०२ अनुमानम्

द्वितीयोऽवतारः
अनुमानम्

१. अथानुमानं निरूप्यते । व्याप्यस्य व्याप्यत्वानुसन्धा- नात् व्यापक विशेषप्रमितिरनुमितिः । तत्करणमनुमानम् । व्या- प्यस्य धूमस्य अग्निव्याप्यत्वानुसन्धानात् व्यापकविशेषप्रमिति- र्वह्निप्रमितिः ।

२. अनधिकदेशकालनियतं व्याप्यम् । अन्यूनदेशकालवर्ति

AVATARA II

ANUMĀNA

1. Now inference is explained. Inferential cogni- tion is that which is the valid knowledge of the parti- cular pervader’ (vyāpaka), obtained from the observa- tion of the pervadedness of the ‘pervaded’ (vyāpya ). ’ Inference is the instrument of that (i.e., the inferential cognition). Inferential cognition of fire is that which is the valid knowledge of the particular pervader (fire) obtained from the observation of the fact of smoke being invariably pervaded by fire.

2. The pervaded is that which is, as a rule, not more extensive (than the vyapaka) in respect of space and time. The pervader is that which is not less exten- sive (than the vyāpya) in respect of space and time.

-अनुमानम्

२३

व्यापकम् तदिदमविनाभूतं व्याप्यम्; तत्प्रतिसम्बन्धि व्यापक- मिति ।

३. तेन निरुपाधिकतया नियतसम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । सेयं ‘यत्रधूमस्तत्र वह्निः’ इति व्याप्तिर्भूयोदर्शनात् गृह्यते ।

।

४. व्याप्तिद्विविधा - अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् । साधनविधौ साध्यविधिरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । यथा - ‘यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान्’ इति । साध्यनिषेधे साधननिषेधरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । यथा - ‘योऽनग्निः स निर्धूम’ इति ।

This pervaded has invariable relation (with the per- vader); (and) the pervader is the correlate of that (i.e., the pervaded).

3. Therefore it is said that pervasion is the invari- able relation (between the pervaded and the pervader) not based on any adventitious condition.2 This perva- sion in the form, ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’, is perceived after repeated observation.3

4. Pervasion is of two kinds, because of the difference as the affirmative (concomitance) and the negative (concomitance). When, by the affirmation of the probans, the probandum is determined, that perva- sion is called the affirmative pervasion; for instance, ‘whatever has smoke, has fire’. When, by the nega- tion of the probandum, the negation of the probans is determined, that pervasion is called the negative pervasion; for instance, ‘whatever has no fire has no smoke’.

२४

५. सेयमुभयविधा व्याप्तिरुपाधिसम्भवे दुष्यति । साध्य- व्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वम् उपाधिः । यथा वह्निना धूमे साध्यमाने आर्द्रेन्धनसम्बन्ध उपाधिः । मंत्रीतनयत्वेन इयामत्वे साध्यमाने शाकपाकजत्वमुपाधिः ।

६. स चोपाधिद्विविधः - निश्चितः शङ्कितश्चेिति । निश्चि- । तो यथा - ‘विप्रतिपन्ना सेवा दुःखहेतुः, सेवात्वात्, राजसेवावत्’ इत्यत्र पापारब्धत्वमुपाधिः । अयन्तु ईश्वरसेवायां नास्तीति निश्चयादयं निश्चितोपाधिः । शङ्कितो यथा - ‘विप्रतिपन्नो जीव एतच्छरीरावसाने मुक्तिमान्, निष्पन्नसमाधित्वात् शकादिवत्’ इत्यत्र कर्मत्यन्तपरिक्षय उपाधिः । स च निष्पन्न समाधौ विप्रति-

5. When upādhi (adventitious condition ) inter- venes, both the kinds of pervásion become vitiated. Upadhi is that which is invariably pervasive of the probandum and non-pervasive of the probans. For instance, where smoke is to be inferred by fire, the upādhi is contact with wet fuel. 4 (Or), where, by being the son of Maitrī, brownness is to be inferred, the upadhi is having been born of a substance of the particular digested green vegetables.

6. Upādhi is of two kinds: the determined and the doubted. The determined is (as follows ); ‘service ( of Iśvara), it is disputed, is the cause of sorrow, because it is servile, like the service to a king’. Here the upadhi is the effectuation of sin.5 But since it is esta- blished that this does not exist in the service of Isvara, this upādhi is called the determined. The doubted is as follows: ‘The individual self, it is disputed, after giving up the body becomes free, because the samādhi is perfect, like that of Suka’. Here the upadhi is

Y5

अनुमानम्

२५

पन्ने जीवे, अस्ति नास्तीति सन्दिग्दधत्वात् शङ्कितोपाधिः । अतो निरुपाधिकसम्बन्धवत् व्याप्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

७. व्यप्यं साधनं लिङ्गम् इति नार्थान्तरम् ।

८. तस्य द्वे रूपे अनुमित्यङ्गभूते - व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता चेति । पञ्चरूपाण्यपि सन्ति । तानि च पक्षसत्त्वं सपक्षसत्त्वं विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तिः अबाधितविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति ।

९. सिसाधयिषितधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी पक्षः । यथा अग्नि- मत्त्वादिसाधने पर्वतादिः ।

absolute destruction of karma. Since it is doubtful whether such condition exists or not in the individual self, the subject of dispute, whose meditation has become perfect, this upadhi is called the doubted. Hence it is established that the probans is present where there is unconditional relation.

7. Vyāpya, sādhana and linga are not of different meaning.6

8. It ( vyāpya ) has two forms-pervasion and subject-characterization," which are the two limbs of inferential cognition. It has also five forms (or condi- tions). There are the presence in the subject (paksa- sattva), the presence in the similar instance (sapakşa- sattva), the absence (of the probans) in the counter- instance (vipaksād vyāvrtti), unstultified object (abādhi- tavişayatva) and absence of the opposite probans (asat- pratipaksatva).

vili 9. Pakṣa (subject) is that substrates which is qualified by the attribute desired to be inferred; as mountain etc. in which fire is to be inferred. 9

२६

१०. सिसाधयिषितसजातीयधर्मवान् सपक्षः । यथा महा- नसादिः ।

११. साध्यतज्जातीयशून्यो विपक्षः । यथा महाहृदः ।

१२. प्रबलेन प्रमाणेन पक्षे निश्चितसाध्याभाववत्त्वं बाधि- तविषयत्वम् । यथा - ‘महाह्रदोऽग्निमान्’ इत्यादि । तदभावस्तु अबाधितविषयत्वम् ।

१३. समबलतया प्रतीयमानप्रमाणोपरोधाभावोऽसत्प्रति- पक्षत्वम् ।

१४ एवंभूतं व्याप्यं द्विविधम्-अन्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवला- न्वयिभेदात् ।

Jon one daug

10. Sapaksa (similar instance) is that which possesses similar attributes (of the probandum) which is desired to be inferred; as hearth etc. (in which the concomitance of fire and smoke is observed).10

11. Vipaksa (counter-instance) is that which is devoid of the probandum as well as anything similar to that; as lake etc. 11

dsaidi

12. Bādhitavisayatva (stultified object) is the non-existence of the probandum, which is established in the subject by strong evidence; as, ’the lake has fire’ etc. 12 Non-existence of that is ‘unstultified object’.

13. Asatpratipaksatva is the non-existence of an obstruction by an equally powerful evidence.13

14. The probans of such description is twofold, because of the difference as anvaya-vyatirekin (the affir- mative cum the negative) and kevalänvayin (bare co- affirmation).

अनुमानम्

२७

१५. पूर्वोक्तपञ्चरूपोपपन्नं व्याप्यं अन्वयव्यतिरेकि यथा - ‘पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्; यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्नि- मान्, यथा ‘महानसः’ ‘योऽग्निः स निर्धूमः, यथा महाहद’ इति ।

१६. तादृशमेव विपक्षरहितं व्याप्यं केवलान्वयि । यथा- ‘ब्रह्म शब्दवाच्यं, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवत्’ । विपक्षाभावात् केवलान्वयि चतूरूपोपपन्नम् ।

१७. केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्याप्रसिद्धेस्तद्व्यतिरेकव्या- प्तिर्दुर्ग्रहा । अतः केवलव्यतिरेकिनिरासः ।

१८. केवलान्वयिनि अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि च अत्यन्ताती- न्द्रियार्थं गोचरता निरस्ता ।

1

15. The aforesaid five-formed probans is of the nature of anvaya-vyatirekin: as, ’the mountain has fire, because it has smoke; whatever has smoke has fire, as a hearth; whatever has no fire has no smoke, like a lake’.14

16. The same probans without counter-instance is bare anvayin: as, ‘Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar’.15 The bare anvayin has four forms (only), because of the non-existence of the counter-instance.

17. As the probandum is not known in kevala- vyatirekin (bare co-negation) the pervasion of co- negation is hard to understand. 16 Therefore the bare negative (probans) is rejected. 17

18. The (inferential) cognition of objects which are absolutely beyond the senses in bare anvayin or anvaya-vyatirekin is (hereby) refuted.

२८

28

स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति द्विधा विभज्य

१९. तदेतदनुमानं स्वार्थं परार्थं

केचिदाहुः ।

२०. सर्वेषामनुमानानां स्वप्रतिसंधानादिबलेन प्रवृत्ततया स्वव्यवहार मात्र हेतुत्वमिति स्वार्थानुमानमेव इत्यपरे ।

२१. तदनुमानबोधकवाक्यं प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगम- नरूपपञ्चावयवसंयुक्तम् ।

इति ।

२२. तत्र पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा - ‘पर्वतोऽग्निमान् '

।

२३. लिङ्गस्य वचनं हेतुः । यथा - ‘धूमवत्त्वात्’ इति । २४. व्याप्तिनिर्देशपूर्वकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । तत् द्विधा - - अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् । यथा - ‘यो यो धूमवान् स

19. Dividing this inference, some say it is of two kinds : that for oneself 18 and that for another. 19

20. Others say that inference is for oneself alone; for all inferences, owing to their origin by virtue of self- comprehension, become the cause for one’s experience

alone.

21. The syllogism which apprises that inference is made up of five members such as pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya and nigamana.

22. Of these, pratijña (thesis) is the statement which predicates the subject: as, ‘This mountain has fire’.

23. Hetu (reason) is the statement of the probans: as, ‘Because it has smoke’.

24. Udaharana (typical instance) is the statement of example after the pervasion is pointed out. This is twofold, because of the difference as the affirmative and

अनुमानम्

२९

सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस’ इत्यन्वयोदाहरणम् । ‘योऽनग्निः स निर्धूमः, यथा महाहृद’ इति व्यतिरेकोदाहरणम् ।

२५. दृष्टान्तनिदर्शनेन व्याप्ततया पक्षे हेतूपसंहारवाक्यमु- पनयः । सोऽपि द्विविधः - अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदाद् । ‘तथा धूमवान्’ इति अन्वयोपनयः । ‘अयं च न तथा निर्धूम’ इति व्यतिरेकोपनयः ।

२६. हेतुपूर्वकं पक्षे साध्योपसंहारवाक्यं निगमनम् । एतदपि द्विविधम् । यथा - ’ तस्मादग्निमान्’ इति अन्वयेन निगमनम् । ‘तस्मादयं निरग्निर्न भवति’ इति व्यतिरेकेण ।

२७. एवं पञ्चावयववादिनो नैयायिकाः ।

mamTM sT

the negative : as, ‘Whatever has smoke has fire, as a hearth’, is an affirmative example; ‘Whatever has no fire has no smoke, like a lake’, is a negative example.

25. Upanaya (application) is the concluding statement of the concomitant probans in the subject by pointing out the example. This is also twofold, because of the difference as the affirmative and the negative: ‘And so this has smoke’ is the application of an affir- mative type; ‘And so this is not without smoke’ is the application of a negative type.

26. Nigamana ( conclusion ) is the concluding statement of the probandum in the subject by means of the probans. Even this is twofold: as, ‘Therefore this (mountain) has fire’ is the conclusion of an affirmative type; ‘Therefore this (mountain) is not devoid of fire’ is the conclusion of a negative type.

27. Thus the Naiyāyikas are the upholders of the five-membered syllogism.

यतीन्द्र मतदोषिका

२८. प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणरूप व्यवयववादिनो मीमांसकाः । २९. उदाहरणोपनयरूपावयवद्वयवादिनः सौगताः ।

३०. अस्माक त्वनियमः । क्वचित् पञ्चावयवः क्वचित्त्र्य- वयवः क्वचित् द्वयवयवः । उदाहरणोपनयाभ्यामेव व्याप्तिपक्ष- धर्मतयोः सिद्धत्वात् तावतैव अनुमित्युपपत्तेश्च । मृदुमध्यमक- ठोरधियां विस्तरसंग्रहाभ्यां व्यवहार उपपद्यते इत्यनियम एव । एवं पञ्चावयवसंयुक्तः सद्धेतुरेव वह्नयनुमापकः । सद्धेतुरित्युक्त- त्वात् धूमसदृशधूलीपटलान्न वह्नयनुमितिः ।

28. The Mimämsakas are the expounders of the three-membered syllogism which is of the nature of pratijñā, hetu and udāharana. 20

29. The Saugatas 2 | are the expounders of the bimembered syllogism which is of the nature of udaha- rana and upanaya.

30. But for us there is no fixing the number. In certain cases there may be five members, in others three members and in others again two members; since by udaharaṇa and upanaya only pervasion and subject- characterization are established, the inference is accom- plished by these (two ) only. 22 Since by expansion and reduction (of members) the usages of weak, mediocre and sharp minds are accomplished, there is no fixing the rule. In this manner, right probans accompanied by the five members causes the inference of fire. From the expression ‘right probans’ (it follows that) inference of fire is not possible from a mass of dust resembling. smoke.अनुमानम्

३१

३१. अन्ये हेतुवद्भासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते च असिद्धवि- रुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदेन पञ्चप्रकाराः ।

३२. तत्र असिद्धस्त्रिविधः – स्वरूपासिद्ध आश्रयासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति ।

३३. स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा - ‘नित्यो जीवः, चाक्षुषत्वात्, घटवत्’ इति ।

३४. आश्रयासिद्धस्तु - व्योमारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्द - त्वात्, सरोजारविन्दवत्’ इति । व्योमारविन्दमाश्रयः । स चासिद्धः ।

-blotow

Ibbedynemer

31. Others say the fallacious reasons ( literally, appearance as probans) are those which appear like reason (while they are not). They are divided into five kinds, as asiddha (unestablished ), viruddha (adverse), anaikāntika (inconsistent), 23 prakaranasama ( equal explanation ) 24 and kalatyayapadişţa (vitiated by time).25

love

32. Of these, the asiddha is of three kinds : sva- rūpāsiddha (unestablished regarding itself), aśraya - siddha (unestablished regarding its locus) and vyāpya - tväsiddha (unestablished regarding its pervasion).

33. Svarūpāsiddha is as follows: The indi- vidual self is eternal, because it is visible, like a jar’. 26

34. Asrayāsiddha is as follows:-‘Sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus grown in a pond’. Sky-lotus is the locus, and it is never established (i.e., it never exists). 27

To

fondong all

३२

३५. व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो द्विविधः - एको व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणा- भावात्, अपरस्तु उपाधिसद्भावात् । आद्यो यथा - ‘यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्’ इति । क्षणिकत्वसत्त्वयोः व्याप्तिग्राहक प्रमाणासिद्धेः । द्वितीयो यथा - ‘अग्नीषोमीया हिंसा अधर्मसाधिका, हिंसात्वात्, ऋतुबाह्य हिंसावत्’ इति । अत्र निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिः । अतो हिंसात्व- हेतुः सोपाधिकः ।

३६. साध्यविपरीतव्याप्तो हेतुविरुद्धः । तद्यथा - ‘नित्या प्रकृतिः, कृतकत्वात्, कालवत्’ । कृतकत्वहेतुः साध्याभावव्याप्तः ।

35. The vyāpyatvāsiddha is twofold-the first one is due to the absence of the evidence which enables one to grasp the pervasion and the other is due to the presence of an adventitious condition (in the proban- dum). The former one is as follows:-‘Whatever is existent is momentary’. Here the evidence that enables one to grasp the pervasion between ’existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is unestablished. 28 The latter is as follows:-‘The slaying involved in agniṣomīya sacrifice engenders demerit, because it is of the nature of slay- ing, like slaying which is outside the pale of kratu’. 29 Here the prohibition (of killing animals) is the adventi- tious condition. Therefore the probans which is of the nature’ of ‘slaying’ is conditioned.

36. Viruddha is that reason which is pervaded by the contrary (i.e., non-existence) of the probandum as, ‘matter is eternal, because it is produced, like time’. Here the reason ‘producibility’ is pervaded by the non- existence of the probandum.30

Y

अनुमानम्

३३

لله

।

३७. सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स च द्विविधः - साधा- रणोऽसाधारणश्चेति ।

३८. पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारणः । यथा - ‘शब्दो नित्यः, प्रमेयत्वात्, कालवत्’ । असाधारणस्तु विपक्षसपक्षव्या- वृत्तः । यथा - ‘भूमिर्नित्या, गन्धवत्त्वात्’ इति ।

३९. प्रकरणसमस्तु साध्यविपरीतसाधकहेत्वन्तरवान् । यथा - ‘ईश्वरोऽनित्यः, नित्यधर्मरहितत्वात्’ । ‘ईश्वरो नित्यः, अनित्यधर्मरहितत्वात्’ इति । अयमेव सत्प्रतिपक्षः ।

४०. कालात्ययापदिष्टो यथा - यस्य हेतोः साध्याभाव-

37. Anaikantika is also known as savyabhicāra. It is of two kinds: 31 sādhārana (common fallacy) and asādhārana (uncommon fallacy).

38. Sādhārana is that which is present in the subject, similar instance and counter-instance: as, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is knowable, like time’.32 Asādhāraṇa is that which is not present in the similar instance and the counter-instance; as, ‘Earth is eternal, because it has smell’. 33

39. Prakaranasama is that which admits a diffe- rent (i.e., counter) reason that proves the contrary (i.e., non-existence) of the probandum: as, ‘Isvara is non-eternal, because he is devoid of eternal attributes ’ (and the counter reason is) ‘Iśvara is eternal, because he is devoid of non-eternal attributes’. 34 This itself is (called) satpratipaksa.

40. Kalatyayāpadista is as follows: Kālātyayā- padişța is that reason which is present in the subject

३४

वान् पक्षः स कालात्ययापदिष्टः । यथा - ‘अग्निरनुष्णः, पदार्थत्वात्, जलवत्’ । अयं च प्रत्यक्षेण उष्णत्वावधारणात् बाधितः ।

४१. एवमनुमाने निरूपिते उपमानादेरनुमानादावन्त- र्भावः । यथा अतिदेशवाक्यार्थ स्मरणसह कृतगोसादृश्यविशिष्ट- पिण्डज्ञानम् उपमानम् । गवयमजानन्नपि यथा गौः तथा गवय’ इति कुतश्चिदारण्यकवाक्यात् श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् यदा गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डं पश्यति तदा तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणसह- कृतसदृशपिण्डज्ञानं जायते । तदुपमानमित्युच्यते । स्मरणरूपत्वात्

in which there is the non-existence of the probandum: as, ‘Fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like water’.

h As the hotness (of fire) is determined by (tactual) perception, the probans is stultified.

41. Having thus explained inference, comparison (upamāna) and others are included under inference etc. For instance, upamana is the knowledge of a figure qualified by cow-similarity which is accompanied by the recollection of the meaning of an assimilative35 statement (atideśavākya). A person, though ignorant of the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’,36 hears from a forester that gavaya is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest and remembers the meaning conveyed by the assimilative statement. When he sees the figure qualified by cow-similarity, then there arises in him the knowledge of the figure qualified by cow-similarity, accompanied by the recollection of the meaning of the assimilative statement ( heard before). That (knowledge) is said to be upamana. Upamana is included under

अनुमानम्

३५

तस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः । व्याप्तिग्रहणापेक्षत्वादनुमानें अन्तर्भावः । वाक्यजन्यत्वात् शब्दे वा अन्तर्भाव ऊह्यः ।

४२. अर्थापत्तिर्नाम दिवा अभुञ्जानस्य पुरुषस्य पीनत्व- दर्शनात् रात्रौ भोजनं कल्प्यते । एतस्या अनुमाने अन्तर्भावः ।

४३. तर्को नाम व्याप्याङ्गीकारेण व्यापक प्रसञ्जनम् । तद्यथा - ‘पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्’ इत्यनुमाने, ‘धूमोऽस्तु वह्निर्मास्तु’ इत्युक्ते, ‘यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात् ’ इति एतस्य प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वम् ।

perception, since it is of the nature of recollection. It is brought under inference, as it requires (or depends upon) the cognition of pervasion. And it is included unde, verbal testimony (also), since it is sentence- generated.37

42. It is called arthāpatti when postulation of eating at night is made, because fatness is seen in a person who does not eat by day. 38 This (also ) is included under inference.

43. What is called tarka (reductio ad absurdum) is the acceptance of the pervader (vyāpaka) by the hypothetical admission of the pervaded (vyapya). For instance, in the inference “The mountain has fire, because, it has smoke’, if someone says, ‘Let there be smoke but no fire’, (the refutation would be ), ‘If there were no fire, there would be no smoke also ‘. Thus tarka is an aid to pramāņa.

३६

४४. तर्कानुगृहीतप्रमाणपूर्वकत्वावधारणं निश्चयः ।

४५. वीतरागकथा वादः ।

४६. पक्षद्वयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । ४७. स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना तु वितण्डा ।

४८. अविवक्षितशब्दार्थारोपेण दूषणं छलम् ।

४९. स्वव्यापि दूषणं जातिः । असदुत्तरं जातिरिति वा । ५०. पराजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । इत्येषामनुमानाङ्गत्वा- दनुमाने अन्तर्भावः ।

Niścaya (ascertainment) is the determination (of truth) by means of pramāna aided by tarka.

45. Vada (discussion ) is debate between two parties without any prejudice.

46. Jalpa (wrangling) is that discussion which establishes the position of both the sides of those who are desirous of gaining victory.

47. Vitanda (cavil) consists (in opposition to the other side) without establishing one’s own position (in the argument).

48. Chala (quibble ) consists in attacks (on the opposite side) by attributing unintended meaning to the word. 39

Jo

49. Jati40 (futility) consists (in pointing out) a defect which pervades one’s own position; or wrong reply is called jāti.

50. Nigrahasthāna (ground of defeat) is the cause of one’s defeat. All these, being the limbs of inference, are included under anumāna.

अनुमानम्

३७

५१. क्वचित् क्वचित् नैयायिक मतानुसारेण उक्तमिति न विरोधः । इत्यनुमानं निरूपितम् ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमवासेन श्रीनिवासवासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां अनुमाननिरूपणं नाम द्वितीयोऽवतारः ॥

51. There is no contradiction in interpreting here and there according to the school of Naiyayikas. Thus inference has been explained.

Here ends the second ‘avatara’ on anumana of Yatindramatadipikā composed by Srinivasadasa, the foremost disciple of Sriman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Sri Vadhūlas

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