रामानुजीये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Now, Anumana or Inference will be ex- pounded:

That knowledge (Pramiti) is Inferential knowledge (Anumiti), which is the particular knowledge of the pervading (Vyāpaka), obtained from the consideration of the pervaded- ness of the pervaded (Vyāpaka) “. The Instrument or Means by which such knowledge is obtained is Inference (Anumāna). (Illustra- tion): Knowing that smoke is pervaded by fire, the knowledge of the pervading is obtained, ie., fire.

The Pervaded (Vyāpya) is ruled by limit- edness of space and time. The Pervading (Vyapaka) has the Characteristic (vṛtti) of

Vyapya and Vyapaka are technical terms of Hindu Noëtics. In the sentence. ‘smoke is pervaded by fire’, it means that the one is invariably found with the other. Vyapti would be the invariable or universal concomitance of two things; or the insepa- rable connection of the one with the other, sine In the illustration, smoke is the Pervaded,

non-limited space and time.

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The Pervaded

is even in inseparable conjunction (with the Pervading). The Pervading is the correlate (or Co-ordinate to the Pervaded). The invariable fixed relation subsisting between the two is Pervasion (Vyapti). This Pervasion, stated as: ‘Where there is smoke, there is fire’ is admitted, from frequent (or repeated) observation. **

Pervasion is twofold: Positive (Anvaya) and Negative (Vyatireka). Where by an Inferrant (Sadhana) the Inferred (Sadhya) is attempted, that Pervasion is called Positive, for example: ‘Whatever is smoky is fiery’”, where, by the denial of the Inferred (Sadhya), the denial of fire the Pervading, element. Vyapti may perhaps be rendered by co-concurrence of two or more facts.

“This means that fire is a more universal term than smoke, for there may be fire where there is no smoke, but where there is smoke there is fire. Cp. this with the major term and middle term of logic, the minor term being the place where fire is found (say mountain). Vyapya is thus the Particular, and Vyapaka the Universal.

** That is to say, the general statement is by induction from several particular instances.

That is, wherever smoke is observed, there is Are (as in a hill)-(by Agreements, in other words).

II.]

INFERENCE

the Inferrant (Sādhana) is attempted, that Per- vasion (Vyapti) is Negative, for example: ‘What is non-fiery is non-smoky ‘. " Both these kinds of Pervasion is affected or circumscribed by conditions (Upadhi). Condition (Upadhi) means where the Inferred (Sadhya) pervades, the In- ferrant (Sadhana) does not pervade. For example, where, by fire, smoke is intended to be inferred, the condition (required) is conjunction with moist firewood; or where brownness is intended to be inferred by being the son (or sonness) of Maitri, the condition is the circum- stance of such birth (caused) by (eating) cooked

greens.

66 That is, when the hill has no fire in it, it has no smoke. (by Differences, in other words).

Such condition is absent in a heated iron ball. Upadki, in other words is that which always co-exists with the major term, and not always so with the middle term. See note on ‘Upadhi’ p. 275. Appendix to Madhavacārya’s Sarva-Darsana-Sam- graha [by E. B. Cowell &c., Trubner & Co., London].

87 That is where the cause of brownness of a son is intended to be inferred because of his birth from his mother Maitri, a circumscribing condition for32

YATINDRA-MATA-DIPIKA

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Condition or Limitation (Upādhi) is twofold: Settled (Niścita) and Doubted (Śankita).

The Settled is thus:–

(Assertion) ‘The disputed “service” is woe- ful, (= Conclusion)

(Reason) Because it partakes of servitude, (Instance) Like service to a king.’

In this (syllogism), the condition Upādhi) (of serving a king, which is distasteful to the servitor) is provided by (one’s) sin being the determinant. But this does not exist in the ser- vice to God. This therefore is called the Settled

condition.88

The Doubted is thus:-

(Assertion) The disputed 8 soul, after the term of this body, attains Release (Mukti) (=Conclusion).

such a fact may suggest the cause to be due to his eating of green vegetables. The inference of a cause from an effect is thus affected by some condition.

** That is, that soul is to serve God is a condition of a settled nature..

“Disputed means a disputed point,-a questioned assertion. That is, God-service may, or not, be a fact. Such an entity as soul may, or not, exist. A noot-point.

II.]

INFERENCE

((Reason) Because, meditation is ripe,

(Instance) Like Śuka.”

In this (syllogism), the condition (required) is the surceasal of all actions or works (Karma). As it is doubtful whether such a condition exists or no in a problematical soul,-meditation- ripe-that condition is called the doubted.

Hence, where a connection (or relation) exists unaffected by condition (Nir-upādhika), that which is so connected is the Pervaded (Vya- pya).

Pervaded (Vyapya), Means or Instrument (Sādhana), Sign (Linga), are not of different import”. “This has two forms, which are limbs (i.e., factors or elements) to Inferential know- ledge (Anumiti):-(1) Pervasion (Vyapti), and

The great sage, the son of Vyasa.

“I…, they are synonymous terms.

The definition of Vyapti is: Yatra dhumas tatra ‘gnir iti sähacarya-niyamo VYAPTIḤ’ i.e where invariable attendedness or con-comitance holds, such as ‘where smoke is, there is fire”. Vyatti or Pervasion (a technical term) thus means the indiscerptible co-existent relation between two things.

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(2) Subject-attributiveness” (Paksha-dhar- matā).

It has also five forms. They are:-

(1) The being attributive to subject (Paksha- dharmată),

(2) The presence in right place (Sa-Paksha- tua),

(3) The absence from wrong place (Vi- paksha-vyāvṛtti),

(4) Not annulled by, or inexceptionable (A-badhita-vishayatva),

(5) Absence of equal antithesis (A-sat-prati- paksha).

Paksha (Subject) is the substance (Dharmi) in which the inferrable attribute (Dharma)

“Subject = terminus minor (smoking mountain),

Predicate-terminus major (smokiness),

Middle term terminus medius (fieriness),

Smoke found in the mountain, and smoke always accompanying fire, are thus the two signs or reasons by which to infer fire in the mountain.

The definition of Paksha-dharmata is.-‘Vyap yasya parvatádi-vṛttitvam’, i.e., the existence of the Pervaded in mountain etc., such as, ’the smoke seen is found to exist in the mountain’.

II.]

INFERENCE

exists; such as the mountain etc., in which the fieriness (Predicate) is to be established.

Sa-paksha (Right Subject or Place) is the similarity to that where an attribute is to be established; such as the kitchen-hearth etc.

Vi-paksha (Wrong Subject or Place) is the dissimilarity to where an attribute is to be esta- blished; such as the lake etc.

Badhita-vishayatva (annulled thing) is the absence of what is to be surely established in the subject by strong reasons (to the contrary); such as: ’the lake is fiery’. ‘Not so annulled’ is A-badhita-vishayatva.

A-sat-pratipakshatva” is the non-annulment by an equally strong reason.

The Vyapya (or Inferential instrument) so described is two-fold: (1) Anvaya-vyatireki

** A negative instance, or an instance on the opposite side, or that in which the Sadhya the Inferred or the terminus major (predicate, ie., fieriness) is not found; such as the negation of fieriness in a lake (of water), as its assertion can be made in a hearth. Et seq.

Sat-pratipaksha means that where a reason exists to disprove what is to be proved :—Yasya sädhyābhāva- sädhakam helv-antaram vidyate sa sat-pratipakshaḥ.

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(Present-Absent), (2) Kevalà-’nvayi (Present

only).

The aforesaid five-formed Pervasion (i.e., Vyapti or Instrument) is of the Present-Absent. Thus:-

Vyati- + Anvayi.

reki

• The mountain is fiery,

Because it is smoky,

For whatever is smoky is fiery,

As the kitchen-hearth.

(Whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky,

Like the lake.’

Absent +Present

The same without the Vipaksha (antithesis) is the Kevalanvayi (Present only, form). Thus:– Brahman is Word- expressible,

Kevalan-

vayi

Because It is a thing,

Like the jar.’

Present

only

Hence the Kevala-’nvayi is four-formed be cause the fifth, the antithesis (Vipaksha) is wanting.

A Kevala-vyatireki (Absent only) form, is inconceivable inasmuch as Sadhya (predicate

" I…, Revelational or Scriptural Word. It means, Scriptures alone can speak of God. This is in con- trast to Natural Theism.

II.]

INFERENCE

or major term) is nowhere. Hence a purely Vyatireki is excluded (or inadmissible).

That either the Kevala-’nvayi or the Anvaya- vyatireki concerns only the supersensuous objects is (thus) repudiated.*

The aforesaid Anumāna (Inference), say some, is divisible into two kinds: (1) Svārtha or Self- benefit, (2) Parartha or Others’ benefit. Others (opine): it is of the ‘self’ character alone, inasmuch as all inferences are ensuant on the power of one’s own reflection, and hence useful for one’s own procedure.

The syllogism that establishes an Inference consists of five members:

Pratijna-Assertion, 2. Hetu-Reason,
Udaharaṇa-Instance,
Upanaya-Application (or Deduction),

*That is, the opinion that inferential ‘Means’ establi- shes only objects beyond the cognition of the senses, is not admitted. This position is that of the Natural Theologians as contrasted with the Orthodox or Scriptural Theologians. The Naiyayikas think that God can be proved by Inference; but the Vedantins affirm that such a proof is unstable; whereas proof by Scriptures (Word) is unshakable.

Nigamana-Conclusion."

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In this, Pratija or Assertion is the sentence indicating the Paksha (Subject), thus:—

‘The mountain is fiery’.

Hetu or Reason indicates the Linga (Sign), thus:-

‘Because it is smoky’.

Udāharaṇa or Instance is indicating an ex- ample where concomitance or co-existence (Vyapti) obtains, and this is twofold; Anvaya or Affirmation, and Vyatireka or Negation, thus:-

‘Whatever is smoky is fiery’ is a case of Affirmative Instance.

‘Whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky’ is a case of Negative Instance.

Upanaya or Application is the sentence which refers the Reason to the subject by a

“The equivalent Vaiśeskika synonyms are:

Pratijna.
Apadesa, Linga, Pramāṇa, Kāraṇa,
Nidarśana.
Anusandhāna.
Pratyamnaya,

II.]

INFERENCE

consideration of the Instance. This also is two-fold: Affirmative and Negative; thus:-

‘The mountain is smoky,’ is of the Affirmative. ‘The mountain is not non-smoky’ is of the Negative.

Nigamana or Conclusion is the sentence, which conclusively locates what is to be Infer- red (Sadhya) in the Subject (Paksha), by means of the Reason (Hetu). This is also twofold, thus:-

(1) ‘Therefore the mountain is fiery’,

(2) Therefore the mountain is non-fiery.’ This five-membered syllogism is of the School of the Naiyāyikas or the Logicians.

The Mimamsakas” uphold a three-mem- bered syllogism, viz., Assertion (Pratijñā), Reason (Hetu), and Example or Instance (Udā- harana).

The Saugatas " hold to a two-membered syllogism, viz., Example (Udāharaṇa) and Application (Upanaya).

“The Vaidikas of the two Schools Purva and Uttara; or the Vedantins, as may both of them be styled.

“The School of the Buddhists divided into Sautrāntika, Vaibhāshika, Yogâcāra, and Mādhyamika,

YATINDRA-MATA-DIPIKĀ

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For some it may be five members; for some three, and two for some, but for us there is no restriction. By Example and Application alone, Pervasion (Vyapyatva) and Location (Paksha- dharmata) are established, and Inference is possible from this much alone. That amplificat- ions and abridgements may (severally) suit the (different) dispositions of minds, lowly, middling or lofty, place us under no restrictions whatever (as to number).

Thus a well-reasoned five-membered syllo- gism provides the proof for the fire (in the mountain). ‘Well-reasoned’ is (advisedly) used in order to guard against an inferential know- ledge of fire being attainable by a smoke- resembling volume of dust.

There are specious arguments seemingly valid, called: Hetv-übhāsas.100 They are:-

Asiddha (Impossible),
Viruddha (Reverse),
An-aikantika (or Sa-vyabhicāra) (Super- fluous),

109 I. ., Paralogisms and Sophisms, or Fallacies.

II.]

INFERENCE

Prakarana-sama (or Sat-prati-paksha)

(equi-loquent).

Kālātyaya’padishṭa* (or Badhiā) (Mis-

timed).

Of these, Asiddha or Impossible is three- fold:-.

(1) Svarūpâ’siddha or Natural Impossibility, (2) Ãśrayâ’siddha or Local Impossibility, and (3) Vyapyatva’siddha or Pervasive Impossi-

bility.

(1) Natural Impossibility is thus (illustra- ted):-

The Jiva (soul) is eternal, Because it is visible,

Like the jar.’

(2) Local Impossibility thus:-

‘The sky-lotus is fragrant,

For it is of the lotus (species), Like the pond-lotus.’

Sky-lotus is the locus and this is non-ens.

(3) Pervasive Impossibility is of two kinds: The one is that where the Means for pervasion is absent, the other where a condition (Upadhi)

• Also called Kalatita [vide Gotama Sutras, 50]: ’ Kalâtyayâfadishṭaḥ kälätstek.’

642

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is present. The First is thus:- Whatever is is momentary’. In this the Means whereby to establish an induction between the is ’ness and

momentariness is absent. The Second is thus:-

‘The Agni-shomiya 10-immolation determi- nes demerit,

For it is of the killing (kind),

Like killing, out of the pale of Kratu Here the conditioning comes from the prohi- bitioning.

Hence the reason of killing is conditioned.

The Viruddha or reverse-fallacy is that in which the reason is vitiated by the reverse. Thus.-

‘Matter (Prakṛii) is eternal,

Because it is effected,

Like time.’

Here the reason of ’effected’ is pervaded by the negation of the Inferrable.

101

101 A sacrifice (Vedic) prescribed to the Deities Agni and Soma.

10 Here what is intended to be proved is the eternality of matter; but in the reason given, a non- eternal element (viz., effectedness) occurs. Hence what is to be proved is negated.

II.]

INFERENCE

The Anaikantika is Savyabhicara or Superfluous :-

198

This is twofold: (1) Sādhāraṇa or Ordinary, (2) Asādhāraṇa or Extraordinary. The ‘Ordi nary’ is of the Paksha (Subject), Sa- paksha 10 (Co-Subject). Vi-paksha (Ex- Subject). Thus:-

‘Sound is eternal,

Because it is ‘object’

Like time.’

100

108

The Extraordinary’ is what is absent from (or non-existent in) Sa-paksha (Co-Subject), and Vi-paksha (Ex-Subject). Thus :—

‘The Earth is eternal

Because it is odorous.’

107

Prakarana-sama or Equi-loquent is that where a reason exists which proves (or infers) the negative of that which is to be proved:

103 Ie, the terminus minor,—the mountain.

1** The kitchen-hearth.

105 The lake.

106 ‘Object’ is to translate Prameye or that which is cognised by a Pramana or Means of Knowledge. 107 L… Which tells equally on both sides,

‘God is eternal,

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For He is devoid of non-eternality, God is not eternal,

For He is devoid of eternality.’ This is the same as Sat-prati-paksha.108

Kalatyayapadishţa 10” or Mis-timed is thus:

‘Fire is non-warm,

For it is a substance,

Like water.’

But as fire is actually associated with warmth, the argument is debarred.

Having thus expounded Inference (Anumāna,) the others Comparison (Upamāna) etc., 11a are included in Inference. For example, Comparison is said to arise thus:-One, remembering the meaning of an analogous sentence, sees a form

•

100 Yasya badkyâbhāva sädhakam hetv-antaram asat- pratipakshaḥ’ [Tarka-Samgraha. II].

10 See mark p. 41, lit: precluded by time.’ 110 Others consider the Means of Knowledge to be more than the three which the Vedantins consider can cover all. The other Means (Pramanas) are such as :-Upamana or Comparison, Arthāpatti or Assump- tion, Sambhava or Probability, Attikya or Tradition; Cashfa or Gesture, Ablãos or Non-existence.

II.]

INFERENCE

similar to that associated with cow. Then arises the knowledge of the form (or the new object, the Cow-like Gavaya), so associated, aided by the remembrance of the meaning of the sentence (before heard). Assortable thus with remem- brance (memory), Comparison is classable under Perception. Or it is classable under Inference as there is evidence of a process of induction (Vyapti).” Or it may be surmised as falling under the class ‘Word’, for it is derived from a sentence (heard).

111

Arthâpatti or Assumption is thus:- A person is observed not eating in the day time, yet looks plump. The assumption is made that he eats in the night. This is classifiable under Inference

Tarka or argument is the bringing about a non-desire (or negation) of the Pervading (Vyā- paka) by admitting the Pervaded (Vyapya), thus:-Supposing an Inference were stated:

“The mountain is fiery

Because it is smoky ‘;

"” See Pages 14, 15, 16, 17 ante. Le., Analogical reasoning.

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and it were objected:-‘Let there be smoke, but no fire’, the argument would be: If there were no fire, let there be no smoke as well." The Means (Pramāņas) promote this.""*

J113

Niscaya (Nirnaya) or Ascertainment, is the ascertainment of a truth by the employment of Means, favoured by argumentation (Tarka).’

116

Vāda or Debate is unbiassed discussion, (or fair discussion by people free from prejudice)."

Jalpa or Wrangling is the discussion with the main view of (gaining) victory on either side."""

Vitanda or Cavilling, is the being devoid of (good reason for) establishing an opinion.’

118

Chala or Quibbling is the ascription of a different than the intended sense to an ex- pression.11

118 A reductio ad absurdum.

114 Read Gotama-Sutra: I. 1.

110

116

117

118

110

“I

40: Avigħāta &c.

I. 1. 41 : Vimṛśya &c.

I. 2. 42: Pramana &c.

I. 2.43: Yathokto &c.

I. 2. 44: Sa-pratipaksha &c. I. 2. 54: Sambhavato &c.

II.]

INFERENCE

Jāti or Futility is either reviling which will re-act on oneself, or a self-contradictory reply.120

Nigrahasthāna or that which courts one’s own defeat.’“1

All these are but limbs of Inference; hence

included in Inference.

We adopt the methods of the Naiyayikas wherever feasible. Hence such a course is not (to be thought) erroneous.

Thus has Inference been expounded.

Thus ends Advent II,

The Treatment of Inference (Anumāna)

in the

Light of the School of Rāmānuja.

121

130 Read Gotama-Sutra. I. 2. 56: Sadharmya &c.

I. 2. 60: Vipratipatti &c. Nigrahasthāna, literally means Occasion for rebuke’, ‘Unfitness for argument’ is the sense intended,

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