रामानुजीये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

The achievements of the Indians in the realm of philosophy are very great and of outstanding merit. The results arrived thereby are varied in nature and diverse in outlook. They are classified under different heads, the principle underlying such a classification being the characteristic feature which is common to those results brought under one head. Each has come to be called a system of thought but the term which has been in vogue to refer to each head is darśana. This term conveys the sense of intuition which a seer possessed and was therefore responsible for the development of a system based on that particular intuition which may concern with truth (tattva) or knowledge of soul (ātmajñāna). The term system, however, denotes the sense of systematisation. Every system of Indian thought, as it is called darśana, has its source traced to the divine vision or the intuition of a sage with whose name it is associated. The Nyaya system is called Gautamadarśana, as Gautama’s name is associated with its beginnings. The names Pātañjaladarśana, Jaiminiyadarśana and others admit of similar explanations.

Among the various systems of thought, some are called nāstika as they deny validity to the Vedas and others are called āstika as they are based on the authority of the Vedas. Among the systems in the astika group, it is only the Vedanta darśana that has regular development and continuity to the present day. It has a powerful influence over the people of this land and has become popular among some sections of scholars in the West. This system has been solely devoted to the investigation into and study of the nature of God designated as Brahman, selves called atman and the material world and the interrelation between these. Hence it has been very popular and a living principle of life in this land. On the contrary, the systems other than the Vedanta dealt with matters mostly different from these. If in certain cases, these matters also were dealt with, it was only done in an indirect way, very often to seek support for the conclusions arrived at in those systems. Any way, the matters dealt with in the Vedanta system were given secondary importance in these. It is but natural that these remained to arouse only academic interest with the exception of the Mimāmsã and Yoga systems which, in spite of having had practical value, could not produce on the people of the land that amount of influence which the Vedanta has been by supplying the soul in bondage with information regarding the nature of soul and a solution for the ills of the world.

The name Vedanta is given to this system as this is based on the Upanisads which form the concluding portions of the Veda’s. The Upanisads, unlike the remaining portions of the Vedas, deal with the natures of Brahman, soul and world and the question of their interrelation. The teachings of the Upanisads were to be acquired by pupils from the preceptors with utmost secrecy. The Upanisads

could therefore be held to contain secret instructions. Interpretation of the passages of the Upanisads depends on the long successive line of teachers and pupils who have been maintaining the traditional line of interpretation. The line of teachers and pupils had not been one but many and therefore the interpretations of the passages offered by various teachers differed from each other. In fact, even in the interpretation of one and the same passage, this difference became pronounced in the various lines of teachers and pupils. The Upanisads themselves contain many doctrines diverse in character and sometimes conveying mutually contradictory ideas. Thus there are passages which speak of the monistic, dualistic and pluralistic doctrines. Some support yogic discipline while others uphold the worship of the deities. Some passages speak of the world as unreal while others as real. Brahman is identical with the selves according to some and different according to others. Interpretations offered by the various teachers for many of these passages are opposed to each other.

Attempts were made by some scholars of old to give a systematic exposition to the teachings of the Upaniṣads but did not produce any appreciable result. Their results are mentioned by sage Badarāyaṇa who composed the Brahma Sutras on the teaching of the Upanisads. These s tras are aphorisms, very brief and unintelligible except with the aid of commentaries. The traditional interpretations of these sutras offered by the scholars began to vary from each other. The attempt of the scholars was to interpret, in accordance with the tradition handed down to them, these sutras in the light of the teaching of the Upanisads. Many of these scholars took the Bhagavadgītā for supporting their interpretations. Thus the Upanisads, Brahmasutras and Bhagavadgītā became the triple basis of the Vedanta (Prasthānatraya). Due to this difference in the interpretations offered by the teachers, many schools arose in the Vedantadarśana. All the schools base their tenets on all these basic texts and profess their implicit authority to the Upanisads. It must, however, be remembered that the object of treatment, whether it is Brahman, self, or the world, would not get changed merely because the passages in the Upanisads dealing with them were interpreted differently by the various scholars however eminent they might have been. If, however, it had been possible to change the object of investigation by the method of interpretation adopted, scholars would not have been in a position to understand the object as they were taught the line of interpretation by their preceptors. Or, the object must have been changing every time a scholar adopted a novel method of interpretation while studying that object. Posterity would have become bewildered unable to identify that object when it was undertaken for scrutiny. Such a thing did not happen. That is why, it has been possible for the precursors and leading exponents of the various schools ofxi

Vedanta to undertake an independent line of investigation and study of the Brahmasutras and the Upaniṣads. The passages of the Vedas, Bhagavadgītā, Purāņas and Itihāsas, Nyaya, Mimāmsā, and Sankhya are utilised to their advantage while interpreting the Brahma-

sutras.

Before the rise of the important schools of Vedanta now in vogue, attempts were made, by some scholars among whom Bhartṛprapañca was prominent, to interpret the Brahma sūtrās. Bhartṛprapañca held that Brahman was identical with and at the same time different from the world of sentient and insentient beings. Brahman is one involving variety due to the infinite number of selves and innumerable distinctions in the universe. At the time of creation, what was one, namely Brahman, became transformed into the manifold universe. This view is called Bhedabhedavāda and Brahmapariņāmavāda. The means for liberation is right knowledge and religious duty both combined and having equal importance (jñānakarmasamuccaya). This view was refuted by Sankara but was revived unsuccessfully by Bhaskara and Yadavaprakāśa in slightly different forms. After Rāmānuja, they lost their significance and were forgotten.

For understanding the principles on which the schools of Vedānta are based, it is enough if some groups of passages in the Upanisads are taken up and studied as to how each group had been responsible for the rise of a particular school of Vedanta. In the main, there are three such groups. One group teaches non-difference between Brahman and the world consisting of sentient and insentient beings. The second speaks of the difference between them. The third teaches the relation between them. According to the first group of passages, Brahman is faultless and stainless. It is motionless and peaceful. It is without attributes. It is knowledge and bliss. There is nothing apart from it. If one realises that everything is the soul, what else can he see? Everything in the world is nothing but Brahman.1 According to the second group of passages, one becomes immortal by knowing his own self and the ruler as distinct from each other. The Universal Lord thought to create the beings. He is the Lord of the universe. He is the Lord of Himself. He is the highet Lord of the Lords. He is the supreme deity of the deities. He has everything under His control. 2

निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् (श्वे. 6-19) ; निष्क्रियं शान्तम् (श्वे. 6-19) ; केवलो निर्गुणश्च (श्वे. 6); विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म (बृ. 3-9-28) ; नेह नानास्ति किंचन (बृ. 4-4-19); यत्र त्वध्य. सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् (बृ. उ. 4-5-15). सर्वे खल्विदं ब्रह्म (छा. 3-14-1)-
पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति (श्वे-1-6) ; प्रजापतिरकामयत प्रजाः सृजेयेति (तै. ब्रा.) पतिं विश्वस्यामेश्वरम् (तै. उ.2-11-3)

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According to the third group of passages,

Brahman is the inner self of all and is the ruler of the universe. He is your self, inner controller and immortal. For whom the earth is the body, the water is the body, the soul is the body. Each school which is mainly based on one of these groups of passages does not ignore the passages in the groups other than its but offers an interpretation to those passages in a manner to support the interpretation of passages in its group.

The passages in the first group were given a systematic interpretation by the Advaita School of Vedānta. Gauḍapāda and his pupil Govindabhagavatpāda were chiefly responsible to propagate the tenets contained in these passages. Sankara, who became the pupil of Govindabhagavatpada, gave a definite shape to this thought by writing commentaries on the Brahmasutras, Upanisads and Bhagavadgītā. According to this school, Brahman alone is existent, conscious and blissful. These existence (sat), consciousness (cit) and bliss (ānanda) are not attributes of Brahman. They are not different from Brahman. As these alone are present in Brahman but are not the attributes of Brahman, Brahman is called attributeless (nirguna). In this school, existence is three fold, namely, real (pāramārthika), apparent (pratibhasika) and phenomenal (vyāvahārika). Brahman alone has real existence. Appearance of silver in the shell and other cases have apparent existence. The world

world has phenomenal but no real existence. Illusion (māyā) which has three qualities sattva, rajas and tamas, screens Brahman. As a result of this, Brahman is not seen. The world alone is presented to ordinary experience. What had not existed before it is produced and what would not continue to exist after it is destroyed cannot be said to have real existence. The world is said to be created and is said to be destroyed. As a result of mãyã, what does not exist appears to exist. Illusion itself is said in the Upaniṣads to be destroyed. Hence it cannot be real or eternal. Illusion which is unreal and which produces the world is responsible for the nature of the world. Hence the world must be unreal. Illusion has two aspects, one in which sattva dominates and the other where it is undermined by rajas and In the first aspect, illusion is called mãyã and in the latter, avidyā. Brahman is reflected in both. The reflection formed in the māyā is called God and that in the avidya is called soul. According

तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं दैवतानां परमं च दैवतम् (श्वे. 6-7 ) ; सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः (बृ. 4-4-22).

अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा (तै. आ. आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः (बृ. उ. 5-7-7 ) यस्य पृथिर्व शरीरं यस्यापः 5-7-7) शरीरम् (3-7-3)

3-11-2 ) एष त

शरीरं यस्मात्मा

are

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to some scholars, the reflection of Brahman in the internal organ (antaḥkarana) a modification of māyā is called soul. The souls God many as avidya or antaḥkarna is manifold. possesses knowledge, power and other attributes to perfection as he is the reflected image of Brahman in the sattva dominated māyā. The souls have these in less and varying degrees as they are the reflections in the avidya where sattva is undermined by the influence of rajas and tamas. It is as a result of being the reflected images of Brahman in the avidya, that the souls have passion, volition, hatred, pain, pleasure, etc. Due to the frequent changes taking place in the avidya, the selves are found to move from place to place. As the reflection of Brahman in the māyā is called God, possessing perfections in qualities, the souls have to worship God, and do good deeds. It is through these means that the souls have the impurities or the effects of avidya gradually removed. Then they become fit to know the nature of Brahman. They can then learn the full significance of the passage tattvamasi " and practise it by constant meditation on its significance. The selves have to undergo experiences through three stages, namely, waking state, dream state and state of deep sleep. In the waking state, the soul gains the experience of the world through the sense organs. The dream state is that in which impressions alone, left by the experience of the external world, remain. In deep sleep, even the impressions do not exist but mere nescience. The objects of the waking state do not exist in the dream state and those in the dream state do not exist in the state of deep sleep. From this, it becomes clear that the external world and the world of the dream state do not exist during the state of deep sleep. Excepting the concept of ‘I’ in these two stages, there is nothing that can be said to be present. In the state of deep sleep, the inner heart ceases to exist. In the state of yoga, even nescience does not present itself.

Hence consciousness alone exists in the soul. The word ’tvam’ refers to this condition of the soul and the word ’tat’ refers to the condition of Brahman. Both the words ’tat’ and ’tvam’ in the passage ’tattvamasi’, show that consciousness in Brahman and souls is the same. By constant meditation on the significance of this passage, the self realises itself to be identical with Brahman. It finds everything other than Brahman as illusory. In spite of having had this realisation, the self will have to be in bondage due to the effects of avidya but it would not be affected by the ills of the world. As the self has self-realization during this period, it is said to have jîvanmukti. After the effects of avidya cease to have hold on the self, that is, when the person dies, the self gets final release (videhamukti) which is called kaivalya identical with becoming Brahman.

Since the writing of the Bhāṣya by Sankara on the Brahmasutras, a controversy arose as to where illusion rests. Two schools in Advaita arose as a result of this controversy. One was held by Prakāśātman. His view was that illusion rests in Brahman. This view came to be

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called Vivarana school as Prakāśātman expounded it in his Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. The other view was held by Vacaspatimiśra, the author of Bhamti, a commentary on the Brahmasutrabhāṣya of Sankara. According to him, illusion lies with the individual selves.

The second group of passages of the Upanisads formed the basis of the Dvaita school of Vedanta. Brahman in this school is Visnu. He is the abode of all auspicious qualities. He creates the world, maintains it and destroys it. He is omniscient. He has aprākṛta body, that is a body not made out of the products of matter. He has various forms like Vasudeva, Sankarṣana, Aniruddha, Pradyumna and others. Lakṣmi is His consort. Visnu and Laksmi alone are eternally released. All other souls are in bondage. They are atomic in size. Among them, some deserve to get release. They have to get it by worshipping Visņu. Some are eternally in bondage. They could get to heaven by good deeds done here and to hell by committing sinful deeds. After the results of their deeds have been fully enjoyed there, they have to come to this world again. Thus they have no chance of getting released. Some selves deserve cternal damnation. Demons and debased men belong to this category. They have hatred for God and devotees of God. Devotion to Visnu is the only means for obtaining final release. The nature of final release consists in the enjoyment of bliss of one’s own nature. The selves which are different during the stage of bondage continue to remain. different in the released state. The conditions during the period. of release are fourfold viz., salokya, sāmīpya, sarūpya and sayujya. Perception, inference and Agama are the three valid means of proof recognised in this school. The world of movable and immovable objects is real. Brahman is different from the inanimate objects and individual selves. There is difference internally among the inanimate objects and selves. The selves are different from the inanimate objects. On account of this fivefold difference, this school came to be called dvaita.

The Upanisadic passage “tattvamasi” is explained thus in this school. As it is, the passage establishes identity between’ tat’ referring to Brahman and tvam referring to the individual self. This is unacceptable to the exponents of this school. The whole passage in which ’tattvamasi’ occurs is śvetaketotattvamasi. The sense of this passage is O! Svetaketu, thou art that. The words svetaketo tat’ are split up as ‘Svetaketo atat.’ When split up thus, the passage means O! Svetaketu, thou art not that, that is, you are other than that. This establishes the difference between Brahman and self.

The passages in the third group form the basis of the Visiṣṭādvaita school of Vedanta. In this school, Brahman, the selves and the insentient world are real. There are two eternal entities. One group comprises Brahman and souls and the other matter.

characteristic feature of the former is sentience which makes it shine and realise its own luminosity. The latter can be known only by the former. While the former does not undergo any change, the latter undergoes changes frequently but yet remains eternal. Brahman creates the world out of matter. This world cannot be unreal. The word māyā out of which the world is said to have been created refers to primordial matter (mulaprakṛti). If matter (māyā) were to be unreal, then there is no sense in attributing creation to that unreal entity. An unreal object cannot be created. The world cannot be said to possess only apparent existence. Silver appears to be present in the shell but that cognition of silver is sublated subsequently by the correct cognition of the shell. The test for the existence of an object externally lies in its being utilised for a specific purpose. Mirage, hare’s horn and others are denied external existence, as they have no practical utility. The same cannot be said of the world. The souls find the insentient world to be useful for some purpose or other. Besides, silver has got real existence elsewhere and therefore its denial in the shell is justified. The same cannot be held in the case of the world. Hence when a particular cognition is not sublated, the object of that cognition must be taken as real. It is not also correct to say that what did not exist before it is created and does not exist after it is destroyed must be unreal. The real test for the existence of the object being its practical utility, this will only prove that the world is non-eternal but not unreal. An unreal object cannot be put to any use. The world, though it has temporary existence, finds use at the hands of the selves, during that period of existence. When the world is proved to be real. it is unfair to deny reality to it on the strength of the passages from the Vedas which declare the world to be unreal. Whether such passages really declare the world as unreal is itself doubtful. A proper interpretation is to be given to such passages consistent with the experience of reality of the world. There are some passages in the Upaniṣads which speak of the relation between Brahman and world. Some other passages deny the existence of the world. If the latter is held as valid, then the former cannot be valid. It would be absurd to admit the Vedas as valid, recognise the former as valid and then to deny validity to it on the ground that the latter is valid. If the former is held valid, the latter would cease to be valid. This position is equally An interpretation which would admit both as valid is that while the former passages mean that Brahman and the world are real, the latter passages only deny that world has got existence independent of Brahman. Passages which speak of Brahman as without a second (advitiya) only mean that there is no object other than Brahman, superior to Brahman. If the sense of the Upanisads is to be taken to indicate that the world is unreal, then the words gods, demons, men and others world convey no specific sense.

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Brahman in this school is Vişņu with Lakṣmi. They are inseparable. Brahman is the cause of the world. It is called Brahman as it is huge. By huge must mean also the possession of all auspicious. qualities. All these qualities are useful to help the selves. The passages which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities should be taken to mean that Brahman has no defective qualities.

In this school, the relation between Brahman on the one hand. and the souls and the world on the other is that of a body and the person possessing that body (śariraśarīribhāva). The ordinary definition of the body (śarira) as a combination of elements and as composed of the limbs is defective as this does not apply to the aprākṛta body of Brahman and as this applies also to cases like dolls which are models of the body. The body of any living being is found supported by the soul within it. The soul supports the body by its very nature and knowledge. When a body falls down senseless, it has existence as it has the support of the soul within. When the unconscious condition is over, the body gets up. This is because of the support it gets from the soul. When a person is in deep sleep, the soul supports the body by its very nature (svarupa). When there is separation of the soul from the body, the latter gets destroyed. This is because the body has ceased to be supported by the soul. As in the case of the ordinary body, in the cases of souls and world, Brahman is the supporter (ādhāra). The very fact that souls and the world have continued existence is because of Brahman’s knowledge. Though these cannot be separated from Brahman, these are supported by Brahman. Thus there is the relation of adhara and adheya between Brahman on the one hand and the souls and the world on the other. Secondly, the ordinary body is controlled by the soul, that is, the body acts under the directions of the soul within. It is the will of the soul that is responsible for the functions of the body. Even so, the souls and world are controlled (niyamya) by Brahman. They are controlled by the will (sankalpa) of Brahman. The world changes at the will of Brahman and the soul retains its nature at the will of Brahman. This means that the souls and the world owe their existence to the will of Brahman. Hence there is the relation of niyantṛ and niyamya between Brahman on the one hand and souls and the world on the other. Thirdly, the soul is the śeşin and the ordinary body is seṣa. These two terms śeşin and seșa are used in the sense of independent and dependent ones. That which exists solely for the purpose of imparting some excellence to a person is called śeşa while the person is called śeşin. In the light of this definition the body is seṣa being

परगतातिशयाधानेच्छया उपादेयत्वमेव यस्य परः शेषी । वेदार्थसंग्रह :

स्वरूपं स शेषः;

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entirely at the disposal of the soul. The same may be said of the souls and world which exist only for the use of Brahman. They are placed at the disposal of Brahman. Brahman makes use of them according to its will. Hence there is the relation of the śeşin and seṣa between Brahman on the one hand and the souls and world on the other. When these three aspects of the body are considered, the body could be defined as that which is supported, controlled and is entirely at the disposal of the soul.5 The souls and world are supported, controlled and are entirely at the disposal of Brahman. Hence the former represent the body of Brahman. This proves that Brahman is immanent (antaryāmin). The relation between the two is called apṛthaksiddha inseparable relation. The body is the mode (prakāra) of the self (prakārin). The latter sustains the former and makes use of it for its own satisfaction. Similarly, Brahman sustains the selves and world and makes use of them for its own satisfaction. Hence Brahman is prakarin and the souls and the world are prakāra. In this school, there is only one tattva namely Brahman which has the sentient and the insentient beings as its prakāras. There is difference between Brahman and the prakāras. There is difference between the prakāras. The two namely prakāra or viśeṣaṇa and prakārin or viseşya are distinguished from each other but are not divisible. The unity between them namely selves and world (prakāra) and Brahman (prakarin) as viśeşana and viśeşya is the organic unityvisista aikya. Thus there is oneness (aikya or advaita) which is organic or attributive (visiṣṭa). Hence this school is called Visiṣṭādvaita. This means that there is nothing else besides this Brahman.

The souls are many. They are of atomic size. They exist by themselves. They are self-realised and are the seat of knowledge. The former is possible because of they themselves being knowledge (dharmijñāna). The latter is the case as then knowledge rises in the souls about the objects (dharmabhūtajñana). The two are different from each other but inseparable. Both are imperishable. But they undergo contraction and expansion as a result of the sins committed by the selves. As the sins vary according to individuals, there are variations in the nature of these. During deep sleep, they lie dormant in the souls. Desire, volition, pleasure, pain and others are only varieties of knowledge. These souls are real and eternal, as the Upanisads speak of them as not produced and eternal. Hence they

यस्य चेतनस्य यत् द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यं तच्छेषतकस्वरूपं च तत्तस्य शरीरम् । (श्रीभाष्यम् . )

अशेषचिदचित्प्रकारं ब्रह्मकमेव तत्वम् । तत्र प्रकारप्रकारिणोः प्रकाराणां च मिथोऽत्यन्तभेदेऽपि विशिष्टैक्यादिविवक्षयैकत्वव्यपदेशः, निषेधश्व | ( न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनम् . )

aftar-

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cannot be mere reflections. Besides, reflection is formed for an object which has colour, size and other attributes. Hence there cannot be any reflection for Brahman nor can the souls be such reflections. The souls come into the world at the will of Brahman which dispenses justice according to the merits and demerits of the souls. The souls could get freed from bondage only at the will of Brahman. To get rid of the ills of the world, the souls have to adopt devotion (bhakti) or self-surrender (prapatti) as the means. The state of liberation consists in the enjoyment of bliss in Vaikuntha. The souls are alike in the released state and have aprākṛta bodies. The significance of the passage ’tattavamasi’ is thus explained in this system. There are passages in the Upanisads which state Brahman willed ‘I shall become many’, ‘It created the world’, ‘Brahman created itself’. These passages mean that Brahman itself became many. It is said that the world of animate and inanimate beings is the body of Brahman This means that Brahman’s body transformed into world, that is, Brahman becomes many through the creation of the world. Hence Brahman is the cause and Brahman itself is the effect. In other words, Brahman is the cause when the souls and matter are in the subtle form and are the modes of Brahman. It is the effect when the souls and matter are in the form of name, colour and others but still the modes of Brahman. In ordinary usages, the word ’tvam’ refers to a soul endowed with a body. It refers also to the soul present inside the body. Likewise, the word ’tvam’ in the Upanisadic passage must be taken to refer to the soul of the individual soul which is a body of the former. The souls and world are bodies of Brahman. Brahman is the soul of all these bodies. The word ’tvam’ refers therefore to Brahman present within the souls. This refers to Brahman in the state of the effect. The word ’tat’ refers to Brahman in the state of cause. Both are identical.

The school of Advaita is based entirely on the passages of the first group. As regards the passages of the second and third groups, the exponents of this school hold that these are not valid and as such what these convey cannot be relied upon, as these come into clash with the teachings of the passages in the first group. These passages would only prove that the world has phenomenal existence (vyāvahārika sattā) including Isvara and souls. Strictly speaking, the teachings of the passages should be taken to convey the unreal nature of the world. The exponents of the Dvaita school base their doctrines on the passages of the second group and treat those of the remaining groups as only conveying the sense of master and servant between Brahman on the one hand and world of animate and inanimate beings on the other. Any reference to identity that could be found in these passages should be taken to stand for dualism. Sometimes, the king is said to be identical with his state, though he is different

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from it. In the same way, Brahman is said to be identical with the world. This is the way in which the passage tattvamasi’ could be interpreted without resorting to the change of ’tat’ into ‘atat". The exponents of the Visiṣṭādvaita school hold all the passages in these groups as equally valid. The passages in the first group speak of the organic unity (visiṣṭa aikya) of Brahman, selves and inanimate world. When they deny anything, they do so only with reference to that which is apart from this organic unity. The passages in the second group establish that there is real difference mutually between Brahman, selves and inanimate world. Actual existence of this world is thus not denied. The passages in the third group establish the relation between Brahman, selves and the inanimate world and thus prove that the relation of body and soul subsists between Brahman on the one hand and the selves and world on the other. Thus it is proved that there is no contradiction between the passages in any of these groups.

The school of Visiṣṭādvaita is based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtras, Bhagavadgītā and the Agamas. The Agamas are of two kinds, namely Pañcarātra and Vaikhānasa. They contain the teachings of the Vedas in a summarised version for the easy comprehension and use of those who cannot afford to study the vast mass of Vedic literature. They contain directions regarding the rituals and daily religious practises of the devotees of Viṣnu. They give rules and regulations regarding the construction of temples and images and the rituals associated with the worship of idols in temples. According to these, Brahman exists in five modes namely, para, the áprākṛta form in Vaikuntha; vyuha, the form in which it is accessible to all devotees including gods, Brahman lying on the serpent in the milky ocean; vibhava, the forms through which Brahman manifests itself all its powers for the sake of maintaining dharma like the incarnations of Rama, Kṛṣṇa and others; antaryāmin the immanent one, being the soul for the world of animate and inanimate beings; and arcã, the form in which Brahman revealed at particular times to devotees and in which it is worshipped in the temples.

All these are to be traced to the Vedas. The Pāṇcarātra Agamas have the same authority as the Vedas. Both are revelations. Viṣṇu revealed them both. The word pañcarātra refers to the five fold routine life which the devotee of Vişņu should lead. The five daily duties are abhigamana going to the temple of God with mind, speech and actions concentrated on Him, upādāna collecting materials for His worship, ijya actual worship of God, svadhyāya study of the Vedas and allied literature and yoga meditation on God. It is held that Aniruddha, one of the incarnations of Visnu preached these doctrines and they were revealed to sages Narada, Sanaka,

Šāṇḍilya and others. As these were preached by God, these Agamas are called Bhagavacchistra. The literature of the Рãñcarātra Agamas is available in the form of works called samhita, a term denoting their Vedic origin and their relation to the Vedic literature. There were 108 samhitas of the Pañcaratra Agamas. Only some of them are available in print. Most well known among them are Sātvatasaṁhitā, Ahirbudhnyasaṁhitā, Iśvarasṁhita, Pauṣkarasamhita, Jayākyasaṁhitā, Padmasaṁhitā, Pārameśvarasaṁhitā, and others.

Like the Pañcarātra Agamas, the Vaikhānasa Agamas are equally valid. These are called after the name Vikhanas which refers to to Brahmā, who under this name revealed the doctrines to sages Atri, Marici, Kāśyapa and Bhṛgu each of whom brought out a work called after his name, e.g., Atrisamhita, Mārīcisamhita and others.

In addition to these Agamas, the utterances of the Vaisnava saints called Alvārs are held in great authority by the exponents of the Visiṣṭādvaita school. These saints were thirteen in number, the prominent among whom was Nammālvār otherwise known a sSaṭhakopa. The utterances of these saints are contained in four thousand stanzas in Tamil language. These constitute Divyaprabandha. The Visiṣṭādvaita school attaches to this class of literature validity equal to that of the Vedas. Concept of Vişņu as Brahman and devotional aspect of the Visiṣṭādvaita literature owe much of inspiration to this Divyaprabandha. In fact, literature which grew on this came to be looked upon as Vedanta in the Tamil (Dravida) language, the Divyaprabandha being held as Dravida Veda.

The earliest exponents of the Visiṣṭādvaita school were Tanka also known as Brahmanandin, Dramida, Guhadeva and others. Bodhayana who is identified with Upavarṣa wrote an elaborate gloss called Vṛtti on the Brahmasutras. Tanka wrote a gloss called Vakya on the Chandogya Upanisad. This was commented in a Bhāṣya by Dramida. Passages from these works are cited by later writers. The original works are lost to us. Sankara and his followers, and Rāmānuja and his followers cite the passages from the works of these writers in support of their doctrines. In his Sribhāṣya, Rāmānuja mentions these scholars as his predecessors in the field and as advocates of the Visiṣṭādvaita doctrines. Bodhāyana’s Vṛtti was very elaborate. Rāmānuja summarised the contents of this work in his Śrībhāṣya.

Nathamuni, whose full name was Ranganathamuni, flourished in the 9th Century A.D. He wrote Nyāyatattva and Yogarahasya both of which are now lost. They are cited by later writers, in particular, by Vedāntadeśika. The former work was written on the metaphysical principles of this school.

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His grandson Yamunācārya (918-1038 A.D.) wrote Agamaprāmāṇya vindicating the validity of the Pañcarātra Agamas, Siddhitraya comprising Atmasiddhi, Iśvarasiddhi and Samvitsiddhi and Mahāpuruşanirnaya. The Sidditraya is not available in full. The principles of this school are here advocated and maintained in regard to the nature of soul, God and cognition. The Mahāpuruşanirnaya establishes Visnu as Brahman. Besides these works, Yamunācārya wrote the Gitārthasangraha, a summary of the teachings of the Bhagavadgītā, Catuśśloki and Strotratna being stotras in praise of Laksmi and Visņu.

After Nathamuni and Yāmunācārya, the two leading exponents of this school, Rāmānuja (1017-1137) A.D.) was the greatest philosopher of this school. This school came to be called very often after his name as Rāmānujasiddhanta. He wrote three commentaries on the Brahmasutras under the titles Srībhāṣya, Vedantasāra and Vedāntadipa. Of these the Śrībhāsya is his magnum opus, while the other two are brief commentaries. Besides these, he wrote Vedārthasangraha devoted to a study of the more important Vedicpassages in the light of the principles of this school, Bhagavadgītā bhāṣya, a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, Gadyatraya comprising Saraṇāgatigadya, Vaikunthagadya and Srirangagadya, all the three in prose form conveying the doctrines of this school in the form of stotras and Nitya a manual on the mode of worshipping God. The Śrībhāṣya had many commentaries written by eminent exponents of this school. They are:-

(1) Nyayasudarśana by Varadanārāyaṇabhaṭṭāraka
(2) Srutaprakāśika and (3) Srutapradipikā extensive and brief commentaries respectively by Sudarśanasuri,
(4) Naya prākāsika and (5) Bhāṣyabhavabodhana, extensive and brief commentaries respectively by Meghanādari,
(6) Tattvaṭīkā by Vedantadesika and
(7) Mulabhāvaprakāśikā by Rangarāmānujamuni.

After Ramanuja, there flourished a number of writers who besides commenting on the works of Rāmānuja, produced independent treatises on the doctrinal principles of this school. Many of these works are now lost to us and are known from citations of later writers particularly Vedāntadeśika. The periods when these writers flourished could not be ascertained. The dates of these writers should have been after Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D.) and before Vedāntadeśika (1268-1369 A.D.). Such works are:-

Adhyatmakhaṇḍa-dvayavivaranam and
Tattvaratnākara by Parāśarabhaṭṭa, son of Śrīvatsānkamiśra, one of the chief disciples of Rāmānuja.

The former work was devoted to the treatment of the general principles of this school. The latter work must have been a very extensive one, mainly metaphysical in treatment.

Prajñāparitrāṇa, a work on the principles of this school by Varadanārāyaṇabhaṭṭārka, the author of the Nyayasudarśana, the commentary on the Sribhāṣya.

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Prameyasangraha and 5. Sangatimālā on the metaphysics of this school by Visņucitta, pupil of Kurukeśa, one of the chief disciples of Ramanuja.
Mānayāthatmyanirnaya, on epistemology by by Varadaviṣṇumiśra.
Sribhāṣyavivarana a gloss on the Sribhāṣya of Rāmānuja and 8. Şadarthasaṁkṣepa on the doctrines of this school by Sriramamiśra, one of the chief disciples of Rāmānuja.

The works, written during this period and available are:-

Bhagavadguṇadarpaṇa, a gloss on Viṣṇusahasranama,
Aṣṭaśloki on the esoteric formula of this school,
Śrīgunaratnakośa and
Srirangarajastava, poems in praise of Lakṣmi and Lord Ranganatha.

All these were written by Parāśarabhaṭṭa, the author of the Tattvaratnākara.

Nyāyakalāpasangraha, an epitome of the adhikaranas in the Brahmasutras, in the light of the Sribhasya of Rāmānuja. The author was Seneśvarācārya.
Nitimālā on the metaphysics of this school by Nārāyaṇārya. 7. Nayadyumani on the doctrines of this school by Meghanādāri, the author of the Nayaprakāśikā and Bhāṣyabhavabodhana, commentaries on the Śrībhāṣya.
Visņucittiyam a commentary on the Viṣṇupurana by Vişņucitta, the author of the Prameyasangraha and Sangatimālā.
Prapannapārijāta,
Prameyamālā,
Tattvanirnaya and
Tattvasara by Varadacārya, pupil of Visņucitta.

Of these, the Prapannapārijāta is an ethical code for those who surrender themselves to God and the remaining three are on the metaphysics of this school.

Tātparyadipikā, a commentary on the Vedarthasangraha of Rāmānuja and
Sukapakṣiya a commentary on the Bhagavata by Sudarśanasūri, pupil of Varadācārya and author of the Śrutaprakāśikā and Śrutapradipikā.
Nyāyakuliśa a polemical treatise by Atreya Rāmānuja, pupil of Varadācārya and preceptor of Vedantadeśika.

After Rāmānuja, the greatest philosopher of this school was Vedāntadeśika (1268-1369 A.D.). He had the titles Kavitārkikasimha and Sarvatantrasvatantra. Even the name Vedāntadeśika was a title, his original name being Venkaṭanatha. He came to be widely known under the name Vedāntadeśika. He wrote about 116 works. Of these, nearly ten are lost. Among the available works, about fifty are written in Tamil with an admixture of Sanskrit words in some of them and twenty nine are the stotras. The following are his independent treatises in Sanskrit :— I. Tattvamuktākalapa with his own commentary Sarvārthasiddhi. This deals, in metrical form, with the main principles of this school. 2. Nyāyapariśuddhi, a polemical treatise directed against the Nyaya system and in defence of Visiṣṭādvaita. 3. Nyāyasiddhañjana, an incomplete polemical treatise directed against the Vaiśeşika and Sankhya systems and in defence of Visiṣṭadvaita. 4. Mimāmṣāpādukā, a metrical treatise on both the Purvamimamsa and Vedanta systems, both being treated as a composite system in the light of the Visiṣṭādvaita school. 5. Adhikaraṇasārāvalī, a metrical epitome of the adhikaranas in

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the Brahmasutras according to the Śribhāṣya of Ramanuja. 6. Satadūṣaṇī, a refutation of one hundred stand-points of the Advaitins in defence of their school. At present, this work contains only sixty-six sections. 7. Saccaritrarakṣā, 8. Nikṣeparakṣā, 9. Pāñcarātrarakṣā, respectively on the mode of pious life to be led by the followers of this school, on the need to adopt self-surrender (prapatti) as a means for getting liberation and on the validity of the Pāñcarārtra Agamas. Vedāntadeśika distinguished himself as a reliable commentator on the works of Ramanuja and others. Such works are:-

Tattvaṭīkā, an incomplete commentary on the Sribhāṣya of Rāmānuja, 2. Seśvara mīmāṁsā, a commentary on the first and a part of the second pādas in the first Adhyāya of Jaimini’s Mīmāṁsā sūtras proving that Pūrvamīmāmsā upholds theism. 3. Tātparyacandrika, commentary on the Bhagavadgitābhāṣya of Rāmānuja. 4. Gitarthasangraharakṣā, a commentary on the Gitārthasangraha of Yamunacārya. 5. Rahasyarakṣā, a commentary on the Gadyatraya of Rāmānuja. 6. Iśāvāsyopaniṣadbhāṣya, a commentary on the Iśāvāsyopaniṣad. These fifteen works reveal how an able exponent of this school, Vedāntadeśika should have been. They are highly valuable for the citations they contain from his predecessors not only in this field but also in the Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Advaita school of Vedanta and others. His Dramidopaniṣattātparyaratnavali and Dramidopaniṣatsāra are metrical renderings in Sanskrit of the summary of the Tiruvaymoli of Nammālvar. His Yadavābhyudaya is a Mahākavya in twenty four cantos on the life of Krsna. It has a valuable commentary from the pen of the Advaitin polymath Appayadikṣita. His Hamsasandeśa is a lyric after the manner of Kalidasa’s Meghasandeśa. His Subhāṣitanīvi is a didactic poem like Bhartṛhari’s Nitiśataka. His Sankalpasuryodaya is an allegorical play in ten acts. Among his stotras, the Pādukāsahasra containing one thousand stanzas in praise of Rama’s sandals is remarkable for the author’s display of his fancy and imagination.

After Vedāntadeśika, there flourished about 1600 A.D. Mahācārya who, besides commenting on Vedantadeśika’s Sataduṣaṇī, in his Candamaruta, produced polemical treatises under the names Advaitavidyāvijaya, Gurupasattivijaya, Parikaravijaya, Pārāśaryavijaya, Brahmavidyāvijaya and Sadvidyāvijaya. All these are directed against the Advaita school of Vedanta. About the same period, Rangarāmānujamuni commented on all the important Upanisads and acquired the title Upanisadbhāṣyakāra. His Viṣayavākyadīpikā is a gloss on some of the important passages in the Upanisads. He wrote the Bhāvaprakāśikā, a commentary on the Srutaprakāśikā of Sudarsanasuri and a commentary on the Nyāyasiddhañjana of Vedantadeśika. The doctrines of the Visiṣṭādvaita school, were treated in the Yatindramatadipika by Srinivāsācārya, pupil of Mahācārya.

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Meghanādāri calls himself as the son of Atreyanāthārya. He refers to Śrīrāma and others as great preceptors (paraman gurun)." This shows that the author belonged to Atreyagotra. The words ‘śrīrāmapramukhān sarvān paraman gurun’ may mean that Śrīrāma and others were the preceptors of his father Nātharya and therefore great preceptors. The word ‘sarvan’ however would show that many others are meant here. If the words ‘paraman gurun’ would mean that Śrīrāma was the preceptor of his father Natharya, then the date of Meghanādāri could be easily fixed. Śrīrāma referred to here is identical with Śrīrāmamiśra who was also called as Somāśiyāṇdan, one of the chief disciples of Rāmānuja. He wrote a commentary on the Sribhāṣya under the name Śrībhāṣyavivaranam and another work Şaḍarthasaṁkṣepa. Both these works are not available. They are cited by Vedāntadeśika.

Meghanādāri makes references to the former and occasionally quotes from it. He refers to Sriramamiśra frequently in this work Nayadyumani. Apart from Rāmānuja and many other early writers like Panini, Sabara, Vṛttikāra (Upavarṣa), Manu and Parāśara, Meghanādāri refers to one Vadisimha whose identity could not be established. In the work ‘Arcirādigrantha’, Vadisimha had shown Brahman as qualified by the matter and souls. Arcirādi is known as one of the works of Pillai Lokācārya son of Vadakkuttiruvīdipillai (1168-1265 A.D.) also known as Śrī Kṛṣṇapāda. The latter was, along with Periyavaccanpillai, (1168-1263 A.D.) the pupil of Nambillai also known as Kalivairidāsa (1147-1252 A.D.). There was a disciple of Periyavāccanpillai with the name Alagiya Maṇavālapperumaljīyar" who had the title Vādikesarin. Perhaps he is meant here under the word Vadisimha. But, he is not known to have written the work Arcirādi. Any way, it is difficult to reconcile the tradition that Pillai Lokācārya wrote ‘Arcirādi’ with Meghanādāri’s statement that Vadisimha wrote Arciradi. If however, it is possible to admit Meghanādāri’s reference as reliable, then, Vadikeśarin must have been a contemporary of Pillai Lokācārya who lived in the 13th Century A.D. Then Meghanādāri could have been a junior contemporary of Vadikesarin,

श्रीमदात्रेयनाथार्यान गुरून्नः परमान् गुरून् ।

श्रीरामप्रमुखान् सर्वान् श्रीमद्रामानुजं मुनिम् || ( नयप्रकाशिका १-११ ) 8. वादिसिंहकृतार्चिरादिग्रन्थेऽपि पृथक् प्रकृतिपुरुषविविशिष्टब्रह्मणः कारणत्वमभिहितम् । (नयद्युमणि : १७९ - १८० )

सुन्दरजामातृमुनेः प्रपद्ये चरणाम्बुजम |

संसारार्णव संमग्नजन्तु संतापोतकम् ॥

अस्मद्विधपरित्राणप्रेमभद्राणमानसम् ।

वादिकेसरिणं वन्दे रम्यजामातरं मुनिम् || ( गुरुपरम्पराप्रभावः)

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in which case, Meghanādāri should have lived in the 13th Century A.D. Apart from the works of Rāmānuja and others, Meghanādāri cites a stanza from the Nyayasudarśana of Varadanārāyaṇabhaṭṭāraka, a commentary on the Sribhāṣya. As the date of this writer is not known definitely, this will not help in fixing the date of Meghanādāri. Meghanādāri refers to Bhavanatha, the author of the Nayaviveka, in the Nayaprakāśikā. As the date of Bhavanatha is fixed to be about 1100 A.D., Meghanādāri must have lived after 1100 A.D. For want of reliable evidences, his date cannot be fixed with certainty.

Meghanādāri is known as the author of three works:-1. Nayaprakāśikā, a detailed commentary on the Sribhasya of Rāmānuja, 2. Bhāṣyabhavaprabodha, a gloss on the Śrībhāsya and, 3. Nayadyumani, an independent treatise on the principles of the Visiṣṭādvaita school. Dr. Das Gupta mentions Mumukṣūpāyasangraha as a work of Meghanādāri. This work, however, is not available. Among these, the first mentioned is the first work of the author as it is referred to in the Nayadyumani. The second work has no beginning nor end. Perhaps it was written after the Nayaprakāśikā.

Nayadyumani is the third work of Meghanādāri. This work contains twelve sections. The division of the work into twelve sections was perhaps suggested to the author by the title Nayadyumaņi which means the gem in the sky of naya. The gem in the sky is the sun. The twelve ‘rāsis’

‘rāsis’ through which the sun passes through are here twelve sections. The twelve sections are:-1. Sariralakṣaṇanirupaṇam, 2. Adhyayanavidhinirupaṇam, 3. Svataḥprāmāṇyanirupaṇam, 4. Vākyārthapradipaḥ, 5. Anvitābhidhānanirupaṇam, 6. Sabdanirupaṇam, 7. Srutilingādinirūpaṇam, 8. Yathārthakhyātinirupaṇam, 9. Upodghatanirnayaḥ, 10. Kālanirūpaṇam, 11. Pramāṇanirupaṇam and 12. Prameyanirupaṇam.

A brief account of the contents of each of these sections is given below. In the first section called Sariralakṣaṇanirupaṇam, the author refers to the definitions offered for the body by the Sankhyas and Naiyayikas and rejects them on the ground that these definitions are not all comprehensive. The definitions do not apply to plants, trees and others which are devoid of feeling. That the plants and trees do not seem to possess any feeling is due to the relation of the soul with a particular kind of body. Hence the body must be defined as that which is controlled, supported and is at the entire disposal of the soul. This definition applies not only to ordinary bodies of human beings, birds and others but also to the selves and the world being the body of Brahman. The statement the body is of five elements’ is made to convey that such is the nature of the human body so that detachment could be produced. The passage handless and feetless’ shows that Brahman has no body whose existence is

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brought about by karma. It is this definition that upholds the Visiṣṭādvaita conception of sarirasariribhāva.

The second section Adhyayanavidhinirupaṇam is devoted to an investigation as to how an injunction for the study of the Vedas is made available. The Bhaṭṭa school of Mimāmsakas holds that the passage one shall study the Veda ‘10 is the injunction (vidhi) which enjoins the study of the Vedas. Such a study is enjoined for one who has had his initiation (upanayana). This injunction is to be followed upto and inclusive of studying the Vedas together with their meaning. On the other hand, the Prabhakaras hold that the passage svādhyāyodhyetavyah does not express a complete injunction, as no specific adhikarin is mentioned here for whom the order is intended. It does not indicate whether the person is desirous of getting the meaning of the Vedas (arthajñāna) or heaven or any other thing. There is no need to bring words from other contexts to complete the injunction for creating activity, as the other injunction ‘one shall teach him'11 indirectly requires persons to study the Vedas. Hence this injunction that one shall study the Veda is to be inferred from the passage defining a preceptor (ācārya) as one who initiates the pupil, teaches him the Vedas along with the ceremonial and esoterics 12. The preceptor must have a desire to become a preceptor (rāga, ācāryakāma). From this passage, it is inferred that an injunction is available in the form having initiated the pupil and teaching him the Vedas, one shall become preceptor ‘13 Meghanādāri supports the Prabhakara view. Sudarśanaśūri and other commentators on the Sribhāṣya uphold the Bhaṭṭa view that the adhikarin is one who desires to know the meaning of the Vedas and this is implied in the passage svadhyāyodhyetavyah. Meghanādāri, however, says that he was sharing the views of Srirāmamiśra one of the chief disciples of Rāmānuja. This section has an abrupt end and is incomplete.

The third section Svataḥprāmāṇyanirupaṇam deals with the question of validity of cognitions. While the Naiyayikas hold that knowledge is generated by external factors and therefore validity of that knowledge depends on the perfection or otherwise of those external factors, the Mīmāṁsakas believe that knowledge is not generated, but as it rises, it does so revealing objective facts. It

स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः । (तै. आर. २ - १२)

तमध्यापयीत । (शत. ब्रा.)

उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः ।

सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्य प्रचक्षते ॥ (मनु. २१४० )

उपनीय वेदाध्यापनेनाचार्यकं भावयेत् । (नयद्युमणिः पु. २० )

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does not depend on objective facts, for the latter depend on knowledge for their revelation. Following the Prabhakara school of Mīmāmsā, Meghanādāri defines a valid means of proof as experience. As the object itself is presented in the cognition, there is no need for that cognition to depend on any other to declare its validity. Recollection is not valid as it reveals the previous experience as the cause of activity. Hence validity of a cognition is intrinsic (svataḥ) There arises no indecision when knowledge arises regarding its correctness. Subsequently, it may be sublated. Then it is declared invalid. Invalidity therefore is due to later experience or some other data in the form of contradictory experience or defects in the sense organs. Hence invalidity of a cognition is extrinsic (parataḥ). Verbal testimony is intrinsically valid, as even in the absence of a speaker, the passage uttered is understood. Following Prabhakara, Meghanādāri holds that Vedas alone constitute verbal testimony while validity is inferred in the case of words other than those in the Vedas from the trustworthy nature of the speaker. The question of invalidity does not rise in the case of the Vedas which are not of human origin. Invalidity also is extrinsic in the case of words other than the Vedas. The loss of the Vedas during deluge need not be imagined, as even during that period, Brahman exists and it is held that at the time of creation, Brahman, after creating Brahmā, gives him the Vedas. As ākāśa is only a product (karya), it cannot be eternal as the Naiyayikas hold. Sound has ākāśa as its substratum. Sound therefore is not eternal as the Mimāmsakas hold. It continues to exist as long as ākāśa exists. Hence it is not existent for few moments. This section has an abrupt beginning and appears to be lacking in some portion in the beginning.

In the fourth section called Vākyārthapradipa, Meghanādāri discusses the meaning of sentences. The views of the various schools of thought are set forth and criticised. At the outset, the view of the grammarians is stated. A sentence according to the grammarians conveys activity (kriya). Every sentence must lead to some activity. This view is criticised by the Prabhakaras on the ground that activity is of momentary existence and is found to produce the result only when causes operate. Activity cannot exist at the time when heaven and other results are produced. The meaning of the sentence must therefore be, the Prabhakaras hold, invisible potency (apūrva) which is fit to be produced for the person on whom is enjoined the imperative of obligation (niyoga). On him is this obligation enjoined who understands the work (or rite) as belonging (or concerning) to himself. A reference is made to the view that activity creates impression in the soul and the soul with such impressions gets qualified to reach heaven and obtain other results. This view, which appears to have been held by Udayana, is rejected for want of support from

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any valid authority. The view of the Advaita school of Vedanta is then set forth. According to this school, all sentences convey only one idea namely, Brahman. Meghanādāri sets forth the Advaita concept of Brahman on the strength of the passages from the Upaniṣads. Perception and other means of proof are likely to become defective as instruments of valid cognition. In fact, they become so and therefore the Vedas alone, which are intrinsically valid, are to be relied upon in understanding the true nature of Brahman. Passages of the Upanisads teaching dualism ought to be taken to refer to the empirical existence of the world. The passage ’truth, knowledge, endless, Brahman’ means only Brahman. The entire passage (akhandavākya) means only this. Thus, Brahman, without attibutes, must be taken to be the meaning of sentences. This is refuted by the Prabhakaras, who prove that difference exists in the world and that the passages from the Upanisads could not be interpreted to yield the sense of the Advaitic concept. The Prabhākaras would accept both identity and difference as real. Every thing is identical with every other thing due to existence (sattā) and is different from it due to inherent speciality. The Prabhakaras give evidences to show that the world is real. The next view that is referred to here is that of sphota held by the grammarians and preached by Bhartṛhari. According to them, sphota is the word without parts, external and the cause of the world. It is Brahman. This theory is identical with that of the Advaita school of Vedanta. Sound called under the name sphota is held to be identical with Brahman. The sentences convey only sphota. Everything else is unreal. This view is criticised and rejected as it was done in the case of the Advaita school. There is nothing like sound called sphota apart from the sound cognised by the ear. The Bhatta school of the Mimāṁsakas holds the meaning of the sentence to be bhāvanā otherwise called primary sense (abhidha). This is denoted by the potential mood (lin). All words have an activity (vyāpāra) called primary sense which is to be inferred from the knowledge obtained about the object. This activity is called bhāvanā or pravartanā, as it gives rise to activity in men. The next view that is cited is that of Mandanamiśra who held that the potential mood (lin) in a sentence conveys that which is the means for obtaining the desired object (iṣṭasādhana). The Prabhakaras refute these views held by the Bhāṭṭas and Mandanamiśra. The word in the potential mood cannot give rise to activity, as the word is sound,a quality of the ākāśa and as all activities rest on substances. What gives rise to activity shall be the meaning of the sentence. The means of getting what is desired object cannot be the meaning of the sentence. The Prabhākaras then argue that the passage of the Vedas convey only the sense that an act (rite) should (ought to) be done. Since the passages in the Upanisads deal with things already existent and therefore not to be

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accomplished (karya), the study of such passages need not be under-

taken.

Meghanādāri takes up this matter for discussion. He justifies the undertaking of the study of the Upanisadic passages. All sentences of both Vedic and worldly origin mean only Supreme Brahman, as that alone could be denoted by all words. This becomes possible, because Brahman is the soul for the world of animate and inanimate beings. Words which refer to the animate and inanimate beings, which are the modes of Brahman, mean only Brahman having these as the modes. For instance, the word’ cow’ denotes the animal characterised by gotva.

Incidentally, there is reference made to the conception of liberation in the Visiṣṭādvaita school. Those who understand from the passages of the Vedas only the results pertaining to the world and heaven cannot understand all the modes (prakāra). Even if they are understood, there cannot be scope for liberation for which the means is only the knowledge taking the shape of worship (upāsanā). When all obstacles are removed, liberation takes place in the form of getting near Brahman in a particular place (Vaikuntha). It is ignorance of this that distinguishes the released soul from that in bondage. Remaining aloof (kaivalya) is not final release. Knowledge of God helps in giving rise to the knowledge of all things. Viṣṇu is the giver of all fruits (for the actions performed by souls). Invisible potency (apūrva), which is insentient, cannot grant the results for the rites performed. Agni and other deities, who are referred as givers of results, become fit for this, as they are also modes of Brahman and as Brahman is imminent in them. The words could not therefore convey the sense of the act to be accomplished. In some cases, the connection between the sentence and its meaning is based on convention, while in general, it is eternal. This applies also to the words in the Tamil language. Words when they apply to the world must be taken in the secondary sense. Hence passages like one who is desirous of heaven shall perform the sacrifice’ do not mean any activity imposed as the imperative of obligation on the doer, but means that the sacrifice should be accomplished by the activity of the doer as a means of pleasing the deity.

The potential mood means the injunction that the desired object or its means should be accomplished by the activity of the doer. Injunction gives rise to activity. Meghanādāri does not agree with some who hold injunction to be the imperative of obligation of a reliable person who desires for the welfare of others, as this is opposed to the view found in the Srībhāṣya.

In the fifth section called Anvitābhidhananirupaṇam, Meghanādāri states the views of Prabhakara and Kumārila regarding the way in which the verbal cognition arises from a sentence. Prabhakara

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held the view that the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in sentences. That is, no word can denote any sense when taken apart from such a sentence. The words yield their meanings only as generally related to other factors in that sentence. This view is called anvitābhidhānavāda. On the contrary, Kumarila held that words independently convey their meaninga which are combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. This view is called abhihitānvayavāda. Meghanādāri refutes both these and maintains Arthāntarānvitābhidhānavāda. The Prabhakaras do not agree with this view on the ground that potency will have to be recognised in that case both in the relation and the meaning related. Meghanādāri shows that potency need not be recognised in both. Potency is recognised in that which is related. It need not be specifically applied to the other, as this itself would apply there. Verbal expectancy, congruity and proximity are accessories in anvitābhidhānavāda.

In the sixth section, Meghanādāri deals with sound. Sound is not eternal nor is it of momentary existence as the Naiyāyikas hold. Akāśa the substratum is not eternal but lasts for a longer time than most among the created objects. Sound exists for a long time and does so as long as ākāsa lasts. It exists wherever ākāśa exists. The statement that sound is eternal must be taken in the relative sense, like the eternal existence of the immortals (amara). Eternality of sound consists in the Vedas being not produced by any human being. The words in the Vedas and in ordinary usage are the same.

If they were different, the words used in the Vedas could not be interpreted. Sound is said to be eternal in order to maintain the eternal nature of the relation between a word and its meaning. The word refers to the universal (jāti) which is in the form of assemblage of parts (samsthāna). Assemblage of parts is a quality of the substance alone. It is not present in the quality. Sound is twofold, viz., alphabetical (varna) and noise (avarna). Both are eternal. The organ of hearing is not ākāśa itself, as all sense organs take their rise from ego (ahankāra). Hence like the eye, the ear also apprehends its object by reaching the object (prāpyakāri). Space for movement and favourable wind are accessories for the ear.

In the seventh section, the author deals with the six pramāņas, śruti, linga, vakya, prakaraṇa, sthāna and samakhya which are used to interpret injunction (vidhi). After defining and illustrating them with reference to the karmakāṇḍa portion of the Vedas, the author applies them to the Vedanta. Hereby the author shows the Purvamimāmsā rules of interpretation could be applied to the passages of the Upanisads.

In the eighth section, the theory of error is taken up for discussion. The author states the various theories of error and refutes them and concludes that the theory of yatharthakhyātī alone is acceptable.xxxi

At first, the anyathākhyāti theory of the Naiyayikas which the author calls as viparitak hyāti is set forth and refuted. That an object is present before or not must be determined by the content of the knowledge. If the cognition rising from a particular object is to have a different content, then that cognition need be no cognition as that content is not present before. Hence the cognition cannot rise about an object not presented before. There is thus no scope for viparitakhyāti. The treatment of anirvacaniyakhyāti held by the Advaitins is discursive. If in the case of the cognition of silver in the shell, the Advaitins hold that an indefinable silver (anirvācya rajata) is presented which is mistaken for real silver, Meghanādāri argues that this is a case of viparītakhyāti. The perception of the indefinable silver will not give rise to any activity. Strictly speaking, indefinable silver cannot be mistaken for real silver, as there is nothing in common between them to give rise to error of this kind. The author then discusses the nature of māyā and proves that anirvacaniyakhyāti cannot be maintained. The theory of asatkhyāti maintained by the Madhyamikas is then refuted. Since what is not existent appears as existent, this is only anyathakhyāti. The theory of atmakhyāti held by the Yogācāras is also a case of anyathakhyāti as what is cognition appears as objects. The theory of akhyāti maintained by the Prabhakaras is shown by the author to be a kind of yatharthakhyāti.

In the cognition ’this is silver’ rising from the shell, there are two parts “this” and “silver.” This’ refers to the silvery character

which is related to real silver. Silver’ refers to the recollection of silver cognised before elsewhere. Both those are presented in the same cognition. This is not a case of anyathākhyāti. The shell is mistaken for silver, because of the shining character of silver present in the shell. What is present in the object is cognised. Some special features present in the shell to declare it as such are not apprehended. This cannot be a case of error but must be one of actual observation. The author shows that the Prabhakara view that the knowledge of silver arises out of shell present before because of non-apprehension of the difference between the two cognitions cannot be maintained, as there does not rise the experience of remembering silver. The author states his view on this subject as yatharthakhyātī. Due to pañcikaraṇa, every object will bear resemblance to every other object in some degree. The silvery part or the shining character which belongs to silver is presented in the shell and this gives rise to the cognition that the object presented before is silver. The portion of silver is much smaller in the shell. As mire is said to be watery due to the small portion of water being present there, the shell is said to be silver due to the small portion of silver present in the shell. Even those who advocate anyathakhyāti have to admit that a substance like earth is called earth because of preponderance of the earthy

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portion there, although other elements go to make up the composite product called earth. Similarly, the shell has the portion of silver in a small proportion. If the cognition ’this is silver’ is to rise about the shell which does not have the silvery portion, then this cognition must be taken as based on no object. A certain object cannot become the content of a cognition which has some other object. Meghanādāri explains in the same manner certain cases like ‘conch is yellow,’’ milk is bitter’, ’the crystal is red’, ‘circle of fire brand’, reflection of the face in the mirror’ ‘movement of trees and others in the opposite direction when a person is seated in a quick-moving vehicle or boat,’ and ’two moons’. Meghanādāri then shows that all other cognitions which are considered by the scholars of other systems as erroneous are only valid cognitions. Dream for instance. is considered by the Naiyayikas and others as erroneous experience. In the Visiṣṭādvaita school, dream is a case of correct cognition as it is created by God. God provides the souls with such experience of dream cognitions, thereby awarding them the fruits of the actions not yet experienced. For instance, the vision of one’s own head being cut off presented in the dream is to be explained as the creation of God, as this could not be based on the impressions already produced from such experiences. The misconception of taking the body for the soul or identification of the body and soul must be explained in a similar manner. Similarly, doubt is not a case of misapprehension but a correct cognition. Between a post and a man, there are some features that are common. These being real should give rise to a correct cognition. Doubt rises only from one cause namely the common feature present in both the objects, the object present before and the object present in the mind and mistaken for the object existing before. Indecise cognition (anadhyavasaya) is not also a kind of misapprehension as the Vaiśeṣikas take it to be. Reasoning (tarka) is only an activity of man intended to help the operation of the valid means of proof.

In his Śribhāṣya, Rāmānuja states that the yathārthakhyāti is the view of the scholars deeply learned in the Vedas. 14 While commenting on this, Sudaršanasuri writes that Bodhāyana, Nāthamuni and others are the persons referred to here as advocating yatharthakhyāti.15 Rāmānuja states that even those who hold different views on the theory of error should accept anyathakhyāti. 16

यथार्थ सर्वविज्ञत्नमिति वेदविदां मतम् । (श्रीभाष्यम्)
वेदविदाम् भगवद्बोधायननाथमुनिमिश्रादीनामित्यर्थः । (श्रुतप्रकाशिका) 16. ख्यात्यन्तरवादिनां च सुदूरमपि गत्वा अन्यथावभासोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः, असत्ख्यादिपक्षे सदात्मना, आत्मख्यातिपक्षे चार्थात्मना, अख्यातिपक्षेऽप्यन्यविशेषणमन्यविशेषणत्वेन ज्ञानद्वयमेकत्वेन च, विषयासद्भावपक्षेऽपि विद्यमानत्वेन । (श्रीभाष्यम्.)

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On this, Sudarśanasuri remarks that anyathākhayāti is the basis of all other theories of error except yatharthakhyāti. 17 In his Nyāyapariśuddhi, Vedantadeśika says that anyathākhyāti is the condition of all theories of errors but akhyāti is a simpler mode of approaching these theories; and therefore Rāmānuja had referred to both. (Ny. Par. 1) Therefore, Vedāntadeśika states in the Tattvamuktakalapa that the theory of ror in the Visiṣṭādvaita school is called Yatharthakhyāti which is conjoined with akhyāti. (Tat. M. K. 4-11). Here akhyāti is mentioned because Rāmānuja states that all cognitions are yathartha as the advocates of akhyāti do. It therefore appears that Rāmānuja advocated akhyātisamvalitayatharthakhyāti. Rāmānuja shows that even akhyāti is based on anyathākhyāti.

In the course of the treatment of the theories of error, Meghanādari incidentally refers to direction (dik) as the region of earth and others. Direction as such is not an independent substance. The organ of vision is only one moving quickly between the two eye-

sockets.

In the ninth section under the name Upodghatanirṇaya, the author asserts that the first sutra in the first pada of the first adhyaya of the Brahmasutras forms an introduction and refutes the view held by others that the first four sutras there form an introduction. He cites the view of Sriramamiśra in support of his interpretation.

The tenth section is devoted to the treatment of time. Time has no independent existence. It is a substance. It has divisions created through the conditions (upadhi) with which it is connected. Vedāntadeśika and others take time to be eternal while Meghanadāri treats it as longstanding.

In the eleventh section Pramāṇanirupaṇam, the author defines pramāņa as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge like memory. He refers to the definitions offered by the scholars holding different views.. A section of scholars of the Visiṣṭādvaita school define it as the knowledge capable of apprehending that whose nature is not apprehended before. This definition is defective as the word ’tattva’ meaning real nature is superfluous. A section of the Naiyayikas hold pramāņa as experience other than recollection. The author shows that this definition does not apply to certain cases. Recollection is valid. Invalidity consists in depending upon something else. Recollection would become invalid only when it is to determine its object and therefore must be considered valid as an instrument

17 यथार्थख्यातिव्यतिरिक्तपक्षेष्वन्यथाख्यतिपक्षः प्रचल इत्यभिप्रायेणाह –ख्यात्यन्तरेति । (श्रुतप्रकाशिका )

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of valid cognition. Another definition cited here is “pramāņa is that which is pervaded by valid cognition and associated with its means or substratum.” The author shows that the definition would apply to the knowables also as they are pervaded by valid cognition and hence defective. This definition seems to be the same as that given by Udayana (N.K. IV 5). The definition “pramāņa is experience of the thing as it is” is defective, as every experience is true and as the word yathartha does not serve any purpose. For the same reason defective are other definitions like pramāņa is the means of correct experience and pramāņa is experience of its nature. The Bhaṭṭas define pramāņa as that which helps in the apprehension of an object not cognised before. If this definition applies to the cognition of others, then as others could have already cognised soul, ākāśa and others, inference of such things would become invalid. If the definition applies to one’s own cognition, then cognition arising about a thing already known to oneself would become invalid. The Buddhist’s definition that pramāņa is the knowledge that does not disagree is defective as the word’ visamvada’ cannot be specifically understood and applied to any concrete case.

The author states that perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony and presumption are the five pramāņas of this school of Vedanta. Though Rāmānuja does not mention the number of pramāņas in the Sribhāṣya and other works, yet the passage in the Śrībhāṣya 18 ‘must be interpreted in the light of the passages of Upavarṣa, known as the Vṛttikara of the Purvamīmāmsā. But the other exponents of this school admit only three pramānas, perception, inference and verbal testimony. 19

Perception is defined as the cognition directly and immediately experienced as determining the object. Immediacy consists in not being separated by any other factor (avyavahita). The author rejects Varadaviṣṇumiśra’s definition of immediacy which consists in distinct appearance. 20 The author divides perception as determinate and indeterminate. In this connection, the author holda very detailed discussion on the cencepts of the qualification, qualified and complex cognition (vaiśistya). Another classification of pers ception into two kinds is yogipratyakṣa and ayogipratyakṣa. Of these, the former is always of the determinate type. God and released souls do not require the aid of sense organs for perceiving the objects. The author rejects the definition of preception as given by the Advaitins.

प्रमाण संख्याविवादेऽपि । (श्रीभाष्यम्)
त्रिविधं प्रमाणं प्रत्यश्चानुमानशब्दभेदात् । ( न्यायपरिशुद्धिः ) 20. आपरोक्ष्यं नाम विशदावभासत्वमिति ।

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The author’s definition of inference is almost the same as that of the Naiyayikas. The author’s definition of adventious circumstance (upadhi) is the same as that given by Udayana (N. K. III). Inference is threefold as in the case of the Naiyāyikas but with slight difference. They are karaṇānumānam, kāryānumānam, and anubhayānumānam. A further classification into three kinds is given under the heads anvayavyatireki, kevalānvayi and kevalavyatireki. Varadaviṣṇumiśra and Parāśarabhaṭṭa have the same classfication. On the strength of the arguments of Yamunācārya and his preceptor Atreya Rāmānuja, Vedāntadeśika rejects kevalavyatireki type of inference. The author is aware of this view (Na. dy. Pp. 201-2). Again inference is of two kinds, for one’s own purpose and for others. The latter has only three members of syllogisms namely, pratijñā, hetu and udaharana. The author refers to Udayana’s view while arguing for the inclusion of fallacies of the minor term under the fallacies of the middle term.

Sastra is one of the means of proof which determines the object denoted by the words of the Vedas. Hence words other than those of the Vedas do not come under Sastra. By sastra, the author means verbal testimony. Following the Prabhakaras, the author refuses to admit passages other than those of the Vedas as valid intrinsically. In the case of the Mahabharata, Vedāngas and others, the use of the word śāstra is of secondary significance. Ayurveda, Dhanurveda and Smṛtis are to be treated as sastra. The author refutes the view of the Vaiseṣikas and others who bring verbal authority under inference. The author then discusses in detail the significance of the various injunctory passages (vidhivakya) and the passages of the Upanisads.

Analogy is a means of proof. The argument that if analogy is to be an independent means of proof because of similarity as its basis, then there must be another indepentdent means of proof for dissimilarity cannot hold good, as dissimilarity is the negation of similarity and the negative feature does not have existence and therefore this question does not arise.

Presumption is shown to be an independent means proof. The author illustrates the employment of this means of proof for the interpretation of the Vedic passages.

In the last section, the author deals with the knowables (prameya). The object of knowledge is only one namely Brahman. Still, there are many objects to be known as the modes of Brahman. Such objects are three in number, namely-substance, quality and action. Among these, substance is that which has quality. It is two fold, sentient and insentient. The former is of three kinds, Supreme soul, individual soul and knowledge. The Supreme soul is to be known only through the Vedas. Arguments based on the theory of causation, as are advanced by the Naiyayikas, would only

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show that the creator of the world should have been only an ordinary soul. Brahman, which is identical with the Supreme soul, is both the inherent and instrumental cause of the world. Hence the argument of the Sankhyas to prove the origin of the world from primordial matter becomes untenable. Brahman is both the cause and the effect of the world. While being the cause, Brahman is the instrumental cause and also inherent cause in the form of primordial matter. The author refutes the interpretations offered by the Advaitins, and the followers of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakāśa for the Vedic passages dealing with the creation of the world. Whether God has a body is discussed at length resulting in the conclusion. that God has an aprākṛta body. Passages which speak of Brahman as having no feet and hands only mean that Brahman can act even in the absence of the body. Brahman is known in this school under the name Nārāyaṇa. His consort is Lakṣmi. The term Lakṣmipati which refers to Brahman denotes Bhumi also as the consort of Nārāyaṇa. The word hri’ occurring in the Vedic passages shows that Nila is also a consort of Nārāyaṇa. Regarding the position of Laksmi, Meghanādāri argues that she is only an ordinary soul, atomic in size. However, she is eternally present along with Nārāyana. As the consort of God, she is entitled to the highest form of worship next only to Brahman. This view of Laksmi has been held by the section of this school known as Tenkalai, as opposed to the Vadakalai section which treats Laksmi as the consort of Nārāyana, an aspect of Brahman along with Him, thus holding Brahman to be divyadampati. The author then takes up in great detail the concept of liberation. Devotion and self-surrender are the methods to be adopted by the souls to get final release. The soul is then proved to exist distinct from the body. Knowledge is sentient as the soul is only dharmibhūtajñāna, on account of which the soul is in a position to feel and experience the world and also itself. Cognition which rises in the souls is dharmabhūtajñāna. The author then deals with inert matter in all its conditions like the states of their causes and effects, the sense organs and the nature of the human body. Qualities and action are then treated. Potency (śakti) and similarity (sādṛśya) are recognised as the qualities. Darkness is admitted to be a substance.

A study of these sections reveals Meghanādāri’s powers of independent and critical reasoning. In his attempt to present the fundamental doctrines of the Visiṣṭādvaita school in the proper perspective, he had achieved remarkable success. He had argued for the acceptance of some doctrines from the Nyaya and Mīmāṁsā systems to be included in the Visiṣṭādvaita school as they do not go contrary to the fundamental doctrines of the school. He had also criticised vehemently some of the principles of Nyaya and Mimāmsā

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which he felt as totally untenable for supporting the doctrines of of this school.

In the very first sentence of his Nayadyumaņi, Meghanādāri states the doctrine of the Visiṣṭadvaita school (Na. dy. P. 1). In his Nayaprakāśikā, a commentary on the Sribhāṣya of Ramanuja, the author cites a stanza of Srīrāmamiśra which states the soul, Brahman, the relation between them, avidya, the means of destroying it and final release as the six principles of the school of Ramanuja. 21 The author was probably brought in the line of this Sriramamiśra, one of the immediate disciples of Rāmānuja, as is evident from his references to the views of this scholar in his Nayadyumani. Meghanādāri was an ardent devotee of Hayagriva and Srirama. This is understood from some of the invocatory stanzas at the beginning of each section.

High regard for Rāmānuja and Sriramamiśra must have been responsible for Meghanādari’s independent stand he is found to have maintained in holding fast to the doctrines of this school. Śrīrāmamiśra is referred to as a staunch advocate of the views of the school.22 Rāmānuja, the author says, appeared before him in his dream and clarified the doubtful points in the Sribhāṣya. 23 Very often the author seeks the authority of Śrīrāmamiśra for his maintaining a a particular view. The following are some of the points at issue over which he held a view different from the scholars of the same school:

I. A section of the scholars of this school holds that verbal authority of the worldly type (laukika) is also intrinsically valid. The majority of the scholars including Meghanādāri holds that ordinary words have only extrinsic validity. (Na. dy. P. 43).

On the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha) and of injunction (vidhi), Meghanādāri follows the Prabhakara school of Mimāmsā. In this respect, it seems that his conception of these two is not only unique but is not shared by other scholars of the school. 24 (Na dy. P. 97).
जीवब्रह्मान्वयाविद्यातदृद्ध्वं सोपायमोचनम् ।

विषयो वादिविमतेः रामानुजमते स्थितः ॥

इति श्रीराममित्रैः शास्त्रस्य षडर्थविषयत्वाभिधानात् । (नयप्रकाशिका.) अस्मन्मतज्ञपरिवृढतमैः श्रीराममित्रैः । (नयद्युमणि: पु. १७१) भाष्यार्थसंशये यस्य स्वप्नेऽर्थान् प्राह भाष्यकृत् । ( नयप्रकाशिका . ) आमस्य हितकामस्य नियोग केचिदूचिरे ।

भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेतदेवान्मन्यत ॥ ( नीतिमाला . )

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Noise (dhvani) and articulate sound (nada) are recognised by some scholars of this school as eternal. This is criticised by Meghanādāri. (Na. dy. P. 119)
While some scholars hold the first four sutras in the Brahmasutras as forming an introductory part of the Brahmasūtras, Meghanādāri treats only the first sutra as introductory. Meghanādāri rejects the former view and seeks the authority of Sriramamiśra for support. (Na. dy. P. 171).
Time has no independent existence. Meghanādāri refers to a view that time is a separate substance. (Na. dy. P. 175).
While defining pramāņa, Meghanādāri refers to the different views held by the exponents of the school and repudiates them. 25 (Na. dy. Pp. 182, 184, 185).

In defining perception, immediacy (sākṣātva) is defined clear presentation (viśadāvabhāsatva) by some scholars. Meghanādāri refutes this definition. (Na. dy. P. 187). The scholar referred to here might have been

here might have been Varadaviṣṇumiśra, author of the Manayāthātmyanirṇaya whom Vedāntadeśika names as holding this view in Nyāyapariśuddhi-Pratyakṣa Ahnika I.

Meghanādāri’s profound scholarship in both the schools of Mimāmsā, Bhāṭṭa and Prabhakara and in the Nyaya system is revealed in every section of this work. He advocates the Prabhakara theories of vidhi, yatharthakhyāti, anvitābhidhānavāda and the number of the means of proof. In the matter of the number of the means of proof, he establishes a standpoint which goes against the tradition of the school. Meghanādāri does not hesitate to adversely criticise the Prabhakara view on the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha). His critical and analythical powers of reasoning are revealed in the treatment of the number of pramāņas, vidhi, anvitābhidhānavāda, upodghatanīrupaṇa and prameyanirupaṇa. With great skill, the author demonstrates that there is no room for any inconsistency in the works of Rāmānuja. (Na. dy. Pp. 134, 172, 188, 191).

Meghanādāri’s style is simple and easy flowing but is not polished with elegance and grace as is found in the works of Rāmānuja and Vedantadesika. When the occasion demands, the author is capable of adopting a terse style of discursive kind. (N. dy. Pp. 56, 57, 146-153). Occasionally, the author summarises his views in verse form. (Na. dy. Pp. 9, 116).

V. KRISHNAMACHARYA.

cf. तत्रास्मदीया एव केचिदन्यथाख्यातिमिच्छन्तः स्मृतेः प्रामाण्यमनिच्छन्तः सम्यगनुभवः प्रमेति लक्षयन्ति । उभयमिच्छन्तो यथार्थज्ञानं प्रमेति । उभयमनिच्छेन्तोऽनुभूतिः प्रमेति । एवंप्रायाणि च वाद्यन्तरोक्तानि लक्षणानि । (न्यायपरिशुद्धिः)