) is not known. It is not modification of material Nature either, because it (the modification) is admitted to be an effect of superimposition and cannot possibly form the cause of the superimposition. If the mere existence (of material Nature) be accepted as (its) proximity (to the individual soul), then there arises the possibility of the superimposition even in regard to finally released souls. Thus, according to your view, the coming forth of the world is inappropriate. This topic will be elaborately dealt with on the occasion of refuting the views of the Sankhyas under the following aphorism and others : “Even if it be accepted (that it may be proved that material Nature is the cause of the world, it should not be inferred as such a cause), because there is no purpose (served by the inference)” (Ved. Sut. II. 2. 8.) 4 anfufagrarafa Sutra 11. Tarkāpratishthānādapi (149) (The view that material Nature is the cause of the world cannot prevail) also because (mere) syllogistic reasoning (in support of it) is devoid of solid ground.740 The view that the Brahman is the cause of the world, which is based on the scriptures, is alone to be accepted, 740. Sutras 11 and 12 are taken as one by Sankara. The justifi cation for Ramanuja’s arrange- ment is that Sutra 12 raises and answers an objection, which can disposal of cases occur I. 1. 5 & 6, arise only after the Sutra 11. Similar with reference to 1. 1. 12 & 13, and I. 4. 4 & 5. Adhik. III, Sut. 12] LOGIC INCONCLUSIVE 329 because also (mere) syllogistic reasoning has no firm foundation. And the view that material Nature is the cause of the world should not (be accepted). The instability of (mere) syllogistic reasoning is seen from the mutual conflict of the hypothetical arguments advanced by the Buddhists, the Vaiseshikas, the followers of Akshapada, the Jainas, Kapila and Patanjali.741 amongìufafa àtancafanigaaş: Sutra 12. Anyathanumeyamiti chedevamapyanirmokshaprasangaḥ (150) If it be said that it (i.e., material Nature) has to be inferred (as the cause of the world) otherwise (than in the manner of other schools), in that manner also there occurs the possibility of getting no freedom (from the evil of instability of mere syllogistic reasoning). After having rightly found fault with the now actually available syllogistic reasoning of the Buddhists and others, it may be said that we shall infer the view that material Nature is the cause of the world otherwise’, that is, in such a manner that it overcomes the errors pointed out. If it be so held (it is stated in reply that) ‘in that manner also’, that is, in regard to you, who have the support only of logical reasoning which has its source in the intellect of man, there exists the possibility of its being condemned in that same manner and at different times and places by logical arguments conceived by persons more skilful than you in perverted reasoning. Thus, it is not possible to 741. Sakya, Ulukya, Akshapada, Kshapana, Kapila and Patanjali are listed as makers of philosophi- cal systems based on mere logical reasoning. The four names stand for the Buddha, Kanada, Gautama and Jina. Patanjali is the founder of the Yoga system. 330 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I avoid the absence of freedom from the evil of the instability of logical reasoning. Therefore, the $ästra alone is the criterion of truth in regard to the subject which is beyond the reach of the senses. Only for the purposes of supplementing and supporting it, logical reasoning has to be adopted. And accordingly the following passage says:-“Whoever with the help of logical reasoning which is unopposed to the Veda-sastra, puts together the teaching on duty as given by the sages, he knows duty and not others.” (Manu. XII. 106). (Here) the meaning of being ‘unopposed to the Veda-sastra’ is that it is not opposed to the sastra known as the Veda.742 Therefore, inasmuch as it is opposed to the Veda, the Smriti of the Sankhyas has to disregarded for the purpose of obtaining therefrom logical arguments, which, as aids and supplements to the Veda, have the character of explaining the teaching of the Veda. ADHIKARANA IV SISHṬĀPARIGRAHĀDHIKARAṆA gà farzraftæer afq sarearar: Sutra 13. Etena sishṭāparigrahā api vyākhyāthāḥ (151) By means of this (reasoning), the other unacceptable views are also explained. “The other’ means the rest (of the views). The unacceptable views are those in which the acceptance of 742. ‘Veda sastra’ m y also be taken to mean ‘Veda and šāstra (of Kapila)’. Hence Ramanuja’s explanation of the correct meaning. Adhik. IV, Sut. 13} ATOMIC THEORIES 331 " the Veda finds no place.743 What remain to be considered and are unacceptable are the other views in which the Veda finds no acceptance. “By means of this (reasoning),’ i.e., by refuting the view of the Sankhyas which is not accepted by the Veda, it is to be understood that the views of the Vaiseshikas, the Naiyayikas, the Jainas and the Buddhists stand refuted. An additional doubt, however, is raised to the effect that, inasmuch as all these schools agree in holding the infinitesimal atoms to be the cause of the world, it is not possible to say that the logical reasoning which relates to the (establishment of the) causal entity has no solid foundation. The answer to this objection is this. There is certainly agreement among them 80 far. But there is no difference among them in regard to their being based upon (mere) logical reasoning; and in regard even to the essential nature of the infinitesimal atoms, there is disagreement among them. They held them (ie., the atoms) to have the character of the void and not to have the character of the void, to possess the character of knowledge and to possess the character of an object of knowledge, to be momentary and to be eternal, to be absolute and to be restrained in more than one place, to be real and to be unreal, etc.744 For these reasons, it (i.e., 1 743. The expression sighţă- parigrahaḥ’, in the Sutra is interpreted by Ramanuja differ- ently from Sankara. The latter took it to stand for ’those views which are not accepted by disciplined exemplars’, Ramanuja tries to include Sähkhya also among the unacceptable views by his exclination, The addition al doubt here, according to Sahkara, is that logic cannot be lightly dismissed as inconclusive, as it has been well developed by the Buddhists and the Náiyayikas, Ramanuja feels that the atomic theory of the origination of the • universe has to be specifically referred, to here. 744. Among the atomists, the Madhyamika school of the Buddhists believe the atom to have the character of the void; the Yogachara school regard it as having the character of know- ledge; all Buddhists except the Madhyamika hold the atom to be: momentary; the Jainas suppose it to be restrained in more than one place; the Yogacharas think that it is unreal, while the Vaiseshikas and the NaiyAyikas declare it to be real. More particulars about these systems are given later in Ved, Sut. (II. 2).332 SRI-PHASHYA [Chap. I, Part I their logical reasoning) undoubtedly possesses no solid basis to rest upon. ADHIKARANA V BHOKTRĀPATTYADHIKARANA. भोक्त्रापत्तेर विभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकचत् Sutra 14. Bhokträpatteravibhāgaschet syallokavat (152) If it be said that because it (ie., the possession of the body) makes Him get into the condition of the enjoyer (of pain and pleasure), there is non-distinction (of the Brahman from the individual soul), it (i.e., distinction) is possi- ble, as in the world. Again, the Sankhya raises the following objection. It has been already stated above that the Supreme Brahman, who owns; as His body, all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in their gross and subtle states, possesses the character of both the cause and the effect, and that therefore there is a distinction in nature between the individual self and the Brahman. This distinction, however, cannot possibly exist. For, when the Brahman possesses a body, He gets into the condition of the enjoyer; and it is impossible in the case of the Lord also, as in that of the individual self, to avoid the condition of being the enjoyer of pleasure and pain arising from the condition of being the possessor of a body. It may, however, be said that the reply to the possibility of such enjoyment taking place in the case of the Lord has been given in the aphorism: “If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a Adhik. V, Süt. 14] ASSOCIATION WITH BODY 333- part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corporeal association).” (Ved. Sūt. 1. 2. 8). It is not right to say so. Indeed, under that (aphorism), it has been stated that to Him, who as the object of worship is ever seated in the abode of the heart (of the worshipper), there is no. possibility of enjoyment (of pleasure and pain) merely by reason of His being inside the body. Here, however, it is stated that if, like the individual soul, the Brahman also is associated with a body (as its lord), then, as in the case of. that (individual soul), the possibility of being the enjoyer of pleasure and pain cannot be avoided. It is in fact observed in regard to the individual souls which are embodied that, though there are no modifications like childhood, old age etc. due to the body, there is association with pleasure and pain arising (respectively) from the harmony and imbalance of the humours of the body. The scripture also says the same thing thus :-” To him who remains with a body, there is, indeed, no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who remains without a body”. (Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 1.). Therefore, according to the view which upholds the Brahman with a body to be the cause of the world, it is impossible for any distinction. to exist between material Nature and the individual soul, and according to the view (of Yadavaprakāśa) which upholds the absolute Brahman to be the cause of the world, there will result to Him the condition of being the substratum of all characteristics existent in the world, such as wrong aims of life etc., as in the case of clay, gold and such other things (in their causal state becoming the substrata of their characteristics in the state as effects). For these reasons, the view which maintains material II. S.B.-43. 334 Nature better.745 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I to be the cause of the world is, indeed, " If it be so argued, the reply thereto is as follows. “It (i.e., distinction) is possible as in the world”. Indeed, distinction obtains between the nature of the individual souls and that of the Lord. As a matter of fact, the attainment by the individual self of the condition of the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, which is due (respectively) to the harmony or disharmony of the humours of the body, is not due to his being possessed of the body. On the other hand, it is due to his karmas, which consist of merit and demerit. The passage beginning with “To one who has a body…. (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 1.) relates to the body produced through the effects of karma, because there is not even the trace of the wrong aims of life in relation to the individual self who is freed from the bondage of karma, who has his true form revealed and. who possesses a body, according to the following passages: “He is one, he is three-fold” (Chhānd. Up. VII. 26. 2.); “If he became possessed of the desire to go to the world of the manes. (Chhand. Up. VIII. 2. 1.); and “He moves about there, eating, playing, enjoying (Chhand. Up. VIII. 12. 3.). There cannot at all be the possibility of the slightest trace of the wrong aims of life in regard to the Supreme Self, who is devoid of sin, because there is not the siightest trace of contact with karma (in His case), even though He has for his ….. "” 745. The problem of evil is discussed under this Sutra as well as under I. 2. 8 & III. 2. 12. In all three places the relationship of the Brahman as the soul to the world which is His body, is dealt with. Under 1. 2. 8, the question was whether evil does not taint the Brahman by His mere presence in the body. The reply drew atten- tion to the fact that the Brahman and the individual self are present in the body for different reasons. Now it is asked whether lordship over the body does not taint the Brahman. The answer is that the individual self does not expe- rience pain and pleasure by reason of his being the lord of the body, but on account of the effects of karma. These effects are again in the form of the favour or disfavour cf the Brahiman. Another aspect of the problem will be dealt with under III. 2. 12. Adhik. V, Süt 14] DRAMIDA’S SIMILE 335 characteristic the possession of the entire universe in its gross and subtle states as His body.746 “As in the world.” For instance, in the world, although in regard to those who obey the king’s mandate and those who disobey it, there is association with pleasure and pain arising out of the king’s favour and disfavour (respectively), yet there does not result to the king who issues the mandate, merely by reason of his possessing a body, the condition of the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain consequent upon obedience and disobedience to the mandate. The commentator, Dramida, says the same thing thus: “Just as in the world a king, while he is in a place which is full of insects, extremely unpleasant and beset with evils, is not touched by the evils having his body fanned to by fans etc.; protects his beloved people; and uses enjoyable things like sandal paste etc. which cannot be enjoyed by all ordinary people; similarly, this Lord of the worlds, who has His own power as his moving chowrie fan, is not touched by evils, protects His world like the world of Brahma (the four-faced creator) and uses enjoyable things which cannot be used by ordinary people.” Modifications in regard to the essential nature of the Brahman are not admitted, as are admitted in the case of clay, gold and other such things (in their causal condition). For there are scriptural texts which declare that He has an immodifiable nature and that He is devoid of all evil etc. 746. It should be noted that the scriptural p.ssages under refer- ence are interpreted differently by the Sankhya and the Vedantin. Mere association with the body is taken to be meant by the Sänk by a; the latter understands here only the association of the self with a body under the influence of karma. The possession of a body or bodies by the freed soul does not bring it misery. Neither can any evil attach to the Lord who does not acquire His body under the influence of karma. 336 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I This aphorism, however, has been interpreted by other schools747 as intended to deal with the distinction (between the Brahman and the individual salf) by means of the illustrative example of the foam, the wave and the ocean, after raising the doubt that there is no distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment according to the view which upholds the Brahman to be the cause of the world. It is not right to say so. Because those who accept the view that creation proceeds out of the Brahman, which is possessed of a limiting adjunct, or nescience, or a power contained within itself, cannot consistently make out such an objection and answer it (under this aphorism as we have done). That which is conditioned by the limiting adjunct, or nescience, or power involved in the causal entity possesses the state of the enjoyer, and the limiting adjunct (as well as the nescience or the power) possesses the condition of the object of enjoyment. It is indeed impossible for those two things (the Brahman and Its limiting adjunct) which are distinct from each other to attain the state of each other. The modification of the essential nature (of the Brahman) cannot certainly be accepted by those (schools) also, because according to the aphorism (II. 1. 35) beginning with “If it be said there is no karma (or results of works) before creation because of (the declaration in the scriptures) of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the Brahman prior to creation), it is replied that 747. The reference is to Sankar, Bhaskara and Yatava- prakasa. Nescience is posited by Sank ra, limiting adjuncts by Bhaskara and a power or capability by Yadav aprakās’ a. See Note 235 and pp. 275-181 of Vol. I for outlines of the views of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakas’a. It may be noted that, while Ramanuja and Nimbarka take bhoktrapatti in the Sutra to mean the attainment of the condition of the enjoyer by the Brahman, Sankara understands thereby the object of enjoyment becoming the enjoyer. It may also be noted that Vallabha’s interpretation is similar to Sankara’s. Madhva seeks to establish the difference between the individual self and the Brahman in moksha on the basis of the known difference in samsåra.Adhik. VI, Sūt. 15] CAUSE & EFFECT 33 337 it is not right to say so, because both (the selves and karma) are beginningless…,’ the beginninglessness of the individual souls and of the karmas associated with them is propounded. Even if the modification of the essential nature of the Brahman be accepted to be the world, the doubt regarding the acceptance of the non-distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment does not arise in any one; because the distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment is appropriately raised as in the case of pots, dishes, bracelets and crowns etc., which are the modifications of clay and gold. And even if there should be any modification of the essential nature (of the Brahman), the Brahman Himself will have both the state of the enjoyer and the state of the object of enjoyment. Thus, again, there arises inconsistency (according to the view of these schools). ADHIKARANA VI ARAMBHAṆĀDHIKARAŅA. तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः Sutra 15. Tadananyatvamārambhaṇasabda dibhyaḥ (153) The identity (of the world) with Him is made out from the passages containing the words arambhaṇa etc. In the aphorism, “If it be said that (in case distinction between the cause and the effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like)” (II. 1. 7) and other such (aphorisms), the Brahman was propounded to be the cause of the world on the assumption that there is identity of the world, which is the produced effect, with the Brahman, who is 338 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I its cause. Now that same identity is first controverted and then established. Here the followers of Kaṇāda (i.e., the Vaiseshikas) hold as follows:-It is not possible for the effect to be identical with the cause, because (the idea of) that effect is recognised as a distinct state of consciousness (from that of the cause). Indeed, the states of consciousness relating to the cause and the effect, as, for instance, to the threads and the cloth, the lump of clay and the pots, are not of one and the same form. Because there is also a difference in the words (denoting the cause and the effect). As a matter of fact, threads are not cloth, nor is the cloth called the threads. Again (there can be no such identity), because there is difference (between the causes and effects) in regard to the work (done by them severally). Surely, water is not brought by a lump of clay, nor is a wall built by a pot. (There can be no such identity) also, because there is difference in time (between causes and the effects). At a former time is the cause and at a later time the effect. (There can be no such identity) also, because there is the difference in shape (between the causes and their effects). The cause (i.e., clay) has the form of an undefined lump of matter, the effect (i.e., the pot) has the form of a central portion resting on a broad base. It is only thus that a pot is said to be destroyed, even though the lump of clay is existent. There is also seen to be a difference in number (between causes and effects). Threads are many and the cloth is one. Moreover, the activity of the agent (producing effects) would be useless. If the effect is the cause itself, what is there that remains to be accomplished by the activity of the agent? If it be said that, though the effect is existent (already in the cause), the activity of the agent is necessary for (acquiring) fitness to do work (such as bringing water Adhik. VI, Süt. 15】 CAUSE & EFFECT 339 by means of the pot), then the activity of the agent has always to continue. And as the whole would always have to exist, the distinction of eternal and non-eternal things: ceases to exist.748 Again, it may be said that the effect which is itself previously existent in an unmanifested condition is made manifest by means of the active interference of the agent (producing effects); and that, therefore, it is held that the agent has a purpose and that the distinction of eternal and non-eternal things remains. This is not right; because, ’ on the supposition that one manifest thing (i.e., effect) stands in need of another manifest thing, there will result the fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum; and because also, on the supposition that there is no such need, it follows that the effect has to persist eternally before consciousness, and because, again, if it be admitted that the manifestation (of the effect) has an origin, room is given for the view that the effect is non-existent (in the cause).749 Moreover, if it be held, that the activity of the agent is that which manifests a thing, then it will follow that by means of the activity of the agent which relates to (the manifestation of) a pot, there is manifestation also of the water-jar of the ascetic and such other things. For lamps and such other things, which admittedly possess the power of manifesting things, are not seen restricted to any particular thing to be manifested. Indeed, it is not true 748. Eight resons are here given why there can be no identity between the cause and the effect, according to Kanada, (i) The ideas and (ii) the words descriptive of them are different. (iii) Their shapes and (iv) numbers vary. (v) Different works are done by the cause and the effect, (vi) They exist at different times. (vii) The effect is brought about by work done on the cause. (viii) Non-eternal things show the cause and the effect to be different. Two other arguments are implied. (ix) There is d fference on account of modification and size. (x) When the cause exists, the effec does not exist, and vice versa. 749. The followers of Kanāda here attack a theory of causality very similar to that of the Vedantin. Three possibilities from the theory are envisaged, and all the three are criticised as illogical. 340 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I that the lamp lit for (making) a pot (visible) does not manifest water-jars of the ascetic and such other things. Therefore, it is only as forming the cause of the origin of an effect that is non-existent that the activity of the agent has a purpose. Thus, the view is disproved that the effect is. (previously) existent (in the cause). And it cannot be said that the postulation of an invariable (antecedent) cause (for any particular effect) proves the effect to have surely existed (previously) in the cause. Because this is appropriate solely through the fitness inherent in the cause (for giving rise to a particular effect).750 It may again be objected that the activity of the agent finds no scope even according to him who holds that the effect is non-existent in the cause. Inasmuch as before its being produced the effect has no existence, the activity of the agent has to exist elsewhere than in the effect. In such a case, as those other things (where the effect exists) are undetermined, it follows also that the activity of the agent which is related to the threads may be said also to produce the pot. But it is not right to hold this view. For a particular cause is capable of pro lucing a particular effect, and by means of the activity of the agent which is associated with that cause, the production of that effect is. accomplished. In this connection, some (i.e., the Advaitins) say as follows: The effect is identical with the cause. For there is nothing which is called an effect, which is in reality 750. The answer is here given by the followers of Kanada to the objection: if the effect is altogether new, why should particular causes be chosen to be wrought upon for the production of particular effects? The reply is that a particular cause has a peculiar capacity or fitness rather to produce the effect associated with it. The potter chooses clay for the making of a pot, because the clay has a fitness for giving rise to a pot on being worked upon, and not because the pot exists in a latent condition in the clay. Adhik. VI, Sūt. 15】 ALL EFFECTS UNREAL 341 other than its cause. For every effect and the way in which it is practically realised are founded on ignorance. For instance, effects such as pots and dishes, that are conditioned in their existence solely by means of the way in which they are realised for practical purposes and that again are other than the clay which forms their cause and which is perpetually known to exist in its modifications like pots and other things-(these effects) are all unreal, while it is the substance of the clay itself forming their cause which is real. Similarly, the whole of this universe, which is other than the Brahman who is pure existence devoid of attributes and forms its cause, and which in practical realisation is conditioned as the principle of egoity and so forth, is unreal; while it is the Brahman Himself who is pure existence and who forms the cause, that is real. For whatever reason this is so, for that same reason there is no effect other than the cause. Hence the effect is identical with the cause.751 It should not, however, be said that the illustrative example (given above of pots and clay) is inappropriate, for the reason that unreality is not established in regard to pots and such other effects, as it is in regard to silver and other things falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl etc. For there, also, it is merely the substance of clay that is alone established by reasoning as being real; and anything other than it (i e., clay) is disproved to exist by reason. What then is the reasoning here? It has already been observed that the substance of clay alone is capable of 751. The Advaitins interpret this Sutra to mean that there is nothing real other than the Brahman who is the cause. Ananyatva is not taken to indi- cate being non-different from (i.e., identical with) the effect, but having none else in existence other than oneself. The Advaitins also oppose the Vaisesh ka thesis that the effect is different from the cause, but they do so by denying II. S.B.-44 that any real effect other than the cause exists. Their general view on the Brahman being the sole reality has been stated at some length in Vol. 1, pp. 24-47. The reasoning hereafter is more or less on the same lines, but with special reference to the context here. The reality of distinction’ was denied there, the reality of effect is denied here.342 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I persisting before the consciousness and that anything other than it is logically excluded in perception; and that in the illustrative example of the snake (or crack in the earth, or stream of water) falsely perceived to exist in the rope, and in other such (examples), it has indeed been observed that ropes and other such things which persist before the consciousness and form the basis (of false knowledge), are all real, and that the snake, crack in the earth, stream of water etc., which are logically excluded in perception, are all unreal. Similarly, the substance of clay itself which persists before the consciousness and forms the basis (of false knowledge) is real, while pots, dishes etc., which are logically excluded from perception, are all unreal.752 Moreover, the Self which has real existence has no destruction, and the horns of the hare etc., which have no real existence have no manifestation (to consciousness). Therefore, an effect which is capable of both manifestation and destruction is known to be that which is indescribable either as existence or as non-existence. And what is (thus) indescribable is quite unreal, like the silver etc. falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl etc., and the indescribability also of such (silver etc.) is established by means of perception and stultification.753 752. Compare Vol. I, pp. 39-40, and the syllogisms given there. Similar syllogisms underlie the reasoning here; (i) The substance of clay is real, because it continues to persist like the rope in the instances of the rope-serpent etc. (ii) Pots, dishes, etc., are real, because they are all excluded from perception, one after another, like the snake, the crack in the earth, the stream of water etc., in the above examples. un- 753. Here the world is sought to be proved to be unreal on the ground that it is neither a real entity like the Brahman nor a non- Un- entity like the horns of a hare, See Note [43 of Vol. I. The syllogism here is: Pots, dishes etc, are unreal, because they are neither entities nor non-entities, like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl. reality here is not regarded as failure to persist before the con- sciousness, but as that which is liable to be stultified by knowledge. See the definition of unreality’ given in Vol. I, p. 26. This view of unreality is ascribed to the Vivarana school of Advaitins, deriving from Padmapada, disc ple of Sankara, a Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] ALL EFFECTS UNREAL 343 Again, it may be asked whether the causal substance of clay and other such things which produce effects, do produce such effects in their unmodified state, or do so after assuming any particular condition. Surely, they do not do so in their unmodified state, because (then) it follows that they are always producing effects. Nor do they do so after assuming any particular condition. For this assumption of a particular condition also has to be similarly based on another previously assumed particular condition; and that (previously assumed condition) has to be similar (that is, based on another condition). There will thus result the logical fallacy of a retrogressus in infinitum. If it be said that it (i.e., the causal substance) in its unmodified state alone, but in association with a particular place or a particular time or a particular instrumental cause, produces its effect, it is replied that it is not right to say so. For the association (of the cause) with a particular place etc. also does not, for the reasons stated above, exist in regard to it, either in its unmodified state or in any particular condition.751 Again, it should not be urged that pots, necklaces, curds, etc. are respectively seen to be produced out of clay, gold, milk, etc., that no stultification is seen by reason of 754. Here a possible objection to the inference that pots, dishes etc. are unreal, because they are all excluded from perception, one after another, is sought to be answered. Exclusion is not concomitant with unreality, “The logical exclusion of a thing (which is perceived in relation 10 a particular place and a particular time) from a different place and a different time is not … seen to be invariably concomitant with un- reality. (Vol. I. p. 57.) The logical exclusion is concomitant with unreality when the limiting conditions as regards stultification are perceived. These are per- 443 ceived in regard to the cognition of silver in the mother-of-pearl, but not in regard to the cognition of pots, potsherds etc. The argu- ment is similar to pointing out that the inference that the mountain is smoky because it is fiery is fallacious; for smokiness is concomitant not with fire in general, but with fire in associa- tion with wet fuel. The reply to this criticism is that the effect, if real, should be capable of being logically defined. But it is not so, and is hence unreal. Compare the Advaitins’ similar argument about differentiation in Vol. I, P. 38. 344 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I the condition which is perceived in relation to time, place, etc., unlike in the case of the silver falsely perceived in the mother-of-pearl (where such stultification is seen); and that, therefore, those who depend upon perception, have necessarily to accept the view that the effect is produced out of the cause. (This view is untenable) because, in regard to this view, no alternative of any kind is admissible. (Thus) it is asked whether it is merely the gold and other things that are the cause of the mystic cross (svastika) etc., or whether it is (the form of) the necklaces and others that is the cause thereof, or whether it is the gold etc. as forming the basis of necklaces, etc.755 Surely, the gold and other things themselves are not such causes, because there is no effect that is different from the gold etc., and because also nothing can possibly form its own cause. If it be said that the (effect of the) mystic cross (svastika) is seen to be distinct from the gold (i.e., the cause), it is replied that it is not distinct. For gold is recognised (in both), and because also nothing is perceived (that is) over and above gold. If it be said that the distinct entity (in the effect) is proved by a difference in the knowledge (relating to both) as well as by a difference in the words (expressive of both) and by other differences, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Because the difference in knowledge, in words and other differences which are all conditioned to arise in relation to an indefinite entity, have an erroneous basis, like the difference in words, and the difference in expression of and relative to the knowledge of silver in the mother-of-pearl and 755. Gold, a primary product (ruchaka) and a secondary pro- duct (svastika) are here under consideration. ‘Ruchaka’ has been taken in its ordinary sense of ’necklace’, but it may also mean a coin. The svastika jewel is supposed to be made by melting the other differences, and in ruchaka. The point here is that neither mere gold as substance, nor the form of the ruchaka, nor gold as qualified by the form of the ruchaka, can be shown to be the cause of the effect, svastika. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] ALL EFFECTS UNREAL 345 consequence, they (i.e., such differences) are incapable of proving the existence of any other entity distinct (from the cause). Nor are golden necklaces etc. the causes of the mystic cross (svastika) etc. For the golden necklace is not perceived by you in the mystic cross (svastika), as threads are perceived in the cloth. Nor again is gold as forming the basis of golden necklaces (the cause). For gold is not perceived th the mystic cross in the form in which it forms the basis of the golden necklace. Thus, an effect which is other than the cause, such as clay, etc., is seen to possess the character of an unreality. Therefore, the whole world which is other than the Brahman, being an effect, is unreal. The aforesaid view regarding the unreality of the effect has been explained on the basis of the assumed reality of clay and other (causes), in order that it may be the more easily understood that whatever is distinct from the Brahman possesses the character of unreality. In reality, however, clay, gold and other such causes are unreal like pots, golden necklaces, and other such effects (respectively). For all of them are alike one another in being the effects evolved out of the Brahman. It may be made out that whatever is distinct from the Brahman possesses the character of unreality, (not merely from reasoning but)also from the following and such other passages from the scriptures: “All this has its Self in That; It is true” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.); and “There is nothing here that is many and varied; he who sees the world as though it were varied attains death from death” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 19); “Where, indeed, there comes into existence duality as it were, there one sees another. Where, however, all has become the Self to him, there who shall see whom by what?” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. & 346 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I IV. 5. 15); and “Indra is known to assume many forms through the power of illusions” (Bṛih. Up. II. 5. 19),756 Moreover, it should not be supposed that the purport learnt from the scripture is contradicted by perception. For every effect is, in the manner mentioned above, known to possess the characteristic of unreality. Further, perception has pure existence for its object. Even if there be contradiction (between perception and scripture), there is the reason given (in support of the view) that the sastra is a more powerful criterion of truth757-the sastra which cannot possibly have any defects such as those arising out of the innate impression of distinction; which finds its scope at last (after other means of proof have been stultified) ;758 which, though in regard to its essential nature (as a collection of words), and in regard to its other characteristics, it stands in need of perception and other means of proof, does not desiderate any (such other means of proof) for making out its meaning; and which does not also admit of errors cropping up. Thus, all things other than the Brahman who forms the cause, are unreal. It should not moreover be supposed that, owing to the unreality of the world, there arises unreality in regard to the individual self (also). For it is the Brahman Himself who has assumed the condition of the individual self. It is 756. The authority of the scrip- ture is invoked to support the conclusions reached by reasoning. The first quotation from the Chhand. Up. (VI 8. 7) strikes the keynote. The grammat cal equa- tion here is taken to show the stultification of the reality of the world, and the affirmation of the Brahman as the sole reality. When a pillar, for instance, is mistaken for a thief in the dark, the statement, “The pillar is the thief’’, stultifies a previously exist. ing wrong conception. Compare Vol. I, pp. 188-189. Indra in the pissage from Brih. Up. stands for ’the Highest Lord’. 757. It is declared here that the Vedas do snow the effect to be unreal, that this will have to be accepted even if it is contradic ed by perception, and that it is not so contradicted. Compare Vol. I, pp. 29-30 and 37-38. 758. The reference is to the SO called apachchheda nyāya, explained in Vol. 1, Note 30.Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] VACHASPATI’S VIEW 347 indeed the Brahman Himself that experiences the condition of the individual self in all bodies, according to the following among other scriptural passages: “Having, as this, individual self, entered into…” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3 2); “The one Lord is hidden in all beings” (Svet. Up. VI. 11); “The one God was in many places” (Taitt. Ar. III. 13); “This Self, hidden in all beings, does not shine” (Kath. Up. III. 12); and “There is no seer other than Him” (Brih. Up. III. 3. 23). It may, however, be objected759 that if the Brahman, who is only one, experiences the condition of the individual self in all bodies, then the perceptual recognition of the pain and pleasure in all bodies will have to be as in the expressions, ‘There is pain in my leg,’ and ‘There is pleasure in my head’. Moreover, there will have to be no such settled relative positions such as the individual self and the Lord, the bound and the released, the pupil and the teacher, and the state of ignorance and the state of knowledge. Here (in this connection) some who certainly are of opinion that the Brahman has no second, explain the present position thus.760 The quality of being the enjoyer of pleasure, the quality of being the enjoyer of pain, and all other such qualities, all of which belong to the individual 759. The objectors here may be taken to be Ra nanuja and the followers of Bhedabheda. Two 760. Among the Advaitins, there is a wide variety of views in regard to fundamental problems. Most of them may be found summed up in Appavya Dikshita’s Siddhantalesasangraha. broad divisions of thought seem to be referred to now by Ramanuja- those who locate ignorance in the jiva and those who locate it in the Brahman. The former school, associated with Vachaspati Misra, is first outlined. Rangarāmānuja quotes from Vachaspati’s Bhamatī on Sankara’s commentary on Ved. Sut. (I. 4. 3 & 9) to show that ignorance is located in the jivas and that every jiva has a different ignorance. To Váchas- pati, the individual self is Pure Consciousness defined and delimit- ed by the internal organ. It is not a reflection of the Brahman in ignorance, as some others hold.. But he uses the analogy of reflec- tion to clarify his points. 348 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I selves that are the reflections of the Brahman who is one only, are fixed with reference to the influence exercised by particular limiting adjuncts (on those selves); in the same way in which smallness and largeness, purity and impurity, and other such qualities which are observed in reflections of the same one face in gems, swords, mirrors and other such things (appertain to the limiting adjuncts and not to the face). It might be objected that, as has already been stated, the individual selves are not distinct from the Brahman in the following scriptural passage: “Having, as this individual self entered…” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2). This is true as a fact of the highest reality. But the conclusion under reference is arrived at on the basis of distinctions that arise out of illusion. Who is it then to whom this illusion belongs? Certainly, it cannot belong to the Brahman, because He consists of pure intelligence and is (therefore) devoid of illusion. Nor does it belong to the individual self, because (under such a supposition) the fallacy of reciprocal dependence results. Thus, the state of the individual self is, indeed, dependent on the illusion, and the illusion is dependent on the individual self. But this is not so, because ignorance (avidya) and the state of the individual self are both beginningless, according to the argument derived from the seed and the sprout. Moreover, like the swallowing up of a palace (in a magic show by a magician) and other such (inconsistent) things, ignorance, which is not a real thing, has altogether the nature of inconsistency, and in relation to it, the fallacies which appertain to real things such as the fallacy of Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] VACHASPATI CRITICISED 349 reciprocal dependence, do not help to bring about its disproof,761 As a matter of fact, the individual souls which are not distinct from the Brahman naturally possess the quality of purity. Nevertheless, it is possible for them to possess a conditional impurity, just as blackness and other impure qualities belong to the reflection of a face in swords and other things. Therefore, it is appropriate for those (individual selves) to form the abode of ignorance. Accordingly, it is appropriate for them to possess the quality of being the products of illusion. The impurity found in the individual self is an illusion like the blackness and other impurities found in reflected images, Otherwise, it would follow that they (i.e., the individual selves) will obtain no final freedom (from bondage). As the stream of illusion, appertaining to the individual souls, has no beginning, its origin need not be investigated.762 The aforesaid argument, advanced by those who do not know the truth regarding Advaita, is paraded with the object of gaining respectful recognition at the hands of 761. The criticism here is that the individual self, being a product of ignorance, cannot be the locus of the ignorance as well. A very similar objection is referred to by Vachaspati under Ved. Sut. (T. 4. 3). The reply uses the principle of the seed and the sprout. There is no reciprocal dependence between the two, as the seed of one plant gives rise to the sproat of a different plant. Likewise, the ignorance which causes the condition of an indivi- dual self is different from the ignorance located in that self. II. S.B.-45 • Infinite regress, which may be alleged, cannot bring about dis- proof in regard to the phenomena of illusion and ignorance. 762. The (illusion of) impurity affecting the individual self is the liability for association with ignorance, which in turn leads to Its being subject to the illusion of birth, death etc. Here too there is an infinite regress, impurity giving rise to ignorance and ignorance giving rise to impurity. The reply is that the stream of illusion is beginningless. 350 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I those who have faith in the doctrine of distinctions.763 Thus, if it be said that in its natural and unfictitious condition, the individual soul forms the abode of ignorance, then the statement amounts to saying that it is the Brahman Himself who forms the abode of ignorance. If it be said that, in any form other than this (natural one) which is assumed to exist, it forms the abode of ignorance, then it will have been argued that non-intelligent matter forms the abode of ignorance. Indeed, the Advaitins do not accept any form other than these two. It may again be said that, in its essential form itself, which is associated with the form assumed by illusion, it forms the abode of ignorance. But this is not so. For it has not been established that its essential form, which consists of one indivisible uniform essence, has a form which is not qualified save by ignorance. Indeed, it is only that form which forms the abode of ignorance as explained (by you),764 Moreover, the acceptance of the view that the individual self is conditioned by ignorance is, indeed, for the purpose of arriving at the distinction between bondage 763. Another school of Advaitins here come forward to criticise those who locate ignorance in the individual selves. In Sures’vara’s Sambandha-vårtika, there seem to be indications that ignorance is to be located in the Brahman. This line of thought was subsequently developed. Here this school of thinkers criticise Vachaspati’s followers as advancing arguments pleasing to dualists and realists. The suggestion is that they hover between monism and pluralism and fall between two stools, 764, Corresponding to the gold, the ruchaka and the svastika men ioned earlier (p. 344), we have here the Brahman, the fictitious form of the jiva, and the Brahman as having this form. Ignorance can be located in the Brahman, but not in the form. For the Brahman alone is intelli- gent and real; anything else is both unreal and non-intelligent, Ignorance cannot be located in non-intelligent matter. Failure to realise this indicates that those who try to locate ignorance in the jiva are not true Advaitins. Nor can the Brahman as qualified by any form be the locus of ignor- ance. A kind of circular reasoning is here alleged. It is the location of igacrance which creates the form, and it is the form which is said to bring about the location of ignorance. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] LOCUS OF IGNORANCE 351 and freedom.765 But this definite determination cannot be arrived at, even according to the view, which says that the individual self is conditioned by ignorance. Indeed, the destruction of ignorance is itself final freedom. It being so, if one (individual self) is finally released from bondage, there results the destruction of ignorance, and in consequence all the other (individual selves) will also obtain final release. It may be said that those others do not obtain final release, and that, therefore, ignorance still continues to be. Then, in such a case, not even a single individual self can have final release, because ignorance has not met with destruction. It may again be said that a different variety of ignorance is fictitiously assumed with regard to each individual self. Under such (an assumption), whoever has his ignorance destroyed, he obtains final release; whereas whoever does not have his ignorance destroyed, he continues to be in bondage. But it is not right to say so. You speak of each individual self after accepting the distinction with regard to individual selves. Is that distinction relating to individual selves natural or manufactured by illusion? Surely, it is not natural, because it is not accepted (by you), and because also (in such a case) the fictions of ignorance, which are resorted to for the purpose of establishing distinctions, will be of no use. Again, it may be said that it (i.e., distinction) is manufactured by ignorance. If so, it is asked whether the ignorance, which serves to manufacture the distinctions in regard to the individual selves, belongs to the Brahman, or whether it appertains to the individual selves. If you 765. The charge of bringing about the emancipation of all individual selves by the destruc- tion of the ignorance of one self has been brought against Vachas- pati, who replies to it under Ved Sut. (II. 3. 40). There too he uses the analogy of the reflection of a single face in many media like gems, swords etc.352 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I say that it belongs to the Brahman, then you return to my own view.756 If you say that it belongs to the indi yidual selves, it is again asked (of you) whether you forget that this (ignorance) serves the purpose of causing the production of the distinctions in regard to the individual selves. Again, you may hold that whatever kinds of ignorance are fictitiously assumed for the purpose of arriving at a definite determination in regard to the conditions of bondage, freedom, etc., with reference to each individual self-by those very kinds (of gnorance) there results also the distinction in regard to the individual selves. Then (it follows that) on proof of the distinction in regard to the individual selves, those (kinds of ignorance) are proved; on proof of those (kinds of ignorance), the distinctions in regard to the individual selves are true. Thus, there arises the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Moreover, in this case the argument derived from the seed and the sprout is hardly maintainable. Indeed, among the seeds and the sprouts, one particular seed produces one particular sprout. But in the case under consideration, whatever individual selves are fictitiously manufactured by whichever kinds of ignorance, on those very (individual selves) is the existence of those kinds (of ignorance) dependent. Such a procedure is no proof,707 You may again hold that, according to the arguments derived from the seed and the sprout, each kind of ignorance, resident in a prior individual self, manufactures a posterior individual self. If so, there results the 6 765. My own view’ is that of the upholders of the location of ignorance in the Brahman. 767. The charge of the fallacy of reciprocal dependence can be disproved, if there is scope for the application of the principle of the seed and the sprout. If one ignorance manufactures a jīva, and the jiva manufactures another ignorance, this principle will apply. But it is declared here that this is not the case. Cf. p. 348. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] LOCUS OF IGNORANCE 353 momentariness of the individual self, and room is given for admitting the experience (by a self) of the effects of what has not been done (by it) as well as the destruction of the effects of what has been done (by it) and so on. For this very reason, the view also is set at naught, that from the Brahman every kind of ignorance resident in each prior individual self produces the condition of each posterior individual self.768 If a stream of unceasingly flowing ignorance is accepted, then in the same manner the state of the individual self, fictitiously called into existence by that ignorance, will also have to be beginningless, like an unceasingly flowing stream, and will not have the character of unchanging permanence. That permanence, which it is required that the condition of the individual self should possess until the attainment of final freedom, will not be available.769 It has further been stated above that, in relation to the ignorance which does not have the character of a real thing and is solely of the nature of inconsistency, the evils which appertain to real things, such as the fallacy of recriprocal dependence, do not bring about any disproof (of the individual self). Under such a supposition, ignorance has to abide in the released individual selves as well as in the Supreme Self. It may be said that, as they possess the nature of pure knowledge, that which has the nature of impurity (i.e., ignorance) cannot affect them. Then, it is asked whether ignorance is founded on any logically consistent reasoning. If so, on account of the logical arguments given above, it (i.e., ignorance) cannot reside in the individual selves also.770 768. A beginningless series of javas is bere denied. 769. Advaitins require that the state of the individual self should be beginningless and that it should last till emancipation is achieved. Only thus can there be harmony with the scriptures. One list makes out the following to be anadi (beginningless) in their view: the jiva, Isvara, ignorance, Pure Consciousness or Intelligence etc. 770. “The logical arguments given above” refer to the charge of reciprocal dependence etc. 354 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I Again, it is asked when, after the birth of true knowledge, there results destruction of the ignorance abiding in the individual selves, whether the individual self does or does not also meet with destruction. If it meets with destruction, then the final freedom will have to be characterised as the destruction of its (i.e., the individual self’s) essential nature.771 If it does not, there will be no final freedom even after the destruction of that ignorance, for the condition of the individual self, which is other than the essence of the Brahman, still remains. It has also been stated above, that a definite determination in regard to what is purity or impurity etc. can be consistently aimed at in the same manner in which, in relation to the face, cleanliness or uncleanliness etc., which are to be observed in gems, swords, mirrors, and other such reflecting media, are so arrived at.772 Here, it has to be considered when the smallness, uncleanliness, and other erroneous impressions arising out of limiting adjuncts are put an end to. If it be replied that this happens when swords and other limiting adjuncts are removed, then it is asked whether the reflection in which smallness etc. abide, exists or not at that time. If it exists, then the individual self, which corresponds to that reflection, also exists. In consequence, there results the absence of final freedom. If it does not exist, then, in the same manner, the individual self ceases to be, and consequently final freedom will have to be characterised as destruction of the essence of the individual self. 771. The destruction of the essential nature of the self can be moksha only to Buddhists. 772. The analogy of reflection is now criticised, Vachaspati’s comments under Ved. Sút. (II.3.40) appear to be particularly under consideration, It should also be noted that Vachaspa’i does not belong to the so called prati- bimba schools according to whom the java and Isvara are both reflections of the Brahman, or the jiva is the reflection of the Isvara who is the reflection of the Brahman. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] MAKER OF ‘JIVA’ 355 Moreover, he to whom there appears any evil of the nature of a wrong aim of life,-to him the removal of such (evils) forms the right object of pursuit. It being so, the question is asked whether the appearance of evil arising from limiting adjuncts results to the Brahman who corresponds to the object undergoing reflection, or whether it results to the individual self who corresponds to the reflection, or whether it results to anything else. In the case of the first two alternatives, the given. illustrative example (of the face and its reflection) is not appropriate, because the appearance of smallness and other evils cannot result to the face, or to the reflection of the face. Indeed, neither the face, nor its reflection can have consciousness. If evil appertains to the Brahman, then it should also follow that ignorance appertains to the Brahman. The third alternative also cannot hold good, because there is no seeing person other than the Brahman and the individual self. Again, it has to be explained who it is that manufactures the individual self, which is produced out of ignorance. Surely, it cannot be ignorance, because it is not intelligence. Nor is it the individual self. Because then it woul i mean that the thing depends on itself (for its production); and because also the state of the individual self, like that of the silver (erroneously perceived to be produced) in the mother-of-pearl, is capable of being manufactured by ignorance.773 If it be said that the Brahman Himself is the manufacturer (of the individual self), then it is the same as saying that the Brahman is beset with ignorance. 773. ‘Silverness’ in the mother-of-pearl is the illusion when the latter is perceived as silver. Some defect (in observa- tion) is the cause of the illusion: and the perceiving subject is the maker of the illusion. If the jiva is the illusion and avidya the defect, then who is the maker of the illusion? The maker cannot be the illusion. i 356 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 Further, if it is not granted that the Brahman is beset with ignorance, then it is asked whether the Brahman sees the individual selves or not. If He does not see them, such things as the wonderful creation based on seeing (that is, thinking ‘), the power of differentiating names, forms, etc., cannot belong to the Brahman. Again, if He sees them, then the Brahman, who is one indivisible uniform mass, cannot see the individual selves without the help of ignorance. Thus, there results ignorance to the Brahman. For this very reason, the view which maintains a distinction between mayd (i.e., the means of causing illusion to others) and avidya (i.e.. the means of causing illusion to one’s self) is also set at naught.77+ Indeed, the Brahman, although He possesses maya, cannot, in the absence of ignorance, possess the capability to see the individual selves. And one who possesses maya cannot deceive others without seeing them. Neither does māyā serve the possessor of māyā as a means of seeing others; only when others are seen, it serves as a means of deceiving them. Again, you may hold that the māyā of the Brahman, while it helps Him to see the individual self, forms also the cause of the illusion of the individual self. In such a case, maya enables the Brahman, who is indivisible, uniform and self-luminous, to see others; and is no other than the avidya which is another name for māyā. Again, the view may be held that avidya is the cause of false perception, whereas māyā shows that to be falsity, 774. The distinction between māyā and avidyn is made in various ways. Maya is single, while avidyas are many. The former is made of prakriti, where pure sattva is dominant; the latter has its sattva constituent impure. The former is an adjunct of the Lord, while the latter is the adjunct of the individual self. The former does not cause delu- sion to its substrate whose desires are not hindered, unlike in the case of the latter. The Lord is the reflection of the Brahman in maya while the individual selves are H s reflections in avidya. And so on. The Vivarana school sees no difference between māyā and avidya.Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] ‘MAYA’ & ‘AVIDYA’ 357 which, being other than the Brahman, is false; and does not serve Him as the cause of false perception. Therefore, it does not possess the character of avidya. But this is not correct. For otherwise, after it is known that the moon is only one, that which forms the cause of the perception of two moons will have to possess the character of avidya. And if the Brahman knows what is other than Himself to be certainly false, He does not deceive that thing. Indeed, no one who is not mad desires to deceive those whom he knows to be unreal. Again, the view may be held that avidya is the cause of the perception of things which are both undesirable and unreal, whereas maya does not serve the Brahman as the cause of the perception of undesirable things. It does not, therefore, possess the character of avidya. But this is not right. The knowledge of two moons does not form the cause of misery, and therefore does not possess the character of being undesirable (or being no object of human pursuit). Nevertheless, it is caused, by avidya itself, and for removing it, men take great pains. If māyā does not form the cause of the perception of what is undesirable, then it (i.e., the māyā), not being regarded as deserving destruction, will have to accompany eternally the essential nature of the Brahman. It may be replied that this may be so and that no harm will result therefrom. But the harm is indeed the perception of· duality, and there will be contradiction of the scriptural texts teaching monism, such as the following: “But where indeed there comes into existence duality as it were Where, however, all has become the Self to him, there who shall see whom by what?” (Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 14 & IV 5. 15) It may again be said that the scriptural passages teaching monism deal with the Highest Reality, whereas māyā possesses the character of unreality, and there is, IL. S.B.-46 358 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I therefore, no such contradiction. But it is replied that the perception of māyā which is unreal and the association with it, cannot, in the absence of avidya, appropriately result to the Brahman, who has the essential nature of unlimited bliss. Moreover, it may be asked of what use to the Brahman is the eternal maya 775 which is unreal. If it be said that it serves to deceive the individual self, it is again asked of what use is the deception which is no desirable object. If it is replied that it is all mere play, it is again asked of what use mere play is to One who has unlimited bliss. It may, however, be replied that it is only to those persons whose enjoyments (of pleasure) are fully perfect, that mere play is seen in the world to have the character of an object of human pursuit. In the case under consider- ation, it is not proper to say so. Indeed, the play is unreal and is produced by unreal materials of play which in turn appear to be unreal: by its means as well as by means of its unreal appearance, the pleasure of play cannot be originated in those who are not mad. And surely, as stated before,776 it has to be seen that it is impossible to assume fictitiously the existence of the individual self as the abode of avidya, in contra-distinction to the Brahman, who is accepted to be the abode of māyā. Therefore, the Brahman Himself, divided into various parts by the beginningless avidya associated with Himself, perceives manifoldness as existent within Himself. And this has to be accepted by those who accept the Brahman to be without a second. It has been stated already that a definite determination in regard to bondage, salvation, etc., cannot be appro- priately arrived at. This objection is not urged on behalf 775. Maya is not eternal in the sense in which the Brahman is so, All that is suggested is that it is not felt to deserve removal or destruction, and SO may be expected to persist indefinitely. 776. The reference is to the fallacies of reciprocal dependence etc., already raised. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] IGNORANCE IN ‘BRAHMAN’ 359 of one who holds that the Brahman is conditioned by ignorance and for the following reasons. The Brahman, who is one only and ignorant, will be finally released from bondage on the destruction of ignorance. And there will therefore be no need at all for definitely determining the distinction of bondage, final release, etc. The definite. distinction between who is bound and who is finally released, who is the pupil and who is the teacher, etc., which are all within the practical world of experience are manufactured by illusion as in the case of the perceiver of dreams. It is also appropriate and possible for all fictitiously assumed things to arise out of any one avidya, as they do in the case of one who has dream-perception. That is to say, the pupils, the teachers etc., who are perceived indeed by a single dreamer, are invariably manufactured by his ignorance. For this very reason, the fictitious assumption of many kinds of ignorance does not also stand to reason,777 The really existent condition of bondage, final release, etc., as well as the differentiation of myself and another, is not accepted by him who holds that the Brahman is conditioned by ignorance. But the unreal (condition) can be appropriately had by means of ignorance. And the syllogistic reasonings (in this connection) are as follows. (1) The apprehension of distinctive conditions of bondage and final release as well as the apprehension of the distinction of oneself and another is manufactured by 777. A broad division of the Advaitins is into those who believe in one self and those who believe in many selves. Among those who believe in one self, there are several schools. Here the refer- ence is to those who believe in a single jiva, which animates only a single body. The bodies in the world are like the bodies seen in dreams; they are not animated by this self. There is no distinc tion in this view between released and bound souls. The so called release of Vamadeva, Suka and other sages is like a release in dreams. 360 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I one’s own ignorance; they possess the character of unreality like the apprehension of distinction seen in dreams. (2) All other bodies are also ensouled solely by me, because they possess the character of bodies, like this (my) body. (3) All other bodies are also manufactured by my ignorance, because they possess the character of the body, or because they possess the character of an effect, or because they possess the character of non-intelligence, or because they possess the character of a fictitious thing; like this (my) body. (4) The whole of the intelligent existence, which is the subject-matter of dispute, is altogether myself, because it possesses the character of being intelligent. Whatever is not myself, that is seen to be unintelligent, as for instance a pot.77; Therefore the differentiation of oneself and another as well as the differentiation of the bound and the freed, the pupil and the teacher, etc. is all manufactured by one’s ignorance. For even a dualist (Kanada), the distinctive conditions of the bound and the freed are difficult of proof, because the past periods of time known as kalpas are infinite in number, and therefore, if in each kalpa final freedom accrues to a single individual, all will have to obtain final release, and in consequence there will be none who has not attained final release, It may be said that there is an infinity 779 of individual selves, and therefore there exist those who have not 778. The first syllogism sets ont the proposition described in the previous paragraph and explained in Note 777. The second stresses that there is only one self. Then it is pointed that there is only a single avidyă. Finally, the unity of intelligence or consciousness is brought out It should be noted that a negative instance is given to prove the last syllogism. This is because all consciousness is the minor term, and the example or instance will have to be found outside it. 779. If against an infinity of kalpas an infinity of souls is counterpose, examination of the concept of infinity becomes neces- sary. The argument here is refuted presently by the Vaiseshika, It may also be noted that while the Advaitin believes in the infinity of a single self, the Vaiseshika believes in an infinity of selves. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] ‘BRAHMAN’S’ INFINITY 361 obtained final release. It is asked what this infinity is. If it be said that it is what cannot be counted, it is replied that, though owing to largeness in number, it cannot be counted by men of small intelligence, it is certainly capable of being counted by the Omniscient Lord. If it is impossible for Him also (to count), He will have no omniscience. It may again be said that the individual selves have no number, and therefore not to know the number, which does not exist, cannot cause the attribution of the absence of omniscience to the Lord. (It is replied that) if the self be differentiated, the negation of the quality of number (in relation to it) cannot be appropriate, thus. The selves do possess the quality of number, because they are differentiated; even as pulses, mustard, pots, cloths etc. (that are differentiated from one another). And if they are differentiated, it follows that like pots etc., the selves will have non-intelligence, the quality of being the non-self and the quality of being destructible. Moreover, the Brahman can have no infinity. Infinity means being devoid of limitations, and according to the view which believes in distinctions, it is impossible to predicate of the Brahman that He is devoid of limitation as any definite thing by reason of His being entirely distinct from all other things. Indeed, limitation as any definite thing is nothing other than the existence of other things. For a thing which has the limitation of the character of any definite thing, it is improper to be unlimited by time and place. For pots and other things, which certainly have the limited character of definite things, are also undoubtedly seen to be limited by time and place, because of their being entirely distinct from all other things. Similarly, all the intelligent individual selves as well as the Brahman, being possessed of the limitation of the character of a definite thing, are also limited by time and place. And in the result, there arises contradiction with such passages as the following: “The Brahman is existence, knowledge, infinity, (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.), which declare the “9362 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I negation of all kinds of limitations (in regard to the Brahman). 780 Birth, destruction etc., will also accrue to the individual self as well as to the Brahman. Indeed, the limitation of time (in regard to a thing) is only the attain- ment (by it) of origination and destruction. Therefore, the whole world, beginning with (the four- faced) Brahma and ending with a clump of grass, is the display of the ignorance of the Brahman, who is one only and unlimited. The determination etc. of the conditions. relating to the putting together of pleasure and pain are also appropriate, as they partake of the nature of ignorance, like the determination of distinctions produced by dream- perception, Consequently, the one only Brahman, who has an eternal, free and self-luminous nature,781 becomes, under the influence of beginningless ignorance, the seat of super- impositions in the form of the world; and therefore, there being in reality nothing else than the Brahman, the world has identity with him.

It is here stated in reply (by the Vaišeshikas) as follows: It has been stated above that the Brahman, who is devoid of attributes and is mere self-luminousness, perceives manifoldness in Himself when His own essential nature is veiled by the beginningless ignorance. And it has already been stated before (in reply that this theory) is opposed to all the criteria of truth, and opposed also to his (i.e., the Advaitin’s) own words, for the reason, 780. The infinity of the Brahman is interpreted by the Advaitin to mean that He is free from limitation in regard to time. and place and as a thing. He exists at all times and places, and no other thing exists. See p. 34, Vol. I. It is urged here that to concede the reality of anything other than the Brahman is to deny Him infinity. 781… What the Advaitins mean by the Brahman’s eternal, free and self-luminous nature is explained in pp. 43-47Y Vol. I. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] TEST OF REALITY 363 among others, that, if concealment of the nature of the cessation of luminosity happens to One whose essential nature is luminousness and who has no parts, the destruc- tion of His essential nature will be the result, and in there can consequence, concealment.782 possibly be no (such) It has been further stated above that the effect which is other than the cause is stultified by logical reasonings and is therefore an illusion, like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl. This is improper, because there is no (such) reasoning. Again, it has been stated above that the cause alone, which persists before the consciousness, possesses the character of reality, and that effects like pots, dishes, etc., which are logically excluded, possess the character of unreality. This (statement) also has been indeed earlier nullified for the following reason, among others, that the logical exclusion from one place of a thing which is seen in another place does not stultify (its reality).783 It has also been stated above that the effect possesses the character of unreality inasmuch as it possesses the character of indescribability either as existence or as non- existence, owing to its being capable of actual perceptual existence and being destructible. This is not right, for the capability for (its) being actually perceived to exist and for (its) destruction does not indeed prove (its) unreality, but (its) being non-eternal. Whatever thing has been perceived in association with a particular time and place, the cause of its unreality is certainly its stultification in association with that particular time and place only. In the case of a thing which is perceived to exist in association with a different time and different place, its being stultified in association with another time and place proves merely that it is not 782. See p. 142, Vol. I. 783. See Note 754 on p. 343, and also Vol. I, p. 57. 364 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I invariably concomitant with such different place and different time, and not that it is unreal. And the counter- syllogism may be stated thus: The effect known as the pot etc., is real, because there is no stultification of it, when there are limiting adjuncts rightly perceived in relation to time, place, etc.; as is the case with the self.784 Again, it has been stated above that the effect is not produced out of the essence of the cause in both its unmodified and modified conditions. This is not right, because the origination of an effect is possible out of a cause in association with place, time and other such auxiliaries. The statement above made, that such an association does not happen to the modified as well as the unmodified (cause)-that is also improper; because it is only that which is indeed unmodified before that can possibly be in association with time etc. It may be said that, as immodifiability does not vary, the association with place, time etc., links up even earlier. It is replied that association with place, time etc., which is dependent on other causes (like karma, God’s will etc.) has no dependence upon this (i.e., modification).785 Therefore, that cause which has assumed a particular condition known as the association with place, time, etc., produces the effect. This is nothing defective. And it is not possible to deny in any manner whatsoever what is seen unstultified, viz., that the cause has the power of producing the effect. It has also been stated above that it is not possible either for mere gold, or for its effects like the necklace, or for itself (i.e., gold) forming the abode (of the effects) to 784. In association with a particular time and place, a pot is as real as the self, whose reality is accepted by both the Vais’eshika and the Advaitin. Nothing can stultify the pot there and then, even as nothing can stultify the self. Limiting adjuncts other than time and place are also indi- cated to deal with such phenomen a as delusions in regard to time and place, 785. The reply is here given to the argument that the effect is in- capable of logical definition. See pp. 343-344 above: Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] EFFECT IS REAL 365 be capable of producing effects. This is improper; mere gold etc., associated with the above-mentioned auxiliaries (of time and place), are entirely capable of producing (effects). And it is not possible to affirm that there is no effect seen that is other than the gold which forms the cause, Because the mystic cross (svastika) of gold is seen to be other than gold, and because also another thing (than the cause) has been already established by means of a difference in knowledge (in relation to causes and effects), by means of the difference in the words (expressive of both) and by means also of other differences. And this is no illusion like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl and other such things; because a thing which is perceived between (its) birth and destruction is not seen to be stultified with reference to its association with that particular place and time. And there is not seen any reasoning whatever that is capable of stultifying this perception. 78. The perception, leading to the recognition of gold even at the time of the perception of the previously unperceived mystic cross (svastika), is not contradictory of the persistence before the conscious- ness of gold as forming the abode of the mystic cross. And the proof of the unreality of the world with the help of scriptures has indeed been already set at naught. And what has here to be replied to the other view that there is no contradiction of perception (with the scriptures) -all that also has already been clearly explained. 787 What has also been stated to the effect that all the bodies are ensouled by a single self-that is not right, because then it will lead to the recognition in only one person of pleasures and pains arising in all bodies. Indeed, 786. The implication is that the origination and destruction of a thing prove it only to be non- eternal, not unreal. II. S.B.-47 787. See page 346 above, and Note 757. The Advaitin’s argu- ment about the scripture is given in Vol. I, pp. 29-30 and 37-38. The reply to it is given in Vol. I, PP. 90-97. 366 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I in the case of Saubhari 788 and others, by means of one self, the recognition of pleasures etc. arising out of many bodies, was seen in relation to one person. It is impossible to say (as the Advaitins do) that the thing ‘I’ possesses the character of the knower, and that there is no united gathering up of experiences, owing to its variety, and not from the manifoldness of the self. The self is, indeed, the knower, and that (knower) is certainly the thing ‘I’. It has already been explained that the material principle of egoity which forms an internal organ of sense is not the knower, on account of its being, as an organ of sense, non intelligent in the same way in which the body and the external organs of sense are non-intelligent.789 It has been also stated above that all bodies possess the character of having been manufactured by the ignorance of only one person for the reason that they have the character of being the body, of being non-intelligent, of being produced effects and of being fictitious fabrications. This statement also is improper, because all bodies do not certainly possess the character of being projected by ignorance, and the negation (of the possession) of such (a character) results from the appropriate explanation that whatever is unstultified possesses the character of reality. as And the statement made to the effect that, whatever is different from intelligence is seen to possess 788. See p. 155 above and Note 573. Saubhari’s soul animating 50 bodies is an excep- tional case. It is cited to urge that if one soul animates all bodies, it must experience the pleasures and pains of ali embodied beings. The second syllogism on p. 360 is being answered. 789. The Advaitins hold that the character of being the knower is superimposed on the One immodifable Consciousness and that it is ‘seated in the knot of the evolved principle of egoity known as the ahankara’. (Vol. I, p. 45). The ’thing, 1,’ is thus the ahankara or anta ḥkarana, which is many and varied, and which accounts for the individuality of the experiences of different bodies, But the Vais’eshikas and Ramanuja maintain the individual self to be the knower, To the former, the self is merely the substrate of knowledge, which ‘comes and goes’. To Ramanuja, as set out in Vol. I, po. (8-90. the self is of the nature of knowledge and also has knowledge for its attribute. This difference does not prevent the two schools of thought from making a united stand against the Advaitins here.Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] VAIN EFFORTS 367 non-intelligence, all the intelligent selves are identical-this has also been disproved clearly through the declaration of distinctions (in regard to them) arising out of the determined arrangements relating to (their) pleasures and pains, 790 What has been mentioned above to the effect that, because things are ensouled by me and are manufactured by means of my ignorance, the thing ‘I’ is indeed the whole of the totality of intelligent beings and that therefore the thing ‘I’ is only one-this is the erroneous talk of one who is quite ignorant of the settled conclusions of his own school. In your view, the self is only pure intelligence entirely distinct from such things as ‘I’, ‘you’, etc.791 Moreover, to one who holds the view that everything other than pure intelligence is unreal, any effort at ‘hearing’ (the scriptures) etc., for the purpose of attaining final freedom, is fruitless, because such (an attempt) is an effect of ignorance, like the effort made for the purpose of seizing etc. the silver etc. in the illusory perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc. and in other such perceptions. The effort made for the purpose of attaining final freedom is useless, because it is an effect of knowledge dependent on a fictitious teacher, like the efforts of Suka, Prahlada, Vāmadeva and others.792 Further, the knowledge resulting from scriptural sentences such as “That thou art” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.) does not remove the bondage (of ignorance), because it is born out of sentences manufactured by ignorance, or because it is itself 790. In this and the preceding paragraphs, the third and fourth syllogisms on p. 360 are answered. A single avidya, it is pointed out, cannot create all the bodies, which are non-eternal, but not unreal. Then the fourth syllogism is refuted. 791. Here and in what follows a reply to the first syllogism on p. 360 appears to be indicated. The argument is: The self, being distinct from ‘I’ and ‘you’, cannot be the thing ‘I’ What is then the point of speaking about the projections of ‘my ignorance’? 792. Suka, the son of Vyasa, was a famous sage. Vamadeva is celebrated in the Vedas. Refer to Ved Sut. (1. 1. 31). Prahlada, the son of the wicked Hiranyakashipu, was a great devotee of the Lord in the Vishnu and other Puranas. 368 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I of the nature of ignorance, or because it has its abode in the knower manufactured by ignorance, or because it arises out of the ‘hearing’ (of the scriptures) dependent upon a fictitious teacher-like the knowledge produced by means of sentences intended to remove bonds forged in dreams.793 Again, the Brahman, who is pure intelligence devoid of attributes, is unreal, because He is known by means of the knowledge which is an effect of ignorance, or because He is known by means of the knowledge resident in a knower projected by ignorance, or because He is known by means of the knowledge having the nature of ignorance. Whatever is so (known), that has the characteristic (of unreality), as for example, the city of the Gandharvas, what is perceived in dreams etc. 794 And the Brahman, who is pure intelligence devoid of attributes, is not self-luminous, so as not to desiderate any other means of proving (Himself). And what has been already stated to the effect that self-luminous knowledge is seen to possess the characteristic of being witnessed by the self, this amounts indeed to saying that that (self-luminous knowledge), having the nature of pragmatic fitness in relation to particular things to be known, is seen only in association with the knower. This point has been already explained. Those arguments also, which, being based upon logical skill, are advanced in proof of that (self- luminous knowledge) being attributeless-they also are set aside by means of the reasonings which are stated subse- quently (in the context) to the effect that that self-luminous knowledge is a product of ignorance etc.795 three “The 793. Compare Vol. I. pp 90-93. 794. Compare the syllogisms in Vol. I, p. 93. city of the Gandharvas’ is an idiomatic expression to mean a kind of mirage giving the appear- ance of a city in the sky. 795. Compare Vol, I, pp. 41, 58 and 62. The self luminous nature of consciousuess is emon- strated solely by means of the fact that perception brings external objects to the light of conscious- ness. Adhik. V, St. 15] SELF-LUMINOUSNESS 369 Further, what is pure intelligence devoid of attributes cannot appropriately possess the characteristic of being the witness of ignorance, nor have the illusion of the projection of the world made up of the material principle of egoity etc; because the characters of a witness, illusion etc., also are to be seen in association with particular knowers and not in association with pure intelligence, and because neither luminosity nor luminousness dependent on one’s own self can result in relation to that (pure intelligence devoid of attributes). Luminosity, indeed, is seen to be of the nature of the realisation of the pragmatic fitness of a certain particular thing to a particular person. Indeed, for that very reason, that self-luminousness is predicated by you also in regard to that (pure intelligence devoid of attributes). And luminosity does not accrue to a dis- similar thing (ie., pure intelligence) which is devoid of attributes.796 Again, what is proclaimed in your own schools to the effect that a real effect is seen to take its birth even out of an unreal (cause)-that also has been disproved by your own admission that such effects, being all but unstultified, are real in the world of practical experience, but in the highest sense of reality have the nature of ignorance itself. The same view has been already disproved by us in a general manner, while we were demonstrating that all effects are produced out of a very real cause itself. And you cannot possibly say that these logical reasonings are 796. To kara the Brahman is mere jñapti, intelligence or aware- ness, implying no subject-object relations. Ramanuja says that the self is of the nature of jñapti. But there is knowledge only when the knower contacts the object of knowledge. Subject-object rela- tionships are essential Luminous- ness is said to be predicated of the attributeless intelligence by the Advaitin only on the basis of such relationships. For his views, see Vol. I, pp. 42-43. Rāmānuja explains their implications later (Vol. I, p. 67). ‘To a dissimilar thing’ translates the reading ‘atadrisasya’ of the text; and it refers to the distinction between pure intelligence and other luminous things associated with subjects and objects. Another reading tad risasya’, points to a luminous thing which is a knower associated with an object of knowledge. When such a knower loses all attributes, there can be no luminousness. 370 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I contradicted by the scripture, because the scripture is the effect of ignorance and has the character of ignorance, and therefore there is nothing particular here in contradistinction to the illustrative examples (regarding the conflict between the different means of proof).797 What has been stated above to the effect that, although the Brahman is capable of being known by the knowledge relating to unreal things, He is certainly real for the reason that He is seen to have no subsequent stultification-that is not right, because after it is definitely determined that He is capable of being known by the knowledge arising out of an erroneous cause, to say that no subsequent stultifi- cation is seen (in regard to Him) is not of any avail. For instance, there is no subsequent stultification seen in relation to the knowledge, “The void (or nothing) alone is the reality”. Nevertheless, what is denoted by that (sentence) possesses the character of unreality, for no reason other than that it is definitely determined to be based upon error.793 Moreover, the following scriptural passages, “There is nothing here that is many and varied” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 19) and “The Brahman is knowledge, bliss” (Brih. Up. III. 9. 28), come last of all, after previously negating the whole of the totality of things other than pure intelligence, and therefore it is said that there is here seen no subsequent stultification. But, according to him who holds the view that nothingness alone is the reality, the non-existence of even that (entity of pure intelligence) is upheld, and as it (i.e., that view) relates to what is subsequent to that (entity of pure intelligence), subsequent stultification is seen (with reference to this last-mentioned entity). There can possibly be no negation beyond the nothingness of all 797. See Vol. I, pp. 90-93. The illustrative examples are those of the city of the Gandharvas, fetters in dreams, the perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., recently mentioned. 798, The Advaitins who hold that the Brahman can be known by statements about His nature in the scripture are referred to. See Vcl. I, pp. 28-37 and 97, and Note 71. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] KNOWLEDGE & ERROR 371 things. Consequently, this (nothingness) alone is seen not to have any subsequent stultification. The erroneous basis, however, is common to perception etc., as also to the knowledge which relates to the negation of all things and is born out of the Vedanta. 799 Therefore, the whole of the totality of knowledge exists in a real knower, and being itself real, possesses the power of proving other particular things. It being so, a portion of knowledge has an erroneous basis, and such error is real, while another portion (thereof) is born out of materials available (therefor) which are free from error and real. So long as this is not accepted, so long there will not be any definite distinction between what is a real and what is an unreal entity, as also no practical transaction belonging to the life of worldly experience. The practical transaction of the life of worldly experience is, indeed, both real and illusory, and is based upon the luminosity which exists in the real knower and has the nature of establishing particular things. That pure existence, which is devoid of attributes, cannot, however, form the cause of the (real and unreal) appearance etc. of real and unreal things, and therefore the practical transactions of worldly life cannot take place at all.800 What has been further stated by them to the effect that, as it is impossible for error to arise without a basis, pure existence, which forms the basis of all erroneous superimpositions, has the character of reality-that has been disproved on the ground that it is possible for errors to arise even though the basis (thereof) is of an unreal character, in the same way in which it is possible for errors to arise even though unreality attaches to the misleading 799. State rent precedes nega tion: and the negation of attributes to the Brahman there- fore comes last. The Advaitin negates attributes and the world, because of negating passages, but the Madhyamika negates the attribute.ess Brahman also. 800. Ramanuja’s theory of error is set cut at some length under Pramananupapatti, the fifth of the seven objections directed against Advaita under J. 1. 1. See Vol. I, pp. 144-170.372 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I cause, or what is of the nature of the abode of the misleading cause, or the quality of being the knower, or the knowledge.801 Again, you may be of opinion that, inasmuch as error is nowhere seen to arise, when its basis has the character of unreality, it has necessarily to be accepted that pure existence is real. But then error is nowhere seen to arise when the misleading cause, or being its abode, or being the knower, or knowledge is unreal. In their case also, in accordance with what is seen, reality has necessarily to be accepted. Thus, there is (here) nothing particular (to justify you in holding your view) other than enthusiasm in regard to it.902 What has been stated above to the effect that, even according to the view which maintains distinctions, inasmuch as the past periods of time known as kalpas are infinite in number, all the individual selves must have attained freedom, and there can therefore be possibly none who is bound, and consequently the definite distinctions between the conditions of bondage and final beatitude are impossible to arrive at-this is set aside on the score of the individual selves being infinite in number. It has also been stated above to the effect, that, if the individual selves have to be different from one another, it is unavoidable that they should possess the quality of number like pulses, mustard, pots, clothes etc. Here (in this case) pots etc. also being infinite in number, the illustrative example is deficient in regard to the predicate sought to be proved. It may be said that in the instances, ten pots’ and ‘a thousand pulses’, the quality of being possessed of number is seen to exist. True, but that C 801. See Vol. I, pp. 74 and 97. The Vaiseshika here asks the Madhyamika’s question why illusion cannot rest on an unreal basis. 802. Illusion or error on an unreal basis is not known, accord- ing to the Advaitins. Unreal misleading causes etc, also cannot produce error, say the Vai- s’esh kas. Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] VASTU-PARICHCHHEDA’ 373 (quality) does not belong to the essential nature of the pots etc. On the other hand, it belongs to the pots etc., which possess the limiting adjunots of space and time. We shall, however, accept such a quality of being possessed of number in relation to the individual selves. And by this much it will not follow that all (selves) have final freedom, because of the individual selves, in their essential nature (as free of the adjuncts of time and space), being infinite in number,803 What has been stated above to the effect that, if the individual selves are accepted as being differentiated, there will result to them, as in the case of pots etc., the quality of being non-intelligent, the quality of being non-self, and the quality of being liable to destruction-that is improper, because distinction in relation to things of one species does not cause to things of that species the character of things of a different species. Indeed, the distinction relating to pots does not cause to them the character of the cloth.804 What has already been stated above to the effect that, if distinction (in relation to the Brahman) exists, then, owing to the limitation as a definite thing, the limitations due to place and time also will result to the Brahman, and therefore the character of being infinite will not result to the Brahman-that is improper, because even in the case of things which are subject to the limitation as a definite the 803. The argument is: individual selves have number, because they are different from one another, like pulses, mustard etc. Several counter-arguments are suggested; () The quality of number is derendent, not on the distinction between selves, but on the limit ng adjuncts of space and time. (ii) The individual selves, when free of the limiting adjuncts of space and time, have no number. (iii) Similarly, pulses etc. have no number when freed of the limiting adjuncts of space and time. (Hence the illustration in the II. S.B.-48 argument fails to prove the predicate). And so on. 804. The Sruta-prakašika sag- gests the technical steps in the argument. (i) The self becomes the non-self, if differentiated, like the pot, (ii) This is the same as saying the self is non-differ- entiated because of its being the self. (iii) This in turn is similar to the pot is non-differentiated because of its being the pot. Or, whatever is differentiated is not the pot, like cloth. Since pots are in actual fact differentiated, the argument fails. 374 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I thing, no invariable rule is seen as to their limitations in regard to time and place, owing to these (latter) limitations being greater or less as the case may be. The extent of the association with time or place has its determination dependent upon other means of proof (than the limitation as a thing). Therefore, the association also of the Brahman with all time and all place, which is arrived at through other means of proof (than the limitation of the Brahman as a definite thing), is not contrary to reason.805 It may be said that infinity will not result to the Brahman merely by reason of the limitation as a definite thing, as there will (then) be the absence of freedom from all kinds of limitations. It is replied that this same is also the case with you, who accent that the Brahman is totally distinct from ignorance. Therefore, inasmuch as you accept that (pure) existence is entirely distinct from ignorance, then from the (admitted) distinction in regard to the Brahman, all the evils arising out of distinction result to you also. If a total distinction (of the Brahman) from ignorance is not accepted by you, then the Brahman will certainly have to be of the same nature as ignorance; and for that very reason, the passage also, which gives the definition of the Brahman to the effect, “The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity” (Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1), will convey a wrong meaning. In fact, if distinction is not admitted to be an entity, then there can be no discrimi- nation between what proves one’s views and what disproves another’s (i.e., an opponent’s views) etc., and in consequence everything will be inappropriate. 805. Limitation as a definite thing (or vastu-parichchheda) is defined by the Advaitins as “This (thing) does not become this other (thing)”. They claim that merely because of it, the limitations of time and place also result, Rāmā- nuja’s reply implies the following: (i) Variations are seen in the limi- tations of time and place, but not in vastu-parichchheda. (ii) Size and duration in particular cases are not caused by vastu-parichchheda, and so it cannot result in the limitations of time and place in general. (iii) In vastu parich- Chheda there is no attribute whose variations correspond to those in the limitations of time and place. Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] ‘PURVAPAKSHA’ ENDS 375 The establishment of infinity also takes place merely through the absence of the limitations of time and place, and not through the absence of the limitation as a definite thing in addition, because there is no manifestation to consciousness of such a thing (i.e., a kind of infinity which is due to the absence of limitation as a thing) which resembles the horns of a hare (in having no manifestation whatsoever to consciousness). According to him, however, who maintains distinction, the Brahman has all things as His modes by reason of His having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things for His body, and therefore He has no limitation (placed on Him) either by Himself or by another, 80; Accordingly, seeing that the effect, which is thus distinct from the cause, possesses the character of reality, the whole of the world which is the effect of the Brahman is undoubtedly other than the Brahman. 807 If it be so arrived at, we state in reply: “The identity (of the world) with Him, is made out from the passage marked with the word ārambhaṇa and the like” (Ved. Süt. II. 1. 15). identical with Him, that is, supreme cause, is made out by means of the passages containing the word, arambhana etc.-that is, by means of such passages as explain that (identity). 806. The Viseshika accepts vastu-parichchheda, without ad- mitting the limitations of space and time as its necessary conse quence. Even the Advaitin, he says, is in the same boat, by accepting the Brahman to be distinct from ignorance. (If this ignor ince is sa d to be unreal, then vastu-parichchheda is distinction from the highest reality. This distinction, being unreal, endures only till stultific t on and therefore becomes a limitation of time. If vastu parichchheda is mere distinction, the Brahman becomes subject to it.) Ramanuja, while (The truth) that the world is with the Brahman who is the accecting distinction, also main- tains the Brahman to be free from vastu-parichchheda as He is capable of being described in grammatical equation with every- thing in the world. (This is indicated in the last sentence of the paragraph.) This freedom arises from His own nfinity, and leads to His being free from limitations of space and time, 807. The Vaiseshika sums up, claiming the effect to be different from the cause. He is the main opponent in this section, the adhikaraṇa-purvapakshin. 376 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I The passage containing the word ‘ārambhaṇa’ and others (i.e., such passages) have the word ‘arambhana’ at their commencement, and they are the following passages. “Modification (i.e., vikāra), (as also) name is reached (or attained) (by clay) for the purpose of speech (followed by action); it is (all) real only as clay” (Chhānd. Up. VI. 1. 4); “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second” (Chhānd. Up. VI. 2. 1.); “It thought-‘May I become manifold and be born’. It created tejas” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3.); “Entering along with the individual self, which is also the same as Myself…” (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.); “All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the Sat (i.e., in the One Existence), have their abode in the Sat and are established in the Sat” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 4 & 6); and “All this has That for its self. That is existence. That is the Self. That thou art, O Svetaketu (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.) Here, in this context, are implied other similar contexts. Indeed, these passages declare the identity of the world which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things with the Suprem Brahman. 08 Thus, in accordance with the passage, “You are indeed dull. Did you ask for (knowledge of) that Ruler by knowing whom what is not thought becomes thought, what is not known becomes known?” (Chhānd. Up. VI. 1. 3.), after previously bearing in mind that the whole world has the Brahman for its cause and that the effect is identical with the cause, the proposition is enunciated (by the teacher) that by knowing the Brahman, who is the cause, the whole of what forms the effect is known. Then the student, not knowing how the whole effect (of this world) has the Brahman alone for its cause, puts 803. These passages, quoted from the Chhand Up. (VI), come after the illustrative examples referred to in the Ved. Sut. (I.4.23) and extend up to the famous declaration, “Tht thou art”. Ramanuja splits up vacharam- bhanam into two words, with the implied authority of arambhanam standing by itself in the Sutra (II, 1, 15).Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] REAL AS CLAY 377 questions, as given in the passage, “Who is that Ruler, reverend sir” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 3.), to the effect, whether by knowledge of one thing it is possible for other things to become known. Urged by which, he (i.e., the teacher) becomes desirous of giving the teaching that the world has the Brahman alone for its cause, and accordingly shows in the passage, “Just as, my dear child, by one lump of clay all that is made up of clay becomes known” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 4.), how there is entire identity of the effect with the cause as established in ordinary perception. The meaning of the given illustration is that inasmuch as pots, dishes etc., which are produced by a lump of clay, do not possess the character of being any substance other than that (clay), they become fit to be known by means of the knowledge relating to clay, 809 In the passage, “Modification, (as also) name, is reached (or attained) (by clay) for the purpose of speech (followed by action); it is (all) real only as clay” (Chhand. Up. VI. 1. 4.), he (the teacher) explains the identity of the effect with the cause solely by means of ordinary perception, in order to meet the objection, according to the arguments of the Kāṇādas, that the effect possesses the character of being a different substance from the cause. ‘Arambhaṇam’ is (a verbal noun) formed from (the verb) ‘a-rambh’, which is the same as ‘a-labh’, meaning to be touched’ (i.e., reached or attained). The verbal noun with the lyut affix (ana) is formed so as to be in an accusative relation to the verbal root, according to the rule, “The kritya and lyut affixes have a wide application” (Panini, III. 3. 113). The meaning of the expression vacha’ (lit. ’through speech’) is by reason of the practical realisation preceded by speech’. In fact, the practical realisation relating to the bringing of water etc., as in the instance, ‘Bring water by 809. “By knowing one lump of clay” in Chhand. Up. (VI. 1. 4) is explained as “by knowing one lump of clay”, It is not the existence of the lump, but know- ledge relating to it that leads to knowledge about things made from it. 378 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 11, Part I a pot,’ etc. is preceded by speech. In order that this practical realisation may take place, a ‘vikara’ (or a particular modification) which has a broad base, a hollow inside and such other characterisitics, and a namadheya (or name) which arises out of that (modification), are both reached (or attained) by that same substance of clay. In order that particular practical realisations such as the bringing of water etc. may take place, the substance clay itself becomes associated with different configurations and different names. Therefore, the pot and other things are real as clay itself, i.e., are real as the substance clay, i.e., are known with the help of the means of knowledge (as being that substance clay) and not as any other substance.810 Therefore, in relation to clay, gold and other substances themselves, different conceptions, different names etc., are appropriate merely by reason of their assuming different configurations, in the same way in which in relation to one and the same person known as Devadatta, owing to various changes in his conditions, various conceptions, various words, etc. are seen in the expressions, ‘He is a boy’, ‘He is a youth’, and ‘He is an old man’, as also particular effects. 811 What has been stated above to the effect that the effect is different from the cause for the reason that there is the practical realisation that the pot is lost even while the clay is in existence-that is set aside on the ground, that production, destruction etc. are seen to be particular 810. ‘Arambhanam’ is equated with ‘alambhanam’ од the phonetic principle that often / and r are interchangeable. The sentence in which it occurs replies to Svetaketu’s doubt that the illustrative examples given earlier only show the effect to be different from the cause. So he is taught that the effects of clay are still clay. Ramanuja feels that the iti in mrittiketyeva satyam supports him against the Advaitin, snowing the pots to be real as clay and not the clay to be the only real thing. 811. ‘Devadatta’ here denotes an individual self and not a body. Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] EFFECT IS IN CAUSE 379 conditions of that same causal substance. It is right that one and the same substance should have, in its particular conditions, particular words (denotative of it) and particular effects also. For a substance to assume particular conditions is dependent on the activity of the agent, and thus it (i.e., the activity of the agent) has a purpose (to serve),812 The objections which arise in regard to the theory of the manifestation (of the effect latent in a cause) are avoided merely by (our) not accepting such (a manifestation). Even if the origination (of the effect) be admitted (out of the cause), the view which says that the effect is existent in the cause is not contradicted, because origination (of the effect) belongs altogether to what really exists (as the cause). This contradiction is set out: that it (the effect) is already existent (in the cause) and that it is produced. This is the doubt of one who does not know the truth regarding the production and destruction (of things). The association of a substance with a later configuration is the destruction of that same thing in association with a former configuration and is the production of a condition of its own (i.e., of the substance). Therefore, a substance in all conditions being really existent, the view which maintains that the effect is existent (in the cause) is uncontradicted. If it be said that to admit a non-existent configuration leads to the view which holds that the effect is non-existent (in the cause), then even, according to him who holds that the effect is non-existent (in the cause), if the production does not possess the common characteristic which constitutes the class of productions, then the view which says that the effect is existent (in the cause) will find scope for operation. And if it (i.e., one instance of production) possesses the com- mon characteristic constituting the class, (its production 812. Here is the reply to the objection in p. 338 that the identity of cause and effect will make the activity of the agent producing the effect purposeless. 380 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I will have to possess a similar quality, and so) there will be a regressus in infinitum. In our view, however, as the conditions (of a substance) do not deserve to be in associ- ation with separate effects or (separate) cognisability (apart from the effects and cognisability of the substance), that which possesses these states itself goes through production and all other (states),813 This view is faultless. * In the same way in which the state of being a pot results through the destruction of the state of being the halves (of that pot), of being powder, and of being a lump (of clay), the state of being manifold results from the dissolution of the state of being one, and from the dissolu- tion of that (state of being manifold) the state of being one; and there is nothing which is opposed to reason.814 Similarly, in the passage, “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1), it is said that all this existence indeed, which now, owing to the differentiations of name and form, has assumed the form of the world which has a varied nature, was formerly one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms; and it has no second inasmuch as it possesses omnipotence and does not tolerate another presiding entity (over the universe). Thus identity alone is taught. The creation of the world is (then) stated to take place after the Self wills to become manifold in the form of the world, which consists of varied movable and immovable things, like the external element of light and heat and the elements which are to be created, as stated in the text: “It thought, “May I become mani- fold and be born”” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 2). Therefore, identity is conclusively established between the world which 813. To raise the question about the production (utpatti) of the condition called production is to Ramanuja as much a self. confuting argument as to question about the production of production is to the Vaiseshika. In Rāmā- nuja’s view, production is only a particular state or condition, and his condition cannot be cognised apart from that of which it is a condition. 814. This is a reply to the argument in p. 338 that the difference in number between cause and effect shows the two to be different. Cause and effect are here seen to be two states of the same substance prevailing at different times. Adhik. VI, Sut. 15] WHAT IS CREATION? 381 forms the effect and the Supreme Brahman who is the supreme cause.815 To the objection how it is appropriate for the Supreme Brahman Himself, who is denoted by the word ‘Existence’ and is omniscient, who wills the truth and is devoid of evil, to assume the form of the world, which is capable of being pointed out thus, “This is existence indeed”; how the world itself, which is denoted by the word ’existence’, can possess oneness (with Him) through the absence of names and forms; how it (i.e., the world) need not require any other presiding entity (than Himself); how it is appropriate for it (i.e., the world) again to possess the power of thinking, which is the same as willing, to become manifold in the condition of being the world made up of wonderful immovable and movable things; and lastly how creation can proceed in accordance with (such) willing–the answer is given in the passage beginning with “The same deity thought, ‘Indeed, I shall enter these three deities with this individual self which is also the same as Myself, and evolve the differentiations of names and forms’. (‘I shall make each) of them tripartite, tripartite’ (Chhand. Up. VI. 3. 2 & 3).. 339 Here, after pointing out all the non-intelligent things by the expression, “three deities”, it is stated that He will make these things possess wonderful names and forms by the entry thereinto of the individual self which has Him for its self. The meaning is that “with the individual self, which is the same as Myself”, that is, with the individual self, which has Me for its self, I shall enter as the self and make these (non-intelligent things) possess wonderful names and forms. What is said is that to Himself and to the individual self there results the possession of names and 19 815. In the Chhandogya phrase, “one only without a secon1, One indicates the Brahunan as the material cause of the world and advitiya the identity of the material cause with the efficient II. S.B.-49 cause. See Vol. I. pp. 99-100. Creation is explained with refer- ence to Chhand. Up. (VI. 2. 3), which is summed up except for the vyashti srishti referred to by prajayeya (‘may I be born’).382 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I forms through entering (the non-intelligent things) as the self. This is clearly explained in another scriptural passage- “Having created that (world), He became the sat and the tat” (Taitt. Up. II. 6. 1)-which says that the world with the individual self is entered into by the Supreme Brahman as forming the self (thereof). Thus what is here recalled to our mind is what is established in the Antaryami Brāhmaṇa (i.e., Brih. Up. III. 7) to the effect that the intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in (their) condition as effect and (their) condition as cause, both when gross and subtle, form the body of the Supreme Brahman and that the Supreme Brahman forms their self. Hereby the objection raised above is set aside. And the statement regarding the differentiation of names and forms is made in view of the Brahman remaining as the self of the non-intelligent thing associated with the individual self.816 Therefore, it is the Brahman Himself, having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things for His body, who is denoted by the word jagat (i.e., the world). So the whole passage at whose commencement it is stated that Existence alone, this only was in the beginning, is very appropriate in its primary significance. All the modifi- cations as well as all the erroneous aims of life are found to be in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form His body, and so the Brahman’s quality of being devoid of evil and His being a mine of auspicious qualities are both well maintained. Therefore, he (i.e., the Sutrakara) speaks of this immediately after- wards in the aphorism: “He 816. In regard to the scriptural statement that Existence (Sat) was only in the beginning, the doubt arises whe her this is the Brahman or the world. If the Brahman, how can He, being perfect, become the imperfect world? If the world, how can it think and will about creating? In answer, creation is (the Brahman), however, is explained in two stages-the evolu- tion of the elements out of primordial matter, and the entry therein of the individual self with the Brahman as his self. Tue “three deities” mean the elements of tejas, water and earth. See Vol. 1, Note 248. For sat and tyat, see Vol. I, Note 183. Adhik. VI, Süt. 15] ‘BRAHMAN’ IS WORLD 383 different (from the individual self) (because the difference (between the two) is declared (Ved. Süt. II. 1. 22). in the scripture”. Similarly, the passage, “All this has That (Brahman) for its self’ (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.) teaches the identity of all intelligent and non-intelligent things with the Brahman; and the same (identity) is summed up in the conclusion, “That thou art” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.)817 This identity is similarly made out in passages occurring in the other contexts also: “All this indeed is the Brahman” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 1); “When the Atman indeed is seen, heard, thought about and known, all this, indeed, becomes known” (Brih. Up. IV 5. 6); “All this, whatever there is, is this self” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7); “The Brahman indeed is all this” (Brih. Up. II. 5. 3); and “The Atman indeed is all this” (Chhand. Up. VII. 25. 2). Non-identity is negatived in the following passages: All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things apart from the Self” (Brih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7); “There is nothing here that is many and varied” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 19); and “He who sees this world, as if manifold, obtains death from death (i.e., samsara)” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 19 & Kath. Up. IV. 10). To a similar effect is the “Where indeed there is duality, as it were, there passage: one sees another….but where to one, all this has become the Self, there by what (independent organ) can one (independently) see what (independent thing)?” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 5. 15). This (passage), while it propounds that one who has no knowledge has the perception of 817. All passages regarded as having been referred to in the Sutra have been quoted earlier : and with one exception-Chhånd. Up. (VI. 8. 4 & 6)-they are explained. It is possible that Ramanuja considered only one phrase bere pertinent-‘sada- yatanaḥ’ (‘having their abode in the Sat’); and its purport as reinforced by the next passage, “All this has that (Brahman) for its self.” 584 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I duality whereas one who is wise has the perception of non- duality, declares that the identity (of the Brahman.with the individual self) has alone the character of truth. Thus, then, by means of the passages commencing with the word ‘arambhana’ etc., identity is established between the world and the supreme cause who is the Highest Brahman. The truth here is as follows.3:8 The Brahman Himself. who, because of His having all the intelligent and non- intelligent things as His body, has them as His modes, is always denoted by all words. Sometimes (i.e., during pralaya) He has the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, when they are in such a subtle condition as to be incapable of being separately denoted from Him even as forming His body, and (then) the Brahman is in the condition of cause. Sometimes also (i.e., during and after creation) He has the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, when they are in such a gross condition as to be capable of being practically realised through differentia- tion in names and forms, and He is (then) the Brahman in the condition of effect. Thus, the world which has the character of an effect is identical with the Supreme Brahman who is the cause. And between the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form the body (of the Brahman) on the one hand, and the Brahman who is their Self, on the other hand, both in the condition of cause and in the condition of effect, the definite distinction of good and evil which results from that definite distinction which relates to their respective natures, that is established by hundreds of scriptural texts, has been already mentioned in the aphorism: “There is, however, no such (inconsist- ency) because examples (illustrative of the position that the Brahman is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available “. (Ved. Sut. II. 1. 9). Those however (i.e., the Advaitins) who hold that the identity between the cause and the effect results through 818. Ramanuja now tries to the Brahman and the world with reconcile the difference between their identity as t ugnt here. Adhik. VI, St. 15] BHASKARA REFUTED 385 admitting an effect that is unreal-according to them, the identity between cause and effect cannot be established, because it is inappropriate for identity to exist between a real thing and an unreal thing. If such were the case, there would be unreality in regard to the Brahman or reality in regard to the world. Again, there are those (i.e., the followers of Bhaskara) who, while undoubtedly admitting that the effect is also real, hold to the view that the distinction between the individual self and the Brahman is due to limiting adjuncts, that the identity (between them) is natural, and that between the Brahman and the non-intelligent thing, how- ever, both (distinction and identity) also are natural. According to them, there can exist no entity other than the limiting adjuncts and the Brahman. The indivisible Brahman, who has no parts, is Himself in contact with limiting adjuncts. His essential nature itself undergoes modification in the form of evil; and if it be admitted that it is the power (of the Brahman) that undergoes modifica- tion, identity results between (that) power and the Brahman. For the foregoing reasons, the scriptural passages which maintain the definite distinctions, namely, that the individual self and the Brahman are respectively subject to karma and devoid of all sin, and so forth, will be contradicted, as well as those (other) scriptural passages which hold that the non-intelligent thing does and the Brahman does not undergo modifications etc. $19 There are again those (i.e., the followers of Yadava- prakāsa) who maintain that the world is not different from the Brahman for the following reasons: The substance of pure existence alone, which is devoid of all modifications such as the character of being the enjoyer etc., and which is associated with all power, is the causal Brahman. At the time of universal absorption, He has all His particular 8 9. Bhaskara’s views are dealt wi!! at some length under Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 4). See Vol. 1, pp. 275-281. They are also briefly summed up in Vol. I, Note 235. 386 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I experiences of pleasure and pain set at rest, and although self-luminous He remains, like the individual self in dream- less sleep, totally undistinguished from the non-intelligent thing. He remains at the time of creation in three conditions which are parts of Himself and have the forms of the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller, like the clayey substance of clay which assumes the forms of pots, dishes etc., and also like the ocean which assumes the forms of foam, waves, bubbles etc. Therefore, the character of being the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller, as well as the good and evil arising out of them, are definitely determined respectively to resemble the qualities of being dishes, pots and water-jars as well as to resemble the distinct effects associated with those (qualities). And the oneness of the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller as being made up of what is existence is quite appropriate, like the oneness of the pots, dishes, water-jars etc., as being made up of clay. Conse- quently, the substance of pure existence alone exists in all conditions. These (followers of Yadavaprakasa) go against all scriptures, Smritis, Itihāsas, Purāṇas and logical reasonings. Indeed, all the Vedic scriptures, together with all the Smritis, Itihasas and Puranas, establish the Brahman who is the lord of all lords, who is always omniscient and omnipotent, who wills the truth and is devoid of evil, who is unlimited by time or place and is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, and who is the supreme cause. But they do not establish that pure existence which is beyond even the Lord and of which the Lord is a part. Accordingly, there are the following scriptural passages: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3.); “It thought, ‘May I become manifold and be born (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 3.); “The Brahman indeed, this one alone, was in the beginning. Being one, He did not feel strong. He created the Kshatriyas of excellent

Adhik. VI, Sat. 15] NARAYANA IS CAUSE 387 form so that they may be superior to others those Kshatriyas among the gods, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu and Isana” (Brih. Up. I. 4. 11); “The Self, indeed, this was in the beginning. There was nothing else blinking (i.e., active). He thought, ‘May I create the world’” (Ait. Up. I. 1.); and “Indeed, Nārāyaṇa alone then was, and not Brahmā, nor Īsāna, nor the sky and earth, nor the stars, nor the waters, nor fire, nor the moon, nor the sun. Being alone, He did not feel happy. Of Him who was in the height of meditation. …” (M. Up. I. 1). < By means of these and other similar passages, it is made out that Nārāyaṇa Himself, the Lord of all the lords, is the supreme cause. The words, ‘Sat’ (existence), ‘Brahman’, and Atman’, which are all found mentioned in similar contexts, are particularised by the word, “Nārāyaṇa’, occurring in a context similar (to the other above-stated contexts), and they reveal Him alone. 820 That causality belongs to the Lord Himself is heard declared in the scriptures thus: “(May we know) that greatest Lord, who is the highest among lords……!” (Svet. Up. VI. 7.); and “He is the cause, He is the Lord of what is the lord of senses (i.e., of the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior” (Svet. Up. VI. 9.). The Smriti also, which is attributed to Manu, after introducing the subject-matter in the passage beginning with “Then the self-existent divine Lord-,” says: “After thinking and willing (to the effect that He would become manifest), He, with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures from His own body, created the waters only at first and therein cast his seed” (Manu, I. 6 & 8). The Itihasas and the Puranas also declare the Highest Person Himself to be

Of the three terms, Sat (‘Existence’), Brahman (‘That which is huge’) and Atman (’the Self’), denoting the cause of the world, the first is most general, the second is more restrictive, and the third implies intelligence. When Narayana is mentioned, then all doubt and vagueness are at an end. What is indicated by the general terms, Sat etc., is now particularised. 388 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part I the supreme cause in the following and other similar pass- ages: “Nārāyaṇa has the world for His body. He consists of countless selves and He is ancient…… He, wishing to create, created from out of a thousandth part (of Himself) two kinds of beings” (M.B. XII. 180. 11 & 12); and “The world was born out of Vishnu, and is existent in Him alone” (V. P. I. 1. 35).821 Again, it is not possible to say that the Lord is pure existence itself; because He is accepted as forming a bit of it, and because also He has the particular attribute of being the controller. Moreover, it is not possible to say that His association with innumerable auspicious attributes like intelligence, bliss etc., is only occasional; because they are all characterised as eternal, owing to their being natural, in the following and other passages: “His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, strength and action” (Svet. Up. VI. 8); and “He who understands all and who knows all” (Mund. Up. I. 1. 9). Do not say that it is only association with the potential power of intelligence, of bliss ete., that is natural to Him, because it is indicated separately that power is natural to Him and that intelligence, strength, and action are also natural (the epithet ’natural’ qualifying both ‘power’ and knowledge, strength and action’), and because also’ there would have to be (otherwise) a figurative interpretation (in regard to the words ‘intelligence etc.). 822 It is not possible to say again that, as in the case
In the passages now quoted, the cause of the world is declared to be the Lord or Nara- yana, and not the Sat.
The followers of Yadava- prakasa believe that the associa- tion of the Lord with auspicious attributes is occasional. Svet. Up. VI. 8, where the power of the Lord is referred to as well as His association with intelligence, strength and action, is understood by them as referring to (1) His supreme power of bringing together what cannot be brought together and doing impossible things and (i) His associat on with the capability for intelligence, strength and action. Ramanuja criticises the view, Ly point ng out that they impos a restricted meaning on the Lord’s power and force a figurative interpretation on His intelligence, strength and action. Adhik. VI, Sit. 15] YADAVA REFUTED 389 of the word ‘pāchaka’ (or cook) and other such words, the krit affix denotes merely capability (or potential power) in regard to ‘sarvajňa’ (‘He who understands all’) and other such words, because it is not the mere krit affix (in general) that is taught to denote capability, and because also under the aphorism, (“The krit affix) is used in the sense of capability in association with the words ‘hastin’, and ‘kava ta’” (Pāṇini, III.2.54), and other such aphorisms, only a few of the krit affixes are taught as denoting capability. In the case of ‘pachaka’ and other such words on the other hand, a metaphorical meaning has to be accepted as a matter of necessity.523 Again, the Lord being a particular portion of that (i.e., Existence), if that (i.e., Existence) has to be a whole made up of parts, then as the whole has to be greater than a part, in the same way in which the sea is greater than the waves, there would be contradiction of thousands of passages like the following which relate to the Lord (as the greatest): “(May we know) that Highest Lord, who is the greatest Lord of lords” (Svet Up. VI. 7); and “There is seen neither His equal nor His superior” (Svet. Up. VI. 8). Further, if Pure Existence itself consists of all things, and if it is a whole-then the Lord being a particular portion of that (Existence), the teachings which are given to the effect that He consists of all things and forms the whole, would be contradicted. Indeed, pots and dishes are not made up of water-jars, nor do they form parts of those (water-jars). 824 It may,
The krit affix is used to form nouns denoting agents of actions from verbal roots. Some exceptions to the rule, like the words, hastighna’ (lit. ’elephant- killer’ and ‘kavataghna’ (lit. ‘door-destroyer’), are mentioned in Panini (II. 2. 54). In usage, they mean respectively a mahout and a thief, persons who are not killers, but who have the capacity to destroy.
Pots, dishes and water- jars seem to stand respectively for
S.B.-50 however, be said that, as the intelligent selves, the non- intelligent things and the Lord. In Yadavaprakasa’s view, a part of Pure Existence divides itself into selves, matter and the Lord. The analogy is of a portion of the mud of the earth being made into pots, dishes and water jars. Now, selves, matter and the Lord are made up of Existence; but the selves and matter are not made up of the Lord, Pots, dishes and water-jars are made up of mud. but pots and dishes are not made up of water-jars. 390 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 Pure Existence is perfect in every one of its parts, it is perfect also in the part known as the Lord, and that there- fore all other things consist of Him and form His parts. But this is not so, because Pure Existence being perfect even in a pot, it will follow that the Lord also consists of the pot and forms part of it. Furthermore, when in such expressions as ‘A pot is’, ‘A cloth is’ etc., Pure Existence is understood to be an attribute of things, it cannot appropriately either be a substance or form a cause. Existence is, indeed, the possession of the capability of being an object of practical realisation. The capability of being the object of a contrary practical realisation by a thing which is capable of that particular realisation is non-existence. If the category of substance alone is accepted to be existence, then it will follow that the other categories of action etc. will be non- existence. Even on the principle according to which one kind of grass known as kāśa is accepted (in religious ceremonies) in the place of another kind of grass known as kusa, for the reason that the former belongs to the same class as the latter, it is not easy to establish that, in regard to the categories of action etc., all of them possess one and the same kind of existence.825 If through being sat (existence) itself all things possess identity (or non-differentiation), they will all be omniscient, and hence the character of all things will be recognised as coming together (in them), from which it follows that there

The Pure Existence of Yadavaprakas’a is either an attri- bute or a substance. If an attr bute, it cannot be the causal substance from which the world has evolved. If it is a substance, the categories of act on etc. must be deemed non-existent. It cannot te said that existence is primarily a substance but secondarily in- cludes action etc. also, as the grass kāśa is used as a substitue for the grass kust, when the latter is not available, in religious ceremonies. For existence cannot admit of grades or classes within itself. It may be noted that the kisa- kusa-nyaya is sometimes used to indicate being driven from one untenable argument to another almost equally untenable. But here the only point is th it kāšu is unimportant and a substitute for kuša. Adhik. VI, Süt. 16] CAUSE IN EFFECT 391 will be a confused mixture of all good and evil. And this has been already stated.826 Consequently, identity (between the Brahman and the world) exists only in the manner stated above.

It may be said (by the Vaiseshikas) that different conceptions and words are used in relation to the conditions of childhood, youth, etc., when one and the same person is in association with those different conditions of age; there is also seen such a difference in conceptions and words in relation to clay, wood, gold, etc., where there are different substances. It being so, it is asked how it is determined that the differences in ideas and words respec- tively relating to causes and effects, like clay, pots etc., are based only on (changes of) condition.827 To this the reply is as follows:-
wrà atre:
Sutra 16. Bhave chopalabdheḥ
(154)
Because during the existence (of the effect) also there is a perception (of the causal substance).
Because where effects such as ear-rings are in actual existence, there is an actual perception of gold which forms their cause. The meaning is that this is due to the fact that, when it is said “This ear-ring is gold”, there is the perception leading to the recognition as gold (of both gold and the ear-rings). The clay and other things are not perceived in this manner in gold etc., which are different substances (from clay etc.). Therefore, that substance

See p ge 333 above under Ved. Sut. (II, 1. 14).
The objection is that differences in words, ideas etc. cannot be restricted merely to differences in state; they apply also to different substances. The answer shortly is that they can indicate only differences of state, when there is also at the same time a recognition of identity.392 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 alone which forms the cause is spoken of as the effect, when it assumes different conditions, as in the case of (one and the same person being spoken of at different times as) the boy, the youth etc. There is, moreover, an additional reason that, even according to the person who holds that they (i.e., the cause and the effect) are distinct substances, it is admitted that there is association (of the cause such as threads) with a different condition (known as being the non-intimate cause which is the union of those threads), and in conse- quence the differences in the ideas relating to the words expressive of (threads and their union or) such things are all practically realised. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assume a different substance (in the effect). And this perceptual recognition is not founded upon any generic properties (as is the case when it is said, “This is that same cow”). For there is no perception of another entity, which forms the basis of the class in which such generic properties reside. One and the same substance, which belongs to the class of gold, is seen to exist both in the condition of cause and in the condition of effect. Again, it is not possible to say that, if there be different substances (as cause and effect), it is only by the persistence of the material cause that recognition can be had (of it) in the effect. When there is difference of substance (between cause and effect), merely because of the persistence of the base, there can be no recognition (of the cause) in the different substance (i.e., the effect) residing in it (i.e., the base). It may, however, be said that in the case of the scorpion and other effects produced in cowdung and others (i.e., such causes), cowdung etc. are not seen to be recognised. But this is not right. For in this case also there is the recognition (in the effect) of the substance of earth which forms the first cause (of these things). Adhik. VI, Sut. 17] EFFECT IN CAUSE 393 It may again be said that in smoke, which is the effect of fire, there is not seen any recognition of fire. Be it so. In this case, there may be no recognition (of the cause in the effect). Nevertheless, it is nothing wrong, because fire is merely an instrumental cause (of smoke). Indeed, smoke is produced out of wet fuel in close contact with fire. And the property of odour being common to both (smoke and wet fuel), smoke is certainly the effect of the fuel.828 Therefore, where the effect exists, there also is the perception, “This (effect) is certainly that (cause)”. Hence it is made out that these differences in ideas, words etc. (relating to causes and effects) are founded upon a mere change of conditions. Consequently, the effect is identical with the cause. On account of this also (the effect is identical with the cause): सत्वाश्चापरस्य (155) Sutra 17. Sattvachchaparasya Because also of the existence of the other thing (i.e., the effect in the condition of cause). Because the other thing, that is, the effect, is existent in the condition of cause, the effect is identical with the cause. Indeed, both in daily life as well as in the Vedas, it is only the effect that is taught to be the cause. For instance, in the world, it is said: “All these pots,
In this Sutra, the recogni- tion of the cause in the effect proves their oneness. The differ- ences between them are of state only, and do not need the assump- tion of difference in substance. They are not different entities of If they the same class like two pots, as two entities are not seen. are said to be two substances rest- ing on the same base or material cause, the recognition here is not possible. Two exceptions to recognition are then dealt with, 394 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 dishes etc., were only clay in the forenoon.” And in the Vedas it is declared: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. III. 19. 1),829 असद्व देशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषाद्युकेशशब्दान्तराञ्च Sūtra 18. Asavyapadesänneti chenna dharmāntareṇa Seshadyuktessabdāntarāchcha. (156) vākya- If it is denied (that there is identity of the cause with the effect) for the reason that the effect is taught to be non-existence. it is replied that it is not so, because it (i.e., such non- existence) is due to another attribute, as is seen from the remainder of the scriptural passage in question, from logical reasoning and from other words used in the scripture. 830 It has been said that the existence of the cause in the effect may be made out from the usage of the world as well as from the Veda. This is not correct, on account of the teaching about (i.e., the effect being) non-existence, as in the following passages from the scripture: “Non-existence only was this in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. III. 19. 1.); “Non-existence indeed was this in the beginning” (Taitt. Up. II. 7. 1.); and “Indeed in the beginning this was really not anything at all” (Taitt. Br. II. 2. 9). And in the world, it is said that all these pots, dishes and other effects were non-existent in the forenoon. Therefore, what has been stated above (by you) is not appropriate.
The difference between Sutras 16 and 17 is that knowledge of oneness between cause and effect is dealt with in the former, and a statement of oneness in the latter. Alternatively, the former points out: “That (cause) is this (effec)”. The latter refers to: “This (effect) is that (cause)”.
Sankara splits this into two Sutras, starting the second with the word, ‘yukteḥ’. Adhik. VI, Sat. 18] NON-EXISTENCE 395 If it be argued thus, the reply is given that it is not right to say so. For such teaching is given in view of its other attributes. Indeed, that teaching relating to non- existence is given, because that same effect was in association with a different property. Indeed, it was in association with a different configuration. It is not given, because of its possessing the character of absolute nothing- ness as per your opinion. It has been already definitely stated that existence and non-existence are two attributes of substances. Of these, non-existence is an attribute different from the attribute of existence. In regard to the world, which is pointed out by the word “This”, name and form constitute the attribute of existence, whereas the opposite of this (attribute), namely, the attribute of non-existence, is the subtle condition (of the world). Therefore, in relation to the world which is associated with name and form, non- existence is the attainment of the subtle condition which is opposed to this. How is this made out? From the remainder of the scriptural passage and from other words used in the scrip- ture. The remainder of the scriptural passage, which begins with “Indeed in the beginning this was really not anything at all” (Taitt. Br. II. 2. 9), runs thus: “That non-existence itself ma le up its mind, ‘May I be existent’” (Taitt. Br. II. 2.9). From the inferential indication of making up the mind, which may be made out from the remainder of this sentence referred to above, the meaning of non-existence has to terminal to be different from utter nothing- And because the same meaning must be understood in other passages also, the meaning of non-existence has to be determined to be this in passages like “Non-existence only was this” (Chhand. Up. III. 19. 1).831 ness.
In the Taitt. Br. passage non-existence’ is seen, from the sequel, to le different from absolute nothiness. (So, too, in the Tilt Up. passage.) The same meaning has to be understood in the parallel passage from the Chhand. Up., even though there is here no explanatory sequel. 396 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 By means of logical reasening also, non-existence is made out to be of the nature of a different attribute (of the effect). Indeed, logical reasoning makes it clearly known that existence and non-existence are two attributes of substances. The association of the substance, clay, with a form which has a broad bottom and hollow inside, is the cause of the practical realisation that the pot is existent. The association of that same (clay) with a condition opposite thereto is the cause of the practical realisation that the pot is non-existent. This being so, the condition of being a half of a pot is opposed to that (other condi- tion of being associated with a broad bottom etc.); and therefore the very condition of being the half of a pot is, so far as the condition of the pot is concerned, the cause of the practical realisation of its non-existence. And there is nothing else known as the non-existence of the pot other than this (non-existence described above). Nor can such negation be assumed, because only by that much (of non- existence as is given above) the practical realisation of non- existence can be appropriately experienced.832 Similarly, by other scriptural passages also, the association of the effect at an anterior time with a different attribute is made out. Such other scriptural passages have already been set out, and they include the following: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning.” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1). The absolute non- existence (of the effect) has been objected to in the statement: “Dear child, whence indeed can it be thus”? (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 2). And then the conclusion is established: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning.” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 2). The following seven
The Vaiseshikas list categories-substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence, and non- existence, Ra nanuja accepts only the first three of these. Non- existence is regarded by him not as an ultimate category, but as an attribute. It has been already shown by him towards the end of the commentary on II. 1. 15 that ex stence c nnot be either 2 substance or an action. See Note 825 above. For the different kinds of non existence, see Note 37, Vol. I.Adhik. VI, Süt. 20] TWO EXAMPLES 397 declaration is very clear on the point: “Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has itself been now differentiated by means of names and forms”. (Bṛih. Up. I. 4. 7.) Now in illustration of the identity of the effect with the cause, he (the Sutrakāra) points two examples in the two following aphorisms thus. पटवच्च Sutra 19. Patavachcha (157) As in the case of the cloth. Just as the threads themselves, through entering into a particular combination, become a different effect, having a different name, form etc., so too, in that manner, the Brahman also (becomes the world). यथा च प्राणादिः Sūtra 20. Yatha cha prāṇādiḥ (158) And as in the case of the pranas etc. Just as the one and same element of air, after entering into various kinds of activity in the body, is changed into different effects having the names and forms denoted by prāṇa, apāna, etc.,833 similarly, the Brahman, who is one only, becomes the world, made up of varied immova- ble and movable things. Consequently, the identity of the world with the Brahman who is its ultimate cause, is a demonstrated conclusion.
See Note 388, Vol. I, for the fivefold activity of the element, ‘air’. II. S.B.-51 898 94 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 ADHIKARANA VII ITARAVYAPADESĀDHIKARAṆAM इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसतिः Sutra 21. Itaravyapadesãddhi- tākaraṇādidoshaprasaktiḥ (159) It may be said that, owing to the other (ie., the individual self) being described (as identical with the Brahman), there will result to Him the evils of not doing what is good (to Himself) etc. It has been said by those who establish the identity of the world with the Brahman that the identity of the indivi- dual self also with the Brahman is taught in the following and other passages: Thou art that” (Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.); and “This self is the Brahman” (Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 5.). 34 66 Against this, the following objection is raised.$35 If the other, that is, the individual self, is taught in these passages to possess the state of the Brahman, then in regard to the Brahman, who is associated with omnisci- ence, the attribute of willing the truth and other such
“Those who establish the identity of the world with the Brahman” include the Advaitins, the followers of Bhedabheda and the Visishtadvaitins. ‘Identity’ means different things to them. The problem is how it is to be understood. Is it absolute identity, o is it identity in the sense that the Brahman is the Self and the individual se f His body? S
The objector here seems to be the Vaigeshika, alleging in- consistencies and contradictions in the consequences flowing from the assumption of identity between the individual self and the Brahman. Adhik. VII, Süt. 21] BHASKARA REFUTED 399 qualities, the evil of not creating a world which has the natuse of what is good for Himself, the evil of creating a world which has the nature of what is bad for Himself, and other such evils will find occasion to operate. This world (being a collection of souls) is also a mine of infinite miseries, arising from one’s own self (or body), or through natural causes, causes, or through supernatural agencies.836 No intelligent person who is independent will proceed to work for himself such an evil as this. The scriptural passages, which speak of the distinction of the Brahman from the individual self, have been given up by you, who speak of the identity between the world and the Brahman. If there be distinction (between the world and the Brahman), identity (between them) will not result.837 It may, however, be said (by the followers of Bhaskara) that the scriptural passages relating to distinction deal with the distinctions arising out of limiting adjuncts, and that scriptural passages relating to identity deal with an identity which is natural. Here it is to be asked whether the Brahman, who is unassociated with limiting adjuncts and forms the cause of the world, knows or does not know the individual self who is naturally non-different from Himself. If He knows him not, His omniscience is defective. If He knows him, then, in regard to the Brahman, who knows that the misery of the individual self who is non-different from Himself is His own misery, the taint of the evils, such as not doing what is good for oneself and doing what is bad for oneself, cannot be avoided. It may again be said that distinction between the individual self and the Brahman is due to ignorance and
For the three kinds of miseries, see Note 12, Vol. I.
‘Identity’ (ananyatva) is here understood in the Advaitic sense; and On that b sis, Advaita, Bhedabheda and Visishtadvaita are criticised. 400 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 that the scriptural passages which speak of distinction relate to such (a distinction). In regard to this position, also, the alternatives as well as the results flowing therefrom, which have all been given in connection with the view which maintains that the individual self is ignorant, undergo a similar fate.838 According to the view which holds that the Brahman is associated with ignorance, it is not possible for the Brahman, who has a self-luminous nature, to be a witness of ignorance, nor is it possible for the creation of the world to take place as from it (i.e., the ignorance or the witnessing of ignorance). If the luminosity is concealed by ignorance, then inasmuch as concealment causes the cessation of luminosity, there will result the destruction of His own nature itself.839 For that luminosity itself is of (His) very nature. Indeed, it has already been stated that a thousand evils, including the evil of the destruction of His own nature, will thus result. Hence it is inconsistent for the Brahman to be the cause of the world. If it be so arrived at, it is replied to (by the Sutrakāra thus). अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्देशात् Sūtra 22. Adhikantu bhedanirdesāt (160) (The Brahman) is however other (than the individual self), on account of the difference (between them) which is taught taught (in the scriptures). The word ‘however (tu) excludes the view which has been set forth above. “The Brahman is other.” That
See pp. 349-358 above.
The argument about the concealment of luminosity is set out in Vol. I, p. 142. It is the second of the seven objections raised by Ramanuja to Advaita. See also pp, 362-363 above. Adhik. VII, Sut. 22] ‘BRAHMAN’ IS ‘OTHER’ 401 is, He is distinct from the individual self, who deserves to be associated with the miseries resulting from himself, from natural causes and from supernatural agencies. Why? Because such a distinction is taught in the scripture. Indeed, the Supreme Brahman is taught to be distinct from the individual self in the following and other passages: “He, who dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self from within-He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self” (Madh. Bri. Up. III. 7. 22); 840 “Knowing the individual self and the Impeller to be different, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality” (Svet. Up. I. 6.); “He is the cause, He is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses” (Svet. Up. VI. 9); “One of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the Other shines in splendour without eating at all” (Svet. Up. IV. 6.); “The two unborn, the Intelligent and the non-intelligent, are the Lord and the non-lord” (Svet. Up. I. 9); “Embraced by the Self” (Bri. Up. IV. 3. 21); “Ridden upon by the Omniscient Self” (Bri. Up. IV. 3. 35); “Out of this prakriti (or Nature) He who is the owner of the maya creates this world, wherein another being (i.e., the individual self) is bound down by māyā (S’vet. Up. IV. 9); “He is the Lord of the prakṛiti (or Nature) and the individual souls, and the regulator of qualities” (Svet. Up. VI. 16); “The Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfills the desires of the many” (Svet. Up. VI. 13); and “He who is moving within the avyakta, whose body is the avyakta, whom the avyakta does not know… He who is moving within the akshara, whose body is the akshara, and whom the akshara does not know… He is the Internal Self of all beings, is devoid of sin, is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa.” (Sub. Up. VII).
Ramanuja quotes this passage to show that the Brahman individual self also. See the Srutaprakašika under I. 1. 22. is d stinct from the released402 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 agııiqas aggqufa: Sutra 23. Asmādivachcha tada nupap til (161) As in the case of stones, etc., it (i.e., becom- ing the Brahman) is inappropriate (in relation to the individual self. Stones, faggots, clod, grass and all other all non- intelligent things, which deserve greatly to be given up and are always subject to modifications, cannot appropriately possess the same essential nature as the Brahman, who is faultless, not subject to modifications, the opposite of all evil and the sole seat of auspicious qualities, who is entirely distinct from all things other than Himself, who is infinite and has an essential nature solely of knowledge and bliss, and whose great glories are many and varied. In the same way in which this is so, in that same way the intelligent individual self, who is deserving of association with infinite misery and who resembles a firefly, cannot appropriately attain to the state of the Brahman, who is, in accordance with the passage 841 which says that He is devoid of all sin (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 5) and so on, made out to be the opposite of all evil and the mine of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence. In accordance with the scriptural passage beginning with “He whose body is the self” (Madh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22.), the individual self forms the body of the Brahman, and so the Brahman, through having the individual self for His body, exists as the self of that (individual self). Therefore,
The Chhandogya passage, fully quoted on page 121 above, rons; “This Self is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst, desires the truth and wills the truth.” His desiring the truth and willing the truth indicate that He is a mine of innumerable auspicious qualities. The other qualities of the Self in the passage show Him to be the opposite of all that is evil, Adhik. VII, Sut. 23] ‘BRAHMAN’ & WORLD 403 the pointed indication (of the individual self as the Brahman) in a grammatical equation has in view the establishment of the Brahman having the individual self for His mode. And it is therefore not contradictory of the above view; on the contrary, it declares this very meaning set forth above. And all this has more than once been made clear in support of the aphorisms, “Kāsakritsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also), because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the self of the individual self)” (I. 4. 22), and others,842 Therefore, the Brahman in all conditions has the intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things for His body. Hence the Brahman who has the intelligent and non- intelligent things in their subtle condition as His body is the cause. That same Brahman who has the intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things in their gross condition as His body is the effect known as the world. Thus the grammatical equation between the world and the Brahman becomes appropriate. The world possesses the character of the effect of the (causal) Brahman, and also the character of being identical with Him. There is no confusion of the natures which belong to the non-intelligent thing, the individual self and the Brahman, and which consist respectively of being subject to modifications, being subject to misery and being the mine of all auspicious qualities. And there is also no contradiction with any scriptural passage. According to the scriptural passage, “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only…” (Chand. Up. VI. 2. 1), it necessarily follows that, even in the undifferentiated condition also, the individual self, in association with non-intelligent things, exists in its subtle condition as the body of the Brahman. For even then, in that condition also, it exists in a subtle condition, as
The other aphorisms in view include II, 1, 9, 1. 2. 21 etc. 404 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 declared in the two Sutras: “There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him) because it (i.e., creation) is depen- dent (on karma). The scripture says accordingly.” (II. 1. 34); and “If it be said there is no karma (or results of work before creation), because of the declaration in the scriptures of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the Brahman prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because both (the selves and karma) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures” (II. 1. 35). Non-differenti- ation, however, results appropriately from the absence of the distinctions of name and form. Thus causality undoubtedly results in relation to the Brahman. is Those again$43 who, having in mind that condition (of the Brahman) which is dissociated from ignorance, maintain the distinction (of the Brahman) in relation to this same individual self-in their case, all this cannot properly fit in. For to Him (i.e., the Brahman) in that condition there do not exist omniscience, lordship over all, the attribute of being the cause of all, the attribute of being the self of all, the attribute of being the controller of all, and similar attributes. And in that same form the distinction of the individual self (from the Brahman) is indeed declared to exist by the same scriptural passages.. All this is in your opinion the attribute of ignorance.844
The reference here is to Sankara’s statement under II. 1. 22: “That Brahman who is omniscient, who is omnipotent, and whose essential nature is eternal, self luminous, pure and free, is adhika or differ- ent from the embodied self; and Him we call the creator of the world.”’ Here Ramanuja asks whether the Brahman who is adhika is associated with ignor- nace or dissociated therefrom. The omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is manufactured by ignorance; but the Brahman whose essential nature is eternal, self-luminous, pure and free, has nothing to do with ignorance. It is further implied that, according to the advaitic analysis of the Ved. Sut., the II Chapter cannot deal with any differences manu- factured y ignorance between the Brahman and the embodied self. $6
There is another reading for this sentence which may be translated thus: Because all this is manufactured by ignorance (it cannot properly fit in).” Adhik. VII, Sut. 23] PURPORT OF ‘SUTRAS’ 405 Again, under the aphorisms beginning with “The Brahman is, however, other (than the individual self) on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures)” (II. 1. 22), what is established by the Satrakara is not the mutual distinction (between the Lord manufactured by ignorance and the individual self), which, like the distinction between the silver (falsely superim- posed) on the mother-of-pearl (and the mother-of-pearl), belongs to things manufactured by ignorance and is present in the condition of ignorance. But what is accomplished by him thereunder is (to prove) that the Brahman, who, in accordance with the injunction that the enquiry about the Brahman has to be undertaken, is introduced in the very beginning as the object of enquiry and who is the cause of the world, has to be known in the Vedanta; and that any contradiction thereto which may result either from the Smritis or from logical reasoning is set at naught. The two aphorisms, “The re-absorption (of the world into the Brahman), as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings), will lead to the attribution (of modification etc. to the Brahman) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the Vedanta teaching of the oneness of cause and effect)” (II. 1. 8), and “There is, however, no (such in- consistency); because examples illustrative (of the position that the Brahman is untainted by evil in both the states of cause and effect) are available” (II. 1. 9), give a re-statement of what is established in this section. In that context, indeed, the purport of the whole section is established to be the existence of the relationship of cause and effect between two things entirely distinct from each other. The aphorism, “If it be said that (in case the distinction between cause and effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like)” (II. 1. 7), merely re-states what is established in the previous section (i.e., the Arambha- nādhikaraṇa). II. S.B.-52 406 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 ADHIKARANA VIII UPASAMHARA-DARSANADHIKARAṆA उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि Sutra 24. Upasamhāradarŝanānneti chenna kshiravaddhi (162) If it is denied (that He is the sole cause), because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the Brahman), it is not right to say so. For indeed it (ie., creation) resembles (the production of) milk. It has been established that inasmuch as the Highest Brahman, who is omniscient and who wills the truth, has all things for His modes for the reason that He has for His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things both in their gross and in their subtle conditions, it is nothing contradictory to reason that He possesses the character of being all things other (than Himself). Now it will be established that it is not inconsistent for the Supreme Brahman, who wills the truth, to be able to create the wonderful world merely by His will. Those whose powers are limited are seen to stand in need of a collection of materials required for production. From this, how can there be any doubt about omnipotent Brahman being the cause of the world on account of His not having a collection of productive materials? It is replied that it is only in one whose apprehension is slow that such a supposition arises thus. In the world, although a person possesses the power of producing particular effects, he is seen to stand in need of the particular instru- ments of production (required therefor); and therefore, although the Supreme Brahman possesses omnipotence, inAdhik. VIII, Süt. 24] TOOLS NEEDED 407 the absence of particular instruments of production, He cannot appropriately possess the capability of being the creator of the world. This (supposition) is (here) sought to be dispelled. Although potters, weavers and others, who are the (efficient) causes of pots, clothes and other effects, possess the capability of producing those (effects), they are seen to possess the capability of the producing agent only after collecting some instruments of production or other. Those who are incapable of producing such (effects), although they may possess the collection of productive materials, are not able to produce those (effects at all). On the contrary, those who are capable (of producing them) produce them in the presence of the instruments of production. This much alone is the difference (between the capable and incapable). The omnipotent Brahman also cannot appropriately possess the power of being the creator of all in the absence of the instruments of production required therefor; and that before creation He did not have any help is taught in the following among other passages : “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1); and “Indeed, Nārāyaṇa alone then was” (Mah. Up. I.) Thus, it is concluded that the power of being the creator cannot be appropriate (in relation to Him). This above-mentioned doubt is expressed thus (in this aphorism): “If it is denied (that He is the sole cause) because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the Brahman…”. He (i.e., the Sutra- kära dispels it by saying: “…it is not right to say so. For it (i.e., creation) resembles (the production of) milk.” All the things which are capable of producing effects do not stand in any need of a collection of instruments of produc- tion. For instance, milk, water etc. which are capable of producing curds, ice, etc. do not so stand in need of instruments of production in producing those (effects such as curds etc.). In this manner, the Brahman, being by 408 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 Himself alone capable of producing all things, appropriately possesses the capability of being the creator of all. The word, ‘indeed’, which points out (the conclusion here) as though it were well-known, is used to show the utter foolishness of the objection raised. It is not for assuming the condition of curds etc. that milk etc. require the help (lit. throwing in) of things like fermented whey etc. On the contrary, this is for the purpose of hastening (the production of curds etc.), as well as for the purpose of (imparting) a particular kind of flavour. tarfafa ata Sutra 25. Devadivadapi loke (163) He (in creating the universe) is like the gods etc. (who create by their mere will what they desire) in (their own) world. Just as the gods and others like them create in their own worlds merely by their will all the things they desire, in the same way the Supreme Person creates the whole universe by His will. It has to be understood that the gods and others whose powers are ascertained with the help of the Veda, are cited here to serve as illustrative examples, solely with the object of easily understanding the Brahman, whose powers (also) are ascertained with the help of the Veda. ADHIKARANA IX KRISTNAPRASAKTYADHIKARAŅA कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वब्दकोपो वा Sūtra 26. Kristnaprasaktirniravayavatva- sābdā kopo vā (164) Adhik. IX, Sut. 26] A DILEMMA 409 It may be said that it (i.e., the above view) leads either to the whole (indivisible Brahman becoming the divisible world) or to the contra- diction of the scriptural texts relating to the indivisibility (of the Brahman). "” tr It has been stated above that in the condition of cause the Brahman was one only (that is), indivisible; this means that in the condition of cause the Brahman was indeed indivisible owing to His being devoid of differentiation into intelligent and non-intelligent things. This is in accordance with the following, among other scriptural passages: Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1); “Indeed, in the beginning, this was really not anything at all” (Taitt. Br. II. 2. 9); “Indeed, the Self, this one only was in the beginning (Ait. Up. I. 1). It has also been stated that this single, (that is) indivisible, (that is) undifferentiated Brahman Himself, after resolving to the effect “May I become manifold” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 2), became differentiated into (the elements of) ether, air etc., and also into the individual selves beginning with Brahma (the creator) and ending with a clump of grass. It being so, it is to be accepted that the whole of that same Supreme Brahman has been used up in the production of effects. 845 Again, it must be said that the intelligent part (of the Brahman) is differentiated into the divisions of the indivi- dual self and the unintelligent part is differentiated into the divisions made up of (the elements of) ether etc. In
The objector here is the Sankhya and his criticism is first directed to a view very similar to that of Yadavaprakasa (See Note 193, Vol. I and pp. 389-390 above). The scriptural texts under reference speak of the Sat, the Atman or the Brahman as eka or one in the state prior to creation. The Advaitin understands thereby that nothing else exists besides the Brahman: eka refers to the number ‘one’. Ramanuja takes eka to refer to a subtle state where there are no distinctions of name and form. For the created world is contrasted with that state of the Brahman prior to sreation. Here the Sankhya seems to take eka to mean ’not having parts or organs’. 410 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 that case, the following scriptural passages and other such statements, all of which relate to the indivisibility of the Brahman, who forms the (supreme) cause, will be contra- dicted, that is, will be set at naught: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning alone and without a second.” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1): “The Brahman (in- deed was this in the beginning) one only” (Brih. Up. I. 4. 11); “The Self (indeed was this in the beginning) one only’ (Brih. Up. I. 4. 17). No doubt, it is accepted (by the Vedantin) that the Brahman who has the intelligent and non-intelligent things in the subtle condition as His body, is the cause, and the Brahman, who has the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross condition as His body is the effect. Even then, it has to be accepted that part of the embodied Brahman also forms the effect. 846 Conse- quently, the above-mentioned evil (in regard to Him) is unavoidable. It is also inappropriate for Him who is indivisible to become manifold; and it is again inappropri- ate that there should be a part of the Brahman unused in the production of effects. Therefore, all this seems to be inconsistent. Consequently, it is inappropriate for the Brahman to be the cause. To this objection, the following satisfactory answer is given thus. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् Sūtra 27. Srutestu Sabdamilatvāt (165) However, the causality of the Brahman (does not lead to either of these conclusions) because of the scripture, as it (ie, His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts.
Here Rāmānuja’s view that the relationship of body and self which exists between the world and the Brahman avoids the difficulties in herent in the Brahman becoming the world is critic sed. The argumen: is that a part of the Brahman suffers modifications, and therefore the Brahman is subject to change. Adhik. IX, Süt. 28] SCRIPTURE PROVES 411 The word, ‘however’ (tu), removes the evil mentioned above (in regard to the Brahman). There is no such inconsistency as mentioned above. Why? From the scripture. Surely, the scripture speaks of the indivisibility of the Brahman and also of the varied creation proceeding from Him. The meaning is that, in regard to the matters dealt with in the scripture, they have to be understood as revealed by the scripture. It may, however, be said that even the scripture is incapable of conveying any idea which is self-contradictory like “Sprinkle (water) with fire”. Therefore, the Sütrakāra says thus: “as it (i.e., His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts.” As it is proved solely by means of the scripture that this entity (the Brahman) is dissimilar to all other things, therefore it is not contradictory to reason for Him to be in association with wonderful powers. Conse- quently, the Brahman does not deserve either to be proved or disproved by reasoning that is ordinarily observed. 847 arafa àd fafaara fe Sūtra 28. Atmani chaivam vichitrāscha hi (166) Thus, even in regard to the individual self (there is no ascription of the attributes of non- intelligent things), things), because they (i.e., (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful. Moreover, if in this manner an attribute which belongs to one thing is superimposed on another, then the attri- butes which are seen to belong to non-intelligent things.
The reply to the Sankhya is the Śruti reveals the Brahman to be both the cause and the effect. To a further objection that even the Veda cannot be accepted if it makes unreasonable state- ments, the answer is given that the criterion for reasonableness based on worldly experience can- not be applied to statements about the Brahman who is known only on the basis of scriptural texts to be different from all things else.412 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. 11, Part 1 such as pots etc., will have to taint even the eternal intelligent self which is quite unlike any of those (pots etc.), and he (the Sutrakara) says that the non-ascription of such (alien attributes) results from the wonderful variety of the characteristics of non-intelligent things. Hence the statement: “they (that is, the powers possessed by things) are wonderful and varied.” For instance, in respect of fire, water etc., which are different from one another, powers like heat etc., which are different from one another, are seen. Similarly, thousands of powers which are unseen here and there (in particular things) exist in the Supreme Brahman, who is totally distinct from all that is seen in the world. Thus, there is nothing inappropriate here. Accordingly, the objection arising from ordinary observation has been raised and reviewed by the venerable Parasara: “How is it possible for the Brahman who is without qualities (such as sattva), who is unknowable, pure and devoid of evil by nature, to be known as the agent in the acts of creation etc. (of the world)?” (V. P. I. 3. 1); and it is stated (by way of reply): “O thou, the best of ascetics, there are in all things powers which cannot be brought within the sphere of thinkable (or explicable) knowledge, and for that very same reason, those acts of creation etc. constitute the inherent (inexpli- cable) powers of the Brahman, as heat (constitutes the inherent power) of fire.” (V. P. I. 3. 2-3).848 The scripture also says: “Which, indeed, is the wood, and which, indeed, is that tree out of which they fashioned the Heaven and earth? O wise men, question your mind as to which things He presided over-He who bears the worlds. The Brahman is the wood, the Brahman is that tree out of which He fashioned the Heaven and earth the Brahman who supports the worlds presides :
See Vol. 1, pp. 122-123, for an explanation of the V.P. passage, 420 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 (prior to creation) remains in a very subtle state, deprived of name and form and incapable of being separately spoken about, even though it remains as the body of the Brahman. If this is not accepted, it will give rise to rewards for what is not done and no rewards for what is done. Their beginninglessness is perceived (from scriptural passages like the following): “The knowing soul is neither born, nor does it die.” (Kath. Up. II. 18). And the beginninglessness of the stream of creation is (made out from the following and other scriptural passages): “The creator (i.e., Brahma) created the sun and the moon as before (i.e., on the occasion of a prior creation)” (M. Nār. V. 7); “Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has now been differentiated by means of names and forms.” (Brih. Up. I. 4. 7). Thus the beginninglessness of the essential nature of the selves is established merely by the declaration in the scriptures of the differentiation by means of names and forms. In the Smriti also, it is declared: “And know that the prakriti and the purusha are both beginningless”. (B. G. XIII. 19). Therefore, the Brahman alone is the cause of the world, on account of His being different from all things, on account of His being all-powerful, on account of His having sport as the only purpose (in the creation etc., of the world), and on account of His association with a variegated creation in accordance with the karmas of the individual selves. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च Sūtra 36. Sarvadharmopapattescha (174) (The Brahman is the cause of the world) because of (His) having all the qualities (required for being such a cause). The deficiency of whatever qualities constituting the cause (of the world) was mentioned and will be mentioned in respect of the pradhana, the atom etc.,-the collection of all those qualities which bring about causality are present in the Brahman.858 Therefore it is established that the Brahman is the cause of the world.
Here the conclusion is arrived at as a result of all the adhikaranas so far dealt with. 414 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 distinction of place; and the capability to produce gross substances cannot result to them.850 According to the view which holds that the infinite- simal atom is the cause, the atoms are, in the very same manner as set out before, indivisible and unconfined in any subdivision of space. And although they are mutually conjoined together, irrespective of any particular sub- division of space, they are incapable of producing gross effects. æðfðar a agafara Sutra 30. Sarvopeta cha taddarsanat (168) And because also He (i.e., the Supreme Deity) is revealed in the scriptures as associated with all (powers). The Supreme Deity, who is distinct from all other things, is also associated with all powers. In this very same manner, indeed, did the scriptural passages reveal the Supreme Deity: “His supreme power indeed is revealed as varied and natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength and action.” (Svet. Up. VI. 8). Again, they first declare that the Supreme Deity is distinct from all other things: “devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 5). Then they declare that the Supreme Deity is in association with all powers: that is, He “desires the truth and wills the truth.” (Chhand. Up. VIII. 1. 5.) To the same effect also is the following passage: “He is mind- made, has life for His body, light for His form, He wills
The argument about the qualities of the prakriti here and the atoms immediately thereafter, proceeds on the basis that if a thing occupies space it must have the dimensions of length, breadth and thickness, and that if it does have them, it is divisible. Indivi- sible particles, however numerous in number and conjoined together, cannot occupy space and produce gross effects. This question is dealt with at greater length in the Mahaddhirghadhikarana (Ved. Sut. II, 2. 10-16). Adhik. IX, Sut. 31] GOD’S ORGANS 415 the truth, is like the ākāśa, is all-action, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities) and is speechless and unanxious.” (Chhand. Up. III. 14. 2.)851 विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् Sutra 31. Vikaraṇatvānneti chett aduktam (169) If it be denied (that the Brahman is the cause), owing to his having no organs (and body), this objection has already been answered. No doubt, the Brahman is one only, is distinct from all things and is omnipotent. Nevertheless, He is devoid of sense organs, in accordance with the scriptural passage: “He has neither a body, nor the senses”. (Svet. Up. VI. 8.) It may therefore be argued that the production of the effects cannot possibly be due to Him. If it be so held, then in regard to it the reply has already been given under the aphorisms, “However (the causality of the Brahman does not lead to either of these conclusions) as it (i.e. His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts” (Ved. Sut. II. 1. 27) and “Because they (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful.” (Ved. St. II. 1. 28). The meaning is that He is solely proved by the Veda and is distinct from all things else. That is, He is capable of producing each particular effect even in the absence of the particular organ of sense (required therefor). To the same effect also is the following, among other scriptural passages: “He sees without eyes, He hears without ears, without hands and
In Sutra 27, from the Brahman’s dissimilarity with other things, as declared in the Veda, it is inferred that it is not contradictory to reason for Him to be in association with wonderful powers. Thus the declaration about His indivisibility is recon- ciled with the other declaration about the varied creation proceed- ing from Him. Now scriptural texts are quoted which actually declare His possession of wonder- ful powers. The quoted texts have been dealt with already under Ved. Sut. I. 3. 13-19 and I. 2. 1-7. 416 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 feet He moves swiftly and grasps things” (Svet. Up. III. 19), 52 ADHIKARANA X PRAYOJANAVATTVÄDHIKARAṆA न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् Sūtra 32. Na prayojanavattvāt (170) (He is) not (the cause of the world), because it (i.e., creation) has a purpose. Although the Lord, who is one only before creation, and who, by reason of His being distinct from all other things, is associated with the powers of all things, is Himself capable of creating the variegated world, neverthe- less it does not come about that the Lord is the cause, because the wonderful creation (of the world) has a purpose, and because also the Lord has no purpose whatsoever (in such creation). Indeed, in the acts of those who do all things after thinking out beforehand, the purpose may be of two kinds, either relating to one self or to another. Surely, the Supreme Brahman who has by His own nature fulfilled all desires has no purpose to achieve from the creation of the world. Nor is that (creation) for the sake of another. Indeed, one who has attained all desires becomes useful to another by granting favours to that other. No merciful person853 creates a world so full of varied and infinite miseries beginning with birth out of the womb, old age, death, hells etc. On the contrary, if he created the world. out of mercy, he would create it as the sole abode of bliss. Therefore, there being no purpose (served by Him in creating the world), it is inappropriate for the Brahman to be the cause.
The doubt that the Brahman cannot possibly create without auxiliary instruments and materials for production having been dispelled under Sutra 24, the question is now raised whether He can proceed to create without baving organs of sense.
In the place of karuṇāvān some editions read: ‘karunaya’. This can be rendered; ‘No person out of mercy… …’.Adhik. X, Süt. 33] CREATION IS SPORT If it be so argued, we give the following reply. लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् Sūtra 33. Lokavattu līlākaivalyam (171) 417 Mere play is all (His purpose in the creation of the world etc.), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world. To one whose desires are all fulfilled and who is perfect throughout, there can be no purpose served other than mere play in the creation of the world,854 which is capable of being modified by his will and is made up of varied and wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent things. “As indeed is the case in the world”. For instance, in the world, a great king who presides (and rules) over the whole earth consisting of the seven dvipas, notwithstanding his being completely full of courage, heroism and strength, is seen to play with balls and do such other acts solely for the purpose of attending to what is mere play. It is mere play that results to the Brahman also from the creation, preservation, destruction etc. of the world, which are all done according to His own will.855 Thus it (i.e., our argument) is faultless. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति Sūtra 34. Vaishamya-nairghṛinye na sapekshatvättatha hi darśayati (172)
A reading ‘kovalam’ for ‘kevala’ is also seen. It would then qualify ‘prayojanam’ and not ’lila’. The Srutaprakāšikā seeks to explain the force of the two words, ‘kevala’ and ’eva’ by saying that ‘keval’ implies that there is no wager in this sport of creation and that ’eva’ shows that there are no other incidental and unsought for gains from the sport either.
In the prayer with which the Sribhashya opens, the Brahman is described as one “.o whom the creation, preservation, destruction etc. of all the worlds is (mere) play”. Here it is stated that the creation, preservation, destruction etc., of the world result in sport to the Brahman. Thus the question arises whether creation etc. are sport by them- selves, or whether they result in sport. The Srutaprakāšikā up- holds the former view, and the Bhavaprakašika argues at length in support. Both here and in the opening prayer, some other things besides creation, preservation and destruction are implied by ’etc.’ These include the penetrat on into the world by the Brahman and His control thereof from within. 418 SRI-BHASHYA [Chap. II, Part 1 There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him) because it (i.e., creation) is dependent (on karma). The scripture says accordingly. No doubt the Supreme Person, who is distinct from the intelligent and non-intelligent things, although He is one and indivisible before creation, may be possibly supposed to create the wonderful world made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things in consequence of His being associated with unthinkable powers. Nevertheless, the evil of partiality will befall Him, owing to His creation being superior, middling and inferior in consisting res- pectively of gods, animals and men, and immovable things; and mercilessness also is not avoidable in relation to Him, owing to His causing the infliction of fearful miseries (on those beings). To this, the reply is given thus: “(There is) no (partiality or mercilessness in Him), because it (i.e., creation) is dependent.” Partiality and mercilessness do not befall Him. Why? Because unequal creations stand in need of the karmas of the souls of the gods and other beings who are to be created. Indeed, the Śrutis and the Smritis show that the association with the bodies of the gods etc., of the souls of the gods etc., is dependent on the karma of each soul thus: “He who does good becomes good, he who commits sin becomes evil. He becomes auspicious by virtuous action and evil by sinful action.” (Brih. Up. IV. 4. 5.) Similarly, it has been stated by the venerable Parasara that the power of the past karmas of the individual selves to be created is the reason for the differences among the gods etc.: “He (i.e., the Brahman) is only the instrumental (or unimportant) cause of those to be created in the act of creation, in respect of which the principal causes are the various powers (i.e., the karmas) belonging to those to be created. Leaving out the instrumental cause, it (i.e., the thing to be created) does not need anything else. O best among those performing austerities, a (created) thing attains its proper state by Adhik. X, Sut. 35] NO SOULS IN ‘PRALAYA’ 419 means of its own potentiality (as determined by its past karma).” (V.P. I. 4. 51-52). ‘By its own potentiality’ means that the attainment of the position of a god etc., is due to one’s own karma. 856 न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च Sūtra 35. Na karma vibhāgāditi chennānāditvā- dutpadyate chapyupalabhyate cha (173) If it be said that there is no karma (or results of works before creation) because (of the declaration in the scriptures) of the non- distinction (between the individual selves and the Brahman prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because they (ie., both the selves and karma) are beginningless. It (ie., the non-distinction) is appropriate, and it (ie., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures. 857 It may be said as follows: Indeed the individual selves did not exist prior to creation. Why? Because there is mention in the scripture of the non-distinction (between the Brahman and the selves) as in the passage: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (Chhand. Up. VI. 2. 1). Therefore, on account of their non-existence, their karmas did not exist at that time. How then can it be said that inequality in creation is dependent upon it (i.e., karma)? This is not right, on account of the beginninglessness of the selves and the streams of their karmas. Even in spite of their beginninglessness, non-distinction is reasonably asserted, because that thing known as the individual soul
The Brahman is ’the un- important cause’, explains the Šrutaprakašika, in the sense that He is the general cause. The particular causes for inequalities in creation are the karmas of individual selves. The analogy is suggested of water helping differ- ent seeds to sprout and grow into different plants. Here the seeds are the particular causes, while the water is the general cause,
Sankara splits this into two Sutras, starting the second with the word, ‘utpadyate’. Adhik. IX, Sut. 29] SANKHYA ERRORS 413 mind, I tell you, you wise men.” The meaning is that an objection over Himself with His (Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9),849 founded on what is ordinarily observed is untenable in regard to the Supreme Brahman who is entirely distinct from all other things. For the following reason also:- स्वपक्षदोषाच्च Sūtra 29. Svapakshadoshachcha (167) Because also there are errors in his (ie., the objector’s) own view. In his own (i.e., the objector’s) view, that is, in the available view according to which the pradhana etc. form the cause of the world, the pradhana etc. are not distinct from the things found in the world; hence errors arising from what is observed in the world will taint it. Therefore, it has to be accepted (even by him) that the Brahman, who is distinct from all other things, is Himself the cause. Moreover, the pradhana is indivisible, and it may be asked how such an indivisible entity can at all create the wonderful world made up of mahat etc. It may be said that the qualities of ‘goodness,’ ‘passion’ and ‘darkness’ (or sattva, rajas and tamas) are as its components. Here it is to be discriminated whether the pradhana is the collection of goodness, passion and darkness, or whether the pradhana is produced by good- ness, passion and darkness. In the latter alternative, there is the contradiction of the view accepted by you that the pradhana is the (first) cause. There is also contradiction of the number (of 24 principles) accepted by you. There is, again, contradiction of the theory of the production of effects out of those (qualities), which are indivisible. And according to the view that it (i.e., the pradhāna) is a collection of the three qualities, those (qualities), being indivisible, are capable of combination irrespective of any
See page 285 above and Note 708. II. S.B.-53 TRANSLITERATION THE FOLLOWING IS THE SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION ADOPTED IN THIS WORK. Equivalents and Pronunciation. Vowels. ar in SIT ร .. i i u 99 इ ऊ 99 ऋ ri ऋ 11 ल lri 11 Iri 12 $$~ ♬ & 3 * Hausm mica. father (father). give. police (police). put. rule (rule). gridiron or critique. the above prolonged. revelry (revelri). the above prolonged. e 2.0 prey. ai aisle. 19 ओ note. $1 औ ‘au’ like ‘ou’ loud. Consonants. Equivalents and Pronunciation. क् k in ख् kh ** kind. ink-horn (inkhorn). ग् 100 g +9 gh n ch chh j jh II. S.B.-54 97 17 gun. log-hut (loghut). king 19 such. church-hill jump (churchhill). hedge-hog (hejhog). ज् 要可寶可訊الكبر المعاصر بكر لهر در اثر هم SRI-BHASHYA Equivalents and Pronunciation. 422 Consonants. ñ in व् t th d dh ņ 39 "” थ् t like th th "

singe (siñj). cat. ant-hill (anthill). dance. red-haired (redhaired) bind. kith. nuthook (more dental). d like th,, dh this. adhere (more dental). नू n not. 3 प् P pot. " फ् ph uphill. ब् b -0 भू bh 23. म् m. bear. abhor. map. 39 Y royal. 33. r 33 लू I 29. ho.. ष् ་ ཨ ལ ཤ སྐ ལ 27 " sh S 33 h rod. like. waver. 8. palatalised. rush. sir. hear. ’’ h (aspirate) symbol for the sibilant called visarga, or substitute for final s. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME Ait. Ār.-Aitareya-Äraṇyaka. Ait. Up.-Aitareya-Upanishad. A.M. Nār.-Atharva-Mahānārayana-Upanishad. Ap. D. S.-Apastamba-Dharma-Sutras. B.G.-Bhagavad-Gitā. Brih. Up.-Brihadaraṇyaka-Upanishad. Chhand. Up.-Chhandogya-Upanishad. Chulika Up.-Chulika-Upanishad. Garbha Up.-Garbha-Upanishad. G. Dh. S.-Gautama-Dharma-Sutras. Kāṇ. Bṛih. Up.-Brihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, Kāņva Kath. Up.-Katha-Upanishad. Kaush. Up.-Kaushitaki-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad. Ken. Up.-Kena-Upanishad. M. B.-Mahābhārata. Madh. Brih. Up.-Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad, [recension. Madhyandina recension. M. Nār.-Taittiriya-Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad. Mah. Up.-Maha-Upanishad. Maitri. Up.-Maitri-Upanishad. Mand. Up.-Maṇḍukya-Upanishad. Manu-Manu-Smriti. Mund. Up.-Mundaka-Upanishad. Nris. Up.-Nrisimha-Parvatā pani-Upanishad. Pāṇini-Ashṭādhyāyi of Pāṇini. Pr. Up.-Prašna-Upanishad. Pür. Mím.-Purva-Mimāmsa-Sutras of Jaimini. Rām. Rāmāyaṇa of Valmiki. R. V. Rigveda-Samhita. 424 SRI-BHASHYA Sat. Br.-Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa. Sub. Up.-Subāla-Upanishad. Svet. Up.-Svetasvatara-Upanishad. Taitt. Ar.-Taittiriya-Aranyaka. Taitt. Br.-Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa. Taitt. Sam.-Taittiriya-Samhita. Taitt. Up.-Taittiriya-Upanishad. Vas. Sm.-Vasishta-Smriti. Vayu Pu.-Vayu-Purāņa. Ved. Süt.-Vedanta-Sutras of Badarāyaṇa. V. P. Vishņu-Purāņa.

Vivarana-Pañchapadikā-Vivarana of Prakāsātman. The following works, infrequently referred to or quoted, are referred to by their full names: Bhamati of Vachaspati Misra. Bhāvaprakasikā of Raṇgarāmanuja. Daksha-Smriti. Dramiḍa-Bhashya. Naishkarmya-Siddhi of Suresvara. Nirukta of Yāska. Nyaya-Sutras of Gautama. Original Sanskrit Texts of J. Muir. Sambandha-Vārtika of Suresvara. Sankhyakārikās of Isvarakṛishna. Siddhantalesa-sangraha of Appayya Dikshita. Śrutaprakāšikā of Sudarsana Bhaṭṭa. Tandya-Brāhmaṇa. Uṇādi-Sūtras, Vakya of Tanka. Vedānta-dipa of Rāmānuja. Vedānta-sāra of Rāmānuja. Vritti of Bodhayana. INDEX OF QUOTATIONS (n.footnote. For example, 44 n. means ‘footnote on Aitareya Aranyaka : IV. 2. 4 315 Aitareya-Upanishad : page 44’). I. 1239 n., 266, 318, — XVIII. 14 200 46 - 305 61; 62 17, 200 Bhāmati: 387, 409 Atharva-Mahānārayaṇa- Upanishad : 1-239 n. Äpastamba-Dharma- Sūtras: I. 22-4; 23. 2-303 Bhagavad-Gita: IV. 685 VII. 4 214 n. 4-7-206 302 6 ―― VIII. 17-19 - 116 n. IX. 7; 8; 10-217 10-276 23; 24-303 X.8-303 XIII. 19217 n., 420 19-21 ― 216 20 217 n. XIV. 2

143 5 216, 217 n.

XV. 1474 15

200 15; 1917 16111 18-112 n. 347 n. V Bhāvaprakāsikā : 417 n. Brihadaraṇyaka-Upanishad: I. 4.7-236-7, 237 n., 240-1, 397, 410, 420 11 387 — 17 - 410 II. 1. 16; 17-254 2. 3218-9 4261 4. 2257, 259 3 - 259 5-256, 259-63, 272, 311 6- 257, 280, 383 7 272

7-9 272 n. 10- 259, 272 n. 261, 272, 11 272, 273 n. 1229, 256, 261, 265 n., 273 n. 14- 256, 274, 274 n., 280, 345, 357 19-383 426 II. 5. 3383 15-383 19-346 III. 3. 23-347 SRI-BHASHYA 7.45 n., 106, 130, 200, 323 7.1; 247 3-45, 47, 49 IV. 5. 7257-8, 383 8-272 8-10-272 n. 10- 273 n. 261, 11258-9, 272 12272, 273 n. 13265 n., 273, 273 n. 15273-4, 274 n 280, 346, 357 3-23-289 18-33, 44 23-46, 48-9, 52, 130, 200 V. 5.232, 44 8 107 n.

3; 4; 6; 7- 110 4 108 n. 8-108, 108 n., 111 n. 9- 112, 112 n., 114, 131, 185, 279 11 113, 113 n. 9.155 IV. 3.7 192

15 - 95 n. 21 192, 253, 401 — 33 127 n., 129 6.1 112 n.

9.166 VI. 1.7 313, 314 n. — 2.9-69 1542 n. Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad, Kāṇva recension See Kanva - Brihadaranyaka - Upanishad. Brihadaraṇyaka-Upanishad, Madhyandina recension- See Madhyandina-Brihad- aranyaka-Upanishad. Chhandogya Upanishad : I. 9. 1 132, 285 n. 35 192, 401 4.5398, 418 16-164, 166, 166 n., 187, 220, 233 n.,. III. 234

228, 230, 17

234-5 18 233-4 19191n., 345 22- 57, 23

24 - 276 24-25 194

11.5 7 —

224 n.

1 163, 165, 224 2-163 n. 3.23 347
1; 3163

11.1 165, 224 11.3166 13.7 112 n., 131, 194

127 n., 129

117 187, 220 8 n. 14. 15, 6, 8, 9, 12, 18-9, 116, 194, 280, 383 1-25 1-4-5 n. 25 287 5.3 257, 259 6- 256, 259, 261-3, 272, 311 2-19, 415 318-9, 122INDEX OF QUOTATIONS 427 III. 14. 3-4-7, 16-7, VI. 1. 1 19 3 277 n. 278-9 4-6, 15, 19, 20 278, 376-7, 19. 1 - 236, 240, 377 n. 4-6 277 n. 394-5 IV. 1-3 168, 170 1.1-174 2; 3-171 5174 2. - 176 n. ――

2.2 171 n., 172 3168, 172 n. 5- 173 3.5-176 5-7-175

- 177 n. 4.5177 9.338 10-15 31 n. 10.3-36 534-5, 39, 40-2
134-5 2 - 36 1 12.236 13.2-36
135, 37-8 3-38
131, 33, 34-5, 118, 136 n. 1-533 5;6-43 5; 6–278
1-150, 236, 240, 280, 291 n., 318, 376, 380, .396, 407, 409-10, 419 2-380, 396 2-3 225, 409 359, 150, 160, ― 225, 237-8, 238 n., 284, 376, 381 n., 386 3.2 150, 189, 241, 270-1, 314, 315 n., 347-8, 376 2-3–381
1 179, 253

4; 6-376, 383 n. 7-180 n., 181, 191 m., 280, 345, 346 n., 367, 376,383, 398 9.2 - 128 10. 2

128 V. 10. 142 n.

167-8 2-67 4-67 5- 67-8 6-65, 70 12.1-70 13-18.71 n.
165, 68, 76, 78 272, 79, 80-1 19.173
1-3 - 79 368 VII. 1. 390, 92, 94, 99 5-39
1; 292. 3.192 239, 127 n.
1; 292 4-96, 100
194, 96, 98-9,
1

99 n., 100-1 94, 94 n. 18.1101 19.1 101 20. 1-101 21.1 101

428 VII. 22. 1 102 SRI-BHASHYA 23. 194, 96, 102 24-26-105 24. 190, 102, 105 25.195, 105-6, 106 n. 291, 104, 107, 383 26.1106 2 ― 104, 325, 334 3- 99, 99 n. VIII. 1. 1-6 124 n. 188

1-120, VIII. 12. 1135, 333-4 2-135 3-95, 136, 140, 334 4-136 5137, 137 n. 6-137
1

188-9

1187, 189-90 Chulika-Upanishad 3

276, 280-1 3-7 214, 214 n.

4 - 276 5-276, 280-2 14214, 215 n. 123, 124 n. 127, 133, 141, 254 2-124 n. Daksha-Smriti 3 122, 125,

305 125 n. Dramiḍa-bhashya 45 4- 125 n. 151 n., 335 5- 121, 123, 125 n., 126, Garbha-Upanishad III. 7214 250 n., 287, 318-9, 402, 402 n., 414 6 ——
125 n., 126

6 to 2. 10-122
1334
2 128, 128 n. → Gautama-Dharma-Sutras X. 5177 XII. 3178 Kāṇva-Brihadaraṇyaka- Upanishad III. 7. 1445 n., 51 Katha-Upanishad 428 4-95, 95 n., 105 n., 119 n., 132-3, 133 n., I. 13 - 209 139, 139 n., 187, 268 5- 139 n. 4.1 131

395 n. 7 to 12 134, 188 7.1-135, 2-3 250 n. 152 4 119 n.

8.3119 n. 140, 17-26 2027-8, 210 209 26 II. 9 - 30 1225, 30, 210 14; 15-211 18 —420 18; 19 211 n., 267 — 20-211 n. 20-25

212 22 321, 326 22-23 23 10.1119 n. 2-142 23 212 25-21, 23 INDEX OF QUOTATIONS 429 III. 1 – 27, 212 IV. 18242, 244, 2-27 245 n., 247, 3-27, 200-1, 248 n., 250, 252, 252 n., 253 n. 204 n., 226 3-9-198 3-14212 922, 27, 208 10 196, 196 n., 198 n., 208, 213 201, 11 196, 196 n., 12

―
198 n.,
200,
204 n., 208
208, 347
12-13 202

18-19253 n. Kena-Upanishad I. 1-7 Madhyandina-Brihadaran- III. 14 n., IV. 207-8, 208 n., 15-14, 212 IV. 7-25 10383 12-144, 145 n., 184 n., 185-6 12-13-145, 146n., 13 ― 184 n. 144 V. 15143, 143 n., " 186 VI. 2-3 184 n., 185 3 185

9-7 16 - 185 145 n., 17145, 184 n., 186 Kaushitaki-Upanishad I. 3 - 42 n. — 14. 315

249 n. yaka-Upanishad 7-45

2246, 49, 51, 130, 200, 270, 401-2 4.18 233

Mahabharata : XII. 46.70 - 70

1303 11 - 303 11-12 - 388 238.93 157 335. 48168 ― 342.32 282, 303 347. 31282, 303 (Taittiriya-) Mahānārāyana- Upanishad : V. 7 223, 292, 420 VIII. 3; 4 220

IX. 2220, 221 n. XI. 8-12-84 XXIII. 1-235 n. Mahopanishad I. 1-387, 407 Maitri-Upanishad II. 2119 n. Manu-Smriti I. 5161, 283 II. 9 - 35 n. III. III. IV.

245 n., 247 n. 8 IV. 8-9 22 1-7 993 n., 310 1-247 1-17-247 II. S.B.-55 5-8-302 6;8-387 -295, 324

161 21 ―

157 430 SRI-BHASHYA

III. 185-23 n.
IV. 80 178, 180
X. 126177
XII. 106311, 330
Mundaka-Upanishad
I. 1. 1-55
3-56, 295
4-56-7
5-57,
57 m.,
58, 108
618,

III. 1.121, 89 2-88 3-63 n., 85, 142, 295, 295 n. 8-7 2.3-57 8-63 n., 86, 268 9-37, 63 n. Naishkarmyasiddhi of Surešvara

180 n. – 170 n. 18, 52, 53n., Nirukta of Yaska 54, 58, 295, 295 m. 7-53-4, 295 58, Nrisimha-Purvatāpini- Upanishad 8-119 n. 9 - 54, 58-9, 59 n., 190, 239 n., 292, 318, 388

.60 n. 2.1 -59, 60 1-6 61 2-10 60 n. 6

II. 1 Nyāya-Sutras of Gautama : I. 1.11319 n. Original Sanskrit Texts by J. Muir, Vol. III 172 n. Papini’s Ashṭādhyāyi : 7

60 n.
60 m.y 11;12-61 11-13-60 n. 62 n. 1.1 2

10, —— 266 61 62, 5, 7, 52, 53 n., 54, 64, 108, 319 2;4;10-62 n.

65, 69 4 2 2.1 74 62 n. 62 n., 63 63 n. 4;7-9 5;682 13
7, 84 186 - 143 7 10 II. 1. 6-87 50-232

2199
34-35 n. III. 2. 54 389
113

377 V. 1. 122-90

127 - 14 n. VI. 4. 158-90 VII. 1. 39 202 — Prašna-Upanishad : I. 766, 72 n. V.

115 n. 1 116 2 - 119 5-115, 117, 118-9 70 10 1 117 n., 119 118-9 INDEX OF QUOTATIONS Pürva-Mimämsä-Sutras of Jaimini : I. 3. 3
300

VI. 1. 51-2-129 XI.

234 n. — Rāmāyaṇa of Valmiki : VI. 120. 29-324 Rig-Veda: VI. 47

431 VII. 48, 111, 205, 271, 281, 289, 324, 401 Svetasvatara Upanishad : I. 1-3-221 6 8 9 I. 48

325 I. 98. 1 17 66 10 66 III. 8 74

19

283

of

IV. 5

X. 88. 12

19
283
of
IV. 5
X. 88. 12

1-2 129.3 Sambanda-Vārtikā Sureśvara 350 n. Sankhya-Kärikäs of Isvara- krishna : 2- 207 n. 3 230 -~ Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa X. 71 n. 11 X. 6.1.11 72n., 73-4

216 XI. 5. 3. 13177 Siddhanta-lesa-sangraha of Appayya Dikshita

347 n. 679
401
215, 216 n.,

310, 318

215, 216 n., 401 - 215 — 259
48, 319, 321 416 – 217,

219 n., 221 n., 225-7, 281 21, 318-9, 401 -88, 310, 318 -215, 223, 276, 283, 294, 401 9-11-222 10 - 216, 276 - 283 n.

9 216 n., -301, 306 141, 145-6 11 V. 1 2 8 9 -9 VI. 7-8 389 7;9

387 8 9 11 13 Sruta-prakāšikā Sudarsana of 40 n., 57 n., 87 n., 16 101n., 153n., 184n., 202n., 223n., 252n., 293n., 295n., 311n., 18 19 373m., 401n., 417n., 419 n. Subala-Upanishad

II. 111, 205, 223 n., 283, 290

388, 414-5 10, 401 347

401
388 n.,
216, 401 - 118, 161 - 276, 287
Taittiriya-Aranyaka :
I. 12.3
154
III. 12.783, 190, 259 III. 13.347432
III. 13.1
1
w
III. 21
VI. 33 VII. 1

84 SRI-BHASHYA 47, 241, 271 73 158 Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa : II. 2. 4. 2 - 157 -394-5, Tandya-Brāhmaṇa XX. 12.5 176 Uṇādi-Sutras I. 70-84 n. II. 21 170 —

Vakya of Tanka ― 57 n., 127 Vasishta-Smriti VIII. 9-178 9. 409 6.7.2

151 7.6.2
157 8.9 -283, 283n., 285, 285n., Vayu-Purāņa: 413 Uttara-bhäga: III. 1. 5 5.6

10.5

153 Taittiriya-Samhită: I. 6. 7. 1-155 II. 1. 1. 1 - 153 2. 10. 2307 4. 12. 38 151 5. 9. 4-154

IV. 2. 9. 4-119 XXXVI. 69-294 Vedanta-dipa of Rāmānuja I. 2. 1-8 n. I. 3. 22 143 n. HILLE Vedānta-sära of Rāmānuja : I. 2. 1-8 n. I. 3.21 142 n. III.2.20-188 n. Vedanta-Sutras V. 2. 4

158 I. 1. VII. 1. 6
167

1. 10-313-4 Taittiriya-Upanishad : 1.6.1-7 II. 1. 198, 238, 287, 291, 361 II. 5-6-239
147, 241, 284, 1191n., 371n. 4-385 n. 5-6; 12-13-328 n. 13-104 22-401 n. 23- 187 25-144 29-32-165n., 249n. 30-93 31-367 n.

194-5 5.1-291

237 n., 287, 1.2. 310 2.1 1-7 ― 292-4, 382 7 7.264, 287 8 7.1 132, 236, 291, 291 n., 394 13-14 14 8. 1186, 240 18 21 22 III. 1. 12, 10 6. 1-10, 287 194

415 n.” 141, 141 n. -334 n. —

34 n. 44 33 n., 34 n. -49 n., 403n. -89 INDEX OF QUOTATIONS

1. 22-24-143 IL 2. 433 27 -75

75 n. 2.1 8 331 n. 159 n. -328

· 3. 1-6 13-19

21

194-5

143 -415 n. 143, 143 n. 24-40-147 n. 10-16 -414 a. 3.18
268 n. 40 – 199, 351 n., 354 1. III 1. 1 -323 30-32 224 n.

127 n. 43-44

191 n. 2.12 – 334 n. IV. 3. 42 n.

195 + 4. 1

206 n. 3.1 4. 1 268 n. 3 349 n. 3;9 4-5

347 n. 21 22 23 25

328 n. -268-9
403 376 n.

295 n.

17
138 n.
11,
Vishnu-Purana of Parāśara
139,
139 n.
232 n.
I. 1. 35
26

285n.,295n. 28 —
285 n. 5.63 65 303, 388

18 -206, 294 3.1: 2-3-412 4.51-52-419

157

II. 1. 7
337, 405 8-9 -327, 405 9 -93 n., 385, 403 n.

157
II. 1. 7

22.37; 84-324 II. 6.46-47-264 12. 37324 292 32. 6205 12 311 n. 14 391 n. IV. 2.

155 n. 15
396 n. 16 394 n. 21
327 22 24
417 n. 26
291 n.

27

-415 n.
404 n., 405 27-28 - 415 33
294 34-35-404 35 -291, 336 V. 20. 97303

27
-415 n.

16-303 VI. 4.39-40–206 5.60-61-57 (Pañchapadikā-) Vivaraņa of Prakasatman -342n.,356n. Vritti of Bodhāyana :

12, 96, 166

GLOSSARIAL INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES (Arranged according to the Sanskrit Alphabet) The reference is to page numbers. p-page. akalpayat: imperfect third person singular of klrip, to create: hence ‘created’, 223. Akshapāda: a name of Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya sytem of philosophy, 324, 324 n. (Some say that the two are different). un- Akshara: the Indestructible One or the Brahman, 52-64, 107-15, passim, 131, 186, 296 n.; differentiated matter or a state of prakriti (on which see Vol. I, Note 185), 52-64, 107-115 passim, 205, 271, 281, 289-90, 296 n.; the indi- vidual self, 111, 296 n. the Aksharadhikaraṇa: third section of Chapter I, Part 3, of the Vedanta- Sutras, so called because it establishes the identity of the Akshara mention- ed in a scriptural passage. n=note. aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ: He is higher than what is higher than the akshara, 52, 54. Agni: the celestial world of fire, 65, 69, 72-3; the god of fire, 28, 154, 154 n., 155 n., 158, 215; the digestive fire, 74; the fire-sacrifice, 209 n.; the Supreme Self, 75-6. Agnirahasya: a section of the ‘Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa’, 16. agnihotra: a Vedic ritual in which an oblation is offered, particularly to Agni, 78-81, 97. anga: a subsidiary part, an auxiliary science, 134 n. Angiras: a celebrated sage in the Mund. Up., 56. ach a particular affix, 14 n. achit the non-sentient or non-intelligent, matter, 237 n. 436 SRI-BHASHYA aja (masculine) unborn, 217, 220, 227, 229. ajā (feminine) unborn, 213-28, passim. ajām ekām: one unborn (feminine), 217. Ajatasatru: a king of Kasi who figures in Kaush. Up. (IV) and Brih. Up. (II. 1) as a teacher of religious and philosophical truths, 242-54. atachchhabdat: See p. 87. “without lit. atala: bottom”: the name of the first of the seven nether worlds, 150 n. atadṛišasya: of or to a dissimilar thing, 369 n. ativadati: declares as tran- scendent, 94 n. ativadin: one who holds (the object of his worship) as superior (to all other objects of worship) and transcendent, 98-100. Attradhikarana, the second section of Ved. Sut. (1.2), dealing with the ‘Eater’ mentioned in a scriptural passage. atha: then, thereafter, 254 n. Atharva: the eldest son of Brahma the creator; he is described as the first student and earliest teacher of the science of the Brahman, 55-6- Atharva: the fourth Veda. Atharvasiras: the principal texts of the Atharva Veda, 214. ****.. Athāsmin bhavati: (i) Then it attains union with this individual self; (ii) Then it attains union with the principal vital air, which is in this (individual self); (iii) Then he attains: union with this Supreme Self; 245, 251. aditi: the eater, hence the individual self which ’eats” the fruits of its deeds, 25. advitiya: without a second, 381 n. Advaita: the monistic school of the Vedanta, 191 n. ; 371 n., 399 n., 400 n. Advaitic pertaining Advaita, 399 n, to or Advaitins: exponents followers of Advaita, passim. Adrisyatvādi - gunakadhi- karana: the fifth section of Ved. Sut. (I. 2), dealing with the Brahman possessed of qualities like invisibility etc., 51. Adrisya as dharmoktch: 143. See p. 51 for the translation of the aphor- ism. adrishta: lit. unseen; supersensuous, not imme- diately preceded by a visible cause, 179 n.GLOSSARIAL INDEX adharma: lit. unrighteous- ness, hence the means for sin, 211 n.; that which is not the means, 211. adhika: lit. additional used in the sense ‘different’, 404 n. anisayā: by 437 material Nature, or under her influence, 88. anukriti: because of re- semblance, 142 n. helped on anugrihitam: helped of (by), 57 n. adhikarana(s): sections, topics, passim. adhikaraṇa-purvapakshin: the main critic or objector in a particular section of the work, 375 n. adhidaiva: lit. relating to the deities; a passage in the Brih. Up. (III. 7) where the Brahman is described as the Internal Ruler of several deities, 45-6. adhipati: lord, 193 n. adhiloka lit. relating to the worlds; a passage in the Madh. Brih. Up (III. 7), which describes the Brahman as the Internal Ruler of all the worlds, 45, 45 n., 45. adhyatmika: 149. See Vol. I, Note 12. an to breathe, 132 n. ananyatva: non-difference, identity, 341 n., 399 n. anavasthitch: because of not existing (there), 33 n. anadi: having no beginning, 353 n. aniśā: she who is not sovereign or independent, material Nature, 88 n. II. S.B.-56 anubhana: shining after, 143 n. anumāna: that which is measured, material Nature, 87, 87 n. anuvāka(s): section(s) in the Vedas or Upanishads, 10, 23, 209, 210 n. anuvidya: having under- stood, 135 n. See Vol. I, p. 16. Antaradhikarana: the third section of Ved. Sut. (1.2), where the identity of Him who is within (the eye) is established, 31, 136 n. antaratman: He who is within the individual self, 16. antariksha : the inter- mediate world between heaven and earth, 117-8. antariksha-loka: 118. See previous entry. Antaryamin: the Brahman as the Internal Controller of all things and selves, 130 n., 165 n. Antaryami - Brāhmaṇa: Brih. Up. (III. 7), where the theme of the Internal Controller 106, 45 n., 296 n., 323. is taught, 130, 130, 200, 438 SRI-BHASHYA Antary@myadhikarana : the fourth section of Ved. Sūt. (I. 2), where the identity of the Internal Controller is established, 44. antaḥkarana: the internal organ, identified with the material principle of egoity, 366 n. anna: lit., what is eaten, food; hence the (undiffer- entiated subtle) material elements which form objects of enjoyment to the individual selves, 58-9, 59 n. anyat lit., 132 n. Anvāhārya: one of the three sacred fires, being that on the right altar; see Note 439; pp. 34 n., 72, 82 n., 81. can breathe, apachchheda-nyaya: 346 n. See Note 30, Vol. I. aparabrahman: the lower Brahman conceived as full of attributes and hence regarded by mon- istic thinkers to be inferior to the Absolute without attributes, 116 n. Apasüdradhikarana : the ninth section of the Ved. Süt. (I. 3) where the exclusion of the Sudra from scriptural disciplines is discussed, 166. apāna: one of the five vital airs (on which see Note 388, Vol. I); it is con- nected with the activities of excretion and evacua- tion; 74, 132 n. api: and, even, 143 n. apiti: dissolution of the world, 322 n. apunya: demerit, 242 apurva: 153 n. See Note 36, Vol. I. apohana: removal, faculty of reasoning, 17 n. Appayya Dikshita: a cele- brated writer on Saivism, Vedanta and poetics of the 16th century, 347 n. Abhipratarin: identified with Chitraratha, a Kshat- riya prince, 175-6. abhyatta: participle from abhyadā, meaning “has appropriated”, 14. ambara: the ether of space, 107, 109. ambaranta: that which is beyond the ether, un- differentiated primordial matter, 112 n., 114 n. Arthāntaratvā divyapadeśā. dhikarana: the tenth section of Ved. Sut. (I. 3), where Akasa in a scriptu- ral passage is identified with the Brahman, because it is taught, among other things, to be a different thing, 187. Aruna father of Uddalaka, mentioned in the Chhand. Up., 67. GLOSSARIAL INDEX Arjuna: the Pandava prince to whom Sri Krishna teaches the Gitā, 206. arthavada(s): 151-3, 159 n.; 282 of Vol. I. 36, 148, see Note arsasa: afflicted with piles, 14 n. alpa: small, 90-1, 105 n. avāki: speechless, 14. avidya: nescience, spiritual ignorance and illusion, passim; distinguished from maya, and regarded as the means of causing illusion to one’s self, 356, 356 n. avibhaktatamas: the pri- mary undifferentiated state of matter in a subtle condition, 282 n. See Note 185, Vol. I. avyakta: primordial matter from which proceeds the evolution of the consti- tuent elements of the universe, 196, 196 n., 201, 203, 207, 207 n., 208 n., 209, 214, 229 n., 294; the body, 195, 196 n., 201, 203, 206 n., 207; a parti- cular state of primordial matter (on which see Note 185 of Vol. I), 111, 205-6, 281-2, 289-90, 294, 401. avyaktam… cha: lit. the manifest and also indeed the unmanifest, 215 n. avyayibhāva: the indeclin- able class of compound words, 87, 87 n. 439 avyäkṛita: that which is undifferentiated, primord- ial matter, 236-7, 237 n.; the Brahman, 240-1. Asvapati a king of the Kekayas, 67, 70. asat: lit. non-existence, a state of primordial matter 236-7, 239; the Brahman, 240. Asuras demons in perpet- ual hostility to the gods, 151, 154. asmin: masculine locative singular of the pronoun, idam, ’this’; 125, 245, 251. asya: his; the word is the genitive singular of the pronoun ’this’ in mascu- line; 88. ahańkāra: the material principle of egoity (on which see Note 39, Vol. I); pp. 159 n., 201 n., 205 n., 206, 213, 230 n., 231 n., 288; the ’thing, I’, 366. ahankā rādeśaḥ: teaching (about the Brahman) under the conception of the ego, 106 n. ahama deśaḥ: teaching (about the Brahman) as the ego. Ahalya 325. See Note 738 on p. 325. Ahaharetva……gobhirastu: See Note 586 on p. 172. 440 SRI-BHASHYA A: a verbal preposition, 279 n. ākāśā: the fifth of the great material elements which is supposed to fill and pervade the universe, the ether of space, 5n, 7, 12-13, 13 n., 19, 40 n., 42 n., 80 n., 105-122 passim, 131-3, 187-94 passim, 435, 311 n., 415; the Brahman, 3, 132, 187, 187 n., 189-91, 194, 254; the individual self, 187, 187 n., 192; primordial matter, 108 n., 110. Akāsādhikarana: the eighth section of Ved. Sut. (I. 1), where the Akāśā mention- ed in some scriptural statements is identified as the Brahman. ajagmatuḥ: perfect third person dual of gam with the preposition ā, 252 n. atman: the individual self or Supreme Self according to the context, passim: the ether as the pervader, 121 n.; the mahat as the pervader, 201, 201 n. atmani in the self, 203. Atharvanikas: followers of the Atharva-Veda, 82, 115, 214. adi: At the end of or in the middle of a compound word, this means ‘begin- ning with’, ’etc.’ and so on, 33 n. Adityas a class of gods generally regarded as 12 in number and sometimes supposed to represent the sun in the 12 months of the year, 163 n., 165. ā deśa: controller, ruler, 278-9, 279 n. ; teaching, 279 n. Granda: bliss as the rapture Brahman, 10; from power and sovereign- ty, 104 n. Anandamaya: that which consists of bliss, the Brahman, 104. Anandavalli : lit. the creeper of bliss; the name of Taitt. Up. (II), 10. anumana: lit. that which is arrived at by logical inference, primordial matter inferred as the cause of the world, 87, 87 n. ānumānika: that which is ligically inferred (as the cause of the world), pri- mordial matter, 194. Anumānikadhikarana: the first section of Ved. Sit. (I. 4), where the claim of the Sankhyas that a scriptural passage supports their view about the cause of the world is disproved, 195. Apast amba: name of a well known sage and author of aphorisms on law, custom and ritual, 303 n. GLOSSARIAL INDEX ārabh: to touch, reach, seize hold of, 377. arambhana: that which is touched, reached or attained, 337, 375-7, 376 n. a Arambhaṇādhikarana: the sixth section of Ved. Sut. (II. 1), where the identity of the world as an effect with its cause, the Brahman, is established with the help of scriptural passage begin- ning with the word ‘arambhaṇa’ and other passages, 337, 405. alabh: to touch, reach, seize hold of, 377. alambhana: that which is touched, reached attained, 377. or Asmarathya: an ancient sage, whose views are sometimes referred to in the Vedanta-Sitras, 76, 77 n., 265-6, 265 n. Aruni: the son of Aruna, 177. ähavaniya: one of the three sacred fires (explain- ed in Note 438), pp. 34 n., 72, 80 n., 81. the Itaravyapadeśadhikaraṇa: seventh section of Ved. Sit. (II. 1), where the true significance of the description of the other (i.e., the individual self) (as identical with the Brahman) is explained. 441 iti: thus, 69 n., 378 n. Itihasas: traditional records of heroic history; the Rāmāyaṇa and the Maha- bharata, 57, 57 n., 153, 163 n., 168, 170, 272 n., 301, 386-7. Ityadhidaivatam: See Note 447 on p. 45. Ityadhilokam: See Note 447 on p. 45. itva: chariot, 172 n. itvan: going, 172 n. 156, Indra: the chief of the minor gods, 3, 134 n., 135, 151, 154, 154 n., 156 n., 158, 185-6; Lord, 346. the Indrapraṇādhikarana: the eleventh and conclud- ing section of Ved. Sut. (I. 1), dealing with the significance of the words ‘Indra’ and ‘prāņa’ in some scriptural passages, 165 n. indriyas: organs 234. of sense, imanich: a grammatical affix, 90. ishika: a kind of reed, 68, 79. Ikshana: seeing, willing, 237 n. İkshatikarmadhikaraṇa: the fourth section of Ved. Sit. (I. 3), where the identity of the object of the action of seeing in a scriptural passage is deter- mined.442 SRI-BHASHYA iyatuḥ: perfect third person dual of i(n) ’to go’, mean- ing ’they two went’, 252 n. Isana: lord, ruler, 146 n., 184 n.; Siva, 387. Isvara: the Lord, Šiva, 111 n.; the Brahman with attributes, 353 n., 354 n. Isvarakrishna: author of a standard exposition of the Sankhya system, 207 n. Uttambhana: propping up, supporting, 184 n. utpatti: production, origin- ation, 350 n. a kind of fig udumbara: tree, sticks or poles made of its wood, 300, 300 n. Uddalaka: A son of Aruna, he figures as a famous teacher in the Upanishads, 45 n., 47, 67, 177. udyoga: effort, 101 n. udyoga-prayatna: See Note 505 on p. 101. Upakosala: a devoted stu- dent of Satyakāma Jābāla, to whom meditation on the Brahman as the Person within the eye is taught, 31-44, passim. upadesyam: what is to be taught, teaching, 279. upanayana: initiation (into the Vedas), investiture with a sacred thread which indicates a re-birth in spirit and which entitles the boy so invested, to learn the Vedas, 177, 179, 184. Upanishads: the philoso- phical portions of the Vedas, passim. upanishadic: pertaining to the Upanishads, 95. upapadyate: is appropriate, 419 n. … Upavayantam mushmim- Scha: We protect him from all trouble in this world and the next, 37. Upasamhāradarśanadhi- karana: the eighth sec- tion of the Ved. Süt. (II. the 1), showing that collection of materials seen with producing agents is not necessary to the Brahman for the creation of the world, 406. upāsana: worship through loving meditation; forms thereof, 39 n., 123 n., 104 n., 209 n., 210 n. 96 n., 168 n., Rig-Veda: the first of the four Vedas, 164, 224, 258, 258 n., 259. rita: the fruits of action, 24-5. See also Note 177 and p. 171, Vol. I. ritviks: officiating priests, 61 n., 68. GLOSSARIAL INDEX Eka: one, single, 409 n. ekala having a uniform nature, 224. etatkarma: this produced thing, 243. etad: this, 59, 246, 246 n., 248, 253. etadabhut did he remain, 253 n. etadasayishta: did he lie down, 253 n. ctadamṛitam: This is im- mortal, 105 n. etadagat: did he come, 253 n. etam (accusative) this, 128. etasmat jivaghanāt parāt param: (i) him who is higher than the higher individual selves in their totality; (ii) him who is higher than him who is higher than the individual souls in their totality. enam: (accusative) this, 49n. eta ha vai devataḥ: indeed these deities, 315 n. eshah: he, this, 16, 49. esha te ātmā: This is your Self, 49. esha te ’ntaryami: This is your Internal Ruler, 46. esha tu ativadati: But he (who) declares that his object of worship is transcendent, 99 n. Om: a sacred syllable under- stood to denote Supreme Being, 115-20, 211. the 62 n., 443 onkara: the syllable om, 108 n., 115 n. Audulomi: a teacher whose views are sometimes referred to in the Vedanta- Sutras, 265 n., 267-8. Aupamanyava: a sage interested in the worship of the Vaisvānara, 67, 70. Aulukya: lit. descended from the owl or ‘uluka’; Kanāda, the founder of the Vaiseshika philosophy, so called, because, accord- ing to Prasastapāda, Šiva in the form of an owl taught the system to him, 329 n. Ka: happiness, 40-1, 40 n. Kanāda: the name by which the founder of the Vaiseshika system of philosophy is generally known, 329 n., 338, 339 n., 340 n. Kapila: the founder of the Sankhya system of philo- phy, passim. karunaya: through kind- ness (or mercy), 416 n. karuṇāvān: one who is merciful, 416 n. karma: religious works, rites and duties, 148, 153 n., 164; what is produced, 243, 246-8, 250; the impressed tendency generated in relation to the soul as a result of acts in previous states of embodied existence, passim. 444 SRI-BHASHYA karma-kāṇḍa: the ritualis-kāma: desire, 261-2, 263n.; tic portion of the Vedas, 179 n. karmadharaya: a class of compound words, the members of which are in the same relationship either as adjective and substantive or as sub- stantives in apposition, 129, 129 n. karma-phala: the fruits of karma, 26 n. Karma-Mimamsă: enquiry into the ritual (of the Vedas), as conducted by Jaimini, 1. kalpa: a period of time equal to 4,320,000,000 solar years; see Note 246, Vol. I; pp. 162, 165, 216, 292, 360, 360 n. kalpana: production, crea- tion, 223, 223 n.; imagin- ary mental conception, 223 n. kavāta: door, 389; -ghna, thief, 389 n. Käkshaseni: the son of Kakshasena; it is an epithet of Abhipratārin, 175-6. kandas: sections of the Vedas, 158. Kanvas: descendants of the sage, Kanva, to whom is attributed a recension of some parts of the Veda, 45-6, 45 n., 50-1, 233, 289. Kapeyas: descendants of Kapi or Angiras, who were priests of Abhipratārin Chaitraratha, 175-6, 176n. will, 263, 263 n. kāmāḥ: plural of ‘kama’; lit. desires: here qualities worthy of being desired, 126. kāraḥa: lit. the cause; the eleven senses, 217 n. Karaṇatvadhikarana: the fourth section of Ved. Sit. (I. 4), dealing with some descriptions of the Brahman as the cause of the ether etc., 236. karya: lit. effect: here the body, 217 n. kala: time, 215 n. kāsa: a species of grass, used for mats, roofs etc., 390, 390 n. kasa-kusa-nyāya: the prin- ciple according to which kasa is substituted for kuša; see Note 325; p. 390, 390 n. Kasakritsna: a teacher whose views are some- times referred to in the Vedanta-Stras, 265 n., 268, 271, 271 n. Kasi the famous city of Banaras, 247 n. Kunti: the mother of Arjuna, the Pandava prince, 216-7, 305. Kulluka: a famous com- mentator on Manu, 23 n. kusa: a kind of grass used in religious ceremonies, 81, 390, 390 n. krit: an affix to form nouns from roots, 387. GLOSSARIAL INDEX kriti lit. activity; tion, 101, 101 n. voli- Kritenaprasakiyadhikara- na: the ninth section of Ved. Sut. (II. 1) where the objection that if the Brahman is the cause of the world, the the whole indivisible Brahman must become the divisible world, is dealt with. kritya: the affix to form the future passive parti- ciple, 377. Kekayas a warlike tribe, 67, 70. Ketu: mythologically, the body of the demon, Saimhikeya : in astro- nomy, the dragon’s tail or the descending node of the moon, 188 n. kevalam: (neuter), -ā (feminine); mere, 417 n. Kaushitakins: the followers of Kaushitaka, 242. kta: an affix, 14. kratu 19. kriḍā sacrifice, worship, worship, generally sport, pleasure; the joy from gardens, 104 n. Kshatriya: a member of the military or ruling caste, 21-3, 173-6, 176 n., 260. Kshapaņa: one who prac- tises austerities, Buddha, 329 n. the kshar to flow out, to come out from, 64. II. S.B.-57 445 kshetrajña: ’the knower of the field’, the individual self, 4, 296 n. Kha: the ether of space, 40-1, 40 n. khadya: eatable, 74. Gandharvas: a kind of demigods: their city means an imaginary city in the sky seen as the result of a mirage, 368 n., 370 n. Gärgi: a lady who is the daughter of Vachaknu and who puts difficult ques- tions to philosophers in Brih. Up., 107-14, passim, 131, 186. garhapatya: the perpetual household fire, 34 n., 35, 72, 80 n., 81. gunas redeeming moral qualities, 217 n. guru: spiritual guru spiritual preceptor, 60 n. gau: matter, 296 n. Gautama: a sage, the son of Haridrumat and the teacher of Satyakāma in Chhand. Up. (IV. 4), 177 n.; founder of the Nyaya system of philoso- phy, 319 n., 329 n.; the husband of Ahalya in the Rām., 325 n. Ghan: a suffix, 279 n. 446 SRI-BHASHYA Cha: and, 114 n., 143 n. ; a syllable, 170; however, 223, 306; indeed, 238. chamasa: a cup, particular- ly that used in sacrifices for drinking the soma juice, 213, 218-9, 221. the Chamasadhikarana : second section of Ved. Sut. (I. 4), where the figurative meaning of the Jagadvachitvadhikaraṇa: the fifth section of Ved. Sit. (I. 4), where the word, ‘karman’, in a scriptural passage is shown to denote the world, 242. Janaka: a famous King of Videha, who is also interested in religion and philosophy, 128. janas: one of the seven upper worlds, 150 n. word, ‘chamasa’, in а scriptural passage is referred to. Jabālā: the the chit intelligence, con- sciousness, 183 n.; individual self, 237 n., 297 n. chetana: the intelligent individual self, 326 n. Chaitraratha: a king other- wise known as Abhipra- tärin, 174-6, 176 n. Chaitrarathin: the same as Chaitraratha above; the word is a patronymic from ‘Chaitraratha’; 176n. choshya: suckable, 74 n. Chhandogas: lit. reciters mother of Satyakāma in Chhand. Up. (IV. 4), 177 n. Janaśruti: a king, the son of Janašruta and the grandson of Putra ; he figures in the Chhand. Up. (IV. 1); 167-75, passim. Jābālā: the son of Jabālā, a student and teacher in the Upanishads, 177. Jina: otherwise known as Mahavira, a contemporary of the Buddha; he denied the Vedas and taught a religion of ascetic self- denial and scrupulous regard for animal life, 329 n. in metre, hence chanters jiva: the individual self, of the Sama-Veda, hence, teachers or followers of the doctrines in the Chhandogya Upanishad attached to the Sama- Veda, 79, 90, 120. Jagat:

lit. that which moves; the world, 382.
passim.
jivaghana: the (solid, that is) embodied, individual self, 118; -at: ablative singular, meaning
meaning “in regard to the embodied self”, 117 n.
Jainas: the followers of
Jina, 329, 331, 331 n.GLOSSARIAL INDEX
Jaimini: a teacher who is often referred to in the Vedanta-Sutras; he may be identical with the author of the Purva- Mimämsä Sutras, 75, 78, 162-3, 251; the author of the Pir. Mim. Süt., 148 n.
jña: lit. the knower; the individual self, 207 n.,
229 n.
jñana: knowledge, 179 n. ; the faculty of intellection, 202-3; e, locative singu- lar, 203.
Jñanakanda: the philoso- phical portions of the Vedas, 179 n. Jñānam…niyachchhet: See
p. 203.
jyotish toma: a soma sacri-
fice, 301.
jyotis: lit: light;
Brahman, 144; organ, 233 n.
the
a sense-
jyotirupakramā: the group of things starting with light, 226 n.
Tat: that, 123 n.
tatpurusha: lit. “his ser- vant”; a class of com- pound words in which the last member is defined or qualified by the first with- out losing its original character or importance, the literal meaning of the word being an example, 87 n., 129 n., 193 n.
447
tadanukarah: to resemble
him, 142.
tadamṛitam: That is im-
mortal, 105 n.
tada: then, 254 n.
tadākāśam: that (is) the
ether of space, 40 n. taddevaḥ: those deities,
315 n.
tadyachchhet jñana ātmani: See p.202; -santa ātmani: See p. 203.
tadvat: as in that case,
317 n.
tantra: a cause which leads to more than one effect, using a word to indicate more than one thing as if it had been used more than once, 234 n.
tanmatras: subtle bases of the five material elements, 230 n., 288 n.
tapas: penance, austerities, 114, 118 n., 153 n., 158; one of the seven upper worlds, 150 n.; knowledge, thinking and willing, - see Note 345, Vol. I, 58, 189, 237 n., 283 n., 291-2; the Brahman, 61. tapasastat: “from out of tapas, it…”; see 283 n. tamas: the ‘quality’ of darkness’ which makes matter inert, immobile and dull, 215 n., 216, 221, 231 n., 282, 363, 338, 308 n., 413; primordial undifferentiated matter, 205, 223 n., 283, 283 m., 288-90, 290 n.
"
448
SRI-BHASHYA
tamasastat: “from out of tamas, it…”; see 283 n. tādṛisasya of a similar
thing, 369 n.
tamasa: characterised by the quality of tamas, 159 n., 205 n.
ti: See 139 n.
tu: but, 99 n., 220 n.; on the contrary, 138 n.; how- ever, 251, 306, 314, 322, 322 n.; indeed, 226, 238. te: your, 49.
tejas: the element of light and heat, 150, 218 n., 224-6, 238, 376, 382 n.
te devāḥ: those deities,
315 n.
te yadantara: what is be- tween these two, 190 n. Taittiriyas: the followers
of a school of the Yajur veda, founded by Tittiri, 220. tyat: non-intelligent matter,
see Note 183 of Vol. I; pp. 47, 239 n., 291, 293, 382 n. trinachiketa: a sacrificial fire, or a passage in the Taitt. Br. (III. 11. 7. 1-3), 23, 209, 210 n.
tretā: a triad, hence the three sacred fires collect- ively, 60, 60 n.
tva, -a (fem.):
172 n.
some one,
Dadichi a celebrated sage,
151 n. darvi a ladle, 114.
daharākāśa: lit. little or subtle ether, the Brah- man, 120-44, passim, 188,
191.
Daharadhikarana : the fifth section of Ved. Süt. I. 3), where the identity of the ’little ether’ in the heart is established, 120. dāna: almsgiving, making
gifts, 148 n., 153 n.
dis to point out, to com-
mand, 279 n.
drishti: seeing, worship through meditation, 73 n.
Devata dhikaraṇa : the
seventh section of the Ved. Sit. (I. 3), where the gods are shown as fit to worship the Brahman, 147.
Devadatta : a common name among men used in the sense of ‘some one’, ‘any person’ etc.,
156, 378, 378 n.
daivam: a
the
deity, Supreme Lord, 200. Dyubhvadyadhikaraṇa :
the first section of Ved. Sit. (I. 3), where the heaven, the earth etc. are shown to have the Brah- man for their ‘abode’, 82. dyubhvädvayatanam etc. :
See p. 82; p. 143.
Dramida: an ancient com-
mentator, 335.
dvandva: a class of com-
pound words, which unite two or more words in the same case and connected by ‘and’, 123 n.
GLOSSARIAL INDEX
dvirātra: lit.; lasting two nights, a kind of sacrifice, 176 n.
dvipas: islands; in the puranas, the earth is divided into seven islands named Jambu (within which is India), Plaksha, Salmali, Kusa, Krauñcha, Šāka and Pushkara, 417.
Dhananjaya: lit., wealth- winner, a name of Arjuna, 206.
dharma:
the ordinary means, 211: duty or means to punya, 211 n. dharma-bhūta-jñāna: the attribute of knowledge possessed by the indivi- dual self (which is itself knowledge as substance), 137 n., 326 n.
i. e.,
dharma-sastras:
Smritis, works of religious authority dealing with
laws and duties, 57, 57 n.
dhyāna: meditation, 135 n.
Na: no, not, 87 n., 322 n.
Nachiketas: a son of
Vājasravasa, who is taught the highest religious truths by the god of death in Kath. Up., 28, 30, 209-10, 210 n.
Nachiketa: a fire sacrifice, see Note 624; pp. 28, 30, 209-10, 210 n. nānā: different, 230. Nānumānam: the pradhana
is not, see 87 n.
II. S.B.-58
449
what is
Naman: name,
described in speech, 91 n. nara: water, 162.
Närada: a sage, 91 n., 92,
99, 282 n., 303.
Nārāyaṇa: a name of God, 4, 47-8, 51, 162, 193 n., 282 n., 289, 303, 305, 307, 307 n., 388, 388 n., 407. nididhyasana: steady medi-
tation, 23.
nimitta-karana: an instru- mental or efficient cause, the agent in creation, 237 n.
Nimbarka: a commentator
on the Ved. Sat., who flourished a little later than Rāmānuja, 40 n., 336 n.
a
Nirisvara-Sankhya :
school of Sankhya which denies God, 5 n.
Nirukta: a standard work on Vedic etymology by Yāska, 170 n.
nirvahitri: creator, differ- entiator, one who is the vehicle of, 187 n.
nishāda: of a wild, non- Aryan tribe, 129, 129 n.
nishada-sthapati: see Note
540;
pp. 129, 129 n., 169 n.
naimittika-pralaya: occa- sional dissolution of the universe, where some of the higher worlds remain unaffected, 116 n., 159, 159 n.
450
SRI-BHASHYA
Naiyayikas: the followers of the Nyāya system founded by Gautama, 29, 111 n., 331, 331 n.
of
Pancha(n): five, 229-32.
panchajanas: groups
five;
sense organs,
228-235, passim.
Paramatman: the Supreme
Self, 9, 193 n.
Parjanya: the rain-god, one of the Adityas, 387. parāt: (i) (adj. qualifying a noun in ablative singular) superior ; (ii) (noun in ablative singular) in regard to that which is superior (to), 117 n.
pañchajani: a group of Parasara: the author of
five, 229 n., 230.
pañchaphulyah: groups of five bundles of straw each, 229.
Patanjali: the founder or chief exponent of the Yoga system, 329, 329 n. pati: lord, 193 n.
patim visvasya: Him who is the Lord of the universe, 193 n.
patyādi: (i) the words that have pati at the beginning; (ii) the beginning of the words ending with pati, 193 n.
Padmapada: a disciple of Sankaracharya, and the author of a sub-comment- ary called Pañchapādikā on his commentary on the Ved. Süt., 342 n.
para superior, 54. paratva: the quality of
being the Highest, 55.
Para(m)
Supreme
116 n.
Brahman: the
Brahman, 9,
the Vishņu-Purāṇa, 57, 303.
pachaka: a cook, 389. Pänini: a celebrated gram-
marian, 170 n. Pāṇḍaravāsas: lit. the
white-robed one; epithet of praṇa, 252 n. pātāla: a nether world,
150 n.
an
pada: lit: a quarter: one of the four sections into which every chapter of the Ved. Sut. is divided, 255 n.
papa: sin, demerit, 211 n.,
243.
pitṛis: the manes, 114. pippala: a fruit or berry;
figuratively, the effects of karma, 21, 89, 318, 401.
an ancient teacher in the Pr. Up., 115 n.
Pippalada:
punya: moral or religious
merit, 211 n., 242-3. purāṇas: see Note 104, Vol. I; pp. 57, 57 n., 153, 163 n., 168, 170, 272 n., 301, 314, 367 n., 386-7.
GLOSSARIAL INDEX
purusha: person, the indi- vidual self, passim; the Supreme Person, 16, 60 n., 72, 74, 75 n., 200, 295, 303.
purgapaksha : lit: the earlier view, a prima facie view, an opponent’s view stated to be refuted later, passim: in: an objector or critic, passim. Pūrva-Mimāmsā: enquiry into the earlier (i.e., ritualistic) part of the Vedas, 169 n.; -kas: those engaged in the enquiry, 148 n. Prithagvartman: lit. that which moves in different directions; air, an aspect, part or form of Vaišvā- nara, 71, 71 n., 80, 80 n. prithu: big, great, 90. prithvi: earth as one of the
five elements, 218 n. peya drinkable, 74 n. Poutrāyaṇa: a patronymic from Poutra, itself a patronymic from Putra: hence a grandson of Putra, 170-1.
prakarana : context, topic under discussion, 141 n. prakriti: primordial matter, material Nature, passim; aspect, manifestation, 206; material cause, 277.
Prakrityadhikaraṇa:
the
7th section of Ved. Sūt. (I. 4) where the Brahman is taught to be the material cause (prakriti) of the world.
451
Prajapati a Vedic god, 154 n., 314 n.; Brahmā, the creator, 134-42 passim, 151, 157-9, 188. prajayeya: may I be born,
381 n.
prajnana-ghana: a mass of knowledge, the individual self, the Supreme Self having the individual self for His body, 265 n. pranava: the mystic syllable
‘Om’, 62 n., 211.
Pratardana: a king whom
Indra taught a way of realising God, 249, 250 n.
pratibimba: reflected image,
354 n.
pratishtha: lit.
support, an aspect or part of Vaišvānară, 71, 71 n.
pratika: symbol,
91 n.
pratikopā sanā:
73 n.,
worship
through a symbol, worship of something not the Brahman as the Brahman, 39 n.
pradhāna: primordial, un-
differentiated
matter, material Nature, passim.
prapathaka: chapter, 95 n.
pramaņa-anupapatti: fail- ure of the means of proof (viz., perception to esta- blish difference), 181 n., 371 n.
prameya-anupapatti: fail- ure to establish the thing to be proved (i.e., differ- ence), 181 n.452
pramitadhikaraṇa:
SRI-BHASHYA
the
the senses, 313; the sense of touch, 233-4. prana atmataḥ: The prana comes out of the Self, 99 n.
prāṇāya svāḥā: 73; see
Note 477 on p. 73.
prāṇāhuti : purpose,
sixth section of Ved. Sut. (1. 3), where the Person limited (to the size of a thumb) is shown to be the Brahman, 144. prayatna: effort, activity of the will; see 101 n. prayojanam:
417 n. Prayojanavattvā dhikaraṇa: the last and tenth section of the Ved. Süt. (II. 1), where the Brahman is shown to be the cause of the world, even though creation seems to have a purpose, 416. pralaya: dissolution of the universe, 110 n., 223 n., 282, 292, 384. pravachana: reflection, 23. prasāsana: supreme com-
mand, 279. Prahlada: the young son
of the Asura king, Hiranyakasipu, who is persecuted by his atheistic father for his devotion to God, as described in the Vishnu and other Purāņas, 367, 367 n. prakrita (adj.) material,
77 n.
prajña: omniscient, 253. pran to breathe, 132 n. prāna: the principal or any vital air, passim; the Brahman, 7, 93, 185, 250 n., 251-2, 254, 254 n., 310; the individual self, 90-107, 136, 244, 245 n.; 221 n., 22041, 315 n., the vital airs and
senses,
a
sacrificial offering made to the vital airs, 78-81.
prane: locative singular of prana, ‘in the prāņa’, 245. prano brahma: the prāṇa
is the Brahman, 40 n. pranyat: Can he enjoy?;
132 n.
Prabhakaras: followers of
the Mimāmsā teacher, Prabhakara, 1n.
Badari a sacred spot on
the Himalayas, 282 n. barhis: the sacred bed of kusa grass on the altar, 90 n.
bahu large, great, 90-1. bahupašu : resembling
cattle, 178, 178 n. bahula: having greatness,
the sky as an aspect of Vaišvänara, 71, 71 n., 80, 80 n.
bahuvrihi: lit. having much rice: the attributive compound-word, whose members have no inde- pendence and which serves to qualify another word, the word in its literal meaning serving as an example, 87 n., 193 n.
GLOSSARIAL INDEX
bahviḥ… … sarūpāḥ: her (acc.) who is creating (or giving birth to) many similar young ones, 221 n.
bahvim…… sarūpām: her (acc.) who is producing numerous similar off- spring, 222 n.
Badarayana: a teacher of the Vedanta, probably identical with the author of the Ved. St., 147, 149, 165.
Badari: a teacher of the
Vedanta, 77, 77 n.
Bālāki: a teacher who figures in Kaush. Up., 242-54, passim.
Buddha: the founder of Buddhism, 29, 329 n.; his followers are referred to in p. 331.
buddhi: the ‘great material principle’ or mahat, 201, 205, 213; the intellect, 24, 198 n., 202 n., 203, 205, 221 n.
brihattva: greatness, 9. Bodhayana: the author of the Vritti or an ancient commentary on the Ved. Sut., 8, 12, 96.
brahma: neuter accusative singular of ‘Brahman’, 314. brahmajajña: the knower born from the Brahman, 26.
Brahman: the Supreme Being, passim: matter,
62 n.
II. S.B.-59
453
brahmapura: the city of the Brahman, 123; the city which is the Brahman, 126, 127 n.
Brahma-Mimāmsā :
the
enquiry into the Brahman, the Vedanta, 169 n. brahma-loka: the world of the Brahman, 115, 118-9, 137; the world of Brahma the creator, 116-7; the world which is
the Brahman, 127-9, 191. brahma-vidva: the science of or the teaching about the Brahmau, 31 n. brahmaṇḍa: lit. the egg of Brahma; the universe, 160.
brahmopanishad: teaching
about the Brahman, 166.
Brāhmaṇa:
Brahmin, 21-3, 57, 60 n., 168, 175,
a
177 n., 180-7; Vedie
injunctions, portions of the Vedas dealing with sacrifices, 153: one who attains the Brahman, 115.
to God,
Bhakti: devotion
17 n. bhamani: the shining one,
the Brahman, 33.
Bhaskara: a philosoper who held the Brahman to be both different and non- different from the Brah- man, and for
for whose views, see Note 235 of Vol. I; pp. 29, 265 n., 269 n., 336 n., 385, 385 n.
454
SRI-BHASHYA
Bhishma: the grand-uncle of the Pandavas in the Mahabharata, 330.
bhuktam : what is eaten,
14 n.
bhuktā brāhmaṇāḥ: The Brahmaņas have eaten, 14. bhuvas: one of the seven higher worlds, 150 n.,
157.
bhu a syllable substituted
for bahu, 90.
of the and the future,
bhutabhavyasya:
past
146 n.
bhutadi: the tamasa variety of ahankara from which the tanmatras are derived, 159, 159 n; ahankara,
205, 205 n., 290.
bhuman: lit. the Great One: the Brahman, 90-107, passim; the individual self, 93.
Bhumadhikarana: the 2nd section of the Ved. Sut. (I. 3), where the Great One mentioned in a scriptural passage is identi- fied as the Brahman, 90.
bhis, ; the earth, 150 n.,
157.
Bhedabheda: the philo-
sophical system
which
maintains the individual self to be both different
and non-different
the Brahman,
398 n.
from
347 n.,
Bhoktrapattyadhikaraṇa:
the 5th section of the Ved. Sut. (II. 1), dealing with whether the posses- sion of a body would make the Brahman. the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, 332.
Madhu: honey, nectar, 164. madhu-vidya: the worship of the Brahman as the sun-god and as the internal ruler of the sun- god, 165-6, 166 n., 224, 224 n.
the
Madhva: the great teacher of the dvaita school of the Vedanta, 40 n., 143, 336 n.
Madhvadhikarana :
eighth section of the Ved. Süt. (I. 3), where the worship of the sun, as the honey of the gods, is shown to be the worship of the Brahman, 162, 224 n.
manana:
reflection, 23,
96 n., 104 n.
manas: the internal organ of sense, the faculty of attention, 59, 201 n., 221 n., 231 n.
manasi: in the mind, 202 n.
Manu: a farnous law-giver
225, 302-11, passim.
manomaya:
mind-made,
capable of being grasped by the pure mind, 5, 6.
GLOSSARIAL INDEX
mantra: a Vedic hymn (see Note 14, Vol. I), 60, 60 n. 148 151-3, 158-9, 159 n. : a verse in a Upanishad, 62 n., 216-24. passim, 230, 232-4, 240.
Maruts: the gods of winds
and storms, 163 n.
mahat: an evolute of pra- kriti (see Note 39, Vol. I), 64, 64 n., 196-213 passim, 214 n., 220 n.,
222 n., 230 n., 231 n., 290, 306 n., 413; the individual self, 208, 208 n., 212-3.
mahat
udyatam: 185.
See Note 601.
mahataḥ…… udyatät: See
185 n.
Mahaddirghadhikarana :
the second section of the Ved. Sut. (II. 2) where the impossibility of the non- spatial atoms of the Vaiseshikas giving rise to spatial diatomic and tria- tomic particles and thence to the universe is demon- strated, 414 n.
mahas: one of the seven
higher worlds, 150 n.
mahātala: one of the seven
nether worlds, 150 n.
mahapralaya: the
great
cosmic dissolution at the end of a Brahma’s life, 159 n.
mahāśāla :
owner of a
mansion, 56.
455
mātrā: a prosodial instant, the period of time re- quired for pronouncing a short syllable or short vowel, 115-20, passim. Madhyandinas: a branch of the Vajasaneyins, 45, 45 n., 50-1, 223, 259. Madhyamika: a Nihilistic school of Buddhists, 331 n., 371 n., 372 n.
Māndhätṛi: an
king, 155 n.
ancient
māyā: will-power, 85, 85 n., prakriti, 215-6, 216 n., 222-3, 276, 283, 294, 305, 401; the cause of the illusory manifestation of the world, 218 n.; cosmic illusion and ignorance, 356-8.
mayin: the possessor of maya, the Lord as the controller of prakriti, 216, 222.
mithuna: See 104 n.
Mimāmsā : enquiry, in- vestigation; hence applied to the investigation into the ritualistic part of the Vedas, as well as that into the philosophical
portions, 1, 58.
Mimamsakas: followers of
the
Purva-Mimāmsā,
153 n., 161 n.
muñja: a kind of rush or
grass, 145.
muhurta: a unit of time equal to about 48 minutes, 112.
456
SRI-BHASHYA
mrittiketyeva satyam: It is real only as clay, 378 n.
mrityu: death, 21; prakriti, 205, 289-90, 296 n; the god of death, 387.
me: my, 16.
Maitreyi: the
salvation-
seeking wife of the sage, Yajnavalkya, in Brih. Up. 256, 259, 274.
the
Maitreyi-Brāhmaṇa:
section of Brih. Up. dealing with the teaching given to Maitreyi 255, 260, 265 n.
moksha : salvation,
final
release of the self, 28-9, 39 n., 60 n., 83 n., 132 n., 134 n., 179., 354 n.
Yachchhed vanmanasi: See
p. 202.
yaj to worship, 153. Yajurveda: the second of
the four Vedas, being primarily a collection of liturgical forms, 158, 200, 224.
Yat te antară: what is between these two, 190 n. yatra: in whom, 82. yada: when, 254 n.
yam: a syllable in satyam, which is taken to be identical with the root, to control, 139 n. Yama: the god of death, 30,
210, 210., 387.
yastad veda, yat sa veda: See Note 585 in p. 171. yasmat karaṇāt: for what-
ever reason, 190 n.
yasya vaitat karma: whose handiwork indeed this is, 246.
yaga: a sacrifice, 153.
Yajnavalkya: a famous sage in the Upanishads, 45 n.,
128, 259, 272,
272 n., 284.
Yadavaprakāsa: a philo- sopher holding the soul to be both different and non-different from the Brahman, 116, 206 n., 235 n., 265 n., 311, 333,
336 n., 385-6, 388 n.,
389 n., 390 n., 409 n.
Yamuna: Rāmānuja’s teach-
ers’ teacher, 180 n.
yukteḥ: from logical
reasoning, 394 n.
yugas: recurring cycles of time, consisting of Krita, Treta, Dvapara, and Kali Yugas, which four together total 4,320,000 years, 292.
Yudhishthira: the eldest of the Pandava princes in the Mahabharata, 303.
yoga:
meditation and mental concentration, 56, 172, 181, 306, 308; devotion to God, 307; a system of philosophy founded by Patanjali, 329 n.GLOSSARIAL INDEX
Yogapratyuktyadhikarana: the 2nd section of the Ved. Sit. (II. 1), where the system of Yoga is refuted, 307.
Yogasmriti a manual on the Yoga system, having the authority of a Smriti, 307-8, 308 n.
Yogachara: a system of Buddhist idealism, 331 n.
yogins: those practising
yoga, 33, 62, 62 n.
yoni: source, 295.
yo yonir yonim: See 222 n.
ra: a suffix, 170.
Rangaramanuja: a learned commentator on the Upanishads and author, among other works, of the Bhavaprakāśikā, valuable gloss on Srutaprakasikā,
26 n.,
a
the
457
acces-
rathänga: wheel;
sories of the chariot, 198 n.
rayi: wealth, water, 71,
71 n., 80 n., 81.
by
rasātala: one of the seven
nether worlds, 150 n. rajan: king, 252 n. rajasa: characterised
dominant rajas, 205 n.
Ramanuja: passim Rahu in mythology, a demon swallowing the sun and the moon; in astronomy the dragon’s head or the ascending node of the moon, 188, 188 n.
ruchaka: a necklace, a gold
coin, 344 n, 350 n.
Rudra: Siva, 387; -s: his
eleven 163 n.
manifestations,
rupaka-vinyasta: that which is put in metaphor, 197 n.
23 n.,
132 n.,
171 n.,
Raikva: the
190 n., 279 n., 347 n.
rajas: ‘passion’, a quality of prakriti, 215 n., 216, 221, 231 n., 308, 308 n., 413.
rati: See 104 n.
rathakara: a chariotmaker,
a member of a mixed caste who is specially authorised by the scriptures to raise a sacred fire in the rainy season, 169 n.
II. S.B.-60
teacher of
Janaśruti in Chhand. Up., 167-75, passim.
raudra a sacrifice, 129 n.
Laghu-siddhanta: the ‘small conclusion’ under Ved. Sut. (I. 1. 1.) (in Vol. I, pp. 13-24), 272 n.
linga: characteristic mark,
141 n., 146 n.
lila: sport, 417 n.
458
lehya: lickable, 74 n.
SRI-BHASHYA
loka: a world, 117, 129; -s: objects of knowledge, 244, 253.
lyut: the krit affix, ‘ana’,
377.
Vajra: the
thunderbolt
reganded as the terrible weapon of Indra, 157, 151 n., 185, 185 n. vadati: speaks, 94 n. Varuna: a Vedic god, 387. varna: a syllable, hence the syllable ‘om’, 108 n. Vasishta: a famous sage,
158.
a class of gods,
Vasus:
163-6, 227.
vastu-parichchheda: limita- tion as a thing, 347 n., 375 n.
vak: speech, 202. Vākyakāra: Taňka, an ancient teacher of Ved- anta, 57 n., 127.
Vākyānvayādhikarana: the 6th section of Ved. Süt. (I. 4) where the connected purport of a scriptural passage is established, 255, vāñmanasi: speech (acc.)
within the mind, 202. Vachaknavi: the daughter of Vachaknu, Gārgi, 107n. Vāchaspati Misra:
famous writer of philoso- phical works of the 9th century, 207 n., 347 n., 357 n., 351 n., 354 n.
vacha lit. through speech; for the purpose of speech, 377.
vacharambhanam: is reach- ed for the purpose of speech, 376 n.
Vājasaneyins,
Vājins:
followers of the Sukla Yajurvda (to which the Brih. Up. and the S’at. Br. are attached), 45, 73-4, 103, 192, 228.
Vamadeva: an ancient sage,
359 n., 367, 367 n.
vämani: one who gives
good things, 32.
Vayu: the god of wind,
153, 315.
Valmiki: the famous author of the Rāmāyaṇa, 325 n.
vikara: modification, 376; -ah emotions causing bondage, 217 n.
vijānāti: meditates on,
135 n.
vijñāna: lit: understand- ing; here the individual self, 46, 51.
vijñāna-ghana: a mass of knowledge, the individual self, the Supreme Self having the individual self for His body, 265 n.
vitala: a nether world,
150 n.
Vidura: a wise and saintly
uncle of the Pandavas in the Mahabharata, 168, 170.
GLOSSARIAL INDEX
vidya: knowledge, 52, 58; a mode of worship of the Brahman, 175 n.
Virochana: a king of the
Asuras, 151.
Vilakshṇatvādhikaraṇa :
the 3rd section of the Ved. Süt., where the distinction of the Brah- man from the world is discussed, 309. Visishtadvaita: the school of Vedanta in which the primary reality is the Brahman with attributes and to which Rāmānuja belongs, 399; -ins: its followers, 398 n.
visesha: a special qualifica-
tion, 67.
viseshana: attribute, predi-
cate, 197 n.
viseshya:
substantive,
subject of a predication,
197 n.
visva:
the
all things, universe, 58, 58 n.
visvarupa: that which makes the whole universe manifest, the sun as an aspect or form
of Vaiśvānara, 71, 71 n., 80, 80 n.
Visvamitra: a famous sage,
158.
Vishnu all-pervading God,
22, 30, 119, 151 n., 198- 212 passim, 388.

vinä a stringed musical instrument, 272 m. 459 Vrittikara: Bodhāyana, the author of a Vritti or commentary on the Ved. St., 8 n., 12, 96, 166, 166 n. Veda (s): the sacred books of the Hindus, passim. Vedanta: the concluding or philosophical part of the Vedas, passim; -in: a follower of the Vedanta, passim. Vaiseshikas: followers of a system of philosophy founded by Kanāda and noted for its category of visesha or particularity, 329, 331, 337-97 passim, 398 n. Vaisvanara: the sun-god, 66, 75; the element fire, 66, 75; the digestive heat of the stomach, 66, 72-3; the Supreme Self, 66-81 passim, 296 n. Vaisvānaradhikaraṇa: the sixth and last section of the Ved. Sut. (I. 3), where the Vaiśvānara, whose worship is taught in a scriptural passage, is shown to be the Brahman, 65. vyakta lit. the manifest, the evolved prakriti or the evolutes, 207 n., 213, 215 n., 223, 229 n. vyapadesat: because of the teaching, 191 n., 192. vyashti: particular, 214 n. vyashti sṛishti: the crea- tion of individuals, 398 n. 460 SRI-BHASHYA Vyasa a famous sage, who is said to have edited the Vedas, written the Maha- bharata, the Puranas etc., 367 n. Sankara: the great teacher of the advaita school of Vedānta, passim. sabda: an expression of the Vedas, 146 n. sarira: body, 13, 197 n., 204 n. Sakya the Buddha who belonged to the Sakya clan, 329 n. Sandilya a sage in the Chhand. Up., 5 n. sanach: the krit affix, ‘ana’, or ‘amana’, used in form- ing present participles from verbs in ätmane- pada, 218 n. sariraḥ the embodied self, 49 n. sarirascha: and also the embodied seif, 49 n. sastras: works of religious authority (see Note 140, Vol. I), 57, 147, 167, 183, 346. Sibi: the father of Satya kāma in Pr. Up., 115 n. sishtaparigrahaḥ: (i) those (views) which are not accepted by disciplined exemplars, (ii) other un- acceptable (views), 331 n. Sishtaparigrahadhikaraṇa: the fourth section of Ved. Sut. (II. 1) where the reasoning against the Sankhyas is shown to apply also to other systems, 330. Suka: a celebrated sage, 359 n., 367, 367 n. Such to grieve, 170. Sidra: a member of the fourth caste, 167-84 passim. Saukeya: a disciple of Uddalaka Aruni in Sat. Br., 177. Saunaka: a famous sage in the Mund. Up., 56; the same or a different sage in the Tand. Br., 176. śrutat duraḥ: he who is far from the Vedas, 170 n. the Sruti (s): revealed Vedas, scriptural texts, passim. Sloka stanza, 119, 208. Svetachchhat rena: by means of a white urabrella as a distinguishing mark, 98 n: -rājānum adrakshit: he identified (lit. saw) the king by means of a white umbrella, 98 n. Svetadvipa: “the White Island” one of the the special abodes of Näräyapa, 282 n., 378. Svetasvataras: followers of a recension the Yajur- veda, 215. GLOSSARIAL INDEX Shasti-tatpurusha: a tat- purusha compound of which the first member is in the sixth (or genitive) case, 129. Sah: he, 40 n., 49, 123 n., 240. all-absorber, samvarga: 175 n. Samvarga-vidya: worship of the Brahman as the All-absorber, 168 n., 170, 174-5. samyadvama: one in whom all desirable things gather together, 32, 34, 38-9. samsara: the recurring cycle of birth and death (see note 3 in Vol. I), passim. sankalpa: will, 263 n. Sankhyopasangrahādhi- karana: the 3rd section of Ved. Sut. (I. 4), where the alleged acceptance, by a scriptural passage, of the number of principles according to the Sankhya is discussed, 228. 387, Sat: the individual self, 47, 139 n., 239, 291, 293, 296 n., 382; the Brahman, 128, 253, 382 n., 387 n., 409; primordial matter, 236-7; Pure Existence, 390. sa te antaryāmyamṛitah: he is your Inner Ruler immortal, 46. sa te ātmā: Self, 49. 461 He is your sat-karya-vāda: the theory that the effect is existent in the cause, 317 n. sattva-guna: a quality of prakriti, passim. satya: the collection of all embodied souls, 58; etymologically the con- troller of individual selves and matter, and thus the Brahman, 139; the Brahman, 95-101 passim, 125 n., 129 n., 127 n; a higher world, 150 n. Satyakāma: a disciple of Pippalada in the Pr. Up, 115, 115 n., 119: a student of Gautama in the Chhand. Up., 177 n: the Brahman, 125 n. Satyākāma Jabala: the teacher of Upakosala and identical with the student of Gautama, 31 n., 38. satyena: (1) by or with truth: (11) specially characterised by (the worship of) Truth, 98-9. sadayatanah: those who have their abode in the Sat, 383 n. Sanatkumara: one of the four sons of Brahma the creator, 91 n., 92, 99. sandeha: the trunk of the body, 71. sandhi: union, 210 n. sannyasins: ascetics, 193. sapta(n): seven, 232.462 SRI-BHASHYA saptarshayaḥ: members of the group of seven rishis or sages, who are Marichi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Kratu and Vasishta, and who constitute the cons- tellation known as the Great Bear, 232. samashţi: general, as opposed to particular, 214 n. samashti-purusha : Sarvavyäkhyānā dhikara the last and eighth section of Ved. Sut. (I. 4) where all passages about the cause of the world are asked to be regarded as explained by principles already laid down, 296. sarvā ha vai devatāḥ: deed all the deities, 315 n. in- sāksḥātkāra: seeing, direct realisation, 96 n. the Sānkhya : a aggregate of individual selves, 54-5. sam(n)jňa: lit. knowledge, here a delusion, 273 n. samprasāda: the individual self (see Note 501), 90, 95, 95 n., 133 n., 135, 139, 139 n. sayuktvan, -gv: one who has a cart, one of excellent qualities, 171, 171 n. sarvajňa: all-knower, 389n. sarvata eva atsyanti: On all sides, they will eat my food, 174 n. sarvata evam……atsyanti : On all sides they eat of his food of this kind, 174 n. Sarvatraprasiddhyadhi- karana: the first section of Ved. Sut. (1. 2), where a scriptural passage is shown to deal with the Brahman because He is taught prominently ‘in all this’, 4. sarvasya adhipatih : the lord of all, 193 n. of system philosophy, expounded by Kapila, a follower of the system, passim. sättvika characterised by the quality of sattva, 201 n., 205 n. Sadhyas: a kind of gods, 163 n. sāman: a sacred text to be chanted, a verse of the Sama-Veda, 115, 119. Sama-Veda: the third of the four Vedas, 224. sālakshanya : similarity, being of the same species, 317 n. …… sāvakāśa baliyan: Be- tween that which has scope and that which has no scope, that which has no scope is the stronger, 302 n. siddhanta: settled conclu- sion, 146 n. su: an affix, 202. sutala: 150 n. a nether world, GLOSSARIAL INDEX sutejah, -as : brilliant, the 79, 80 n. beautifully heaven, 70, of Sureśvara: a disciple Sankara who wrote many philosophieal works, 180 n., 350 n. sushupti: dreamless sleep, 95 n. sukta hymn, 158. sutra: aphorism, passim. Sūtrakāra: the author of aphorisms, i.e., the Ved. Sūt., passim. sṬijamāna: 218n, 219 n. producing, Soma: a Vedic god, 154 n., 387; the prāṇa, 252 n. Saubhari: a sage who multiplied himself into fifty persons, 155, 155 n., 366, 366 n. sthāna: abode, existence, 33 n. sthiti: existence, 33 n. smaryamāṇam: tioned in the (i) men- Smritis, (ii) remembered, re- cognized, 69 n. Smriti: a metrical law book, a religious work of authority other than the Veda, the Bhagavadgitā, passim. sva: one’s own, 270. 463 Svachchhandavṛitti: mov- ing or functioning accord- ing to desire, 144 n. svar: a higher world, 150 n. Svarga: the celestial world of enjoyments, 59, 119, 152: the world of final release, 209. svastika: a gold ornament of the shape of a Greek cross with the four arms bent in the same direction, 344, 344 n., 365. Hara: the individual self regarded as the abductor of prakriti, 215, 216 n. hastighna: a mahout, 389 n. hastin: an elephant. hāra a necklace, particul- arly of pearls, 172 n. hāretvā: See 172 n. hitas: some veins near the heart, 244, 254 n. Hiranyakasipu: an Asura emperor, for killing whom God incarnated as ‘Narasimha ’ or the ‘Man-lion,’ 367 n. hiranmaya: gold, 16. ERRATA The more important printing mistakes are noted below: Read Page Line For 8 8 Let Him Let him 21 15 movable movable and (world) immovable (world). 22 10 (that whole) (the whole) 30 34 37 10 68 3 75 10, Col. 2 Sutra 29 99 VIII. 16. 1) 115 11 139 13 VIII. 12. 2) (Kath. Up. (II. 9) (Kath. Up. III. 9) mushmimcsha (Chhand.Up.II.5) (Chhand.Up. V. II. 5) VII. 16. 1). for Ikshatikarmavyapadesat, read Ikshatikarma vyapadesat. VIII. 3. 4). mushmimscha Sutra 27 145 4, Col. 2 VI. 7 VI. 17. 159 14, Col. 1 By those By means of those 162 11 Nara Nāra 165 21 thought taught 166 19 IV. 14. 1). IV. 4. 16). 170 30 dha da 175 23 is declared is not declared 193 11 form from 195 3 197 24 200 4 205 206 208 218 225 232 270 308 321 24 30 17 NOMJONEMAKÕJAğer 10 23 24 12 aja 17 pañchajani Anumanadhikarana Ānumānikadhikaraṇa the self, the body, the self, among the body, add “And He Himself is the supreme object of attainment”. intellect (B.G. VII. 4-6) (B.G. VII. 4-7). (Kath.Up. III.10) (Kath. Up. III 15). the individual more to the individual mere ajā pañchajanyah mahat 33 thy self 20 by Him the self by him 26 (Kath. Up. II. 2) (Kath. Up. H. 22) 329 1, Col. I 377 72 397 419. 37 1, Col. 1 7 7, Col. 2 Ulukya ā-rambh By knowing one vācha the one and dutpadyate utpadyate Aulukya ä-rabh vāchā By one one and the dupapadyate upapadyate