रामानुजीये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

STUDY of Indian philosophy is incomplete without a knowledge of Vedanta in its triple setting-Advaita, Visiṣṭadvaita and Dvaita. For a beginner, the under- standing of Advaita is facilitated by a number of short authoritative manuals now available with accurate translation and other accessories for study. Similar publications on the Visiṣṭadvaita are extremely rare. This book is brought out to remove that want in some

measure.

The text printed here is based on the Yarindra- matadipika published by Mr V. K. Ramanujācārya and the other two editions of it brought out in the Benares and Anandaśrama Sanskrit Series respec- tively. It has only once been rendered into English, about forty years ago, by Sri Govindācārya Svämin of Mysore. That edition is now out of print and difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Though it has been consulted with profit, the present book is con- ceived on a different plan. The translation here has been made as close and faithful to the original as possible. The collated and punctuated Sanskrit text is given on every page to afford easy reference when- ever the verbatim rendering might appear stiff. Copious notes are appended at the end to elucidate points of difficulty and to supply additional information. An Introduction is prefixed to give a conspectus of the work. It is expected the book in this form will meet the needs of the students of philosophy possessing some knowledge of Sanskrit.

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I wish to acknowledge my hearty thanks to Dr K. C. Varadachari, Professor of Philosophy, Śrī Venkatesvara College, Tirupati for his valuable help in revising the typescript of the translation; to Pro- fessor P. N. Srinivasachari for his kind Foreword, and to Swāmi Vimalananda for his invaluable counsel and suggestive criticism. I am indebted to Professor R. Rāmānujachari who was kind enough to read through the typescript. And lastly, I would express my gratitude for the constant encouragement and unfailing kindness which I have received in the pre- paration of this work from Swāmī Omkārānanda.

Sri Ramakrishna Math Madras, August 16, 1949

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INTRODUCTION

THE Visiṣṭādvaita of Śrī Rāmānuja was not only a reaction against the dry ritualism of the Mīmāmsakas and the mentalism of atheistic thought which followed the intellectual revolution caused by the Buddha, but also a revival of the theistic Mīmāṁsă as advocated by the Vṛttikara Bodhayana known also as Upavarṣa.1 Vedantic theism did not emerge suddenly in the evolution of the philosophy of religion in India. Besides Bodhāyana, Śrī Rāmānuja in his Vedārthasangraha refers to Ṭaňka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bharuci, who were great exponents of theistic Vedanta in the days of yore.2) Śrī R. G. Bhandarkar traces the rudiments of theism to a period anterior to the birth of Buddhism and Jainism. The Ghasundi inscription3 referring to the shrine of Sankarṣaṇa and Vasudeva (about 200 B.C.), the Besnagar inscription recording the erection of a Garuda-column in honour of ‘Vasu- deva the God of gods’ (about 200 B.C.) and the Nānāghāt inscription referring to the worship of Sankarṣaṇa and Vasudeva (100 B.C.) prove the existence of a theistic faith at a very early period. The great contribution of Śrī Rāmānuja is that he has given us for the first time a conception of monotheism in a

1 See Mm. Lakṣmipuram Srinivasacarya’s Darénodaya, p. 151.

2 भगवद्बोधायन - टङ्क -द्रमिड-गुहदेव कर्पाद - भारुचिप्रमृत्यविगीतशिष्टपरिगृहीत-

पुरातनवेदान्तव्याख्यानसुव्यक्तार्थश्रुतिनिकरनिदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः ।

3 Lüder’s List of Brahmi Inscriptions, No. 6.

4 Ibid., No. 1112.

systematic form on the basis of the Upanisads and the Vedāntasūtras. on the basis of th

The distinctive feature of Visiṣṭadvaita, as com- pared with Advaita on the one hand, and Dvaita on the other hand, is its conception of Reality which, while affirming the ultimate unity of the Absolute, allows (differentiation through its modes (prakāras) without implying any fundamental difference in the Reality itself. Visiṣṭadvaita accepts as ultimate the three entities of matter (acit), individual self (cit) and Iśvara. Matter and individual self are absolutely dependent on Isvara for their existence, the dependence being similar to that of body upon self. The universe forms the body of Isvara, and he is. the Universal Self not only of the unconscious matter but also of the conscious selfs. Body is that which an indwelling self supports and controls for its own services. Similarly matter and selfs, being the body of Isvara, are supported and con- trolled by him for his own purposes. Here we come upon Śrī Rāmānuja’s own unique view of the relation of apṛthaksiddhi (inseparability) in which Iśvara stands to the world consisting of matter and selves. The inseparable relation of body to self, in terms of which the relation of the world to Isvara is conceived, brings out clearly the intimate connection that subsists be- tween substance and attribute. Iśvara is substance and the world of matter and selfs form his inseparable attributes.

This conception of organic unity may be illustrated by the instance of a mango. Here the colour, thea taste, the smell, the flesh, the shell and the fibre which constitute the whole fruit can be distinguished asxi

being different from one another.

کا

Each element

Yet c in the fruit has its own distinctive attributes. when all these are united, the synthetic whole is re- garded as a mango. What is common to all the dif- ferent parts of the fruit is their inseparable existence. Of the various elements which constitute the mango, we can regard any particular one as the substantive element (viśeşya) and the rest as attributive elements (viseṣaṇas). Likewise the inseparable unity of matter, selfs and Iśvara constitute the Reality in which Isvara, the substantive element, directs and predominates over the attributive elements. Though the world of matter and selfs have a real existence of their own, they are entirely subject to the control of Isvara in all their conditions. Śrī Rāmānuja’s system is called Visiṣṭādvaita, since the attributive elements (matter and selfs) and the substantive element. (Iśvara) form a synthetic unity.

PRAMA AND PRAMĀŅA LEVE

is vaid 1

According to Visiṣṭādvaita, pramā (valid know- ledge) should satisfy two conditions. As regards the first condition, pramă should reveal the existence of an object or agree with external reality; the second condition of prama is that it should serve some practical need.

Prama, therefore, is defined as that which s favours the practical interests of life as they really are.1 The distinctive cause of a particular prama is pramaņa, A cause is considered distinctive or best, since knowledge arises without delay through its agency.

1 यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणज्ञानं प्रमा ।

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Śrīnivāsa, the author of the present book, following Vedantadesika admits perception, inference and verbal-17 or scriptural testimony as the three ways of knowing. Perception has for its object something always charac- terized by difference, as it is impossible to perceive anything without any difference. Even if someone says that a state of consciousness without any difference is possible, such a determination is always marked by some attribute or other.

Perception is of two kinds, determinate and indeter- minate. Indeterminate perception does not mean the apprehension of an object bereft of all distinctions. For, whatever enters into human experience under any circumstance appears with some elements of spatial and structural relations. Even the perception of an object for the first time involves thinking and discrimina- tion as ’this’ or ’that’. Visiṣṭādvaita, recognizing the necessity of conceptual factors in any experience defines indeterminate perception as the cognition of an individual for the first time with attributes, configu- ration, etc. When the object of the same class is perceived for the second or the third time with the notion of its generic character, the perception is called determinate. This may be illustrated in the following manner: Two persons-a professor of zoology and his servant-go to a zoological garden. Suddenly they come before an enclosure containing ‘marsupial mam-

mals with strongly developed hindquarters’. The

pro- fessor, despite his thick eye-glasses, recognizes them at once as kangaroos. His servant, presumably with better eye-sight, stands bewildered without making head or tail of the animal. To the professor it was an

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apprehension and affirmation of an object as ’this is such’, and to his servant it was something indefinite, devoid of specific judgement. Yet the servant, in spite of the absence of specific judgement, perceived some- thing not devoid of class character. The professor’s apprehension of the kangaroo may be called determi- nate, while his servant’s cognition may be likened to indeterminate perception.

An analysis of the act of perception involves three factors: (1) the knowing subject, (2) the object, not as something constructed by the mind, but as something relatively independent of it, and (3) the consciousness which issues from the subject and illuminates the object. In the act of perception, the consciousness issues out from the atman through the sense-channels, comes in contact with the object, and reveals it. The consciousness while revealing the object reveals itself also. When the consciousness is directed upon an object through any one of the senses, one becomes aware of that object with its attributes. Since Visiṣṭādvaita does not recognize any attributeless object, the cogni- tive act never excludes a perception of the object with- out attributes. Consequently sense-qualities such as the colour of an object etc., are not constructions of the mind. There is a process of the act of constructing in so far as things with their attributes are presented to the mind. If the attributes of an object are not the construction of the mind, they must have their locus elsewhere. And where else could that be save in the object independent of the mind itself? This theory radically affects the usual conception of the individual self and its consciousness. For, the distinction be-

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tween conscious self and object ceases to be a false one, as the very nature of consciousness presupposes the existence of a conscious self as well as objects inde- pendent of the self.

The awareness of an object not in the form of ‘oneness’, but with a ‘bifurcation of subject and object’ has an important metaphysical significance. For, in the highest state of God-realization, when the con- sciousness in its expanded state is directed upon God, the individual is not merged in the Supreme, but be- comes aware of the Supreme. But there is a process of unity in so far as the usual barriers between conscious self and God are annulled. The liberated individual realizes that he is a mode of the Divine. Since the conscious self is aware of ‘oneness’ with God, there cannot be any absolute unity in which the individu- ality is lost.

It is in this connection that we come upon the unique conception of jñāna (consciousness), so impor- tant in the psychological implication of knowledge. Jñana is neither material nor spiritual, but immaterial (ajada). It illumines itself and other objects. It always exists for another and never for itself. That is, it can- not know itself, but illumines objects for the conscious subject of whom it is the attribute. Jñana is the attri- bute of Isvara and jīva. It is, therefore, known as dharmabhūtajñāna or attributive consciousness which suggests there is substantive intelligence as well. Isvara and jīvas, while possessing knowledge, are jñāna in the substantive sense. As attributive knowledge, jñāna is eternal and all-pervasive in respect of Isvara, eternals (nityasūris) and liberated selfs. In mundane life, how-

ever, it is obscured though it endures in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep.

The epistemological conclusion of Visiṣṭadvaita suggests the trustworthiness of our thoughts and experiences which are of the real. The subject of cognition is as real as cognition and cognitive act. Real objects independent of the mind and corres- ponding to their contents, are alone known. There- fore, reality of objects is reckoned as absolute. This view is known as satkhyāti, since what exists (sat) is cognized. If what exists (sat) alone is cognized, how can we explain illusions in which knowledge does not correspond to things? For instance, apprehension of silver in nacre-silver illusion, water in desert, dreams, illusion of white conch seen as yellow, etc. To under- stand the problem of error, each illusion has to be individually judged on its own merits. Broadly speak- ing, Visiṣṭadvaita justifies the theory of satkhyāti on metaphysical and psychological grounds. According ing to the Vedanta doctrine of pañcīkarana, each of the five elements constituting the universe is a com- pound of an eighth part of each of the other four pure elements and half of its own pure form. In the case of the mirage, though a desert contains all the five bhūtas in varying proportions, only water, which is very insignificant, is apprehended. In nacre-silver illusion, consciousness reveals only the silver element- due to memory, similarity and other causes-which is the insignificant portion of nacre. In the case of other illusions also there is revelation of reality, how-

अतः सर्व विज्ञानजातं यथार्थमिति सिद्धम् (श्रीभाष्यम्, 1.1.1.).

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ever trifling it may be. Even the partial identity of an object is accepted as real, since it reveals some aspect of reality though not the whole of it. The difference between prama and bhrama is this: while pramā satisfies the needs of practical experience as it reveals the reality of objects, bhrama does not. Though meta- physically one can justify even the existence of water element in desert, the mirage is admitted to be an illusion from a practical standpoint, as water content of the desert is too little for practical purpose.

The point to be considered is not to examine the scientific exactitude of the theory of visual perception propounded by past thinkers in justification of sat- khyāti. It is useful to find out the underlying principle of satkhyāti. The main function of consciousness is to reveal the reality of an object. Consciousness in its perfect expanded state reveals reality without any blemish. But in samsara, consciousness reveals partial visions, and incomplete knowledge of things result due to its limiting contraction. 12

[Inference proceeds from the knowledge of vyapti (pervasion) between vyapya (pervaded) and vyāpaka (pervader). In a case where fire pervades smoke, fire is called vyāpaka and smoke vyapya. When there is cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire (i.e., the vyāpaka is more extensive than the vyapya) the know- ledge of vyapaka, namely, fire is obtained as in the inference, ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. To ascertain the relation of vyāpti between two phenomena a single observation is not sufficient. Therefore Visis- ṭādvaita emphasizes the need for repeated observation to establish the universal pervasion beyond doubt. The

some cases

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syllogism is not restricted to five members only. In

aseand

three-membered syllogism serves the purpose, and in other cases even two-membered syllogism is recognized as sufficient. Upamana (compa- rison) and arthāpatti (postulation) are brought under anumana, since they depend upon the knowledge of vyapti.

Sabda (verbal or scriptural testimony) is recogni- zed as a special source of knowledge. Scriptural testimony alone can claim the position of the authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which never falls within the range of pratyakṣa or anumana. A statement is authoritative when it is uttered by a trustworthy person, when it is free from errors due to defects of sense organs, or when its meaning is not contradicted by any other cognition. The Vedas are authoritative in toto. The two sections of the Vedas, namely karmakāṇda and jñanakanda, do not contradict each other. The earlier section or the karmakända treats of the various modes of upasana (worship) and the latter section is devoted to Brahman, the object of worship. Hence both the kändas of the Vedas constitute one homogeneous subject. Unlike the Mīmāmsă school where validity of verbal statement is restricted to those vedic texts which have for their scope what is yet to be accomplished (sadhya), in Visiṣṭādvaita the vedic texts which denote Brahman an existent reality (siddha), are also equally authoritative. The Pañca- räträgama and the Vaikhānasāgama, which do not contradict the Vedas, are authoritative in toto ac- cording to this system.iw- tuo Hor

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PRAMEYA domow

to server

The object of valid knowledge (prameya) is divid- ed into two main categories as dravya (substance) and adravya (non-substance). Dravya is not only the material cause but as the locus of change. There are six dravyas-prakṛti, kāla, dharmabhūta- jñāna, nityavibhuti, jīva and Iśvara. Adravya, which is an attribute, is always dependent on dravya. While dravya as an attribute is subject to change, the dravya, as the substantive element, does not undergo any change. A characteristic feature of Visiṣṭādvaita is that adravya is sometimes viewed as both substance and attribute. For instance, though prabha (light) is an attribute of an effulgent object, it serves also as a sub- stance, since it is subject to contraction and diffusion, and possesses colour as an attribute. From the absolute standpoint Isvara is the only dravya, and the world of matter and selfs are his attributes. Iśvara and jīva viewed as substantive elements are not subject to modi- fications, while prakṛti, kāla, dharmabhūtajñāna and nityavibhuti as attributive elements undergo change.

The s

The adravyas are ten. Sattva, rajas and tamas are the qualities of prakṛti. Sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are the qualities of the five bhūtas

.and like ākāśa etc. Samyoga (conjunction) is the external relation between substances. Sakti (potency) is the effecting agent of causation in all causal substances.

PRAKRTI

Prakrti, characterized by the three gunas, consti- tutes the stuff out of which the universe evolves. It is

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the abode of individual self in mundane existence. It is called mulaprakṛti, since it is the primordial cause of the cosmos. It is known as ākāśa, as it is eternal in spite of its manifold changes and modifications. It is termed as avyakta, as it is very subtle in its causal state. It is called avidya, as it is opposed to the know- ledge of Reality, and is known as māyā, as it is the cause of cosmic wonders.zul) had

ao When the matter is in an extremely latent state without distinction of name and form, it is known as pralaya. From prakṛti, known as tamas in the begin- ning of evolution, mahat appears with the three states into ahankara of sattva, rajas and tamas. Mahat evolves into ahankära with the same three states called sättvikahankära (vaikarika), rājasahankara (taijasa) and tāmasahankära (bhūtādi). From sättvikāhankāra, aided by the rajasā- haǹkāra, proceed the eleven senses (five karmendriyas, five jñānendriyas and manas). From tāmasahaṁkāra, aided by taijasa, arise the five gross elements of ākāśa etc., through the media of the five tanmatras of sound, touch, colour, savour and odour.

The entire process of cosmic evolution is nothing but change of states. The distinction between cause and effect is not real. A particular anterior state is called cause and a particular posterior state is called effect. Every effect connotes a pre-existing cause. The doctrine of satkāryavāda or pariņāmavāda affirms the non-difference of cause and effect.

KALA

Kāla (time) is eternal and all-pervasive. Unlike prakṛti, it is devoid of the three gunas of sattva, rajas

and tamas. Time as effect, which we experience in our ordinary life, is changing and non-eternal. Months and years according to human and divine standards, the four yugas, the birth of Manus, etc., and nitya, naimittika and prākṛta dissolutions are dependent on time. It serves as an instrument in the cosmic func- tions of Isvara. Though time has independence in the lilāvibhuti (play-manifestation), it has no indepen- dent status in the nityavibhuti (eternal-manifestation).

NITYAVIBHŪTI

weddings

Nityavibhuti is the immaterial, infinite domain beyond prakṛti and its three gunas. It is self-luminous and is charaterized by what is known as śuddhasattva, different from the sattva of the three guņas: It is known by the different names of paramapada, tripadvi- bhūti, ānandaloka, etc. Vaikuntha, the city of God, is situated within the realm of nityavibhuti. It is the stuff out of which the bodies of Isvara, the eternals, and the liberated selfs are made. It is the means for the enjoy- ment of the liberated self. The five śaktis of sarva, nivṛtti, viśva, puruşa and parameṣṭhin, and the six attributes of jñāna, śakti, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya and tejas manifest in this eternal domian of suddhasattva. Though it is beyond prakṛti, it is capable of descending and permeating the consecrated images (arca) in sacred places.

DHARMABHŪTAJÑĀNA

The conception of dharmabhūtajñāna has already been indicated in dealing with the psychology of per- ception. It is eternal and all-pervasive in respect ofxxix

Iśvara and jīvas. It is not only self-illumined but is also of the nature of both dravya and guna (substance and attribute). Dravya is that which is the substratum of states, and guna depends upon dravya. Dharma- bhūtajñāna is conceived as a dravya, since it is the substratum of change through its states of expansion and contraction; and as a guna, since it inheres in a substance like jīva or Isvara.

JAYRA

dan Terms such as mati, prajñā, samvit, śemuși, etc. are synonyms of dharmabhūtajñāna. All mental states are reduced to consciousness, inasmuch as jñāna is the attribute as well as the essence of individual self. There is no feeling that is not more or less mixed by thinking, no volition that is not influenced by thought. The consciousness is, as it were, an ocean which has the multifarious ripples of mental life. Hence pratyakṣa, anumana, sabda, instincts, desires and passions are but the various phases of dharmabhūtajñāna. It embraces the paths of karma, jñāna and bhakti, and constitutes the root of religious experience. Finally, when the religious experience develops into firm meditation which is compared to the uninterrupted flow of oil, it becomes the means for realizing the beatific form of the Divine. Thus the religious consummation is absolutely depen- dent on the perfect manifestation of dharmabhūta- jñāna.

[The spiritual discipline in the path to perfection. begins with karmayoga which is action without any regard for the fruits, illumined by the true knowledge of the individual self and the Highest. The discipline of karmayoga destroys the impurities of the mind, generates jñāna, and through it, or directly, prepares

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the mind for bhakti. Jñanayoga is meditation upon the individual self, as distinct from prakṛti and its effects, after realizing its true nature from the instruc- tions of the preceptor. Bhaktiyoga is a continuous stream of remembrance of Iśvara, uninterrupted like the continual flow of oil poured from one vessel to another, and is characterized by the eightfold limbs of yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samadhi. Such steady remembrance which is of the same character as intuition results only from the sevenfold discipline (sadhanasaptaka) of viveka (discrimination), vimoka (mental detachment), abhyasa (constant practice), kriya (good actions), kalyāna (virtu- ous conduct), anavasada (cheerfulness), and anuddarṣa (non-exultation).

Bhaktiyoga is the classical pathway to liberation.] [But there is an alternative path to release for those who find it difficult to practise the austere disciplines of sadhanasaptaka and aṣṭāngayoga, and who are not qualified to receive instruction in the Veda and the Upanisads. This may be followed by anyone, irres- pective of his or her limitations, physical, mental, or social. This is known as prapatti. The heart of pra- patti is absolute self-surrender with the firm faith in the saving grace of Isvara. The main characteristics of prapatti are ’to conceive what is in conformity with the will of God, to reject what is disagreeable to Him, to have firm faith that He will save, to seek Him alone as the protector and to surrender one’s self to him in all meekness’. A single act of self-surrender in all sincerity is sufficient to bring about release at once. J

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JIVA 1

Like Iśvara, the jīva is of the nature of conscious- ness and possesses dharmabhūtajñāna as an inseparable attribute. It is real, eternal and unborn. It is distinct from the body, the sense organs, mind and vital airs. Though the individual self, as a mode of Brahman, is essentially of the same nature, it is actually distinct; for it is of monadic size and resides in a separate body. It is the agent, the enjoyer, the embodied Self and the body. It is the embodied Self with regard to its physical body. It is the body with regard to Isvara. It is not only sentient, but it is also of the essence of ananda. Samsara is due to avidya which is of the nature of karma, accumulated by the jīva in its previous births. In this condition jñāna and ananda are obscured but fully manifest in the state of liberation. In spite of its monadic size, the jīva can contact the ends of space through its attributive knowledge.

The jivas, which are innumerable, belong to three classes. The nityas (eternals) are those who have never been caught in saṁsāra, and who have from eternity been enjoying ananda in the Supreme Abode. The muktas (liberated) are those souls who have attained liberation through bhakti and prapatti. The baddhas (the bound) are those who are not liberated from the transmigratory existence due to avidya and karma. At the moment of giving up the body, the jiva which has attained to the knowledge of Brahman issues out of the body through the aperture in the crown of the head and moves upwards through the rays of the sun. The released self ultimately reaches its supreme goal and

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enjoys ananda for ever being established in the com- munion with God. Mokṣa is essentially of the nature of sǎyujya (communion), and not sälokya (co-existence), sarūpya (similarity) or samipya (intimacy).

bat

ISVARA

at obem

chirib

10,

The relation of Isvara to cit and acit has already been mentioned. He is the controller (niyanta), the principal (śeşin) of all, the worshipped in every act, the bestower of all fruit, the sustainer of all and the supreme cause of all effects, while cit and acit are his modes and subsidiaries (sesas), the controlled and the supported. Since consciousness presupposes a consci- ous self, the Reality is not identical with consciousness. Hence Iśvara is not, pure non-differenced Being, nor pure Consciousness, but the highest Self, characterized essentially by consciousness and unsurpassable ānanda. He is the sole cause of the universe since he compre- hends it within himself in latent form prior to creation, and then

then by his will manifests what is latent.

The conception of God as the Supreme Person and creator raises the following question: How can the Supreme Being be eternally perfect, if he manifests himself as the world? Will not the imperfections of the world adhere to the perfect Being also? Visiṣṭādvaita attempts to solve this problem by its doctrine of sarira- śarīrī-sambandha or the relation between the world and Brahman as body and soul. Brahman has the world of life and matter for his body, and constitutes the Universal Self of that body. The world-body has two states, kāraṇa and karya, or the causal and the

XXV

effected, the nature of which are contraction and expansion. These states belong to the world-body of Brahman alone and not Brahman himself. Expan-

sion is evolution and contraction is involution. Brahman becomes or manifests the world in the sense that he evolves the body which is his attribute. Not that the essence of Reality is in a state of flux. The notion of a Supreme Person, whose attribute only is in a state of manifestation, makes the divine Being, the substantive element, the ground of all existence. (The entire process of evolution in the form in which Iśvara mani- fests himself in and through the world-body is an opportunity given to jīvas to attain a life of perfec- tion and communion with the Supreme.) Though this view of evolution attributes to the divine Being a transcendent activity, he as the Antaryamin, reveals his nature in the entire process of evolution and human history. This imparts a unique value to the religious experience of all individuals in their intellectual, moral and psychic levels.

The imperfections clinging to the body do not affect the Universal Self, and the transcendental attributes of the Universal Self do not pervade the body. It is just like infancy, youth, old age and other bodily modifications, which are not the attributes of jīvas, but belong to the body, while pleasure, pain, etc., belong only to the knowing self and not to the body. Thus the relation of sarira-saririn absolves the Reality from having even a shadow of evil.)

Though Visiṣṭādvaita conceives the Reality as qualified by the realms of cit and acit, these modes do not constitute the whole of Reality; for the realms

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of cit and acit, which as existents are real, are not identified with Iśvara who is a self-conscious Being and the substratum of everything. The view of Reality as adhāra and niyantă not only gives a glimpse of the nature of the Supreme Being, but also suggests the personal nature of the Divine. The Visiṣṭādvaita conception of Deity must be sharply distinguished from pantheism on the one hand, and anthropo- morphism on the other hand. There is no room for pantheism since the Reality, in spite of being the Antaryamin in all, is looked upon as Nārāyaṇa, con- crete and endowed with consciousness and super- individuality. Likewise any sort of anthropomorphism is out of place, since the (Supreme Being is thought of as possessing the six attributes of jñāna, aiśvarya, śakti, bala, vīrya and tejas, besides the infinite auspicious qualities of love, mercy, kindness, etc., which transcend the ordinary qualities of human personality.)

Though very often the view has been expressed that Hinduism possesses no elements of theism, Visiṣṭādvaita offers a theistic ideal which affirms the existence of the Supreme Person and consistently in- terprets our experience as a whole so as to account for the oneness of the world. Isvara is an actually exis- tent reality who embraces and comprehends all indivi- dual self and the world of matter-not as isolated entities-but as intimately related to one another in an organic manner, and thus forming a perfect and coherent unity. They have no existence apart from him; in and through him life and matter have meaning and significance.

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THE AUTHOR AND HIS WORK

This compendium, entitled Yatindramatadipikā, is one of the most favourite works among the students of Visistadvaita. If the writings of Śrī Vedanta- deśika, the great exponent of Visiṣṭadvaita, are grand and imposing in diction and presentation, this little work is simple, lucid and full of meaning. As a com- pendious presentation of the epistemology, psychology and cosmology of Visiṣṭādvaita, this manual may be said to have no parallel among the works of its class in the system.

Śrīnivāsa, the author of this standard manual, seems to have been a resident of holy Tirupati, now a township in the Chittoor district of the Presidency of Madras. It is clear from the colophon of the work that he was a son of one Svämi-puskariņi Govindācārya, a devotee of Sri Venkṭeśa, and a disciple of Mahācārya of Vadhula-gotra. This Māhācārya or. Mahārāya is identified with Doḍḍayyācārya of the Kandala Vadhūla- gotra.2 Mähācārya ranks with the great exponents of the Visiṣṭādvaita philosophy. He wrote a famous com- mentary named Candāmāruta on Vedäntadesika’s Satadusani which exhibits his genius and originality as a thinker. Apart from Candamaruta, he has to his credit more than seven works, most of which have not yet been printed. Some of these are Advaitavidyāvi- jaya, Brahmasutrabhāṣya-upanyasa, Parikaravijaya, 1 इति श्रीमद्वाधूलकुलतिलक श्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीमद्वेङ्कटगिरिनाथ- पदकमलसेवापरायणस्वामिपुष्करिणीगोविन्दाचार्यसूनुना श्रीनिवासदासेन विरचिता यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकाख्या शारीरकपरिभाषा समाप्ता ।

2 See the Introduction to ‘The Light of the School of Rāmānuja’ by Govindacarya Svämin.

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Pārāśaryavijaya, Brahmavidyāvijaya,

Vedantavijaya, and Sadvidyavijaya. According to Govindācārya Svāmin, Mahācārya was a friend and contemporary of Appayyadikṣita, one of the greatest scholars of his time.

Mr M. T. Narasimha Iyengar thinks that he had a controversy with Dīkṣita or the philological significance of the word Nārāyaṇa.1 Dīkṣita is gene- rally placed between 1420-1593 A.D. So Mahācārya might have lived towards the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century.

rāja

In this connection it is worth noting that Dharma- rāja Adhavarin, the celebrated author of the Vedanta- paribhāṣā, also lived in the seventeenth century. It appears that Srinivasa was aware of his senior con- temporary’s work as he in some places quotes the very st words of Dharmaraja while presenting the prima facie ve

-linst view of Advaita.2 While Dharmaraja calls his work Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Śrīnivāsa names his Šarīrakapari-

bhāṣā.

tang d

Srinivasa was a direct descendant in the long line of Śrīvaiṣṇava apostles. His immediate preceptor Mahācārya and other Mahācāryas of the same line who were domiciled in Colasimhapuram trace their ancestry to Dasarathi, a nephew of Śrī Rāmānuja.3 So our author had the benefit of the traditional teachings, so valued in the guruparampara of Śrīvaiṣṇavas. Śrīnivasa has no pretensions to origniality, since he, at

1 Ibid.

2 चैतन्यं त्रिविधम् — अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यम्, अन्तकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं, विषयावच्छिन्नं चेतन्यं चेति ।

3 See the Introduction to ‘The Light of the School of Ramanuja’.

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the beginning of his work, acknowledges his indebted- ness to the former acaryas beginning from Bhagavan Bodhayana to his immediate guru, Mahācārya. In the epilogue also he gives a long list of ancient works from which he has drawn upon. The list starts with the Dramiḍabhasya and ends with Parasaryavijaya, the work of Mahācārya. This suggests that the famous Dramiḍabhāṣya was available as late as the seventeenth

century.