रामानुजीये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

AVATARA ONE PRATYAKŞA

Srinivasa, the presiding deity of Tirupati (Chittoor Dis- trict, Madras Presidency).
A hillock on which the shrine of Sri Devaraja is situated in modern Kañcipuram.
Modern Sholinghur (North Arcot District, Madras Presidency).

4 & 6. Srl Rāmānujācārya.
It is quite probable that Krsna is identical with Sri Yamuna- cārya, the grand spiritual preceptor of Śrī Rāmānuja.
Śri Venkaṭanatha (or Vedantadesika), a great philosopher, poet, leader and expounder of Visiṣṭadvaita who was born in 1269 A.D. at Tuppil near Kañcipuram.
Sri Mahācārya alias Dodḍayyacarya, the preceptor of Srinivasa, the author of the present book.
Śri is Lakṣmi. Śri and Nārāyaṇa are inseparably united; this dual form of the Godhead constitutes the highest Brahman, the Father-Mother principle of the universe. The mutual relation of Srt and Nārāyaua, in the language of the Pañcaratras, is one of avinābhava like that of dharma and dharmin, ahanta and aham, light and luminosity, sun and sunshine, etc. Though they are regarded as distinct, there is no difference in their functions or tastes. The so-called dualism is kept up for cosmic functions and redemption of the jivas. As Srivatsankamiśra puts it in his Sristava even Bhagavan is guided by Sri in His cosmic functions as well as redemptive acts. If Nārāyaṇa represents the principle of justice, as the Father of the universe, Laksmi, as the Mother of all, is the embodiment of days or kṛpa. She mediates on behalf of the bound jiva and bestows upon him salvation.
According to Visiṣṭadvaita liberation is not identity with Brahman. When the mukta gives up his physical body, he reaches Vaikuntha, the spiritual realm made of bliss itself. In this noumenal

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realm he is lost in the bliss of Brahman, experiencing sälokya, samipya, sarūpya and sayujya.
The composer of the Vedantasūtras.
The famous Vṛttikara of Purva-and uttara-mīmāṁ să- sutras, known also us Upavarṣa and Krtakoți.
Known also as Tankācārya. He wrote ‘Vakya’ on Chandogyopanisad.
Dramiḍācārya wrote his famous commentary on the ‘Vakya’ of Tanka.
The famous Nammalvar also known as Saṭhakopa.
Näthamuni was the first acarya among the Visiṣṭad- vaitins.
Yāmunācārya, the grand spiritual preceptor of Sri Rama- nuja, was the grandson of Nathamuni.
Śrī Rāmānuja.
The preceptor of Srinivasa.
One of the most important doctrines of Visiṣṭādvaita is that Brahman is the saririn while cit and acit form the sarira. And for this reason Vedanta is known as Sarirakaśāstra. This manual which discourses in technical phraseology on the inner relation betweer. Brahman and the world of cit and acit is called Sārīra- kaparibhāṣā or the philosophy of pan-organismalmonism.
Literally it means ‘The Light of the System of Yatipati or Rāmānuja’.
The Carvākas accept only one pramaṇa, viz., perception: the Bauddhas and Vaiseṣikas accept two pramaņas, viz., percep- tion and inference: the Sankhyas accept three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony: the Naiyayikas accept four, viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony: the Prabhakaras accept five, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and postulation: the Bhaṭṭas and the Advaitins accept six, viz., the five above pramāņas and non-cognition: the Paurānikas accept eight pramaņas, viz., the above six pramāņas and sambhava and aitthya: the Visiṣṭadvaitins like the Sankhyas accept only three pramaņas, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. Later on it will be shown under appropriate heads why srmit, pratyabhijña, anupalabdhi, üha and samsaya are brought under pratyakṣa, and upamana and arthapatti under anumana.NOTES AND REFERENCES

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According to Vedanta cosmology, the acit differentiates itself into the successive forms of the twenty-four categories of prakṛti, mahat, ahankara, the eleven indriyas, the five tanmatras and the five bhūtas. Thus the evolutionary process of sadvidya teaches the non-difference between Brahman and the universe.
Past, present and future.
Seeker of sense-pleasures here or hereafter.
The neophyte who desires to get rid of all the bondages of mind and matter.
Near Trichinopoly in Madras Presidency.
Tirupati.

alte Ant
A small hillock in Kañcipuram.
Modern Sholinghur.
It is difficult to bring out the full import of the word *vyavahara’. It is not mere conduct or behaviour. Vyavahāra stands for the test of practical needs of life in their proper perspec- tive. Prof. M. Hiriyanna has translated vyavahārānuguna as *adapted to practical interests of life’. Knowledge is true not only when it agrees with outside reality, but also when it satisfies the practical interests of life. Truth is that which is both experienti- ally and experimentally verified.
To cognize a nacre as a piece of silver.
E.g., the definition ’that is a cow which possesses horns’ applies to buffaloes also which are not intended to be defined.
Previously it was stated that instrument (karana) of valid knowledge is pramaņa. Here the meaning of karana is explained.
A section of the Advaitins themselves do not accept the view of valid knowledge as consisting in having for its content a thing that is not already known (anadhigata).
If wrong knowledge is generated owing to defective sense organ, it cannot be defined as ’that knowledge which is adapted to practical interests of life as they really are’. And consequently owing to the absence of proper instrument of prama, the evidence becomes invalid.
What was indefinite and devoid of specific judgement in the nirvikalpaka perception becomes definite and determinate in the savikalpaka perception. In Advaita epistemology the savi- kalpaka apprehends relatedness whereas the nirvikalpaka does not

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apprehend any relation (samsarga). If the latter is absolutely non- relational there arises some difficulty in determining its percepti- bility. Hence in Visiṣṭadvaita the nirvikalpaka is called ‘prathama- pindagrahana’ or the cognition of the individual for the first time in which the generic character of the object alone is apprehended. The second is called ‘dvitiyapindagrahana’ or the cognition of the individual for the second time in which what was already known becomes explicit. It may be noted that both perceptions are saviseṣa not nirviseṣa.

PATOME
A substance comes into contact with visual sense along with its colour which is connected with the jar through the relation of asrayana’. This sense-relation which causes perceptual know- ledge is known in Visiṣṭadvaita as ‘samyuktasrayanasambandha’.
According to Naiyayikas ‘samavaya’ or inherence is one of the causes that brings about perceptive cognition.
Here Visiṣṭadvaita follows the Nyaya theory of smrti. According to Annambhaṭṭa, smrti is the knowledge which is caused only by the samskära. A samskara is nothing but a reminiscent impression derived from a prior experience. When such an ‘impres- sion’ dependent on a prior experience becomes the cause of memory, it cannot claim to be a separate way of knowing.
The famous shrine of Sri Ranganatha is situated in Srirangam.
According to Bhaṭṭas and Advaitins, pratyabhijñā is a cognitive complex consisting of pratyakṣa and smrti. But the Naiyayikas would account for it by including in pratyakṣa of a parti- cular type without recognizing any such parts. The Visiṣṭadvaitin, to keep up consistency, would have to bring pratyabhijñā under pratyakṣa, as smrti itself is included in pratyakṣa. For pratyabhijñā is nothing but perceptual experience arising through the contact of the sense organ with some object.
1. This is a vexed question among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Advaitins along with the Bhaṭṭas accept abhava as the sixth pramaņa. The Naiyayikas do not admit it as a distinct pramana, though they hold it as a distinct category. The Visiṣṭadvaitins along with the Prabhakaras refute the theory that abhava is a distinct category, and equate it with the ‘mere floor’ (or kevaladhikarana) in the absence of a jar on the floor.
  
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Cf. Sribhāṣya (I, i, 1): “Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real; for śruti and smrti alike teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else’. In the scriptural account of evolution it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite. For instance, the red colour in fire comes from the primal fire, white colour from water and the black colour from earth. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vedanta theory of pañcikarana says that all things are composed of all the five ele- ments in varying degrees. But the thinghood of every object is largely shaped by the preponderant element. We find some simi- larity between nacre and silver owing to intermixture of common component parts. In the nacre-silver illusion, owing to ocular defect, the percipient picks up a nacre mistaking it for silver though the silver-content is insignificant. When the percipient’s vision is free from any defect, he apprehends the nacre-content, and there is no illusion for him. Hence the cognition of silver in nacre is true though the silver-content has no economic value. Likewise when one cognition is being sublated by another, the disillusion- ment is explained on the basis of preponderant element in its constitution. So whenever we apprehend the preponderant element of an object, the cognition becomes more true, the fragmentary perception becomes less true. There is no illusion in the Visiṣṭā- dvaita epistemology in its literal sense.
There are five theories of illusion: atmakhyāti, asatkhyāti, akhyāti, anyathākhyāti and anirvacaniyakhyāti. These theories of bhrama are accepted by Yogacaras, Madhyamikas, Prabhakaras, Naiyayikas and Advaitins respectively.

The Vijñānavada school of Buddhism, otherwise known as the Yogacara school, explains bhrama as subsisting in the ‘atman’ (consciousness) which externalizes itself in the form of objects like silver in the silver-nacre illusion. This theory of error is called atmakhyāti. Visistadvaita refutes the theory of atmakhyāti in which, cognition arising without a corresponding object produces silver and makes it its object; for this khyāti fails to explain not only the production of the effect, but also contradicts an admitted principle according to which there are four causes that bring out a cognition: they are the adhipati-cause, the sahakari-cause, the

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alambana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. According to Yoga- caras, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any perma- nency. On the basis of this principle it is difficult to prove that the form of subsequent cognition is due to the action of the previous cognition independent of external object. For, it cannot be main- tained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of red colour, there arises immediately the cognition of another colour. There- fore the conclusion is that the manifoldness of cognitions is due only to the manifoldness of objects.

The Sunyavādins explain bhrama as consisting in the cognition of asat (non-being). In the case of a wrong cognition ’this is silver”, which arises in the absence of silver, the object of cognition is ‘asat’. On the basis of such experience, even asat becomes compe- tent as an object of cognition. This theory of error is known as asatkhyāti.

Visiṣṭadvaita strongly repudiates the theory of the Madhya- mikas who state that there is nothing save a universal void. If it is stated that ‘Nothing is the only Reality’, the Vedantasūtrà replies, ‘And on account of its being unproved in everyway’ (II, ii, 30). If these nihilists are asked whether they hold that everything is existence, or non-existence, or anything else, they cannot establish nothingness on any of these views; for, the ideas of existence and non-existence have reference only to particular states of really existing things. Hence any theory of nothingness would imply the acceptance of the reality of things. Moreover, if one wants to establish the doctrine of sunya, he must attempt it only with the help of some means of knowledge, the reality of which he must admit. On the contrary, if he does not acknowledge the validity of the means of knowledge, everything becomes real. The con- clusion is that asat cannot be established in any way.

The Prabhakaras accept the reality of two cognitions, the per- ceived nacre as ’this’ (idam) and the recollection of silver seen elsewhere. At the time of cognition, the percipient is unable to identify the recollection of silver as recollection since he merely apprehends it as cognition. The object of recollection, silver, enters into his consciousness, divested of its association with a particular place or time. In other words, when two cognitions of silver and nacre arise, the percipient misses their difference

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owing to his non-discrimination consequent on the visual defect. So there arises pravṛtti (volition) on his part to pick up the so-called silver. When he finds that there is no silver at all, the disillusion- ment comes with the conviction that his activity was in vain. Even this theory is imperfect as it cannot adequately account for the mental decision on the part of the percipient to pick up silver when there is no silver at all. Nor is mere non-discrimination between the recollection of silver and the present perception sufficient to induce pravṛtti leading to activity.

The Nyaya theory of bhrama is known as anyahākhyāti. According to this khyati when one thing, nacre, is wrongly per- ceived as silver the erroneous cognition takes the form ’this is silver’. Here ’this’ stands for nacre which is not perceived as nacre owing to some ocular defect. This visual perception of nacre as ’this’ arises in the usual way by the contact of the sense with the object. Only the silverness which is the property of some silver existing elsewhere is presented to the perception as belonging to nacre as ’this’. But how could there be a perception of silver when there is no sense-relation between the silver and the sense of sight? So, to get over this difficulty the Naiyayikas hold that the real silver is connected with the sense of sight through a super-normal type of sense-relation (alaukika-sannikarsa). Though the Naiyayika contends that sat alone is being presented to the consciousness, he confounds the theory by trying to bring an absent reality within the range of the sense through supernormal relation; otherwise he cannot explain how bhrama consists in wrongly perceiving the nacre as silver which is elsewhere.

The Advaita theory of anirvacaniyakhyāti holds that bhrama is neither real nor unreal, nor both, and is therefore inexplicable. According to Advaita (vide Vedantaparibhāṣā) the silver-nacre illusion takes place in the following manner: When the defective sight of a person comes in contact with an object (nacre), a vṛtti of the internal-organ which has the form of ’this’ and the form of brightness arises; and in that vṛtti, Caitanya limited by ’this’ is reflected. Then owing to out-going vrtti, the Caitanya limited by ’this’, the Caitanya limited by the vṛtti and cognizer-consciousness become one. Then avidya, which is present in vişayacaitanya identical with pramatṛcaitanya, which has nacreness for its mode,

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and helped by the samskara of silver, kindled up by the similarity between the object seen as ’this’ and silver, transforms itself into an object with the appearance of silver and into an apparent cogni- tion of silver. In this state of false superimposition the experience is real as long as the cognition lasts, and then becomes unreal when true knowledge dawns.

Of all the theories of bhrama, none has been subjected by Sri Ramanuja to such a thorough examination as the theory of avidya. This classical refutation is known as ‘saptavidha-anupa- patti’, viz., asrayanupatti, tirodhananupapatti, svarupānupapatti, anirvacaniyatvanupapatti, pramānānupapatti, nivartakanupapatti and nivṛttyanupapatti. In explaining the anirvacaniyatvanupapatti, it is asked: what is meant by the anirvacaniyata of avidya. If anirvacaniyatva is defined as the difference of avidya from sat and asat, it would be actually inexplicable, since no means of knowledge can enable us to understand it. In our experience we find that the whole host of objects is arranged according to our states of consciousness (pratiti), and each state of consciousness presents itself in the form of sat or asat. If, therefore, we have to assume that of states of consciousness, which are in the form of sat or asat, the object is neither sat nor asat, then anything might be the object of any state of consciousness.
A piece of nacre cannot serve the purpose of silver. 47. The knowledge of silver in nacre.
“There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then He creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss; then He creates delights, joys and bliss. There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then He creates tanks, lakes and rivers. For he is the Maker’ (Br. Up., IV, iii, 10).
When the dreaming person wakes up, all the dream- perceptions vanish.
Only the dreaming person perceives chariots etc., and

not others.
The eyes become yellow owing to certain diseases like jaundice. This is called ‘pitta’ supposed to be caused by excess of bile.
For, the colour of the crystal is overpowered by the brilliant red of the China-rose.

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Water always exists in conjunction with light and earth; but owing to the ocular defect of the percipient and the adṛṣṭa, the light and earth are not cognized, while the water is alone cognized.
As a matter of fact, the direction is one. By a sort of artificial division, the direction is divided into east, west, south, north, etc. A village which is to the east of one is to the west of another.
According to the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika realists, dik is a distinct substance. Later on it will be stated in the fourth avatara that dik need not be admitted as a distinct category inasmuch as it is derivable from the connection of the apparent motion of the sun with the sky.
This is analogous to the cognition of a real wheel; but in the case of a real wheel no intervals are cognized as there are none, while in the case of a firebrand none are cognized owing to the rapidity of the movement.
Similar reflecting, surfaces.
One samagri cognizes the moon in her real place. The other samagri moving somewhat obliquely cognizes at first a spot near the moon, and then the moon herself who appears a little removed from her original position. Although there is only one moon qualified by connection with two spots simultaneously, the affection of the eye gives rise to difference in the samagri, which in turn to a double apprehension, and the latter again to the double- ness of the moon.
It is not possible to apprehend any object devoid of all difference; for instance, a cow devoid of attributes and configura- tion. It has been already stated that even the non-determinate perception apprehends only objects marked with difference.

All states of consciousness have for their object some- thing that is qualified by difference as appears in the case of judge- ment like ’this is a jar’. When a jar is apprehended, it is so appre- hended as different from all other objects such as book, table, etc. Difference there means nothing but jarness. But in the perception ’this is a jar’, it is comprehended not as difference but as jarness alone. When it is to be comprehended as difference, it requires a counter-entity; and so comprehended it is responsible for the saying ‘jar is different from cloth’.

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Visiṣṭādvaita does not admit these two faults; for the only objects of perception are those that are qualified by generic character etc., which, as relative things, give rise to the judgement revealing the difference between themselves and the things in which they inhere. Moreover, as soon as a perceptive cognition takes place, we at once apprehend on the one hand, the generic character which is the basis of difference from everything else, and on the other, the essential nature of the thing itself. Just as con- sciousness manifests itself as well as the object known, the difference also reveals itself as well as the things which differ.
Ten persons crossed a river. One amongst them, desiring to know whether all of them had reached the other shore safely, counted all from one to nine except himself. All of them were in a great fix as the tenth person could not be traced. A Nestor came to their rescue and counted them all from one to nine and declared the tenth person as ’thou art the tenth’.
Dharma is not an object of perceptive cognition. 64. This is the Advaita theory of perceptual cognition. 65. Tatra nisprakarakam jñānam nirvikalpakam. (Tarka- sangraha).
Akṣapada Gautama, the author of the Nyayasutras. 67. Otherwise known as Ulūka and Kasyapa, the composer of the Vaisesikasutras.
The celebrated Sanskrit grammarian who is said to have obtained his knowledge of grammar from Lord Siva himself.
Cf. the atomic theory of the Vaiseṣikas refuted in the fourth avatara.
If Indra and other gods are corporeal, they must be non- eternal also. Consequently the vedic words denoting the vedic deities also become non-eternal. Secondly, from the Scripture we understand that many mantras have ‘makers’; for instance, ‘Reverence to the rsis who are the makers of the mantras”, “That is Agni; this is a hymn of Visvamitra’, etc. From all this it may be assumed that the Vedas have personal origin only. This view is refuted by Visiṣṭadvaita. For, vedic words such as Indra and others, unlike the word Devadatta which denotes a particular individual, denote by their own power particular species of beings. like the word ‘cow’ which denotes particular species of animals,

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Therefore, when an individual belonging to Indra-class has perished, the Creator, on the basis of the vedic word ‘Indra’ which is being presented to his mind creates another Indra possessing the same attributes. Hence Vedas cannot be non-eternal owing to corpo- reality of the gods.

Now, as regards the authorship of the Vedas; the creation of Vasistha and other rṣis, who denote classes is preceded by their being presented to Prajapati’s mind through those words; then He creates them endowed with the very same characteristics and appoints them to ‘see’ the very same ‘kaņdas’ and ‘mantras’. These ṛsis, being endowed thus, undergo the proper discipline and finally ‘see’ the mantras in their very sounds and accents, declared by the Vasisthas and other rṣis of former aeons. The vedic mantras have a personal origin only in such a relative sense.
The Infinite Being beyond all contact with the sense is not an object of perception or inference. In the first place, percep- tion being based either on the sense organs or on yogic powers is incapable of apprehending that which transcends all relations. Nor does Brahman fall within the sphere of inference either of the kind which proceeds from the visesa or of the kind based on samanya. The former one is inadmissible, for such inference is not related to anything beyond the range of the senses. Nor is it of the latter kind, since we do not see any linga that is invariably connected with a Supreme Self who is capable of creating the universe. A persistent ratiocination still cannot show us a way to infer the Supreme Self. The teleological and cosmological arguments cannot prove Him as the world-architect or the first cause that exists per se. There is no proof to show that the earth, mountains and oceans though created, were emanated from one Creator. Nor could it be proved that all the effected things have a homogeneous character like a jar, because we see many effects are qualified by the difference of time of production etc. Nor by inference can any one maintain that the highest Self with infinite power alone can create; for even individual beings by means of extraordinary power acquired by religious merit can create. Hence Scripture is the only means for knowing Brahman, the highest Reality.
According to Visiṣṭadvaita the jiva is atomic in size. Cf. eighth avatara.

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Cf. fourth avatara where the categories are refuted.

Cf. second avatara.

Cf. last avatara.

H

Apm

AVATARA TWO

ANUMANA
What is necessary is that the vyapaka must be more extensive than the vyapya. When one knows that smoke is pervaded by fire, he obtains the knowledge of the vyapaka, namely, fire. For, there may be fire without smoke as in the case of a red-hot iron ball, but where there is smoke, fire is invariably present. Thus when the vyapya is first ascertained, then the knowledge of the vyāpaka is also obtained.
It is interesting to note that Srinivasa describes vyapti as an invariable relation not due to connection with any adventitious circumstance, i.e., that it is nirupadhika and not aupadhika. For instance, that smoke is pervaded by fire is an unconditioned relation not brought about by any adventitious circumstance. Per contra, in the proposition, ‘Fire is pervaded by smoke’, vyapti is not an unconditioned relation, since it depends upon the adventitious contact of wat fuel with fire. Here our author follows the earlier writers on Nyaya who define vyapti as anupadhikaḥ sambandhaḥ. See Primer of Indian Logic, pp. 262-63.
Some Naiyayikas criticize the view that the relation of vyāpti is known through repeated observation (bhūyodarśana). According to Dharmaraja, a great thinker of the Advaita school, vyapti is ascertained by the perception of concomitance (sahacara darsana) when there is no cognition of inconstancy. Since what is determinative is sahacaradarsana, it matters little whether the perception is a single one or repeated. This view may be thus examined: All admit that the cognition of vyapti is obtained in experience. A single experience cannot establish the universal pervasion, as one is not sure of the non-existence of the opposite. Granting that a genuine exception stultifies all the previous ex- periences, how is one to know whether the so-called exception isNOTES AND REFERENCES

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genuine or apparent? Hence to make sure that a certain type of relation is actually vyapti, or the contrary experience is a genuine one, one has to eliminate all dubitative conditions by repeated observation. Hence the need for bhūyodarśana.
In the proposition, ‘The mountain has smoke, because it has fire’, contact with wet fuel is the upadhi. The upadhi is perva- sive of the probandum, as contact with wet fuel is found wherever there is smoke. But contact with wet fuel is not found in every place where there is fire: for instance, a red-hot iron ball: hence the upadhi is non-pervasive of the probans.

Pāpārabdha pervades only ’the cause of sorrow’ which is the probandum, and not ‘service’ which is the probans, since every kind of service is not produced by sin.

All the three words imply probans, reason or mark.
Pakṣadharmată consists in the presence of the invariable concomitant in the subject like a mountain.
Dharmin is, that in which certain attributes are conceived as inhering.
Pakṣa is that in which the presence of the probandum is doubted, and is yet to be established; as a mountain, when smoke is taken as the probans.
Sapakṣa is that in which the probandum is known for certain.
Vipakṣa is that in which the absence of the probandum is known for certain.
Badhita is that which is advanced to establish a pro- bandum whose absence is proved by another powerful instrument of knowledge. In the syllogism, ‘Lake has fire’, the probandum ‘has fire’ is sublated by its opposite ‘has no fire’ by the existence of water there.
In satpratipaksa the probans admits of being neutralized by another counter-probans which may be advanced to prove the non-existence of the probandum. For instance, in the proposition, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible like sound-ness’, the counter- probans is ‘karyatva’ as in the proposition, ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect like a jar’. In an instance like this two counter- probans neutralize each other and prevent the inference. absence of such counter-probans is asatpratipaksa.

The

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The anvayavyatirekin probans has both positive and negative concomitance with the probandum. Vilant
The bare anvayin probans has positive concomitance alone. For instance, ‘Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar’. Here the negative pervasion is not possible as there is no counter-instance in which the non-existence of the probandum could be known for certain. Moreover, in this syllo- gism, negative pervasion cannot be predicated between word- expressibility and thingness as all things are expressible by words.
The kevalavyatirekin probans is that which has negative concomitance alone. For instance, ‘Earth is different from the rest, because it possesses smell; whatever is not different from the rest has no smell, as water; this earth is not so; therefore it is not without difference from the rest’. In a proposition like this there is no instance of positive co-presence in the form, ‘Whatever has smell is different from the rest’, since earth is only the pakṣa which possesses smell.
The Naiyayikas recognize three kinds of probans, viz., anvayavyatirekin, kevalanvayin and kevalavyatirekin. According to Advaitins this anumana is of the nature of anvayin alone. They along with the Mimamsakas bring the vyatirekin under a distinct pramana called arthapatti. It is interesting to note that our author recognizes kevalanvayin and anvayavyatirekin and altogether repudiates kevalavyatirekin.
It causes one’s own anumiti. A person may understand the relation of vyapti between smoke and fire from his repeated observation at kitchen and other places, and make out the generali- zation in the form, ‘Wherever there is smoke there is fire’.
A person after inferring fire from smoke for himself, uses this syllogism of five members in order to enable another person to have the same inferential cognition.
The Advaitins also along with the Mimamsakas maintain that either pratijña, heut and udaharana, or udaharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana are sufficient.
A follower of Sugata or Buddha. Philosophic Buddhism is divided into four schools: Madhyamika, Yogacara, Sauträntika and Vaibhasika.

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Srinivasa along with the Saugatas reduces the syllogism to two propositions viz., udaharaṇa and upanaya. Pervasion between fire and smoke and the presence of probans in the subject are sufficient to make out a valid inference. Since these two essential conditions are established by udaharaṇa and upanaya, the other propositions are considered to be superfluous.
Also known as savyabhicara. 24. Also called satpratipaksa.
This is the same as the badhita.
Here the probans visible’ is fallaciously assumed in the subject as visibility cannot be established in respect of jiva. 27. Here the ‘sky-lotus’ which is the locus of probans being fictitious, the probans ’lotus’ has no locus standi.
When a person repeatedly observes the pervasion between smoke and fire at kitchen and other places, it acts as a means to arrive at the generalization, ‘Wherever there is smoke there is fire’. In the giyen example the perceiver had no occasion to observe that the existents are momentary, and consequently he has not the help of such pramāna to grasp the pervasion.
In this syllogism, the prohibition of demeritorious actions is the upadhi. Since prohibition comes into force whenever demeri- torious actions are performed, it is pervasive of the probandum. But there is no prohibition in every place where slaying is done as in the case of immolation involved in kratu. Here the upadhi is non-pervasive of the probans.
Here ‘producibility’ does not establish the eternality of matter, but its contrary, the non-eternality; for whatever is pro- duced is non-eternal.
The Naiyayikas recognize a third kind of savyabhicara known as anupasaṁhärin (non-conclusive). Vide TS., the chapter on anumana.
In this instance, the reason ‘knowability’ is equally related to eternal as well as non-eternal things. Since all knowable things are not universally eternal, we cannot predicate eternality to sound, because it is knowable. As Annambhaṭṭa puts it: sadhārana is one which is present in a place where the probandum is absent, as in the syllogism, “The mountain has fire, because it is know- able’. Here knowability is found in a tank where fire is absent.

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The quality of earth is found in earth only which has smell as its attribute, and not anywhere, either in eternal objects or in non-eternal objects. Since we do not know whether earthness is per- vasive of eternal or non-eternal objects, the reason is doomed to fail. 34. When two opposite reasons counteract each other, they leave us in doubt without establishing any conclusion.
Mm. S. Kuppusvami Sastrin has translated ‘atidesa- vakya’ as assimilative proposition.
An animal of the bovine species.
Srinivasa refutes the view of upamana as a distinct means of knowledge. He analyses upamana into three discrete parts, each of which is subsumed under pratyakṣa, anumana and sabda. When a person who is ignorant of the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’ learns from a forester that ‘gavaya’ resembles cow, it is an example of knowledge derived from the sense of sentences. Secondly, when he goes to a forest and recollects the meaning of atidesavakya on seeing the figure qualified by cow-similarity, it is purely a perceptual cognition, since recollection is derived from samskara which again is caused by a prior experience. And finally, when the knowledge of the figure, qualified by cow-similarity, as ‘gavaya’ arises in him, it is evidently a cognition based on vyāpti in the form, ‘Cow resembles gavaya, because it is the counter- correlate of resemblance existing in a gavaya; when something is the counter-correlate of resemblance existing in another, the former resembles the latter: as the left hand, which is the counter-cor- relate of resemblance existing in the right hand, resembles the right hand’.dw
Visiṣṭādvaita along with Nyaya, Sankhya and other schools refuses to recognize arthapatti as a distinct means of know- ledge, since its purpose is served by inference: for instance, in the syllogism, ‘Devadatta eats at night, because he is fat without eating by day’, ’eating’ is the pervasive concomitant of ‘fatness’, since whenever fatness is seen, there must be eating also. As it is known that Devadatta is not eating by day, the inference is that he must be eating at night.
It is of three kinds: vakchala, samanyachala and upacara- chala (NS., I, ii, 52). It is called vakchala when a term is deliberately taken in a wrong sense. For instance, when someone says, ‘This

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boy is navakambala’ (possessing a new blanket), a quibbler objects, ‘He is not navakambala’ (possessed of nine blankets). Samanyachala consists in taking the individual for the whole class; for instance, when someone says, “This brahmana is learned’, another objects, “This brahmana is not learned, since many brahmanas are not learned’. Upacarachala consists in taking the meaning of an expres- sion literally while it was used metaphorically; for example, when a person says, “The scaffolds cry out’, a quibbler objects, ‘Scaffolds cannot cry out as they are inanimate objects’. Here the term ‘scaf- fold’ means the people standing on the scaffolds.
Jati is of twenty-four kinds. (NS., V, 1).

Junam

AVATARA THREE

SABDA
The importance of sabda as a distinct pramana cannot be minimized. Since Brahman does not fall within the province of pratyakṣa or anumana, sabda in its aspect of sruti alone can. claim the position of the authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman.
Errors arising from the defect of sense organs.

Brahma or Prajapati.

This is the position of the purvapakṣin (i.e., the follower of Purvamimamsa): The means of determining the power of words to express things is to watch the speech and actions of people. Speech and action always mean that certain things ought to be performed. No word, therefore, can have for its purpose an accom- plished thing inasmuch as it is the means of knowledge only with reference to things that ought to be performed. Hence vedic texts cannot claim to be a distinct means of knowledge of Brahman, as Brahman is an existing entity and not a thing to be effected. Moreover the Vedas teach that mere works have eternal results. (For instance, akṣayyam ha vai caturmasyayajinaḥ sukrtam bhavati). Hence an inquiry into Brahman is without any purpose when works works alone grant eternal results.

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Ato vedäntäḥ parinispannam parambrahma, tadupāsanam ca aparimitaphalam bodhayantiti tannirnayaphalo brahmavicāraḥ kartavyah. (Sribhāṣya: I, i, 1).
Even statements of facts such as ‘Your father is doing well’, and ‘This is not a snake but a rope’ evidently have some purpose; namely, such and such terms express such and such meanings. Hence it is baseless to maintain that words have mean- ing only with reference to things that ought to be done.
This is how a child learns the connection of words and meanings. The child, while observing that words give rise to ideas in its mind, finds out that the application of a particular word to a particular thing is based upon the expressive power of the word. Thus the theory that words and actions have implication only with reference to the things-that-ought-to-be-done is unjustified.
Abhicarakalpa is the name of a treatise on thaumaturgy regarded as a part of the Atharvaveda. If it could be demonstrated that certain mantras have power with reference to the things of the world, it may convince even an unbeliever to have faith in the efficiency of the mantras in relation to the attainment of heaven etc.

FOR

S
According to Vṛttikära Bodhayana ’this sariraka is connected with Jaimini’s work as contained in sixteen chapters; this establishes that the two Mimämsas constitute one science’. Just as each half of Purvamimämsäsütras consisting of six chapters is separate, and each chapter is separate, the Purva- and Uttara-mimām sās also are separate only in so far as the subject- matter treated in them differs. Hence the whole of the Mimāmsă- sastra beginning with the aphorism ‘Now therefore the inquiry into dharma’ and ending with the aphorism “There is no return on account of scriptural statement’ constitutes one body of doctrine owing to its continuous character of contents and order of succes- sion.
Rk is that mantra which is divided into padas each of which consists of a definite number of syllables: for instance, gayatri etc. Yajus is that mantra where there is no division into pādas and which is not set to music. When a mantra is set to music it is called saman. Atharva contains hymns, prayers and invocations either for the safety or destruction of beings.

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The definition of mantra is a vexed problem in vedic literature. According to Purvamimämsäsütras (II, i, 32), mantras are those texts which express mere assertion. The previous sūtra (II, i, 31) has already declared that the mantras are not injunctive. So Sabarasvamin comments ’that it is only while the sacrifice is being performed that the mantra functions; if it enjoined the act, its functioning would come before the commencement of the per- formance’ (Sabarabhāṣya, trs. pp. 200-201). But Laugakṣibhaskara defines that mantras are those which recall to memory objects connected with sacrificial performance (prayogasamavetartha- smarakā mantrāḥ).
Arthavada is a declamatory text containing either praise or blame. Though it does not convey any primary meaning of its own, it is connected with some text which is directly injunctive. When a declamatory text is construed with an injunctive text it serves the purpose of eulogising what is enjoined or blaming what is prohibited. For instance, the declamatory text ‘Vayu, verily, is the swiftest deity’ is connected with the injunctive text ‘He who is desirous of prosperity shall sacrifice a white animal to Vayu’. This text recommends the act of sacrifice by praising Vayu. And when a declamatory text says ‘He howled’, the statement is made with reference to the prohibitory passage ‘Silver shall not be given upon the sacrificial grass’. Thus condemnation is expressed of what is prohibited in the injunction. Again, arthavada is of three kinds. The first kind is called gunavada, when there is contradic- tion; as, ‘The sun is the sacrificial post’. The second is called anuvada, when repetition is made of an already established thing; as, ‘Fire is a remedy against cold’. The last kind is called bhūtārtha- vāda, when it is devoid of contradiction or accomplishment; as, ‘Purandara who bears the thunderbolt in his hand’.
Apurvavidhi is that injunction which establishes what is not established by any other means of knowledge. In the injunction ‘Desiring heaven one should sacrifice’, the attainment of heaven is not made known by any other evidence than this injunction. The sacrificer brings into existence a power called apurva which leads the performer to heaven by means of the sacrifice. Similarly water- sprinkling produces in the grain an apurva which is not otherwise possible.xfre

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Visistavidhi is but a form of apürvavidhi. The Chan- dogyopanisad (III, 14) states the attributes of Brahman as ‘He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light’ etc. ‘Made of mind’ means: Brahman can be cognized by a mind purified by meditation through the means of sadhanasaptaka such as viveka, vimoka, etc. alt
Parisankhyavidhi is that injunction which excludes one of the two alternatives simultaneously established. In the injunc- tion “This rope (the ancients) took up’ etc., there is not the purpose of establishing the seizing of the horse’s rope, since that is already established. But it is an injunction of exclusive specification pur- porting to exclude the holding of a donkey’s rope.
The classical definition of niyamavidhi is thus: ‘Restric- tive injunction is one which restricts the course of an action to one particular alternative (instrument) when several alternatives being possible any other of which, without the vidhi, would equally likely be resorted to’ (Arthasangraha, translated by D. V. Gokhale, p. 28). According to our author here the injunction restricts the conduct of the student who intends to approach the preceptor for knowledge. The śrutis and smṛtis direct the student to seek the teacher in a particular manner; for instance, Mundakopanisad (I, ii, 12) says, To know that, he, with sacrificial fuel-in hand, must approach a guru who is well versed in the Vedas and absolutely established in the realization of Brahman’.
Vide Purvamimämsäsütras, I, xiv, 17.
A Soma sacrifice typical of a whole class of some sacri- ficial ceremonies.
It may be noted here that Yajnavalkyasmṛti is divided into three chapters called ‘Acara’, ‘Vyavahara’ and ‘Prayaścitta’.
The original authorship of the Yogasastra is attributed to Hiranyagarbha, also known as Prajapati and Caturmukha. Patanjali and others are only later expounders.id
Sri Ramanuja says: ‘Hiranyagarbha himself is only an indi- vidual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior guņas, i.e., passion and darkness; and hence the Yogasmṛti is founded on error, no less than the Puranas promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga cannot therefore be used for the support of Vedanta.’ (S.B.E., Vol. XLVIII, p. 413.)

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179
The origin of Sankhya philosophy is attributed to Kapila. 23. Though Kapila is referred to as a model of consummate wisdom, he is not accepted entirely owing to his anti-vedic views such as holding pradhana to be the universal material cause etc., which run counter to the Vedanta doctrine of Brahman being the sole cause of the universe etc. Likewise is Yogakästra first pro- pounded by Hiranyagarbha. Yoga also admits pradhana to be the independent material cause and Iévara as a mere operative cause. Secondly, the Yoga conception of meditation is also of anti-vedic character, since the two objects of meditation, namely the indi- vidual self and Isvara are independent entities, the jiva not having its self in Brahman and Brahman not being the material cause of the world. The conclusion is that such views of Kapila and others which contradict the vedic doctrines of Manusmrti, Bhagavadgītā, Mahabharata and Visnupurana are rejected. But unlike the systems of Jina and Sugata, Yoga and Sankhya are not absolutely rejected, since certain points in all these doctrines are accepted. For instance, the Sankhyan conception of twenty-âve principles and the Yoga method of mental concentration are admitted.
Traditional history like the Rāmāyana and Mahaā- bharata.
Legendary stories.

26

Since Vedanta texts are concerned with Brahman lying beyond the range of pratyakṣa and other pramāņas, ordinary men with an imperfect knowledge of the Veda can hardly determine the meaning of Vedanta passages without the help of a smrti instituted by a competent and trustworthy person. But, while choosing the help of a smrti one must be very careful as many a smrti contains doctrines opposed to the Veda. Hence one should follow such smrti which does not contradict the Veda.
The most celebrated epic poem consisting of eighteen books. The authorship is attributed to Vyasa or Kṛṣṇadvaipayana. It gives the history of Bharata’s descendants along with numerous episodes which are small epics by themselves.
The Rāmāyaṇa is a favourite epic of the Hindus com- posed by the sage Valmiki. It contains about 24,000 verses in seven cantos and describes the ideal life of Sri Ramacandra, the hero of that epic.

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YATINDRAMATADĪPIKĀ
According to the Padmapuräna, the puranas are divided into three kinds. The divison is as follows: Visnu, Naradiya, Bhāgavata, Garuda, Padma and Varaha are called sattvika- puranas; Brahmaṇḍa, Brahmavaivarta, Märkandeya, Bhavisya, Vamana, and Brahma are called rajasa-puranas; while Matsya, Kurma, Linga, Śiva, Skanda and Agni come under the tamasa

class.
A purana treats of five topics as declared in the follow- ing verse:

Sargasca pratisargaśca vamśo manvantarani ca Vamsanucaritam caiva purāņam pañcalakṣaṇam.
The doctrines of Kāpālas, Kalāmukhas, Pasupatas, etc., have to be disregarded owing to their peculiar theory of Reality and strange practices not warranted by the Veda. They maintain the distinction of material and instrumental causes, and hold Pasu- pati to be the instrumental cause of the world. But if Pasupati is regarded as the highest Brahman constituting the Self of all, there will be no difficulty in adopting the essential doctrine of the Pasu- patas.
‘Mantra’ is found in the place of ‘divya’ in Sri Vedanta- desika’s Pañcarātrarakṣā.
The origin of Pañcaratragama is attributed to Śrīman Nārāyana Himself, who, animated by infinite love towards His devotees, taught the science to Narada, Sanḍilya and other great seers through Sanaka and others. According to some critics, the Pañcaratra doctrine is not authoritative since it admits the origi- nation of the jiva, which is opposed to śruti; for instance, from Vasudeva originates the jiva called Sankaraṣaṇa. Śrī Rāmānuja in his commentary on the Vedantasūtras (II, ii, 43) strongly controverts the theory of the origination of the individual self by profusely quoting from the Pañcarātrāgamas. Brahman, known as Vasudeva, abides Himself in a fourfold form (vyuha) with a view to enable His devotees to realize Him in a concrete manner. The identity of the Supreme Brahman with the fourfold form is declared. in the Satvatasamhita: “This is the supreme sastra, the great Brahmopanisad, which imparts true discrimination to BrahmaņasNOTES AND REFERENCES

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worshipping the real Brahman under the name of Vasudeva’ (S.B.E., XLVIII, part III, p. 525). The Pauskarasamhita also says, ‘That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self: that is the authoritative doctrine’ (Ibid.). What the agamas emphasize is that the Supreme Self voluntarily assumes the fourfold form of Vasudeva, Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha on account of his love towards devotees. But if it be asked why Sankarṣaṇa and others are identified with jiva etc., it is said in reply that since Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha preside over the jivas, internal organ and ego, they themselves are denoted by those names. As Sri Ramanuja puts it, the case is analogous to that of Brahman who is designated by terms such as ether, breath, etc. According to some, another objection is that Sandilya is supposed to have learnt the doctrine as he did not find any basis in the Veda for the highest realization. This is tantamount to saying that the Pañcarātra system is opposed to the Veda. To this objection Sri Ramanuja replies as follows: ‘When the Veda says, “morning after morning those speak untruth who make the agnihotra offering before sunrise”, it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise….Analogous to this is the case of Sandilya’s alleged objection to the Veda. That the Bhagavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the Paramasam- hita, “I have read the Vedas at length, together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to blessed- ness, whereby I might reach perfection”; and “The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness for those devoted to Him, extracted the essential meaning of all the Vedanta texts and condensed it in an easy form” (S.B.E., XLVIII, Part III, p. 527). Thus the Pañca- rātrāgamas are authoritative in toto, since Sriman Nārāyaṇa Him- self taught it with a view to enable His devotees to apprehend the meaning of the Veda.
The origin of Vaikhanasagama is traced to Brahma himself who expounded the Sastra to his four disciples Atri, Marici, Kasyapa and Bhṛgu.

182

etc.

YATINDRAMATADIPIKĀ
Code of jurisprudence, morals, social and religious laws,
Sixty-four kalas beginning with gita and ending with the knowledge of the science of magic.
The most celebrated Alvar-saint in the hierarchy of Śrivaisnavism, known also as Nammalvar, Saṭhakopa, etc.
Sri Ramanuja’s magnum opus, the immortal commentary on the Vedantasutras, which interprets the Sutras as Sarirakaśāstra in the literal sense of the term.
This means that an original composition of a person is pauruşeya.a
Expectancy (akankṣa), compatibility (yogyata) and proxi- mity (sannidhi) are the necessary factors for arriving at a judgement from a given proposition. Expectancy consists in completing the sense of a judgement by desiring a word. For instance, a single word like ‘cow’ is incapable of conveying complete sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility consists in the sense being not absurd; for example, ‘wet with fire’ is sublatable. Proxi- mity consists in the utterance of words without long intervals. If words like ‘meditate on God’ are uttered with undue delay, there would be absence of proximity which is necessary to convey the verbal cognition.
Abhidha is that which conveys the expressed meaning of a word to our intelligence.
The philological meaning of a word. So
Traditional or conventional meaning of a word.
By the word ‘adi’, yogarüḍhi is meant. Yogarūdhi is that which relates to both the philological and the conventional meaning of a word. For instance, ‘pankaja’ philologically means anything born or originated in mud; but in common parlance the meaning is restricted to ’lotus.
Sound or word proves difference since it possesses the capacity to denote only such things as are affected with difference. Sound has twofold operation, i.e., it operates through words and through sentences. Now, a word is formed from the combination of prakrti (radical element) and pratyaya (suffix). Since prakṛti and pratyaya have different meanings, the word also should neces- sarily convey a meaning affected with difference. And moreover,

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a sentence containing a plurality of words denoting plurality of meaning, is incapable of denoting an object without difference. Hence the aggregate of words, secular or vedic, denotes a thing affected with difference. of gallerim
The body of a sentient self is that which is absolutely controlled and supported by the ‘dweller in the body’ for his own ends. Similarly all sentient and non-sentient beings constitute the body of Isvara, because they are absolutely controlled and supported by Him for His own purpose.
Before grasping the true knowledge of Vedanta, the import of words would be incomplete since it was thought that the words denote only sentient beings and non-sentient objects. Hence after the dawn of true knowledge, namely, that Reality is the self of cit-acit body, the import of words becomes perfect inasmuch as one knows at this stage that every word denotes nothing except Brahman.

AVATARA FOUR

PRAKRTI

RE
Kanāda recognizes (vide Vaiseṣikasūtras, I, i, 4) six padar- thas-substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence. The Bhaṭṭas admit five padarthas-substance, generality, quality, activity and non-existence; whereas the Prabhakaras recognize eight-substance, quality, activity, generality, inherence, potency, similarity and number. The Sankhyas recognize only prakṛti and purusa; while the Advaitins admit two categories- atman and anatman. Some people think Visiṣṭādvaita admits three categories, namely, cit, acit and Isvara.tal out
The Nyaya-Vaiśeşika classification of activity into five kinds seems to be pleonastic, as motion which is caused by con- junction would include all forms of activity.
Visistadvaita does not recognize samanya or jāti as a distinct category. For instance, when we perceive a beast, no doubt, the perception takes the form “This is a beast’. But this generic character, uniform as it is to all beasts, is realized in the

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vyakti itself, and not apart from it. The manifestation of jāti in the vyakti has been possible only owing to the structural simi- larity called samsthana, and this samsthana is nothing but jāti. In this connection it is interesting to know what Sri Rāmānuja says on the subject: (That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not perceive anything, different from the structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form’ (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 45).
Samavaya or inherence is an intimate relation existing between whole and parts, substance and attributes, generic charac- ter and individuals etc. This intimate relation is inseparable as long as the connected substances do not cease to exist. Visiṣṭad- vaita refutes the view that samavaya is a distinct category. Sama- vaya is assumed in order to account for the inseparable and in- dissoluble relation subsisting between two things. Now a reason has to be found out why samavaya is such, and this requires some- thing else to establish it, and so on, ad infinitum. Moreover, it is unreasonable to assume any essential nature for samavaya which itself is an unknown entity.
Vide note No. 38 on samyuktāśrayana in the first

avatāra.
From vaikarika which is of sattva-nature, there arise the indriyas. The bhūtādi which is of tamas-nature produces tanmatras (subtle matter) which in their turn originate gross ele- ments. The taijasa is of the nature of activity, and helps the other two in their functions.
The sense organs help us to cognize external objects.
Manas is not only the inner sense organ through which consciousness flows to the senses but also the sense commune which receives and co-ordinates sense knowledge.
Manas is called buddhi when it is engaged in the function of deciding (adhyavasaya); ahankara or abhimana when it con- ceives wrongly-for instance, when the atman is identified with the body; and citta when it thinks.
Adṛṣṭa is the fruit of good and bad actions committed in a previous existence.-HIG

Y15*

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185
Sri Ramanuja’s Commentary on the Vedantasutras. There is another reading here, according to which this passage means “The view….should be explained so as not to be in contradiction with the Bhāṣya’.
The adjective ‘particular’ is used to distinguish the sound from the subtle element of sound which is imperceptible to the senses.
The Vedanta doctrine of quintuplication is thus: First, one element is divided into two parts, and one part is again divided into four sub-parts; each of the four sub-parts is mixed with each of the remaining four elements. So on the basis of the quintuplica- tive process, each substance has a fivefold nature. The distinctive character of any element is determined on the basis of the fifty-per- cent element which predominates over the other lesser elements.
The purvapakṣin maintains that ākāśa which is all- pervasive and devoid of parts is not at all produced since there is difference of opinion in the scriptural texts regarding this topic. But this view is rejected by Sri Ramanuja (cf. Commentary on VS. II, iii, 3) since the Veduntasutras and śrutis establish the origina- tion of ether (cf. Taitt. Up. II, 1; Mund Up. II, i, 4). Moreover, a contradictory inference has no force when the point in question is established by Scripture.
The sense of this sentence is not clear; for the mani- festation of prana is weak in the case of non-ambulants. The Telugu edition of the work has here a different reading, according to which the passage means ’that the restriction of function is only in respect of ambulants. But in respect of non-ambulants there is prāna in them but it is feeble’.
One substance like tejas has a twofold form, viz., as prabha and prabhavan. Although prabha is a quality of an effulgent object, it is in itself a kind of substance, and not bare quality like redness; for it can exist apart from its substrate and possesses colour as an attribute. It is called substance because it illumines itself and other objects; and attribute, because it always depends upon its substrate.
“That Divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these being it rendered tripartite.’ (Cha. Up., V, iii, 3 and 4).

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‘Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of com- pletely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of the soul’. (Sribhāṣya, II, i, 9, and S.B.E., XLVIII, part III, p. 424).
The lakṣaṇa which is different from the essential nature of the object defined, and yet is the definition by which the object is defined is called taṭasthalakṣaṇa.
The definition that body is the seat of activity has the defect of over-pervasion, since a jar also would be a sarira as it is the seat of activity.
The definition that body is the seat of sense organs is too narrow as it does not include the organless bodies of stone and wood, and many other physical organisms devoid of sense organs. For instance, the stone-body bestowed on Ahalya.
The definition of body that it is what causes the enjoy- ment of the results of actions does not serve the purpose since it excludes ’earth’ etc. which the Upanisad texts declare to be the sarira of the Antaryamin. Further, the aprakṛta forms which Isvara assumes by His wish as well as the bodily forms of the nityasūris are not the fruition of any karma.
The definition that body is the aggregate of head, hands, feet, etc., is ridiculous as it includes all inanimate images and figure.
Saubhari who was endowed with special powers could assume bodies simultaneously.
This may be compared to the simile of the snake and its coils.
A yojana is equal to four krosas or eight miles. 28. Visnupurana.

AVATARA FIVE

KĀLA
Sattva, rajas and tamás.
In the texts, ‘In the beginning, my dear, there was sat only’ (Cha. Up., VI, ii, 1), and ‘Then there was neither asat nor

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sat’ (Taitt. Bra., II, viii, 9, 3), the words ‘beginning’ and ’then’ indicate that there was time even before creation.
There is no cognition which is not qualified by time.
Twinkling of the eye as a measure of time, a moment.
Fifteen nimișas make one kāṣṭhā.
Thirty kāṣṭhās make one kalā.
Thirty kalās make one muhurta.
Dissolution is fourfold: nitya, naimittika, prākṛta and atyantika. Nityapralaya is sleep in which every effect dissolves for the time being. Naimittikapralaya is the dissolution at the termination of Brahma’s day. Prakṛtapralaya takes place at the end of every epoch of Brahma. Atyantikapralaya is release from the bondage of matter when the jiva realizes God.
There are two kinds of time: akhaṇḍakala (impartite time) and karyakala (time as effect). The former is eternal and is the cause of the effected time, whereas the latter, which we experience in our ordinary life, is changing and non-eternal.
When Isvara in sport creates, sustains and withdraws the entire universe, time serves as an instrument in His cosmic functions.
Līlāvibhuti is the sport of Isvara which consists in the production, sustentation and absorption of the entire universe. In the language of the Upanisads He becomes Sat and Tyat, i.e., He who was the Self in the causal state interpenetrates the world in its effected state also as the Self of all temporal objects.

Nityavibhuti is Vaikuntha, the spiritual universe, in which time is dependent on the will of Isvara. As Prof. P. N. Srinivasa- chari puts it, ‘The lilavibūti, the world of splendour which exists for the sport of the Lord, is the play of the eternal in the temporal and the nityavibhuti or eternal splendour of paramapada is time as eternity….In the former, time is finite and effected by the gunas, while in the latter, it is not causally related, but is infinite and beyond the place of space-time’ (The Philosophy of Visistadvaita, p. 498).

MAD TOL

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AVATARA SIX

NITYAVIBHUTI

Jom T
Suddhasattva is a kind of spiritual matter which exists in the Highest Heaven. It is identical with nityavibhuti. As Dr. Schrader says, it is a necessary hypothesis for explaining (i) the aprakṛta bodies of Isvara, nityas and muktas; and (ii) the presence of the ‘means of enjoyment’ in Vaikuntha.
For the definiton of dharmabhütajñana, the attributive consciousness, see the seventh avatara.
Dharmabhūtajñāna and suddhasattva are called parak or external, since they appear for others only and never for themselves. That is, they are self-luminous and manifest for the sake of the individual self which is self-conscious.
For a clear conception of pañcasakti see Padmatantra, XII, 36ff. According to this verse Vişņu himself is called pañcaśaktimaya. The saktis are sarva, nivṛtti, viśva, purusa and parameṣṭhi.
The six attributes are jñana (knowledge), sakti (might), bala (strength), aiśvarya (dominion), virya (energy) and tejas (splendour).
Bhagavadgitä constitutes a part of the Bhismaparvan in the great epic, Mahabharata, comprising eighteen chapters from the twenty-fifth to the forty-second.
‘God speed you (in your journey) beyond across the darkness!’ (Mund. Up., II, ii, 6).
Jñānātmakatva means svayamprakasakatva, self-luminosity. 9. The astrabhuṣaṇa-adhyaya of Visnupurana (1, 22) is a great authority on this subject. The ornaments and weapons which adorn the body of the Divine Figure symbologically represent the principles of the universe.
Kaustubha is a famous gem obtained by Visnu at the churning of the milk ocean.
A curl of hair on the breast of Visnu.
These four belong to the regions of Sankar sana, Prad- dyumna, Aniruddha and Vasudeva respectively.

NOTES AND REFERENCES
Dharma, jñana, vairagya and aiśvarya.

189
Vimala and others are the eternal attendants who serve the Lord.
“Who with such a consort sits on the eternal Serpent who is the sole transcendental seat of excellent wisdom and strength, and the divine seat of whose body is illumined with streams of light emanating from the clustering gems of his many hoods. Seṣa who is aptly styled by all to be Thy servant (Seșa) on account of his different bodies chosen in Thy service, such as house, bed, sandals, garb, pillow and umbrella for keeping out rain and sun and the like’ (Sri Yamunācārya’s Stotraratna, 39-40).

AVATARA SEVEN

DHARMABHUTAJÑANA
Consciousness is not identical with the being, but is the attribute of an individual self. Hence it cannot be held that being is not the object of consciousness. But it may be admitted that the knowing individual self is not the object of consciousness at the time when it is manifesting other objects. But an absolute rule cannot be made since the knowledge of one person may become the object of the knowledge of another or that one’s state of con- sciousness may become the object of his own apprehension. So it cannot be maintained without deviation that consciousness is self- proved because it is consciousness. In the words of Sri Rāmānuja the true meaning of svayamprakasatva is that ’the essential nature of consciousness-or knowledge-consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own being’ (S.B.E., XLVIII, part III, p. 48).
‘It is like physical light which can only show but cannot know. (See P. N. Srinivasachari’s Philosophy of Visisṭādvaita,

p. 29.) (See F
It has already been told that one substance, say, fire can subsist in twofold form as light (prabha) and luminous substance

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YATINDRAMATADIPIKĀ

(prabhavan). Although it is an attribute inhering in a substance, it is itself nothing but substance as the locus of colour etc. Ana- logously though consciousness is the attribute of individual self, it may be defined as a substance since it is a viṣayin, being the sub- strate of contraction and expansion.
Though consciousness is vibhu it becomes limited in the phenomenal state of existence owing to the influence of karma. In the state of liberation it becomes all-pervasive and infinite, being freed from the contraction due to karma.
When a sense organ or a light manifests an object, it does not require any sense organ or light for its function.
Since sense of sight and light have sättvikähankara and tejas for their substance, they cannot be classified under the same genus.
When there is a. repeated cognition of one and the same object, for instance, a pillar, there is no splitting up of conscious- ness in which the succeeding one comes into existence after the destruction of the prior one. But so long as there is the presentation of one and the same object in all succeeding moments, the con- sciousness persists as one single stream.
It is believed that some particular variety of gems have the power of neutralizing the burning property of fire.
Br. Up., I, v, 3.

Nirandhra literally means ‘without any hole’.

Firm meditation on God which is compared to the un- interrupted flow of oil is called bhakti or upasana; when such meditation, characterized by sakṣātkāra, is daily practised till the last moment of death, it becomes the means for the realization of the beatific form of the Supreme Deity. This is in agreement with the Chandogya passage (VII, xxvi, 2) which declares ‘on the attain- ment of recollection, all the knots are loosened’. In this connec- tion the Bhāṣyakara derives support from the Vakyakara who declares, ‘Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground of meditation and statement’ (S.B.E., XLVIII, part III, p. 15).
The eight well-known limbs of yoga as enumerated by Patanjali are meant to control the mind from its outgoing tenden- cies, and help it to attain the one-pointed concentration. Yama is the moral discipline of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and non-receiving of gifts or favours (YS., II, 30).NOTES AND REFERENCES

191

Niyama is self-purification, satisfaction, austerities, study and contemplation of God (Ibid., II, 32). Asana or posture is that which is firm and pleasant (Ibid., II, 46). A firm seat enables one to control the respiratory functions: Pranayama is the control of the motions of expiration and inspiration (Ibid., II, 49). Mastery of respiratory functions helps one to attain control over the vital airs of the body. Pratyahāra is the withdrawal of the sense organs from their objects and assuming the real form of the mind-stuff (Ibid., II, 54). If the mind is not allowed to contact with the external objects, it will remain tranquil. When the mind is arrested from its outgoing tendencies, it can stick to some object. Dharaṇā is focussing the mind to some particular object (Ibid., III, 1). When consciousness, devoid of forms, illumines only the content, it is called samadhi (Ibid., III, 3).
The sadhanasaptaka has been quoted by Śrī Rāmānuja in the Sribhāṣya (I, i, 1) as the words of Vakyakara (identified with Tankācārya Brahmanandin) who declares them to be the means for bhakti in the form of steady remembrance.
Food becomes impure by three defects: Flesh of animals etc., come under jātidoṣa while food coming from improper source, say, a fallen person, has the defect of aśraya. Leavings of food or such food into which some impure thing has fallen has the defect of nimitta or causal. Mental purity is preceded by physical purity. This is consistent with the Chandogya passage (VII, 26) which declares that when the body is pure, the mind is pure, and with the attainment of mental purity dhruvasmrti or mental concentra- tion results.
Freedom from the web of desires is essential for achiev- ing the calmness of mind, and without mental tranquillity it is not possible to meditate on Brahman. Hence the śruti declares, ‘Let him meditate with calmness of mind’ (Cha. Up., III, xiv, 1).
Repetition of steady remembrance of Brahman results from the mental tranquillity. In this connection Bhāṣyakara Dramiḍācārya is quoted in the Sribhāṣya as declaring the famous Bhagavadgita passage, ‘Constantly absorbed in the thought of that object’ (VIII, 8).
Even at this stage the neophyte is not free from the social and moral obligations. Further, the fivefold duties serve as

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the means for the realization of Brahman. Sri Ramanuja quotes the following passages as authorizing this view: ‘The performer of virtuous actions is the best among the knowers of Brahman’ (Mund. Up., III, i, 4), and ‘The Brahmanas seek to know Him through the recitation of the Veda, sacrifices, charity, penance and fasting’ (Br. Up., IV, iv, 22).
Kalyana is the practice of the inner virtues which are indispensable to spiritual life. This is confirmed by the Vedanta texts, such as ‘He is to be attained by truth, real knowledge and continence’ (Mund. Up., II, i, 5), and ‘Verily, Brahmaloka is for those who are endowed with penance and continence and in whom truth is established. To them belongs the pure world of Brahman in whom there is neither deceit, untruth or guile’ (Pras. Up., I, 15 & 16).
Anavasada is freedom from low spirits owing to un- favourable conditions of time or place and recollection of sorrows. Since dejection is an obstacle in the path of divine life, the śruti declares, ‘The Atman cannot be attained by one devoid of strength’ (Mund. Up., III, ii, 4).
As excessive exultation is the positive obstacle in the way of meditation, the Upanisad states, ‘He who knows Him becomes calm, subdued’ etc. (Br. Up., IV, iv, 23).
When the upasaka, equipped with the discipline of sadhanasaptaka continues his meditation, which has acquired the vividness of darśana, to the last moment of his consciousness, he perceives the beatific form of the Divine just prior to the exit from the present body. This is called antimapratyaya.
Even after the dawn of bhakti the antimapratyaya may not come owing to the non-extinction of the prarabdha. ‘Hence the upasaka has to wait till the exhaustion of his prarabdha.
This has reference to the famous passage, ‘The Self, my dear Maitreyi, is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon, to be meditated upon’ (Br. Up., IV, v, 6), which contains the instruc- tion of meditation. Just as the clause, ’the Self is to be heard’, is a confirmation of what is already established by some other means, the clause, ’the Self is to be reflected upon’, is a confirmation of what is already established by ‘hearing’. The first two clauses refer to the sentence-generated knowledge subserving ‘meditation’ which itself is declared by the clause, ’the Self is to be meditated upon”.

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193

The aphorism which authorizes this point is ‘Reflection more than once, on account of instruction’ (VS., IV, i, 1). In this connection Sri Ramanuja says that ‘knowledge’, which is the means of release, is of the nature of ‘meditation’, since the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘meditating’ are interchangeably used in the former and latter portion of the Vedanta texts; for instance, ‘One should meditate on mind as Brahman’, and ‘He who knows this shines and warms through celebrity, fame and Brahmavarcas’ (Cha. Up., III, xviii, 1 and 6).one

W. 24. The Upanisads embody thirty-two kinds of Brahmavidya which enjoin that the only object of meditation is Brahman and not matter or the jiva. They also prescribe the method of intuiting Brahman for those desirous of release. Besides certain kinds of attributes which are common to all the vidyas, each vidya embodies one or more special attributes of Brahman, which distinguishes it from the others. Of late, attempts have been made to classify the vidyas along with their Vedanta texts and with the Vedantasütras in which they are treated. Mr A. Srinivasa Raghavan of Pudu- kottah has given a list of the thirty-two vidyas with reference to their respective Upanisad texts and the Vedantasütras in his edition of Sri Sariraka Adhikarana Ratnamälä. The references to the vidyas mentioned below have been traced in accordance with this list.
Antarkaṣividya is not found in the list prepared by Mr. Srinivasa Raghavan. This may be identical with akṣisthasatya- brahmavidya, embodied in the text, ‘Satya is Brahman….the being who abides in the orb of the sun and in the right eye’ (Br. Up., V, 5), and discussed in the third chapter of the Vedantasūtras (iii, 20).

and
One of the texts that deal with daharavidya is, ‘In this city of Brahman there is the palace, the small lotus, and within it the small ākāśa. What is within it is to be sought after, for that is to be known’ (Cha. Up., VIII, i, 1). This topic is dealt with in I, iii, 13, and III, iii, 38 of the Vedantasütras. This vidya, after declaring that the ākāśa within the lotus of the heart is neither elemental nor jiva, but Brahman, praises the Infinite who, owing to His boundless love towards the devotees, becomes the finite in the hearts of all beings as the object of meditation.

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The conception of Brahman as Bhuman is embodied in the passage, ‘Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is Infinite’ (Cha. Up., VII, 24 and VS., I, iii, 7). This vidya teaches the knowledge of Brahman as Bhuman and concludes that he who intuits Brahman as the Self of all ’loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes svarāṭ’.
Sadvidya is taught by the text, ‘In the beginning, my dear, Being only was this, one only without a second’ (Cha. Up. VI, ii, 1 and VS., I, i, 5). Sadvidya establishes that the cause of the World is Brahman, denoted by the term ‘Sat’, and not pradhana assumed by the others on the basis of inference.
“Verily, this sun is the honey of the devas…. He who knows this nectar becomes one of the vasus’ (Cha. Up., III, 1 and VS., I, iii, 30). Madhuvidya teaches that the sun is called madhu or nectar as he is the abode of nectar; and he who meditates on the sun in the above manner procures the position of vasu etc.
‘The person that is in the eye, that is the Self; this is the immortal, the fearless, this Brahman’ (Cha. Up., IV, xv, 1 and VS., 1, ii, 13). Here upakosalavidya teaches that the Person seen in the eye is none but Brahman since all the beings go to Him. He is called Vamani and Bhamani as He conveys blessings to the devotees and shines in all the worlds.

and 31. All this is Brahman. One should meditate upon the world with calm mind as beginning, ending and continuing in Brahman’ (Cha. Up., III, xiv, 1 and VS., I, i, 1). Sanḍilyavidya teaches that one has to meditate on the world as having its self in Brahman inasmuch as cit and acit are His attributes.
Puruṣavidya or paramapuruṣavidya is in other words. known as trimatrapranavavidya. According to Govindācārya- svamin the relevant Upanisad text that embodies this vidya begins with ‘Ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke’ and ends with ‘purusanna param kiñcit sa kaṣṭhā să para gatih’ (Katha Up., III, 1-11). But according to Mr. Srinivasa Raghavan the Vedanta text that elucidates this vidya is, ‘He again who meditates on the Supreme Purusa by the syllable Om of three matras reaches the sun….he sees the Person dwelling in the city who is higher than the indi- vidual selves’ (Pras. Up., V, 5 and VS., I, iii, 12). This vidya

NOTES AND REFERENCES

195

declares that the Paramapuruşa referred to in this context is not Caturmukha-Brahma, the aggregate of the individual selves, but the highest Brahman. From this Vidya we understand that he who meditates on the Pranava with one syllable attains the world of mortals, with two syllables, the heavens and with trisyllabic Pranava which represents Brahman, he reaches Paramapuruşa, the highest Brahman.

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‘At present you know the Vaiśvānara Self, tell us that ….but he who meditates on the Vaiśvānara Self as Prādeśa- matra’ etc., (Cha. Up., V, xi, 6; xviii, 1 and VS., I, ii, 25). In this vidya the object of meditation is none but the Supreme Brahman. The upasaka who meditates on Vaiśvānara as having the uni- verse for His body becomes purified as declared in the passage, ‘Just as the fibres of the isikä reed would burn when thrown into fire, similarly the sins of the vidvän are burnt’ (Cha. Up., V, xxiv, 3). 34. The connected Upanisad text, “Those who know this, and those who in the forest meditate upon śraddha and tapas go to light’ (Cha. Up., V, 10) is discussed in the third chapter of the VS. This vidya declares that all those who practise meditation go on the path of devas to reach Brahman.
“He who at the beginning created Brahma, who delivered the Vedas unto him-I, seeking liberation, go for refuge to that effulgent One’ (Svet. Up., VI, 18). Nyasavidya inculcates the doctrine of absolute self-surrender to Iévara by the renunciation of every material consideration.
Vide Ahirbudhnyasamhita, XXXVII, ii, 27 and 28.
A distinction is made between bhakti and prapatti. While bhaktiyoga is a classical process which generates devotion by means of the severe sevenfold discipline, prapatti provides a simple and easy path for the weak, erring humanity. The bhakta has to fling himself but once at the feet of Bhagavan: the saving grace and mercy will not be far off. Since this act of self-resignation has immediate effect, even the prarabdha-karma is annihilated, and the sadhaka need not have to wait for another body for liberation. Further, while the arduous path of bhakti demands continued practice of meditation till the last moment of death, prapatti ex- cludes the necessity of such continued representation by a single supreme act.

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The Carvākas are those materialists who identify the ‘self’ with the body.

This is the view of the Vijñānavādins. When the pre- ceding momentary consciousness has perished, the subsequent momentary consciousness originates; hence there is no causal relation between the two. -8
The Jainas hold that the entire complex of things is of a Pyrrhonian nature inasmuch as any attribute can be predicated about an object. To prove that all things are characterized by permanence and non-permanence, existence and non-existence, they put forward the following seven paralogisms: May be, it is, May be, it is not, May be, it is and is not, May be, it is not predicable, May be, it is and is not predicable, May be, it is not and is not predicable, May be, it is and is not, and is not predicable. (Vide S.B.E., Vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 517).
According to this system the individual self in its state of liberation loses all its special attributes including that of pleasure

tes including that also.
According to māyāvāda everything has only an empirical reality save Brahman; consequently the knowledge of Brahman that arises from the study of the empirical texts cannot be final, valid

or eternal.
Bhaskara and Yadava, who uphold the doctrine of identity in difference, believe that a co-ordination of jñana and karma is necessary for the intution of Brahman. This view is rejected since ‘meditation’ is alone admitted to be the means for liberation.
This refers to certain strange practices such as smearing oneself with the ashes of a corpse, eating its flesh, using a skull as

sh, using a skull a a drinking vessel, etc.

AVATARA EIGHT

to Niw yo

JIVA
If jiva is merely defined as ‘sentient’, there will be over- pervasion inasmuch as Iévara also is sentient; hence the attribute of ‘sesatva’.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

197
Srinivasa very clearly defines the concept of jiva by dis- tinguishing it from the definition of the dehätmavādin who con- tends that body is the jIva; from the indriyatmavädin who holds that sense organs are identical with the jiva; from the prapat- mavādin who contends that the pranas constitute the jiva; and finally from the antaḥkaraṇātmavadin who maintains that the jiva is cit delimited by the mind.
The śruti states that the jiva passes out of the body at the time of death and again enters it at the time of birth. (Vide VS., II, iii, 20.) If the jiva is omnipresent, this passing out of the body etc., are not possible. The relevant texts that confirm the ‘passing out’ and ‘returning’ are as follows: “The self departs by that light (of the heart) either through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body (Br. Up., IV, iv, 2), and ‘he returns from that world to this world for action’ (Br. Up., IV, iv, 6).
The definition that the jiva is aņu does not mean that it has the limitation of a bare monad. In our ordinary experience we find that the light of a luminous body can extend beyond its substrate. Similarly this all-pervasive and infinite consciousness of the jiva can radiate from its nucleus without any limitation.
‘The intelligent one is not born, nor it dies’ (Katha Up., II, 18).
The connection of the jivas with various bodies is due to the karma of those jivas. The Upanisad states, ’the doer of good works becomes good, the doer of bad works becomes bad. He becomes virtuous by virtuous deeds, vicious by vicious deeds’ (Br. Up., IV, iv, 5).

Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate; for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience’ (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 565).

The limiting adjunct which binds the individual self is avidya which is of the nature of karma, accumulated by the jiva in its previous births.
The agent is the jiva and not the gunas since, Scripture declares ‘he who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice’. Vide also

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VS., II, iii, 33: (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.’ Moreover, if the activity belonged to prakṛti and not to jiva, then it would follow, that, since prakrti is connected with all the jivas, everyone would experience all actions. 10. While the saririn is the controller (niyanta) and sup- porter (adhāra) of the body, the sarira is the supported (adheya) and the controlled (niyamya). Just as the physical body, composed of the five elements, constitutes the body of the jiva, the jiva also in its turn forms the body of Iévara on the basis of adhara-adheya and niyantr-niyamya principle. Thus the jiva is the body and the indweller of the body from two points of view.
The view that each jiva has the same size as the body it occupies has a serious defect; for it the jiva, which was commen- surate with the body of an elephant, has to enter into the body of an ant, it would become incomplete as it then occupies less space. See Sribhāṣya, II, ii, 33.

35 12. If, according to Yadavaprakasa and Bhaskara, Brahman abides in the form of subject, object of enjoyment and ruler, or Brahman becomes the jiva by. a real upadhi, all the imperfections and defects of the jiva would become Brahman’s also.
The ekajivavādin contends that the entire world is fabri- cated by the avidya of a single self. He does not predicate multi- plicity of the apparently conditioned consciousness.
The anekajivavädin maintains the multiplicity of the apparently finite consciousness on empirical grounds; he holds that the jivas are as many as the internal-organs which limit and define the supreme homogeneous Consciousness. Vide Vedantaparibhāṣā, ’tatra jivo nama antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanyam’.
It has been already pointed out that though the jiva is not vibhu, its consciousness has not the limitation of a monad. If the jiva can be compared to a light-house, its consciousness is like the powerful beams of light which can extend to distant places. Thus though the jiva is limited to one place, its consciousness can inter-penetrate and pervade other realms.
“He who behaves thus throughout his life, reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return-he does not return’ (Cha. Up., VIII, 15).
Brahmaņas, kṣattriyas, and vaisyas.

or H

NOTES AND REFERENCES

199
‘Want and wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing from the assaults, hard to be endured of the three kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is un- touched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is a mass of auspicous qualities in their highest perfection’ (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 327).
VS., from I, iii, 33 to I, iii, 39. de 18 C
Akiñcano ananyagatissaranya tvatpädamülam saranam prapadye (Sri Yamunacarya’s Stotraratna, 22). bola
When a prapanna flings himself at the feet of Bhagavan with the intercession of Sri as puruṣakāra, the Divine Mother who is the embodiment of kṛpå, grants him salvation by Her redemp- tive mercy.out
‘He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done’ (Kausi. Up., I, 4), and (His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done’ (Satyāyaṇins quoted in the Sribhāṣya, S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 646).
Vide Chã. Up., VI, xv, 2: ‘his speech is united with the mind.” 24. There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; going upwards by that one attains immortality’ (Cha. Up., VIII, vi, 5).

you
‘When he departs from the body, he moves upwards by

V

these rays only’ (Cha. Up., VIII, vi, 5).

Jon 26. The spiritual realm where the divine is ever manifest.
“There is a person, not human, he conveys them to Brahman’ (Kausi. Up., I, 4).
Kauşi. Up., I, 4.
‘Free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger, free from thirst, whose wishes are true and whose purposes are true’ (Cha. Up., VIII, i, 5).
He reaches the Supreme Oneness, free from stain’ (Mund. Up., III. i, 3).
Mokṣa is essentially of the nature of sayujya (com- munion), and not salokya (co-existence), särüpya (similarity) or samipya (intimacy). Sayujya does not mean real identity between Brahman and jiva, but connotes some difference between the two.

SRI

200

YATINDRAMATADIPIKA

In the beautiful language of Visnupurana (V, viii, 30), Brahman leads the jiva towards atmabhava like the magnet which attracts the iron; hence there is no loss of personality just as the attracted body does not become one with the attracting body. Bhagavadgitā also says that mukta attains the attributes like Brahman (XIV, 2). The author of the Dramiḍabhagya declares that the mukta, owing to his sayujya with Brahman, effects all things like Him.
If sayujya means identity with Brahman, it follows that the power of creation, sustentation and destruction of the world must be attributed to the liberated self. To this the Vedantasūtras” reply is: ‘With the exception of cosmic functions’ (IV, iv, 17). Moreover, the Upanisad texts mention the power of ruling, controll- ing, etc., with reference to Brahman alone. The Vṛttikära also declares that with the exception of cosmic functions, the mukta is equal to Brahman through light.
‘Non-return according to Scripture’ (VS., IV, iv, 22), and ‘He who behaves thus throughout his life reaches the world of Brahman and does not return’ (Cha., VIII, 15). In this con- nection Sri Ramanuja says, ‘As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage of karman, has its powers of know- ledge fully developed, and has all its being in the supremely blissful intution of the highest Brahman, it evidently cannot desire any- thing else nor enter on any other form of activity, and the idea of returning into samsara therefore is altogether excluded’ (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 771).J
That is, their descent into the world of mortals is not determined by the effects of karma.

AVATARA NINE

அரணக்கி

ISVARA
Isvara is indicated by such passages as ‘My dear, Sat only was this in the beginning’ (Cha. Up., VI, ii, 1), and ‘In the beginn- ing Self only was this’ (Br. Up., I, iv, 1).
‘Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non- intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutesNOTES AND REFERENCES

201

effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause’ (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 142).
Three causes bring about the origination of an object, viz., the upadana-cause, the nimitta-cause and the sahakarin-cause. For example, in the production of a pot, earth is the upādāna- karana, potter the nimittakarana and the potter’s wheel and other accessories the sahakarana. On the other hand for the origination of the universe, Iévara Himself solely constitutes all the three causes. 4. The following objection is raised: The Vedanta text, ‘Being only was this in the beginning’ (Cha. Up., VI, ii, 1), teaches that ‘Being’, which denotes the cause of the universe, is nothing but prakrti inasmuch as the word ’this’ indicates the effected state comprising sattva, rajas, tamas, etc. Since the non-difference of cause and effect has been accepted, the cause must be prakṛti which comprises the three elements of sattva, rajas and tamas. This view is rejected as it is not based upon the śruti; for the śruti expresses a kind of mental activity on the part of the ‘Being’ as stated in the text, ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth’ (Cha. Up., VI, ii, 1). Therefore the non-sentient prakrti devoid of ’thinking’ cannot be the cause of the universe.

do
According to this canon of interpretation the term ‘animal’ connotes ‘goat’ in connection with the sacrifice called daikaa-pasu. 6. According to this nyaya all general terms must find their ultimate significance and meaning in a particular term.
Objection raised by the Advaitin.
Let us take for instance two apparently contradictory sets of Vedanta texts: the text, ‘Now, if a person meditates on another God thinking “he is one and I another”, he does not know’ (Br. Up., II, iv, 6) dispels the notion that jiva and Brahman are different, while the texts, “The Lord of the pradhana and the in- dividual selves’ (Svet. Up., VI, 16) and ‘The ruler of all, the Lord of the selves’ (Mahānār. Up., XI, 3) declare difference in the nature of jiva and Brahman. When we are confronted with such con- flicting texts, Ghatakaśrutis enable us to understand the correct relation free from seeming contradiction. The text, ‘He who dwells within the Self, but is different from it, whom the Self does not know, whose body is the Self, who controls the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one’ (Br. Up., III,

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vii, 22), establishes that Brahman is the Self of all inasmuch as all beings have their origin, sustentation and absorption in Him and constitute His body, Since every jiva constitutes the body of Brah- man, and Brahman constitutes the Self of jIva, there is no real contradiction in the relation between jiva and Brahman. The abheda texts deny difference in so far as jiva is of the nature of Brahman. The bheda texts affirm difference in so far as Brahman is different from jiva in the same way as jiva is different from its body. Likewise, the text, “Thou art that’ does not affirm the essen- tial unity of jiva with Brahman. “Thou’ and ‘That’ refer to Brahman qualified by difference. The term “That’ denotes Brahman intro- duced before as, “It thought “may I be many”, and the term “Thou’ refers to Brahman in so far as having for His body cit related with acit. Thus the relation of sarira-saririn harmonizes the apparent contradiction between jIva and Brahman.
For example, Mundaka Upanisad (I, i, 6) in the first half of the mantra denies Brahman of all the qualities related to matter, and in the second half defines Brahman as possessing eternality, all-pervasiveness, subtlety, imperishableness, creativeness, etc.
It may be objected that on the basis of sarira-saririn relation, all the imperfections of the sentient beings and the non- sentient matter may cling to Brahman, and consequently Visistäd- vaita is wrong in ascribing material causality to Brahman. Visiṣṭād- vaita repudiates the idea of Brahman being related even with the shadow of evil. Since Brahman constitutes the Self of the universe- body, namely, cit and acit, it is quite consistent to hold that Brah- man’s body is connected with two states, i.e., causal and effected, the nature of which are contraction and expansion. In ordinary life we observe that the states of childhood, youth, old age, etc., effect the body only, while bliss, knowledge, etc., belong to the self. Similarly, the imperfections adhering to cit and acit do not belong to Brahman, and the special attributes of Brahman do not extend to cit and acit. tanto sow walent A
The theory of Vyüha, which is one of the foundational doctrines of the Päñcaratra, forms part and parcel of the Viṣiṣṭă- dvaita conception of the Deity. Sankarṣana emanates from Vasu- deva, Pradyumna from Sankarṣana and Aniruddha from Pradyu- mna. In the language of the Pañcaratra the manifestation is like

NOTES AND REFERENCES

203

*one flame proceeding from another flame’. As Dr. Schrader points out, the word is a combination of the root uh ’to shove’ and the preposition vi ‘asunder’ meaning ’to shove asunder’ of the six gunas into three pairs. Though each Vyūha is the manifestation of the highest Divine qualified by all the six gunas, it however, is characterized by two predominant gunas. Further, each Vyuha has two sets of activities-cosmic and ethical. Sri Ramanuja informs us (VS. II, ii, 42) of another aspect of the Vyuha, referred to in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Santiparvan of the Mahabharata. In this alternate view Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual selves, internal organs and organs of egoity; and consequently Sankarṣaṇa is denoted by jiva, Pradyu- mna by manas and Aniruddha by ahankara. at topp
Vasudeva the highest Self possesses all the six guņas, namely, jñāna (knowledge), aiśvarya (lordship), sakti (potency), bala (strength), virya (virility) and tejas (splendour). Cf. Lakṣmi- tantra (VI, 25) ‘Sadgunyavigraham devam’.
The activities of Sankarṣana are to destroy the universe and propound the scriptures.
Pradyumna creates the universe and introduces all the dharmas (dharmanayanam).
Aniruddha protects the creation and makes known the tattva (tattvam jñāpayati). Or as Dr. Schrader states, ’the ethical activities of the three Vyühas are declared to be teaching (1) by Sankarṣana of the Sastra or “theory”, namely, of monotheism (ekāntikamärga); (2) by Pradyumna, of its translation into practice (tatkriya); and (3) by Aniruddha, of the gain resulting from such practice (kriya-phala), to wit, liberation’ (I, Pañ., pp. 38-39).
Vasudeva hypostastizes into Kesava, Nārāyaṇa and Madhava, Sankargana into Govinda, Vişņu and Madhusudana, Pradyumna into Trivikrama, Vamana and Sridhara, and Aniruddha into Hrişikeṣa, Padmanabha and Damodara,
This means they become the presiding deities of the sun in the twelve months of the year.
The ten principal avatars are Matsya, Kürma, Varaha, Nrsimha, Vamana, Parasurama, Rama, Balabhadra, Krsna and Kalkin. According to Visvaksenasamhita and Lakṣmitantra all the avatars descend from the fourth Vyuha, namely, Aniruddha. But

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Padmatantra declares that of the ten Vibhavas, Matsya, Kürma and Varaha descend from Vasudeva, Nrsimha, Vamana, Śrīrāma and Parasurama from Sankarṣaṇa, Balarama from Pradyumna, and Śrikṛṣṇa and Kalkin from Aniruddha. (Vide I. Pāñ., p. 48).
The great devotee Prahlad who had taken refuge in Narayana is referred to here.
Pralamba was an asura who assured the form of a cowherd, and joined the band of cowherds with a view to destroy Krsna and Balarama. Krsna knowing the motive of the asura, arranged a sham-fight, the result of which was the members of Krsna’s party who were the vanquished had to carry on their back the members of Balarama’s party who were the winners. It so happened that Balarama was carried by Pralamba. The asura, who assumed his real form, began to fly in the air with Balarama. But Balarama hammered the head of the asura and made him fall down. Likewise he killed Dhenuka who came in the form of an ass. 21. According to Ahirbudhnyasamhita the avatars are thirty- nine; they are as follows:
Padmanabha
Dhruva
Ananta
Sakyatman www

Madhusudana

www.5.
Vidyadhideva
Kapila
Rāhujit

Kalanemighna Pārijātahara

Lokanatha
Sāntātman
Viśvarūpa
Vihangama

Krodhätman

Badavāvaktra
Dharma
Vägisvara 14.

Ekambhodhisayin
Kamatheśvara
Varaha

Narasimha

Piyüşaharana
Sripati

Käntätman

Dattatreya 27. Nyagrodhaśayin 28. Ekasrngatanu

Vamanadeha

Trivikrama
Nara

Nārāyaṇa

Hari
Kṛṣṇa
Parasurama 36. Śrīrāma
Vedavid
Kalkin

Fatalasayana

NOTES AND REFERENCES

205

Dr. Schrader informs us that the Vibhavas are thirty-nine according to Satvatasamhita also. But our author, following Varavaramuni, admits thirty-six Vibhavas only, since Kapila, Dattatreya and Parasurama are supposed to be secondary avatars.

The avatar of Dadhibhakta was assumed with a view to grant the nectar.
The avatar of Hayagriva was undertaken for delivering the Vedas.
The avatar of Naranarayana was assumed in the form of student and preceptor with a view to impart the esoteric doctrines.
The mukhya-avatar is supposed to be the Isvara himself in a spiritual body, whereas the avatar of gauna or aveśa is said to be a self in a material body which is possessed by the power of the Isvara for some particular purpose.kap w
The aspirants who seek liberation are advised to worship the primary or mukhya avatars only, and not the secondary ones, since the latter constitute the locus of such selfs which are quali- fied by egoism.
The authority for this conception is the passage of the Gitä which states ‘I come into being by My own maya’ (VI, 6). ‘By My own maya’ is to be taken as ‘By My own will’.
Vide Bhagavadgita (IV, 8): ‘Pariträṇāya sadhūnām vināśāya ca duşkṛtām, dharmasamsthapanarthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge’.

to be
For instance, Śrīrāma lived at Ayodhya in the tretayuga; but the image of Srirama can be consecrated anywhere and at any time for purposes of worship. V A Jaen og Die aan sit as he ad by ale od sd 16

danum

morted som

stoms an

Sad dar dine kad sul

sa

AVATARA TEN

ADRAVYA

T

and

Cup A

son ob and 1 be 11
‘For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but Sattva and so on are the causes of

not themselves substances.

lightness, light etc., belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any

206

YATINDRAMATADĪPIKĀ

"

effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as “gunas” (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, pp. 484-85).
Since sabda cannot serve as a material cause, it is viewed as a non-substance.
In this connection the ‘pilupakavada’ of Vaiseṣikas and the ‘piṭharapakavāda’ of Naiyayikas may be read with profit.
Vide Cha. Up., VI, iv, 1. According to this text fire has only three colours, namely, red, white and black.
The Naiyayikas postulate citrarupa (variegated colour) as a distinct variety.
The Vaiseṣikas hold that, when a pot is baked, even the constituent atoms are destroyed along with their properties; the new qualities are produced subsequently. This is known as ‘Pilupǎkavāda’ or ’the theory of atoms being baked’. On the contrary, the Naiyayikas hold that the constituent atoms are not destroyed in the process of baking. This theory is known as ‘Piṭharapakavāda’.
Prakṛti, kala, suddhasattva, dharmabhütajñāna, jiva and Isvara.
For instance, when a monkey is hanging on the branch of a tree, the conjunction of the monkey with the tree may be said to be present and non-present in the same tree with reference to its top and bottom. This is known as avyapyavṛtti in Nyaya.
The Naiyayikas have to admit samyogaja-samyoga on the basis of the distinction between avayavin (composite whole) and avayavas (composite parts). As Visiṣṭadvaita does not admit such absolute difference between the whole and the parts, the contact of the hand with the book means the contact of the body with the book.
The Nyaya-Vaiseṣika theorists admit ‘vibhāga’ as a separate quality.

AYVARDA
Naiyayikas do not admit conjunction between two all-pervasive substances. Vide A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 125.0
The Lord is all-pervading’ (Svet. Up., III, 11): “What- ever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Nārāyaṇa’ (Mahānär. Up., II, 6).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

207
Saktayaḥ sarvabhāvanām acintyajñānagocarāḥ, inyato’to brahmanastāstu sargādya bhavaśaktayaḥ, than bhavanti tapatam śreṣṭha pävakasya yathoṣṇata (VP., 1,

iii, 2). To man

of 14. The twenty-four gunas according to Annambhaṭṭa are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, vicidity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike, volition, merit, demerit and tendency. (Vide A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 16.)
There are three kinds of tendencies, namely, vega (speed), bhāvanā (reminiscent impression) and sthitisthāpaka (elasticity). The first belongs to earth, water, fire, air and mind; the second belongs to the individual self, and the third is the inclination of a thing to recover its original position when it is changed.
The Naiyayika’s conception of the twenty-four gunas is redundant. Since vibhaga is nothing but the absence of samyoga, it cannot come under any special classification. Paratva and aparatva cannot be explained apart from space-time relation. As pointed out by Mm. S. Kuppusvāmi Sastrin, but for the realistic phobia. of the Nyaya-Vaiseşika thinkers to find a corresponding objective reality for every thought in their mind, there is hardly any need to give a distinct place for all these guņas.
The names of most of the authors of the above exegetics are traced in accordance with ‘The Light of the School of Rāmānuja”.
By Dramiḍācārya.
By Nathamuni.
By Yamunācārya.

21 to 24. By Ramanujācārya.

25 & 26. By Viṣṇucitta.
By Somayaji Andan or Rāmamiśra.
The Gloss on Sribhasya by Sudarsanācārya.

29 & 30. By Varadanarayana Bhaṭṭārka.

31 & 32. By Kidambi Rāmānuja.
By Varadaviṣṇumiśra.

34, 35 & 42. By Vädikesari Saumyajāmatṛmuni. 36 to 41. By Vedantadesika (Venkatanatha). 43. Pillai Lokācārya.

44 to 46. By Mahācārya, the teacher of Srinivasa..

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YATINDRAMATADIPIKA
Prapya is Brahman to be realized. The. prapta is the jiva that seeks Brahman. Bhakti and prapatti are the means for the realization of Brahman. Phala is the realization of Brahman, which is possible by entering into the realm of nityavibhuti. Virodhi is the obstacle to be conquered. Pillai Lokacārya has elucidated in his Arthapañcaka the doctrine of Visiṣṭadvaita in this fivefold form.
Relation between Isvara and the world.
It is interesting to note that there are differences of interpretation among the acaryas of the same tradition in spite of the fact that the continuity of tradition has been tenaciously maintained from acārya to ācārya. But the so-called differences are differences in approaches but not in the foundational doctrine.
VS., I, i, 1.

lavercast
Srinivasa, the presiding deity of Tirupati or Venkatagiri.

AVATARA ONE PRATYAKŞA

AVATARA TWO

AVATARA THREE

AVATARA FOUR

AVATARA FIVE

AVATARA SIX

AVATARA SEVEN

AVATARA EIGHT

AVATARA NINE

AVATARA TEN