AGAMA PRAMANYAM

1. Homage to Visņu, the sole cause of the origin, subsistence and annihilation of the world, the sole cause of perfect bliss, for whom everything is as instantly evident’ as a myrobala in the hand.
2. Those of my contemporaries who are ‘pro- foundly dishonest and will condemn a penetrating treatise, however great its merits, because they are envious, (may condemn it.) There are many others, who have an excellent judgment of what is essential and what is not-honest students who do not cavil; and they will praise my work.
3. Even erudite scholars may err when their critical acumen is dominated by partisan views; yet, let the sagacious without envy study the Bhagavata doctrine as I shall present it here.
4. There are certain people whose minds are confused by the noise of multitudes of sophisms and falsehoods which are borrowed from anyone that comes and claiming superiority for their own studies and learning, and pretending to protect the Way of the Veda, they refuse to accept the authority of Pañcaratra Tantra which, being composed by the Supreme Per- son Himself, leads to unparalleled beatitude. 1 And they contend: It has been decided that Verbal Testimony’ is a means of knowledge in two ways: dependent testimony which depends on other authority, .. and independent testimony. These two kinds are thus distinguished: No verbal assertion can be a means of valid knowledge if it has been formulated by a person; 1 2 AGAMA PRAMANYAM for a verbal assertion to be authoritative, it must by definition be independent. “That is to say: verbal evidence which originates from a person carries authority only then when it is used to corroborate a fact which has already been truly established by other means of knowledge, and which enables the speaker to take this fact for granted. Now, Perception and the other means of knowledge which involve Perception, cannot produce the knowledge that the Pañcaratra Tantra does indeed set forth that the desired heaven, release and other supernatural ends can be attained by means of such ritual acts as Con- secration and such devotional acts as worship of the Bhagavan etc., for this relation of means and ends is not of the order of Perception. For if we consider Consecration, worship etc. merely with the aid of Perception, we cannot say that they are means to realize the summum bonum. Not only, therefore, is Perception of an ordinary kind unavailing, but there is also no way to know that there have been recently certain persons of superhuman sensibility who would have had perceptual evidence that such acts really are means of attaining the desired ends; for the sense-organs of such persons, too, cannot surpass the boundaries of sensitiveness as we know it commonly.
5. An objection may be raised here: However, perception of a superior kind is possible, depending on its percipient. Perception, therefore, may become perfect if the percipient is perfect. That is to say: a finite thing may be found to become infinite; for instance, extent becomes infinite

AGAMA PRAMANYAM 3 in space, which is infinitely extended. Similarly, we find that finite Perception is considerably widened in air-borne creatures, like crows, owls, vultures etc., so that Perception might conceivably become infinite in some being. This indeed is the uppermost limit of knowledge where it encompasses every knowable thing; for we know from experience that knowledges exceed one another as their contents exceed one another. That is why the wise can say that there is Someone in Whom such finite qualities as supremacy, dispassionateness, power etc. subsist in an infinite and unequalled condition. Consequently, this Person whose immediate perception encompasses the entire range of things that are present in the world is hereby explained to be the Bhagavan who has immediate perceptual knowledge that Consecration, worship and so forth are dharma. So what remains unproved? (is improper). . 6. This objection is thus refuted: The supreme perceptual knowledge which you assume is just a fancy. Perceptual knowledge can never go beyond its own sphere and trespass on another. For instance: A superior kind of visual perception, as well as a superior perceptible object, must necessarily occur in loci where inherent relations of one kind, as between colour and coloured, obtain in one object. No knowledge that is received through one of the senses can encompass all that is knowable through all senses. So how can perceptual 4 AGAMA PRAMANYAM knowledge by itself make all things known, i.e. also things known only through other means of ..: knowledge? 7. The objector resumes: However, the sensitivity which we attribute to Perception is directed toward the perceiving of what exists at present. Of course, if Perception did not have this function of perceiving what exists at present as its natural function, it would cease to be Perception at all. Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that a superior kind of Perception, defined as encompassing all objects, is a priori impossible because it is limited to being Perception! 8. The objection is refuted: If from finite Perception you conclude to infinite Perception, then I ask you to explain: can a finite quantity ever attain to such expansion that it cannot be further expanded? You insist, as it were, on full maturity in a little boy! ’even as a boy, after attaining the full growth, cannot grow physically further?’ There are two possibilities: either the infinite exists in the finite, or the finite gradually becomes infinite. 1 The former cannot stand, for there is no Perception to support it: we have never seen a bowl or a similar finite object which had the same expansion as space. And suppose a finite quantity could assume inconceivable infinitude: why, then any single jar or pitcher could fill up the entire space within the Egg of JOAMA PRALINTAS 5 Brahma, so that all other things would be pushed out and perish accordingly! If you take space itself as the subject,’ you merely prove the proved.’ In the alternative you cannot avoid the illogicality we have pointed out: as a matter of fact, never before has anybody seen a finite pillar which was pervaded by an infinite pillar Consequently, there remains the defect of mutual exclusion. Let us also consider your illustration, namely that in space we have an example of a finite extent becoming infinite. Extent is by definition a limited extension of space, a relative quantity, something that can be entirely circumscribed. Extent in this definition does not subsist in space as such, so how can you adduce it as an example? Besides, if one were to infer extent in space, one would simultaneously infer the possibility that space might be surpassed in extent by another quantity. And so the illustration again falls short of the thesis. Nor is there any evidence for the thesis that a superior perception reveals that Consecration, worship etc. are actually dharma. To sum up: For all these reasons it would appear to us that the supposition that some, otherwise un- perceived, supreme spiritual being exists with a superior sensibility is very weak; and this being so, we conclude that Perception offers no authority for the postulated relation of means to ends’; and since the authority of Pañcaratra is based upon the Perception of this sup- posed relation, its authority is entirely non-existent. 6 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 9. Not only is there no Perception, but there cannot possibly be an Inference to support the thesis in question, for it is wholly suprasensible: and Inference, of course, can only take place after an invariable con- comitance has been observed by means of Perception. If no fires have ever been observed before, they cannot prove that smoke is invariably concomitant with them.” 10. Nor do we find scriptural evidence which sets forth that the performance of all the rites which are established in the Satvata" doctrine is mandatory; such evidence would have proved that the Pañcaratra Tradition, being based upon this mandate,’’ carried authority. Nor is it possible, in the absence of explicit revelation, to infer such evidence from Scripture. For just as the relation of means to certain ends which are their fruits, c.g., heaven, as Paficarātra maintains Consecration, worship etc. to be, does not allow of being inferred because no such relation can be verified by Perception, just so no scriptural authority to furnish the basis of such a relation can be inferred from Scripture. " Nor is any verbal testimony capable of providing valid knowledge that Scripture is the basis of the Tradition concerned. Verbal testimony is of two kinds, originating from a person or not originating from a person.’s Personal speech cannot be proof of it, for persons may lie in order to deceive their hearers. For even today, we find philosophers who pretend to be scriptural and yet expound an interpretation which is wholly unscriptural. ADAMA PRAMANYANY 7 So we have our doubts whether the claim made by the authors of the Pañcaratra texts that their own compositions are founded in the Veda is really the result of an honest conviction that such is indeed the case, or nothing but the self-glorification of authors who write as their fancy takes them! · This argumentation by itself suffices to disprove the contended authority of Pañcarātra, for there is no eternal Scripture" to support the claim. Nor can Analogy prove that Scripture is its basis, for this criterion cannot be properly applied; for how could the proof we need, which cannot be found by the other means of knowledge, be within the scope of the mere knowledge of similitude? Nor can it be argued that, since the Tradition cannot be proved by other means, Implication’s proves that Scripture is its basis. The argument is as follows, circumstantial Implication must prove the tradition, as it cannot be proved otherwise; the authors of the Pañcaratra, clearly have this tradition that Consecration, worship, etc. are dharma and this tradition is comparable to the tradition of Manu and others that certain non-Vedic rites, as the aştaka etc., are dharma; now there can be no tradition of a fact unless that fact has been cognized before; but here we have the tradition of a fact that cannot be proved by Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony or Analogy; therefore the cognition of the fact can only have originated from Scripture… " However, this argument would only prove its point if there were any authority for the assumption 10 AGAMA PRAMANYAM of the three estates do not accept the doctrines of Traditions of this kind. 13. OBJECTION: Nevertheless, the fact that Bhagavata Brahmins, who wear the hair-tuft, the sacred thread etc. prescribed in Scripture, perform daily the rites of Pañcarātra should then justify the presumption that these rites likewise ultimately derive from the Veda, On what grounds, then, are we to assume that this same Pañcaratra Tradition really has its origins in error, deceit and the like, the very negation of valid authority?. 14. REFUTATION: We reply: Well! So you really argue that the Bhagavatas, who are hated by the three estates, are exemplary and hence authoritative ?! Objection: But they are Brahmins, and Brahmins are considered to be the highest estate: why should they not be exemplary? + Refutation: Brahmins? Far from it! We do not regard Brahmins as a distinct species, different from the species man, with specific characteristics which mere sensory perception permits us to recognize as present in some specific bodies and absent in others. Hair-tuft, sacred thread etc. which are prescribed for Brahmins and the other two estates, do not make a man a Brahmin! Nor do they demonstrate that a man is a Brahmin, for we see them worn illegally by blackguards, outcastes and the like. Therefore, the sole criterion by which ‘we can tell whether a man · AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ 11 is indeed a Brahmin is acceptance of undisputed expressions by older persons, which give us irrefutable proof. Nor do ordinary people, use without hesitation the term Brahmin to describe Bhāgavatas. There is also a distinct difference in the two appellations: here Brahmins, there Bhāgavatas. 15. OBJECTION: ריוי The people do not use the word Brahmin’ to refer to Bhāgavatas. The reference is only difference as this much Brahmins and this much Bhāgavatas. Be that as it may, still, the appellations Satvata, Bhāgavata etc. are also used to name Brahmins, by some sort of transference of properties, just as the word parivrajaka is used to designate a Brahmin20. REFUTATION: The argument is false. Persons of certain inferior castes are commonly referred to as Satvatas; the name is used to denote these castes, and not anything else. The gram- marians have the rule that it is improper to use a certain word in its etymological sense if it can also be taken in a customary sense which is more common, e.g., rathakāra 21 If there were no such rule, how could the word rathakara give up its etymological meaning of “chariot- maker” to become the name of a particular caste, even to the extent of cancelling all connotations which we have learnt??? Similarly, Satvata refers to a person who has been born from a oratya vaiya and belongs to the lowest castes, and is thus excluded from the sacraments of initiation", etc. Manu says: “The issue of a vaisya vratya extraction is called Sudhanvā or Bhāruṣa or Nijangha or Maitra or Salvata” It cannot 8 AGAMA PRAMANYAM that cognitions are invariably true. But when certain notions which are produced by the false cognitions of people whose judgement is clouded by hatred, prejudice and obstinacy, cause such “traditions” to be written in accordance with these false cognitions, could these traditions possibly be true? 11. Here an objection may be raised: However, the same arguments may be advanced against the authority of the traditions of Manu etc. The observation of the aṣṭaka rite does not produce any perceptual knowledge that this rite is indeed a means to realize the postulated end. Nor can it be inferred, because no relations is perceptually given. Nor is there any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found. Nor again can such evidence be inferred from Scripture where it is not found explicitly, because no relation is perceptually given. Nor can it be proved, through Analogy, as there is no apparent analogue. Nor through circumstantial Implication, because of the reasons given above against the argument that it is otherwise unprovable. Now, if it is legitimate in one case to presume scriptural authority in support of it because there happens to be a well-established tradition about it among Vedic experts,-well, in Pañcaratra, too, great sages are traditionally known as the founders of the sacred transmission, sages like Narada, Sindilya and others. The same objections and the same justifi- cations can be advanced about both the tradition of Manu etc. and the tradition of Pañcaratra. Either both are authoritative or neither is. There are no grounds to show that the two traditions differ in some essential respect. Either we must reject the authorityAGAMA PRAMANYAN 9 of Manu’s tradition as well, or we must indeed show in which respect the Pañcaratra tradition is different from Manu’s. . 12. This objection is refuted: The author of the Sutras, by making the Sutra: “Tradition is also valid, because it has the same agent as Scripture”?", has clearly indicated that in his opinion no essential difference exists between Scriptural and Traditional validity. Accordingly, we find that those who are qualified for the three Vedas perform equally for purposes of higher benefits both the ritual acts which are enjoined by Scripture (e.g., agnihotra, pūrṇadarsamāsa, iyolistoma 18,etc.) and the ritual acts enjoined by Tradi- tion (e.g., aṣṭakā, acamana, sandhya worship “, etc.), because they have been instructed in both varieties of acts by their fathers or preceptors. The firmness with which so highly qualified exemplary persons have adopted these traditional rites as incumbent upon the three higher estates goes to show that the knowledge that rites of this kind, aṣṭaka etc., obviously found to exist, are mandatory ultimately derives from Scripture itself. On the other hand, we find that those who observe the scriptural rites of agnihotra etc. do not observe the Tantric customs in the same manner as they observe such traditional customs as acamana investiture with the sacred thread etc. On the contrary, the Vedic experts condemn those who do. It follows that the validity which we attribute to different Traditions “because”, as the Sutra says, “they have the same agent as Scripture”, cannot well. apply to heterodox Traditions as the Pañcaratra; for exemplary exponents 2 12 ADAMA PRAMANYAṀ be disputed that Bhagavata is another name for Satvata; Smrti has it that “the fifth, called Satvata, worships the temples and sanctuaries of Visnu by royal decree’;’ he is als called Bhagavata.“25 The ‘Smrti. thus describes’ which profession the descendants of the said vratya vaiśya pursue-and with our own eyes we indeed see them pursue this profes- sion. Thus Usanas: “They all live by the plough and the sword, the Acaryas and the Satvatas live on the worship of the Deity.“2 Similarly, in the Brahma Purāṇa-“He worships the sanctuaries of: Visnu by royal decree.” Elsewhere the same is stated. thus: “The profession of the Satvatas is to clean up the sanctuaries of the Deity and the eatables offered to the idol, as well as to guard it.” And, to dispel the last doubt about the sort of people they are, Manu declares: “Whether disguised or not, they can be known by their deeds.” 16. Their conduct, moreover, proves that they cannot be Brahmins. For a living they perform pūjā to the Deity, undergo their Consecration, eat them- selves the food which is offered to the idols, observe deviating sacraments-from the prenatal garbhadhāna rite to the funerary rituals-, omit to perform the frauta ritual and avoid contact with Brahmins. These and other habits show conclusively that they cannot be Brahmins. Smrtis declare that the reason of their disqualifica- tion for Vedic rites is this that they perform pūjā to the Deity in order to earn a living: “Those who from generation to generation have worshipped the Deity professionally are disqualified for the study of the Veda, AGAMA PRAMANYAM 13 for participation in the sacrifices and for officiating in sacrifices.” Their own Parama Samhita states the same prohibition: “Whether in disaster or emergency, in terror or in straits, one must never worship the God of gods for a living.”” Such habits as wearing the garlands that are offered to the God and ́eating the food that is presented to the idol and other practices of that kind, which are condemned by all right-think- ing people, shows plainly that they are not Brahmins. Furthermore, we wonder how it can be presumed that the authority of these people proves that Scripture is the basis of their way of life: at the mere sight of them all respectable men perform expiatory rites such as candrayana! Smrti declares that if one sets eyes on a devalaka, it is necessary to perform an expiation. A devalaka is someone who lives on temple treasure and worships the idol for a livelihood. Thus Devala: “One who lives on temple treasure. is called a devalaka. Likewise: “A Brahmin who has worshipped the deity for three years in order to make a living is called a devalaka and he is held to be unworthy to partake in any ritual.”” Those who have been known to worship the God as a hereditary profession are automatically regarded as devalakas. The rite of expiation is set forth in the precept: “A Brahmin who is taking his meal should not look at ordure, a pig, a eunuch, a sacrificial pole, a devalaka or a corpse; if he does he must observe the candrayana.” Atri, too, very explicitly declares that they are not Brahmins: “The Avalukas, Devalakas, Kalpadevalakas, Gaṇabhoga- devalakas and fourthly those of the Bhagavata profes- sion are corrupt Brahmins.”” Also the venerable Vyasa: 14 AGAMA PRĀMIŅYAM “The Ahvāyakas, Devalakas, Nakṣatragramayajakas and Mahapathikas are outcaste Brahmins.””” Therefore, the fact that Pañcarātra recognizes the authority of the Bhagavatas who by birth and by deeds have deviated from the Way of the Veda is sufficient ground to deny authority to the Pañcarātra Scriptures. 17. Furthermore, the class of texts with which we are here concerned are not valid means of knowing which acts are good and which are evil inasmuch as they are accepted by heretics, and thus are of the same kind as the Buddhist statements on stupa worship. Besides, their own texts relate that the instruction in all their dharmas presupposes the abandoning of the Way of the Veda; “having failed to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Sandilya learnt this doct- rine….”. But how can we presume that a certain text can teach that a certain object, which is known from the four Vedas, is man’s supreme goal in life if he rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as sources of knowledge about the means which lead to bliss? On the contrary, we find that Manu and other authors of Traditions declare that their works which expound as their teaching the means of attaining all kinds of desirable ends derive solely from Scripture: “The Veda in its entirety is the basis of the Law, as well as of the traditions and customs of those who are expert in Law”; “the Law is enjoined by Scripture and Tradition”; “it is entirely expressed in the Veda; for the Veda contains all knowledge.” Further, the assertion that those who have already been consecrated by the sacraments of Investiture etc. and are thereby qualified for all the Vedic rituals, ADAMA PRAMANYAS 15 agnihotra etc., must yet undergo another sacrament, called Consecration,” in order to be qualified for the worship of the Bhagavan, demonstrates that the system is non-Vedic; for if it were Vedic, they would be qualified for Tantric ritual by the regular sacraments. Again, another indication of its non-Vedic character is the fact that the system is not included among the fourteen sources of knowledge, which all orthodox people recognize as giving authoritative information on the Law." If it were authoritative, then it would have been recognized as such by tradition; but as it is not so recognized, this proves that the Pañcaratra tradition is non-Vedic. For this reason the venerable Badarayana, when he has occasion to refute the heterodox doctrines of Kanāda, Akṣapada, the Buddha etc. as inimical to the Way of the Veda, also refutes the Pañicarātra in his Sūtra: “Because of the impossibility of origin.”"" Therefore, as the Vedic experts regard the Pañcarâtra doctrine as non-Vedic since it is not included among the Vedic systems and because of other reasons which will be advanced in the sequel, it cannot be compared with the Tradition of Manu etc. In view of all this it is our opinion that such infrequent good rites-e.g., the worship of the Bhagavān -which are described by the Pañcaratricas (who teach a good many others, mostly black arts of exciting hatred, haunting a person out of his occupation, envoutement etc.) are merely added to deceive people about their real attentions and do not deserve our faith or consideration: they are like milk that is put in a dog’s bladder!

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AGAMA PRAMANYAM

To sum up, it is not proper to assume that Pañcarātra is based on the Veda and therefore equally authoritative as the doctrinal works of Manu’ and

others.

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DISCURSUS:

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18. At this point someone interjects:10 If you please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute the cause of the delegated and indirect authority of the Tradition of Manu etc. But is there any reason why we should have to depend exclusively on the Veda as the basis of the Pañcaratra tradition too? The same direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the authority of the Vedas themselves is also the foundation of the authority of the Pañcarâtra doctrine; the authority of the latter is not based upon the relation of supporting authority and supported authority which characterizes typical smarta injunctions, e.g., aṣṭaka and acamana which have their common basis in the Veda.

In fact, the two traditions of the aṣṭakā rite and the acamana rite are not interdependent, but, they are equally and independently authoritative. Similarly, Pañicarātra and Scripture are not interdependent. If Pañcaratra collapses as soon as it is denied the support of the Veda, why then should the Veda not collapse when the support of Pañcaratra is taken away from it?

19. The Vedas derive their authority from direct knowledge which originates from a person and must therefore naturally derive from a person… Who can doubt it? For we perceive that words, from their very nature, depend for their composition on some entity that is different from themselves. How clse

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could they exist at all? If it is objected that the significance of the Book called Veda just consists in this that it does in fact exist as Word though nobody has composed it, then we reply; why, if this were true, then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists in this that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire! It is utterly out of the question.“1

20. OBJECTION. But since the applicability” of the dharma cannot be shown by any of the means of .knowledge, how can a book on it be composed?

REPLY. Don’t argue like that: for the Bhagavan who, of course, has an immediate intuition of dharma and adharma through the knowledge which is natural to Him has had this Book called Veda composed out of compassion for the world.

21. OBJECTION. But does this intuition or per- ception also encompass dharma and adharma?

REPLY. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavǎn be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.? For the maker of such effects must be one who is capable of perceiving their material and instrumental causes. Now, dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes of the world"; this is also the consensus of the Mimämsakas. Consequently we must postulate a cer- tain person who has this perceptual knowledge; and that person must also be the one who created the Veda at the beginning.

22. If one contends that such entities as mountains, earth and the like are not effects, the answer is as follows:

The entities in question, earth etc., are effects, because they have a complex construction, like a king’s palace."

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AGAMA PRAMANYAM

Similarly, from the fact that they are made up of parts we conclude that they are subject to destruction.

Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed by someone who knows the means by which they can be destroyed, just as we can destroy clay vessels etc. when we know by what means to destroy them.

In the case of entities that are shattered, for instance, by a falling tree, that is without perceptible intelligent agency, the cause of their destruction remains dubious: but because of this very dubiety there can also be not positive certainty that the cause of their destruction is entirely occasional.

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to infer in this world that an entity which has mass and can move is subject to origination and to destruction.

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed effects, on the grounds adduced above, it follows that the Bhagavan has knowledge of dharma and adharma which are the instrumental causes of origination and annihilation.

Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, mountains and the like, have been created by a maker who possesses the described knowledge.

Everything that has origin and end is, in our experience, created by such a maker, just because it is subject to origination and annihilation, like a house.

23. Let it not be argued that there is no inter- mediate production of effects like body, world etc. between acts that bring about the desires of the person who undertakes them, for these acts are unable to

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produce anything unless they are used as an instrument by a spiritual being, since they are non-spiritual them- selves, like an adze: without the operation of a spiritual being-the carpenter-an adze is incapable of effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole.

And we are not able to create through the instru- mentality of apurva factors:" for before the actual fruition of the ritual act we cannot know their instru- mentality, and it has been said that only a person who has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental causes can be a maker with respect to these causes." And there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, to be capable of having the required actual knowledge of the apurva that is to arise from the act.

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the entire Universe with dharma and adharma of all em- bodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc., and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted knowledge etc. subsist. As they say: “The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together.”

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Mantras, arthavadas," epic and purana corroborate this point; c.g. “The one god, Prajapati, creating heaven and earth, created the Vedas,” etc. At the moment of inception the great Grace of this Person who is the Bhagavan is evoked by a glance at the aggregate of individual souls who are almost in a state of non-spiritual stupor, their instruments for the experiencing of karmic results-body, senses and other organs-being completely dissolved. His Grace evoked,

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he originates the entire universe and simultaneously He creates the triple Veda which states pellucidly the means by which the souls in transmigration can realize the objects of their desires. Then again, perceiving that they are in a pitiable condition, being immersed in the ocean of existence which is perturbed by wave upon wave of all manner of iniquities, His heart burns with supreme compassion and He promulgates, through Sanatkumara, Narada etc., the Paficarãtra Samhitas which constitute the sources of knowledge about the manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to perfect bliss. Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord and are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas, can they belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu of anyone?

REFUTATION.62

24. If this is true, then on what authority is such a creator of the Vedas known to exist? He is not directly perceived.

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is word that it therefore must have an author, for that would entail the total reversion of your special

contentions.

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for its composition on the agency of some being is also perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied being.

Now for all embodied beings the body is the instrument for good and for evil; so the assumption that the Veda is utterance would occasion the inference that it has been created by an embodied being whoseAGAMA PRAMANYAM

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happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and evil karman, and who therefore cannot be God.

Moreover, in that case it would be impossible to establish the authority of the Vedas themselves; for if dharma-the Law-is not independent of other means of knowledge, there is no exclusive authority of the Vedas."

25. OBJECTION. But why should dharma be in- dependent of other means of knowledge? For we have asserted that He has actual knowledge of dharma and adharma: how else could He produce the world of which dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes?

REPLY. That has indeed been asserted, but the assertion is fallacious: for no creator of the entire uni- verse can be found of whom this can be assumed.

To your argument that the world must be effected because it has a complex construction can be objected that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities:

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g. pots and the like; those which are not found to be made at all; and those whose creation remained doubtful, like the earth etc.

In the two first-mentioned cases there is no room for God’s activity. As to the third, the earth etc. are not involved in a total origination or disintegrations, but merely, as now, subject to varying degrees of increase and decrease which are adventitious. To say that the Mimämsakas accept origination and annihila- tion in this sense is to prove the proved.

In our opinion, too, these intelligent agents bring about various results by means of sacrifices and other acts, in order to enjoy these results themselves; and

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the assumption that they are indeed, as is proved for both of us, instrumental therein is quite correct, for we can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, donations and the like. However, the special power described with terms like apurva can never be open to perception. How then can we have use for a supervis- ing God?56

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for instance a potter, when he wishes to produce a certain product-pots-must first have direct knowledge of the power of their material cause-clay-and instrumental cause-stick-to produce these products before he can actually undertake their production. Else people who are unaware of the power of the requisite causes would never be able to employ these causes in order to pro- duce the results they want. In the case under discussion the persons concerned do indeed know which causes are required to bring about the results they want, for they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc., through the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scrip- ture. Thus, aided by these causes, they render mani- fest such products as earth etc.

Also, there is no invariable rule that only an agent to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully known is capable of undertaking an action and nobody else. A man can still be an agent in the action of knowing without perceiving in his own mind the material and instrumental causes that go into the making of this action of knowing. Why, then, contend that the causes must be known first?

27. The contention that the entire Universe is subject to annihilation because it has parts is incorrect.

་

Such a conclusion is

evidence against it.

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cancelled by stronger perceptual For the knowledge that does arise in the world of here and now is plainly this: ‘Here is the meru; here is the sun; here is the earth.’

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that these entities are related to different times; and certainly both in former and later ages there arise similar per- sons who have the same notion of these entities’ present existence. To put it in syllogistic form:

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and mountain, because the past is time, like the present.

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard to the future. This reasoning does not entail the fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal, for in their case origination and annihilation are directly evident.

. It does not follow that, when a certain fact cannot be proved on the strength of a certain ground, since this ground involves a contradiction, this same ground cannot prove the same fact when it does not involve a contradiction.$7

The other inference that has been given to prove that the world is subject to origination and annihila- tion, namely on the ground of motion when there is mass, is likewise incorrect; for this ground, too, is cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition. Con- sequently, inference cannot provide positive proof that the world is subject to origination and annihilation.

28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on the ground that the world is a product; but this ground precludes a specially qualified producer. For a product generally implies on the part of its producer a number

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ADAMA PRAMANYAN

of properties which are natural to him and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the con- comitance between him and his product. Properties like being in possession of a body, having something left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc. How, then, can the fact that the world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it possesses the postulated pro- perties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow? The production of a product requires the activation of the body, which requires on the producer’s part an effort whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condi- tion bodiless person can be an agent.

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argu- ment, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself subject to origination or not? If it be subject to origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, then your contention that whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true. The solution of others, namely that God’s special properties can be demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion, does not hold good either. For that rule holds only of a case where a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

29. OBJECTION. But if even a well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all

AGAMA PRAMANYAM

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logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduc- tion can indeed convey true knowledge, that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

REPLY. We do not say that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as many properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasp- ing the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case where the term which we seek to establish through deduction can also be known through another means of knowledge, then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone. In the present instance, how- ever, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance elicited through positive and negative consideration are in- discriminately established by the deduction,

A similarly occasional relationship between pro- ducer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person’s action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural,

+

I J

517

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AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ

of properties which are natural to him and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the con- comitance between him and his product. Properties like being in possession of a body, having something left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc. How, then, can the fact that the world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it possesses the postulated pro- perties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow? The production of a product requires the activation of the body, which requires on the producer’s part an effort whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condi- tion bodiless person can be an agent.

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argu- ment, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself subject to origination or not? If it be subject to origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, then your contention that whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true. The solution of others, namely that God’s special properties can be demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion, does not hold good either. For that rule holds only of a case where a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

29. OBJECTION. But if even a ‘well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all

AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ

25

logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduc- tion can indeed convey true knowledge, that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

+

REPLY. We do not say that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as, many properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasp- ing the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case where the term which we seek to establish through deduction can also be known through another means of knowledge, then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone. In the present instance, how- ever, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance elicited through positive and negative consideration are in- discriminately established by the deduction.

A similarly occasional relationship between pro- ducer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person’s action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural.

4

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AGAMA PRAMANYANI

30. Another question to be considered is from what point in space, at what point in time, and to what purpose a person who is satisfied in all eternity would produce the universe. Every agent, e.g..a potter, produces a product by means of certain instruments, while occupying a certain space at a certain time and aiming at a certain result which he wants. If the production of the world is purely sport and without ulterior motivation, since God does not want anything, beware, for this states clearly that the Lord is by nature independent from anything beside Himself. Yet willy- nilly, without regard for anything He might wish, He shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and destroying the world. Is He in creating the creatures prompted by His compassion? But why, then, does He not create them happy? If you reply, because God takes karman into account, then you deny his complete independence. Besides, if their karman provides sufficient causes for these creatures’ variety, why assume God at all?

Therefore, there cannot be such a person who is capable of creating the universe, of perceiving immediately dharma and adharma, and of composing

the Vedas.

31. Moreover, if the Vedas were created by someone, this creator would be remembered: ‘He is the one who has composed them.’ It is not proper to assume that he has been forgotten, just as the digger of an exhausted well is forgotten. The latter is justifiable because the well no longer serves a purpose. But in the case of the Vedas, who, without remembering that

AGASIA PRAMANYAMI

27.

the author was reliable, would give credence to all the Vedic rites which are to be performed at the expense of great trouble involving the loss of various properties? Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas that they have been composed by a person, because this person, however worthy of remembrance, is not re- membered, they can no more prove that God was their author than the Mahabharata and similar books can. Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person. In consequence, the contention that the validity of Pañcaratra is based upon the same immediate cogni- tion which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself is the contention of those whose discrimination has been warped by their bias in favour of their own conclusions.

32. OBJECTION. But in what does this ‘preter- personal’ character of the Veda consist? If it consists in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words, the same holds true of the Pañicarātra Tantra." Or if it is the eternity of the words that constitute it, again the same is true. It could not be the eternity of the word-sequence, for sequence cannot be natural to eternal entitics." If it is said that it is the sequence of the sounds in so far as these sounds are pronounced in one particular sequence, then we reply that since a sequence of pronunciation is non-eternal, the sequence of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal. So where does the difference lie between Pañcaratra and Vedić revelation?

REPLY. The difference lies herein that in the case of the Pancaratra the sequence is created by an

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ADAMA PRAMANYAM

independent person, whereas in the case of the Veda, a dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact sequence which had been laid down before him by students who preceded him. A category of a different degree which is established on the strength of recog- nition should not be denied. And with this we con- clude our lengthy disquisition,

33. The preceding has proved that the proposi- tion that the Paficarãtra is authoritative because it is based upon an immediate cognition of a person cate- gorically different from other persons, is not viable at all. Since there is no means of knowledge by which the existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of good and evil can be proved, it follows that this Tantra must have been promulgated by some human being with the purpose of deceiving the world.

34. OBJECTION.62 This would be true if proof of the existence of the Lord could only be sought on the strength of logical argumentation. As it is, this is a

fallacy, for the great Lord is known on the authority of the upaniṣads. When we hear the multitudinous statements of the eternal Scriptures which set forth the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme Personality who is capable of creating the entire uni- verse, how then can we refuse to accept the authority of a tradition which derives from His immediate cognition?

35. To continue this topic," these scriptural statements do not exceed the bounds of their authority just because they are concerned with facts; for similarAGAMA PRAMANYAN

29

statements made by persons concerning facts that are extremely remote from a connection with other means of knowledge cannot be denied the authority which is afforded them naturally.

Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority because of the consideration that since either a proving or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up there remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or reversed"; for the same may equally well happen to a statement concerning, not a fact, but a karya. A kārya, too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for it must be admitted that ordinary karyas, like ‘fetch firewood’ are also known through other means of knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the odana.65

Or if it be claimed that, inasmuch as a karya con- cerning a categorically different thing like the agnihotra etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority, there- fore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing must needs be its authority,-well, then we may say that there is not a ghost of another authority for the Bhagavan whose form consists in unsurpassed knowledge, supremacy and beatitude; so that it should follow that everything is entirely the same in both cases, depending on one’s particular partisan views.

Moreover, the theory is that since another means of knowledge can apply to a fact, a verbal statement concerning this fact cannot validly prove it: but why should not this other means of knowledge itself be the repetitious one since verbal testimony concerning its fact may conceivably turn up? or, why should other means of knowledge which themselves are liable to

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AOAMA PRAMANYAṀ

various deficiencies entail the negation of a notion that arises from eternal Scripture untouched by all defects inherent in persons, merely because it is deduced that its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge? This is absurd.

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily follow from the inductión, c.g. absence of omni- science", possession of a body etc., find no room in the Bhagavan whose supernal manifestation of miraculous knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from hundreds of fruits, just as cold can find no place in fire.

And, in consequence,

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the Tantra is false, while it is composed by the Omniscient One Himself who is known through the Upanisads? Alas for the fool’s grand exhibition of labour in Mimämsä! How can a mind schooled in Mimāmsā be so mistaken?

63

36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers command respect, maintain that all Vedic testimony carrics authority only concerning such karyas as cannot presuppose any other authority. Since words arc considered to have their true sense only when they concern such a karya, it is impossible that any state- ment can be denotative if it concerns something else than a karya. Therefore, when a man has observed that in an exchange between two adult persons a certain inherently related action of one of them takes place immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the other, he concludes with certainty that the denoting

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power of the sentence as inferred by means of circum- stantial-implication terminates completely in the karja that has been conveyed by that sentence." The very awareness of karga is known to relate to one’s own karya; so the onlooker, observing the same pro- cess in the present case, realizes that the one person’s action has been caused by the other person’s variously differentiated behaviour: “Surely this person has been made aware by the other of this karya that he proceed to his action immediately upon become aware of what he has to do.” This leads the observer to the conclu- sion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly denotative in so far as it serves to convey a karya whose specific motivation conforms to the entire statement, then whatever bits of meaning come to mind as a result of the addition or omission of words are denoted by these words only in strict accordance to this karya, " which thus constitutes the primarily known principal element of the statement. In such a statement the imperative and optative verbal terminations," which unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of karya, convey by themselves the body of the karya, whereas the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a con- textual relation with the karya by describing consequent matters which required by the karya, e.g. a person’s qualification to accomplish it etc.73

37. Take for example the statement that a son has been born to the person spoken to, a purely sub- stantive statement; the aggregate of words which convey nothing more than this bare fact that a son has been born, is not definitely proved to possess t

the power

32

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ADAMA PRAMANYAM

of denoting the postulated birth of the son by means of such resultant effects as cheerful looks or joyfully bristling hairs on the part of the father." For, it is impossible to establish definitely that the occurrence of a cause for various joys in future, past and present is really due to the denotative power of the statement. Therefore, also in the case when we have a verb in the present indicative collocated with words that have their proper signification (in that they refer to things that presuppose no other means of knowledge), it must be assumed that in it we have a substitute with a positive (i.e. injunctive) denotation of words without actually having explicit reference to a kārya,75

38. A person knows that a certain word has a certain denotation, when it is known what is the deno- tation, of the other words with which it is collocated. 76 It is proved that words have the power of denoting things only in so far as they are contextually connected with a karya; consequently, their validity concerning an established fact is based on this that they give rise to the notion of karya.

It is contended that this denotation of karya is only occasional in words," but this contention is incorrect; the ground for words to be denotative is that they deal with a karya, so that the contention suffers of the vice of being unproved. For a notion that arises from a verbal statement can never terminate in any object whatsoever that is not a karya.

The cognitions of contextual relations which arise immediately upon hearing a profane statement are said to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from

Inference.73

AOAMA PRAMANYANI

33

Thus it is right that these cognitions do

not terminate in kärsas.

39. Ifit were not accepted that verbal statements always bear on karyas, on what grounds then could an indicative statement like agnihotram juhoti “he offers the agnihotra” be accepted as an injunction? Or if it be claimed that in this case, even though the statement as it stands has no complete validity, it is accepted as an injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a pur- pose, we reply that this claim is incorrect, since the operation of means of knowledge is not dependent on purpose, but rather is the acceptance of purpose depen- dent on the operation of the means of knowledge. It is not proper to assume that since one does not like to find rocks when one is looking for gold therefore one finds gold! As long as we do not assume that a state- ment is denotative only when it bears on a karya, we cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative contains an injunction.

40. In the same manner the meaning of the upaniṣads must also be interpreted as being subordi- nate to such injunctions as “One must know the soul, meditate on it, etc.“9 which are expressed in differnt passages; this meaning, then, is that one must know the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunc- tion.

That the soul is the object of an injunction does not by itself however prove that the soul exists as an established fact; for there can also be an injunction that a certain thing be such while actually it is not so; for example the injunction, “Know your father in someone who is not your father,” or “Know that the

5

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35

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AOAMA PRAMANYAM

syllable OM, which is not the udgitha, is the udgitha."‘80 All statements that set forth the reality and the eternality of the soul only serve to convey that there is a spiritual agent, who is required in order to experience the otherworldly fruits that are mentioned in ritual in junctions where the time of fruition is not speci- fied.“1

Therefore, no verbal statement whatever is a means of knowing a thing as such. Thus, by denying thatthe arthavādas, too, can serve to convey knowledge of facts like Rudra’s weeping, it is shown that they merely serve to give praise in contextual connection with an injunction, which may be comparatively remote.83

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated divine person, whose personality is the product of the baseless beliefs of people that have failed to consider the true denotation of preceding or succeeding state- ments, is eliminated, with which we conclude our extensive discussion.

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture. Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed convey knowledge of facts; even so, what possible basis is there for the assumption that there exists a person who knows dharma and adharma, when we take into account the cognition that arises from injunction? Omniscience is possible only if the omniscient person knows the objects exactly as they are known by means of the different means of knowledge; for there is no statement which declares omniscience by cancelling the normal means of knowledge. Even if there were such a statement, it would have to be explained as an

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arthavada since its word-meanings would not allow of mutual relation. A cognition about a sentence-mean- ing arises from the individual words and it presupposes in these words such properties as appropriateness etc. which are learnt through other means of know- ledge; now we wonder how such a cognition could arise at all, if there were a conflict with these other means of knowledge that are required primarily for the cognition to arise! If a statement concerning an object that is contradicted by perception etc., were authoritative, who could then reject the identity of sun and sacrificial pole? And if there is a person who possesses this peculiar excellency, what happens to the authority of the texts which is sought to be proved ?87

43. OBJECTION. However, those who follow the Pañcaratra clan have the tradition that this Pañcaratra has been composed by this person.

REFUTATION. But why do the Pasupatas then not agree with their view? They, too, claim that the Sovereign of the universe is the promulgator of their own system, and others have the same claims. Now they cannot all of them be omniscient, because then it would be impossible for them to set forth mutually contradictory teachings. The same ground which allows one among several discussants to prove an omniscient promulgator must hold equally for all of them. But which one among the many omniscient beings who propound mutually conflicting teachings while claiming each for himself the prerogative of omniscience, which one do we conclude is the one and only omniscient God? As the text says, “If there are several omniscient beings who propound incompatible

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AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ

‘doctrines and if for cach of them the arguments are equally valid, then whom can we elicit as the true and only one?” When each omniscient being is assumed on the basis of one’s own Tantra doctrine since the various tantric doctrines are mutually in conflict, the result will be that none of them is authoritative. !

"

44. OBJECTION. How can the teaching of Vasu- deva himself, who is well-known in Revelation and Tradition, be brought to the same level as other Tantras? For the manifestation of His power has been revealed in the Purusa Hymn, “The earth sprang from his feet, the quarters of the sky from his ears;”

389 and again, “The creator created sun and moon as before;” likewise, He is Brahma, he is Siva;” “Visnu’s highest step,” “No one is his lord in this world, no

one

e his commander; he has no sign.” In this way, the statements of Revelation describe his manifestation characterized by His origination, maintenance and annihilation of the world. Similarly, the Tradition: “From Visnu arose the world, in him does it subsist; he is the one who causes it to exist and to perish,” said Parāśara; Manu, too, declared that He is the lord: “Nārāyaṇa is above the unmanifest, and the World-egg is produced by the unmanifest.“95

This Supreme Person who is continually praised for His knowledge and supremacy in the statements of: Revelation and of the sages has created Pañcaratra. If this Tantra is then on a level with Tantras that are apostate from the path of Revelation, then one might as well reason that a soma-drinker is on a level with a wine-drinker, just because he is a drinker! Is this

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Tantra not superior? Wherefore, then, are the qualities of immaculate knowledge, supremacy etc. of the Bhagavan not currently attributed also to the Destroyer of the Three Cities in the texts of Revelation? There- fore. it is absurd to hold the cquality of the Tantras promulgated by both. Or, since He is the God who is the cause of the origination, protection and destruc- tion of the universe and for whom the entire Vedanta furnishes evidence to the exclusion of anyone else, how could He promulgate a doctrine that is outside the pales of the Veda?

45. OBJECTION. Nevertheless, a fair number of śrutis are found which ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to lord Pasupati as well: “He who is all- knowing, omniscient;”” “The supreme great sovereign of sovereigns."‘sa

REPLY. By secondary denotation these two words “omniscient” and “sovereign” apply not only to the one who actually is omniscient and sovereign, but also to others, not excepting God Siva, who are as it were all-knowing and supreme. Besides, if in the above quotation ya sarvajriah farvavit the word sarvajra were indeed used to describe the omniscient one, there would be tautology of sarvanit.

Consequently, the word sarvajña refers only to Mahadeva; and so the Skanda-Purana, Linga-Purāņa and other Purāņas exhaust themselves in describing this all knowing and sovereign character of Siva. Therc- fore, since the Pasupata Tantra has been promulgated by this Pasupati, it acquires authority in this way; but

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the reversion of the authority of all Tantras in con- sequence of their mutual contradictions applies to this Pāšupata Tantra too.

46. Further, granted that the Lord Vasudeva is the Person known in the upaniṣads, how then can the theory be held of him that he has promulgated the Pañcaratra Tantra which conflicts with Revelation-of him who said, “Revelation and Tradition are ‘my commands?” Thus we conclude that there has been a deceiver who assumed the name of Vasudeva’ and under that name composed the Tantra under

discussion.

Or else, suppose that Vasudeva Himself, ruler of the entire universe, was the promulgator of this Tantra; they still say that Hari, whose personal manifestations are deceptive because of his power of ‘illusion, has promulgated these unholy texts deceivingly under the guise of holy texts in order to destroy the whole mass of enemies of the gods. Now, has he indeed composed this Tantra, leading the faithful into the mysterious abyss of his grand power of illusion, or not? This is the question that now arises. How are we to resolve it? Or are we rather to understand that he composed this Tantra while he himself was in error, since it is not accepted by the followers of the Veda, just as the doctrine of the Jainas is not accepted? That the followers of the Veda do not accept it has been set forth at length above.100 Consequently, then, Pafcaratra Tantra is not authoritative because it derives from the cognition of an independent Person.

47. Nor is it proper to argue the validity of the Pañcaratra Tradition “like the Manu Tradition etc. 99101AGAMA PRAMANYAM

39

If the God has composed the Tantra after having, like manu etc., learnt the meaning of the Veda from a teacher who was satisfied with his pupil’s obedience, then the assumption that He was independent is pur- poseless and false. It is not borne out by human experience that the Veda was immediately manifest to him, even though he never learnt it. The defects which the Author of the Värttika enumerates, those of personal superiority and inferiority etc.,”

,102 are all to be presumed in the case of Pañcaratra.

48. Moreover, the Saivite, Pasupata, Buddhist, Jainist, Käpälika and Pañcaratra teachings are tradi- tionally known as heretical. On the basis of the

distinction between Vedic and Tantric we arrive at the conclusion that Pañcaratra is outside the Veda. “Tantra is of four kinds: Saiva, Pasupata, Saumya and Laguḍa; thus are described the divisions of Tantra; one should not confuse them.” Likewise: “There are three distinct doctrines, the Bhakta, the Bhagavata and the Satvata;” this description of the divisions of Tantra is also found in Pancarătra.

49. Furthermore, that a doctrine destitute of all logic and embracing the view that the soul knows birth, which is rejected by Revelation and Tradition, should be Truth is a highly ludicrous contention. Thus we find the śruti, “Verily, this soul is unperishing, essentially indestructible; it is not conjoined with size;” and, “This dies without the soul; the soul does not die."*104

OBJECTION. This is all very well, but all that this statement says is that the soul is not destroyed, not that it is not born.

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REFUTATION. No, hy stating that it cannot be destroyed, it also decides that it cannot be born; it is impossible that an entity that has been born does not perish.

OBJECTION. Nonetheless, from the emphasis which in the statement “only sat was here is laid on the uniqueness of sat, it follows that there were no souls before the time of creation. Had the individual soul existed before why then this emphasis of “only sat” on sat’s absolute solitariness?

REFUTATION. The reply to this is that here the emphasis on sat’s uniqueness is with regard to the elements of wind, water and ether that were about to be created by sat. Were the soul excluded by this statement of sat’s solitariness, then the soul’s origin would have been described in the sequel, just as the creation of ether is described. This is not done; there- fore the soul does not know birth, since in the sequel “That sat created fire, etc.““06 we do not hear of the creation of the individual soul.

OBJECTION. However, in the text yato vā imāni bhūtāni etc.107 we hear that the souls too know origin, continuance and reabsorption. Iere the word bhuta denotes the jiva, the individual soul; for thus we find the word used in the passage bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni,108 The verb jinanti “they live” in the text can only apply to the souls, the expression tena jayante “by whom they are born” evidently refers to these same souls.

REFUTATION. This is not right. The word bhuta commonly denotes only the elements ether, wind, fire, water and earth. If the word is used for something

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else, it is used metaphorically. Of these elements, ether etc. which are primarily understood by the word bhula, it is stated that they are variously modified 09 and that they live. The verb “they live” describes a condition of being analogous to living.

And if the word bhuta be used in the sense of individual soul, then too the statement declares that the soul is born only in the sense that its entrance into a body is a birth. Therefore, when the word bhita refers to the individual soul, it can rightly be said that the souls are born, just as it is said that the cow, once born walks about. There are śrutis to this effect, like “For the soul, unborn, alone “10 and we also have other śrutis which declare that the soul is unborn. Similarly, the word of the Lord: “Know that both matter and spirit are without beginning;” “this ancient spirit is un- born, eternal, everlasting;”” “it is never born nor does it dies etc. Finally there is the syllogism: the individual soul in question never knows birth; for, while being substantial, it is bodiless, as it consists of spirit, like the Supreme Soul.

50. There are some who notice the logical defects inherent in the view that Scripture of a personal origin, which we have explained above, and having no other course open posit that Tantra too must be eternal. Against this position, we state that it is sublated by the fact that its author, who is patent euough and tacitly remembered, is not forgotten at all; and hence this position does not deserve our

notice.

51. Besides, why has the argument about the Pasupatas etc. been swept aside with a stick? If one

6

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replies, let the argument stand, we shall have the defect of mutual exclusion. And Vasudeva’s author- ship of the Tantra, which is commonly known to everybody, can no more be rejected than the prefer- personal origin of the Veda. Or else, if someone says that any of the three means of knowledge is in the case of Pasupata Tantra cancelled by non-appearance,” reversion and dubiety, the answer is, your own postu- lation applies equally well to the Laguda doctrine”, and once you know this, it is refuted. Your worship better keep quiet.

114

52. To sum up. For the reasons set forth above we maintain that the exposure of this Tantra’s incom- patibility with Revelation, Tradition, Epic and Puraṇa as well as with the conclusions of our logical demonstra- tion, and the inacceptability of this Tantra to all exemplary persons go to show that the Pañcaratra texts must have been composed by someone who pretended to teach a path that would lead to heaven and salva- tion, but actually wished to deceive the world. Con- cerning.its apocryphal character,’ which we have now exposed, we have the declaration: “The traditional teachings that are outside the Veda and all other false doctrines remain fruitless in the afterworld, for they are considered to derive from tamas.” Those who follow the Veda are forbidden to speak with those who follow such evil paths: “The following are not to be honoured even with a word: heretics, criminals, impostors, crooks, thieves and hypocrites are not to be honoured even with a word.”

53. In the manner116 presented above the prima- facie case can be made that the Pañcaritra in its

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entirety has no validity whatever as a means of knowledge. Against this prima-facie case we now sub- mit that the Tantra in question must be accepted as valid, because it produces faultless knowledge, like the scriptural statements on the Vedic sacrifices jyotiştoma

etc.

54. Now, such defects as are elicited by the science of logic cannot be detected in this inference. Let us consider the Object of the Proposition. The Object of the Proposition is, by definition, the content of a certain thesis is proposed; it is a term which itself is established, and of which it is now to be proved that it is particularized by another term, which is also established.” In the present case the term which particularizes the object is not unknown, for this term, sc. “validity,” is for both parties cstablished with regard to the valid means of knowledge, Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. Nor is the subject itself unknown, for the Pañcaratra system is known universally. Nor is the Object to be proved already proved, for this Object, “The Pañcaratra is valid,” is not proved for the opponent. Nor is this Object in- compatible with Perception, since its opposite, sc. non- validity, is beyond perceptual verifiability. Nor is this Object incompatible with Inference, because no inference proving non-validity is found.

"

55. OBJECTION. But such an inference is actually found: Pañcaratra Sastra is non-authoritative, because it is non-Vedic, like Buddhism.

REFUTATION. We reply, What is this non- authoritativeness which this reasoning seeks to prove?

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If it is defined by the fact that the Tantra does not produce knowledge, then this definition militates against Perception; for the knowledge which arises in a student, who is able to comprehend the relation bet- ween. word and meaning, concerning the meaning of the sentences of Pañcaratra Sastra he hears is per- ceptually evident. Nor is the predicate, sc. “non- authoritativeness,” defined by dubiety, since then we have the same conflict with Perception; for the state- ment, “One must worship the four-armed Supreme Person in the centre of the lotus,” does not occasion a doubtful cognition: “Must one worship Him thus or not?” Nor, in the third place, is the predicate. defined by reversion, since there is no non-apprehension of what should be there, and since, the presumption of future reversion militates against Perception and would put an end to all operations. This point shall be dis- cussed in detail later on.

56. OBJECTION. Still, the proposed validity of Pañcaratra militates against Scripture. Since in Pañcaratra Agama we have its meaning conveyed exactly as it is, this conflict between Scripture and Pañcarātra is not vicious only if Pañcaratra is not authoritative.

REFUTATION. Why, if that were so, that would mean that if its authority is disproved by Scripture it is proved by Inference, and if it is proved by inference it is disproved by Scripture;119 which is a vicious circle.

57. Besides, what does this mean, “being non- Vedic, or outside the Veda?” If it means that

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Pañcaratra is different from the Veda, we have an occasional application to Perception etc., which are also different from the Veda. If, in order to avoid this defect, the ground is thus specified, ‘because, while being language, it is different from the Veda,’ we have a hetvantaram deadlock, which, as they say, occurs when into a syllogism with an unqualified ground and addi- tional qualification is accepted.120 Also, we then have an occasional application to the statements of Manu, which also are language and different from the Veda. If then, my slow-witted opponent, in order to remove this defect from your ground you claim that being outside the Veda means “not deriving from the Veda,” then what do you, logician, think of it?

Well, by this definition of the ground we get the meaning, “something, namely in case there is question of language-statements, is non-Vedic, because it does not derive from the Veda.” But then there is an occasional application to the Veda itself, which does not derive from the Veda! When the ground is re- defined as “because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a language-statement but not a Vedic state- ment,” then again there would inevitably be an occa- sional application to statements of reliable persons which do not derive from the Veda and yet are valid, like “Thereare trees on the river-bank.” If the reason is further corrected into: “because it does not derive from the Veda, namely, in case of a language-statement -but not a Vedic statement-and this statement con- cerns an action to be taken,” then still we have a vicious applicability to such precepts as “One must eat little when one has indigestion.” Again, if the ground is

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then reformulated as “because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a statement specified by all the above specifications and also concerned with dharma and adharma,” then this ground is partly impertinent, because Pañcaratra Sastra does not deal with dharma and adharma exclusively, since the great majority of its statements concern Brahman. If then, the specifica- tion is added “….when it deals with objects that are outside the scope of other pramanas,” then again the ground does not fully apply, for hundreds of śrutis demonstrate that the Perception of God encompasses all things related to dharma and adharma. We shall discuss this point presently;” this suffices for the time being to expose the baseless fancies of those who have not made a study of Akṣapada’s system. Other con- ceivable inferences will be presented; and refuted, later on.

We conclude therefore, that the proposition “Pañcaratra is authoritative,” is not in conflict with Inference.

58. Nor is it in conflict with Scripture, for hundreds of scriptural statements, like idam mahopa- nişadam, will be adduced which set forth that Pañcaratra is authoritative. There are no grounds to suspect in our proposition anyone of the three kinds of contradiction of language-statements; namely, con- tradiction within the terms of the statement; contradic- tion with one’s own thesis; or contradiction with universally accepted facts.

First, there is no contradiction within the state- ment. This type of contradiction is of three kinds: of

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mere utterance; or utterance of property; and of utterance of substance. Firstly, the proposition is not contradicted by its mere utterance, for the statement of the thesis “Pañcaratra Sastra is authoritative” does not cancel its own content, as does, for instance, the statement: “During my entire life I have kept silence.” Secondly, there is no contradiction through utterance of property, as for example the statement: “All statements are untrue;” for the authoritativeness predicated of Pañcaratra does not cancel the proposi- tion. Thirdly, there is no contradiction through utterance of substance, since in the given substance a connection with the given property is not contradictory: Pañcaratra is not contradicted by its property authorita- tiveness, as motherhood is contradicted by the property sterility. For upon the assertion of the authoritative- ness of the substance in question, it is not contradicted by any particular substance named in Revelation, since the imputation of questionableness is secondary, as in the case of the assertion that certain acts of violence which are enjoined are against the dharma,12 There is, therefore, no contradiction by language- statement; so that we conclude that the proposition is presentable.

59. Nor is the ground affected by logical defects, like occasional application etc. The ground is not occasionally applicable to other terms. This fallacy of

occasionalness is of two kinds, general occasionalness and special occasionalness. An instance of, the first kind provides the ground in the argument: “The earth is eternal, because it is knowable.” Of the second kind: “The earth is eternal, because it, possesses

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smell.” Our ground, namely, ‘Pañicaratra is authori- tative, because it produces faultless knowledge’, does not apply equally whether it is authoritative or not, which would render the ground generally-occasional.126 For this ground, namely its being a cause of faultless know- ledge, has not been found before in the alternative pro- positions that Pañcaratra is deceptive and hence non- authoritative. Neither does the ground have a specially- occasional application, because the illustration “like statements on Vedic sacrifices such as jyotistoma etc.” shows its connection with other instances on the same side of the argument.

Nor is the ground precluded, since there is no con- comitance of its opposite; being a cause of faultless knowledge is not invariably accompanied by non- authoritativeness. Nor is the ground cancelled by lapse of time, since there is no conflict with Percep- tion and in this it is analogous with Scripture.

Nor is the ground itself unproved or unestablished. If a ground is unestablished, this is because either its locus or its essence is unestablished. The first does not apply, for its locus is Pañicarātra Sastra, which is proved to exist. Nor does the second apply: for there are three ways in which a ground may be unestablished as to its essence: through ignorance, through dubiety, or through reversion. Ignorance does not apply, as follows from the fact that the words describing the ground are pronounced.” Nor does dubiety apply, for that the ground is correct is undoubted and self- evident to the defender of the proposition, while for the opponent the same is easily proved by the fact thatAGAMA PRAMANYAṀ

no defects are apprehended in it.

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That the ground would be unestablished through reversal is utterly out of the question.

60. OBJECTION. But how can we discard the supposition that the Pañcaratra texts are faulty?128 This supposition arises instantly since the texts are of personal origin.

REFUTATION. How do you avoid the same supposi- tion in the case of the Vedas? There too it arises instantly, since the Vedas are language-statements. When you reply, it is avoided because the Vedas have no personal author, then you may realize that in our case, too, it is avoided, since the Tantras have been composed by the Supreme Person, who is omniscient and eternally satisfied, and you may keep quiet!

What I mean to say is this. Our position is that in language as such there are no defects that invalidate its authority; as language, language is authoritative. Its authority is in certain cases invalidated by defects in the character of the speaker, for instance in a language statement, “There is a herd of elephants on my finger-tip.” The statements in the upanisad portion of the Veda remove whatever suspicion we may have about any defects in the character of the speaker in the text collection here under discussion. For the Vedanta texts set forth that the omniscient Lord of the world is supremely compassionate; then how can we suppose Him to be deceitful etc.?

61. OBJECTION. However, I have said that language statements have no authority when they concern established facts, on the ground that when terms are applied to such facts they do not have proper denotative power.

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REFUTATION.

AOAMA PRAMANYAṀ

This view is not correct. Profane language, eliciting a fact by direct application, even though this fact is established, really operates its denoting power as fully as it does by applications which concern karyas. Consider the illustration that has been given abovels. When certain manifestations (of joy) in a man’s face, which follow on his hearing the statement “A son has been born to you,” make it appear that the man spoken-to is happy, one instantly understands that his happiness is the result of his receiving from this statement a knowledge of an agreeable meaning, and one then infers that, for a medium-aged person too, this happiness derives from the statement. Thus one concludes that, since this happiness came to exist upon the existence of the statement, the statement itself has the power to convey an agreeable meaning. If there arises a doubt as to which particular ground of happiness among the many different grounds that may occur according to past, present and future, then consider this. A young boy, who wants to understand the meaning of speech, immediately upon hearing the same statement receives knowledge that a birth ceremony is being held. He thinks to himself, “There must be a reason for this.” Then he considers, “Is the agreeable meaning which has been understood from the statement the cause of this knowledge that a birth ceremony is to be held ?” and he realizes that this meaning was precisely this that a son had been born. 11

And on that issue: Definite knowledge of the donation of words in a sentence is had through the words that are included or excluded. This being so,

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words denote their meanings, whether these are established things or not.

62. OBJECTION. However, the relation of cause and effect is not just known from the fact that one comes into existence upon the existence of the other, for that would mean over-extension. Nor does the realization that a birth ceremony is to be held follow invariably upon the knowledge of an agreeable mean- ing; for we find also that the same realization follows upon a feeling of distress, namely when the informed father is vexed by the trouble of maintaining his family, 132

REPUTATION. Don’t we find that the realization of a karya is caused by a verbal statement, so that we can agree that, for example, the realization that a cow is to be fetched following a statement “Fetch the cow” is indeed caused by that statement? When you say that, since this realization cannot occur without a cause therefore the proximate statement must in that case be the cause of the realization, then I maintain that the same holds also in the case of “A son is born.”

It has been decided by our opponent that the verbal denotation of a meaning which causes an action to be taken is a result of the inclusion in the statement of a linadi suffix. 13 He who maintains that all words only bear meaningfully on kärya, maintains in effect that padarthas exist only in karya statements and that e.g. in the case of cows, horses and the like, which are related to bodies, their being a padartha is ascertained by the inclusion or exclusion of the words denoting them in a statement concerning kärya. If he says, indeed, whenever their being a padartha is significantly

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‘construed, it is construed just as connected with karya, we reply, Stop being obstinate; for verbal exchange is also possible through denotation of words that are connected with other things than karyas.

63. It is necessary to accept the position that words are denotative of connected meanings, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain that they are denotative of meanings connected with karyas. The definition ’the thing meant by a word is always connected with a karya’ fails to cover the defined topic completely; for it does not apply in the case of injunctive suffixes, since these suffixes denote their own meanings as connected, not with karya, but with consequences of already established facts, such as proper qualification on the part of the person en joined etc.195 Or if it is said that in their case there is denotation of connected meanings and in the other case denotation of meanings connected with karya, we reply that this is a neither old nor young, argument ;156 it is more appropriate simply to accept the view that there is denotation of connected meanings in general.

64. Therefore, the adherents of all schools should accept that words have proper denotation for the meanings they denote because these meanings are connected with other meanings that are required to complete the sense of the statement, are closely collocated and are appropriate. Even if the denoting power of language were to be understood only through its proper signification in karya statements alone,”” even so it is correct when we decide the denotation of language to take the standpoint that karya is just one of the inessential factors of denotation, like the identity

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of the speaker, the extent of space in which a statement can be heard etc. The logicians hold the view that the meaning of a language statement cannot be known except by language statement. Consequently, there exists no inherent relationship with karya as cause of denotation in uses of words that have their proper signification, just as is the case with floating precious stones on water. Just as this floating, however helpful it may be to determine the identity of certain diamonds, e.g. the brahmin diamond, serves no purpose when a stone is being transacted which has already been properly identified, similarly the karya,however helpful to understand the proper signification of a word, serves no purpose once its proper signification has been identified.

65. Moreover, if words denote their meanings only as connected with karya, then how can we know from them that, for example, there is a relation between a fruit and a river-bank, is in a statement: “There is a fruit on the river-bank?” If you say that a statement of such a substantive relation does not denote the relation it states through its primary sense, but through secondary sense, then, we may ask, where do statements then have their primary sense? If you answer in a karya which is not previously known through other means of knowledge, we reply: no, for then no use of words would be possible, since their meaning would not yet have been identified. Naturally there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a word when that word denotes a meaning not previously known through other means of knowledge, and no cognition can arise from words with unknown meanings, for that would entail over-extension.

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66. OBJECTION. My position is this. In ordinary language a statement is understood to have its proper signification when it bears on a karya that is to be accomplished with a certain action. In Vedic language a statement enjoys a special power of denota- tion which ’transcends the transitory root-sense of the word “sacrificing”, and it has this power of denotation because it is the means of realizing a certain fruit and acquires this power on account of the collocation of words describing this fruit; whereas in ordinary language, since there verbal exchange is possible also to the unsophisticated, this determination of the nature of word and meaning is not attended to.

REFUTATION. This position is just wishful think- ing; for a language statement, even if understood in your way as bearing meaningfully only on a karya to be accomplished with an action,139 does not by that token set forth a permanent karya, 140 since that would mean over-extension. If we cannot know the true connection of words even when the usage of our elders, through which the denotations of these words is under- stood, takes place in accordance with these words, then we can never know their connection! If a language statement has lost its postulated true denoting power because it is impossible, it does not thereby acquire another denoting power. In such cases we surely must assume lakṣaṇa. For when certain words are collocated that have incompatible meanings, these words do not therefore denote something else altogether, for then all word meanings would become unreliable.

67. Besides, we do not admit that the fact that a word has the power to communicate a karya that is not

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previously known through other means of knowledge proves that there actually exists a relationship between itself and the fruit of the action it enjoins. The only relation proved of it is that with injunction, not with instrumentality. That in a statement there subsists a relation with a karya which transcends the root-sense of the verb cannot be proved except by the relation of karya with the fruit of the act, and the latter relation cannot be proved without the former. And therefore there is a vicious interdependence that cannot be refuted. If there is no factor which activates the person who, according to the injunction, is specified by the heaven that is to be achieved, the injunction itself cannot be the means of achieving the desired heaven. The root-sense of the words being transitory, the statement itself cannot function as this means,142 Therefore the assertion that a language statement communicates as its proper meaning a karya which exceeds this transitory root-sense, cannot be correct. A person is not specified hy heaven as the object to be achieved,” but it is the person who desires heaven who is enjoined upon to accomplish the act. Heaven can- not be the specification of the person’s qualification, because heaven is yet to be achieved. Only something that has already been achieved, that actually exists, can specify the person upon whom an act is enjoined, for instance, the real fact of his being alive etc. Conse- quently only his desire can specify his qualification for the act.

68. Furthermore, precisely how is heaven, which in your opinion functions as the specification of the person enjoined, an object to be realized, a sadhya?

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If its being a sadhya means that it is fit for a relation with a sadhana, it is impossible for heaven to be siddha, as long as its relatability obtains, since it cannot become siddha in the meantime.” The only authority that exists for heaven becoming siddha in the end is the injunction itself, while the only authority for the injunction is just this that heaven does become siddha. This is plainly a vicious circle. If heaven is the sädliya, the injunction is not the sadhya. It is not possible to combine two sadhyas in one sentence.

69. OBJECTION. Indeed, the unity of a sentence is broken up when it contains two sadhyas that are independent, but not when the two are interdependent. And here the two sadhyas are interdependent since the realization of heaven is contained in the realization of the injunction. That is what the Author says: “When the niyoga is realized, everything else in accordance with it is also realized;” and: “Why should the realization of the fruit not be held to be subservient to the realization of the injunction ?146 Therefore there is no conflict here.

REFUTATION. No; unless heaven is realized, how can the injunction be realized? Without the realiza- tion of heaven neither the qualification, nor the object, nor anything else required by the injunction is realized.

70. OBJECTION. In the case of the qualifications for periodical rites the injunction does not require the ‘realization of any fruit.147 Nor does an injunction to one act fail to apply to a person who really desires another fruit. The pre-eminence is really the injunction’s; a person is enjoined upon by the injunc-

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tion to any act in the same way as he is enjoined upon to perform the periodical acts. For the injunction

draws unto itself the desirous person who himself thinks that the heaven which he desires is the principal object, in the same way as the injunction to perform the periodical acts activates a person, even though he does not desire anything, to these acts which bear no fruit at all.

Besides, a person who is desirous of heaven also opens and shuts his eyes; for you these actions do not subserve his realization of heaven. Why not consider the sacrificing an action of the same kind? There are some who do not accept that it is a means of realizing heaven.

71. REFUTATION. If that is the view, we ask: Are the sacrifice etc., which are to be grasped by the cognition that they are such means, eliminated from the injunction? On this point: When the injunction does not mean to convey a relation between the object to be realized and the means of realizing it, then all acts are fruitless.

Therefore, it is sound to maintain that from the injunctive suffixes there results first the cognition that they are indeed the means to realize the desired object, and that subsequently the desire for this object prompts a person to undertake the act of realization. But it is improper to maintain that the primary denotation occurs in the expressing of a meaning that was previously unknown, and that the denotation in the expressing of any other meaning is secondary. We conclude that ordinary, non-Vedic statements give rise to cognitions concerning meanings that are just so established by these statements.

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72. OBJECTION. But these cognitions do not arise from the denoting power of language, but result from Inference. For these statements, though their denota- tions in conveying certain meanings are consciously known once their proper meanings have been learnt, do not furnish complete certainty about their meanings merely upon being heard by a listener, when they are accompanied by doubt which is created by the listener’s observation that in one case or other statements have deviated from their proper meanings. And, unless there be complete certainty, the meaning will remain unknown; for no knowledge can arise in one’s mind from uncertainty.

If the meaning of a statement is not known, the listener wants to discover it: “The speaker uses words whose meanings apparently admit of being connected; and reliable persons do not use words whose connections are unknown;” and the listener realizes that therefore the speaker has knowledge of such a connection. If the knowledge of connection is thus inferred, the meaning discovered by the listener does not require the authority of verbal testimony. Consequently, since ordinary language statements are dependent on the speaker’s cognition; they terminate in that cognition through Inference alone.

73. REFUTATION. This view is not correct; for a word conveys its right meaning as its natural func- tion, and the observation that in one case the statement happened to be untrue under the influence of defects in the speaker’s character should not give rise to a general suspicion which would cause all statement to give up its natural capacity of conveying its meaning.AGAMA PRAMANYAM

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The suspicion that a fire may not burn in other cases because in one case, when obstructed by mantras, it fails to burn, does not make fire fail to burn! And the fact that the sense of vision may give rise to a cogni- tion which does not correspond to reality-e.g. that nacre is silver-as the result of some optical error does not signify that the visual sense cannot produce true cognition of the visible presence of a pitcher etc.

Therefore, a statement does indeed instantly convey a certain meaning to the listener if he knows the relation between the words and their meanings. It does not require knowledge of the basis. Before there is complete knowledge on the part of the listener about the basic knowledge of the speaker, and, further, when the meaning has been expressed, the question rises: “How does he know this?” and Inference proceeds to resolve that question. You want to infer: “Did the speaker know something?” or wish to infer his knowledge of the connection of the different meanings. But the mere knowledge that the speaker knew something is not enough for utterance and action concerning a state- ment-meaning to proceed. Inference of a cognition concerning the connection of different meanings is im- possible without a prior cognition of such a connection. This being so, the meaning of the statement must be known first. For cognitions whose particular objects are not connected, are not connected themselves. Nor is a particular meaning established by cognitions that are inferred to be such. If you say that any word combina- tion which is able to convey a certain connection produces knowledge of just this connection, I maintain that the connection of the particular meanings must be

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known previously; unless a connection has already reached the level of cognition it cannot give rise to being expressed in a statement.

74. To conclude, the cognition of an established fact in statements like “there is a fruit on ’the river- bank” is strictly of verbal origin and does not arise from Inference. Therefore the position that statements produce valid knowledge only if they deal with a previously unknown karya is taken only by people whose judgments are ‘stultified by their continuous preoccupa- tion with their own theories. In the manner set forth above it is true that statements may bear meaningfully and informatively on other meanings as well.

Consequently, all the statements of the Upanisads which set forth the existence of a categorically different Person (e.g. “He is the overlord of the Universe, sovereign of all. He commands all the world”.””” “All this is manifest to Him150 etc.”) are authoritative etc.”) are authoritative as to what they state, since they produce indubitable and unreversed knowledge of their

contents.

75. Nor do statements concerning established facts lose their authority simply because of the con- sideration that repetition or reversion might be antici- pated on the strength of our assumption that either a corroborating or an invalidating cognition about the same facts could conceivably occur; for the same thing would also apply to statements concerning karya. Be- sides, a karya can also be known through other means of knowledge, e.g. the karya that firewood is to be fetched; for it has been admitted that that karya can also be known through another means of knowledge as

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in the case of the cooking of the odana.151 Or if a statement which sets forth a karya about a categori- cally different act like the agnihotra is held to be authoritative because no other authority for it can be conceived to exist,-why, since there is not a ghost of other authority for the existence of the Bhagavan whose personality consists in unsurpassed knowledge, sove- reignty and beatitude, it is all the same, depending on what partisan view one takes !

Moreover, if a cognition concerning a content that is also known through another means of knowledge does not recognize its own content as authoritative, since it has already been taken care of by another authority, this non-authoritativenes of its content is beyond experience for it is a mere matter of assump- tion. Therefore it must be maintained that all indubi- table and unreversed knowledge is authoritative, regardless of whether its content is established, or yet to be performed, or anything else. Hence we reject our opponent’s position.

76. The objectionis that omniscience is acquired by means of the regular senses is incorrect, because śruti contradicts it: “He sees without eyes, hears with ears; he who does not see with the eye, who sees the eyes, has neither effect nor instrument;”" “know- ledge, strength and action are natural to Him,“155 etc. These śrutis do not speak metaphorically, for there is no authority for this assumption. Metaphorical usage is assumed when the primary meanings of the śrutis make no sense. Since the primary meaning here makes sense, the assumption of metaphorical use is baseless.

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77. OBJECTION. But in this case we have in fact reason to cancel the primay meaning, because the primary sense militates against other means of know- ledge.

REFUTATION. What other means of knowledge? Not, to start, Perception, for we see no Perception occur which shows that the said Person is non-existent. If you retort that non-existence is decided by the non- apprehension of what should be there, we reply that this does not hold in our case since the object, that is the said Person, is actually apprehended through Scripture itself, which is the highest-ranking among the assembly of the means of knowledge. Nor does it militate against Inference; for how could an Inference which disproves that Person arise at all, slow-moving as it is, when its object is instantly refuted by the rapidly arising scriptural cognition? Moreover, if this were so, the relation of sacrificing etc. to heaven, apurvals etc., would logically be contradicted by the fact that sacrificing etc. are actions, when Scripture did not cancel such reasoning. True, the identity of sacrificial pole and sun, which is asserted by Scripture, is cancelled by another means of knowledge, namely Perception alone, because the difference between a piece of wood and the disc of the sun is indeed obvious. Besides, in this case it is legitimate to assume metaphorical usage, for the statement of this identity is an arthavada, since it forms one single statement with the proximate injunction about the unction of the sacrificial pole. 157 There is no other injunction to which it could be accessory as an arthatada. Alternatively, inasmuch as the human importance of a

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statement would be lost if there were no injunction to connect it with, an injunction may be supplemented and then the arthavada is regarded as accessory to that supplemented injunction.

78. The objections that as long as statements fail to prompt the operator of the means of knowledge to being active or to prevent him from being active, they do not communicate self-sufficient information, docs not hold good. For, we find that statements have human importance also outside any connection with an injunction; in such a case it will be as in the statement “A son has been born to you,” and the like. Nor need an injunction be supplemented in these cases. For without an injunction, too, joy arises from the informa- tion that a son has been born. Likewise, a statement which is self-sufficient in merely expressing particular actions which questioners want to know in exchanges of question and answer-e.g. “Which action?” “Cooking!"-do not require the supplementation of an injunction. In the upaniṣadic texts the knowledge of brahman is declared to be rewarded by great bliss: “the brahman-knower becomes brahman”; 159 “the brahman knower attains the supreme”; “the saman cantor attains with brahman all that he desires: “161 the human importance of statements without in junc- tions is quite clear from these and other scriptural words.

1

To sum up, when it is established that the Bhagavan is the treasury solely of beautiful qualities of direct universal cognition, compassionateness etc., qualities which are true and natural to Him, and which we know from hundreds of quoted śrutis, then it

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is also established that the Tantra which is based on His universal cognition is authoritative indeed.

79. OBJECTION. Granted that, as you have ‘des- cribed it, there exists some Person who is endowed with natural omniscience, as it is known from the upaniṣads, yet, unless it is absolutely certain that this Person is indeed Hari, Pañicarātra will not be authori- tativc.

REFUTATION. This is a worthless remark; no experts in the Veda dispute that the Supreme Soul, cause of the entire universe, is Vasudeva. For He is revealed in the upaniṣads as the Supreme Soul: “Truth, knowledge, infinite; that is the supreme step of Visņu. Vasudeva is the ultimate matter, the ulti- mate spirit” 162 “He was alone beyond who became this world”; “higher than whom there is nothing at all” in accordance with the subject expressed in these statements there are passages like: “From whom these beings…” “Sat alone, my son… Therefore Visņu’s perfect knowledge is established by the upanisads. And it is not declared in śruti that the origination, subsistence and destruction of the world are caused by anyone but Him. Hence there is a consensus that He is the supreme omniscient soul.

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That He is the Supreme Soul we learn also from the statements of Dvaipayana, Parāśara, Narada and other great seers. Thus: “Know thou, O tormentor of thy foes, that the entire world rests on Visnu. The Great Visņu creates the totality of creatures, moving and unmoving. In him they go to their reabsorption, from Him they originate.” “The glorious Sage Nārāyaṇa, without beginning or end, is the sovereign

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Lord. He creates the creatures, those that stand still and those that move. That He is the Supreme Brahman is also learnt elsewhere. Kesava, O best of the Bharatas, the Blessed One, is the sovereign, the supreme soul, the entire universe: thus it stands revealed in many places of the Scripture.” 163” For those who seek to know the supreme principle by means of many-sided reasonings Hari alone is the Principle, the great Yogin, Nārāyaṇa the Lord. “16

Likewise in the Danadharma,

“Padmanabha is the Supreme Soul, the highest One, the pure One, the Refuge. This is the secret doctrine of the Veda; dost thou not know, sacker of cities? By His grace do we all cause the worlds to exist. And the trusted ones, and the first among the immortals, and the gods are held to be His repre- sentatives. If Visnu is indifferent, no good will come to us.”

Thus Rudra’s word. 165 Similarly, in the Maha- bharata and Matsya Purana,

“He who amongst them is the Supreme Soul, He indeed is the eternal, unqualified, perfect One; He is to be known as Nārāyaṇa, for He is the world-soul, the Spirit.”

Likewise in the Varaha Purāṇa,

“Who, excepting the Lord Narayana, is superior to the God whose conduct has become the life-order on the earth ?”

“There has been no God greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of the Vedas and the Purāņas, O excellent ones.”

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Likewise in the Linga Purana,

“Janardana is the sole Spirit, the highest One, the Supreme Soul, from whom Brahma was born; from Him Rudra and from Him all the world.”

Likewise Parāśara’s word,’

1

The world has originated from Visņu ‘and’ on Him it rests. He is the maker of its subsistence and its destruction."*166

Likewise in the Manavadharmaśāstra,167

“Nārāyaṇa is higher than the unmanifest; the World-Egg originates from the unmanifest. Within the Egg are all these worlds as well as the earth with her seven continents.”

Therefore, the study of these and similar śrutis, smrtis, epical texts and puranas proves that Vasudeva is the universal cause, the Supreme Soul.

80. Nor do the śrutis declare that Rudra is the Supreme Soul, or that any other deity is. On the contrary, the followers of the Ekayana sākhäls say that he has an origin, and the same is found in the Veda itself: “Darkness was here…. from which Rudra is born; that is the greatest in all the worlds, that indeed is the oldest in the worlds.” “Similarly, Rudra’s posi- tion is clearly known to bea result of his karman: ““He obtained his greatness by propitiating Visnu.” “From the forehead sprang a drop; from that Rudra was born. ‘2169

These and other śrutis declare that Rudra was born. This being so, the statements that in appearance convey the greatness of Rudra and others really serve as laudatory statements, like the śruti: “the car is

"

"

brahman,”

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Consequently, the passages in the

Puranas which declare Rudra etc. to be the Supreme Soul have not their primary meaning, because they are in conflict with Perception and Scripture.

81. Concerning the objection that the assertions of the doctrines of the Tantras are to be rejected since their greatness is set forth only in non-Vedic Tantric texts, we say that Visnu is stated to be the Supreme One in the texts of the Way of the Vedic doctrine. example in the Visņu Purāṇa,

For

“The Supreme Soul, the Basis of all creatures, the Supreme Lord is called by the name of Vişņu in Vedas and Upanisads.””””

In the Varaha Purāṇa,

“The Supreme Brahman is Vişņu; the triple division in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine is here set forth; the ignorant do not know this.” There has been no god greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of Vedas and Purāņas, O excellent ones.”

173

Likewise in the Matsya Purana,

“In those acons where sattva prevails, the great- ness of Visnu is declared. In aeons predominated by tamas the greatness of Fire and Siva is expounded.““74

Likewise in the Linga Purāṇa,

“For there is no other recourse ordained but Vişnu; this the Vedas constantly declare, no doubt about it.”

· Likewise in the Vayu Purāṇa,

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“The Spirit that belongs to the Way of the Veda is explaind to be the thousand-armed supreme lord of

creatures.”

Likewise in the Bhavisyat Purāṇa,

“Visnu is traditionally known to be the Sepreme in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine. Visnu is the greatest among persons, the most exalted Supreme Person.“175

All this has already been explained in great detail in the Purusanirnaya76 and is therefore not further enlarged upon here. Therefore, how can our tongue endeavour to say that the Tantra which is revealed by Visanu who is known from the Upanisads is false? For He is such that He has an immediate insight into the dharma of Consecration, Propitiation etc., by virtue of the omniscience that is natural to Him.””

82. Considering that the sensual pleasure to be had from attainment of heaven, the birth of a son etc. is inseparable from various forms of misery and does not, continue for long, the supreme sages Sändilya, . Narada and others have rejected this pleasure, which in their view was really misery, and in order to attain the release left their dwellings to become mendicants; and they have decided definitively that He has created the Pañicarātra Sastra which sets forth the knowledge and manner of propitiation of Himself which constitute the sole means of attaining the unparalleled beatitude they sought.

83. This argument cannot be extended to other Tantras, for in the various authors of those Tantras error etc. is possible. It is impossible that PerceptionAGAMA PRAMANYAṀ

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or another means of knowledge forms the basis for the other Tantras, and they themselves do also not claim that Scripture is the basis. Besides, because they communicate a meaning that is incompatible with the conclusions of the upaniṣads the view that these Tantras are based on Perception or Scripture is sublated.

For there are four kinds of followers of the way of life set forth in those Tantras, the Käpälikas, Kala- mukhas, Pasupatas and Saivas. The Käpälika doctrine is described as follows: the reward of release is attained by knowing what the six mudrikas178 are and by wearing them, not by knowing Brahman. As they say, “He who knows the identities of the six mudrikas and is expert in the supreme Mudra, and meditates upon the self in the vulva posture, attains nirvana.” The six

mudrikas of the Kāpālikas are stated to be the earring, necklace, pendent, head ornament, ashes and the sacri- ficial theread: there are two more subsidiary mudras described, namely skull and skull-staff. One whose body is marked by these mudrus will not be reborn in the world.” Now, the śrutis do not bear out their view that the knowledge of such paraphernalia, the wearing of them and the concentration on the body in the immoral vulva posture are means to attain release, for the grutis expound that release is attainable only by one who has renounced all sensual desires of this world and the other world and who concentrates on the soul Vasudeva as the cause of the entire Universe: “knowing Him one goes beyond death; there is no other path to tread ctc.“179

The same is. true of the Kalamukhas who teach that certain practices, which are condemned by all the

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sastras, like eating from a skull, bathing in and tasting of ashes of cremated corpses, carrying a laguḍa staff, putting up wine-cups and worshipping the deity in them, will secure all material and immaterial desires: these teachings are outside the Veda.

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84. Also some of the teachings of the Pasupatas and the Saivas in which compatible and incompatible elements are indiscriminately mixed are likewise out- side the Veda, The Pasupata system is as follows: there are individual souls which are called pasus, cattle, and their overlord is Siva, the Lord of Cattle. To assist the souls Siva has composed the Pañcādhyāyi.100 There the five Categories are ex- plained, namely, Cause, Effect, Injunction, Yoga and the Cessation of Misery. The Cause is of two kinds, material and instrumental. Rudra is the instrumental cause and a sixteenth part of him is the material cause. The Effect comprises the elements from Mahati to earth. The Injunction is stated to comprehend principally a number of rites, secret practices, bathing and lying in ashes etc. 182 The Yoga is said to be con- centration and the muttering of formula, OM etc. The Cessation of Misery is held to be release; thus the five Categories are enumerated.–The term “cessation of misery” means total and final cessation of misery. The system holds that this cessation or release is defined by the annihilation of all the qualities of the differential soul.

This conception of God is held by the Saivas as well as the others. And this view of God is entirely, incompatible with Scripture, for it is revealed in śruti that the Supreme Brahman is both the material and the

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instrumental cause of the Universe. Also, it is repeatedly revealed in the scriptures that release con- sists in perfect bliss. As the authoritativeness of these Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradic- tions, it is not really necessary for them to be rejected with the stick of the Veda.

85. Moreover, the Saivas etc. accept stages of life etc. that are outside the varnasrama system that is proved by the Veda and are consequently outside the Veda. As they say,” merely by entering Consecration one becomes instantly a Brahmin. A man becomes an ascetic by accepting the Käpälika vow.”

86. Let it not be said, How could Rudra, who is very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of texts which are not authoritative? Nor is it right to hold that these texts are based upon the recollection of an author of the same name as Siva, because the ground is overextensive. For the theory that the author was in error and could be in error, because he was not Siva but some other person with the same name, can only follow if the Veda sublates the system; this latter ground is sufficient to prove the lack of authority of these texts and entails no overextension to other texts. And error is not entirely impossible in the case of such persons as Rudra etc. Or else one may reason that since Rudra may have composed such a system for the purpose of deceiving the world because he is known as a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even necessary to assume error on his part. For thus it reads in the Varaha Purana,

“For Thou, strong-armed Rudra, must cause deluding doctrines to be expounded, the deceptions of

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jugglers and the like as well as conflicting practices. Having shown that the fruit can be won with little effort, you must delude all these people quickly.””

184

Similarly, the venerable Rudra himself shows in the same Purana that the Saiva and the like scrip- tures which are there being discussed are apostate from the Veda, that only apostates from the Veda are quali- fied for these doctrines and that their only purpose is just to deceive them. “I have propounded this sastra as though it were correct doctrine in order to deceive those who have deserted the Way of the Veda.185 From that time onward, O excellent Ones, the people who believe in the scriptures promulgated by myself do not respect the Vedas, 186 Thus the Pasupata and like doctrines are active in the Kali Age.““87

Likewise he shows that the worship concerning himself as it is propounded in the Pasupata Tantras and other such Tantras is different and does not form part of the worship of the Bhagavan: “The said act of worship concerning me which is being observed is really outside the Veda. This ritual called Pasupata is the lowliest and deceives men.188 Only the lowest people worship me with exclusion of Visnu.” The large numbers of statements like the preceding ones will not be written out here, because they are too numerous. It is clear enough that those who follow these scriptures are outside the Veda, as is stated in the same Purāņa: “He cursed those who kept the observances of hairtuft, ashes and skull, Be you outside the Veda and disquali- fied for Vedic rites. In the Kali Age all those who assume that appearance, wearing hairtuft and carrying a laguda stick, exhibitng arbitrary observances and

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carrying false lingas about, all these hair-tuft wearing devotees of Rudra are consumed by the fire of Brahma’s curse.” These practices are well-known in the Saiva scriptures: “Rosary, and bracelet in the hand, a hair-tuft on the head, a skull, bathing in ashes etc.”

Similarly, he declares in the Aditya Purana that along with relinquishing the Bhagavan they relinquish the Veda: “Others, those that wear ashes and hair-tufts as described have formerly been made to relinquish the Veda as well as God Nārāyaṇa on account of Gautama’s curse.“19:

Moreover, those fools who pass censure on Vasudeva arc to be regarded as heretics, for thus it is declared in the Linga Purana, “Those who consider the Supreme Person to be equal (to Siva) are to be regarded as heretics who are expelled from the Way of the Veda,“192

To conclude, it is these followers of other Tantras of whom 193 it is said, in the smṛtis: “Heretics, crimi- nals etc.”, that they should not be honoured even with a word; and the declaration “Which are outside the Veda…” refers to them. Consequently, since it cannot properly be said of the other Tantras that they are based either on Veda or on Perception, another cause must be assumed for them.

87. OBJECTION. If it is true that for these Tantras another basis must be assumed, let the defect be granted.

But is in your own view knowledge not self-proved?

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REFUTATION. Certainly; but this self-validity of knowledge is here negated by these two defects of sublation, namely, sublation through Perception and through Scripture, for both these defects are plain in their case.

The equality of Pañcaratra Tantra and those other Tantras which has been postulated on the ground that both happen to be Tantra, while in fact one of the two is incompatible with Scripture and plainly shows a different provenance, would mean that Brahmin Murder and Horse Sacrifice are on the same level because both are actions: For in the case of Pañicarãtra Sastra we have positive certainty that it is based on Scripture and Perception.

88. OBJECTION. I made the objection19 that if its being based on Scripture follows from its being established by the Veda, then it cannot be assumed that the author was independent.

REFUTATION. No. Surely, we can assume no independence in man, but for God it is revealed in Scripture, e.g., “To Him all the world is manifest…” “From fear for Him…”

89. OBJECTION. But if the Pañicarātra traditions are really derived from the Veda, then how is it that no recollection of the Vedic words which furnishes this basis has persisted among the Pañcaratrikas, whereas the meaning of these words apparently does persist? It is not right to contend that only the recol- lection of the meaning is important because that has purpose while the recollection of the actual Vedic statements is to be disregarded because it is purpose- less; for it is not proper to forget that from which the meaning’s authority derives.

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Or if, in order to justify this oblivion, the stand- point is taken that the doctrine is based on a Vedic sakha which has been lost or which is always deducible, then whatever doctrine a person adopts he can always make authoritative simply by attributing it to a lost sakha; however, it is hard to prove what a lost or deducible śākhā actually contain.

Or if these traditions are based on an extant Sakha, then others would know it as well as the author, and hence his taking the trouble of promulgating these texts would be purposeless.

REFUTATION. The reply to this is as follows: The Bhagavan, who has an immediate presentation of the entire collection of the Veda by virtue of the perfect knowledge that is natural to Him, observed that his devotees were not firm enough in their minds to retain and transmit the lessons of all the various śākhas which consist of widely scattered injunctions, arthavadas and mantras of many different kinds, and having observed this he was moved by his compassion to condense the meaning of the Veda in an easily comprehensible way and to teach it so. On this showing nothing is un- established. As they say “The blessed Hari took the essence of the Upanisads and condensed it, the Sage, out of compassion with his devotees for their con- venience.”

The other objections made,195 which are equally applicable to all Traditions of Manu and the others, are easily answered by all those who have made a diligent study of the commentaries on the Tantras and are not further enlarged upon here.

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90. OBJECTION. The thesis that the Pañcaratra Tantras are based on the Veda is disproved by the fact that we find in these very Tantras a condemnation of the Veda. For it is said that Sandilya, failing to find a meaning of human importance in the four Vedas, learnt this sastra.

REFUTATION. This is the objection of someone who does not know the distinct meaning of the state- ment. For this censure does not mean to censure something deserving of censure, but rather to praise something else than that which is censured. For instance, in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa the censure passed on the pre-dawn oblation “Morning upon morning they speak untruth,” is understood to praise the post-dawn oblation. It is as in the Manavadharma- Sastra: “The Rgveda is of gods and deities, the Yajurveda of man, and the Samaveda of the deceased; therefore its sound is impure;””” here the censure of the Samaveda serves to praise the other Vedas. Or as in the Mahabharata: “Formerly the assembled seers placed the four Vedas and the Mahabharata in the balance, one at one side, the other at the other side. And since in bulk and in weight the latter pre- ponderated, it is called the Great Bharata for its bulk and weight.” This is said, notto belittle the Vedas, but to bestow praise on the Mahabharata. In this same way the above statement must be taken as praise of the Paficarãtra. Just as the censure of the pre-dawn oblation etc. does not really intend censure, since elsewhere in the same texts they are praised, so will it be in our case too. In Pañcaratra, too, we frequently find praise of the Veda; for example: “Nothing that

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is made up of words is superior to the Veda, thou who art seated on the Lotus. That is said by the Upanisads which set forth the knowledge of truth” etc.

91. Besides in the quotation caturşu vedeşul99 the meaning is not that there is no purpose of human importance in the Vedas but simply “failing to find the purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas…”

OBJECTION. However, the principal connection in this sentence is between “failing to find” and “a pur- pose of human importance;” not between “purpose of human importance” and “in the Vedas.”

REFUTATION. Don’t argue like that, for there is no negation in the sentence. For it is not so that this purpose of human importance is absent from the Vedas; hence the sentence “failing to find that pur- pose of human importance which is in the Vedas, and desirous of finding it, he learnt the Pañcarātra Sastra,” conveys that both Revelation and Pañcaratra have the same meaning.

92. The further objection that Pañcaratra is non-Vedic because of the injunction that those who are qualified for Vedic sacraments etc. must undergo such sacraments described as Consecration because they are propitiations of the Lord, does not hold good. For such statements as agnavaisnavam.. 201 which enjoin the sacrament of consecration upon those qualified for Initiation etc. as accessory to the ritual of the jyotistoma etc. do not therefore become non-Vedic.

Or if the ground for its non-Vedic character is the injunction of sacraments other than the Vedic ones,

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the ground is inappropriate, because of the circular argument it involves: only if the non-Vedic character of Pancaratra Sastra is proved, it is proved that these sacraments arc rcally different; and if the latter is proved, it is proved that Pañcarātra Sastra is non- Vedic.

Moreover, the ground is either that the Pañcaratra sacraments are different from all Vedic sacraments, or that they are different from some Vedic sacraments. Not the latter alternative, for this would mean that the sacrament of Initiation ctc. is non-Vedic because it is different from the sacrament of Tonsure; nor the first alternative, because it does not escape the said defect? for the sacrament of Initiation is not different from all

Vedic sacraments; and we have said that the difference (of Pañcarātra sacraments) from Vedic sacraments is disproved on the ground that Pañcarātra Sastra is Vedic.

93. The objection202 that Pañicarātra is outside the Veda, because like the Pasupata Tantra it is not included among the fourteen sciences which are held to be authoritative of dharma, would also have an occasional application to the texts of the Bharata and Rāmāyaṇa composed by Dvaipayana and Valmiki.

94. The objection that Pañcaratra is non-Vedic because it is rejected by the blessed Badarayana is incorrect. For how could the blessed Dvaipāyaṇa 203 be thought to reject the Bhāgavata doctrine, while he himself is a supreme Bhagavata, model for all the world? It was he who said, “This has been extracted from the Bharata in its full length of one hundredAGAMA PRAMANYAM

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thousand Slokas after it had been churned with the stick of thought, as butter is extracted from curds, and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Aranyaka from the Vedas, and the amṛta from the herbs: this Maho panisada which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Samkhya and Yoga is called the Pañcaratra. This is bliss, this is brahman, this is the summum bonum. Being consistent

with Rk, Yajuh and Saman and the Atharvängirasas, this discipline will of a certainty be authoritative.““204

And in the Bhismaparvan too: “Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaisyas and Sūdras as described are all to worship, serve and honour Madhava according to the Satvata ritual that has been promulgated by Samkarṣaṇa, at the end of the Dvapara age and the beginning of the Kali age.“205

Also in the Santiparavan: “Certainly, the Vaiṣṇava must undergo Consecration with all effort: for Hari will be particularly graceful to one who has been consecrated and to no one else. One should consecrate a Brahmin in spring, a Ksatriya in summer, a Vaisya in the autumn, a Sudra in winter, a woman in the rainy season according to the Pañcarātra doctrine.“206 And likewise: “It has been made commensurate with the four Vedas on the great Mountain Meru.“207

Now, how could Dvaipayana reject the Pañcaratra, which is his own supreme doctrine, comprising the sense of the Upanisads, as follows from these and a hundred direct and circumlocutory declarations made with full respect?

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95. OBJECTION. But then how to explain the sutra ut pattyasanibhavā!?203

REPLY. What is the intention of the sutra?

OBJECTION. The following: Since it is expounded in the Bhagavata Sastra that the individual soul has an origin, and since this is impossible as it militates against Scripture and Logic, therefore this sastra is

erroneous.

REPLY. If that is the meaning of the sutra, then how can the sutra be intended to reject the Pañcarātra Sastra? For the Pañcaratra Sastras do not accept that the individual soul has an origin, which assumption would have justified the sutra’s rejection.

OBJECTION. But is it not their assertion that Vasudeva is at once the supreme material cause and the supreme spirit; that from him the individual soul Samkarṣaṇa is born, from Samkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna, and from the latter the ego called Aniruddha?

REPLY. No. The personal manifestation of God is described as being constituted by vyuhas,209 and the word ‘individual soul” is assigned to one of these Dyihas for practical purposes, in order to prove clearly the differences that exist within the Adorable One, which differences are in accordance with those of the varnas. It is as they say: “The four vyhas are to be worshipped successively by the four varnas succes- sively.” Besides, the words ‘individual soul,’ ‘mind’ and ’ego’ do not denote these tanmatraso themselves, but refer to a person who is the superintending deity of these orders and whose personality is entirely different

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from the order he superintends. Birth is described as the acquisition of various bodies, as is said in the statement toyena jivan in the Yajurmurdhan.”

Besides, the Author of the Sutras has already discarded the śruti, smrti and profane views concerning the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul in the sutra caracara paparayas tu syat tadoyapadefa bhāktas tadbhārabhācitrāt.22 And since, moreover, the origination of the individual soul out of Brahman has been rejected in the sutras nätma śruteh nityatovac ca tabkyal1,219 it does not occasion a renewed exposition: an issue which does not need being made a topic would then be made a topic.

96. This also explains the sutra na ca kartuḥ karanam;21 for it is not said here that the instrument, sc. the mind, originates from the agent, sc. Samkarṣaṇa. For we have already stated that these names solely refer to the persons who superintendent these orders but are themselves different from them.

OBJECTION. Then why this sutra at all? For we do not find that instruments, like a hatchet, originate from an agent, like Devadatta, so that an instrument out of an agent makes no sense.

REFUTATION. Well, then you reject the general view that all instruments, vital airs, mind etc. have their origin in Brahman which itself is without the entire collection of all instruments and rests solely on its own power; this view is stated in the text: “From it springs the vital air, the mind and all the senses."‘215

Or if you do agree on this because it is clearly proved in Revelation, I ask you why you don’t agree.

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on it because it is clearly proved in Pañicaratra.

It is not a very proper procedure to deny things that are proved by smrti; since both śruti and smrti spring from perfect knowledge, they are equally valid.

97. OBJECTION. The sutra vijñānadibhāve vā tadapratisedhal216 is explained as follows: The Author raises the question which one of two alternatives may be true: Are these four equally and independently sovereign, or has one a quaternity of personalities which he has assumed at his own desire? and then he points out the defect: if they are equally sovereign, none of them can be effects because they are equal; when they are different forms of one, what is the pur- pose of this division?

REFUTATION. That is not correct, because an alternative is impossible. For no one who holds that there is a God theorizes that the world has several Gods, least of all the Pañcaratrikas who hold that “Vasudeva is the ultimate material cause”. But this one Bhagavan, who has divided Himself into four for reasons of sport, protects the entire world. And this position is not unjustified, because it is justified in the same manner as the appearance of second-born and first-born brothers like Bala and Bharata. For just as the Bhagavan, who has created the variety of pheno- mena of ether, ‘Wind, Siva, Brahma etc. for His sport, and whose sole motivation is the sport of his unfathomable power, has voluntarily assumed the personalities of Rama, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata, Satrughna etc., without there being the possibility of logical conflict in the same manner the divisions of

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Samkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, too, are unconflicting.

either

98. Furthermore, vipratiṣedhat may mean “because of conflict with Revelation”, on the basis of the citation “failing to find in the four Vedas….;” or “because of mutual conflict between the Tanti as them- selves”. The former alternative, incompatibility with Revelation has already been refuted as being without valid basis. Mutual conflict between the Pañcarätra Tantras themselves, whose terminological precision has been perfected by the rules of logic governing principal matter, generality, peculiarity, quality and the like, does not exist. On the other hand, statements that lack the corroboration of logic can have no cogency; as the maxim says: “A statement must have precision perfected by logic before it can communicate its meaning.”

Consequently, the Author of the Sutras gives the lie to those exegetes who, hy superimposing on the Pañcaratra Tantras (whose validity he strongly affirms as no less than that of the Vedas, in such assertions as “idam mahopanisadam,” etc.) the non-existent doctrine of the soul’s origination, explain that the sutra means to reject the Pañcaratra Tantras. Enough of the book!

99. The meaning of the sutras is this. First the Author has set forth that the doctrines of Kapila, Kasyapa, Buddha, Jina and Pasupati,218 who oppose the Author’s own accepted doctrine, are unnatural29 because they conflict with Revelation and logic. Now, in order to remove the suspicion that the Paficarātra

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Tantras (which are his own accepted doctine) are equally unnatural with the other doctrines because their usual enumeration on an equal plane with the others has made them closely associated with them in people’s thinking, he elicits their validity.

In the first two sutras the prima-facie case is laid down the Pañicarãtra likewise has no validity, ulpaltyasambhavat, i.e., on account of the impossibility of Sanıkarṣaṇa’s origination which is taught there. Why should it be impossible? Because it cannot be established in either of two possible cases; either the four yuhas are equally sovereign, or else one God exists in four persons; and in either case there is im- possibility of origination. If they are equally sovereign, they cannot be created because they are equal; if only one being is admitted no origination is possible either, since a distribution within one being of creating and created parts is inconceivable. 100. Similarly na ca kartuḥ karanam: Pañcarātra has no validity for the further reason that it is impos- sible that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates from the agent, sc. the indi- vidual soul called Samkarsana, for the hatchet does not originate from Devadatta. Or there is this alternative explanation of na ca kartuḥ karanam: and for the further reason that the instrument does not originate from the agent Samkarsana, since according to the text: “From it spring the vital air, the mind and all the senses,” it is revealed that all instruments really originate from Brahman. AGAMA FRAMANYAM 85 101. Then follows: tijñanadibhave ta tada- pratised hal. By the particle ca this prima-facie case is now reversed. What has been said, viz., that there is no validity since in neither case origination of Sarkarṣaṇa etc. is possible, is untrue: it is not contra- dictory that Samkarṣaṇa etc. have originated. Indeed, it would be contradictory if they were not vijnänädi. Vijnanadi is a dvandva compound: “knowledge and beginning,” that means: Brahman; thus vijñā- nadibhāve means brahmabhave. Inasmuch as they are Brahman (brahmabhave), the origination is not contra- dictory. That is to say: by virtue of the fact that the unique Supreme Soul Vasudeva, whose omnipotence is unbounded, enters into them through His māyā, a cause-effect relation is justified. The objection that the mind cannot originate from Samkarsaria, on the authority of the śruti that the mind originates from Brahman, is invalidated by the fact that he, sc. Sarpkarṣana is vijänädi, i.e., Brahman. 102. Furthermore, what is being said in the argument na ca kartuḥ karanam? Is it that the instru ment of a certain action does not originate from the agent of that same action; or that no instrument of any action whatever originates from any agent whatso- ever? If the first view is taken, we have a conflict with Inference, because the argument contains the fallacy of proving the proved. The mind, originating from the agent Samkarsana cannot be the instrument of Samkarsana’s action of originating it, since it itself is the object of the action; nor can it be the instrument of the action of being originated, since it itself is the 86 AGAMA PRAMANYAM agent of that action. we have a conflict with Perception, because we see that for instance a pitcher, though it be the instrument of an action of fetching water, yet originates from the agent of such an action, the potter. This the Author says in the sutra vi pratiṣedhat: ‘because there is conflict.’ If the alternative view is taken, 103. As to the other explanation that has been given of these two sutras, 220 since it is ujiānādi, i.c. “a ground for validity”,221 the denial of the validity of Pañcarātra is not justified, because it entails over- extension. The invalidity, which is defined by the non-origination of knowledge through repetition or dubiety in the Tantras, is rejected, because knowledge is actually had from them. In order to remove the suspicion of untruth occasioned by the speaker’s character, the word adi is used to convey the intended meaning that the Tantras are in fact spoken by a trust- worthy person. Consequently the meaning is this: He always has direct knowledge of the entire world by virtue of the omniscience which is part of His nature; He bestows man’s wishes upon him, when He is satisfied-and he is satisfied by meditation alone; Him the experts in the Veda describe as eternally satisfied in all His desires: how then can there be defects in Him like error, deceit etc.? 104. The ‘impossibility of origination,’ which has been stated in the first two sutras, is thereupon denied for Samkarsana and the other forms of God in the sutra vipratiṣedhat. This means either; “Because there is conflict with the Bhagavan’s perception which is AGAMA PRIMIYYASI 87 inferred through Pañcaratra;” or “Because there is conflict with śruti which is inferred from the same Tradition.” 105. Or there is another interpretation: since the sutras intend to illustrate the rules of exegesis, the author first assumes that there is a conflict between Śruti and Pañcaratra, though in fact there is no such conflict, and then reasons this out as follows: suppose that Рañcaratra is in conflict with the veda, is this sastra then, like the statements of Manu etc., valid or invalid? This question is thereupon answered: “It is invalid, because of the impossibility of the origination of valid knowledge concerning a conflicting sense; and this impossibility itself is proved on the ground that there is independence of something that is dependent.” Thus the sutra utpallyasambhavat means: “because it is impossible that a valid knowledge originates, since, as long as the dependent Pañcaratra Tradition does not start proving the validity of its own sense by establishing the validity of its basis, the cognition which originates from the independent preterpersonal scripture determines the Tradition’s sense as being different, and consequently conflicting with itself. For Pañcaratra conveys that scripture is its basis only as long as the sword of direct scripture does not cut its root. 106. OBJECTION. But why should the Vedas themselves be independent, since their validity, too, depends on the direct cognition of the Bhagavan, because this cognition is their cause? Just as the Pañcaratra Traditions are dependent on His cognition, so are the Vedas too dependent on His cognition.222 88 ADAMA PRANINYAM RETUTATION. To refute this view, the statement is made: na ca kartuḥ karanam: “The Vedas are not the product of a maker, i.c. the Bhagavan. Karana here in the sense of “things that are made or pro- duced,” by the rule “suffix-ana in the sense of the object of the action.“22 This then means that the Vedas are preterhuman. 107. Vijñānādibhāve va tadapratised hal. If, on the other hand, it is not true that the Pañcarātra Sastra is invalid, then what? tadapratised hal, i e. non-rejection of the origination of valid knowledge (namely, even when partly conflicting, the conflicting statement may be valid optionally), because it is based upon the direct cognition of the Bhagavan in whom error and deceit are impossible as He is a source of vijana (vijñānādi- bhāve): Vijñāna means “knowledge par excellence in which no rnistake is possible. For since all other authors of Dharmasastras are not omniscient, as they are involved in samsara, and since therefore they are also not entirely selfsufficient, various lapses are con ceivable in their knowledge. Whereas in the case of the Bhagavan, whose supremacy is natural and un- limited, His knowledge is the immediate insight in all dharma and adharma, which is natural to Him and true, as is known from hundreds of śrutis; it is this knowledge which in the sutra is described as vijñāna, When such knowledge is the ‘beginning,’ i.e. the basis, there is non-rejection, sc. the sastra is valid. 108. OBJECTION. But how can it be assumed that the Tantra, which conflicts with scripture, has validity? For if it is valid, it becomes optional besideADAMA PRAMANYAM 89 scripture; and optionality is deficient in the case of the Tantras by eight defects. Option is assumed when there is no invariable rule that something should be such and not otherwise, because there is no reason to reject, in one case or another, an alternative statement; for instance: “He must sacrifice with rice,” beside “he must sacrifice with barley.” In the latter case it is impossible to eliminate one or the other because neither of these statements is characterized by in- dependence. In the former case, however, there can be no such option between scripture and Pañicarātra, because the two are not equal; for the Vedic statement is independent, because it is preterhuman, whereas the Pañcaratra statement is dependent. So how can they be alternatives and optional? 109. REFUTATION. Listen: because Pañicarātra too is independent. OBJECTION. How can a statement deriving from a person be independent? REFUTATION. Let us ask the logician to explain this: must dependence on something else be assumed for a statement to be informative, to give positive certainty, or to state the truth about its content, or to serve a purpose of human importance? All four are impossible. When the statement is heard, “One must worship the Bhagavan with the attendance due an emperor,“224 nothing else is re- quired for this statement to be informative, because the meaning of the words has already become known from other contexts. Nor does this small measure of dependence prove the weakness of the statement’s 12 90 ADAMA PRAMANYAM validity, for the same weakness would follow for śruthi too.223 Nor is anything else required for the statement to give positive certainty; for the statement “One must worship….” does not occasion doubt whether one must or must not worship, since that would entail a negation of the direct declaration of the real sense. Nor is anything required for the statement to be true to the facts, for the knowledge produced by the statement does not require anything outside its own cause?76 to be true to the facts, because secondary validity is inappropriate and not admitted.??? Nor is it necessary for the statement to be dependent on something else in order to serve a purpose of human importance, for the proof of this purpose follows from a consideration of the entire body of doctrine. In this case, those who have undergone the afore-mentioned sacraments have knowledge of the content of the statement when they have heard the doctrine, and hence they perform the “five-times- a-day” rites, which form this content, and hence they attain to supreme perfection; this is learnt solely from the Sastra itself. 110. Or if the objection is raised that, granted the self-validity of Pañcaratra, this validity is not complete as long as it has not been made certain that there are no defects, after it has been made certain that the speaker is reliable,-I reply that this view is not correct; knowledge that there are no defects does not completely establish validity, since the validity arises from the cause itself of defectless knowledge and not from the defectlessness of this knowledge. AGAMA PRAMANYAM 91 111. Nor is positive certainty about such of the speaker’s qualities as his reliability required for his statement to be defectless, because the statement’s defectlessness is proved solely by its being defectless. As the Author of the Värttika declares, “Then the qualities (of the speaker) do not exert any influence (on the validity of his statement) because (its defectless- ness) is already known.“229 The same Author also shows that, even when there is certainty about its defectlessness, the existence of qualities (like reliability in the speaker) is helpful: “When defectlessness is known, they are helpful by merely existing.“250 Nor does the validity, when it has been established require something else in order that consequent actions of acceptance, rejection etc. proceed, because action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire. As they say, “Action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire.” Moreover, in the case of the self-valid Vedas, too, we find this same dependence in that their validity would not be completely established as long as there were no certainty of their defectlessness after the certainty about the non-existence of their author. 112. OBJECTION. But when the non-existence of their author is proved without effort by the non-appre- hension of what ought to be there, the question of the non-validity does not arise for the Veda, for defects are impossible without something or someone in which they could reside. As they say: “In that case (the Veda) the absence of non-validity follows quite naturally from the absence of an author; therefore its validity cannot be questioned.” ןנגיי 92 AGAMA FRAMANYAN REFUTATION. Why, in the case of Pañcaratra too no question can arise about its validity, since the absence of defects is easily proved by the fact that the omniscient and omnipotent God is its speaker; so the argument is the same. In other words, in both cases of self-validity there is positive certainty that there are no defects; in the case of the Veda because there is positive certainty that no person is involved who could possess these defects; in the case of Pañcaratra because there is positive certainty that its speaker possesses virtues which preclude defects. It is here as in the following two cases of absence of heat: there is no heat in ether because it is certain that there is no locus for heat in ether; nor is there heat in cold water because there is coldness which precludes heat. 113. Moreover, neither dependence nor inde- pendence is by itself a cause of invalidation.22 The independent cognition that some substance is silver while in reality it is nacre is invalidated by the cogni- tion: “This is not silver:” this cognition itself is consi- dered as dependent. The cognition “This is that flame,” is found to be invalidated by the inferential cognition that arises from the disappearance of oil234; the latter cognition itself is dependent because it arises from a sense-perception. The simple truth therefore is that which is susceptible to invalidation is invalidated by that which is not so susceptible; in our present case there is no such susceptibility either of Scripture or of Pañcaratra. 114. Or if you think that it is impossible to give positive certainty that the Tantra is promulgated by AGAMA PRĀMĀṆYAN 93 Vasudeva, as it is in conflict with Scripture, I ask you: Why then does the knowledge arise that Scripture is preterpersonal, while it is invalidated because it conflicts with Pañcaratra? They accept it that the Veda is preterpersonal just because it is Veda; but then one can equally claim that Pañcaratra is promulgated by Vasudeva just because it is Pañcaratra. If the preterpersonal origin of the Veda is proved by the fact that there is no recollection of an author, then why not agree that Pañcaratra is promulgated by Vasudeva just because there is recollection of his authorship? For there exists a strong transmission of the recollection, extending to women and children, that Kesava is the author of the Paficarãtra. So great a faith do people have in His authorship that they erect monuments according to the precepts of Pañca- rātra, donating elephants, horses and great wealth in various fees. In the Skanda Purana it is said that “Kapila is the promulgator of Samkhya, Kesava of Pañcarātra,” Likewise in the Mahabharata: “Nārāyaṇa Himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañcaratra. This great Upanisada, consistent with the four Vedas, as well as with the doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga, called Pañcaratra, which was revealed by Narayana’s tongue, has been taught to the sages by Narada as he had seen it and heard it in the abode of Brahma.” From these and thousands of other statements in the Puranas, which are supported by the rules of interpretation, the conclusion follows naturally that Pañcaratra was indeed composed by Vasudeva Himself. On the other hand, some experts dispute that the Veda is eternal,295 9-1 AGAMA PRAMANYAM Therefore, the real ground for the thesis that the validity of the doctrine of the Bhagavan and that of the Veda is above question is this that both are causes of defectless knowledge. Consequently, because both are equally exemplary, they are optionally valid. It is with this view in mind that the wise Author of the Sutras has explained: vijñanadibhave vi tadapratisedhah. 115. OBJECTION. However, granted that error is made inconceivable by the Bhagavan’s omniscience, yet, since He is also omnipotent, He can also have composed the Pañicarātra in order to deceive. Now, when people, considering this possibility, are confused in their minds as to which view they should take, that this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them, or that it has been stated according to the truth with complete attentiveness of mind, what way is there to resolve their dilemma? We should prefer to decide that since it militates against Scripture it results in disaster. REFUTATION. To this objection the Author replies vipratisedhat, i.c., on account of the contradiction of all śruti, epic, purāņa and worldly experience. If, without any reason, merely because the Bhagavan is omnipotent, the question is raised if He might bave intended to ruin His devotees, why, then one could also raise the question whether He would not hurl even the virtuous into hell by a whim of His omnipotence and con- sequently the whole world would fall into inactivity! Besides, we could also raise the question whether He did not wish to deceive people, because He is omnipotent, and thus created in the beginning the Vedas themselves with false meanings, which are also ADAMA PRAMANYAM 35 95 suprasensible, took away from Brahma16 etc. also the power of recollecting that He was the creator of the Vedas, and from then onward set in motion the transmission of Vedic instruction until the present day: how can we be sure about it? Or the position can be taken that since there is no evidence that, while He is indeed omnipotent, He acted up to the full measure of His omnipotence, since there is no purpose for Him to deceive people because He is satisfied in all His desires, and since He is not in the least affected by defects of partiality and cruelty etc. because He abides with natural affection for all living beings; and since, if He had composed the Pañcaratra in order to deceive, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the wise men who, up to now, learn its instructions and perform the contents of these instructions have forgotten the defects of its author, it must follow that such a suspicion does not arise; and if this view is taken, all this will equally apply to the Vedas as well. Therefore, what possible purpose could He who is satisfied in all His desires, who is omniscient and a treasury of compassion have in deceiving the poor people who have failed to understand the meaning (of the Veda)? Or how could the supreme sages everywhere praise the Tantra as being equal to the Upanisads, if it had been composed in order to deceive? For thus the saints declare in Varaha Purana, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Bharata etc. that this Tantra is an equally esoteric doctrine as the Vedas; and wc declare the same. “Through Veda, Pañcarātra, through devotion and sacrifice, O Brahmin, I can be 96 ADAMA PRAMANYAM attained, and not in any other way, even in hundreds of lacs of years. If one among thousands will grasp the Pafcaratra and, at the expiry of his karman, will die my devotee, the Vedas and the Pañcaratra will dwell in his heart forever.23 This supreme Pañcarātra doctrine of mine, which is not difficult to grasp, that you shall reach to all the world by my grace, doubtless.2 The Yogins mediate upon the Eternal One with Purāņas, Vedas and Pañcaratras, and worship Him with the proper rites. Thus Särnkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Veda and Aranyaka on the other hand are one and the same; all together they are the members that constitute Pañcaratra, O excellent one. He who sees through Veda and Pañcaratra sees truly; this great Upanisada, consistent with the four Vedas….” Since the number of these and similar statements is infinite, we stop here. If you still raise the question if there cannot be ruin in such a Tantra, then there can be no faith in anything. It is with this view in mind that the Author sets forth: vipratised hal. Therefore, even if there were a conflict between the Bhagavan’s doctrine and the Veda, there still would be option between them; but we have already expounded that there is no conflict between them at all. 116. OBJECTION. However, how can the venerable Author of the Bhāṣya239 state that those parts which are in conflict are invalid: “If there be conflict, it is carefully eliminated.” REFUTATION. This statement means that those of frail minds, who are not strong enough to plunge into the deep ocean of rules of interpretation, must not be AGAMA PRAMANYAM 97 disrespectful to the Veda. This is comparable to the venerable Jaimini’s exposition that the fruits of acts serve to increase people’s faith in the acts. 117. The contention has been voiced that Pañica- rätra is invalid because “it is accepted by those who are outside the Veda.” But why could one not equally well contend that the Vedas are invalid because they are accepted by those who are outside Pañcaratra? Furthermore, what exactly does this mean, being “outside the Veda,” and what means “accepted by those who are outside the Veda?” Does “being outside the Veda” mean “being different from the Veda” or “doing what is forbidden by the Veda” or “being hostile to the Vedas?” In all Likewise we must inquire whether “accepted” means learnt” or “known” or “observed.” cases the ground proves to be defective. 33 First of all, if “outside the Veda” means “different from the Veda,” and “accepted” means “learnt, then the ground proves to be occasional, since it equally applies to the Vedas themselves: the Vedic statements, which are valid, are “learnt” by members of the three estates, which themselves are “different from the Veda.” If you take “accepted” to mean “known,” you do not get rid of the same defect. If the term “outside the Veda” means “different from the Veda,” and “accepted” means “observed,” then there would likewise be an occasional application of the ground to the Vedas themselves. If outside the Veda” is taken to mean “performing for- bidden acts,” the ground has an occasional application to those statements of the Veda which enjoin expiatory 13 98 AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ ceremonies. For since statements en joining expiations, c.g. “One must sacrifice with the küsmanda verses,“2” whose content is to be learnt”, “known” and “observed,” by those who perform forbidden acts, are authoritative, it would follow that the ground “because they are accepted by people outside the Veda” is occasional.42 Nor are the Pañcaratra Tantras invalid because they are “accepted” by people hostile to the Veda, for the ground is unproved. Besides, acceptance by people hostile to the Veda does not by itself refute the validity of what is accepted. If it did, the Path of the Heretics would be unbarred; for they endeavour to uproot the validity of the Veda. Thus the naked Jainas could effortlessly render the Vedas untruthful simply by “accepting” the Vedas in some manner by way of deception. 118. OBJECTION. A consideration of such state- ments as “He should never use the Veda, except at a funerary offering,” shows that the defect affects only the unqualified students, not the defectless Vedic statements themselves. REPLY. Then the defect affects only the unquali- fied students in the case of the Tantras under discussion as well, and not the defectless Tantras themselves; so everything is the same, depending on what partisan view one takes. Or if it be held that “outside the Veda” means “unqualified to perform Vedic acts,” and that Pañca- ratra is invalid, like the caityavandana statements,*** because it is accepted by those who, being unqualified, are outside the Veda, the following distinction must beAGAMA PRAMANYAM 99 considered: is the ground here that the Tantras are accepted by people unqualified for all Vedic rites, or by people who are unqualified for some Vedic rites? This point should be clarified. Now, the first alternative cannot be adopted, because the ground is not proved. For there is no human being who is not qualified for any śrauta rite whatsoever, e.g. non-violence etc., because his human- ity as such provides his qualification. Otherwise candālas etc. would do no wrong if they committed such crimes a brahmin-murder, theft of brahmin- wealth, miscegenation with caste-women, study of the Veda etc., simply because they were not qualified to observe these prohibitions. If a man does something he should not do, he commits an offence. It follows that everybody is qualified to these Vedic rites,243 which shows that the ground is not proved and that the illustration falls short of the means of proof. Nor can the second alternative be adopted that the Tantras are invalid because they are accepted by people who are unqualified for certain Vedic rites, because that would entail the conclusion that all Vedic statements are invalid. For every man has some Vedic rites for which he is not qualified: the brahmin is not qualified for the Royal Consecration, the kṣatriya not for the ritual drinking of soma. Consequently, this ground has an occasional application to the Vedic state- ments, which are accepted by qualified persons belong- ing to the three estates, and is therefore inconclusive. As to the illustration, the view that heaven is attained by worshipping a caitya is not invalidated by its being accepted by heretics, but by the deficiency of its cause. 100 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 119. We have already said that Pañcarâtra has been accepted by the Vedic, and among all orthodox pre-eminent, sages Bhrgu, Bharadvaja, Dvaipāyaṇa etc. And in the present day we can also observe how exemplary persons of great learning, believing that these rites are most effective in attaining bliss, perform the rites of temple-building, erection of idols, prostration, circumambulation and particular festival ceremonies, just as they perform the agnihotra and other rituals enjoined directly by Scripture. And it is improper to maintain that their conduct has no foundation, for that would entail that such smärta rites as crepuscular worship, astaka etc., are similarly without foundation. It has been said that the conduct of exemplary people is authoritative,246 and also that even when they do not know the cause of their custom, they do know what is proper custom. 120. If the ground for the invalidity of Pañca- ratra is that it is accepted by Bhagavatas, 2” well, then the scriptural statements of the Ekayana śākha and the Vajasaneyaka sakhas and the means of knowledge Perception, Inference etc., would also be invalid since the Bhagavatas accept those too! This same ground, moreover, namely that Paficarãtra is invalid because it is accepted by the Bhagavatas, suffers from two defects; it is both specially-occasional and unproved.249 Why is Pañcaratra rendered invalid by their accept- ance? If it is because they do not belong to the three estates, then the Atharvanic statements whose content is accepted and observed by rathakaras, niṣādas and other groups which do not belong to the three estates (Statements like “The rathakara must add fuel,” “With AGAMA PRAMANYAM 101 that he must sacrifice for the chief of the Nisadas,“249 etc.) would also be invalid. Or, be it granted that the acceptance of certain rites by outcastes renders them invalid; yet, in view of the fact that the eminent brahminhood of these Bhagavatas who follow the doctrine of the Bhagavan is evident by all criteria of knowledge, their acceptance of Pañcaratra rather confirms its validity. He says: By the same means of knowledge by which the brahminhood of one set of people is evident the brahminhood of another set of people is evident. 121. OBJECTION. But when one sees the small sons of the twice-born who wear the customary hairtuft, sacred thread, palasa wood stick and muñjagrass girdle, one knows, the moment the eyes fall on them, that they are brahmins. REFUTATION. And in our case, when one sees learned people who day after day study the Vaja- saneyaka and Ekayana sākhās, wear prominently their sacred threads, upper garments and hairtufts, impart teaching, sacrifice, receive priestly stipends—does one not instantly know that they are brahmins? If it be held that outcastes, low-caste people etc., may also illegitimately sacrifice, teach, carry palata sticks etc. and that they behave as though they were legitimate brahmins, and that therefore neither costume nor conduct provides positive certainty that a man is a brahmin, then the same applies to other priests than Bhāgavatas. Or be it granted that there are cases where people illegitimately display the marks of brahminhood; still, 102 AOAMA PRAMANYAM though there may be doubt about the legitimacy of these marks in others because of their resemblance to pretenders (just as when there is a doubt that one may be mistaken about real silver too because one has mistaken nacre for silver), then there can be certainty of their being genuine brahmins in all cases when no misapprehension occurs, because otherwise doubt would conflict with Perception and lead to infinite regress. 122. Or if it be held that the others are genuine brahmins because they recollect those gotras which are peculiar to brahmins, the same applies to the Bhagavatas; for the Bhagavatas have the tradition: “We are descendants of Bharadvaja, of Kasyapa, of Gotama, of Upagava.” Nor is this recollection or tradition of gotras un- founded or merely contemporary, for the same can be argued for all tradition of gotras. If there were doubt about descent since error could conceivably occur, this would confuse the whole world about the authenticity of their brahminhood. After all, anyone may fear that he really is a cardala if he suspects his mother of having had a lover; and how, my excellent opponent, can you be quite sure yourself that your birth entitled you to Vcda-study? Therefore if the brahminhood of Bhagavatas, which is completely established by the recollection of the various gotras which has been passed on in uninterrupted transmission, stands unchallenged, then there is no difference whatever in this between the brahminhood of Bhagavatas and of others. 123. Further, if some who believe in the Supreme Person are monotheists and others who believe in AGAMA PRAMANYAM 103 petty godlings are polytheists, is then the same authority stated for the brahminhood of the ones as well as of the others, or how else is their brahminhood known if not by that same authority? If this is the question, then listen: there remains a criterion to determine brahminhood in either case, either Percep- tion, or Inference, or Circumstantial-Implication. 124. OBJECTION. But how can Perception con- vey that they are brahmins? For when we are close to two individuals whom we have not seen before, onc a brahmin, the other a kṣatriya, of the same age and the same appearance, we do not immediately observe the distinction that one is a brahmin and the other a kṣatriya in the same way as we instantly observe the differentness of a goat, an elephant, a buffalo etc. Nor is it proper to maintain that the visual sense conveys the brahminhood of a nearby individual in dependence on our recollection of his father’s brahminhood etc.; for that recollection itself is impossible without a previ- ous immediate cognition, just as the recollection of the son of a sterile mother is impossible. Nor can we know from Inference that a man is a brahmin, for we do not find a concomitant mark. And such qualities as tranquillity, self-restraint, austerity, purity etc., cannot be taken as marks of brahminhood, because they are available only in the case of a good brahmin and because they are not exclusively confined to brahmins. Nor can Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof of brahminhood, because it is not lacking in season and the fact that the sentence-meaning of the statement, “In spring the brahmin must add fuel to the fire, is otherwise unestablished does not there- 104 AGAMA PRAMANYAM fore by Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof that a man is a brahmin; for knowledge of that sentence- meaning presupposes knowledge of the word-meaning of brahminhood etc. 125. REFUTATION. All this does not make for a defect in my argument. There is no invariable rule that Perception becomes manifest only at the first contact between sense and object and not otherwise Perception is that which illumines the unmanifest while there is continuity of the operation of the senses. Thus there can be Perception of brahminhood; for when we keep our eyes open we note, immediately upon observ- ing the particular differentiae of the genus brahmin- hood, that the brahminhood is quite clearly noticeable in those who belong to the families of the different gotras-Vasistha, Kasyapiya Sathamarṣaṇa etc.–, who are pure in their conduct, and who display the sacred thread, upper cloth, hairtuft and munja grass girdle. Nor does it run counter to ordinary experience that the eyes can convey brahminhood in dependence on the observation of the peculiarities of genus. In every case the sense becomes the cause of the rise of determination of sense-object when favoured by the accompanying circumstances of place, time, configura. tion etc.25 It is the natural function of the sense-organ as such to relate itself to these accompanying circum. stances. As the author says: “No organ of knowledge, whether in Veda or in ordinary process, becomes effica- cious in determining the object that is to be realized through the accompanying circumstances unless it is favoured by these circumstances.“252 Consequently the visual sense, when favoured by the recollection AGAMA PRAMAYYAM 105 of genus, gives knowledge of brahminhood without the object giving up its perceptuality. So it is evident that the visual sense can be the instrument of knowledge of genus in dependence on a variety of accompanying factors. Gold becomes manifest through its colour fromcopper etc., ghee is differentiated from oil, through its smell and taste; fire, which is hidden by ashes, is perceived through touching the ashes. Sound may provide us with proof that there is a horse in the distance; a pitcher etc. are known through their configuration; brahminhood through descent, and also through conduct in certain particulars, which is completely protected by the king. It has been contended that when we see two individuals of the same age and appearance, the differ- ence between the two does not immediately appear to the eye; but the perceptuality of their differentness is not refuted by just this. In this case the non-percep tion of their differentness is caused by the defect of similarity. The difference between nacre and silver, which are similar in appearance and configuration, may not be immediately visible, yet that does not mean that their difference is not visible at another time; and the same holds for the difference between brahmin, kṣatriya and vaiśya. Or else, brahminhood is that which arises from the differentiae of genus, and such a product can empirically be known just like any other product by a process of positive and negative consideration, e.g. “what are the specific characteristics to which the elders apply the term brahminhood, or to which characteristics is the term applied?” It has been said 14 106 AGAMA PRAMANYAM often that it applies to those who possess recollection of gotra, Vedic ancestry etc.; let us not start discussing this question again, or we must repeat our old argu- ment: it is established that the Bhāgavatas are brahmins, because they possess gotra etc. 126. The objection 25 was made that the Bhagavatas are born from a vaisya vratya, on the authority of the two statements: “The fifth one, the Satvata, must worship the sanctuaries of Visnu by royal decree;” and “he is also called a Bhagavata; he is born from a vaiśya vratya.” To this we reply: precisely what do we learn from these two statements? Is there a simple connection of names, or must an invariable rule be stated ?254 It is impossible to make it a rule that the words Bhagavata and Satvata denote a vaiśya vratya, for that is not known from the text, and it involves overexten- sion. In the statement, “the fifth one, Satvata,” we do not find a denial that the words Bhagavata and Satvata denote other meanings, for that would mean ignoring the explicit and inventing the unstated. In our statement the fifth one, who is born from an vaidya vratya, is understood to bear the name of Satvata: “The fifth one, Satvata…”, since the word ‘fifth’ is the operative term as it is mentioned first. And if the fifth is the Satvata, the Satvata is not necessarily also be the fifth, namely the vaiśya vratya. For when the stated subject (e.g. a mountain) is possessed of fire, the predicated fire does not necessarily possess smoke.255 Consequently the consideration if a smṛti statement of this kind cannot give certainty that the words Sātvata, Bhagavata etc mean vratya. AGAMA FRAMANYAM 107 401 127. If it be argued that since these two words also may denote another caste (namely of the vaisya vratyas), then the mere fact that certain brahmins are denoted by these words proves that these brahmins belong to that caste, even though they follow the doctrine of the Bbagavan, it would also follow that, since we find the collocated word acaryas also used to denote the issue of a lowly vaisya, therefore an eminent brahmin who is an acarya imparting teaching of the Veda with its ancillae and its esoteric teachings is thereby denoted as being a vaiśya vratya! If, on the other hand, even though a true brahmin is denoted by the word ācārya which denotes a vratya, there still can be no suspicion that he actually is a vratya, because there is positive certainty of his brahminhood which is clearly proved by other means of knowledge, and because it is possible that the word acarya is used figuratively (ācārya as one who “accumulates”- acinoti the pupil’s knowledge) for a Brahmin teacher, then in our case, too, the same argument can be made, namely thus: even though they are denoted by the terms Satvata and Bhagavata, which denote another caste, yet there can rise no suspicion that they actually are vratyas, because the brahminhood of these followers of the Bhagavan’s doctrine is firmly known from the recollection of completely obvious clans, Vedic ancestry etc., and because it is possible that the terms Satvata and Bhagavata have a figurative denota- tion of sattva-val257 and bhaga-vat. In other words, the fact that the same word de- notes both classes of people does not mean that there- fore both belong to one and the same caste, lest the 103 • AGAMA TRAMANYAM true brahmin be not made into a low-caste man because he is also denoted by the word acarya. We fint that the word hari also means ‘frog.’ Does it follow that a lion is a frog because both are denoted by the same word? Then word itself would be horned, since ‘word’ is denoted by gaul!” Consequently, just as the words sudhanvan, ācārya etc., which denote more than one meaning, are also used for someone born from a vaisya vratya, so also the words Bhagavata and Satvata. 128. The contention that when the conven- tional meaning and the etymological meaning of a word collide, it is right to assume the conventional meaning of the term, in this case of the terms Bhagavata and Satvata, is not correct; for when a denotation is appropriate which is the composite of the denotations of the component elements of the words, then it is not right to assume a non-composite denota- tion. For he who theorizes that the words satrata and bhagavata have their conventional meaning in denoting someone born from a vaisya vratya, must also theorize that the words sattvaval and bhagarat, which are the stem and the taddhita suffix built on the stem,261 have a different meaning in a sentence like, “having observed the satvata rules, a man becomes a Bhagavata because of the merits he has won in a previous existence.">162 This goes to prove the assumption that in this case the word may have a double meaning by etymology alone, because it is possible for it to be used in the sense of “issue of a vaidya vratya.” And it is possible that those vratyas too, despite the fact that they fail toAGAMA PRAMANYAM 109 worship the Bhagavan directly, yet may be denoted by the words satvata and bhagavala, because of their work discipline of cleaning up Vasudeva’s temple, clearing away the bali offerings, guarding the idol etc., for it is taught that the can suffix may occur in the sense of a simple relation, “this is of that.” And it is declared that the issue of a vaiśya vratya has the work discipline of cleaning the Bhagavan’s temple etc., “and (the task) of the satvatas is the cleaning of the deity’s temple, the eating of the offerings, the guarding of the idol;” and “he must worship Visnu’s sanctuaries."‘264 129. Herewith is also rejected the contention that the Bhagavatas are vratyas because they would have the same profession. For it is one thing to clean the temple, clear away the bali offerings, guard the idol, and quite another thing to perform the variety of actions that are daily observed by the Bhagavatas: the cleaning of the way to the idol, the preparation for worship, offering, daily study, and meditation. It is as it is in the case of the jyotiştoma etc. In the jyotiṣṭoma, too, a carpenter has a task in making the various receptacles, soma-cups, soma.decanters, ladles etc., while the officiating pricsts have their tasks in reciting various different mantra recitations, representing the deity, pres- sing of the soma etc. And this occupational similarity, limited as it is, does not raise the question whether the priests have the same caste as the carpenters! So here, too, there is a difference between those who perform the pañcakalika ritual, which is established by the Bhagavan’s doctrine, and the low-caste people who do the cleaning-up of the temple and are also called temple-guards. 110 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 130. Further, the contention266 that, if the words bhāgavata and satvata have their etymological meaning, this entails that the word rathakara in the injunction the rathakara must build a fire” denotes someone belonging to the three varnas on account of its etymology of chariot-making, 268 is not correct. For in the case of rathakara it is correct that the term refers to someone belonging to the three varnas, because other- wise the springtime etc., which are given in the state- ment on the origin of this fire-building, would be invalidated, and because usages of a word in the sense of different castcs, which is given in the mantra “saud hanvana ṛbhavaḥ siracakṣasaḥ would be invalid- ated.270 Despite the fact that rathakara is also a name for another caste-as learnt from the smrti “the rathakara is born out of a kariņi by a mahişya””” (so that the rathakara is born from an anuloma marriage of a kṣatriya man and a vaiśya woman), nevertheless, since, on Sankha’s evidence”” that the rathakara is not forbidden to perform rites of sacrificing, fire-building and initiation, there is no conflict of qualification for rites that can only be realized through knowledge of the Veda, 273 and since the word rathakara (in its etymological meaning) is inappropriate for members of the three varnas because they are forbidden to follow an artisan’s profession, therefore we can only conclude that in both cases different castes are denoted by the term, and so there is no conflict. Moreover, when knowledge of the thing meant by a word is obtained from the denotation of the separate members that compose the word, then the Author of the Sutras rules out the validity of a denotation in AGAMA PRAMANYAM 111 which the meanings of the component members are lost, namely in prokṣanişu arthasam yogat.274 Therefore, those eminent brahmins are called sätvatas and bhagavatas who because of their pure character (sattva) devote themselves to the Bhagavān who is the Supreme Person. Later on we shall show that other smṛtis set forth the eminent brahminhood of the Bhagavatas. 131. The further objection,275 namely why these people should invariably be denoted by the exclusive names of Satvata and Bhagavata, if their brahminhood were the same as that of others, can be answered thus: there is no defect in that, for it is as it is in the case of the names parivrajaka and nigadu. Certain brahmins are called bhagavatas, just as certain brahmins are called pariurajakas, and certain yajul formulae nigadas, though both are equally brahmins and equally ya juh formulae; namely in the statements: “The brahmins should remain, the parivrajakas must be fetched;"‘776 “the yajul formulae take place, not the nigadas; the nigadas take place, not the yajuh formulae;” and this is so because of the interpretation: “the nigadas are the fourth mantra collection, or the yajult formulae, because they are identical.” 132. The contention that the Bhagavatas arc bad brahmins because they perform pūjā to the God, partake of the offering substance etc. for a livelihood, is countered in the following manner: Surely not all Bhagavatas worship Hari for their profession, for many Satvatas are found who perform puja for themselves. If there are certain people who, while being Satvatas, 112 AGAMA PRAMANYAM follow a reprehensible profession and perform sacrifices for respectable Bhagavatas professionally, this fact alone does not mean that one may say that they are not brahmins. A vedic priest who officiates as an adhvaryu at a jyotistoma does not thereby lose caste. If the priest were not to receive fees, the pūjā itself would remain fruitless; they take fees in order to realize completely the excellence of the puja. At the conclusion of the worship one must give gold to the priest according to capacity; otherwise the fruit will go to the puja priest himself, as is shown by the smrti: “A sacrifice for which a small fee is given kills (the sacrificer).“279 It is however prohibited that a covetous Vedic priest officiate as a priest after he himself has put up his demands for a fee, c.g. in the statement: (“There is an error called ‘garbage”). When the sacrificer appoints as a officiant priest who covets the office, thinking either “He should give me (a fee)” or “He should choose me.” “This is as far from the sacrificer as garbage; this does not benefit the sacrificer."‘280 The donation of the sacerdotal fee which is purified by faith is felicitous for both, as according to the smrti, “He who receives the offering and he who denotes it both go to heaven,“281 133. The statement 282 that professional worship of the deity and living off the god’s treasure makes a man a devalaka must be taken to refer to the profes sional worship of, and the living off the treasure of, other deities than Vasudeva. Thus the blessed Vyāsa: “A devalaka is he who lives on Rudra etc.””””” there is also Sandilya’s word: “All those who perform And sacrifices professionally and are also not consecrated AGAMA PRAMANYAM 113 Like- are the only ones who are traditionally known as karmadecalakas in this world, O sage. One should not touch them or consort with them for a year.” wise: “Certain people who are karmadevalakas and kal padevalakas are unqualified for ritual before the deity for a period of three years. Those brahmins who, without being consecrated, perform rites set forth in the Kalpa, either professionally or for the fame of it, arc kalpadevalakas. One must have puja offered by another professional priest who has been properly consecrated; one is unable to worship the god oneself. This is the principal offering; in another manner it is secondary.” “In another manner,’ that is to say, when it is done by a non-consecrated priest. This the author elucidates: “The rite performed professionally by ‘some priest who has not been properly consecrated is called of the lowest degree.” By considering these and a hundred similar smrti statements we can be sure that living off the deity’s treasure and professional pūjā offering of brahmins who go without the sacrament of consecration as established by Pancaratra renders them sub-Brahmins and devalakas. 134. As to the statement that the Bhagavatas cannot pass for exemplary persons because they make use of flower and food offerings, which practice is abhorred by exemplary persons, to this we say: what does the śrotriya 285 mean by left-over flowers and left- over food? When he takes it only as the flowers and the cakes, he is contradicted by all the world, for nobody approves of wasting flowers and cakes. Also, a particularized prohibition 27 is not in order, because it is not established. No notion of a particularized 15 114 AGAMA PRAMANYAM thing occurs when the particularization is not deter- mined; and here it is impossible to determine the particularization. OBJECTION. Why should it be impossible, since the particularization is that’it is forbidden to use food what has been offered up to the deity? REPLY. Are you now accepting the validity of Pañcaratra? For only when one admits that there is a deity present in the idols that are erected with the sacred formulae en joined by Pañcaratra Tantra can one postulate that the particularization of the prohibition lies in the offering-up to the deity. For unless the validity of the Tantra is admitted, how can an idol which is set forth in the Tantra be a deity, and, a fortiori, how can the substance that is offered up for this deity’s sake be nirmalya and nivedya. For a deity does not exist by just being a deity; only that deity which is known to be correlated with an oblation on the autho- rity of scriptural testimony is the deity to that oblation; that is your own doctrine. Or if it be held that something is nirmalya and nivedya because it is admitted by the Pañcaratrikas that it is offered up to the deity, well, in that case you must also admit its purity because the Pañcaratrikas acccpt also that the utilization of nirmalya and nivedya is per- fectly pure. Or if you do not accept this peculiar excellence, since in your opinion the Paficarãtrikas have accepted as pure something that is really impure,-well, in that case you must accept it that the substance which is offered up is not really nirmalya and nivedya, since then AGAMA PRAMANYAM 115 you opine that the Pañcaratrikas have adopted some- one who is not really a deity by mistaking him for a deity! In other words, inasmuch as the offering up of mere flowers, cakes etc.289 is not approved, and because it is impossible to particularize the prohibition of utilizing these substances according to the terms of one’s own doctrine, therefore the particularization must be determined in the terms of the others’, i.e. the Pañcarātrikas’, doctrine; and thus the offering up becomes greatly purifying. And inasmuch as therefore the utilization of nirmalya and nivedya becomes most purifying, it must needs be accepted by those who admit the validity of the Pañcarātra Tantra as well by others who do not. 135. OBJECTION. But how is it possible then that even one who admits the validity of Pancarātra should reject nevertheless the nirmalya and nivedya? For in the Tantras the tasting etc. of the nirmalya is prohibited. For instance, it is said in the Sanat- kumāriya Samhita: “The offering that is proffered (to the deity), flower or fruit, is called nirmaly a; that must be avoided meticulously.” Similarly in another passage: “When one has eaten nirmalya, or the food- rests of someone who is not one’s guru, one must observe a milk.vow for a month, continuously recite the eight-syllable formula, and drink the pañcagavya, in order to be purified.” “290 Likewise in the Indraratra: “One should not live off the Supreme God, nor eat the nirmalya offerings.” Also: “And the nirmalya offerings are never fit for consumption.” Similarly in another Samhita: “One should not eat the nirmalya offerings, 116 AOAMA PRAMANYAM nor smell them, nor step over them."-How then can one accept the purity of the utilization of the nirmalya when we thus know from several Samhitas that it is prohibited? REFUTATION. To this he says: The utilization of a proffered substance which has been offered up to the deity is not condemned if it is done within a period of ten näḍikās. Thus in the same Indraratra: “The wise one must let the offering-cake stand for ten nāḍikās. This period of time has been prescribed both for night and for day. They condemn the nirmalya that has stood for more than this period of time; thereupon he must throw it in water, or in fire, or bury it in the ground.” OBJECTION. But what is said here is not to praise the tasting etc. of the nirmalya, but to prescribe that the substance of the cake puja is thrown away after a period of ten naḍikās. In the statement: “He must let the offering cake stand for over ten näḍikās,” the injunction is laid down that when the proffered flowers, cake etc. in general have been taken off as nirmalya, because they have now fulfilled their ritual function, they must be kept by way of accessory pūjā rite for a period of ten nädikas. And consequently even a study of the conclusions of your own Tantras shows that the touching etc. of the turmeric powder, the food offerings and the water used to clean the idol’s feet is not established by Tantric doctrine. Now, where are you? REFUTATION. Where are you, loquacious debat- ers, witless fools who have been swallowed by your own tongue which plays around with a grain of AGAMA PRAMANYAṀ 117 knowledge! Your objection looks black and white at once, like the moon with its spots. This prohibition applies only to fools like you, since all this is indeed to be observed by Vaisnavas who are qualified to do so, and thus it is capable of wiping off a multitude of sins in the same way as the drinking of soma at a Vedic sacrifice; for it is not to be touched by others, just as the puroḍāśa cake is not to be touched by dogs! Thus in the Isvara Sanhita, “It is difficult to find in this world a true votary of the lord, my son, and, among those who are, it is even more difficult to find a disposition which is truly pure enough for the foot- water, or to use the garlands etc. which have been mentioned in the doctrine. Therefore, O six-faced One, all this which is purified by the formulae and the glance of the Bhagavan is forbidden to those who lack this disposition and are not votaries.” And in another passage: “The saffron, sandal, camphor and oils that have been taken off Vişnu’s body are supremely puri- fying.” Likewise in the Padmodbhava: “He who wears the powder that is taken of Vişnu’s body on his head obtains the fruit of a Horse Sacrifice and glories in Visnu’s heaven.” Similarly in the Isvara Samhita, “No blame should be put by statements arising from ignorance on all that is used, the perfume, flowers etc., (the water) of the idol’s bath etc., and the curds, milk etc. Those who condemn this divine purifying agent be- cause they consider it nirmalya, those witless detractors of its power will go to hell.” The above statements which to the consecrated prohibit the use of nirmalya at the time mentioned in the time instruction293 must be understood to mean a 118 AGANA PRAMANYAM time subsequent to that when the (offerings to) the chief of the Bhagavan’s retinue294 is being used. Since the garlands, sandal etc. which are offered up to the Bhagavan, later on, after the Viśvakşena offering, become unfit to eat, therefore the Satvatas use the nivedya etc. before that time. Consequently the use of the nirmalya is a cause of excellence for the Satvatas. 136. Moreover, it is our postulation that the exemplary people hold the nirmalya of other gods in contempt; this is postulated like the drinking of soma (which is good) because it is Vedic (in contrast to the drinking of liquor which is evil). So I have said that those who do not accept the validity of the Bhagavan’s doctrine are unable to determine what is nirmalya. When it is properly determined (namely according to the Bhagavans doctrine) the Bhagavan’s nirmalya proves to be extremely purifying, as is demonstrated by the statements of all Vedic teachers. In a matter for which the only means of knowledge is verbal testi- mony, it must be so as verbal testimony says that it is. Unless one is deaf, one cannot say that there is no verbal testimony concerning it. For instance it is said in the Brahma Purana: “The nivedya of Visnu is declared by the sages to be pure and fit for consumption; one who cats other nirmalya and niredya must perform the candrayana in expiation. The malya which is taken from the body of Visņu takes away evil and is holy. He who wears iton his head goes to supreme bliss.” It follows that the smrti statement that a man who cats nirmalya and nivedya must perform the candrayanas should be takenAGAMA PRAHAṆYAM 119 to bear upon the nirmalya of Rudra, Kali etc. Thusin the Mahabharata: “Meditating in one’s heart upon Hari, one must offer food to Him with full attention, thereupon pick up this food again with the middle- finger and the thumb, and then sacrifice it bit by bit, saying: “Prāṇaya svāhā, Apānāyasvāhā, Vyānāya svāhā, Udanaya svālā, Samānāya svāhā.” Likewise in another passage, “what has been offered to the god must be given to a brahmacarin.” Thus in the Mahabharata: “The saintly knowers of the Pañcarâtra ate in his house that which had been left over by the Bhagavan, as a means to attain to bliss, as supreme nourishment.”””” And likewise the blessed Saunaka: “He himself eats the nivedya.” He who condemns Vişnu’s nivedya, whose purity is proved by hundreds of similar smṛtis and which dispels the fear of rebirth, really ignores the statements of the smrti because of his heterodoxy and ought to have his tongue cut off 137. OBJECTION. But how can the nivedya be a means for the praṇagnihotra? The exemplary people do not approve of a means for homa etc. for which no building bricks are used. Nor can a substitution of another substance do duty as a homa, because he lives off food that has been obtained according to taste. Nor can a substitution of another consumption be made to replace the nivedya, for scripture enjoins upon the twiceborn a meal in the evening and a meal in the morning, as follows from the prohibition: “One should not take food in between.” REFUTATION. That is no defect, since the multitude of deitics, like prana etc. are revealed to be parts of Visņu, in the same way as Viśvaksena, the chief 120 AGAMA PRAMANYAM of Visnu’s retinue. For just as the flowers, cake etc., though proffered to the Bhagavan but actually given to Viśvaksena shows that He is familiar under various guises, or just as at a sacrifice the soma juice that is left over by the hotar is pure to the adhvaryu, so it is also with the nirmalya.298 Moreover, only scripture can be our criterion for what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten. When it says that something is fit to be eaten, what injunc- tion are we to invent ourselves? Just as the same rule governs both the periodical and the desiderative agni- hotra, so the same rule governing the eating of the nivedya applies also to the praṇagnihotra. 138. As to the remark299 that from the observance of different sacraments, from conception ceremony to cremation, it follows that the Bhagavatas are not brahmins, here again ignorance is to blame. It is not your Honour’s fault that the Bhagavatas, who have the Vajasaneyasakha in the transmission of their family line, observe the sacraments of conception ceremony etc. according to the manner laid down by the grhya- sutras of Katyayana etc. Those who perform the forty sacraments which are enjoined by the Ekayana scrip- ture while giving up the dharmas of the Veda, from the recitation of the gayatri onward,500 they properly follow the rules laid down by the grhyasutras of their own sakha and do not abdicate their brahminhood because they fail to follow the rites of a different sakha; since otherwise it would follow that other brahmins too would forfeit their brahminhood because they fail to perform the rites enjoined by other AGAMA PRAMANYAN 121 people’s Sakha. For everywhere among brahmins we find customs that differ according to birth, caraṇa, gotra, qualification etc. Even though one ritual is understood for all sakhas, still all the various dharmas relating to mutually different qualified performers do not all together accumulate in anyone place. And the Aspirants who are distinct from those brahmins who are qualified for rites of the aindragneya etc., which are means leading to the enjoyment of rewards like heaven etc., as enjoined by the three Vedas, and who themselves are qualified for the rites of the Ekayana, rites which alone are the means of attaining to the Bhagavan, viz. knowledge, cleansing the way to the Lord, preparation of worship and oblation, as enjoined by the Ekayana scripture, are brahmins too. It follows that the non-observance of certain rites en- joined by different sākhās does not mean that either one forfeits his brahminhood-that the Ekayana śākhā is preterpersonal scripture has been enlarged upon in the Treatise on the Validity of Kasmira Agama,502 and is therefore here not further discussed. But since it is quite obvious that the Bhagavatas, which we are dis- cussing here, are connected with the dharmas of the three Vedas, like the savitri recitation, there is no possible support for the suspicion that they are really vratyas because they would have abandoned these Vedic dharmas. 139. May Nathamunis be victorious, he to whom the Three Principles are immediately evident by virtue of his own miraculous power, he by whose pupils the arrogance of the rivals of the Sätvata Doctrine is terminated after their own view was rent to pieces by 122 XOAMA PRAMANYAM variously apposite arguments, he whose spirit is for ever the abode of the feet of Mukunda. May, for the length of this Aeon, play on the pious, enchanting and irreproachable sayings of the extensive collection of prose and verse compositions which eclipse the cleverness of the befuddled, conceited and witless assembly of the evil crowd of the rivals of the Satvata doctrine, whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nathamunindra,504 and by which all the unholy powers are cleansed. Printed at Prabha Printing House, Bangalore-4, India NOTES

1. To Yamuna, God’s omniscience consists in this unlimited percipience, so that, as he will argue below (§ 109), the validity of Pancaratra does not rest only on Scripture, but also on Perception.
2. In the purva paksa the principal opponents introduced are what one may already call smärta brahmins, and among them especially the orthodox followers of Mimasă. No Vedanta opposition will be discussed.
3. fabda, and its synonyms, have been translated variously as Verbal Testimony, Verbal Evidence in general, or Scripture in particular, depending on the context.
4. prāmāna has generally been rendered with “means of knowledge,” sometimes with “criterion.”
5. jagati or loke: “in the world of experience, in common experience.”
6. Punctuate after iti which closes the question introduced in preto vyacasṭām; abhi-ni-vif “to stick to a partisan view (in the teeth of contrary evidence).” I take bāla iva as sandhi for böle iva, the meaning being that the objector takes the view that something limited (the boy) is really unlimited (mature adult).
7. siddhasadhana, one of the defects of an argumentation by which proof is sought of that which is already proved or established. Space (akata) is, by definition, unlimited and cannot illustrate the thesis that something finite can be infinite.
8. vibhu in the sense of “omnipresent, infinite.”
9. namely, the Pafcaratra postulation that such tantric ceremonies as consecration (diksa), etc. are means leading to the summum bonum.
10. In the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke, as in the case of the kitchen. 123 15 124 AGAMA PRAMANYAM
11. Yamuna throughout treats Sitvata and Bhagavata as synonymous.
12. paurusega and apauruseya; the latter has in the sequel been rendered with “preterpersonal.” Person here does not inean only “human person” but “any being endowed with personal features, including God.”
13. “Eternal Scripture” (agama) is preter-personal scripture, since any verbal statement originating from a person is cotemporal with that person, and the purvapaksin does not admit the existence of an eternal personal deity.
14. arthapatti, throughout translated “circumstantial-impli- cation”. It is a kind of inference by which is established something that must be established, yet is not established by another means of knowledge; for example: “Deva- datta, who is well-fed, does not eat by day:” since he cannot be well-fed without eating at all, it is deduced, by circumstantial implication, that he eats by night,
15. namely, the relation of being a means to a certain end. 16. KMS 1.3.2 api oä kartṛsāmānyal pramāṇam anumānam syāt “smrti is authoritative, because both smpli and Veda have the same agent performing its mandates,”
16. The morning and evening oblations, the New and Full Moon oblations, and the soma sacrifice, examples respect- ively of nitya (daily recurring), naimillika (occasional) and kamya (desiderative) rites.
17. aştaka is the name of the 8th day after Full Moon in the winter and fifira months, on which an oblation is per- formed for the deceased (Manu 4.119; 150).
18. the crepuscular observances.
19. the point is taken up in detail infra §§ 119 ff.
20. respectively yoga, whereby the component parts of the word are given their own meaning; and rudhi, the total meaning of a word that has become conventional and does not necessarily correspond to the meanings of its component parts. NOTES 125 Rathakara means by yoga “chariot- maker, cartwright.” by rudhi a caste which is not at all characterized by this profession.
21. adhyayanasiddhabuddhyangalvabhangenapi. Such a “connota. tion” is, for example, that the rathakara in the literal sense of cartwright is disqualified for Vedic ritual, because a cartwright is a füdra; on this point see infra.
22. upanayana, which is the first step to his acquisition of Vedic knowledge.
23. Manu 10.23. 25, the term “by royal decree” shows that it is a caste profes sion. Quotation not identified
24. not found in Aufanassamrti (AAS 48).

unidentified. 28. unidentified. 29. Manu 10.40. This point is detailed upon infra 134 f 30. unidentified. 31. unidentified. 32. not in Devalasmrti. 33. unidentified. 34. not in Atrismpti: Avaluka is unknown to me, kalpa. devalaka can be explained as a professional kalpa priest, kalpa either in the sense of (“unorthodox) ritual,” or ‘astrological mansion’; gapabhogadevalaka is likewise obscure, but probably refersto unorthodox priest engag in gapa worship. 126 37. namely, dikṣā. AGAMA PRAMANYAM 38. namely, the four Vedas, six Vedangas, the Puranas, Mimans5, Nyaya and Dharmasastra, 39. BrS. 2.2.42. 40. A Naiyayika. Traditionally, Nyaya does not accept the Mimans view that the Vedas have not originated from a person. 41. The argument is thus: The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language; language is invariably found to originate from persons. The Naiyayika compares the Mimasaka’s view in the terms of this argument with the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke. 42. avatara “descent, emergence.” The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the incans-end relation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority. 43. This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (phala) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation. 44. cf. Udayana, Kusumanjali4.1. 45. Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma). 46. This is the Mimänsä view which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being whose body is itself the product of dharms and adharma and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them. The Mimamsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction, but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about. NOTES 127 The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally. No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation fromact to act, by either beginning or ending the universe. On this cf. Prakarapapafcika, p. 137 ff. for the Prabhakara view, and Slokavirttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihara 47-116 for the Bhitta view. 47. lit. “that which is unprecedented, not known before, sc. by other means of knowledge;” in Mimänsä it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result. 48. The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized; thus the act’s power-apurva-cannot be known before- hand as the instrument of effectuation. By the Naiyayika’s definition only one who knows what instru- ments are effective in production can actually produce. 49. unidentified. 50. mantra and arthavada: the terms indicate that the Naiyayika continues to address the Mimimsaka, for these of course are Mimämsä terms, mantra being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, arthavada the descriptive, non- in junctive passages of Brahmana and later Vedic texts. 51. RV. 10. 90. 14. 52. Yamuna concurs in the Mimämsaka’s refutation of the Naiyayika’s views, to the extent that he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he will counter the Mimämsä assertion that God cannot be proved at all, that in fact there is neither room nor pur- pose for a God in the universe. For Yamuna, God has all the characteristics He has for the Naiyayika, but he proves them from Scripture, not reason. 53. That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of apurva facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertain- ing to dharma. 128 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 51. the individual soul. 55. supra note. 56. Since the aparca power is suprasensible, it can never be perceived, and the assumption of a God who ‘supervises’ and controls this power because he perceives it is absurd. 57. read na labhyate ‘oirodha’ pi; the meaning is this: when a certain fact (the eternality of pots) cannot be proved by a ground (recollection) because this ground contains a contradiction (it is recollected that pots having existed cease to exist), this does not prove that the same ground (recollection) cannot prove the eternality of earth, mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain). 58. adhikaranasiddhanta is a conclusion which, as soon as one thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator), establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience). On this question, ef. Tarkabhäşă 43. 59. It is the contention of Mimämsă that words and their capacity of conveying meaning are eternal. 60. Sequence, of course, supposes priority and posteriority of the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal. 61. kramäväntarajati; the difference resides in the createdness of the Pancarătra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, which introduces a difference of degree between the word sequences of both corpora of verbal statements. 62. This is Yamuna’s objection, which states the extent to which he concurs in the preceding Mimämsä argument against Nyaya. 63. This starts the discussion of the Prabhakara theory on the limitations of the validity of verbal statements. First general Mimämsä views on the subject are discussed. 64. The validity of labda lies in its communicating contents that cannot be known through other means of knowledge. What I translate as ‘facts’ are more literally “establishedNOTES 129 entities,” established, that is, by other means of knowledge than labda. A scriptural statement of the kind “grass is green” is not strictly valid in the sense that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a scriptural statement to that effect. Another proving factor, e.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn up conceivably and thus make the scriptural statement superfluous; or we may find that grass is not invariably green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the scriptural statement. Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture’s being a means of knowledge, is to the Prabhakara Mimamsaka, its being the sole means of knowing a parti- cular thing. To the Prabhakara this validity is ideal in the case of in junctions concerning actions which, supra- sensibly, lead to a certain desired end. 65. The injunction concerning the odana oblation includes an injunction concerning the preparation of the odana and the fetchingof firewood for the cooking. Since experience shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this karya is not strictly known on scriptural authority. 66. This objection ignores the priorities among pramāpas, or means of knowledge; for the Prabhakara, Perception, etc. are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of perceptible, etc. contents. Generally Perception is prior to Inference. To Yamuna, therefore, no priority of Perception to Scripture is given, which is expected since in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God’s) Perception, as in the case of Pañcaratra. *67. This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both the Naiyayika’s and Mimamsaka’s views: the defects consequent upon the Nyaya proofs of God are avoided on the basis of scriptural examination, since Scripture can indeed validly pronounce on God. 68. The Prabhakaras, who are notorious for the gaurava ‘complicatedness’ of their argumentations. 130 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 69. “Denotation, denoting power, denotativeness” in the following Prabhakara discussions have to be understood as the power of verbal statements to provide unprece- dented and non-superfluous knowledge concerning their contents. In the Prabhakara view, a verbal statement by itself is denotative only in injunctive forms, while substantive statements have denotation either through contextual connection with injunctive statements, or (but this is not strictly “true” denotation) through repet- ition of otherwise knowable facts. This view, which has obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the first place, is thereupon extended to ordinary language as well, and is thus expressed in the following theory about learning language which is here understood. A child learns what certain sentences ‘mean’ by observing the action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences. When he knows no language meaning (yutpatti), he may acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another to “get the cow,” and subsequently observing that the other is getting the cow: by associating the two events he knows that an order to get the cow was the content of the first adult’s statement “get the cow.” A remark without consequent action (e.g., “It is hot today,”) can- not convey any such knowledge to one who does not know language. The process of the child knowing the sentence meaning is here described as arthapatti “reasoning by circumstantial implication;” since there is no other ground for the second man’s getting the cow, it must have been the first man’s statement, 70. Thus Salikanatha, Prakaraṇapañcika, p. 182: niyo yaḥ sarvakarye yalt svakiyatvena budhyate. 71. That is to say that the denotativeness of the words composing the statement is dependent upon the injunctive denotation of the statement as a whole. 72. The linädi verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries like “should, must, to be to, ought to.” NOTES 131 73. For example, a sentence: “He desires to go to heaven,” which has the verb in the indicative, followed by a state- ment “he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice,” where the verb is injunctive, is truly denotative in spite of its indicative form, since it is obviously subordinated to the injunctive sentence, to which it describes the performer’s qualification: only one who desires to go to heaven has title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma sacrifice. 74. This is an example like “it is hot today;” the young father’s happy countenance is not considered an action. 75. E.g., the sentence “he who desires to go to heaven offers the soma sacrifice,” is an injunctive statement in indicat- ive form. 76. This is the Prabhakara view of the denotativeness of single words, summarized in the formula anditäbhidhāna, which is short for käryänvitäbhidhana “denotation of words syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence,” 77. This point will be taken up and confirmed infra § 64. 78. E.g., a statement “there are fruits on the river bank” does not by itself, self-sufficiently, create in the hearer the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank; the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the hearer must infer that the speaker knows what he is talking about, that he knows that fruit means ‘fruit’, river bank ‘river bank,’ etc. 79. This is again the Prabhakara view. The Bhatta view is somewhat different; according to the latter the upanisads are artharadas (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory of elements of injunctions) to the eternality of the performer’s personality (diman), which eternality is pre- supposed by the efficacy of the injunction: e.g., the injunction “he who desires heaven must offer with the soma sacrifice” supposes the immortality of the performer. 17 132 80. Ch Up. 1.5.1. AGAMA PRAMANYAM 81. In this the Prabhakara concurs with the Bhatta. Injunc- tions without time of fruition specified are not guaranteed to bring about the desired effect during the present lifetime of the performer. 82. I read ata avarthavādānām. 83. On this point see KMS 1.2.1. with Sabara’s bhāṣya. 84. On the Bhatta view of omniscience, cf. Kumārila, Samb. 47-59; 114-116. 85. i.e, the appropriateness or propriety of a word in collocation with other words; in the sentence “his mother is barren,” “barren’ is obviously inappropriate. 86. The identification is considered an arthavada, i.c., lauda. tory of the sacrificial pole 87. The relation between God and the texts has to be proved. I read jadi ca for api ca. 88. unidentified. 89. RV. 10.90 14 90. 91. Mahānär Up 11.12. 92. Kath Up. 3.9. 93. Svet Up. 6.9. 94. Visnu Pur. 1.1.31. 95. Not in Manusmrti; reference perhaps to Manu 1.9-10? 96. I read tatha pi. 97. Mund Up. 1.1.9. 98. Svet Up. 6.7. 99. unidentified. 100. supra § 12. 101. supra §11. 102. Kumзrila, Slokavärttika 2.114. 103. BA Up. 4.5.14. 5 . NOTES 133 101 Ch Up. 6.11.3. 105. ChUp.6.2.1. 106. Ch Up. 6.2.3. 107. Taitt Up. 3.1.1. The whole sentence includes tena jivanti, on which the present exegesis of bhuta is based. 108. Bh G. 18.61. 109. namely, that they are born (jätäni) and die (prayanti). 110. Svet Up. 4.5. 111. Bh G. 13.19. 112. Kath Up. 2.18. 113. Kath Up. 2.17. 114. sc. of knowledge. 115. here used as synonymous with Pasupata. 116. I read rityā. 117. pratijñārthah, the object or content of the pratijñā, which is the first step of the five-membered syllogism, e.g., “the mountain has fire” (parvatasya grimattvam). It does not therefore coincide with the Subject. In the proposition both S and P must be siddha, established as existing somewhere; a non-thing like a harc’s horn can be neither S nor P. 118. this “non-apprehension of what should be there (yogānu pa- lambha) is the criterion by which we know the absence of a thing. Here it is the absence of truth in Pancaratra that needs be proved by yoganupalambha, if the objector’s contention that Pancaratra is invalid-through-reversion be correct. 119. I have difficulty in understanding the argument unless I assume an illogicality. By stating as his ground “since in agama we have its meaning exactly conveyed as it is” the objector not only agrees with the preceding argu- mentation that on inferential grounds Pañcaratra is not 134 120. AGAMA PRAMANYAM invalid, but even goes so far as accepting that it is valid in other words, confuse non-invalidity with validity. Then, because of this validity (svarthasya tathatväva- bodhanat), there arises a conflict with a deviating state- ment of the Veda which has its own validity; since only one can be true, it follows that when Paficarãtra is true by inference, it is untrue by Veda. But I don’t see how the objector can reasonably infer the validity of Pañca- rätra, since its meaning or content is admittedly suprasensible. Yamuna himself has not argued that Inference proves the validity, but that Inference cannot disprove the correctness of the thesis. a hetvantaram constitutes on the part of the debator a con- fession of importance since the ground which he gave does not hold and he has to produce a different ground. By the rules of debate this means a defeat.- 121. infra §§ 76 f. 122. The founder of the school of logic. 123. The Vedic injunction na hinsyal sarvabhutani “one should not injure any being” raises the question of the validity of injunctions which do require injury to beings. But this is a secondary question which does not affect the validity of the Veda as a whole. Similarly, the thesis “Pañcaratra is valid” is not disproved by the possible mention in the valid Veda of something that conflicts with something in Pañcaratra. So far the argument is not for validity but against invalidity. 124. Since pots are knowable, the ground would also apply to prove the eternality of pots and all things that are knowable. 125. Since only earth (as an element) possesses smell, this ground has no general applicability. 126. Like the ground “because it is knowable” which applies to things regardless of whether they are eternal or not. NOTES 135 127. Obviously, if the ground were not known, it could not be stated. 128. This objection seems to speak to the summary denial that the ground is unestablished through reversion. 129. Be it repeated that the validity, authoritativeness, etc. of Verbal Statements (i.e, fabdabramanya) is founded on the basic assumption that statements truly and accurately communicate their things-meant (arthe), that a word accurately conveys its meaning. Among these things- meant Yamuna includes facts as well as kārgas, hence the following debate with the Prabhakara. · 130. supra § 37. 131. Yamuna here takes up the Prabhakara’s theory that a child learns the meaning of language through the action his elders take on hearing a statement, so that the denotativeness of language is defined by its injunctive- ness. He uses the Prabhakara’s example of the factual statement: “A child is born to you.” A child who does not know language has no way of understanding the meaning of this statement because the young father’s happiness conveys nothing specific But, asks Yamuna, suppose the same child has witnessed his father reception of the cheering news and the subsequent preparations for a birth ceremony. Since one follows immediately upon the other, the child associates one with the other and can thus understand the meaning of the statement, though the statement itself was no injunction, but a communication of an established fact, 132. Then, one may suppose, the child would not so readily associate the birth ceremony with the previous com- mueniation. 133. supra §36. 134. The things-meant or denoted by the word. 135. Yamuna’s argument is that the injunctive, etc. termina- tions of the verb denote the injunction as their thing- meant (padartha); but what makes this injunction 136 AGAMA PRAMANYAM ‘meaningful’ is not that it is an injunction, but that it is connected with someone who is qualified to accept the injunction, e.g., in the injunction svargakamo yajeta. The injunctive ya jata has no meaning or purpose unless there is a “desire for heaven;” the meaning of the injunction thus is connected with the consequence of this desire of heaven, namely, that somebody who has this desire is prepared to do something about it. 136. ardhajarati is a half-old woman; the ardhajaraliyanyaya is used to indicate that the opponent wants to have it both ways and that consequently his argument, like a half-old and half-young woman, is useless either way. 137. Misra’s text here has yady api pravṛtly anu papattisamadha- gamaniyaiva sabdaśaktis “the denoting power of language is to be known only through the impossibility of operation,” “which makes no sense. The reading must be corrupt, in anu papatti we may find a corruption of uyulpatti, in pracṛtti perhaps a corruption of käryärthe or käryärtha-. I read conjecturally käryär the vyutpatti- samadhigamaniyaiva, which gives the required sense. 138. This holds for those statements which are not verifiable by other means of knowledge, for if they are verifiable, they are no incans of knowledge in their own right. 139. read na hi kriyakarye vyut pannak sthāyi karyam. 140. sthayi; the Prabhakara view is that the karya has a lasting efficacy beyond the inevitably transient action it involves; for the karya must remain in order to effect the fruit of the action at any time after the completion of the action. Yamuna objects that we cannot have two altogether different denoting powers in langauge, one to convey a transitory thing, another to convey a non-transitory thing. The only possible explanation is that of laktand “figurative usage,” which remains related to the mukhjä rtti “principal usage.” But he will deny the entire 141. construction (67). NOTES 137 142. This is the Prabhakara view, which holds that in the injunction niyoga stargakāmo yajeta the sadhya (object to be realized) is not starga, but the entire niyoga (cf. Prakarapapañcika, p. 190), so that the statement of the injunction would become the means (sadhana) to realize that sadhya, sc. the injunction. 143. Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā p. 182. 144. Nothing can become a fact (siddha) as long as it is still to be made a fact (sadhya) by a ‘factualizing’ means (sadhana); thus as long as it is related with such a means it cannot be a fact. 145. This is the principle of karakyata: a statement can contain only one in junction, otherwise there is vakyabheda: what should be one sentence is split up into two. 146. Quotations not identified; but for the argument, see Prakarapapañcikā, p 183 f 147. No specific fruits are attached to nitya rites. 148. māhātmya, which corresponds to pradhanya, prad hânatā 149. BA Up. 5.6.1. 150. Not to be found in the major Upanisads. 151. supra §35. 152, supra §42. 153. read ity asal for iliyat. 154. Svet Up. 3.19. 155. Svet Up. 6.8. 156. cf supra note. 157. supra note 86. 158. supra §36. 159. This must refer to the śruti sa yo ha voi tat param veda • brahma veda brahma bhavati (quoted Ramanuja, Vedartha- sarngraha, 91), which I have been unable to locate. 160. Taitt Up. 2.1.1. brahmavid äpnoti param. 138 AGAMA PRAMANYAM 161. This must refer to Taitt Up. 2.1.1 so’fnute sarvān kāmān saka brahmana vipascita, but sa samagaḥ is obscure, unless one may regard it as a corruption of vipafcită. 162. Partial quotations from Taitt Up. 2.1.1, Mund Up. and an unidentified source. 162a. Nrsimhapurvatapani Up. 2.4 (which reads purastad for parastad) and Svet Up. 3.9. 163. not identified. 164. not identified. 165. Could this refer to Varaha Purana? Cf. infra. 166. Vişņu Pur., 1.1.31. 167. Not in Manusmrti. 168. A little known Vedic branch (if it was a Vedic tradition), from which certain Vaisnava sects derive their authority; cf. infra §138. 169. These quotations could not be identified. 170. BA Up 4.1.5. 171. Visnu Pur. 6.4.40. 172. cf. Varaha Pur., 72.4, which reads padyate in b. 173. cf. Varaha Pur. 7026 na tasmat parato devo bhavita na bhavisyati. It is clear from several quotations from this Purana that Yamuna’s text had different readings, not all of them better. 174. Matsya Pur. 290.15. 175. The Linga, Vayu and Bhavisyat quotations could not be verified. 176. Title of one of Yamuna’s treatises. 177. read sa hi sahajasampedanasäkṣātkṛtadikṣārādhonadid harmoḥ. 178. External signs worn by Saiva sectarians. 179. Svet Up. 3.8. 180. “The Doctrine of the Five Chapters.” 181. The highest material evolute; the sloka is out of order,NOTES 139 182. The text reads gudhacaramukhasmasānebhasitāvasanaḥ parchi, which is a corruption; I read, wholly conjecturally gudhacabhasmasnanata yanadikriyāparak. 183. The text reads yogo dharanam uejate hydi dhiyam omköra- puream tatha, and seems out of order. The sense is clear however. 184. corresponds to Varaha Purana, 70.36 foam ca rudra mahā- baho mohatasträni kärayal al payasam dariayitoa mahajätu mahetoarah. 185. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.41, which in cd reads nayasiddhanta sam jñābhir ma ya fästram tu darfitam. 186. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.38, which reads in cd fastresvabhirato loko bahuljena bhaved ataḥ. 187. nearest is Varaha Pur., 70.42, tada pasupalam sastram jāyale vedasanjñitam. 188. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.21, yad vedabāhyam karma sacchastram udditja senzate I tad raudram iti cikhyalam tan nestam gaditam nṛṇām. 189. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.40, mam vimor oyatiriktam ye brahmanias ca doijottama bhajante papakarmanas te yanti narakam narāḥ. 190. not identified. 191. read yesam for eşam. 192. not identified. 193. supra §52. 194. Taitt Up. 2.8.1. 195. supra 12. 196. Aitareya Br. 197. Manusmrti, 4.124. 199. Mahabharata 1.265 f. 199. supra §17 200. supra §17 201. ägnavaispava, name of a sacrificial cake offered at the dikşaniyeşti, 18 140 202. supra § 17. AGAMA PRAMANYAK 203. The author of the Brahmasutras is identified with Vyasa. Dvaipayana, composer of the Mahabharata 204. Mahabharata, 12 340 (129.76) ff. 205. Mahabharata, 6.66 (3012). 206. Mahabharata not identified. 207. Mahabharata not identified. 208. BrS, 2.2.42. 209. ‘Divisions’ of the Supreme God as Vasudeva, Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. 210. tanmatras here in the sense of the “higher evolutes.” 211. toyena jivan visasarja bhimyam, MahānārUp., 1.4. 212. BrS. 2.3.16 (17). Translation: “A word descriptive of moving or unmoving beings, has not a secondary meaning [in referring to Brahman], because such a being’s existence depends on Brahman’s existence.” 213. BrS., 2.3.17 (18). Translation: “The atman is not born because there is no śruti to that effect, and because of its eternality, which is proved by the śrutis.” 214. BrS., 2.2.43. 215. Mund Up., 2.1.3. 216, BrS., 2.2.44. 217. BrS., 2.2.45. 218. In BrS., 2.2. 219. asamañjasya, taken from BrS., 2.2.37. 220. supra §§96, 97. 221. i.e., as a tat puruşa compound “the beginning (source) of (valid) knowledge:” aijäänddibhave since He (God) is a source of valid knowledge.” 222. cf. supra § 18. 223. Karmani lyut Papini. 224. not identified. NOTES 141 11 225, in order to understand any statement, one must first know the meaning of the words that compose it; this may be called dependence, so that to this extent any statement is dependent for its informativeness on other and prior knowledge; but this must also apply to Vedic statements. 226. If the cause (here: God) is above suspicion, the statement will be accurate. 227. gunataḥ pramanyasya yuktatcüd anabhyu pagamãe; my under. standing is that a statement has its validity by itself, and no secondary validity in the sense that its content must first be validated by some other means. The validity itself must be proved (namely by the character of the personal author or by its preterpersonal origin), but once proved, the statement itself is valid. 228. Vaisnava rite observed five times a day: pancakālikā. 229. Ślokavärttika, 2.6 7 ab. 230. ib. 2. 67 cd. 231. not identified. them. 232. this speaks to 108, that the independent cognition cancels the dependent cognition, if there is conflict between Yamuna makes the point that this is not invariably true; that neither dependence nor independ- ence is a cause of invalidation, sapeksanira peksatve is a dual and requires the correction of karanam into karane, if my understanding of the text is correct, 233. namely, because it requires another cognition in order to be denied. 234. namely, in the example of the burning lamp: is it the same flame that burns at six o’clock and at seven o’clock? We don’t see the flame change or be succeeded by another flame. Only inference shows that since there is a differ- ent amount of oil in the lamp at different times, it is different oil that is burning as a flame, so that the flame is really different. The sense perception is of the varying amounts of oil. 142 235. The Naiyāyikas. AGAMA PRAMANYAM 236. Since Brahma is the creator of the world, he can know whether there were Vedas or not before creation; by taking away Brahma’s memory, God in His omnipotence could start the myth of the preterpersonal origin of the Veda.. 237. not identified. 238. not identified. 239. Sabarabhāṣya and KMS. 240. supra §17: vedabahyagrhitatrat. I have rendered grhite by ‘accepted’ to cover approximately the variety of meanings that Yamuna detects in the word. 241. Manusmrti, 8.107. 242. People who do prohibited acts follow Vedic expiations; but if acceptance by people who commit forbidden acts is sufficient to deny the validity of what they accept, this means that the validity of the Veda would be denied. 243. Manusmrti. 244. supra § 17: this Buddhist injunction is outside the Veda in one sense. 245. For the observance of a prohibition is as much a ritual action as the observance of an injunction. 246. supra §14. 247. supra § 16. 248 supra § 59. 249. Quotations not identified; the groups enumerated are sudras, and yet by Vedic injunction have to observe, i.e., to accept, the few Vedic injunctions addressed to them Do they by their acceptance invaficfate these injunctions? 250. not identified. 251. read desakitasamsthanaditi. 252. not identified. 253. supra § 15. NOTES 143 254. i.e., is the same name used for several groups or only one? 255. The argument is: if S is P, then P is not therefore S. The example is ‘parvato ‘gnimin dhumavattvät’ if we interchange S and P, we get parvato dhumavän agni- mattvåt, but this is not true, for though there is no fireless smoke, there is smokeless fire. Similarly here: the fifth may be a satvata or a vaisya vratya, but being the fifth does not make the sitvata a vaisya vratya. 256. In the Manu quotation supra § 15. 257. explained below, § 130. 258. Hari has apparently a meaning ’lion.’ Or did Yamuna think of Nrsimha? 259. gauḥ can mean ‘cow’ and ‘word,’ 260. supra §15. 261. taddhita suffix, cf. Panini. 262. ‘conventionally’ the two words are synonymous, ’etymo- logically’ they have different meanings. 263. Papini. 264. quoted supra. 265. supra note. 266. supra § 15. 267. not identified. 268. For the word means etymologically “maker of chariots, carts.” 269. not identified. 270. By refusing to accept a rudhi meaning the authority of the Vedic statements concerning all the features of the sacrifice made by the now disqualified chariot-maker would be lost, and the authority of the statement that caste names may designate more than one caste would also be lost. 271. cf. Amarakosa, 10.4. 272. not verified. 144 AOAMA PRAMANYAM 273. which is the prerogative only of the three varņas. 274. KMS. 275. supra § 15. 276. not identified. 277. not identified. 278. supra § 16. 279. cf. Manu, 11.40. 280. AitBr., 3.46. 281. not identified. 282. supra § 16. 283. This and the following quotations could 284. 285. identified. supra § 16. not be a Brahman erudite in the Veda and following its observances. 286. If he does not believe that God is present in the effigie, the offerings are obviously not used and cannot be characterized as left-overs. The priest’s avoidance of them would simply amount to sinful waste. 287. He must make his prohibition specific, in order not to prohibit the priest from using food that is otherwise wasted. But he cannot determine the specification on his own terms. 288. used flowers and used food offerings. 289. without divine utilisation. 290. The pañcagavya is a substance in which the 5 products of the cow are mingled. 291. one näḍikā is a half muhurta. 292. cake used at Vedic offerings. 293. namely, in the above statement on the 10 nädikas. 294. Viśvaksena, to whom puja is performed after the main pūjā. 295. as quoted supra § 16. NOTES 296. Mahibhirata quotations not verifiable. 145 297. The ritual taking of food is considered a performance of the praṇignihotra. 298. The hotar is the principal reciting priest at the soma sacrifice, the adhvaryu the main executive 299. supra §17. 300. namely, at the upanayana ceremony. 301. aindrägneya, name of a srauta ritual. 302. Name of a work of Yamuna, 303. Predecessor of Yamuna at Sriranga. 30+. Näthamuni compiled the sayings of the Vaisnava saints, the Alvärs. Printed at Prabba Printing House, Bangalore-4 211: श्रीभगवद्रामानुजपरमाचार्य श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनिविरचितं सिद्धित्रयम् अभिनव देशिक वात्स्य वीरराघवाचार्य- विरचित गूढप्रकाशाख्य टप्पणसहितम् SRI YAMUNACHARYA’S SIDDHI TRAYA with a Sanskrit Commentary (Goodha Prakasa) By SRI U. Ve. ABHINAVA DESIKA Uttamur T. VIRARAGHAVACHARYA AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION IN ENGLISH By R. RAMANUJACHARI Formerly Professor and Dean Faculty of Philosophy and Education, Annamalai University AND TRANSLATION IN ENGLISH By R. RAMANUJACHARI & Mimamsa Kesari K. SRINIVASACHARYA Formerly, Lecturer, Annamalai University. Published with the Financial Assistance from The Ministry of Education and Social Welfare Government of India, Delhi By UBHAYA VEDANTA GRANTHAMALA BOOK TRUST PRICE] 25, NATHAMUNI STREET, MADRAS-17 1972 [Rs. 12-50 Analytical Outline of the Three Siddhis ATMA-SIDDHI Mangala sloka Conflicting views concerning the finite self Conflicting views regarding the pramaņas by which the finite self is established Conflicting views regarding the Supreme Self Diversity of views regarding the manifestations of the Supreme Self Conflicting views concerning how the Supreme Self is known Varying views regarding the nature of moksa Conflicting views regarding the means to mokṣa The special features of this treatise Determination of the nature of the individual self The purvapaksa or prima facie view that body is the soul on the evidence of perception. The case for the identity of soul and body The purvapakṣin’s criticism of the position that the body is not the self The attempt to show that the body could at once be the subject, and the object of knowledge Summing up of dehātma vāda position with reasons. The refutation of the doctrine of the identity of body and soul Ahampratyaya (the cognition “I” or self-consciousness) does not involve knowledge of bodily organs; hence the self is distinct from the body Even cognitions like ‘I am stout’ establish a self distinct from the body Identity of body with soul illusory Yogic perception vouches for the separateness of soul and body Arguments in support of the view that body and soul are Page 12 4 5 6 :78 9 10 11

121 13 distinct entities , The Sankhya arguments against the claim that perception establishes identity of body and soul Refutation of the Carvaka criticism of arguments that the body and soul are different 14 15 IV The illustration that intoxicating quality arises from the mixture of non-intoxicants not apposite Example of redness produced by chewing not apposite The illustration of parti-coloured cloth unhelpful to the Cārvāka Being distinct from the other qualities of the body, consciousness is not an attribute of the body Additional reasons in support of the view that the body is not Argument based on negative concomitance indefensible The view that the senses are the soul 99 16 the soul 17 The refutation of this view The doctrine that manas is the soul 18 19 The refutation of this doctrine Refutation of the Naiyayika proof for the existence of manas Refutation of the argument that manas is the non-inherent cause of pleasure, pain and the like Untenability of the view that atma guņas such as pleasure arise only in conjunction with some substance other than itself and that it is manas Even if conjunction with such a substance were necessary it does not follow that it must be with manas Manas is no other than buddhi Manas is not the soul The theory that prana is the soul Refutation of this theory The theory that consciousness is the soul The Bhatta view that consciousness is insentient 20 20 21 222 24 25 26 There is no such thing as jnatata: hence consciousness is self-luminous 27 Additional arguments to show that consciousness is self-luminous The contention that consciousness is itself the soul as there is economy of thought The contention that the cognition ‘I know’ will not prove the existence of a soul distinct from knowledge The contention that like the knower. the known also is unreal The refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine that consciousness 28 99 29 is the soul 30V Impossibility of explaining recognition even on the admission that the self is a stream of consciousness To obviate this difficulty the veiled Buddhist contends that consciousness is unborn, changeless and devoid of distinctions Refutation of the Advaitic view This is opposed to experience It cannot be maintained that consciousness does not grasp its own prior non-existence 30 31 33 34 The contention that there are no pramāņas to establish antecedent non-existence is refuted 35 Consciousnees is not eternal 36 The contention that consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness is disproved The contention that if consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness it would cease to be consciousness is met 37 The assertion that if consciousness is without an origin it could have no changes is refuted 39 The contention that if consciousness is unborn it cannot have differentiation is refuted The contention that consciousness is quality-less stands self-refuted Even on the view of the veiled Buddhists recognition would be inexplicable 40 42. Refutation of the view that jnatrtva is the result of super-imposition 43 The contention that jnātṛtva resides in ahamkara 44 This is opposed to every-day experience Indefensibility of the position that pratyaktva belongs to ahamkara 45 The untenablility of the view that akamkāra appears as knower either on account of reflection or contact with consciousness The contention that ahamkara appears as knower because it manifests consciousness as residing in itself 46 The refutation of the preceding view None of the three alternative ways in which ahamkara could be said to manifest consciousness is tenable 47 None of these possible modes of the third alternative is tenable VI It cannot be maintained that the manifesting entity should manifest the object as residing within itself. Refutation of the contention of Suresvara that in deep sleep there is no consciousness of ‘I’ 50 Analysis of your statement establishes just the opposite of what you intend to prove 51 The reflection “I was not even aware of my self” does not mean the absence of .1’ but something else. The statement in question undoubtedly points to the existence of the “I” and its manifestation 52 The “I” (ahamartha) persists in the state of release On the strength of the sacred text relating to liberation and endeavour of souls for securing mokşa the existence of “I” (ahamartha) is proved Refutation of the view that the I is an objective element 53 (i. e. it is jaḍa) 54 Even in the state of release the self shines to itself as ‘I’ The consciousness of “I” is natural and not due to occasional factors 55 Ahamkara which refers to the body and which is a product of matter is the result of delusion and has to be dispelled It is only where the self appears as “I”-I am deva`–‘I am man the possibility of ajnana arises 56 The unsoundness of the argument that consciousness itself is the soul as it is insentient 57 The argument that on account of the invariable concomitance of the knowledge of ‘1’ and consciousness they are identical is unsound 58 Even the contention that since one and the same consciousness presents the invariable concomitance of known, knower and knowledge they are identical is refuted. The contention that knower and known are one on the ground of invariable concomitance even as different flames are considered one on account of similarity The example of different terms appearing as identical is not helpful Refutation of the contention that there is no object that does not manifest itself. 60 1589 61 62 64 VII Scriptural support for the existence of a soul distinct from consciousness The Pramana by which the existence of the jiva is established (a) The Nyaya view After proving in general terms that consciousness being a guna must have a substrate it is shown by a process of elimination that it must be a spec:fic entity namely, ātmā Refutation of the Nyaya view 8886 64 66 Argument from pure negative concomitance fares no better 68 (b) The Sankhya view The Sankhya mode of proof stands discredited for the same reasons Refutation of the Sankhya arguments 69 The impossibility of a conscious and changeless entity being the victim of illusions The refutation of the argument that the vṛttis of the antaḥkarana are superposed on the puruşa The existence of the soul established by sruti and śrutyarthāpatti (c) The Mimāmsā view LEE 28 71 72 74 75 76 Refutation of this view The Bhaṭṭa view Refutation of the view 77 Untenability of the suggestion that jnana is the objects of mental perception Enquiry into the nature of sukha, duhkha etc 78 The Bhatta view again 80 The Prabhakara reply thereto 81 The Bhatta rejoinder 82 The Prabhakara position clarified while refuting the Bhatta view The Prabhakara view that in deep sleep and moksa there is no 83 self-consciousness Refutation of the prabhakara view and proof that the soul is self-luminous 86 The Prabhakara centention that jnana is not self-luminous Even if prana is self-luminous, the soul does not depend on prana for its apprehension 88 The soul is self-luminous The proof that the soul has consciousness as its eternal and. essential nature 89 2 VIII The purvapaksa that consciousness is noneternal and that there are no grounds to prove that it is eternal The opponent calling in question the siddhantin’s position Refutation of the view that the atma (dharmin) and consciousness (dharma) are one Refutation of the view that consciousness is all-pervasive Untenability of the view that the soul has a twofold knowledge (i) eternal and (ii) non-eternal The illustration of the remembrance that there was no elephant at the tank-bund in the morning cited to prove the existence of consciousness in deep sleep is unhelpful Nor is the remembrance on waking, ‘I slept well’ helpful in 988 89 190 91 92 93 39 proving that there is self-awareness in deep sleep 95 The contention that the self depends on jnana for its manifestation and that jnāņa is non-eternal 96 The proof that dharmabhuta-jnana is eternal Though jnana is eternal it has atma for its support 97 Refutation of the view that the conjunction of consciousness with object is prāņa In respect of the self the analogy of the relation of cause and effect does not hold 98 The contention that since dharmabhūta jnana is dependent on occasional factors it cannot be eternal 99 The reply to the foregoing Refutation of the view that as cognitions are limited by time they are non-eternal 101 Activities of consciousness altoether of a different nature from activities such as locomotion and cooking 102 The illustration of the body not apposite In deep sleep there are no activities of consciousness (dharma bhūta jnāna) The experiences of the soul in deep sleep need not all be remembered Refutation of the contention that if dharma-bhūta-jnana is eternal, it would do away with the distinction between bound and released souls 104 99 106 IX Refutation of the view that nidra is a mode of action accounting for the experience of pleasure or pain on waking The conclusion that nidra is no vrtti will not contradict the yoga sutra Granting nidra is a vṛtti, from that reason itself it follows that consciousness is an essential nature of the self The self-luminous soul-the substrate of praṇa-is eternal The soul being the substrate of prana is svayamprakāša Determination of the significance of the term prakasa and of the nature of its relation to the soul 106 007 107 103 109 19 The contention that the self is the object of knowledge and not svayamprakāšā 110 The contention that atma is the seat of prakasa inferred from prākaṭya 111 Refutation of that view Nyaya refutation of the Prabhakara and Bhaṭṭa views and the contention that relation of jnana and its visaya is through sense contact 113 The Nyaya argument that with the disappearance of jnana, prākatya disappears is untenable because with the disappearance of the efficient cause, the effect need not disappear 114 That the disappearance of the nimitta karana need not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the effect is illustrated with the instance of two-ness and the like Untenability of the argument that numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as objects last Cognition of duality and the like is not constant, since it depends on desire to enumerate Consciousness illumines objects through contact with them Jnana is of limited nature by means of sense contact Fallacious to consider what is devoid of touch unlimited Objects, past and future could come into contact with. consciousness as what existed or what is yet to be 115 116 99 117 X The non-apprehension of intervening space explained 119 The objection that consciousness as a quality cannot leave its substrate and proceed elsewhere answered 120 The prabhakara view of sabda refuted The Prabhakara view that object is manifested without the relation of consciousness 122 The prabhakara view refuted 99 The objections to the concept of adüratva answered Deciding on the nature of the knowledge relation as samyoga The examples of sukha etc adduced by the purvapakṣin not apposite Definition of sarira (body) according to the siddhantin The significance of dhiḥ occurring in the śruti texts cited above References to origination of knowledge, its loss, doubt, certainty and the like explained Though the soul is self-luminous, there is need of scripture to make its nature clearly known Inquiry into the duration of the soul: The soul is eternal Purvapakṣa: The Buddhist view that the soul is momentary 124 125 126 127 128 130 132 The Mimāmsaka view ISWARA SIDDHI Laukikapratyakṣa cannot prove the existence of God Nor could yoga pratyakṣa prove the existence of God Impossible even for the senses that have acquired supernomal powers through drugs, charms, austerities and yogic concentration to establish the existence of God 99 “9 137 The Nyaya arguments for the existence of God Yogic concentration even of the end stage incapable of proving God 138 No pramana other than perception is competent either to prove the existence of God The Mimāmsaka critcism of the Naiyayika view The argument proves what is already proven The Mimāmsaka objection that since the earth, the ocean etc,, 144:0 XI cannot be made, they can not be said to have a cause. Your argument would only establish the reverse of what you seek to prove i.e it would not prove an omniscient Lord but only a finite individual The possibility of the precisely opposite conclusion i.e. that the world is not created The argument that the nimitta karaṇa need not know the upādāna karana and hence one who is not omniscient could be cause 142 143 The Mimāmsaka concludes his argument 144 The Naiyayika reply to the Mimamsaka contention Meeting the charge that there is no vyapti 145 The nature of adhisthāna defined The jiva cannot be the nimittakarana of the world 146 The untenability of the contention that the argument only establishes attributes opposed to omniscience etc. What is needed for creation is controlling activity and 147 not the body 148 Activity can be initiated without the instrument of the body i.e. mere sankalpa suffices No need to entertain any doubt on the ground that in the case in point many of the characteristics differ from those found in the illustrative example Adducing special illustrations to strengthen the conclusion that the divine creator is vastly different from the human agent Other arguments to establish the existence of Isvara SAMVIT SIDDHI Enquiry into the significance of the text 149 13532 155 “Brahman exists, one only without a second” ‘Advitiya’ cannot be taken as a tatpuruşa compound Nor can it be taken as a bahuvrihi compound 156 The significance of the expression Advitiya (the view of the Visiṣṭadvāitin) 157 Other sruti texts in support of the siddhantin’s view Refutation of the view that the world is illusory 158 The untenability of the view that the world is at once sat and asat Inquiry into the significance of the text tat tvam asi 159 161 XII The view that consciousness is the cause of the world is untenable The purvapakṣin trying to justify the above contention with The contention that consciousness is eternal examples 163 164 The contention that consciousness is devoid of attributes Detailed examination of the advaitic position-consciousess is manifold Consciousness cannot be eternal, all-pervasive and unitary Untenability of the contention that there is nothing apart from consciousness The contention that avidya is the cause of the world and that it is difficult to define it as different and non-different What is the significance of the negative particle in avidya ? What does the term vidya occurring in vidya mean? Asrayanupapatti-avidya cannot dwell in jiva Nor is Brahman the substrate of avidya 165 19 166 99 167 168 There is no escape from anyonyasraya dūṣana by stating that vidya is an avastu (unreality) 169 Avidya cannot be avastu (unreal) Is avidya single or manifold; is the bound soul which is its substrate unitary or manifold? 170 Avidya cannot be single The contention that Suka and others attained mukti is not true Refutation of the above contention ‘171 2 The contention that mokşa is an eternally existent state; it has only to be rendered manifest through dhyana etc. The unintelligility of the notion abhivyakti (manifestation) Avidya cannot be an obstacle to Brahma jnāna Refutation of the view that there is only a single soul 172 The untenability of the view that there is a plurality of jivas, each having its own avidya Being endowed with qualities like self-luminosity and unity. consciousness cannot be said to be without a second (advitiya) The untenability of the contention that these are not qualities but refer to the absence of certain features It cannot be contended that the world is distinct from sat 17:3 173 174 176 and asat XIII The refutation of the view that pratyakṣa cannot perceive difference 177 Is the mithyatva of the world real or unreal? Either alternative goes against the advaitic position. 179 In the very act of denying dharmas, the ground on which the denial is made shows Brahman to be endowed with dharma. 180 Refutation of the contention that the invariable concomitance of knowledge and the known establishes their identity. 180SIDDHITRAYAM ATMA SIDDHI

1. May I have the highest bhakti to Sriman’ (the Consort of Sri or Lakṣmi), the Supreme Puruşa who is ever pleased by souls whose sole enjoyment is in rendering service to the Divine, and to whose will Matter (prakṛti), bound souls (purusa), time, manifest material nature, released souls and innumerable eternally perfect souls always conform. (St. 1) There are many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Infinite Self. With a veiw to making the matter clear, a book named Atmasiddhi. (the determination of the real nature of the soul) is written. (St. 2) That the knowledge of the self is the means of attaining trans- cendental felicity is indeed admitted in all systems. Upanisadic texts such as the following, declaring that the knowledge of the finite self and of the Supreme Self is the means of liberation are found:- “On knowing the finite self and the Supreme Controller to be different, and thereby becoming the object of His grace, he attains immortality”. “If one should know the self”; “The knower of the self crosses over sorrow”; 5 “He who knows Brahman attains the Highest” “. Eminent teachers hold many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Highest Person. 1 As the prayer is for highest form of bhakti to Sriman, it is evident that Yamunacharya considers Lord Narayana along with Lakshmi the means of salva- tion, even as He, in conjunction with her, is the supreme goal. 2 Visistadvaitism recognises three classes of jivas - baddha (the bound), mukta (the liberated) and nitya (the ever- perfect). Jainism accepts a similar classification. 3 In the state of Prakrti is the primordial source of the material universe pralaya (dissolution) it is known as avyakta (the unmanifest); in the state of sarga (evolution) it is called vyakta (the manifest). 4 Svet. Up. 1.6. 5 Chand, Up. 6 Tait. Up. 2 Siddhitrayam (Conflicting views concerning the finite self.)
2. With regard to the individual self, some maintain that it is the body itself; others that it is the senses; others, that it is mind (manas); others that it is vital breath (prāna); still others that it is pure consciousness, which is erroneously supposed to possess the quality of being a knower and which does not appear in its real state as the ‘I’ 8; Others that it is different from body, senses, mind, vital-breath and consciousness and that, like ether and the like, it has a non-intelli- gent nature, and that it is the substratum of knowledge, pleasure, pain and other adventitious and special qualities, and that it is the object of selfconsciousness.” Others again say that it is of the nature of pure consciousness itself, which appears to possess inauspicious qualities, such as love, hate, pleasure, pain etc., produced by the limiting condition of the internal organ, even as a crystal that is in itself white appears however, to possess redness and other qualities imparted to it by certain specific limiting conditions (say, an adjacent red flower); and that the luminosity of its being is neither born nor destroyed; and that it is selfluminous.10 Others again hold that it has the nature of knowledge and bliss. Still others that its nature is of that knowledge which, on account of its agreeableness to its possessor, acquires the name of bliss and pleasure. (Conflicting views regarding the pramanas by which the finits self is established)
3. Similarly (with regard to the means of knowledge by which it is established, divergent views have been offered, such as that) it can be known through inference; that (it) can be known only through scripture; that (it) can be known through mental perception12; that (it) is directly known only as the knower in all cognition of objects13; that, as it possesses the nature of knowledge, its luminosity is neither born nor destroyed and that it is self-luminous. Though possessed of this 7 Charvak a doctrine. 8 Advaita Vedanta. 9 10 Nyaya-Vaiseshika. Sankhya

12 Sankhya Mimamsa. 13 Prabhakara school of Mimamsa 3 ترا Atmasiddhi nature (i-e though self-luminous), with the aid respectively of scripture, inference, and yogic perception, it is directly perceived in its true nature as having a character different from everything other than itself, clearly, more clearly, and finally most clearly and immediately. Similarly (with regard to its size, the rival views are that) it is infinitely big; that (it is) atomic in size; that (it is) of the same size as the body; that, though in itself devoid of magnitude, it is limited to the size of the body pervaded by it. Again, concerning the manner of its pervasion, the different theories are that it pervades only by its intelligence and that it pervades by itself. Similarly (with regard to its duration, it has been stated that) it is momentary; that it endures as long as the bodily heat lasts; that it exists till the material world is dissolved; that it lasts till mokşa is attained; and that it is unchanging and eternal. Similarly (with regard to its number), it is maintained that it is one and the same in all bodies11; and that it is different in each body. (Conflicting views regarding the Supreme Self) 4. So also about the Infinite Self, some do not admit at all an Isvara (God) who directly perceives all things and who is all-powerful. Some, while admitting a God, maintain that He is of the essence of pure consciousness, which is unchanging and is devoid of the distinction of knowledge, means of knowledge, knower, and the known, and of the ruler and the ruled and so on. (They hold that) on account of begin- ningless avidya, he is erroneously imagined to possess knowledge of manifoldness, such as akasa, and greatness such as sovereignty.15 Others, while accepting this characterisation (of the Supreme Self as being of the nature of pure consciousness), state that it is subject to limiting conditions, and that, in association with the limiting condition 14 One variety of Ekajivavada holds that there is one jiva residing in each of the many bodies. 15 Advaita-ekajivavada and also nanajivavada where Isvara too is a reflection. cf Pancadasi Ch, X, 4 Siddhitrayam of avidyä, for the reason of its having avidyä for its essence, it is taken to possess manifold distinctions of jivas commencing from Brahma and ending with immovable things and that, in conjunction with māyā, which is under its control and which assumes diverse wonderful changes, it acquires omniscience and other glorious qualities. 16 Similarly, others uphold the view that God possesses universal Lordship which is in- variably and exclusively maintained for Him by the modification of inde- pendent pradhana. This modification has for its cause the fact of pra- dhana possessing the quality of sattva par excellence.” Others assert that, although He is free from limiting conditions, He is yet subject to modification. Others favour the view that although He does not under- go modifiications, yet, on account of being reflected by the reflecting media of the diverse internal organs which are aspects of His own māyā, this intelligent being, who is one only, acquires the forms of Viśva, Tai- jasa and Präjna. 18 Others hold that the Lord is that Supreme Person who has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and the activities of the threefold jivas and non-intelligent objects, and who is the great ocean of all auspicious qualities, such as jnana, bala, aiśvarya, virya, sakti, tejas,19 and others which are natural to Him, invariable and unrivalled in excellence. (Diversity of views regarding the manifestations of the Supreme Self) 5. Similarly, even in regard to His manifestations, some contend that He has the four forms of Vişņu, Siva, Brahma and the Sun-God; others hold that His form is threefold or twofold or single, after eliminating those forms which are unacceptable to them. 16 17 18 Nanajivavada, on the view that Isvara is the prototype, not a reflection. Yoga Advaita where Iswara is the prototyp: 19 ज्ञानमिह सर्वसाक्षात्काररूपम् cf. यो वेत्ति युगपत्सर्वं प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः । बलं नाम श्रमप्रसङ्गरहितं सर्वघारणसामर्थ्यम् । ऐश्वर्य नाम अव्याहतेच्छं सर्वनियन्तृत्वम् । वीर्यम् = सर्वोपादानत्वे सर्वधारण सर्वनियमनेऽपि विकाररहितत्वम् । शक्तिः - स्वेतर सर्वनि हिका सर्वोरादानात्मक’. यद्वा यदन्यैः अशक्यत्वादघटितमिव भाति तद्वटनसामर्थ्यरूपा । तेज. = अस्वा वीन सहकार्य तपेक्षत्वम्; पराभिभवन सामथ्यं तेजः केचित्प्रचक्षत ॥ 3 Atmasiddhi 5 Concerning the individual manifestations (of God) doubts have been raised about their being eternal or non- eternal, elemental or non- elemental, whether they exist for their own sake or for the sake of others; and doubts too have arisen concerning their attendants, place of residence, etc. (Conflicting views concerning how the Supreme Self is known) 6. Similarly, with regard to the means of knowledge some hold that He is known from the Vedas alone;20 others that he is established by inference; others that He is also cognised by extraordinary perception. (Diversity of views regarding the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self) Similarly, in regard to the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self also, some maintain that relations such as that between the ruler and the ruled are based on a knowledge of distinctions, which is caused by beginningless avidya; and that, in truth, there is only one reality.22 Others hold that though there is non-difference, the jiva is other than the Supreme Self. As there is oneness in point of essence and distinction on account of limiting conditions, some posit both difference and non-differene-difference in so far as it (Brahman) is associated with limiting conditions, and non-difference in respect of its essence.23 Even when there is diversity, there is the relation of non-difference (between God and the soul); several views concerning this relation are prevalent-that it is the relation of inherence obtaining between whole and part; that it is the relation between sesa and seși or in other words, that between an independent entity and the dependent creature; that it is the relation between the owner and the owned, exem- plified in master - servant relation. 20 Vedanta 21 Nyaya-Vaiseshika 2223 Advaita Bhaskara 6 Siddhitrayam (Varying views regarding the nature of moksa) 8. Even in regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, mokşa, which consists in the realisation of Brahman, the several views maintained are-that it consists in annihilation of one’s self; that it is the destruction of ignorance,25 that it is the state of aloofness re- sulting from the complete destruction of all the special qualities of the self 26; that it is the state of becoming one with Brahman27; that it is the inflow of God’s qualites; that it consists in attaining similarity with Brahman29; that it is the fullest revelation of its (self’s) intrinsic attri- butes of bliss and the like; that it is everlasting service to the Lord kindled by the heightened manifestation of unsurpassed bliss aris- ing from the experience of His qualities, and so on. (Conflicting views regarding the means to mokṣa) 9. About the means of attaining mokṣa also, some contend that it is attainable by karma-yoga and some that it is realisable by jnana- yoga; some believe that it is attainable by either of these (two) helped by the other30; some assert that it is rendered effective by both31; some hold that to him whose mind is purified by both (karma and jnana), it is realisable by bhakti which is ever-lasting and one-pointed. Noticing the conflicting views of inquirers who have not determined anything conclusively, not knowing the strength and weakness of the proofs of the respective views, and entertaining doubts therefrom, wise men will be unable to secure mokṣa so long as the individual self and the Supreme Self are not understood in respect of their nature, the 235 24 25 26 27 220 2233 28 29 30 31 Buddhism Advaita अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षस्सा च बन्ध उदाहृतः Nyaya-Vaiseika Advaita अत्र यद्यपि कोशेषु साधर्म्य पदमस्ति तथापि तदनुचितमिव; अवश्यवक्तव्यस्य ऐक्यलक्षण मोक्षस्या कथनप्रसङ्गात् ॥ cf Siva-Sankrantivada cf Siva-sama-vada Here one of the two is primary and the other secondary Here both are of equal importance. Jnanakarma-Samuccayavada Atmasiddhi 7 pramaņas by which they are established, their relation (to each other), the attainment (of moksa by the individual self), and also of the means thereto. For this reason, this work is begun to make these things clear. (The special features of this treatise) 10. Having the same end in view, aphorisms (sutras) were composed by the venerable Badarayana; and these aphorisms (Brahma Sutras) have been interpreted by the Bhāṣyakara 31 (Dramiḍacharya) whose exposition is concise and profound; and they have been elaborate- ly explained by the venerable Srivatsanka Misra who set forth an ocean of elegant and incisive and forthright rules of interpretation (nyāyas). Nevertheless, as the understanding of persons has been misled by faith in the various writings, good and bad and partly good and partly bad, of Acarya Ṭanka, Bhartṛprapanca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta, 31a Dr. Van Buitenen in his edition of Vedarthasangraha, p. 24. states’…… Yamuna, at the beginning of his Atmasiddhi gives a list of ancient Vedantins-Strangely enough he does not mention the Vrtthi by which Ramanuja set great store and which must have enjoyed great authority………But he mentions a bhasvakrt who had explained Badarayana’s Sutras ‘briefly and profoundly’……… This bhasyakrt is always identified with Dramida, the Bhasyakara, for which …… ……..there are no arguments, Ramanuja declares that the Prithi was an extensive one, Yamuna that the bhasya was a brief one Vrtthi ‘gloss scholion’ is mainly distinguished from a bhasya ‘commentary’ by its size. a long vrtthi will be very similar to a short bhasya. As Bodhayana’s omission cannot be accounted for in this context-where a sub commentary by a Srivatasankra Misra another ancient Master, is mentioned-I am inclined to think that Yamuna and Ramanuja both referred to the same work by different descriptions.” The logic of this Identity is far from clear No. convincing reason has been advanced by Dr. Buitenen to show that there has been a mixing up of the vrtthi and the bhasya. The absence of any mention of Bodhayana vrtthi in Yamuna’s work poses no problem; it is easily explained on the simple hypothesis that the work was not available to him. This would accord well with the traditional account that Ramanuja undertook an arduons journey to Sarada Math, Kashmir, to consult this rare manuscript said to have been preserved there. 31b In the same edition of Vedarthasangraha, p. 25, Dr. Van Buitenen makes the following strange observation. “Tanka’s name which has the second place in Ramanuja’s list does also appear in a list of Yamuna but here he has the distinction of being mentioned the first of a series of adversaries and is put on a par with Advaitins like Bhartrhari and Sankara and Dvaitadvaitins like Bhartrprapanca and Bhaskara.” Evidently, the expression sita sita (good, bad and partly good and partly 8 Siddhitrayam Sankara, Srivatsanka, sic Bhaskara, and others; and as persons do not know things as they are and even understand them erroneously, the undertaking of this work is but proper for a right knowledge of categories. (Determination of the nature of the individual self) 11. The view to be defended here is that the individual self is dif- ferent from the body, the senses, manas, prana and intellect; (it) does not depend on anything else (for its knowledge); (it) is eternal, subtle distinct in each body, and is in its essential nature, blissful. (St. 3) (The purva paksha or prima facie view that body is the soul on the evidence of perception. The case for the identity of soul and body) 12. On the strength of perception we consider the body itself to be the soul. In the cognition ‘I know’, the atman, who is indeed the knower,’ shines forth as the ‘I’; and the body is the object of the consciousness of ‘I’; as is evident from the cognition ‘I am stout’, ‘I am lean’; in fact, stoutness and the like relate only to the body; hence, as the ‘I’ is put in apposition with ’lean’, ‘stout’, etc., it must necessarily be admitted to have the body for its object. Otherwise, all usage, popular and learned, would be meaningless. It cannot be maintained that here (in statements like ‘I am stout’) the ‘I’ denotes the body by a figure of speech (lakṣaṇa), because there is no other place where it can possibly be said to have a primary significance. Again, it cannot be said that if the consciousness of the ‘I’ as knower has for its object the body which consists of several parts, the bad) occurring in the text has escaped the notice of this eminent orientalist: else he would not have drawn such a conclusion - Yamuna’s list is not made up exclusively of adversaries but it contains a few names of exponents of vedantic thouhgt some of whom have composed works which, in his opinion, are trustworthy guides to a Proper ‘understanding of the nature’ of the Real, others untrustworthy and yet others in part reliable and in part unreliable. Again the very mode of reference to Tanka as ‘Acarya Tanka’ clearly indicates the great esteem in which Yamuna holds this thinker., 31c It is noteworthy that reference is here made to two thinkers with almost identlical names-a Srivatsanka Misra, and a Srivatsanka; of these the former is affiliated to the visistadvaita school and is applauded as having laid down a wealth of elegant, incisive and forth-right rules of inter-pretation; while the latter belongs to a rival school of thought. Atmasiddhi 9 knowledge of the body should be accompanied by a knowledge of its parts, colour, etc. But as such a knowledge of bodily parts and colour does not appear, the cognition ‘I know’ would reveal the presence of something other than the body. Such a necessity (of the knowledge of parts and shapes accompanying the apprehension of an object) is found to exist only in the case of perception arising from the external senses. The capacity of the mind is restricted to the manifestation of the soul’s character of being the seat of internal qualities. In fact, (even in the case of external perception) there is no necessity for the apprehension of number, magnitude, etc., because though its parts are not comprehended, a triad of atoms consisting of many parts and possessing visible magnitude is admitted to be the minimum visible en- tity; and because air is known to be perceived by the sense of touch only as the seat of contact (and not as a whole consisting of parts). Even when something other than the body is taken to be the object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its other qualities; likewise, here too (when the body is the object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its parts and colours). The purvapakṣin’s criticism of the position that the body is not the self:- 13. In each of the infinitesimal atoms consciousness is not met with and if it be accepted (that each super-sensible atom possesses conscious- ness), there will result belief in several thousands of intelligent beings in one and the same body; and as the special quality of the effect can- not but be based on the quality of the cause, and as consciousness does not continue as long as the body lasts, consciousness cannot be a special quality of the body. These and other kinds of arguments based on reasoning are lacking in force, as they teach what is contradicted by direct perception. If it (consciousness) be denied to be a special quality, it will amount to its acceptance as a common quality of the body. Moreover, qualities such as the character of owning activities dependent on desires and of being the seat of the senses and the like, which appear in the body and not in such objects as pots, whose non-intelligent charac- ter is admitted on all hands, reveal that the body itself is the intelligent being. 2 10 Siddhitrayam It is not improper to maintain that just as the red colour, which is absent in the parts of the areca nut and betel leaf severally, emerges in the whole, on account of a particular combination of these, even so intelligence emerges in the body, only on account of a particular combination of infinitesimal atoms which give rise to it. There is no warrant for the objection that in the instance cited, from out of the infinitesimal atoms rendered red by the heat generated in the act of chewing (betel leaf and nut) in the order of binaries, etc., red colour emerges strictly only in conformity with the quality of the cause. Further, although the special quality of variegated colour is not found in white, black and other threads severally, we clear y perceive it in the cloth made out of these. How, then, can we assert that the quality of the effect is depen- dent on that of the cause? Again, it cannot be said that over and above the colours of the constituent parts there is no other colour known as variegated colour in the whole; for, in that case, the whole would become imperceptible. If it be said that the whole becomes visible only on account of the colours of the parts, it would follow that all effects would be deprived of their colours. That would contradict experience as also all usage. As the special quality of hardness existing in ice is not found to be dependent on the quality of the causal substance (water), the argument commits the fallacy of anaikanta. Again, hardness cannot be said to be a particular from of conjunc- tion, because it exists in two objects, while hardness exists in one namely, ice and because people who know the nature of things have ad- mitted hardness to be a form of contact. It may be asked how can the body which is an object of perception be regarded as the knower. The attempt to show that the body could at once be the subject and the object of knowledge:- What is the contradiction involved in this? The incompa- tibility lies precisely here-in regard to one act, it is not possible for one and the same substance to be at once the object and the agent of action. If this were so, even on the other view (that something other than the body is the self), how can the self (the perceived) appear as the ‘I’ (theAtmasiddhi 11 perceiver)? If it be replied that it is due to a difference of aspect, then it is equally applicable to the doctrine that the body is the self. Besides an object (of knowledge, and, for that matter, of any activity) is that which shares the fruit of actions which are found in intimate association with something other than itself; but the body experiences the results of knowledge found intimately associated with itself and hence does not possess the character of being an object. Hence there is no room for the objection (How can the body be both the subject and object?). Summing up of dehatmavada position with reasons:- Therefore, the followers of Bṛhaspati hold that the body itself is the soul. To that effect their sutra runs-intelligence emerges from the elements of earth, water, fire and air just as the intoxicating quality springs from herbs etc., THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE IDENTITY OF BODY AND SOUL 16. The body cannot be the soul, because (the doctrine of the identity of the body with the soul is) contradicated by perception. One and the same substance cannot appear as ’this’ and ‘I’ to an identical person. (St. 4) Just as the inward (objective) knowledge of ‘I’ involved in the conciousness ‘I know’ exhibits its object to be distinct from pots and the like it reveals its object to be distinct from the body which is the object of consciousness ’this’. Just as the cognition ‘This is a pot’ (marks off its object as distinct from the object of the consciousness of ‘I’,) even so the outward knowledge ’this’ having the body for its object, dis- tinguishes its object as different from the object of self-consciousness. Otherwise, there will be no basis for the distinction between ‘myself’ and ‘others’. It cannot be urged that one and the same thing may, from different aspects, appear in this manner (as ‘I’ and ’this’) because Deva- datta wielding a stick does not understand himself as ‘This person poss- esses a stick’ (but only as ‘I wield a stick’). Aham pratyaya (the cognition ‘I’ or self consciousness) does not involve knowledge of bodily organs; hence the self is distinct from the body:- 12 Siddhitrayam Moreover, to to a person who has controlled the activities of his external senses and attained mental concentration and known the self as the ‘I’, the knowledge of organs such as hands, legs and belly does not arise. And if the body which is big and possesses parts were taken to be the object of self-consciousness, a knowledge of the organs must necessarily accompany it. It is impossible for the body which is big and which owns parts to be known when none of its parts is cognised. The instance of the tryanuka (triad of atoms) which was cited as disproving the general proposition (that whenever the whole is perceived its parts also should be perceived) does not really disprove it, for there is no warrant for accepting the existence of infinitesimal atoms over and above the triads which are devoid of parts and which are per. ceivable (in sun’s rays proceeding) through the hole of the window. (Even granting the existence of infinites mal atoms) th’s general propos:- tion is not falsified, because it applies only to perceptible parts. Again, it cannot be contended that this rule obtains only in the case of the complex whole cognised by external organs, as there is no warrant (for the same). Besides, in comprehending a whole composed of parts the internal organ, in itself, does not operate. As for the case of air, it is (known as the seat of touch only, because it has no colour, etc.; besides, even here, as in the case of the pot which is being touched, there is knowledge of such diverse parts; hence, no conflict with the general rule on this score, Even cognitions like ‘I am stout’ establish a self distinct from the body- The contention that from statements such as I am stout’, ‘I am lean’, -the self is found to have the body for its object deserves examination. Even there, self-consciousness has for its object some entity which is only inside the body; and like the knowledge of the body gained through visual perception, it does not relate to the body only which has the characteristics of stoutness, youthfulness and the like. Hence the appre- hension of difference and the reference This is my body’, as in the case of the expression ‘This is my house’. This usage (“This is my body’) being based on directly perceived difference, it is not proper to urge that it has to be interpreted figuratively like the expression ‘This is my self’, Atmasiddhi 13 This is the body of the doll. As the word ‘my’ denotes the self and as the two words (my and self in the statement This is my self’) have an identical meaning and as there is no dispute concerning this, a figurative interpretation is proper. But it is not so here (in the statement ‘This is my body). Because a conscious entity distinct from the body is established by perception, the word ‘I’ (in the proposition ‘I am stout)’ denotes by a figure of speech, the body which is related to the self. Identity of body with soul illusory-. With regard to external objects, as there is knowledge of mutually exclusive colours, size, number and configuration, diversity is explicit; but, in the case of the soul, as there is no knowledge of such divergent qualities, to the ignorant there arises the illusion of the body being non- different from the soul. Again, the self has his activities determined by his desires; for, he wills, remembers and infers only at the instance of his desires; the body too has its activities, such as lying down, sitting and standing, determined by his desires; hence arises the illusion of non-difference as in the case of the shell and silver. Yogic perception vouches for the separatness of soul and body. Thinking minds, however, perceive the entity known as ‘I’ which has to be recognised as knower and which is devoid of parts to be really distinct from the body which appears as ’this’ and which is stout and consists of parts. Arguments in support of the view that body and soul are distinct entities- As the knowledge of bodily parts is absent in the consciousness ‘I know’ either it does not have for its object the body or has for its object something other than the body. Wherever there is absence of apprehension of bodily parts, the body is not the object of knowledge, but something else; as in the case of the consciousness ‘This is is a pot’. The knowledge which has the body for its object is, however, different (that is, there is not absence of knowledge of parts of the body), as in the instance of knowledge of the body accepted by both of us. Again 14 Siddhitrayam the body cannot be the object of self-consciousness, because it is known to be ’this’ or because it is grasped by external senses, as in the case o the pot and the like. The Sankhya arguments against the claim that perception establishes identity of body and soul:- Moreover, how can he who has known his self to exist for the sake of nothing other than himself, and known other objects to exist for his sake, take this body which exists for the sake of others, for the rea- son of its being a collection of parts, to be the self? We directly perceive that the entire collection of internal and external objects of experience, such as sound and pleasure, exist for the sake of the self; while the self, the enjoyer, does not exist for the sake of others; but is the one object for whose glory and service everything else exists. Being a collection, the body cannot but exist for the sake of others; and all aggregates such as bed, seat and chariot are indeed found to exist for the sake of others. It cannot be argued that as all collections are known to be for the sake of the body and the like which are themselves collections, the self also should be an aggregate; for, if it were so, the self too would have to exist for the sake of others; but it has already been stated that the self is directly perceived to exist not far the sake of others. On account of the -non-perception of the collective nature of the self-a nature which is cap- able of being perceived–the belief that the soul is an aggregate stands condemned. If the self exists for the sake of another collection, the latter must also exist for the sake of some other collection and that for another and so on ad infinitum. But where an end is possible, an un- ending chain is unders.rable. Moreover, when a collection exists for the sake of something else, it is not because that other itself is a collection. It is only in virtue of his nature as enjoyer the self becomes that other for whose sake all collections exist. For him who attempts to base his reference on all the qualities of the illustrative example, even though they may be unserviceable to the general rule, all inference would be impossi- ble. Atmasiddhi 15 Refutation of the Carvaka criticism of arguments that the body and soul are different:- Even though the distinction between the two (the body and self) may not be explicit, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, as it cannot exist in it and as being quite unlike its other qualities. As all the special qualities existing in the effect are dependent ou those of the causal substance, how can consciousness exist in the body without depend- ing on the quality of its cause? The illustration that intoxicating quality arises from the mixture of non-intoxicants not apposite :- Bṛhaspati’s teaching-that earth, water. fire and air are the rea- lities and that from these consciousness arises just as the intoxicating quality emerges from herbs, etc.-is untenabie. As power is not a special quality, it may be so (that is, need not be dependent on the quality of the causal substance). In all substances the quality known as causal power concerning the effect, cognisable from their respective effects, is a common quality, but consciousness is not so, because it is admitted to belong to the body only and because it is a special quality, as it, while remaining an effect, is cognised by one form of perception. It is not wrong to maintain that, on the basis of their own quality, form out of infinitesimal atoms, which are not effects and which acquire the intoxi- cating quality from the mingling of different substances, intoxicating quality arises in their effects. Example of redness produced by chewing not apposite :- The redness caused by betels, etc., is, likewise, produced by cau- ses which possess the red colour generated by the mixing of different substances, after their parts have lost their cohesion (in the act of chew- ing); hence the red colour perceived in each of their parts too. Conscious- ness is not found in the parts of the body individually, nor have they been said to possess it. If that were admitted, as it would follow that in one and the same body there must be many thinking beings, it is impossi- ble to say which is primary and which is secondary; besides, all refer- 16 Siddhitrayam ence to recognition would be impossible. Just as in respect of what has been seen by Devadatta, there cannot be recognition on the part of Yajnadatta, here also (what has been perceived by one part of the body cannot be recognised by another). The illustration of parti-coloured cloth unhelpful to the Carvaka :- The statement made before, namely, that the variegated colour found in the cloth is not dependent on the quality of the cause, is erro- neous. The quality of variegated colour is nothing but that of being many coloured; and this (variegated colour) is produced by threads of different colours; hence there is nothing objectionable here. Though variegated co’our does not exist in each of the threads severally, it is certainly noticed in the threads which combine and are known as threads of variegated colours. The capacity to produce cloth belongs to threads only in their togetherness; thus the variegated colour exists even in the cause of cloth; hence there is nowhere any violation (of the rule that the qualities of the effect are dependent on those of the causes). It cannot be maintained that the whole’ (the cloth) becomes invisible inasmuch as it does not possess any one specific colour, for, it may become percepti- ble by the very fact of its possessing inherently colour along with big- ness. Let variegated colour be taken to be one specific colour. Even then it is found to be produced by the different colours existing in the causes. It cannot be asserted that it is only the consciousness resident in the parts that produces the particular consciousness in the body, which is composed of those parts, for, consciousness in general cannot exist in the parts. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. On the same count, the belief that pleasure and other qualities belong to the body stands condemned. Being distinct from the other qualities of the body consciousness is not an attribute of the body :- Besides, as consciousness, pleasure, etc., vanish from the body, like the smell of flower and sandal, even when the body continnes to be strong and in the absence of counteracting qualities, they cannot Atmasiddhi 17 be the qualities of the body. Colour and other special qualities of the the body, however, do not leave it in the same manner. 1 The qualities of the body are perceptible to the individual as well as to others and are also to be grasped by external senses; but not so consciousness, etc. Therefore, they cannot be the qualities of the body. Additional reasons in support of the view that the body is not the soul. Further, the body is not the soul, since like a pot,, it has a beginning, exists for the sake of others, possesses a particular configuration and has colour, etc., and is an element. Again, because the body has holes and is not the possessor of the body and is a body, consciousness ‘cannot be its quality, as in the case of the dead body. These and other logical proofs lead us to reject the view that consciousness is a quality of the body. (Argument based on Negative concomitance indefensible) mall bat bluo Thus the matter having been disposed of in this manner with the aid of the aforesaid reasons which point to the major term on the strength of positive concomitance, purely negative concomitance, such as the quality of being the seat of the senses, will be powerless to establish the major term. (The view that the senses are the soul) 17. Then let the senses themselves be (considered as) the soul. They are not referred to as ’this’. Otherwise, (if they were known as ’this’) they, like the body, may be excluded from that which is the object of self-conciousness. Unlike the body, the senses possess neither visible colour and other qualities nor big size. If they did, and if self- consciousness presented the senses as its objects, knowledge of their colour, parts, etc.. may be expected to arise, as in the case of the know- ledge of the body. Knowledge which is the result of their activity, like 3 18 Siddhitrayam the results of bathing, study, etc., must, properly speaking, belong only That is why Satyatapas speaks of the seeing eye.’ to the senses The refutation of this view 18. The theory that the senses are the soul is untenable, as none of its forms stands scrutiny. To explain it further-Do the senses possess knowledge individually or collectively? If individually, what is perceived by one sense cannot be recognised by another. But such a recognition, viz., ‘what I saw I touch’ does exist. That is why the senses, even collectively, cannot be said to possess knowledge. No object is either perceived or recognised by all the five senses together. Again, (if this view were correct) even when one sense-organ perishes death must ensue. Besides, if knowledge belonged to the senses, with the decay of each of the different senses, remembrance of their respective objects could not take place. Moreover, knowledge, though the outcome of the activity of the senses, need not inhere in them. For sin and the like, though resulting from the activity of weapons, etc., inhere in something other (than weapons). Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would 35. See Varaha Purana, Ch. 91, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage’s hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired of the sage if he saw a boar near by and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependents would have to die of starvation. The sage found himself in a dilemma-if he furnished the information regarding the animal’s hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter, and his dependents. After a moment’s reflection, Satyatapas replied, ‘Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives; the tongue that speaks has no eye Wherefore do you ask me ?’ Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the bnar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Visnu and Indra respectively and blessed him.” Atmasiddhi 19 meet with death, and that (if he spoke the truth), it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that.36 (The doctrine that manas is the soul) 19. In that case, let manas (m’nd) be the soul. On that view, it is argued the aforesaid difficulties would be got over. Indeed, manas has been known to be the controller of all the senses and has been so declared. Besides, recognition by a different sense becomes appropriate, since manas is the one entity that is the seat of both perception (and recogni- tion. Even when the respective senses perish, recognition is still possible, since manas is eternal. (The refutation of this doctrine) 20. This theory (that manas is the soul) too is erroneous, because manas is an instrument like the eye, etc. Manas has indeed been con- ceived as the instrument of all knowledge concerning the outer and the inner world. From the fact that even when the different external senses are in contact with their respective objects, they are not appre- hended simultaneously, we learn that there exists some other instrument besides the senses, and that, on account of the absence of its help, all objects do not appear but some one (object) alone is cog- nised.38 Likewise, knowledge of pleasure, etc, as in the case of know- ledge of colour and so on requires an instrument, because it is either a form of activity or of knowledge. How can manas, which is thus known to be an instrument of knowledge, be the subject of knowledge? To be a subject is really to be independent. Independence consists either in the capacity to secure, in accordance with one’s own desires, 36. Vide note 35. 37. Prajnayate is found in the Telugu edition, but is wrongly omitted in the Benares edition. The presence of the word ca implies that there must be another vcrb besides pratijnayate; and it can only be prajnayate. 38. Nyaya Sutra, I. i-16 Yugapat jnananutpattir manaso lingam. 20 Siddhitrayam the means appropriate to the realisation of certain ends, or in the acti- vity brought on by other qualities inherent in oneself. To be an instru- ment is to be the best means to an end, which is invariably associated with dependence on others, which, in its turn, consists in possessing act:- vity that is subject to the control of others. How can we find in the self-same manas the association of these two mutually conflicating quali- ties? Moreover, if it is maintained that manas, which is an agent, acquires, the character of an agent in remembering and other (activities) with the aid of another instrument, then the d’spute concerns only the name. He alone is called the soul who perceives colour etc., with (exter- nal senses such as) eyes etc., and (who experiences) pleasure, etc., with the aid of the internal organ let it be done by all means. If the name ‘manas’ be attributed to that It does not affect us in the least. But it would go against linguistic usage. No more need be said in disproof of this theory. (Refutation of the Naiyayika proof for the existence of manas) :- What, it may be asked, is meant by manas? It has already been described as an internal entity which is the instrument of knowledge. What is the proof of its existence? The fact that knowledge of all objects does not arise s’multaneously (it may be said) has already been shown to prove the existence of manas. True, it has been so ‘po’nted out; but, how does it establish that it is a distinct entity? Even after postulating it, you must perforce admit some other reason to account for the absence of the simultaneous remembrance of all things. Impressions born of the expe- rience of different objects exist simultaneously in the remembering person. Still, all these objects are not remembered, but only some one of them is recalled at a time a given. The order in which the causes that are responsible for stimulating impres ions appear cannot be said to acco- unt for this (the non-appearance of all remembrance at once). If that were so, to a person whose impressions can be aroused solely by concentra- tion, all remembrance should appear simultaneously. But, even in the case of a person who, with the desire to remember all he has ex-Atmasiddhi 21 perienced, withdraws his manas from all things and meditates in gene- ral, all things previously experienced do not become the object of re- membrance. Should it be supposed that the order in which remem- brances appear is due either to unseen forces (adṛṣṭa) inasmuch as all remembrance is either auspicious or inauspicious, or to the fact of the soul being of the nature of knowledge, then, the absence of the simul- taneous appearance of all knowledge, even when the outer senses are in contact with their respective objects, would be rendered possible for the same reason; hence no need to posit a different substance. 4 (Refutation of the argument that manas is the non-inherent cause of pleasure, pain and the like) :- Again, pleasure and the like which are adventitious, which inhere in the soul and which have external objects and unseen forces for their efficient cause, must have a non-inherent cause and that is the conjunc- tion of soul and manas. To believe that this argument establishes the existence of an entity known as manas is erroneous; for, the knowledge. which is produced by contact with agreeable and disagreeable objects and which originates prior to pleasure, pain and the like, and which inheres in the soul, may itself be the non-inherent cause. This (knowledge), in its turn, has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the organs, which are (themselves) in contact with objects, with the soul-a conjunc- tion which inheres in the soul. The activity of the organ which is the cause of this (conjunction) has for its non-inhentent cause the conjunc- tion of the soul with the organs–a conjunction which is dependent on the effort and unseen forces inherent in the soul. This effort, again, (has for its non-inherent cause) the knowledge of the necessity for action existing at the preceding moment. The unseen force (has for its non- inherent cause) the effort itself. Thus, even the argument that know- ledge, pleasure, pain, des’re and other special qualities of the soul require a non-inherent cause does not justify the positing of a different entity. Untenability of the view that atma gunas such as pleasure arise only in conjunction with some substance other than itself and that it is manas :- 22 Siddhitrayam From the fact that the colour of the atoms of earth (prthivi) originates from the non-inherent cause, viz., conjunction with fire, it may be said that the non-inherent cause of the special quality of an eter. nal substance is only the conjunction with another substance; but this argument too is superficial. Wherefrom is it learnt that colour and other qualities of earth particles originate from conjunction with fire? If the answer is:- it is so perceived in the resultant substance, then, inasmuch as pleasure and the like arise after the knowledge of the rea- lisation of agreeable and disagreeable (objects), what is it that is not perceived here? Indeed, there will be occasion to infer other causes only when the perceived causes are found to be defective. And here, there is no defect. Therefore, it is well to accept the following formula that among the factors well known to be causes, that is the inherent cause wherein lies the inherence of the effect; that is the non-inherent cause which is closely associated therewith; and the rest, the efficient cause. It is not proper to posit the conjunction of a different substance which is gratuitous and not well-known and to consider it the non- inherent cause. Such an admission with regard to colour and like the residing in atoms is due to non-apprehension of other causes and to (the logical need for) conformity with perceived things. But the contrary has already been proved here. (Even if conjunction with such a substance were necessary, it does not follow that it must be with manas) :- Even if this were so, that conjunction with another substance, which may be inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance, being known to inhere in objects that can be touched and are elemental, the argument culminates in the cojunction with the well-known body, etc., ; hence, a ninth substance (manas) need not be posited. Again, if indeed, manas were elemental, it must be one among (the bhutas or primal elements) earth and the like; but this is contradicted by other arguments proving it to be otherwise. They are:- Manas cannot be constituted out of the earth, because like the tongue, Atmasiddhi 23 it is an organ instrumental in experiencing taste; it cannot be related to water, because like the nose, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing smell; similarly, being instrumental in experiencing what is not the ob- ject of the respective organs, it is possible to assert that it is not made of fire and the like; hence the non-elemental character of manas. This ar- gument is inappropriate; for it would establish the opposite (conclusion) viz., that it is a distinctive substance (element). The character of being an organ instrumental in experiencing taste, proves that manas is com- posed of water (rasa), even as it establishes that manas is unrelated to earth. Similarly, the other reasons also prove the character of its being related to their respective elements, even as they reveal that it is not the other elements. Further, that organ which grasps a particular quality among sound, touch, colour, taste and smell - that alone is constituted out of the element possessing that quality. Granting, indeed, that this is so, as it is also known that organ alone (i.e., that organ which grasps only a particular quality) is not constituted of other elements than its own, by merely showing that (you) cannot establish the negative result which you intend to convey (viz., that manas is non-elemental). 39 Moreover, being the common instrument apprehending sound and other qualities, manas, like the body, may as well be a single subs- tance made up the five elements, or it may be two-fold, three-fold and so on being made up of different elements.40 For instance, it is said in scriptures, ‘Gentle sir! manas is indeed food.” It may be argued that this scriptural passage does not seek to teach the fact of manas having its source in food, but, like statements such as ‘Prana is water’ it only seeks to assert the fact of its (manas) owning activities dependent on it 39. The sense-organ which grasps only one quality may be said to be made of that particular element alone which possessess that quality. But this affords no basis for the inference that manas is non-elemental; for, manas apprehends all the qualities. 40. The variant reading is ekadvitradimayam. 41. Ohand. Up VI. 5. 42. Ohand Up. VI. 5. 24. Siddhitrayam (food). That is why manas continues to exist even in the state of rea- lisation. Indeed, in the eighth chapter of the same Upanisad this fact has been stated thus: Perceiving with the aid of manas the object of his desires, (he) rejoices”; “To this person, the manas is the celestial eye. Similarly, in the Mahopanisad it is said of the Supreme Deity that ‘He mediates on another object of desire with the aid of manas’ " In the puranas too, it is said, ‘He creates the world with the aid of manas only 461 Manas is no other than buddhi:- To the foregoing, it is replied-True, it is so. It was only said. that rather than assume a different substance we may as well accept this position. But, in reality it is neither elemental nor the ninth substance. remot s In that event, what does the word ‘manas’ refer to? It refers only to the intellect (buddhi). That is why the person of (great) intell- ect is termed manasvi. The differences of states of mind are readily perceived in this way: ‘My mind is perturbed’; ‘My mind is tranquil.’ To conclude, our ancestors’ description of manas as an instrument is calculated to bring out the differences of states, just as intellect and egoity (though ultimately one, serve to indicate differences of states.) L Manas is not the soul:- 1.4. 1:1 The reply is whether, manas is elemental or whether it is a diffe- rent substance; in either of these two cases, intelligence cannot be attri- buted to it. Hence, there is no use investigating into the nature of a substance, when no statement regarding that has been advanced. 46 43 Chand. Up. VIII · 44. Mahopanisad I. 45. Visnu Purana, V. 11, 15. 46. Is manas an aspect of buddhi? Or, is it a different substance altogether? Yamunacharya leaves this question open, and thinks that, in any event, manas cannot be an intelligent entity. -Atmasiddhi The theory that Prana is the soul. door) alpere con at centy -25 21. Then, let vital breath (prāņa) be (called) the soul. If that were so, the apprehension of the body, which is associated with it (prāņa), as one which is connected with the soul, and the apprehension of the body, where there is absence of prana, as one which is not associated with the soul will both be appropriate. Departing from the body, going to other worlds, and wandering in other bodies would be even more appropriate in-as-much as it is prāṇa’s nature to move. Otherwise (ie, if prāņa isnot the soul) scriptural passages referring to departing, going and coming would have to be given a secondary significance, because move- ment cannot reasonably belong to that which is infinitely big and to that which is big but devoid of contact. Refutation of this theory 22. This (theory) too is not correct. Intelligence cannot belong to prāņa, because, like external air, it is only air, and because in the state of deep sleep even when the soul is devoid of activity, prana possessess activity. Indeed, it is only on account of its activity that even in the case of the person who is asleep, transformation of substances that have been eaten and drunk into the sevenfold tissues of the body (dhātus), inhalation and exhalation take place. Prana is, indeed, the air which is mixed up with a little fire, water and food, and which resides in the viscera. This (air) too, being exhaled into and out of the throat, mouth and nostrils, and being sensed, like pots and others similar to it, by the organ of touch, clearly shines forth as the non- soul. Further, the doctrine that prana is the soul, being refuted in the same manner in which intelligence has been negatived of the body, 47. Dhatu (from the root dha, ’to hold’) is that which supports or sustains the body. It is usual to mention seven dhatus or tissues of the body-chyle (rasa), blo d (rakta), flesh (māmsa), fat (medas), bone (asti); marrow (majja); semen (sukra). Sometimes hair (kesa), skin (tvac), and muscle and tendons (snayu) are added to the list. See Tait, Ar. X 54. 4 26 Siddhitrayam does not call for separate disproof. Because the soul is not all-perva- sive, even though it is devoid of contact, departing, going and other (activities) conforming to the direction of effort and unseen forces, may appropriately belong to the soul, as (they belong) to manas ; hence, the passages declaring these activities as belonging to the soul are not to be taken as carrying a secondary significance. As this will be taken up again in inquiring into the size (of the soul), let this suffice (for the present). The Theory that Consciousness is the soul 23- Then, let consciousness itself be (taken as) the soul, because it is not non-intelligent. The quality of non-soul is found in pots and the like to be concomitant with the quality of being non-intelligent. The quality of being non-intelligent, which is foreign to consciousness excludes its concomitant (the quality of being non-soul) from con- sciousness. The quality of being non-intelligent belongs to conscious- ness, because consciousness shines merely by its own being. Indeed, e while it exists, consciousness, unlike jars and the like, does not remain 2. without shining; if it fails to shine, it may be acknowledged that its Shining is dependent upon something other than itself. 01 225 The Bhatta view that Consciousness is insentient. 2511221 boobal Perhaps you may hold the following view: Even when conscious- Hotness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth. When we have the knowledge This is blue'43 we are not at the same time, conscious also of a consciousness, which is not blue and which is different from what may be pointed to by the word ’this’. Hence, by the very existence of consciousness the object is illumined as in the case of the sen- se-relation(where the object is brought to light, though the relation itself is not manifested). Immediate’y after, by noticing therein (in the object) a peculiar illumination, which is adventitious, consciousness is inferred. 49 48. In older philosophical works, more especially in Buddhistic writings, it was usual to take nila as an illustration for an object. In later works, ghata does duty for nila. 49. According to the Bhatta School of Mimämsä, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or Atmasiddhi 27 There is no such thing as jnatata; hence consciousness is self-luminous:- This view is untenable, because, unlike colour and other qualities, that illumination, which is an attribute of things and which is something different from consciousness, is not apprehended even by keen observers. As all worldly experience and usage is explicable solely in terms of consciousness, which is admitted by both of us, it is not proper to posit that (illumination). If the knowledge of objects be admitted to be devoid of the mani- festation of knowledge and knower, sometimes the following experience must occur; “This is a pot; it is not known whether I know it or not.” But it does not occur like this. In respect of the apprehension of objects, past and future, if there is no speech and no action, the manifestation of such objects cannot be proved by inference. And the manifestation of consciousness which is based on the manifestation of objects would be even more impossible. If there are no speech and action, the manifestation of objects is not established by inference, because it appears to have been known prior to them (speech and action).50 To explain-Being prompted by somebody, it is only after concentrating (the mind) and recollecting that a person replies, ‘Now it is remembered by me.’ It cannot be, maintained that the aforesaid speech itself is the cause of this recollec- made known (prakasa-visiṣṭa). It is from this illumination or manifestedness, (prakatya or jnatata) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus it is held, that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its result. For à refutation of this view see Vedanta Desika’s Tattvamuktakalapa, page 394. See also Sarvarthasiddhi. 50. Against the view that cognition is inferred from its result, namely, jnātatā, it is urged that, in respect of objects past and future, as we cannot perceive the prākatya, we cannot infer the knowledge of such objects. To this it may be re- plied that though the jnatata of past and future objects is not perceived, it may be inferred from the speech and action concerning them and that from the jnātatā thus inferred, knowledge of those objects can be easily inferred. This reply is un- satisfactory, because if speech and action do not exist, jnätată cannot be inferred, and much less can consciousness of objects, which is based thereon, be inferred; if they exist, they are not found to prove jnatata, for the objects appear to have been known previously. 28 Siddhitrayam tion, because it is a pre-condition of this (speech), and because of reci- procal dependence. Which shameless fellow will maintain that the knowledge of an object is inferred from statements concerning itself? Additional argument to show that consciousness is self- luminous:- Further, the statements and different properties found in that through whose connection these arise in another object are dependent upon the existence of the former itself and not upon its connection. For instance, the reference to existence arising in the case of earth and the like, on account of association with existence, does not arise in the case of existence itself through the connection with (another existence); the visibility found in earth and the like, by virtue of connection with colour, does not arise in the case of colour itself through the connec- tion with (another) colour. Thus statements, such as, it shines forth’, and qualities, such as, knowability found in pots and the like, arise from connection with consciousness; and these (statements and quali- ties) found in consciousness are not dependent on the connection with consciousuess, but are dependent on its own being. Hence, conscious- ness itself (should be considered as) the soul, as it is self-luminous. The contention that consciousness is itself the soul, as there is economy of thought. Further, whoever admits a knower apart from knowledge admits also consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness were non-existent, the reference to the knower would not be appropriate. If this is so, as it is admitted by both parties, let that (consciousness) itself be the knower. What is the use of that other entity which has been assumed? The contention that the cognition ‘I know’ will not prove the existence of a soul distinct from knowledge. It may be urged that from the statement ‘I know’ it is evident that the soul appears to be distinct from, and to be the seat of, consciousness. True, but as it is determinate (savikalpaka) percep- Atmasiddhi 29 tion, it cannot be admitted as a valid perception. 51 Proceeding on the assumption that the knowledge of distinctions is real, that being which is of the nature of luminosity and which is referred to as I,‘cannot be taken to be a separate entity, because of the invariable association of awareness (of knowledge and knower) to which no exception has been noticed, and because the entity which is admitted by you to be distinct from consciousness cannot be said either to possess the quality of luminosity or not to possess it. For, if the former, it cannot. shine forth, as that will go against its nature; if the latter, it will amount to consciousness itself. The contention that, like the knower, the known also is unreal. Even in the matter of setting aside differences among percived things, the very same mode (of reasoning) will apply. Therefore, the avowed Buddhists as well as the disguised Buddhists (declare) that the self- luminous consciousness alone truly exists and that it alone is the soul, and that this consciousness, on account of the capacity of the immediately preceding cognition known as vāsana (impressions of previous experience), and on account of beginningless ignorance (avidya), has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and the known. For instance, the avowed (Buddhists) say “Although consciousness, in its nature, is devoid of distinctions, yet on account of erroneous knowledge, it appears as possessing the distinction of object-consciousness and sub- 51. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svalaksana) and does not grasp its qualifications. This is passive reception of sense impressions. But the sense material thus received is invariably subject to a process of mental ela- boration. The forms of thought (vika’pa), which are of five kinds-generality (jāti), quality (guna), action (karma), name (nama), and substance (dravya)-are superimposed on the svalakṣaṇa, so that every object perceived has to appear tarough those forms. We cannot help perceiving an object otherwise than as be- longing to a class, bearing a name, as characterised by an attribute and as related to another substance. This is determinate (savikalpaka) perception. As it makes con- siderable additions to the material presented by sense, it may be said to distort the real. Hence, the Buddhists think that, strictly speaking, it is not perceptual in character. cf. kalpanapoda mabhrāntam pratyakşam nirvikalpakam vikalpo vastu nirbhā sādasamvadādupaplavah. 30 Siddhitrayam ject-consciousness.52 The disguised Buddhists, for instance, say-The- spotless] reality eannot be the cause of the world, because (then the world would have no cessation. Hence, māyā alone is the originator of the distinctions of the knower and the known. The refutation of the Buddhist doctrine that consciousness is the soul 24. The reply (to this view) is:- Consciousness manifests itself as perishing every moment and as being different in regard to every object. If that (consciousness) were the soul, how could a person recognise on the subsequent day what he perceived the previous day, as, ‘I saw this’? This cannot be met with the aid of different objectless consciousnesses alone, for the statement that knowledge is characterised by objectless- ness has for its meaning what is contradicted by every form of know- ledge, such as perception and the like. If the middle term (which in this argument is no other than consciousness) possesses an object; there being no distinction between this consciousness and all other conscious- nesses, they would also be similar (i.e., possess objects); if it (the middle term) be objectless, then, as there is no mlddle-term, the conclusion cannot be established. As the doctrine that consciousness is objectless, has been cendemned at length both in the Purva and Uttara Mimamsa sections,53 and as the yatharthakhyāti has been established in Sastra,54 it is not dealt with here.. 4 Impossibility of explaining recognition even on the admission that the self is a stream of consciousness:- That is why even on the Buddhist’s admission that consciousness is a stream, the justification of recognition fares no better. If a stream 52. Quoted in Madhava’s Sarvadarsana Sangraha, in the chapter on Bauddha Darsana. 53. Mimamsa Sutra, I. i. 5; Sabara Bhāṣya, pp. 28-30, Anandasrama Series; Slokavārtika, Niralambana section, pp. 24-90, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; Vedanta Sutras, II. ii. 27. 54. Nathamuni’s Nyāyatattva is the Sastra here referred to. The opening stanza of that work refers to itself as a sastra- DAN Yo BANYO vetti yugapat sarvam pratyaksena sada svataḥ tam pranamya harim sastram nyayatattvam pracakṣmahe.Atmasiddhi i 31 of consciousness which is different from (momentary) consciousness and which endures and which remembers is admitted, it will amount to giving up his own (Buddist’s) position and accepting another’s; if it is not admitted, recognition becomes inexplicable. Indeed, in regard to what is experienced by one person, i regcognition cannot arise in an- other. It cannot be maintained that the illusion of recognition arises in the knower on account of the non-apprehension of difference due to close similarity, as in the case of the flame and the like. Indeed, there (in the case of the flame), to one and the same individual who per- ceives the earlier and the later entities vand who, on account of their possessing similar shapes, fails to notice their differences, the illusion is but natural. But here, in as much as the several consciousnesses are described in Buddhism as being ignorant of any information about one another, and as perish ng without a remainder, neither the charac- ter of being the seat nor that of being the object of the illusion of -identity can arise in these (consciousnesses); because, even if there be great similarity, one person cannot regard what has been performed on by another as having been executed by himself. Hence, an intelligent entity, who is the seat of the stream of consciousnesses that appears and perishes, and who exists at the time of recognition, must be Madmitted. C. L by adrio To obviate this difficult the veiled: Buddhist contends that conscious- ness is unborn, changeless and devoid of distinctions.erocure a doldw Here one may point out that consciousness is not non- eternal, for, its antecedent non-existence is not ascertainable. Its being unascer- tainable follows from the fact of consciousness being self-established. Indeed, in the case of what is self-established, antecedent non-existence and the like cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another. That which manifests, by itself, its own non-existence must do so e either by being existent or non-existent. If it (consciousness) exists, as there will be no non-existence, how can it establish (its antecedent non- existence)? On the other alternative (if consciousness is non-existent), by reason of its very non-existence, it is even less capable of establishing (its antecedent non-existence). Hence, it (antecedent non-existence of 32 Siddhitrayam consciousness) is not established by consciousness itself. Nor is it proved by another, for, consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. If it were the object of consciousness. it would, like the pot, etc., cease to be consciousness. Therefore, (that is, as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not established either by itself or by another), consciousness has no origin. And, as it has no origination, other positive changes have also to be denied.55 For, they are concomitant therewith (origination). That is why plurality of conscious- nesses is also to be denied. The absence of the pervader (vyāpaka), namely, the character of having an origination, involves also the denial of what is pervaded by it (vyapya), namely, plurality. For, what is unborn cannot possess differentiations. Moreover, because differentia, mutual non-existence and the like are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, they cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, nothing that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute.56 Therefore, consciousness alone, which is devoid of all kinds of differen- ices and which is attributeless and which has luminos ty alone for its sole 1 essence, and which is unchanging and eternal, is both the finite and the infinite self. It has, for instance, been said ’that consciousness which is unborn, un-knowable and which is the nature of the Infinite Self…….. Their technical jargon (has it) that (consciouness) alone is the ultimate purport of the Vedánta texts. The Vārtikakāra for instance says that scriptural testimony teaches that consciousness alone,, which is supposed to be the result of those means of knowledge that have external things for their objects (i. e.,perception, inference, etc.), is the gist of upaniṣadic texts. If something other than this (cons- ciousness) were postulated (to be the object of perception, and other pramāņās), there would result the non-authoritativeness of the Vedanta 55. Bhavavikara may also be taken to mean changes of positive entit:es. See Srutaprakasikā, 181-2. -nom 56. The reading in the Benares and Telugu editions is anumeyaḥ. Champ: 57. Suresvara (A.D. 800) is the Vratikakāra here referred to His chief works are the aiskarmya Siddhi and Brhadaranyak panisad-Bhasya-Vatika. The latter work has been com nented on by Anandagiri in his 3astraprakasika and by Ananda- purna in his Nya, akalpa latikā. Atmasiddhi 33 texts; and hence something other than consciousness ought not to be qzo anivery 10 20 unt postulated.“comm Rain out, Refutation of the Advaitic view:- renon or viru 106 Those who have understood (the true nature of) the self (assert) that this doctrine does not conform either to worldly experience or to the Vedas, " This is opposed to experience :- 18 On To explain further-what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence some object to its own substrate (i,e. the substrate of knowledge), to have the words jnana, avagathi, anubuthi as its synonyms, to have an object and to be the quality of the knowing self. It is, indeed, in this manner that the experience I know this’ occurs to all beings individually. As in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, the origination, existence and des- truction of consciousness manifest themselves directly.. را The existence of consciousness in the states of deep sleep, drun- kenness and swoon cannot be accepted, as it is negatived by effectual non- perception. If in those states also consciousness wore to exist, then, at the time of waking, it should be remembered; but (as a matter of fact) it is not remembered. That is why the person who wakes up realises, on reflection, ‘For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.” Though there is no general rule to the effect that there should be remom- brance of all the things experienced and though there is absence of 58. This translation of these two verses (159th and 160th) from the Brhada ranyakopanisad-bhasya-Vartika is based on Anandagiri’s commentary. According to him the first verse means that granting that pratyakşa and other pramanās have exter mal things for their objects, still their result, viz., consciousness, is the gist of the vedan- tic texts. The second verse states that the pramanas cannot have external things their objects, for; otherwise the vedantic texts would lose their authoritativeness, inas- much as they would be powerless to establish differenceless Brahman. Hence, the pra- manas cannot have for their object anything other than vedantic teaching, namely, con- sciousness. See Brahadaranyakopanisad-bhasya vārtika, Anandasrama Series, p. 51 5 84 Siddhitrayam death and other powerful causes responsible for the obliteration of traces of previous experience, the uniform non-remembrance establishes only the non-existence of experience (during states of deep sleep, etc.). Nor may it be said that even though there is manifestation of consciousness, non-origination of its remembrance may be due either to the absence of delimiting objects or to the extinction of the object of self-consciousness. For, the absence of one thing and the non-apprehen- sion of that (thing) cannot possibly be the obstacles in the way of the re- sult which is caused by the manifestation of some other object. Even if there be the manifestation of these three (consciousness. objects and self- consciousness) the manifestation of each of these is the cause of the re- membránce of its respective object. Again, the object referred to by ‘I,’ which secures permanency on the strength of recollection, cannot be said to meet with death in deep sleep and other similar states. That is why on waking there is the judgment ‘All the while I slept well’. Moreover, something known as consciousness (samvid) which is devoid of objects and substrate cannot exist, as there is absolute non- apprehension (of the same). Those who have understood the true im- port of words maintain that the words samvid, anubhuti, jnana, prakāša and the like are relative terms.59 Indeed, neither in common speech nor in scripture do we meet with the usage of roots, such as jānāti without being associated with an agent or an object, It cannot be maintained that consciousness does not grasp its own prior non-existence :- It was maintained that from consciousness its antecedent non- existence cannot be proved, because when what is self-established exists,. at the same time its antecedent non-existence cannot exist. being oppo- sed to it. But this contention is superficial. For, there is no rule to the effect that only such objects as exist at the time of consciousness are pro- ved by it; (were it so) the past and the future would become unknowable. 59. A relative term depends for its meaning on its relation to some other name. Atmasiddhi 35 If it is contended that when the antecedent non-existence of con- sciousness is established, it must be contemporaneous with consciousness (we ask) has it been perceived like this anywhere? If it is so (perceived), as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established thereby, the negation of antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) is not proved. The statement that the antecedent non-existence (of anything) is contem- poraneous with that thing is a mad man’s declaration. Indeed, this quality, namely, that of bringing to light objects that are contempora- neous with itself is the nature of perceptual knowledge arising from the senses. But this is not the nature of all forms of knowledge nor of all means of knowledge. For the same reason, the following (contention) also stands con- demned. If the means of knowledge is real on its own right, inasmuch as it is self-luminous, it must exist at all times; therefore, its object too must exist at all times; for, the means of knowledge is always associated with the bject of knowledge. For, the association of means of know- ledge with objects of knowledge does not consist in the invariable relation of the objects of knowledge with the means of knowledge at the time of its existence; but it consists in the negation of the unreality of that parti- cular form of things in which the latter have been apprehended as existing in a certain place, time, etc. That is why the statement that memory has no external object, because even when external objects have perished memory is noticed, becomes a prattle. The contention that there are no pramanas to establish antecedent non- existence is refutea :- It may, however, be said that the antecedent non-existence and the like of consciousness are not ascertained by perception, because it is not something present at the time of perception; and that it cannot be established by other means of knowledge, since there are no signs (linga) and the like. If this were so, the character of being self-established would not prove the absence of antecedent non-existence; indeed, it has now to be maintained that there are no means of proving it. But it has already been said that it is impossible to hold that there are no means of 36 Siddhitrayam proving it, for non-existence is established by effectual non-perception itself. Consciousness is not eternal Moreover, perceptual knowledge establishes existence of its object at the time of its own existence, and not the existence (of the object) at all times. Hence, it has to be stated that consciousness manifests itself only as being limited by time, taking the form ‘I exist only at this mo- ment, not at other times.’ Otherwise (if knowledge were not limited by time, its object too, namely) the pot and the like would be eternal. Simi- larly, inference and other kinds of knowledge (must be limited by time; otherwise, they would reveal their objects also to be eternal). And it has already been said that a pure consciousness, which is devoid of the distinctions of perception and inference, and which is objectless and supportless cannot exist This contention that consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consiousness is disproved :- The contention that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness on the ground that consciousness cannot be the object of anything else is inde- fensible; for (one’s own) previous knowledge is made the object of present cognition, as in the judgment ‘At one time I knew’. Besides, the consciousness of other persons is inferred from reasons (linga) such as, the invariable rejection and acceptance respectively of disagree- able objects. And, if it is not admitted that the consciousness of others Is inferred, there would result the impossibility of all scriptural and worldly usage, in as much as it would be impossible to grasp the meanings of words.60 Further, approaching the guru and the like would 60. The meanings of words may be understood from vyavahara. Thus, for exam- ple, a youngster notices the pupil fetching a cow when his master utters the words ‘Fetch the cow’, and immediately concludes that the action of fetching the cow was the result of the pupil grasping the desire of the master when he uttered the words ‘fetch the cow. At that time, he takes the words in one mass as conyeying one complex whole of meaning. Which word in that whole stands for the animal, and which signifies the action is not apprehended then. Later, when the teacher says ‘fetch the Atmasiddhi 37 be impossible, for there could be no apprehension that he is possessed of knowledge. The contention that if consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness, it would cease to be consiousness is met : The belief that if consiousness is the object of anything else, it would cease to be consciousness is untenable. The character of being consciousness consists in the quality of manifesting itself solely by means of its own existence to its substrate; or in the quality of being the means of manifesting (by its own existence) its object (to its substrate), 61 These two characteristics (of consiousness, namely that of manifesting itself and its object to its substrate), which are established by one’s own experience, do not fall away even when consiousness becomes the object of another consciousness. How then can it be maintained that consciousness ceases to be consciousness (when it becomes the object of another consciousness)? Pots and the like, on the other hand, do not possess the quality of being consiousness, simply because they do not possess the aforesaid characteristics and not because they are objects of experience. Further, (even on your view) that consiousness does not possess the character of being the object of another consciousness, the same difficulty, namely, that it will cease to be consciousness, does exist as in the case of the sky-flower, (which is not an object of cognition; and. which is not a cognition). horse’, a different animal is brought. Again, when he says ’tie up the cow’, a different action follows. By observing varied actions resulting from the different utterances, the youngster understands that the word ‘cow’ denotes an animal of a certain descrip- tion, that the word ‘horse’ an animal of another kind, the word ‘bring’ denotes the action of bringing, and so on: 61. In commenting upon these definitions, Sudarsanācārya observes that it consciousness is defined as that which manifests itself, this definition would also apply to pots and the like, for, they too manifest themselves. To exclude them. the qualifi- cation ’to its own substrate’ is added; the pot manifests itself, not to its substrate, the ground on which it stands, but to the knowing person. Again, the further qualification ‘solely by means of its own existence’ is added in order to exclude certain attributes of the self, such as, atomic size, eternity and so on, which are manifested to their substrate, not by themselves, but by an act of knowledge. The Sri Bhasya would add 38 Siddhitrayam The quality of being consciousness cannot be attributed to the self, for it possesses the character of being the seat of consciousness. Nor can it be said that it (the self) is not the object of consciousness; for, though it is self-luminous like consciousness, it is admitted to be capable of being known by oneself and others. The objection that, if the self is knowable, it would cease to be self would, as stated before, equally apply even to the view that it is not knowable. If it is contended that it is only the non-existence of the sky-flower (rather than the fact that it is not the object of experience) that is res- ponsible for the sky-flower not being soul or consiousness, then let it be held that even in the case of pots and the like, it is only their character of not being the seat of consciousness and of their not being opposed to ignorance that is responsible for their being non-soul and non-con- yet another qualification ‘at the present time’ with a view to excluding past states of consciousness. Even without this addition, past states of consciousness stand excluded since every past experience is revealed not by its own existence, but by another act of knowing. But this qualification serves to emphasise the fact that any state of cons- ciousness can manifest itself by its own existence only at the time it exists, and that a past state of consciousness can be apprehended by another state-a fact denied by the opponent. ‘At the present time’ denotes ’the time when the relation of consciousness to its object exists’. Since a state of consciousness cannot manifest itself, solely by its own sake, to any person other than its own substrate, the words ’to its own substrate become necessary. This definition is acceptable only to those who maintain the svayamprakasatva theory; hence, a second, which will be acceptable to all is offered. The qualifications ’to its own substrate’, ’ty its own existence’ and at the present time have to be supplied in this definition also. Means of manifesting’ would apply a’so to the potter’s stick, wheels and other instruments; and hence the qualification to its own substrate’. The knowledge arising from one sense organ can not be the means for the manifestation of an object revealed by another sense; visual perception, for example does not manifest that which is the object of auditory perception. Hence the need for the words ‘its own object’ The qualification ‘by its own existeace’ serves to exclude the sense organs, which are instrumental in revealing objects, not by their own be ng, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge As in the case of the first definition, here also the expressions ‘at the present time’ and ‘its own substrate’ arc intended to exclude respectively past states of consciousness and the experience of others. 62. It is not necessary that if external objects, such as pots, exist at all they ought to be known. Hence, they are not considered to be opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi. Knowledge, however, is opposed to ignoranee (ajñānavirodhi); because when it exists it must necessarily shine forth. Atmasiddhi 39 sciousness. Should it be contended that if consciousness is the object of consciousness the two qualities (namely, the, quality of not being the seat of consciousnesss and of not being opposed to ignorance) must be- long to it, (we reply) that even on the view that consciousness is not the object of consciousness, it would likewise possess those two qualities, (as in the case of the sky-flower). No further need to expose how ridiculous these devious and flimsy arguments are. The assertion that if consciousness is without an origin, it could have no changes is refuted:-”” Again, the assertion that as consciousness has no origin, other modifications of it are negatived is fallacious; for, (the implied general próposition, namely, that whatever has no origin has none of the other changes, is falsified by the contradictory instance of antecedent non- existence, because,) although antecedent non- existence has no’ origin, it is found to have an end. Even if the qualification positive entity’ be added, the falsity (of the general proposition as modified viz., All positive entities having origin have none of the other changes) will be proved by the ignorance (avidya) which is admitted by you. For, this ignorance even though it has no origin, is subject to manifold changes and terminates through the rise of knowledge. If it is said that its modifi cations are unreal (we ask) do you admit changes which are ultimately real and believe in any entity having an origin and still being ultimately real? It is only if these are admitted, the qualification ‘ultimately real’ can be fruitfully applied either to the major or to the middle term. If these are admitted, then your case has, indeed, been ably defended by one skilled in logic! The contention that if consciousness is unborn, it cannot have differentiations is refuted:– The statement that what is unborn cannot possess differentiations is not correct; for, the distinction of the self, which is assuredly unborn, from the body, senses and the like has already been established; and because ignorance, which is admitted to be beginningless, has necessarily 40 Siddhitrayam to be taken as being distinct from the self. If ti is said that this differentiation is phenomenal, (we ask) have you observed any-where real distinction to be invariably concomitant with origination? It will be shown presently that the distinctions existing between various kinds of knowledge and objects of knowledge, which are established by un- contradicted experience, are ultimately real.65 The contention that consciousness of quality lesss stands self-refuted:- gine L ) The contention that consciousness does not possess the attributes which are objects of knowledge, and that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities is proved to be fallacious by the qualities of self-luminosity, eternity and the like, which are established by scriptural testimony, inference and other means of know- ledge to exist in consciousness, and which are acknowledged by your- self. It cannot be pointed out that these attributes are in reality, only pure consciousness; for, even though it (consiousness) is admited to exist, conflicting views with regard to these attributes are noticed. It is only after admitting the existence of consciousness that disputants maintain its inferability, momentariness, and the like. Besides, con- sciousness and these attributes are in their essential nature distinct, Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence, 63. All systems of Indian thought, with the exception of the Carvaka darsana’ accept the distinction of the self from the body, senses and so on; and the opponent admits, in addition, the distinction of the self from avidya. Hence, he cannot deny vijātly adheda. ? 64. In order to prove that consciousness admits of no real distinctions, because it has no origin, the negative concomitance (vyatirekavyapti) - whatever has real distinctions must have an origin-must be cited. But as the opponent does not admit real distinctions, he cannot point to any instance of this negative generalisation. Hence, his argument commits the fallacy of vyapyatvasiddhf. Moreover, if the distinction of avidya from the self is not real, it follows that ignorance itself may become the self. 65. The distinction between objects of knowledge necessarily points to distinction between kinds of knowledge. This shows that sajatiyabheda is real… 66. The admission that consciousness possesses the attributes of self-luminosity, eternity and the like implies that consciousness admits of internal differences (svagatabheda). dAtmasiddhi 41 manifests some object to its own substrate, But self-luminousness consists in shining forth or being manifest solely by means of its own existence to the soul. It has already been established in Samvit-siddhi that ‘shining forth,’ which is implied therein, is a quality common to all sentient and insentient things alike. If you were to (confuse this ‘shining forth’ with prakatya and) say that it is not admitted by Vedantins, (we point out that) the expression ‘shining forth’ refers to the quality of being fit to be an object of reference Eternity, again is the quality of existing at all times. Unity is limitation by the number ‘one’. It is not proper to suggest that as these attributes (self-luminosity, eternity and unity) constitute the negation of non-intelligence, of spatial and temporal limitations and of plurality respectively, the aforesaid difficulties are got over. For, even if they are of this nature, as they will still be the attributes of consciousness, you cannot meet the charge of anaikanta (straying reason). The denial of non-intelligence, non-eternity, plurality and the like would be empty statement signifying nothing if the several qualities opposed to these were not present in consciousness. Ignorance (avidya), which is knowable, is found in the self; and this is a position admitted by you. (Hence. it cannot be maintained that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities). Further, after suggesting the relation of consciousness to something with the aid of the genitive case - ending found in the word asyāḥ (occurring in the statement nasya meyo dharmaḥ) to assert the attri- butelessnes of consciousness will, like the attribution of the quality of being a barren woman to one’s mother, convey the opposite meaning If consciousness is admitted to be manifest, it will follow that it possesses attributes; otherwise, (if it is not admitted to be manifest) it amounts to positing an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. If it is said that manifestation itself is consciousness, (we ask) ‘Oh, Ye! tell us whose manifestation it is. If the reply is that it is not the manifestation 67. The expression ‘samvitsiddha veva sadhitam’ indicates that Samvitsiddhi, was composed before Atmasiddhi. 6 42 Siddhitrayam of anything, then, it cannot be manifestation at all, for, manifestation, like the quality of being a son, always refers to some entity and belongs to somebody. If it is said that it (manifestation) belongs to the self, (we ask) what is the meaning of the genitive case - ending?68 Hence, to maintain that a consciousness, which has been described as above and which has a character similar to that of sky-lotus, is the ultimate end of the Vedanta will only lead to the destruction of the Vedas themselves.69 Even on the view of the veiled Buddhists, recognition would be inexpli- cable: Further, even if consciousness were eternal, the impossibility of recognition would still persist; for, recognition which takes the form- ‘I experienced this at one time’-indicates that there is a conscious subject existing at earlier and subsequent times. But, in your view, conscious- ness is mere consciousness. With regard to itself, consciousness cannot be its own subject and its own object. It cannot be maintained that jnatṛtva is superposed on consciousness: Should it be argued that, even though consciousness is ultimately only consciousness, but falsely appears as an experiencing subject, just as the shell appears as silver, and that (this consciousness itself cannot be said to be illusory, for) without a real basis no illusion can arise, this argument is unsound. On this view, the conscious ‘I’ would shine forth as equivalent to consciousness, taking the form ‘consciousness is I,“70 even. as silver, the yellow colour, the quality of being existent in the mirror, 68. Panini’s Şaşthi sese-declares that the genitive case ending invariably refers to some relation or other. The expression ‘soul’s manifestation’ (atmanahḥ siddhih) must, therefore, indicate that there is some relation between soul and the quality of manifestation. Hence, it cannot be maintained that the soul is attributeless. 69. There is a pun on the word vedanta. 70. When a piece of shell is mistaken for silver, the illusion takes the form “This is silver,’ and not ‘shell is silver’; for, so long as the specific qualities of an object are known, no illusion with regard to it can arise. Likewise. when cons- cionsness erroneously appears as the ‘I,’ the illusion must take the form This is I’ and not ‘consciousness is I’, Hence, it may be asked: How can it be asserted that the illusion concerning consciousness would take the form ‘consciousness is I’? Our reply is Atmasiddhi 43 duality and the like appear falsely as being the form of the lustrous object presented before us, the conch, the face, the moon and the like. This consciousnesss which always presents itself as something distinct (from the conscious subject) is marked as taking the form ‘I am conscious’ and as being the distinguishing attribute of the altogether separate entity known as ‘I’, just as the stick is found to be the attribute of Devadatta; when the judgment ‘Devadatta holds a stick’ does not have for its object the stick only, how can it be asserted that (in the analogous case) this consciousness of ‘I’, which reveals the entity called ‘I’ as owning consciousness, has for its object consciousness only, which is, in fact, a mere attribute. Refutation of the view that jnatṛtva is the result of superimposition: How (we ask) did you arrive at the conclusion that the character of of being a knower is an illegitimately transferred quality (adhyasta)? If it is replied that this like the sta ement ‘I am stout’, presents itself only to him who erroneously identifies the self with the body, (and as such, the character of being a knower, like stoutness, is superimposed on the self, we rejoin that) since the consciousness too, which you regard as the self, presents itself only to that person who has that (confusion of the self with the body), this consciousness also must likewise be a superimposition. If it be said that, since consciousness continues even after the dawn of true knowledge of reality, it cannot be illusory, (we ask) ‘Sir, does the self really cease to be a knower after the acquisition of true know- ledge?”” Oh! if that were so, it would be far better not to be a knower of the real than to be a knower of the real; for, at least in the state of illusion, he would perceive, many a happy thing. that in the case of shell-silver it is not the shell aspect of the presented object, but some other aspect that causes the illusion. But in the case of consciousness, as the opponent describes it to be attributeless, it cannot be said that some aspect other than that of being consciousness leads to the illusion. Hence, it has to be admitted that even when its specific aspect of being consciousness is known consciousness gives rise to the illusion of ‘I’ and takes the form ‘consciousness is I.’ See Sruta Prakā sikā, 71. Scriptural passages describing the state of release definitely declare that the released soul continues to be a knower. Hence, it cannot be maintained that with the rise of true knowledge the quality of being a knower vanishes. 44 Siddhitrayam The contention that jnatṛtva resides in ahamkara: h You may maintain that to be a knower is to be an agent in the act of knowing, to be liable to change,72 to be non-intelligent, and to reside in the knot of the ahamkara,” and that the self is the enjoyer of the fruits of the knowing process, a non-agent, a changeless entity, the witness (sākṣin)” and pure luminosity; and that the character of being an agent and the like cannot be the attributes of the self; for, like colour and other qualities, they are knowable and that if the quality of being an agent belongs to the self, even though the latter is an object of the conscious- ness of ‘I’, it will be impossible to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that the quality of being non-soul, of existing for the sake of others, of being non-intelligent and the like would belong to the self even as they belong to the body; and that the distinction of the knower, who is the object of the consciousness of ‘I’, and who enjoys the result of the activity of the body, from the body, which is well known to be the agent in all secular and sacred duties, is noticed; and that similarly here also it is reasonable to admit that the witnessing inward self is distinct from the knower denoted by the term’ I’. This is opposed to everyday experience. This argument (of yours) is illogical, for, apart from the inward self which shines forth as the knower in the judgment ‘I know’, no other 72. Knowledge is an activity and it has a beginning and an end; hence, the quality of being an agent in the act of knowing must have a beginning and end, that is, must be subject to change, 73. Ahamkāra is spoken of as a knot (granthi) either because it is the root cause of the tangled mass of illusions or because it binds the jiva closely to the manifold illusions which are, in fact, its own handiwork. 74. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality, Brahman, which is one, undifferenced, eternal and self-luminous consciousness (caitanya), is particularised by the antaḥ karana in two ways. When Brahman is determined by antaḥ karna as a qualifying attribute (višeşana) it is called the jiva; when it is determined by antaḥkarana as a limiting adjunct only (upadhi), it is called the sakṣin. The antaḥkarana is inseparably bound up with jiva, but is separable from the sākṣin. The sākşin performs the office of manifesting the odjects known as well as the knowing subject. Since all diversity takes its roots in ajñāna, the sakṣin which illumines objects of experience and the experiencer, is spoken of as the ‘witness of ajñāna.’ Atmasiddhi 45 “self which is pure luminosity only and which is termed witness’ is apprehended. The character of inwardness as attributed to the self (pratyaktva) consists precisely in the quality of being ‘I’ found in that entity which by virtue of its being the seat of knowledge, is marked off from the body, senses, mind, vital breath and consciousness, and which, contrary to the procedure of outward objects, proceeds, as it were, and shines for its own sake.75 The character of being a witness as attributed to the same (self) consists in being a direct knower (an eye-witness). Indeed, one who is not knower is not spoken of as witness: Since all objects that are manifested reveal themselves to the knower who shines forth as ‘I’, the experience-‘I know’, ‘It presents itself to me’-is shared by every self. Indefensibility of the position that pratyaktva belongs to ahamkara: The quality of being a knower cannot belong to that modification o unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta) which goes by the name of egoity (ahamkara), nor to that known as intellect (buddhi); for as in the case of the body, the quality of not being an intelligent entity, the character of liability to change, insentience, the quality of existing for the sake of others and other similar reasons make it impossible (for the quality of jnätṛtva to belong to either egoity or intellect:) The untenability of the view that ahamkara appears as knower either. on account of reflection or contact with consciousness. Nor can it be said that the quality of being a knower may well be- long to egoity or intellect on account of the reflection of intelligence; for, what is not open to visual perception is not observed to have refle- ction. Besides, on your view, the quality of being a knower does not really belong to consciousness. If jnatṛtva really belongs to consciousness, on account of conjunction with consciousness, this quality may appear in another substance (say in egoity or intellect) or be apprehended therein, even as heat appears in the iron-ball on account contact with fire. 75. Outward objects present themselves for the sake of the knowing subject, and I not for their own sake. The self, on the contrary, shines for its own sake. Svasmai bhāsamānatvam pratyaktvam. Parasmai bhāsamānatvam paraktvam. 46 Siddhitrayām The contention that ahamkara appears as knower, because it manifests consciuosness as residing in itself:- Yon may perhaps maintain the following view: “In manifesting the self which is none other than pure consciousness, the egoity (ahamkara), although of non-intelligent nature, manifests the self as residing within it- self; for it is the nature of manifesing entities to reveal the objects that are being manifested as residing in themselves, just as a mirror, a sheet of water, particular instances of a class (say, the short, the hornless cows) and the like reveal the face, the sun, cowness, etc. as dwelling in them- selves respectively. The erroneous view that finds expression in the judg- ment ‘I know’ is the result of that (i.e., the ahamkara being a manifest- ing entity reveals consciousness as residing within itself; in other words, ahamkara appears as the possessor of knowledge. That is why in states of deep sleep and release, there is manifestation of the self in its true na- ture of pure consciousness only without the revelation of the ‘I’. That is also the reason why the quality of being non-soul has to be predicated of the ‘I’. Suresvara’s statement runs to the effect-‘If the quality of be- ing ‘I’ belongs to the self, it must persist in states of deep sleep and re- lease; for the reason that it does not persist, it must be taken to belong to something else ‘.76” This (argument) lacks coherence. The refutation of the preceding view:- To say that the ahamkara which is essentially insentient manifests the self-luminious soul is as illogical as to assert that a spent coal manifests the sun. In fact, the manifestation of all objects is known to depend on consciousness, which is not insentient and which you consider to be the soul. The assertion-that the non-intelligent ahamkara, which itself depends for its revelation on consciousness, reveals such a consciousness, which manifests all subjects without an exception and which has as its essential nature a luminosity that knows neither birth nor extinction, nor any other modification-will be ridicu ed by those who have understood the real nature of the soul. 16. Naişkarmya Siddhi. Bombay Sanskrt and Prakrit Series. No. 38. Ch. II Stanza 32. p. 70. Atmasiddhi 47 Further, the relation of being the manifesting and the manifested entity cannot obtain between ahamkara and consciousness, for they are opposite in nature.” If the self is admitted to be capable of being manifested, it would imply that, like the pot, it would cease to be con- sciousness. Do not say ’that the surface of the hand, which is itself mani- fested by the sun’s rays, is seen to manifest those rays themselves; for, the surface of the hand is responsible only for the accumulation of thos rays.78 The sun beams thus accumulated are distinctly perceived; hencee, they are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. None of the three alternative ways in which ahamkara could be said to manifest consciousness is tenable:- Again (we ask) what is the nature of this ‘manifestation’, which is said to be effected by the ahmkara in respect of the self which is essentially consciousness? It cannot be said to be the origination of consciousness; for in as much as it is self-dependent, it must be admitted not to depend for its existenee on anything other than itself. Nor can it be said to be the illuminaiion concerning consciousness, since it is not cabable of being apprehended (by another consciousness). Indeed if it is cabable of being experienced (by another consciousness), it would imply that it, like pots, etc.. would cease to consciousness, None of these possible modes of the third alternative is tenable:- For the same reason (i. e, that consciousness is not the object of another consciousness), manifestation cannot be said to be the assis- tance rendered to the instruments of knowledge (concerning conscious- ness). This assitance may be (of three kinds) - (i) It is either such as results from the removal of those obstacles to the rise of knowledge which reside in the object to be known, like the service rendered to the 77. Consciousness and ahamkara have opposite natures. The former has the character of manifesting all objects without an exception; while the latter, being distinct from consciousness, depends for its manifestarion on consciousness. H nce, it is impossible for ahamkara to manifest consciousness. 78. This analogy is unsound, because, unlike the sun’s rays, consciousness is not spread out and cannot be said to be collected by ahamkara. 48 Siddhitrayam eye by light through the dispelling of darkness. (ii) Or, it is the help arising from being the means of contact between objects known and the sense-organs, like the help rendered by the particular instance, mirror, etc., to the eye and the like, which reveal respectively general qualities, one’s own face, etc. (iii) Or, it is the help which accrues from: the removal of the impurities residing in the knower, like the service rendered by (virtues such as) tranquillity, restraint and so on to the iśastras, which are the means of the true knowledge concerning the infinite and the finite self. (It cannot be the first kind, for) there is nothing resident in con- sciousness which impedes the orgination of knowledge (of consciousness) and which could be removed by ahamkara. (You cannot reply that ajñāna dwells in consciousness and is dispelled by ahamkara, for) inasmuch as ignorance would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge, it is impossible to locate it in the witness which you have admitted, and which is devoid of the two qualities (of being the seat of knowledge and its object). Indeed, pots and the like, which are devoid of the possibility of knowledge, are never spoken of as possessing ignorance. Similarly, for the reason that the quality of being the knower never belongs to pure consciousness, it can never possess ignorance. Even if it is so (i. e., even if consciousness possess ignorance), it is not admitted that ignorance is removable by ahamkara, since ignorance can be put an end to only by knowledge, and since it has been so admitted. Besides, knowledge terminates the ignorance which concerns its own objeet only,79 As the quality of being the object of knowledge has not been attributed to consciousness which is regarded as the self, the ignorance residing therein can never be destroyed by anyone at any time. (The ignorance which you speak of as existing in consciousness may be either defined as the antecedent non existence of knowledge or considered as indefinable). Ignorance, which is of the nature of

79. When knowledge arises it dispels only that ignorance which centres round the object known. For example, when the shell is known as shell, this apprehension terminates the illusory cognition of that object which existed till then. If knowledge is said to put an end to all ignorance. it would have to be admitted that knowledge of the true nature of the shell dispels every form of illusion. See Bruta Prakasikā Atmasiddhi 49 the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the rise of knowledge.80 That the following statements- Ignorance is positive in nature; (it is) indefinable; (it is) the material cause of the world; and so on-are merely incoherent prattle will be shown in the section dealing with the relation (of finite souls to the infinite self). Hence, it cannot be said that the manifestation of consci- ousness is effected by the ahamkara whose essential nature is removal of defects in the objects known. (It cannot be the second, for) as consciousness is beyond the reach of the senses (the assistance rendered to the means of knowledge by ahamkara) cannot consist in being responsible for the contact (of the objects known with the senses). (Nor can it be the third, for) as the entity known as ‘I’ is (in your view) the knower, it cannot be cleansed of its impurities by itself. It cannot be maintained that the manifesting entity should manifest the object as residing within itself. Nor can it be said that it is the nature of the manifesting entity to reveal the manifested objects as residing within itself; because such a nature is not observed in the lamp and the like (which manifest things without exhibiting them as residing in themselves); and because, know- ledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the nature of promoting the manifestation of things as they really are. That knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the aforesaid nature follows from the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprämāṇya); and if this is not admitted, there would ensue lack of certainty in anything.
80. The antecedent non- existence of an object cannot be regarded as an obsta- cle to the origination of that object.
81. On the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge four views have been held. According to the Sankhyas the validity and invalidity of know- ledge are both inherent in it. The Nyaya-vaišeşika takes the opposite position and contends that both the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external factors. On this view, knowledge, in itself, is neither true nor false; it is rendered valid or invalid by outside factors. The Buddhists take invalidity to be intrinsic 7 50 Siddhitrayam (With regard to the analogy of the particular instance, vyakti. cited by you), such a manifestation (of the universal as residing in the parti- cular instances) is due to the fact that the universal is only the charac- ter met with in the instances, and not the fact of those instances being the manifesting entities, as it has already been shown (that the case of the lamp flame) falsifies the view (that all manifesting entities reveal objects as taking their abode in themselves). (As for the analogy of the mirror, etc.) mirror and similar objects are only responsibile for the mistake, namely the reflecting of the ocular rays, and are not manifest- ing agents of faces and other objects.82 The real manifesting agents however, are only light and the like. Although light is the real mani- festing agent the false impression (of the face appearing within the mirror) is the outcome of the mistake of the deflection (of the ocular rays). But here, the capacity to produce a similar mistake (in the self- luminous consciousness) does not belong to the entity known as ‘I’. If it is so, (it. e. if that capacity belongs to the ‘I’), then perception and other forms of knowledge would lose their validity; and hence, nothing would be true. Therefore, what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness, but the entity ‘I’, which reveals itself as a knower. F Refutation of the contention of Suresvara that in deep sleep there is no consciousness of ‘I’. As regards your contention that in deep sleep and release the self manifests itself only as mere consciousness and does not appear as ‘I’ the belief that in deep sleep such a condition of consciousness prevails (i. e., consciousness shining forth without an object or a substrate) has to knowledge, and validity extrinsic. The Mimasakas and Vedantins, while ad- mitting the Nyaya-vaiseṣika view in regard to invalidity of knowledge, maintain that validity is inherent in knowledge.
82. The general proposition ‘all manifesting entities reveal their objects as residing within themselves’ was sought to be established on the strength of instances such as mirror, etc. In refuting this view, it was first pointed out that there are instances against this generalisation. Now it is shown that even the instnces cited by the opponent do not prove his case. The mirror, for example, is responsible only for reflecting the ocular rays, and not for manifesting the face. The real manifesting agents are light and the like.Atmasiddhi 83 51 already been refuted. Since even in deep sleep the self does present itself up to the time of waking only in the form of the ‘I’, (the mani- festatin of the ‘I’ cannot be said to be absent in that state) 93. If it is said that on account of the absence of consciousness of external- objects, and prevalence of darkness (tamas) in deep sleep, the ‘I’ does not present itself clearly and distinctly, (we reply that) it must be ad- -mitted that even the consciousness posited by you does not, likewise, present itself clearly aud distinctly in that state. No one who has risen from deep sleep is found to recall the experience which occurred to him during sleep, namely, ‘I am not I (ahamkara.; nor am I anything else (the knower or the known); but I am only pure consciousness and I stand as the witness of ignorance.’ If you were to say that from the reflection ‘For so long a time I knew nothing at all’ such a position (namely, that in deep sleep there is presentation of pure consciousness only) is made out, (we ask) how (is it made out)? (If your reply is that) this follows from the expression ’nothing at all’ (occurring in the aforesaid reflection, we rejoin) in that case, the manifestation of consciousness also would have to be denied. Analysis of your statement establishes just the opposite of what you intend to prove. While in the judgment, ‘I knew nothing at all,’ the word ‘I’ denotes clearly the self which is manifested in deep sleep and the words ‘knew nothing at all’ negative (all) knowledge on the part of that ‘I’, the fool who manitains (that the self-same judgment establishes) that in deep sleep there is manifestation of pure conscious- ness along with the absence of the presentation of ‘I’ does not know its contradiction to experience. It has already been said that there can be no knowledge without an object and without a substrate. The reflection “I was not even aware of my self” does not mean the absence of ‘I’ but something else:- You may ask: Do we not, on waking, get the knowledge ‘I who slept, was not even conscious of my self”? (Does it not indicate that
83. Ekarupeņa also suggests that presentation of the self as ‘I’ is common to everybody. 52 Siddhitrayam in sleep there is absence of the manifestation of ‘I’)?. True, (we reply): that knowledge (namely, the reflection ‘I was not even conscious of myself’) after indicating by the word ‘myself’ the self, which, in the waking state, is understood as being characterised by caste, stage in life, etc., shows that the ‘I’, which shines forth in sleep, which is not clearly experienced, and which manifests itself for its own sake, is not known in such a manner (i. e. as characterised by caste, stage in life, etc.); but it does not show that the ‘I’ whose essential nature is to be the knower, is itself not apprehended. Indeed, our reflection is to the effect: ‘I did not even know myself as having slept in a particular place and as pos- sessing certain characteristics.’ The statement in question undoubtedly points to the existence of the ‘I’ and its manifestation. Moreover, your position indeed is this, namely, that in deep sleep the self exists as the witness of ignorance. And it has already been said that to be a witness is to be a direct knower. This witness too is nothing but the ‘I’ which is apprehended in the judgment ‘I know’; how then, could this ‘I’ not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which Illumines itself for its own sake appears only as the ‘I’; hence, it follows that the self, which shines forth even in sleep and other similar states, appears only as the ‘I’. The ‘I’ (ahamartha) persists in the state of release:- To maintain that the ‘I’ does not persist in the state of liberation is unsound; for, it amounts to asserting, as is done in Buddhism, but in a somewhat different way, that release consists only in the annihilation of the self. The ‘I’ is not a mere attribute of the self; if it were an attribute, it may be said that even after its destruction the self exists in its true being, as it persists on the dissolution of ignorance. In fact, the true being of the self is nothing but the ‘I’; and knowledge appears to the self as an attribute of the latter as is evident from the judgment ‘knowledge has arisen in me’. (It has been shown that even granting your position that the self exists as a witness of ignorance in deep sleep it does not follow that the ‘I’ disappears in that state.) There is no Atmasiddhi 53 need to argue the point, when something other than the witnessing con- sciousness (sākṣşicaitanya) is the self. On the stength of the sacred text relating to liberation and endeavour of souls for securing moksa the existence of ‘1’ (ahamartha) is proved. Moreover, he who considers himself to be afflicted by the miseries of worldly existence, whether in truth or in error, and thinks ‘I am suffering pain’, and in whom the desire for release has arisen, making him reflect: ‘How may I become tranquil and blissful, setting aside this entire collection of miseries?’, he alone enters upon the means for realisation. If (on the other hand) he were to realise ‘I should be no more if I practised the means (for the attainment of release)’, he would run away at the very mention of the topic of release. As a consequence of this, since there can be none possessing the requisite qualifications (to enter upon the study of the scriptures), the entire upaniṣadic texts and all the sastras relating to liberation would lose their validity.84 If you were to say that mere luminosity which is indicated by the word ‘I’ would persist in the state of release, (we ask) ‘Of what use is it?’ For, no sensible person would exert himself under the influence of the idea ‘Though I shall perish, there will remain some luminosity;85 Refutation of the view that the “I” is an objective element (i.e. it is jaḍa) For the same reason, even the contention-that in self-conscious- ness (which expresses itself in the judgment ‘I know’) that element which is not referred to by the word ’this’ (i. e. the non-objective element, pratyagartha), which has consciousness for its sole essence, and which is luminosity, is the self; and that in the same self-consciousness what
84. The validity of scriptures consists in their generating true knowledge in the mind of the aspirant. If there were no qualified pupils to study them they would lose their validity
85. Cf. Sri Bhāṣya. Nirastakhiladuḥkhoham anantanadabhāk svarat | Bhaveyamiti mokṣarthi śrvaņā dau pravartate || Ahamarthavināśaścet mokṣa ityadhyavasyati | Apasarpedasu mokşakathaprastā vagandhataḥ || Mayi naştepi mattonya kacit jñaptiravasthita | Iti tatpraptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati || 54 Siddhitrayam has to be considered as objective element (yuşmadartha, paragartha), for the reason that it depends for its manifestation on consciousness, is the ‘I’ referred to in the judgment ‘I know’-stands condemned.86 It is also contradicted by direct perception, (for the judgment ‘I know’ implies that knowledge is an attribute and that the ‘I’ is its possessor, and that knowledge is an objective element (parak), while the ‘I’ is a non-objective element, (pratyak). The statement that the intelligent entity refered to in the judg- ment ‘I know’ is an objective element (parak) is as self-contradictory in its meaning as the assertion ‘My mother is a barren woman’. Nor can it be said that this intelligent entity depends on something else for its manifestaion (and is hence parak, i. e., non-soul, for, being of the nature of consciousness, it is self-luminous. Since luminosity, by the very fact of its being luminosity, must necessarily pertain to something or other, as in the case of the luminosity of the pot, etc., mere luminosity cannot be the soul. Therefore, that en- tity alone which shines forth as the knower and termed ‘I’ is the self. Even in the state of release, the self shines to itself at ‘I’ This self, even in the state of release, shines to itself only as the ‘I’, for it shines for its own sake. (There is the general principle that) whatever shines for its own sake is found to shine only as the ‘I’; for example, the self which is subject to the round of births and deaths is admitted by both the contending parties to shine in such a manner. Whatever does not appear as ‘I’ does not shine for its own sake; as pots and the like. The released soul does appear for its own sake. Therefore, it appears as the ‘I’ and in no other way.
86. Two arguments of the opponent are here referred to. The first seeks to prove that consciousness is the soul, for the reason that it is a non-objective element; that it is non-objective is inferable from its being self-luminous; its self- luminous nature follows from its being consciousness. The second tries to establish that the entity ‘I’ is not the self, because it is an objective element. That the ‘I’ is an objective element is shown by its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation. Its dependence on consciousness for its manifestaion is inferred from its being distinct from consciousness. Atmasiddhi 55 The consciousness of ‘I’ is natural and not due to occasional factors.- J It cannot be said that if the released self appears in such a manner (i. e.. as the ‘I’) it would imply that it is involved in ignorance and samsara; for, this would contradict the nature of being a released soul; moreover, the consciousness, of ‘I’ does not have for its cause the quality of being subject to ignorance and samsara. Since even persons like Vāmadeva, who have had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety by means of the direct realisation of Brahman as the self of all, are found to have the consciousness of ‘I’, the latter cannot, in fact, have ignorance for its cause. The scriptures say - ‘Seeing this, the sage Vamadeva understood: I was Manu and the Sun.287 ‘I alone exist and shall exist.“88 From the following passages and others like them it is clear that a similar reference to Himself as ‘I’ is noticed even in the case of the Highest Person, who is not afflicted even in the least by ignor- ance and other evils in any manner and at any time. (The following scriptural passages are found) ‘Let me enter these three divinities (i. e., fire, water and food);99 ‘May I become manifested and be born’; 90 ‘He thought: May I create the worlds” “91 (It is said in the Gita) ‘Since I transcend the destructible (kṣara) and am also superior even to the Indestructible (aksara), I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person’;92 ‘I am he who lifts them ‘I am the giver of the seed, the father’; 94 I know the things past,;, and so on. 9.93 ‘Ahamkara’ which refers to the body and which is a product of matter is the result of delusion and has to be dispelled- (It may be asked) ‘If the ‘I’ really constituted the self, how could the Highest Lord have included ahamkara among the elements that go to make up the material embodiment of the self (kşetra), and how could he have classed it among the evils to be rejected?96 (Our reply
87. Brh. Up. I. iv. 10.

Bh. Gitā. XV. 18. 88. Atha. Up. I. i. 93. Bh. Gitä. XII. 7. 89. Chand. Up. VI. iii. 2. 94. Bh. Gitā. XIV. 4. 90. Chand. Up. VI. ii. 3. 91. Ait. Up. I. i. 95. Bh. Gitā. XII. 26. 96. Bh. Gitā. XVI, 18. 56 … 98 Siddhitrayam is) the teaching of the Highest Lord found in the verse (of the Gita XV. 5) commencing with the words ‘The great elements, the ahamkara to the effect that ahamkara is to be included among th objects that constitute the material embodiment of the self (kşetra) really refers only to that modification of unmanifest prakṛti by whose instrumen- tality the body, which distinct from the real self denoted by the word ‘I’, is erroneously taken to be ‘I’. And this ahamkara, which is res ponsible for our slighting persons who are worthy of respect, and which is termed conceit, is often referred to by sastras as meriting rejection. It is only where the self appears as ‘I’-‘I am deva’ - I am man- the possibility of ajnana airses- Therefore, it is proper to conclude that the consciousness of ‘I’, which has nothing to contradict it, has really the self for its object; and that, on the other hand, the consciousness of ‘I’ which arises in regard to the body that is not the soul, is ignorance. (In agreement with this) it has been said by (Parāśara) the grandson of Vasistha: ‘O thou! the giver of delight to thy family! Hear from me the essential nature of ignorance; it is the consideration of the not-self as the self.“97 (Our position squares well with Parāśara’s definition of ignorance; but yours does not; for,) the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness occurs to no one. Even to you, who maintain that pure consciousness alone is self, the consideration of the non-soul as the self will be possible, if there is the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness. As is proved by perception (the judgment ‘I know’ establishes knowledge to be an attribute and the ‘I’ to be its possessor), and as it results from the application of the aforesaid reasons (such as, if pure consciousness alone persisted and the ‘I’ disappeared in the state of release, no one would strive for realisation), and as scriptural texts (declare that even released souls refer to themselves as ‘I’), and as there is the possibility of ignorance (only on our position), it follows that the self which is the knower presents itself as the ‘I’. 97. Visnu Purana. VI. vii. 10. Atmasiddhi 57 The unsoundness of the argument that consciousness itself is the soul as it is insentient With regard to (your) assertion that consciousness itself is the self because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent, it has to be pointed out (that you must explain) what you understand by ’not non- intelligence’. If it is replied that a non-intelligent entity is that which may (at times) fail to manifest itself, even though it be existent, and that an intelligent entity is that which has an opposite nature, namely, an existence invariably associated with manifestation (we point out that) since pleasure and the like are not considered to be soul even though they are not non-intelligent your reason is fallacious. Indeed, when pleasure, pain, desire and the like exist at all they never fail to present themselves. (If an intelligent entity is defined as) that which depends for its manifestation on its own existenee, (we point out that) since the lamp and the like are not taken to be the soul even though they depend for their manifestation on their own existence, your reason is fallacious. Besides, as a manifestation different from consciousness is not admitted (by you) your hetu (reason), namely, intelligence occurring in the argument that consciousness itself is the soul, because. it is intelligent) becomes unestablished (i. e. commits the fallacy of svarupasiddha); it also contradicts your theory (that consciousness is attributeless). If it is your view that pleasure and the like, although invariably associated with manifestation, are bound to be non-intelligent, for the reason that, like the pot, they manifest themselves for the sake of others, and are in consequence, to be considered as not-soul, (we ask in reply,) Do you mean then to suggest that knowledge too manifests itself for the sake of something other than itself, namely, the knower, the ‘I’? The judgment ‘I know’ establishes this, even as the judgment ‘I am having pleasure’ (proves that pleasure presents itself for the sake of the ‘I’). Therefore, the quality of being not non-intelligent (ajaḍatva), taken in the sense of the quality of manifesting for one’s own sake, does not exist (asiddha) in consciousness (which is the minor term or paksa in your argument). Hence, it is only the entity known as ‘I’, which is not non-intelligent, and which manifests itself for its own sake by its own existence that constitutes the self. The luminosity 8 53 Siddhitrayam of consciousness itself is dependent on its connection with the self. That is why knowledge, as in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, mani- fests itself to that intelligent person who is its own substrate, and not to anybody else. The self, on the contrary, does not present itself for its own sake by depending on its connection with some other soul or some other entity. This will be explained presently. The argument that on account of the invariable concomitance of the knowledge of ‘I’ and consciousness they are identical is unsound- You cannot maintain that the invariable association of the mani- festation of ‘I’ with consciousness prevents us from taking the ‘I’ to be a distinct entity; for, on the same count, it might as well follow that con- sciousness itself cannot be taken to be a distinct entity. Since it (con- sciousness) invariably manifests itself along with the ‘I’, it would follow that consciousness also is not an entity different from ‘I’ and that it is unreal. Moreover, since in each item of knowledge we meet with the absence of the invariable association of the manifestation of ‘I’, the invariable manifestation of ‘I’ with any particular item of knowledge does not exist. Besides, there is neither an object (visaya) apart (from its knowledge) nor pure knowledge divested of any relation to all parti- cular objects; if either existed, then the invariable concomitance of the manifestation of knower with knowledge could be posited.98 And even if the property common to all knowledge (jñānasāmanya) is existent, it 98. Having pointed out that the sahopalambhaniyama itself is impossible for the reason that there is the presentation of the ‘I’ even in the absence of any parti- cular item of knowledge, Yamunacārya proceeds to establish the defective nature of the illustrative example, which the opponent must cite in his argument, namely, wherever there is invariable apprehension of two things together there’must be non-difference between them, as in the case of knowledge and its object. In order to prove that knowledge and its visaya are non-different, the object by itself and the knowledge by itself must be taken and shown to be invariably concomitant. But, in truth, neither exists apart from the other. Hence, the illustrative example is subject to the charge of being unproven. Atmasiddhi 59 is not considered to be a positive entity by the Buddhists.99 We shall show that even in the absence of all (knowledge due to mental) modifi- cations, the soul exists as a self-luminous entity. From the assertion that the two (i. e., knowledge and knower) are one, there arises a contra- diction in the opponent’s own statement; for, the word saha (with) is used only when two entities enter on an identical course of action, as in the instance ‘with the pupil, the preceptor comes’. Further. after refer- ring to the two (i. e. blue and its awareness) by the expression nila- taddhiyoḥ to assert (their) identity by the word abhedaḥ (non- difference) 100 is like stating that one’s mother is a barren woman. Besides, in view of the fact that qualities such as non-intelligencc and the like are denied to consciousness, and in view of the fact that the knowledge of the soul in bondage is invariably apprchended along with the all-embracing knowledge of the omniscient being (sarvajña) (your hetu) is liable to be charged with anekanta dosa.101 If, in their case (i. e., between the knowledge of the soul in bondage and that of the sarvajña), non - difference is admitted, the quality of non - intelligence and that of having a form and the like would have to 99. The Buddhists cannot hope to escape the difficulty by saying that between vişayatva (the property of being an object of knowledge) and jñānatva (the property common to all knowledge) there is invariable concomitance, for they do not consider sāmānya (universal) to be a positive entity. Its admission, they say, leads to all sorts of absurdities. The universal is, at best, a working fiction, a useful device in thinking. When certain things are regarded as similar, it is not in virtue of their possessing some common features, but because of their distinction from the rest. The perception of a cow, for example, does not indicate that cowness, as a positive quality. exists in that creature; it only signifies that it is different from all non-cows (apoha) See Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts. 100. The reference here is to the Buddhistic dictum-sahopalambhaniyamada- bhedo nilataddhiyoḥ. 101. By drawing attention to the fact that the hetu (sahopalambhaniyama) is present even in cases where the sadhya (non-difference) is not known to exist, Yamunarya exposes the fallacy (i. e. anekanta) vitiating the argument of the opponent. The latter may try to meet this by admitting that even in those cases the sadhya is really present. In reply to this, Yamuna says in the next sentence that this admission leads to absurdities. 60 Siddhitrayam be ascribed to consciousness, and the quality of being a bound soul would have to be attributed to the Buddha. Even the contention that since one and the same consciousness presents the invariable concomitance of knower known and knowledge they are identical is refuted- As shown before, even the contention of their (knowledge and knower) being invariably the objects (visaya) of one and the same knowledge stands condemned.102 Besides, here the non-existence o the hetu in cases where the sadhya is known to be absent (vipaksa) cannot be established; for there may be the invariable presentation of knowledge, the known and the knower in one and the same knowledge, and still there may not be non-difference between them.103 What is the inconsistency here? Do (objects of knowledge, such as) blue and the like depend for their apprehension and consideration on knowledge either because they are not self-luminous or because of their non- difference (from knowledge)? As, in this manner, it becomes a matter for doubt, it is impossible to determine that there is this non-difference. And this generalisation (that everything depends for its manifestation on consciousness) obtains only in the case of objects known and not in that of knowledge or the knower. Besides, the conflict (of this theory) with perceptual experience is obvious; for, in every knowledge, the distinction of the knower from knowledge is apprehended. (At this stage the opponent may object and say that the distinction of knower from knowledge cannot be perceived, since the counter-correlative (i. e., knowledge) is not perceived; and that 102. To obviate the contradiction invoived in sahopalambhaniyama to which attention of the opponent was drawn, he shifts his ground and employs a different hetu, namely, niyamena ekajnanasiddhatvam. 103. The opponent argues that knowledge and the knower must be identical; for they are invariably apprehended together in one and the same knowledge. Against the possible objection they may be so apprehended and still may not be identical, he must adduce the indirect proof (tarka) that if they were not identical, they could not be apprehended together in the self-same knowledge. It is shown here that he is unable to do so.Atmasiddhi 61 even if it is admitted to be perceptible on the strength of the doctrine of svayamprakāśatva, it does not help, since it is not visible. To this we reply) in the matter of the perception of difference there is no necessity for the counter - correlative (pratiyogi) to be either perceptible or visible; for when the direct perception of difference is possible with the aid of the mere thought of the counter - correlative, a particular variety of this knowledge is not required, in as much as it is not responsible (for the perception of difference). (We may go a step further and say that) even when the counter-correlative is not apprehended, things are directly per- ceived as being distinct in themselves; 104 and this will be testified to by everybody from his own experience. The contention that knower and known are one on ground of invariable concomitance even as difjerent flames are considered one on account of similarity- (The opponent may ask) since, by trampling on the head of the perception of difference which is alive, (we) notice the universal con- comitance between the invariable manifestation (of two things) together and their non-difference, how can the sublation of non-difference be effected by perception of difference? If it could be effected, even the inference regarding the difference of the flames (at sucessive moments would be stultified by the recognition of their identity. (The reply is that) the fool (of an opponent) is ignorant of the distinction (between these two cases.). Indeed in the case of the flame, the perceptual 104. The apprehension of the generic property (jati) of a thing, say a pot, is nothing more than the apprehension of the distinction from other things, i.e., non- pots; and it prevents erroneous identifications. In fact, difference (bheda) is nothing more than generie property (jati). To grasp the generic property in itself it is unnecessary that the counter-correlative (pratiyogi) should have been perceived But the generic property, in its aspect of eliminating erroneous identifications is known as bheda (difference), and is, certainly, found to pre-suppose knowledge of the pratiyogi. See Sri Bhasya. Ananda Press edn. p. 29: see also verses 13-14 of Adravyasara in Tattvamuktakalapa and Sarvartha siddhi yada punaḥ adhyasa nivartakatvarūpadharmantaravaišistyena vyavahriyante, tada bheda iti tena tesameva dharmaņam vastusvarupeņa vyavahriama nadmne pratiyogisa peksatvam | adhyasanivartakatvarupadharmantaravaisiṣtyena vyavahriyamāņānām pratiyogisă pekṣatvam iti | ucyante | 62 Siddhitrayam knowledge, which arises when there is continuity of the defects in the settled causes (of knowledge) in capable of sublating the inference which is based upon defectless perception. To make the point clear-it is found that, on account of close similarity between the different flames that are extinguished and lighted immediately after and which exist in the parts of one and the same which the remembrance “This is, certainly, that flame which I saw before” occurs to one who has not noticed their difference. The example of different terms appearing as identrcal is not helpful- Therefore, even in other cases (where the flames are not extin- guished and kindled afresh), as there is the occurrence of a series of the complete set of causal factors, which have no counter-acting circum- stances, and as there is the separation of parts (of the causal conditions) it is to be concluded that such a knowledge (of identity) has for its object closely similar and incessantly flowing flame-series. Similarly, as the cognition of diversity in regard to one and the same thing is found in the case of seeing the moon double and the like as being occasioned by the swerving from the normal mode of the working of the sense-organ,105 and as having its object 105. Either through pressure of the finger upon the eve or on account of some defect in the visual mechanism, the rays of the organ of sight (nayanaraśmi) split and travel in two directions, there by creating, for all practical purposes, two mu- tually independent apparatuses of vision. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place, without, however. apprehending her unity; the other, which moves some what obliquely, apprehends. at first, a place close by the moon, and sud- sequently the moon herself, without. however, noticing the intervening space sepa- rating this place and the moon. These two perceptions-one manifesting the moon in her proper place. and other in a place close by-arise in such quick succession that the perceiver fails to notice the order of their occurrence, and thereby omits to note their varying natures. Thus, the double apparatus causes two apprehensions; and as the apprehensions differ, there is also difference in the character of the object apprehended. The mistake here lies in the failure to notice the fact that the duality found in the places is unrelated to the moon. Hence, the perception of two moons. The Prabhakara account, which is closely similar to this, would, however, say that the double apparatus yields a duality of apprehensions, but it fails to grasp that the duality present in the apprehensions is is unrelated to the moon. Compare: ’netravṛttiḥ vittigatadvitvam candrañca agrhitabhedam gṛhṇatiti Prabhakarah | yatha Atmasiddhi 63 contradicted by the simultaneously arising defectless arising defectless cognitions of many persons, this (perception of diversity) is not capable of setting aside the inference of identity in those cases. But here, the knowledge which immediately apprehends the distinction of the knower, knowledge and the known is not of such a nature; hence, here it certainly does pre- vent the very possibility of the birth of the inference of identity. But, here it is not proper to say that identity is inferable on the mere basis of the invariable manifestation of two things together;106 for we know of no obstacle preventing the existence of this hetu (probans) in cases where the sadhya (that which is to be proved) is absent It may as well be that this invariable apprehension is due to objects depending for their manifestation on consciousness. Since the reference to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses serves no purpose for the reason that (knowledge and knower) are not cognised by the senses, (you cannot point out that the perception of difference, like the perception of two moons, is due to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses). As the existence of a sublating cognition is denied by effectual non-perception, (the percep- tion of difference cannot be declared to be false). Moreover, consciousness is well-known to be the manifestation of. objects; 107 and that it is self-luminous is beyond dispute; hence, such an invariable manifestation of knowledge and the known is unavoidable. Pamvitsiddhau Pradhakarama’ opanya se “netravṛttir dvidhābhūtā dve tu apli vitan- vali | dvitvam candrañca yugapat nirbhasayati tatra nah” | iti deśagatadvitvam candrañca agrhitabhedam gṛhņatiti tatotra vaişamyam | Srutaprakäsikā. The verse quoted from Samvitsiddhi is not found in the printed printed books and manuscripts examined so far. books 105. Upalabdhisahityani aniyama and sahopalambhaniyama are identical. The fallacy of anekanta vitiating this hetu was first exposed. Here it is shown that the inability to cite indirect proof applies to this, as it does to the other hetu, namely, niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam. *The Benares edition .eads vitti; the vrriant reading found in the Telugu edi- tion and in some manuscripts has been preforred. 107. See note 104. 64 Siddhitrayam The contention that distinction (of objects from one another) can be established without the aid of consciousness is not likely to be put for- ward by any one who is not mad. Let this violent shaking of the doct- rine which is opposed to experience suffice. Refutation of the contention that there is no object that does not manifest itself- Since the notion that the manifestation of objects, such as, blue and the like, which, in their nature, are not self-luminous, (is effected by consciousness) is vouched for by experience, it requires no other proof. The self, on the contrary, is essentially self-luminous. On this count alone, the self cannot be knowledge, as the former is self- dependent. It has already been stated that knowledge is dependent (on the self), that it is occasional, that it exists only so long as the causes, such as, the eontaet of the senses with their objects, persist, and that its nature is to pertain to some object or other. The self, on the contrary, is independent, and is the knowing subject; it shines as the ‘I’ in every self. -0- Even when it is of this nature, if the self is termed knowledge, on the ground that it does not depend for its manifestation on something other than itself, you are welcome to say so. Even when it is so (described), surely, this knowledge is the possessor of knowledge, and not such a pure consciousness (as is held by you). Scriptural support for the existence of a soul distinct from consciousness: Indeed, for that very reason, the Chandogas (those who chant the Sama-veda) declare “He who has the awareness of ’let me smell this he is the self.’[103 Similarly, after the question “what is the soul?” has been raised, Vajasaneyins offer the same definition (of the soul, namely ‘,He who is in the midst of the senses and vital breath, who has knowledge for his essence and who is the light inside the heart, he is the person, “>109 It is only in the manner indicated already that the true nature of the soul has been here described as follows-,,He who is 108. Chand., Up. VII. xii.4. 109. Brh. Up. IV. lit. 7. 10 Atmasiddhi 65 experienced by everybody, who is filled with knowledge concerning di- verse objects, who resides among the senses and breath as their director, who is the inward light in the region of the shines for his own sake as the ‘I, is the purusa,,,heart, and who 3 of The f Atharva veda say “Truly, this entity, the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (mantr), knower (boddhr), doer (karta), he who has knowledge for his essence, is the púruşa. 110 Similarly, the following and other passages are found :—“Lo! whereby would one understand the under- stander?” “The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world” 112; “He (the highest light to which the jiva reaches up) is the Supreme Person, ““The jiva experiences him in diverse ways. . . not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin " “Even so. the sixteen parts (kalas) of the experiencer (jiva), which depend (for their existence, nature and continuance) on the Highest Person, on reaching Him, become incapable of entangling Him in plea- sure, pain, etc.” 114 “Different from that made of mind is another inner soul consisting of knowledge.

115 13 Even while defining Brahman, in the text– Brahman is satya, jñāna ……..’ the word jñāna does not refer to mere knowledge, but to the possessor of it; for, if it referred to the former, according to the sutra-liti 116– it would follow that the first syllable must have the principal accent. But this word, jñāna has its principal accent on the last syllable. The word jñāna being so accented will be appropriate only if it has, at its termination, the suffix ac, which conveys the same meaning as the suffix matup. Otherwise, it would not be (appropriate). We shall explain this very clearly while treating of the Supreme Self. The Aitareya Upanisad also, after describing Brahman in the words ‘prajñāna is Brahman’, refers to the Lord as the possessor of supreme intelligence by the expres- sion ‘he (Vamadeva), by means of this Self possessed of intelligence. 117 Therefore, it is clear that this soul is truly the knower.

110. Piasna. Up. IV.
111. Brh. Up. II. iv. 14. 112. Chand. Up. VII. xxvi. 2 113. Chand. Up. VIII. xii 3
112. Prasna. Up. V 115. Tait. Up. II. 4
113. Aṣṭādhyāyi. VI. i 193
114. Ait. Up. Part V. 21 9

Siddhitrayam THE PRAMANA BY WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE JIVA IS ESTABLISHED (a) The Nyaya view that the soul is established through inference- 25. What is the means of knowledge (pramaņa) by which this in- dividul self, which is distinct from the body and the like, and which is intelligent, is established? Akṣapada, who is master of the science of logic, thinks that it is inference. What he says is-Desire, hate, plea- sure, pain and knowledge are the reasons pointing to the existence of the soul. 118 Has invariable concomitance between these and the soul, like that between smoke and fire (dhūmadhvaja), been observed anywhere? Indeed, if so, as the knowledge of the self is obtained thence itself, what is the need for inference? (The opponent replies) no invariable con- comitance may have been observed in particular (between qualities such as desire, etc., and the soul); but, in general (i.e., between qualities and their substrate), it may be noticed. To make the point clear… Desire and other qualities, like sound and so on, are inferred to be dependent upon something, for the reason of their being effects, non-eternal (entites) attributes, and so on. That which is the substrate of these, (qualities) is the self. That desire and the like are qualities is inferred by elimination. Being non-eternal, they cannot be either generality (samanya), or parti- cularity (višesa), or inherence (samavaya), or non-existence (abhāva). As they are inherent in all-pervasive substances, they cannot be either sub- stance (dravya) or action (karma). That they are specific qualities, (visesaguna) is established by the fact that at all times, like colour and other qualities, they, while being non-eternal, are grasped by one of our senses. After proving in general terms that consciousness, being a guna, must have a substrate, it is shown by a process of elimination that it must be a specific entity, namely ātmā :- The reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (anvayavya- tirekino hetavaḥ), which, in this manner, indicate only (the need of) some substrate (for desire, etc.), are narrowed down in their scope in such a 118. Icchadvesaprayatnasukhajñānānyatmano linani Nyaya-Sutra, Ii 10 Atmasiddhi 67 way as to refer to the soul by the reasons which are conconmitat in nega- tion only (kevalayyatirekisadhanaiḥ) and which disprove the view that they are qualities of substances other than the soul. That this is so is evident from the following:-Desire and the like are not the qualities of the primal elements (mahābhūtas), because they are perceived only by one- self, or because they are not to be grasped by the outer senses. The qualities belonging to the primal elements, such as colour and the like, are perceivable by oneself and others and are perceived by the outer senses’; but desire and the like are not so (perceivable); hence, they are not the qualities of primal elements. Again, space (dik), time and mind (manas) do not have specific qualities; and their attributes are not open to percep- tion; hence, desire and the like are not their qualities. Reasons, such as the following—since they are not dependent on the causal substances; since they do not exist as long as the body lasts–(reasons) which were cited before, and which refute the view that they are specific qualities of the body, are to be brought forward and applied here also. Therefore. desire and the like are not the qualities of the body; for, while there is evidence contradicting the view that they are the qualities of the body, they are qualities. Whatever does not possess the sadhya does not have the aforesaid sadhana either, as in the case of colour. Desires and the like, however, possess the aforesaid hetu, and hence, they possess the sādhya. Or, the thesis to be proved (instead of being ‘Desire and the like are not the qualities of the body’) may be the following–Desire and the like are qualities of some substance other than the body, which is the point under dispute.119 The aforesaid hotu and illustrative example may be cited (in the case of this thesis also). Positive concomitance too may be shown in a somewhat general way. That which is a quality, when there is evidence contradicting the view that it is the quality of a given entity. is the attribute of something other than that given entity, just as sound is the quality of something other than earth and the like. In this way, just as ether (äkāśa) is proved (to be the substrate of sound), the self is established (to be the substrate of desire and the like.) 119. The point in dispute is not the existence of the body, but its possessing desires etc., as attributes. 68 -agon ai datinum Siddhitrayam Refutation of the Nyaya view 26. Some consider that this (view) is not correct. To elucidate this point:—with the aid of reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (anvayavyatireki) it was only made known that there must be some support (for desire and other qualities), which might be either the body or some other substance. By this reasoning alone the soul is not established (to be that substrate). b Argument from pure negative concomitance fares no better:- 36 2901005 mun bus er 13011 The reason concomitant in negation alone (kevalavyatireki) does not even possess the quality of being a correct reason; for, as in the fallacy called asadharana, there is absence of the probans in inst- ances where the sadhya is surely, met with (sapaksa).120 The objection that on this admission, even the reason concomitant in affirmation alone cannot be considered as correct: for, as in the fallacy known as sadharana, there is the failure to show the absence of the reason in the counter-example (vipaksa) 11-(this objection) does not stand. Since, even in the absence of suspected limiting conditions (upadhis), such as space, time and the like, the co-presence (of the hetu and the sadhya) is 21 53501 7311 23. 120. In the argument, sound is eternal, because it is sound the hetu is vitiated by the fallacy of asadharana; for, it is not present in any sapaksa (i.c… similar examples where the sadhya is present) even as it is not present in the vipaksa. Simil- arly, in cases where reasons concomitant in negation alone (kevalavyatireki) are em- ployed, there being no sapaksa, it is impossible to show the presence of the hetu in apaksas. Hence, kevalavyatireki is considered fallacious. It is defective for another reason also. In order to show that wherever the sadhya is absent the hetu is also absent the sadhya must first have been understood previously; but it is not met with any- where. Hence, the Vedantins dismiss kevalavyatirkie as being faulty. Cf. ‘sadhyābhāvo vipakse kathamiva viditah tasya sadhyaprasiddheh’ Tattvamuktakalapa, Buddhisara, versa 53. See also Nyaya-Parisuddhi (Memorial edition, pp. 66-75) and Didhiti. The Vedanta Paribhasa rejects kevalanvayi also, on the score that the kevalanvayi requires a sadhya which is present everywhere and such a sadhya is inadmissible on the theory that Brahman is nirguna. bodo d 121: The opponent says In the argument the mountain has fire, because it is knowable’, the hetu is defective (sadharna), because it is not absent in the vipaksa. Similarly, in arguments employing reasons concomitant in affirmation alone (kevalan- vayi), there being no vipaksa, the absence of the hetu in the vipaksa cannot be cited. Hence, kevalanvayi also is a defective process of reasoning. Atmasiddhi 69 found, it is definitely ascertained that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sadhya. From the mere observation of the absence of the sadhya when there is the absence of the hetu, it is not possible to ascertain that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sadhya. As the non-existence of the sadhya is met with in innumerable places, it is impossible even to take note of them all exhaustively. If even in a single place the hetu were to be present in some manner, the universality of the connection cannot be maintained. Besides, it is a matter for doubt whether the non-existence of the sadhya is due to the absence of the hotu or to some other cause. Even the thesis (that desire and the like) are the qualities of some entity other than earth and the like may be charged with having an unproven attribute (aprasiddha- viseṣaṇa), for that other entity has not been proved. (b) The Sankhya View The Sankhya mode of proof stands discredited for the same reasons:- 27. By the same reasoning, even the various reasons (such as collocations exist for the sake of others) are to be understood as having been set aside. 3. i 9 The Sankhya proofs for the existence of soul.ee w Let us analyse them in the order of their presentation. “Since collocations exist for the sake of something other than themselves, since (in this other) there is the absence of the three gunas and the like, since there must be control (of these collocations), since there must be an experiencer, and since there is activity for securing aloofness (from sprakṛti), the soul exists.” 122 This means–Being collocations, the body, the senses and so on, like a bed, a seat, a house, etc., exist for the sake of something other than themselves. The character of being a collocation attributed to the body and the primal elements is vouched for by perception. That the same character (of being a collocation) belongs to unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta), mahat, ahamkara and the senses, as to the body and elements, is to be inferred from the fact that the former are of the nature of pleasure, misery and delusion. 122. Sankhya-Kärikā. verse 17. در 19 70 Siddhitrayam 99 124 (A possible objection is that) when the senses are admitted to be derived from ahamkara and when the meaning of what is accepted as the sadhya, namely, the quality of existing for the sake of another is the quality of existing for the sake of another which is itself not a collo- cation, the respective reasons for the above only prove the opposite, and hence, they are subject to the fallacy of ubhaya-viseşaviruddha.123 (The Sankhya replies) this objection cannot be raised. Since the presence or the absence of the senses is dependent respectively upon the presence or the absence of ahamkara, since there is support of scriptural passage such as, “The senses are considered to proceed from ahamkara. since there is contact of qualities, viz., brigthtness and ligthtness 125 (with the senses), the fact that the senses have for their source that variety of ahamkara where-in the sattva quality predominates and which is known as vaikarika is well supported by evidence; hence, it would be improper to deny this fact. Even so, the belief that the self is not a collocation is unshakables, for the reason that (1) if the soul were itself a collcation as it would have to exist for the sake of another collocation, there would result an unending series, and, as a consequence, many things for which evidence is lacking would have to be assumed; (2) the quality of being a collcation is not responsible for an entity being a sesi (i. e. one for whose sake others exist); and (3) inference itself would lose its validity, if also the qualities found in the illustrative examples are taken into con- sideration.126 When the refutation of the statements-that the senses do not proceed from ahamkara; and that the body, senses and the like exist for 123. It is interesting to note that this identical argument has been cited as an example of ubhayaviseṣaviruddha (i. e. Dharmadharmyubhaya visesaviruddha), by Kumarila Bhatta in his Sloka-Varttika Anumanapariccheda. sl. 105-7. The six varie- ties of viruddha-Dharmasvarupabadha, Dharmaviśeşabadha, Dharmisvarupabadha, Dharmiviseṣabadha, Dharmadharmyubhayasvarupabadha and Dharmadharmyu- bhayavišeşabadha-have, in later times, been reduced to one, since all of them. in the last resort, only prove the opposite of what is intended to be proved. 124. Vişnu Purana. I. ii.41. 125. Sattväm laghu praksakamiętam Sukhya-Karika. verse 13. 126. Cf. yadi vivakşitärthavyatirekeņa anumanasya avivakṣitamapi visayaḥ, Banvetasyam kalpanayam sarvanumanam vyähanyeta. yaya-Vārtika (Chowkamba edn. pp. 344-45). See also Nyayavārtikatätparyatika (Benares edn. p. 600).Atmasiddhi 710 the sake of other collocations–is effected on the strength of some evid- ence, it will not necessarily follow that even the facts of their being a collocation and of their existing for the sake of others, which are uncon- tradicted, should stand condemned. Thus, it is evident that the soul, which is itself not a collocation, is free from the three guņas (sattva, rajas and tamas) which are associated with the quality of existing for the sake of another–a quality which never fails to be present whenever the character of being a collocation exists. Being of th nature of pleasure, pain and misery, the body and the like are controlled by some other entity, even as the chariot and other objects by the charioteer and the like. Further. pleasure and pain, which are respectively known as agreeable and disagreeable experiences, point to a person who is pleased or displeased, even as the servant and the foe (imply a person who is ministered unto or one who is hated). Since the body, etc., are perceptible, like pots and similar objects, they must have a perceiver 127 distinct from themselves. A shown before, the absence of the three gunas from the soul, who is (thus known to be) a controller, a knower of agreeable and disagreeable things and a perceiver, is definitely ascertainable. Similarly, as all things commencing from the body and ending with unmanifest matter (avyakta) are of the nature of the three guņas, the state of release, which is essentially the annihilation of all miseries, is impossible of attainment by them; but, since the sastras and wise men endeavour to attain (release), there must be a soul (purusa) that is distinct from the body, that is not a collocation, and that is untouched by the three gunas. Refutation of the Sankhya Arguments 28. Even here, although with the aid of reasons, such as that collo- cations exist for the sake of others, the existence of some other entity 127. In interpreting bhoktṛbhāvāt, some have understood bhoktā as enjoyer, and some, as perceiver. Both the interpretations have been mentioned here. See Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi, Kärikā, 17. 72 Siddhitrayam (than the body), who is a controller and perceiver is established, yet, (with their aid) the qualities of not being a collocation and of not possessing the three guņas, which are admitted by you, cannot be deter- mined as belonging to it. To explain-The positing of a series of collocations, made on the strength of the observation that a collocations always exists only for another collocation, like the positing of a series of causes having no beginning, made for the reason that something is an effect, is not wrong. It cannot be said that (the quality of being a collocation) is not responsible (for anything being a seși, an independent being for whose sake others exist); for, in respect of any collocation, the soul, which is not a collocation, which is unattached. which is bereft of all modifications and which is mere consciousness itself, which is un- changing and for which no service is rendered by anything else, cannot be that other for whose sake the collocation exists. That which is served or produced by another becomes the seși in respect of that other. That which serves or produces anything exists for the sake of the latter.128 But, since the puruşa admitted by the Sankhyas is not so (served or pro- duced by a collocation), how can he be regarded as being that other in respect of the collocation? What is more, how can the collocation be treated as existing for his sake? If it be said that though the purusa is not really rendered any service, he imagines himself as being served, (we reply) by all means let him imagine like that; how does it help to establish that he is being served? For the reason that children imagine ether to possess the dirt found in a region, the character of being dirty will not belong to it. The impossibility of a conscious and changeless entity being the victim of illusions :- Further, to whom such an illusion occurs and how must be investi- gated. It cannot occur to the power of consciousness; for, the illusion, which is a mode of change and which is the root cause of a hundred ills, cannot arise in the exceedingly pure consciousness, as it is devoid of al 128. Cf. Jaimini-Sutra. IlI. i. 1-şeṣaḥ pararthatavat Atmasiddhi 73 modifications. The internal organ (antaḥ karana) too, for which buddhi is another technical expression, cannot experience the illusion; for, like the body, it is non-intelligent. If it be urged that, though it is non-intelligent, the internal organ, being transparent, receives the reflection of consciousness and becomes a conscious subject, as it were. (we reply) not so; for, reflection and its reception cannot properly belong (respectively) to consciousness and buddhi, which are alike formless. If it be contended that to be a reflection is to be like it, (we ask) what is meant by being like’ (consciousness)? If the reply is that it consists in having a nature similar to that of consciousness, (we rejoin) if, indeed, that were so, when buddhi attains similarity with con- sciousness which is free from all modifications. it too becomes devoid of all modifications; and hence, it would be impossible to account for the contact of modifications, such as, illusion, pleasure and pain, which are met with in every soul. If it be said that buddhi has a nature similar to that of conscious ness only in so far as it possesses consciousness, (we reply) no so; for, on your view, the soul is, in fact, consciousness itself and not a conscious entity; the venerable Patañjali, for instance, asks ‘If consciousness alone is the soul, what is it that is referred to here, and by what?’ If it be urged that being like’ (consciousness) means ‘being like not-non-intelligent, (we reply that) it has already been shown that not being not-intelligent is nothing more than the quality of being a knower and that the explanation of being like’ (a conscious entity) is sought to be made in terms of itself ;199 and hence, this (interpretation of being like ‘) is pointless. 6 129. “Being like a reflection of consciousness, it becomes a conscious entity as it were” was the reply to the question “How can the antahkarana, which is non-intelligent, be a conscious entity and experience illu sions?” “Being like a reflection of consciousness’’ when explained, finally amounts to ‘being like a conscious entity. Thus, the answer reduces itself to a tautalogous proposition “Being like a conscious entity, it becomes a conscious entity, as it were.” 10 74 Siddhitrayam Further, how (we ask) can he who maintains that the existence of buddhi is dependent upon the nearness of consciousness posit its being not-non-intelligent? And, when this particular quality, known as the character of being a knower-a quality associated with some object or other-does not exist in either consciousness or buddhi, which are con- sidered to be the orginal and the basis of reflection, it cannot occur in the reflection. This reflection theory has already been refuted while dis- carding the view of the heretics in disguise. The refutation of the argument that the vṛttis of the antaḥkarana are superposed on the purusa. It may be said that, though the puruşa (self) is changeless, the antaḥkarana itself, which possesses wonderful and diverse activities, such as pramāna and viparyaya130 produced by the power belonging to the nearness of the puruşa, exhibits its activities and different objects to the puruşa; and thereby, he comes to be called witness (sākṣi), enjoyer (bhoktā); just as the gathering of generals possessing extremely great valour exhibits to the master its activities, such as entering the enemy’s camp and causing consternation therein, and, as a consequence. he comes to be termed a monarch, a man of valour and a conqueror. But, this view is unsound. In fact, it is only for the sake of the seer that the visible object is found to exist; and for the Sankhyas or for their followers, the heretics in disguise, who alike maintain that consci- ousness alone is the soul, the quality of being the seer is not real. And, the quality of being a sesi (one for whose sake others exist) cannot be brought about by the fictitiously imagined quality of being the seer. Be- sides. it has already been said that even this fictitious imagination cannot arise. (As for the analogy), the king, who commands his generals, in 130. Pramana, viparyaya. vikalpa, nidra and smrti are the five vṛttis of the antahkarana. For an account of these see Yoga-Sutras I.5-11. *The word parakramr yah has been formed in accordance with Panini’s sutra “vinmatorluk (v. iii 65). Compare the stems srajiyas, tvaciyas. Atisayena para- kramavat parakramiyah (one possessing) extremely great valour). All printed books and manuscripts read pratibalavilolanadivrtti; bus prati- balavilolanādivrttim is obviously a better reading. Atmasiddhi 75 a general or in a specific manner, in those activities, and who acquires the fruits resulting therefrom, such as, sovereignty, and who engages in activities such as purchasing, receiving and inheriting,131 which are responsible for the relation of being owner and property, is not an analogue to the soul, which is inactive, and which is rendered no service is rendere by anybody; hence this view is valueless. 132 The different arguments seeking to prove that the soul is distinct from the body and the like are well-known to be stultified (atitaka latā),1 in as much as their subject-matter is shattered by perceptual knowledge, such as, ‘I am stout,’ ‘I go,’; for this reason, those well-versed in the vedas, having no faith even in the view that the proof of the soul is afforded by inference, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas alone. mab gond The existence of the soul established by sruti and srutyarthāpatti. " In fact, scriptural passages, such as the following, directly reveal the distinctness of the soul from the body and the like. “The soul (ātmā) is not this; it is not that.” 133 The bodi- less, the scatheless, the sinewless, the pure (suddha), unpierced by sins (apapaviddha)”; 134 .. 34 Some go into a womb for assuming bodily form; others become immovable objects”; 135 “He is never born, nor does he die”; “Indeed, only this (body) which is devoid of life dies” 136: Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain so long as he is embodied; when he is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him.” 137 Even the injunctions prescribing means for realising heavenly bliss and 131. Perhaps, in preference to birth (janana) mention may be made of con- quest (jaya), since, in the case of ksatriyas, conquest is regarded as a special title to ownership, cf. svami rikthakravasamvibhāga parigrahādhigameşu | brāhmaṇasya adhikam labdham | ksatriyasya vijitam | nirvistam vaisyasudrayoḥ. Gautama Dharma- Butra. X. 38-41. 132. The fallacy of atitakalata or kalatyayapadesa has, in later Nyaya termi- nology, come to be called badha.endle-non a 133. Brh. Up. 136. Chand. Up. VI. xi. 3. C 134. Isa. Up. 8. 137. Chand. Up. VIII xii. 1. 135. Katha. Up. V. 1. 76 Siddhitrayām the like, which are to accrue after bodily death, lead to the positing of an eternal, conscious entity, that is distinct from the body, and so on; hence, the individual soul has for its means of proof the scripture and the presumptive testimony connected therewith (śrutyarthapatti). (c) The Mimamsa view :- The existence of the jiva deduced from sense perception 29. (One may ask) why should this heavy load be placed on the head of the vedas, whose sole aim is to teach the means for realising the good and avoiding the evil? Indeed, we know the soul with the aid of the testimony of perception itself, which is the basis of all pramāņas, such as, inference and scripture. From cognitions such as, ‘This is my body,’ ‘I know this,’ it is evident that this seer shines forth in direct perception as being distinct from the body also, just as he is distinct from objects known, such as, the pot. Refutation of this view 30. (We reply) do not say so; for that is perceptual knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with objects; 138 and from their contact with the inward soul, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and which is exceedingly subtle, unlike their contact with out- ward objects, the senses are incapable of originating knowledge (con- cerning the soul). It has been so declared in the vedas: “The self-ex- istent (svayambhūḥ) made the senses proceed outward (and thus troub- led them). " 139 All objects revealed by the senses will invariably be ac- companied by the quality of non-intelligence; therefore the knowledge born of the senses is incapable of touching the soul. The Bhaṭṭa view :- The existence of the soul established through perception by manas 31. It may be said, “Let the external senses not come into con- tact with the soul and present it, since they are elemental (bhautika; ) but the manas, being non-elemental, may enter into contact with the 138. indriärthas annikarṣotpannam jñānam ..pratyakşam. Nyaya-Sutras, I. i. 4. 139. Katha. Up. IV. I. Atmasiddhi ar 77 and soul and present it. (Against this, we reply) it is not so; for, if that too o be a sense-organ, it must inevitably be elemental. It has been so declared بات 6 in the vedas: Gentle sir! the manas is, indeed, made of food (anna) " 140; when dealing with manas it has been fully explained.. alq odal

It may be urged: “Certainly, there is a cognition of ‘I’ à cog- nition which is direct awareness. And this (cognition) cannot but be what has arisen from the senses. The claim of manas in regard to (the manifestation of) pleasure and the like, even though they do not fall on within the scope of the external senses, is well established. Hence, it is but proper that the cognition of ‘I’ should have this for its cause. This lo can be expressed syllogistically. The soul, like pleasure and so on, is to be grasped by mental perception; for, while it is not capable of being viagrasped by the external senses, it is still an object of perception. Refutation of this view 32. (Our reply is) it is not so; for, from the case of (samvedana) A jñāna, (where the sadhya is absent while the hetu is present), it is found that this argument commits the fallacy of vyabhicāra. (To escape this fallacy), you cannot point out that jñana is not open to perception; for without depending on anything else, it manifests itself as ‘I know; and it has already been stated that if it were not an object of perception, it would, in fact, cease to be knowledge. Untenability of the suggestion that jnana is the object of mental perception:- gmilso DA It cannot be contended that, since it is an object of mental percep- tion, jñāna too is fit to rank among similar examples (sapakṣa); for this contention will not stand scrutiny. (If that is your view), you must point out whether even the knowledge concerning the knowledge of an ni object is produced exactly at the time when, by virtue of a certain con- junction between soul and manas, the knowledge of an object takes y birth, and whether (it is produced) by the selfsame contact, or whether it is produced at a different time and by a different contact. (Regarding the first alternative), the origination of the two (i. e. knowledge of an 140. Chand. Up. VI.v.4. DET 81 78 Siddhitrayam a object and knolwledge concerning the knowledge of that object) at the same time is impossible. If that were so, the birth of a collection of limitless items of knowledge, each of which has the other for its respec- tive tive object, would have to take place at the same time. But it does not take place. If it takes place simultaneously, the distinction made bet- ween being an object of knowledge and owning the object (visayaviṣayit- vaniyamah) would become baseless. (Regarding the second alternative), if it (knowledge concerning knowlege) is made known by a knowledge arising at a different time, it would cease to be an object of perception; for, as knowlegde is momentary, the earlier knowlege will not last till the rise of the knowledge which reveals it. If it lasts, all cognitions would have to exist at all times. If it be urged that it is incompatible with its effect (i.e. if it perishes as soon as its effect springs up), (we reply that) as its effect namely the mental inpression arises inmediately after, it will not exist at a different time (i. e. at a time when the revea- ling consciousness arises). Hence jnana cannot be an object of mental perception. And it cannot be said that it is obvious that the argument commits the fallacy of vyabhicara. Besides, as the quality of being grasped by the senses is invariably concomitant with the quality of being non-soul, your argument commits the fallacy of viruddha also (i.e. is guilty of employing adverse probans). Further the illustrative example cited in the argument is defective in not possessing the sadhya; for, pleasure and pain are not admitted to be objects of perception. Enquiry into the nature of sukha, duhkha etc:- And it is not so admitted, because pleasure and pain are nothing more than the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses. Indeed, whne the senses are not perceptible, their flourishing or decaying state will not be the object of preception. In the case of pleasure and pain, as in that of the senses, or again, in that of the different states of mind (manas) on the view of those who maintain that manas is inferable, the false impression that they are directly perceived is due to the power of long continued experience.141 141. With continued practice one infers the existence of pleasure, pain the states of mind and the like so effortlessly and quickly and without noticing the Atmasiddhi 79. The section dealing with pleasure and pain (sukhaduhkhādhi- karana): 142 or the discussion of the description of the soul (vide p. 8) as being in its essential nature blissful (svatassukhi) found in this work Witself113 ought to be explained to those who, following the Buddhistic aldoctrine, believe that pleasure and pain are included in the category of knowledge, for the reason that they are produced by causes which are non-different from knowledge, and to those who, by accepting the system of Kanabhakṣa (the exponent of the Vaiseṣika system) believe that they harare the special qualities of the soul (and not the flourishing and the decay- zing states of the senses), 14459 several steps of the argument, that one comes to think that he directly perceives them. 142. Sukhaduhkhadhikarana is the sixth section of the first pada of Nathamuni’s Nyāyataṭtva-sastra, a work which is not extant now. Yamuna refers to a few other adhikara pas of this sastra. In fact, his Atmasiddhi may be regarded as a brief exposition of Nyayatattva. Compare Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda Nyayatattva-prakaranam hi Atmasiddih” 780 143. This discussion over svatassukhi is included among the portions of DO Atmasidhi lost. 144. Those who identify pleasure and pain with the flourishing or the decaying states of the senses mean by senses’ the internal sense (manas) and not the outer senses; for, pleasure and pain are nothing more than the tranquil and the disturbed states of manas. cf. tatha ca antahkaranaprasādā vasayda yoreva sukhatvaduhkhatva- vyapadeśadarsanat tatprasādā vasādā veva sukhaduhkar upavityarthah. Ranga- ayramanuja tika on Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda. Og ing " Though this view is defended here and elsewhere in Atmasiddhi, it cannot be bconsidered to be his final view, for, later on, he says that all reference to certainty, doubt, pleasure, pain and the like has for its object either same particular form of contact of knowledge with its object or knowledge possessing that contact. cf. Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda sukhaduhkheca natmadharmau ityaditu vaibhavena matantareņa va abhihitam anyatha kathamevan upasamhārārambhe brüyat tadevam atmasvabhavabhutasya caitanyasya visayasamsleṣavisaesagocara eva niscaya- samsayadi vyavaharabhedah tadvisesabhaji caitanyeva.” Rāmānuja says, in Vedar- thasamgraha, that knowledge, which is in contact with a particular object, and which is considered the cause of pleasure or pain. is really plesasure or pain itself and not its cause. Besides knowledge, nothing else which could be called pleasure or pain is noticed. yena visayaviseşeņa viśeşitam jñānam sukhasya janakamityabhimatam tadviṣayajñānameva sukham tadatireki padarthantaram nopalabhyate *The reading tatcalanam found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is manifestly wrong; it has been altered into cetaścalanam. If, however, the original 0580 IbSiddhitrayam Small Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, avor- sion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects with a view to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness,) when directed to- wards objects. with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aver- sion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by conciousness of past pains. van Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. Since those (i.e.. terms namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length. It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one aland the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, the quality of being at once the preceiver and the perceived. If the dis- abstinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, (for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; simi- larly, for these latter, other parts, and so on ad infinitum. Besides, the quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul. The Bhatta view again:- (Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to mental perception). A consciousness, like the following: I perceive the pot posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the awareness of the perceiver, 145 by those whose intellect has been blinded by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some occasions (at least); for (often) only the several objects which are near the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness per- tains to the self is established by mental perception, and which is asso- ociated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality Wordw Ima reading must stand. the sentence “bhutaduḥkhajñāne na taccalanam sokaḥ” must come after and not precede the sentence “agamitajjñā nena cetașcalanam bhayam.” Niramkusasya is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense. 145. cf. tadātmānamevävet aham Brahmasmi, Brh. up. I. iv. 10. lica laniacre” Atmasiddhi 81 found in the object (known)-a quality which is occasional, which is re- lated to the soul. such as, prakatya and prakasa 146 2: LIV The Prabhakara reply thereto:- t d To this it is replied “It is indeed, surprising that the confusion, namely, that in respect of their own experience the self does not notice any difference at the time objects are apprehended should occur to eminent investigators. It has already been stated (vide p. 27) that the following experience-“This object is really such and such; we do not know whether it is known or not; not do we know whether it appears to me or to others” does-not exist at any time, and that when there is no appehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience would also have to occur. If there is no appehension of the knower the special feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather than in what is perceived by others, cannot be appropriately explained. If the consciousness I perceive the pot’ has for its object a knowledge which is inferred, then, the experience would only take the form ‘I knew’ and not ‘I know’; for, when there is the observation of the special feature (prakatya) produced in the object by knowledge, and when its (i. e., of prākatya) invariable concomitance with knowledge, is brought to mind, and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring knowledge has already been pointed out. Besides, the view that the soul is open to mental perception is refuted by the very fact that knowledge (which is said to be inferred) is grasped by the self as belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any reference to the self, then, between what is known by oneself and what is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction.247. 0. instled 146. Briefly stated, this view maintains that on some occasions, at least, we get a consciousness like I perceive the pot’; it involves three factors-the, knowledge and the pot.. Of these, the second is inferred from the illuminations (prakatya) found in the object known; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding the ‘I’, as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown that it is not open to inference, it must, by a process of elimination. be concluded that it is open to mental perception. 2 on 147. Every one of the statements made by the opponent is refuted. First, it is shown that the knowledge of ‘1’ as perceiver cannot be occasional, and that, 11 82 The Bhaṭṭa rejoinder:- Siddhitrayam How. it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when there is non-apprehension of the knower? Indeed, the distinction of what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not depen- dent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainable on the basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self too deserves to be included among the causes of knowledge; for in the manner of the senses and the like, it (ie., the self) may act as the cause (of know- ledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to maintain that the manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of another; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.?143 Even the contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition. the apprehension of the self and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the aid of prakatya. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred. it is necessarily inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge. the self also is apprehended; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental perception. 148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed; just as when things are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmanifested, there is absolutely no room for the presentation of its substrate, the self. Atmasiddhi 83 taking the form ‘I know this’ does not fit in with experience; and is forthwith refuted. The Prabhakara position clarified while refuting the Bhāṭṭa view:- If that be so149, let it be granted that the self is manifested as the knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-lumino- sity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because the refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible manner; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to be unmanifest. How knowldge never fails to be manifest has been elaborately dealt with in the Prathamadhikarana150 Hence, it is need- less here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge. Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to possess the quality of revealing other objects. The Prabhākārā view that in deep slecp and mokşa there is no self- consciousness. (If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even when know- 149. If the consciousness of the self as the perceiver in every cognition of objects is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also. 150. Tee elaborate treatment of the nature of jñana set forth in Prathamadhi- karana of Nathamuni’s Nyaya-tattva-sastra is, unfortunately, not available But there are some extracts from this work in Vedanta Desika’s Nyayasidha njana. cf. Nyayatattvetu Prathamadhikarane lakṣaṇāntarāņi bahuni duşayitva “atyantavegi- tatyanta sankṣmyam nirbharata thatā svasattākāla bhavyaptiḥ jñāne lakṣma catus- tayam” iti svoktalak şa popasamhārah kṛtah’ Buddhipariccheda, p, 249. 84 Siddhitrayam ledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self is revealed may be rendered intelligible by arguments, but (it) does not satisfy the mind of those who think and act in the light of experience. Again, to the released soul knowledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state). If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of re- lease is eternal, being in dependent of causal conditions, then, there must be perpetual release; and those scriptural passages (which teach the oxistence of jñāna in this state) must be considered to be arthavadas.151 There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause which could account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with impressions of knowledge and actions. And it is not right to maintain that, as the mind (manas) is an eternal organ, through its conjunction itself knowledge is caused in that state; for, although, like ether, mind is, in its essential nature, eternal, it being the originator of jñāna by acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and de- merit.152 Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the means of knowledge; for although it is an eternal sense organ the mind like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge. Nor is the view tenable-namely, that contact with manas, which is assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instru- ment of knowledge; for, it contradicts scriptural passages whish declare that all good and bad deeds perish” ; for example: " the deeds of this person (i. e.. the released soul) perish “; 153 Then he who knows (Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless…",154 151. Arthavadas are those scriptural pasaage which do not directly convey positive or negative Inj iactions, but which. by extolling prescribed or censuring for- bidden acts, alm at infusing in the mind of the listener a keen desire to engage in his sacred duties at the earliest opportunity. 152. Even through the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (ākāsa) it is only the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (karnas işkuli) that can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In the same way. though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not always, but only when associated with merit and demerit. 153. Munia up. II. ii. 8 154. Munda. up. III. i. 3 Atmasiddhi 85 If final release were the result of good deeds there would be a further re- turn (to the state of bondage). Besides in view of the following scrip- tual passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds). “The uncreated (Puruşa) cannot be attained by wh it is created (i. e. deeds).” “Hence, just as here the world won by good deeds perishes.” 156 155 Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself; for, that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the posi- ting of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence of the soul, persist therein at all times; and as a consequence, the stream of births and deaths would not arise at all; hence, there would be no distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, sense and other impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed that, must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, even when the entire set of causal conditions is present So far it has not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jñana. While the body and senses are well-established to be the cause of knowledge, for the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to to jñāna is a mad man’s assertion. Therefore, jñāna must be said to be absent in the state of release; and the scriptural passages speaking of the existence of jñāna, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge of the self, 157 and interpreted in accordance with gauņi vṛtti.158 Therefore, since there is invariable presentation of the self at the very time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all knowledge of objects. 155. Munda. up. 1. ii. 12. 156. Chand. up. VIII i 6. nididdhyäsitavyah. Brh 157. cf. ātmā va are draştavyah mantavyaḥ up. VI. iv. 6. 158. In the proposition ‘Devadatta is a lion’, the term ’lion’ cannot, obvi- ously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta 86 Siddhitrayām Refutation of the Prabhakara view and proof that the soul is self luminous Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedanta do not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of narrow mind which results from ignorance of the true nature of the self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation of objects; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is cap- able of being presented; for, neither of these is the object of the cogni- tion of objects (visayajñāna). That which is not the object of a given consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness, just as taste could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and knower are not the object of viṣayajñāna; hence, they too are not manifested by it. The Prabhakara contention that jnana is not self-luminous (The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being mani- fested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known; (and ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the knower is only the knower? It has already been shown that they are not open to mental perception; and the impossibility of inferring them has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge mani-” fested? (The opponent’s reply is) it does not depend on anything else; because consciousness is self-luminous. (The reply to the above is:) it is not so; for, consciousness too cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your Fossesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the correspond- ing qual ties of the lion. This interpretation of the word lion is in accordance with what is known as gauni vrtti. Gauni vṛtti has been defined by Khandadeva in his famous Bhaṭṭadipika and Kaustubha thus: “Svaŝakyasamavetavatta gaun- vrttih-samavetavatvanca kvacit aropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamāna jatiyal gunavattasambandhenah iti bheda. Jaimini’s Purva-Mimämsä-Sutra, I. iv 23 mentions six varieties of gauní vrtti: ’tatsiddhi jāti sarûpya prasamsa bhuma linga- samavaya iti guņāŝrayah” Atmasiddhi 87 view is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, (it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and not to others: for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) i amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is depend- ent upon the relation of consciousness to the self: for, the presence or absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence or absence of this relation. If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated with the different correlates (pratiyogin) and not for its own manifesta- tion: (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion? If at any time consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion but such a presenta- tion is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a correlative; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of knowledge apart from these. If it be maintained that the manifestation of jñāna is dependent upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails, to present itself: (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self absent? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would on your view, be self-dependent: for when they exist, they never fail to be manifested. If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-lumin- ous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things other than itself; and if you were to ask where is]the need for positing self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external. becomes intelligible, (we may as well reply;) Let the self alone which is admitted on all hands to be the witness (saksin) of all objects and their cognitions 88 Siddhitrayam bé considered self-luminous: (and ask you in turn) where is the need for several entities of that description? Even if prana is self-luminous, the soul does not depend on prāna for its apprehension Moreover, the view that the revelation of what stands witness to a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established; even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended: for, it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness: just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed by the pot. As the conscious eniity is the witness of all object-cognition it cannot be directly revealed by them. The soul is self-luminous All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a mani, festation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul owns a mani- festation concerning itself-a manifestation which is not dependent (upon something similar to it or on anything reavealed by itself). No object is found to depend for its manifestation: on some other entity which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by that object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation some other pot; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise, light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light; nor does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on light itself; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is dissimilar to it. Similarly. sense-organ also does not require (for its manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the sensc-organ for their manifestation; but it requires consciousness, which is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness; in its turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other conscious- ness: nor on the sense-organ and the like, whose manifestation is dependent on itself; but it requires the self-dependent soul, which is its Atmasiddhi 89 substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other self nor does it require consciousness, sense-organs, and the like; whose presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than itself. The proof that the soul has consciousness as its eternal and essentia nature To the soul which has been shown to have consciousness as its essential nature consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, consciousness comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot,. knowledge of the cow and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as different illuminations, such as the illumination of the pot, the illumi- nation of the cloth and so on: even so, consciousness which is an attri- bute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these (different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which is a conscious entity, they become perceptible to the self; even as, on the view of those who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to the self. The purvapakṣa that consciousness is non-eternal and that there are no grounds to prove that it is eternal Those who know the Nyaya and Vaišeṣika darśanas and the Neo- Mimāmsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is

• The reading asādhāranasajā tiyanthāntarāpekṣah found in the mss. and printed copies makes no sense Hence the following emendation svasadhyasadhyasādhārāna- jātiyārthāntarāpekṣah has been suggested. tattadvittitvam is the reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to tattaccittatvam found in the Cowkamba and Telugu editions 12 90 Siddhitrayam an occasional quality of the soul: because consciousness depends (for its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as the contact of the senses with the objects and because experiences, such as, ‘I know,’ ‘I knew’, are known to be limited by time: and be- cause the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would dis- appear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even in states such as sleep and turiya159. Further, in respect of con- sciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinc- tions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then (i. e. if conciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of mani- festing (objects), either all objects would shine forth in one and the same knowledge or none at all there being no distinguishing feature favouring one object rather than another.) When it is admitted to have a different character (i. e, when it is occasional), the distinction of know- ledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on this principle, namely, that knowlebge which arises from the sense organ or probans or something similar coming into contact with a particular object. pertains to that only becomes reasonable. The opponent calling in question the siddhantin’s position.- It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medi- um of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects, and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge pertaining to such and such an object; and that as the process of being coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be

159. The psychology of the Upanisads mentions four states of the soul-jagrat (waking), svapna (dreaming), susupti (deep sleep) and turiya. During the waking state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are in abeyance, but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quies- cent. Turiya is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the ordinary man. While it resembles sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this state the self reveals itself fullyAtmasiddhi 91 coloured (by it). If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding out- ward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured (by it), (the reply is :-) not so: for, in the case of a formless object, such as ether proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere? Nor does the object enter into (consciousness) for the object is perceived by everybody as being located in the place outside. Besides, in the case ef (formless) entities, such as generality, the same difficulty (i. e. impossibility of proceeding outward or coming in) holds good. Refutation of the view that the atma (dharmin) and consciousness (dharma) are one:- It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, exists in two forms, viz., in a dense, and in a sparse form: of these the entity in the dense form is the self: and it has the words pratyak, cetana, kṣetrajna and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse form, referred to by the terms caitanya, jnana and the like, is called, by courtesy, a quality for the reason that it is dependent on the pratyagar- tha (the inward entity in the dense form); even as the luminous entity in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like; while the same en- tity in its sparse form is referred to as prabha (radiance) and jyotih light); proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appro- priate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light (aloka); for, cons- ciousness is only the sparse region of the self, But this view is untenable: for, qualities, such as, those of exist- ing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact (with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the cha- racter of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to make such an admission: for it would result in reducing the self to a non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands 92 Siddhitrayam condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Arhata (Jaina) doct- rine, need not detain us any further. Refutation of the view that consciousness is all-pervasive It may be contended that the self, is, in its entirety, related to con- sciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways; that it is all-pervasive; and that although it is of this nature, all objects do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding from the quality of darkness (tamas): and that when, with the aid of the sense-organs, wherein the sattva quality predominates, this darkness (tamas) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the res- pective objects shine forth: and that thus, without there being any pro- ceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes intelligible. Even if this were so, the senses and probans (hetu), like jnana, could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsi- ble only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping tamas), and not for originating knowledge (It is no escape to say that) the illumination of objects is itself knowledge; since (in that case) the objects also for the reason of their being illumined would have to be considered the knower. Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of con- sciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as knowledge, the same dificulty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the object would have to be considered as the knower) persists. since con- junction exists in both (the self and the object); and, in addition, there is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of know- ledge is experienced to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), as is evident from the experience ‘I know this now,’ ‘I do not know this now.’ Do not say that, just as in the ease of the sun which is unchang- ing and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for mani- festing objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be Atmasiddhi 93 the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). For. in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and - cxpansion, contact with objects and separation therefrom, are possible : and hence the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality; hence, in this case, there is no adequate basis for the conside- ration of the self rather than the object as the knower. Untenability of the view that the soul has a two-fold knowledge, (i) eternal and (ii) non eternal It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold -one relating to itself, the other to everything else; and of these, the former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very ex- istence of the self and persists at all times; while the latter, whose very existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as the knowledge of such and such an object-a knowledge whose presence or absence is based respectively on the presence or absence of the casual factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally. The illustration of the remembrance that there was no elephant at the tank-bund in the morning cited to prove the existence of consciousness in deep sleep is unhelpful: (One may ask : Does not the following argument prove that consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul?) It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness of self always exists; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is in- ferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time. there must neces- sarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case 94 Siddhitrayam of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time; for in- stance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning,160 The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consci- ousness of objects–a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep sleep and the like; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed know- ledge concerning itself. The reply is ’not so’. For, in the light of instances such as, the hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a per- son, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as is evident from his experience ‘In was not present there in the morning, it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with anekanta doṣa, For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, (i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be know- ledge of its locus-a locus which exists simultaneously with the non- existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence of the knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)-which, had it existed, must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two conditions may possibly exist; for, at the time of waking, there is the knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance; and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience exis- ting at the time of sleep also-an experience, wnich is as clear and dis-
160. It is well-known that in the walking statae consciousness always exists. If it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following analogy is employed. Jnst as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank which s the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remem- bers on walking that he had no cognitinn of objects at the time of sleep, he must neces- sarily have krown. in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep, swoon and the like, there is consciousness In other words, consciousness is an eternal property of the soul. Atmasiddhi 95 tinct as waking experience and which is capable of being remembered (if only it existed). 161 Nor is the remembrance on waking “I slept well” helpful in proving that there is self-awareness in deep sleep:- It cannot be said that experiences, such as ‘I slept well,’ prove the presence of the cognition of ‘I’ in the state of sleep; for, experiences such as ‘I slept well’ (found in the waking state) are based on the considera- tion of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses; and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep); even as know- ledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while the ‘I,’ is experienced). They too are certainly experienced thus: “I, belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, in such and such a form."‘162 Moreover, even if the cognition ‘I slept well’ were admitted to be a recollection, the remembrance of ‘I’ pertains only to the self which is known at the time of sleep to be in association with the vṛtti, known as nidrā–a vṛtti based on the quality of tamas (darkness) which makes for the absence of other vṛttis, like pramāņa and viparyaya–even as it is known in the waking state to be in association with some vṛtti or other; it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself (svaprakasa) or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its innate quality; as there is no warrant (for stating that it refers to either of these). The revered Patanjali thinks that nidra (sleep) also, like
161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed, would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no conscious- ness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects.
162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit that its- caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a considera- tion of the state of the person on waking. Similarly, it could be said that the cogni- 96 Siddhitrayam pramāna, viparyaya and so on, is a form of vṛtti. 163 Hesays, “Nidrā (sleep) is the vṛtti which has for its object tamas, which is the cause of the non-existence of other vṛttis, (like waking and dreaming.”) 164 The contention that the self depends on jnana for its manifestation and that jnana is non-eternal:- The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.–The knowledge of the self-the matter under dispute–is dependent upon the cognition of objects, because it is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self found in one who is awake.165 Knowledge is an occasional quality; for it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be maintained that pleasure, pain and like are not the qualities of the self; for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides: as knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other sub- strate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we may say ‘I am happy’). The proof that dharmabhūtajnana is eternal:- Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul; for, it is a quality dependent on the soul itself; just as illumination is an innate quality of light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no other form. That which is devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul, tion I slept soundly’ does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, but is based on a consideration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time of waking.
163. Vyasa Bhasya on Yoga-Sutra I.: 10 and Vacaspati Misra’s tika thereon deal with the question whether nidrā must rank as a vṛtti alongside of pramana and viparyaya
164. Patanjala Yoga-Sutra I. 10. The translation of this sutra is based on Vacaspati Misra’s tțikā See also Nagji Bhatta’s Yoga-Sutra-Vṛtti.
165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon the cognition of subjects, even so, in sleep also the conciousness of self must depend on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of objects then, there cannot be consciousness of the self.. Atmasiddhi 97 becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know; for, (if that were so) in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of Kanāda and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it. Effects, such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be associated with one connected with a body. will lead to the conclusion that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified; even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it resides in the fire associated with wet fuel; or as paddy-sprout leads to the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice associated with the husk Further, when it is possible to differentiate the sou! from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know. Though jnana is eternal it has atma for its support:- It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self; because the nature of cousciousness is to depend upon a substrate and a correlative, while the self has an opposite character; and because the self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly and be- cause on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (tarka) and scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed with knowledge. Refutation of the view that the conjunction of consciousness with object is prana:- Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, owing to the extraneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that consciousness itself (which possesses the relation) may (as a consequence of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. For in as much as the relation dwells in both the relata, the object too would have to be regarded as knower. 13 98 Siddhitrayam It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both the relata, the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to only one specified member of the relata (i e. consciousness), just as in the case of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i. c. in the case of cause and effect) the relation is the form of invariable mutual dependence of the producer and the produced. In respect of the self the analogy of the relation of cause and effect does not hold:- If it be said that here also the same mutual dependence prevails, we reply not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for mutual dependence. Why (we ask) does the object stand in need of consciousness? And why, again, does consciousness require the object? If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of siddhi, we ask) what is meant by siddhi? It cannot denote origination; for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are complete in themselves. such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, etc; (hence) they do not require for their origination consciousness also. (If it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only conscious- ness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are nothing but thoughts (vijñāna) has already been refuted. To maintain that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination would indeed be ridiculous. If you were to say that siddhi denotes manifestation, (we ask) Well sir! do you then contend that because it depends upon objects for its manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation which is dependent on objects? Your understanding of the nature of the soul would indeed be praiseworthy!’ Atmasiddhi 99 (Nor could the object depend on consciousness for its manifesta- tion; for) it has already been shown that manifestation cannot be a quality different from consciousness and residing in objects. Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be said to be dependent on consciousness alone: for (in that event) there would be the manifestation of all objects at all times. Indeed, all the causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not rise on some occasions only, (i. e.. since consciousness which is the cause of manifestation is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). If the specific quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional property, then it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself under a different name. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the soul is the possessor of consciousness and not mere consciousness. The contention that since dharmabhuta jnana is dependent on occa- sional factors it cannot be eternal:- C (The objector may ask) since khowledge, which has been admit- ted to account for the manifestation of different objects at different times, is occasional and is of the nature of a process or activity, how can it be treated as an essential quality of the self? To make the matter clear: When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in some ebjects (e. g., the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e. g. Devadatta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are effects; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceed- ing and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those to whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer that the manifestation of objects which resemble these (ie, reaching the destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar to the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person to whom the manifestation is peculiar. The reply to the foregoing;- It is not so; for in view of the fact that the ownership of land and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs 166 and
166. It is likely that abhavaprapta……is a haplo graphical error for nabhibhā vaprapta……As the expression nabhibhava is used in the Dharma sastras in the sense 100 Siddhitrayam not in virtue of any activity (on the part of the wner), and in view of the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field -an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field be- longs-is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid hetu) may be said to be vitiated by anekanta dosa. In order to escape this fallacy it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his ownership inasmuch as he is devoid of activity; 167 (but this sugges- tion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time (which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal factors). The statement that when they (i. e. time, activity and the like) exist, the effects follow (and hence they are considered to be causal factors is equally applicable to the case of ownership. 168 If it be said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the activity involved in being alive, (we ask) “My dear sir, as this activity is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a pecu- liar activity on the part of the owner?” of relationship, the text as emended, would mean ‘on account of the mere fact of a person being a near kinsman.’
167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the opponent advances the following argument:-Any result which, while remaining in one object, is peculiar to another ca isal substance, must be produced by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and in her. nt in that causal substance. Manifestation while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e. g. Devadatta); therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge is an occasional quality of the knower. The anekanta dosa vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of owner- ship, where the hetu is present, while the sadhya is absent. Though ownership is pe- culiar to the causal substance, namely the owner, it need not be produced by any acti- vity on his part. The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance cited the hetu is absent together with sadhya. In other words, he may say that as the owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal substance.
168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. Hence, though devoid of activity, the owner is certainly a causal factor in respect of his ownership.Atmasiddhi 101 Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar quality, it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved? If it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) mani- fested (and hence life is not responsible for this manifestation of ob- jects, we ask you in reply): Does the aforesaid ownership follow whenever life exists ? 169 If it be said that the existence of grains, such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also (i. e. in the case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can be said) - the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person has for its cause a special attribute belonging to the peron; and (in conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute res- ponsible for the manifestation of object is consciousness, which be- longs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us. Refutation of the view that as cognitions are limited by time they are non-eternal It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions- such as, ‘I knew’, ‘I know’,-which, on account of the fact that they are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For the instance of the sun’s light renders this argument liable to be charged with anekānta dosa. Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions ‘The sun illumines this place,’ ‘The sun illuminated it’ and ‘The sun will illu- mine it.‘170 If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essen- tial quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground
169. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is either lost or given away to another.
170. Thus even though light is an essential property of the sun, it appears limited by time. Even so, ccnsciousness, though an essential property of the self, may still be limited by time. 102 Siddhitrayam that its contact with the regions to be illumined is occasional, it may be replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self; and it is for this reason that the following become intelligible: the depen- dence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, the future and the present and all referencss to the same. Activities of consciousness altogether of a different nature from activi- ties such as going and cooking: – (The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this. case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions–. ‘I knew,’ I know’ and ‘I will know’), like the distinction of the light of the sun or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself)? (We reply the soul is certainly perceived as having that nature (i. e. as having consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed unlike the clod of earth, the soul is never found to be a non-sentient nature. That which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality of (sparsa) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be per- ceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which do not form part of their essential nature). The illustration of the body not apposite:- If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invaria- bly manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so. for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the latter is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with con- ciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property). Atmasiddhi .103 (Our reply is) it is it is not so: For what is said of the analogous instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine forth only as being associated with the body; for to adepts in yoga whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the ‘I,’ without there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the cognition ‘I know’ devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and configuration of the body must have something other than the body for its object. Further when the bodies become differentiated into several classes, such as, devas and men, in accordance with past deeds. and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of the soul). Although there is continuity of the subtle body (ling isarira), the charge of vyabicara cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is not perceived,171 Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of the soul, it should be manifested in the state of sleep and swoon, (we reply) ’not so’; for none of the possible interpretations of this state- ment will stand scrutiny. To make the matter clear :-When this un. welcome position is said to result, do you mean by prakasa, (1) the quality which is commonly present in all objects and which is generated by jñāna and which has for its synonyms terms prakatya and the like, or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge? On the first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, because no such quality (known as prakatya) exists. The non-existence
171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany the soul at all times; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accom- pany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul does not always shine forth along with the body To this the reply is that as the lingasarira is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably along with the lingasarira *The Benares and Telugu editions read tadviprakarsam; and the Telugu edi- tion refers in a foot-note to a variant reading tadaviprakarsam. In fact the reading suggested-tadaviprakarsam-is correct. *From the context it is clear that vyahāra is preferable to the variant reading. Vyavahāra. 104 Siddhitrayam of prakatya has already been clearly indicated while establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non- origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, tamas (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought to light. Indeed when the puruşa possesses consciousness as his essen- tial nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is accep- table to us; hence, to suggest this as a defect in our contention is no charge at all. In deep sleep, here are no activities of consciousness (dharma bhūta- jnāna) If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the prevalenc of everyday activities in these states as in that of waking, (we reply) ’not so’. For the soul is not the object (visaya) of any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the souf (which you think, would result)? Indeed, the soul is incapable ol being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we ask) “Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) knowledge or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like them ever discussed (by them) ?” If it is argued that the non-origina- tion of discussion in regard to these cases is due to the absence of auxiliary causes, such as the efficient condition of the senses, the desire for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query to the person who cannot be questioned. 172 The experiences of the soul in deep sleep need not all be remembered:- If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur. (we reply) ’not so’; for the states of sleep, and swoon are not forms of expe-
172. Compare-Yaścobhayossamo doṣaḥ Pariharopi va samah | Naikaḥ par- yanuyoktavyaḥ Tadrgarthavicarane || When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that difficulty as a charge against the other. Atmasiddhi 105 rience (vrtti). To explain:- Should it be stated that knowledge of the self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form ‘I experien- ced it thus,’ as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) ’not so.’ For swoon and the like are not experiences (vrtti). Indeed, swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching. are not parti- cular modifications (vṛttis) of the intellect. If they were such modifi- cations, they would give rise to impressions (samskaras) which are res- ponsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of jñāna, devoid of modifications (vrtti), when the senses have been withdrawn from their activities on account of the quality of darkness (tamis) which is in the ascendant. It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having jñana as its nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions; for, as the soul would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (samskāras) release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has ser- ved its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself, remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the sam- skāras); and it is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction of consciousness of the self can ever exist; for consciousness of the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. Thus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its remembrance take birth? (It may be pointed out that the cognition ‘I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day’ clearly indicates that there is remembrance of the self; to this it is replied-). Even the awareness- ‘I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day’-which is mixed up with remembrance must be said to be concerned with the self limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also indeterminate (nirvikalpaka); (only) with the aid of knowledge which is 14 106 Siddhitrayam clear and distinct and which is determinate (savikalpaka) is the basis of remembrance (i. e. tne samskāra) produced; when that is so, how could it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist). Refutation of the contention that if dharmabhutajnana is eternal, it would do away with the distinction between bound and released souls:- It cannot be maintained that if (in sleep) the self exists in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one case (i. e.. in sleep) impressions (vāsanās) born of klesas 173 as well as the obscuration of the gunas exist, while in the other (i. e. in release). they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep and asamprajnata samadhi (super-conscious samadhi) there would have to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the state ef super-conscious samadhi that has acquired complete detachment (vairāgya), 174 that possesses the most intense samskāras conducive to restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon the state of final release, must be distinguished from the self existing during sleep. Refutation of the view that nidra is a mode of action accounting for the experience of pleasure or pain on waking:- If sleep is not a form of vṛtti, how (it may be asked) can remem- brances, such as, ‘I slept soundly,’ arise to the person who is awake? Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experien-
173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read samprajñātasamadhavapi. But judging from the context, asamprajñatasamādhāvapi appears to be the proper reading. It is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it. 174. Compare Yoga-Sutra II. 3. Avidyasmitārā gadvesa bhinivešāḥ klesah., * Gaḍham múḍham is a variant reading. Atmasiddhi 107 ced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, ‘I slept well,’ ‘My mind is perturbed,’ ‘My limbs feel light’ have for their cause the impressions (bhāvanas) produced by experiences relating to the quality of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is prepon- derant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cogni- tions-such as ‘I slept uneasily,’ My mind is whirling,’ ‘My mind is unste ady. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva and rajas, there arise the following recollections- I have slept wholly oblivious of everything’. ‘The limbs of my body feel heavy.’ ‘My mind is as it were, robbed away,’ ‘And it is, as it were, covered over’. 4 (We reply) all this is true enough: but your question has already been answered thus :-Assuredly, these cognitions do not have im- pressions (vāsanās) for their source; but are based on the consideration of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind (manas); and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such cognitions take the following form:- ‘On account of the fact that my mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper assimilation of food, ‘I slept well’; (hence, they must be inferential). (Even if they are remembrance), the remembrance may become in- telligible, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several desirable and undesirable objects—a thought which exists at the moment (o sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account, of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during sleep; hence, nidrā need not be a separate vṛtti. The conclusion that nidra is no vrtti will not contradict the yoga-sutra:- (You may ask) how, then, could the sutra of the great sage have come in at all?–“Nidra (sleep) is the vṛtti, which is the cause of the non-existence of other vṛttis.“175 (The reply is) as the context aims at stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the nature of the vṛttis, as in the case viparyaya (which, though not a vṛtti, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals
174. Vide p. 95. 108 Siddhitrayam cannot be met with; for all knowledge is invariably associated with an objective reality.176 And this fact has clearly been proved in the adhikarana: 177 and later it will be established again. As sleep (nida) is a hindrance to the soul (cit) which is to attain release, it is men- tioned as something that deserves to be suppressed Granting nidra is a vṛtti, from that reason itself it follows that cons- ciousness is an essential nature of the self. Let it be granted that sleep (nidra) is a vṛtti having for its object the most highly developed tamas, and that it is responsible for the absence of other vṛttis mentioned already; such as, pramāna:178 let it also be granted that the congnitions arising to the person awake are remembrances. Even then, the fact does remain that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.* (The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, (and ask) how can it be asserted that knowledge is an essential property of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge? (The reply is:–this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that without knowledge which exists in the very nature of the soul, tamas which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest to the soul; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might be said that though knowledge is absent, tamas may be manifested with
175. Compare Yoga-Sútra I. 8. ‘Viparyayo mithyaj iāna natadrūpapratistham.’ 177. Evidently the reference is to an adhikarana in Nathamuni’s Nyayatattva Sastra. As the author is generally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhi- karana to which he refers, in all probabillity, he would have mentioned the name here also. But unfortuntely, it has been lost. cf pp. 79,85 and 112. *The Telugu and Benares editions read tatha satyanadarata. The former refers in a footnote to a variant reading tatha na satyanavarata. The emendation we suggest is tatha satyapyanavarta.
176. Vide note No, 163. Atmasiddhi 109 the aid of the senses or manas or the samskaras; but this is untenable) For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (minas) are quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than remembrances does not belong to the impressions (samskaras). (Nor can it be said that tamas may reveal itself; for tamas is not self- luminous; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than ta nas. For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it or not, that predominant tamas or any other quality residing in the soul becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), forms an essential feature of the soul The self-luminous soul-the substrate of prana - is eternal- Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)–The soul possesses an eternal illumination: for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades (vyapaka)–the quality of being other than a knower–cannot find a place for itself in the soul which possesses the quality of being a knower -a quality opposed to the vyapaka (i. e. the quality of being other than a knower) 179 The Soul being the substrate of pran 1, is svayamprakasa- The possession of illumination as an innate property is attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is in- variably associated with the quality of being other than a knower. Deter nination of the significance of the term ‘prakasa’ and of the nature of its relation to the soul:- What is meant by this illumination (prakasa) which is said to be eternal and innate to the soul? And what exactly is the nature of its 1/9. The syllogism may be stated thus - Notaing possessing non-eternal illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not possess non-eternal illumination. Cf. Ved. Să. II. iii. 31. Pumstvadivattvasya satobhivyaktiyogāt. 110 Siddhitrayām relation to the soul? If illumination means knowledge itself and if the relation is that of being the container and the contained (a frayā śra- yitvam), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite the invariable concomitance of the absence of the sadhya with the absence of the hetu, pots and the like must be cited as illustrative examples in the following way:–Whatever possesses a non-eternal illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other than a knower; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same general category, it would result in the admission that occasional know- ledge resides in pots and the like. The contention that the self is the object of knowledge and not svayam- prakāśa- In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation (in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and being the subject appreheni.ng (visayaviş iyibhava), then, the soul would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, con- sciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul. If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in the case of insentient objects, the reply is ’not so’; for even when some other soul is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only to cases other than oneself; for even in regard to oneself, when it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is noticed. Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same activity are contradictory; just as in the case of a needle, with regard to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced areAtmasiddhi 111 contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its features such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all things, the possesion of consciousness as its essential nature-that the soul (pratyagartha) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through inference or through instruction. Since the illumination described as being innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, the self, like the examples relied upon, such as, sabda (the word), cannot be said to be self-established.180 The contention that atma is the seat of prakasa inferred from prakatya- As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient-a quality by whose aid all understanding and reference, namely, ‘It is illumined’, arise in regard to all objects; and that the relation of this illumination to all objects. without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being the container and the contained; and that, on the strength of the afore- said reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and essential to the soul. Refutation of that view:- But this view has already been refuted. There is no prakasa dis- tinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said ‘It is

• 180. (i) The reading in the text is pakṣasyeva sabdadeḥ; but the correct reading should be sapakṣasyeva sabdadeḥ. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which sabda, dipa, etc., are relied upon as illustrative examples (sapaksa). The syllogism may be set forth as follows:-ātmā svaviṣayaḥ; svaprakāśatvāt, sabdavat dipavat ca. It may also be added that the Vaiyakaranas hold that a word (sahda) illuminates itself while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (sabdabodha) which does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare Bhartṛhari-na sosti pratyayo loke yassabdanugamadrte. (ii) Vipakṣasyeva sabda deh is the reading suggested by some. Atma is the pakṣa in this argument; pots and the like constitnte the vipaksa (i.e. examples where the sadhya, namely self. luminosity, is absent), Sabda also must be classed among counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the sentence would have to be modified as follows:- … … … … the self, like the counter examples, such as sabda, cannot be said to be self-established.’ 112 Siddhitrayam manifested’ is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises know- ledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference ‘It is manifested’ should apply in an identical way to all these three. If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this prakasa for its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness to the soul? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but prakasa; for even objects, such as pots and like, would become conscious entities, inasmuch as they possess prakāsa. If it is said that (consciousness and prakasa are different and that) prakasa is that which is manifested to the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge (samvit)? Indeed, samvit is itself consciousness; and it is not possessed of knowledge. If it be said that this quality (i.e. prakaś 1). dependent upon the relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of prakāśa? It cannot be that of being the container and the contained; for, then, pots and the like would have to be deprived of prakatya. Nor can it be the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object appre- hended, for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of the Bhrantyadhikarana181 (of Nyayatattva) where the statement of the conclusion (siddhanta) commences and from Samvit iddhi. More- over, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject (visa, itva) was the cause of prakāśa, since this quality does not exist in the soul and in non-sentient objects like pots, it (prakāśa) would have to be denied to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects. The view that siddhi is nothing but being the seat of prakasa) which is dependent upon jñāna, and that it is with the aid of that siddhi

181. While discussing the nature of error, Sarvarthasiddhi (Buddhisara) refers to this adhikarana. See the Tattvamuktakalapa, Sarvärthasiddhi p. 404. Atmasiddhi 113 that knowledge is inferred to exist has already been refuted. (The defect of mutual dependence-anyonyaṣraya-involved in that view can by no means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self- luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of prakāśa). Nvaya refution of the Prabhakara and Bhatta views and the contention that relation of jnana and its visaya is through sense contact. Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self- luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the manner in which objects become fit for discussion. Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a prākāsā or discussion is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons (linga). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining to the pot-such as, fetching water-cannot be treated as having for their bases or superintendent (adhisthāna) what is identical with the potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors–such as, the contact of the senses-perish. knowledge of colour and the like disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects, 182 just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is depen- dent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact of the senses with objects falls away?
182. Compare Sri Bhasya on Ved Su II. ii. 27-näbhāvā upalabdheḥ-samban- dhašca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ. see also the Tattvamu ktākalāpa p. 652. Dravyam prāg buddhiruktā paramiha viṣayaissañgamadirnirupyah samyogam Bhāṣyakārāh prathamamakathayan nyayatattvānusārāt., 15 114 Siddhitrayam The Nyaya argument that with the disappearance of jnana, prākatya disappears is untenable because with the disapparance of the efficient cause, the effect need not disappear. The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits prakaṣā as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by jñāna. For knowledge is the efficient cause of prakaša. Then, why (it may be asked) should the prakasa of the objects disappear at the disappearance of knowledgs? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts? That the disappearance of the nimitta karana need not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the effect is illustrated with the instance of twoness and the like. It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of number (sankhya) and the like. 183 For with the disappearance of the enumerative cognition (apekṣābuddhi) there does not result the disappear- ance of numbers. Like number I (unity), the other numbers, namely, 2. 3 and so on. for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or noneternal, (i.e. the number 1. unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts is admitted by all disputants. While the generaliiy, namely, numberness, exists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to number in lasting as long as the support lasts)? An objection may be taken to this argument:–Since number 1 is not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from the svarupa (i. e. the object wherein it is said to dwell); 184 the example cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the hetu.
183. The analogy may be expressed thus:-When the enumerative cognition (apekṣabuddhi) which is the efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so on disappears these numbers vanish; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause of prakasa ceases to be, prakaşa also falls away,
184. This objection is met by Vedāna Dašika in the Tattvamuktakalāpā (Adra- vyasara thus-‘aikyam svabhedama huh katicana na bhidastyekameveti dṛṣṭěḥ Atmasiddhi 115 (The reply Is) not so. Unity (No. 1) is certainly a number; for it per- sists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being it is sought to be identified.) If No. 1 were identical with the very being of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects. as is suggested in the expressions. one pot, one cloth and so on. Indeed, there is no equation of the being of the pot (ghatasvarupa) with that of the cloth to the effect ‘The pot is cloth’; but that equation of No. 1 with the pot (as is evident in the expression ‘one pot’) exists. Being contradictory to other nembers, unity, like No. 2, must necessarily be a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 in the form ‘Unity is No. 2.. Untenability of the argument that numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as objects lust It may be contended that, like contact (samyoga), the numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a contention is liable to be charged with anekanta dosa in the light of the instance of ‘diversity. For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, diversity will never vanish.185 It cannot be said that diversity is nothing but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of anekania by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are indenti- cal). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy.) For (in that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality (luccha). bhedadṛṣtyaikyamohaḥ taditi ca vacanam tattra tatrabhyupetam anyetvetat svasatt- viduritarasamuccityavastha nuvrttam tatpakṣepi svarůpadadhikamidamiha vam dvittvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5,
185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by anekanta dosa is here explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the sadhya is absent, the hetu is still met with. 116 Siddhitrayam Cognition of duality and the like is not constant, since it depends on desire to enumerate. Even though the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being dependent upon enumerative cognition (apekṣabuddhi), their non- apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative (pratiyogin) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses and establishes contact with objects that the dependence of prakāsā on the presence of this contact could be rendered intelligible. Consciousness illumines objects through contact with them by means of sense contact. Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that conscious- ness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting into contact with them.) If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by ‘from’ when it is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity? Jnana is of limited nature. If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, conscious- ness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i. e. all-pervasive). there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one sense-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul- Atmasiddhi 117 taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness:186 for its rapid permeation of different senses (one after another) is perceived as if it were simulataneous. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the character of possessing a form, in the sense described above, belongs to consciousness. Fallacious to consider what is devoid of touch asumtari (unlimited) If it is urged that form (murti) is the quality of possessing touch. and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot possess any activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with anekānta dosa, in view of the instance of sound (sabda). For the sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far dis ant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that manas, though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by the Naiyayikas who have understood the categories (padarthas) and by the Mimāmsakas who have inquired into the import of propositions. Objects, past and future, could come into contact with consciousness as what ep existed or what is yet to be- How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which are nonexistent, come into contact with consciousness? (We ask you in turn) how do they become the objects (visaya) of knowledge? The same explanations that you offer with regard to these187-such as (their be- coming the object of knowledge means just this :) their becoming mani- 1
186. Compare the definition of jana ‘atyantavegitatyanata sauksmyam nirbaratātatha tathā. . . .’-given ni Prathamadhikarana of Nyayatattva and quoted in the Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda. Vide infra p. 95 and note 150. 187 Vedanta Dešika quotes these passages and discusses them in the Nyāya- siddhanjana. Rangarāmānujaswami also comments on them. They identify the first (i. e, the view that objects, past and future, become the object of jnana) as the view of the Naiyayikas, and the second (i. e. the view that these objects possess prakatya) as that of the Bhattas. See Buddhipariccheda, p. 266. 118 Siddhitrayam fested, or their possession of qualities like number-may apply here also.188 Moreover, since such obects may even be said to exist at this very moment as ’things that have perished’ and ’things that are yet to be,’ what is the difficulty in stating that consciousness comes into contact with them in the light of their having such a type of existence.189 Just as the eye comes into contact with the Dhruva and Simsumàra190 mandalas existing in vastly remote regions even so, in regard to entities existingat vastly remote periods of time, consciousness comes into contact with qualities, such as Svayambhu existing at the beginning and end counter to kalpa (world epoch). Hence, there is nothing that could run to everyday experience.191 Further, for the reason that they are manifested by consciousness, things past and future, like knowledge and the knower. cannot be considered to be beyond the reach of knowledge. 188 The illustration (drṣṭanta) of number may be claborared thus:-When one says There were four mangoes, three of them have been lost,’ the No 3 is associated with non-existent objects.
187. The Bhatta Mimāmsakas, according to whom vyakti and jäti are diff- ent and non-different (bhedabheda), maintain that objects, past and future, exist even now in the form of jati and that they may well be said to possess prakatya Similarly, it may be said that such objects have an existence of some sort. Once that is admitted, it is easy to show that conscionsness may come into contact with them. See Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda p. 267. Compare: ‘atitanagatam svarüpatosti adhvabhedat dharmaņām.’ Yoga-Sutra IV. 12 and Vacaspati Misra’s commentary thereon and also the Vyasa Bhasya.
188. The Hindu tradition has it that the Lord Narayana, in the from of the celestial body, Simaŝumārā (also called Sišumāra), controls all the heavenly bodies. and that he acts as their support from his abode in the heart of Simsumāra and that many of th devas dwell in the several organs of Šimšumāra, (e. g. Agni, Mahendra, Kaşyapa and Dhruva shine forth, without ever setting, from the tail region of Šišumāra), and that whoever sees this celestial body gets rid of his demerits (pap) See the Visnu Purana, Amsa II, ch. 9 and 12 and the Bhāgavata purana V Skanda 191. In all probability, the proper reading is nalikām rather than nālokām. On either reading, the meaning is substantially the same. Atmasiddhi The non-apprehension of intervening spacc explained. 119 Moreover, (against the possible objection that if consciousness can get into contact with objects far removed from us by vast stretches of space and time, it must be in contact with those of intervening space and time, it may be replied that) as consciousness moves with extreme rapidi- ty, the false impression arises that there is no awareness of (objects existing in) the intervening space and time; just as the false belief arises, namely, that there is no apprehension of the contact (of the point of light) with different points in space or its separation therefrom -a contact and separation which proceeds in a definite sequence and which resides in the circle traced by the fire-brand (alatacakra). Besides. consciousness, proceeding outward having come into association with that form of the different senses, reasons (hetu) and impressions (samskaras) which is invariably related to their respective objects, gets into contact with those objects only which are respective- ly related to these (i.e., the senses, etc.); just as the significatory potency of words, such as the cow is related only to the universal aspect (of things), even though on hearing a word. like the cow. an object constituted of universal and particular features presents itself in a single cognition or just as the vedic injunction deals only with that aspect of the bhavana which is unknown, having neglected the part already known191 Therefore, here it is legitimate to maintain that consciousness, proceeds through the senses towards their respective objects. To this effect the Adorable Kṛṣṇa says, “It (the manas) forcibly drags consci- ousnesss along, even as the wind drives the boat on water.‘‘192 And Manu says, “From among the several senses even if one sense organ were to proceed out-ward, thereupon the person’s knowledge also would move outward, even as water would flow from the hole found in the leather bag. “193 191a. For example, the injunction, ‘dadhna juhoti’, aims at specifying the kind of oblation to be offered at the Agnihotra, rather than at emphasising the need for performing that homa, the necessity for the latter having been already learnt from the other vidhi, agnihotram juhoti’.
189. Bh. Gitā. II 67. 193. Manusmr II 99. 120 Siddhitrayam The objection that consciousness as a quality cannot leave its substrate and proceed elsewhere answered The objection raised-nameiy, how can consciousness, which is a quality, proceed elsewhere, leaving its substrate?-is hardly reasonable; for it has not been maintained that it leaves its substrate. Conscious- ness proceeds hither and thither by way of the senses without ever leaving the self. That its reunion (with the self) would become impossi- ble were it to lose contact there with has been set forth in the (Nyāya- tattva) Sastra. (It could even be shown that qualities may leave their substrate and proceed elsewhere; for) qualities, such as, sound. odour, the rays of the sun and the lustre of the gem are found to be endowed with move- ment and to leave their substrate. Indeed, sound (sabda) is exceedingly subtle and elemental, and has the quality of proceeding long distances. The Prabhakara view of sabda refuted- A possible objection is the following - sabda (sound) is all-perva- sive, like ether; but, with the aid of dhvani (vibration) which helps to reveal it, it appears as if it dwells in a particular place, and as if it moves about. And it may be put in syllogistic form thus-sabda is all-perva- sive; for, like the magnitude of ether, sound, while residing in one sub- stance, is the quality of ether. (We reply) ’not so’; because sabda is not a quality of ether. It really belongs to the air in motion (vayu); for, like touch (sparśa) which pertains to the air in motion (vayu), sabda invariably originates along with vayu. Any quality which invariably originates along with a given substance must necessarily be considered to be a quality of that substance alone; even as colour and the like, which invariably originate along with a substance are treated as its qualities. And sound invariably originates along with vayu, in as much as both invariably originate together from the contact of the drumstick with the drum or from the separation of the parts of the bamboo caused by its splitting. Besides, sabda does originate; for, like smell, it is grasped by the senses and is also a quality. Moreover, it is created by human activity:Atmasiddhi 121 for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simul- taneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing at an identical place, namely, the nu aber, size, etc., and vessels, like the water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjuction and disjunction of the plate and the like is not of such a nature, it can- not be a factor for manifesting sound. He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason for certain sounds being man.fested while other sounds are not; because sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It has already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the mantifester also must be unitary. Since in the present case the mani- fester is not unitary, the vayu originating from human effort must be the cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simul- taneously in sounds (varna), such as ga-qualities, such as that of possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of being long and short-fail to differentiate their substrates? (It cannot be urged that the recognition, namely. ‘This is the self-same sound which was met with before’ points to the identity of the sound and also to its eternity: for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising from the source being identical and not on the identity of the sounds themselves; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced. 16 Atmasiddhi 121 for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simul- taneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing at an identical place, namely, the nu aber, size, etc., and vessels, like the water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjuction and disjunction of the plate and the like is not of such a nature, it can- not be a factor for manifesting sound. He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason for certain sounds being man.fested while other sounds are not; because sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It has already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the mantifester also must be unitary. Since in the present case the mani- fester is not unitary, the vayu originating from human effort must be the cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct ‘sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simul- taneously in sounds (varna), such as ga-qualities, such as that of possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of being long and short-fail to differentiate their substrates? (It cannot be urged that the recognition, namely. ‘This is the self-same sound which was met with before’ points to the identity of the sound and also to its eternity: for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising from the source being identical and not on the identity of the sounds themselves; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced. 16 122 Siddhitrayam The Prabhakara view that object is manifested without the relation of consciousness The following objection may now be raised: -(The upshot of the discussion is) prakāśa is either the conjunction of consciousness (with the object) or some peculiar property resulting from this (conjunction). But in regard to the manifestation of consciousness neither of these alternatives holds; for relation always pre-supposes difference in the relata. Therefore, consciousness cannot enter into relation with consci- ousness. This conjunction with consciousness cannot occur to the soul either; for the latter is the substrate of the quality, namely, conscious- ness. In fact, the relation between the attribute and its substrate is not the relation of samyoga (conjunction); but really, it is samavāya (inherence); for it is of the nature of the relation existing between inseparable entities. Samyoga (conjunction), on the contrary, is either the coming into relation of two objects well-known to be disparate, a relation dependent upon activity, or the closely contiguous existence of the aforesaid objects, which do not stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. (In order to obviate this difficulty), if prakasa is taken either as one of these relations, namely, conjunction or inherence of consciousness with objects or any one of the other possible relations of consciousness to objects, then the defects of (such a definition) being too narrow (avyāpti) or too broad (ativyapti) may be cited, according to the circumstance of each case, in respect of the knower, knowledge, the known, the body and the senses. The admission of prakasa as a separate entity, having been effec- tively discredited by non-perception (anupalabdhi) does not call forth any other adverse comment. Therefore, it is but proper to admit the following-that entity concerning which there arises knowledge capable of initiating a thought and discussion of it may be spoken of as being manifested. As the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all these three (i. e., knowledge, the knower and the known) is an essential Atmasiddhi 123 feature of consciousness, the diversity in the manner in which the cause (i.e., consciousness) operates (in these three cases) cannot be raised as an objection. It cannot be asked why such and such a nature belongs to such and such an object. If so (i.e.. if the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regard- ing all the three is an essential quality of knowledge, the difficulty raised on p. 104, namely, How can knowledge which is inherent in the soul generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a prakasa or discussion?) may be sought to be overcome by the suggestion that knowledge may, with the aid of various operating causes (such as the senses), be respon- sible for vyavahara concerning the object, even though the latter be devoid of any relation (to consciousness), whether it be conjunction (samyoga) or inherencc (samavāya). The Prabhakara view refuted (To this it is replied) it has already been shown (vide p. 104) that an entity does not enter on its own activities by depending on its efficient cause. It the term prakasa were to signify knowledge conducive to thought and discussion (vyavahārānuguna samvedana), then, the diversity in the significance (pravṛttinimittabheda) suggested by this term cannot be got over. If the expression vyavaharanuguna samved ina is taken as a bahuvrihi compound (i.e., if it denotes that which possesses knowledge conducive to vyavahāra), prakasa would have to be denied to consciousness; for there is no knowledge (which this knowledge may be said to possess). If the expression is taken as a karmadharaya compound (ie., if it denotes the character of being knowledge conducive to vyavahāra), prakāśa would have to be denied to the knower and the known; for they do not possess the character of being knowledge. And the character of being conducive to the starting of an action is to be ascertained from the action itself; but, prior to an action there is) the knowledge (prakasa) that the object concerning which there is activity is already cognised and that there is discussion concerning the same. The true significance of prakasa If so, what is the significance of the term prakaṣate (shines forth)? Indeed, we do not know of a prakasa which exists in common in the knower, the known and knowledge, and which has the same form in all 124 Siddhitrayam these three, and about which no objection could be raised. (To this) it is replied.-evidently, you are not acquainted with the Prathamadhi- karaṇa of Nyayatattva. While pointing out therein that remembrance arises only in the event of there being experience, it has been clearly stated by the author (Nathamuni) that prakasa means not being remote (adūratvam i. e., nearness) from experience, a nearness which is the cause of smrti (remembrance). 19 It amounts to this, namely, that 194 prakāša means not being remote (adura) from experience. The objections to the concept of adūraiva answered (The objector may ask :) What is meant by adūra? Does it mean ‘different from’ or ‘opposed to’ or ’the absence of’ that which is remote? Again, is adūratva (not being remote) a qualification (vişeṣaṇa) or an upalakṣaṇa.?195 If it is a qualification (viseṣaṇa) in each of the three alternatives alike, consciousness or prakasa will invariably be preced- ed by the awareness of not being remote from experience. But, as a matter of fact, it is not. so. If it is an upalakṣaṇa what other nature prakasa possesses besides this upalakṣaṇa must be pointed out. But it has been said that this nature is not apprehended. (To this) it is replied, ‘Enough of this misplaced excitement.’ Let anubhavadura mean either ‘different from that which is remote from experience’ or ‘opposed to that which is remote from experience’. And to be manifest is to be different from that which is remote from experience or to be opposed to that which is remote from experience.196 Why has all this prattle been indulged in?
190. The qualification ’the causes of smrti’ is purposely included in this defi- nition of prakāsa. Otherwise, all objects which are presented to experience would have to possess prakāśa. In actual fact, that is not the case. Though several objects are within the focus of attention, all of them cannot be said to be manifested; for, clearly, we are not interested in them all. Hence, only those objects which fall within the range of experience leading to remembrance can be said to possess prakāša. Compare ‘pathi gacchataḥ kāṣthaloṣṭādijn anotpattyä käsṭhaloṣṭādiṣu satopi- anubhavaduratvasya prakasa padarthatvābhāvāt smgtinimittamityuktam.’
191. Upalaksana is a characteristic which reveals certain aspects of a thing already known to possess other aspects.
192. This verse is quoted in Nyayasiddhanjana. In his tíka on Nyayasiddhaň- jana, Rangarāmānuja interprets prakāśatvam as prakāšamānatvam. Our translation is based on this interpretation. He also suggests the emendation ‘prakāsotra.’ Atmasiddhi 125 Like external illumination, even the cognition ‘It is manifested’ is no other than the awareness of the nature of knowledge and of the object connected thereto-a nature opposed to that of being remote from con- sciousness. There also the thought and reference ‘It shines’, arising in respect of the rays of light and the regions of space wherein they pervade, are based on the quality of not being remote from light. Just as, in the one case, the dispelling of darkness is due to the quality of not being remote from light, here also the dispelling of ignorance is due to the quality of not being remote from consciousness. That is why at a subsequent time recollection of the object known as also of the knowledge itself arises. There being no room for the question as to the precise nature of the relation of consciousness (i.e., whether it is samavāya or samyoga). it follows that the question raised is one that ought not to have been asked at all. Deciding on the nature of the knowledge relation as samyoga Besides, samyoga is merely close contiguity, which, in its turn, is synonymous with nairantarya (not being separated by intervening space). And it is only this samyoga, which obtains betwee inseparable (ayuta- siddha) objects of which one is self-dependent and the other dependent, that is referred to by the technical term sa navaya in the system of the Vaiseṣikas: hence, the question whether the relation of consciousness with objects is samyoga or samavaya, proceeding as it does on the. assumption that samavaya is a separate entity, does not arise. In the section dealing with relation (sambanaavimarsa),197 we will presently show how inherence (samavaya) could be brought under conjunction (samyoga). Or, prakasa may be understood in a different sense as denoting the capacity to initiate thought and discussion-a capacity dependent upon definition of prakasa set forth is this stanza objects perceived by the senses, and not to It must be understood that the applies only to the prakasa residing in that found in objects inferred or to that residing in knowledge itself.
193. The section dealing with the relation of the finite soul to the Infinite Self is included in the portions of Atmasiddhi lost. Already, on an earlier occasion, refer- ence has been made to this section. Vide p. 49. 126 Siddhitrayam the quality of not being remote from consciousness. Even when its causal conditions are present in their entirety. either on account of the presence of obstructing factors, or on account of the absence of the capa- city for being manifested, prakaşa does not arise in the other qualities of the soul (besides its consciousness), such as being all-pervasive and being unattached, and in the body, senses and the like; just as the colour. taste and the like of the water of the Jamna, which is in contact with the eye, are not manifested. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, the self has consciousness for its structure and consciousness for its nature. The self cognises the rest with the aid of the senses. The examples of sukha etc. deduced by the purvapaksin not apposite. Even the charge levelled against us, namely, that consciousness. being a special quality of the sou!, must, on the analogy of pleasure (sukha) and the like, be an occasional quality proceeds from complete ignorance of the true nature of qualities. For the qualities which are dependent upon the very being of anything will last as long as their sub- strate lasts; but the knowledge of pleasure and pain is not dependent in this manner upon the very being of the self. It has already been shown how consciousness is responsible for the self being what it is. 193 Pleasure and pain, on the contrary, are not the qualities of the self; 199 for they have been shown to be no other than the flourishing or decaying state of the senses (vide p. 78). This point will be further elaborated when establishing that the soul is in its essential nature blissful, a fact signified in) the last word 200 i, e., svatassuki, occurring in the
194. This text has been quoted by Vedanta Desika in his Nyayasiddhāñjana. Rangarāmānuja interprets it thus-jňanamatmatve upadhiḥ prayojakamityarthah. Tatasca yavatprayojyam prayojakavasthanavasyambhāvāt bodhasya svābhāvikatvādi siddhy ati iti bhavaḥ”. See Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda p. 238.
195. Surely, this is not his final view on the matter; for in a subsequent pas- sage he declares that certainty, doubt, pleasure and pain are forms of knowledge and consequently, qualities of the self. Here, either he defends a view other than his own or shown off his competency to prove any position (vaibhavavada). See note 144 on p. 79.
196. See note 143 on p. 79. Atmasiddhi 127 stanza commencing with dehendriya mana prana). Hence, the defect of not possessing the sadhana (means of inference) vitiates the illustrative example. Desire and aversion also201 are the different states of manas and are not the direct qualities of the self. Indeed, it is learnt from the scripture: “Desire, will, doubt, faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, contempt, conjecture (dhiḥ), fear-all this is truly manas’’.202 This fact has also been stated in the Gita in the verse commencing with the words, “Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain.“203. Definition of sarira (body) according to the siddhantin As the expression cetanadhṛtih (occurring in this stanza) is one word, it is the definition of kṣetra (body). The body is, in fact, the collection (of the primal elements) which is supported by conscious- ness, 204 It amounts to stating that the body is what enters on its activities only with the aid of consciousness appropriate thereto. That is why descriptions such as the following are found in the Antaryami Brāhmaṇa-”….. for whom the earth is body…for whom the water is
197. When pleasure and pain are shown to be defective as illustrative examples one may cite desire and aversion instead. Herc it is shown that these fare no better, for they too are equally liable to be charged with the defect of not possessing the sādhya.
198. Brh. I v. 3 and Maitri up. VI 30.
199. How, it may be asked, does this verse from the Gita declaring that desire and aversion constitute the kṣetra bear testimony to the view that they are the qualities of manas? Possibly the author thinks that once this verse excludes the possibility of their being the qualities of the self, it could be shown. on the strength of the Brhadaranyaka text, ’etat sarvam mana eva,’ that they belong to manas. 204 Analysing the expression cetanadhṛtih into cetanaya dhṛtih, Yamunācārya arrives at rhe meaning a collection supported by consciousness.’ But in the Gita Bhasya, Ramanuja splits it into cetanasya adhṛtih and interprets it to mean ‘a collocation which has sprung up as the seat of the soul (who enjoys pleasure and pain and who seeks worldly experience or liberation therefrom)’. On either interpretation. cetanadhṛtih denotes only the body. 128 Siddhitrayam body…for whom the soul is body…205 Such descriptions are met with in the puranas also.-“All these constitute His body"206. The significance of dhih’ occurring in the sruti texts cited above. P(The upanisadic passage quoted above reckons dhiḥ, which is obvi- ously a quality of the soul, as one among the properties not belonging to the soul. Hence, the objector asks) what is meant by dhiḥ (in that text)? (The reply is) it means conjecture (utpreksa), and does not have knowledge for its significance. For in the same upaniṣad it has been declared that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Indeed, the scriptural texts assert.-“There is no cessation of the knowing of a knower (because of his imperishabillity)",207 “There can be not cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability. “203 This scriptural text, which establishes that there can be no destruction of knowledge for the very reason that the knower is imperishable indicates hat knowledge is dependent upon the very being of the knower. It is not right to contend that (in the text in question) the seer (drasta) is taken as a qualification of seeing (drşti), i.e., it is not right to interpret the text thus-‘There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer’); because, in that event, there would be im- propriety in the use of the masculine gender, and because the hetu would come to be identical with the sadhya (i.e., there would be no hetu worth the name).20
200. Brh. up. III, vii.
201. Vtṣṇu Purana, I, 22, 86. yani märtänyamurtāni yanyatranyatra vā kvacit | santi vai vastujātāni tāni sarvãņi tadvapuḥ. II
202. Brh. up. IV, iii, 30.
203. Brh. up. IV, iii, 23. draṣṭā as a qualification of must be in the same gender’; Again, on this interpretaion,
204. Two difficulties stand in the way of taking drşti- (i) If draṣṭa were to qualify drṣti. both the words but draṣṭā is masculine, while drsti is feminine. (ii) the text would mean-There can be no destruction of seeing whieh is no other than the seer because it does not perish.’ Clearly, it is vitiated by petitio principii. Atmasiddhi 129 Even if the term drşti aims at revealing the very essence of the soul, the charge of there being no hetu is unanswerable,210 Moreover, it would amount to the abandoning of your position. It is but right to adduce as hetu the proposition that the soul is eternal-a proposition established by several incontrovertible arguments and supported by the sastras. When an object exists, whatever depends upon the very being of that object cannot but exist; even as yellowness of light cannot but exist when gold or the lamp exists. Therefore, this is the true meaning (of the text under consideration)-at no time, whether in the state of worldly existence or that of release is there cessation of knowledge, which is an essential feature of the soul, and which, as a result of its diverse forms of relation with different objects, external and internal, acquires different names. such as seeing, smelling. tasting, speaking, hearing, reflecting, touching and conceiving, and which shines of its own accord. (The scriptures declare): “Just as a lump of salt, without any distinction of parts, whether they be not-inner or (they be) not-outer,211 is filled right through with the same taste, even so this soul, right through, without any distinction of parts, is constituted of knowledge (pra,ňanaghana); “.. by by his own luminosity, by his own light”, 19 “O King”, said he, “this atman is self-luminous” 213 The Chandogas say that even in the state of release “The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world. Verily, the seer perceives all.“214; “The jiva enjoys.. not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin"215; “He who, with the aid of manas, the celestial eye, experiences all enjoyments and feels joyous'16. And other texts like the following-
205. If the term dṛṣṭi, whose gender des not vary in accordance with that of the object which it qualifies (niyatalinga), is taken as an adjective qualifying draṣṭā, the grammatical difficulty may be got over; but the fallacy of petitio principii stil 1 remains.
206. Brh up. VII, v, 13. This text enumerates the parts of the lump of salt in this negative fashion for two reasons :-(1) If the positive mode of expression viz., inner and outer parts, were used, parts in the middle region would be left out. The negative expressions secure exhaustion.. (2) Again, as the soul is niravayava. (partless), the analogy of the lump of salt would be in order only if it uses the negative expressions,
207. Brh. up. VI, iii, 9.

Chand. up. VIII, xii 3. 213. Brh. up. VI, iii, 6. 216. Chand. up. VIII, xii, 5. 214. Chand. up. VII xxvi, 2. 17130 Siddhitrayam “The puruşa does know things, but he fails to know what he ought to understand”-which declare that even in the state when all the senses are destroyed knowledge belongs to the soul strongly affirm that know- ledge belongs to the soul, Statements like the following are found in the purāņas also-“The soul is constituted of bliss and jñāna and is undefiled:“217 Passages such as the following are found in the itihasas- “It (the soul), is the light of all lights.” The revered Saunaka says, “Just as the lustre of the gem is not created by cleansing it of its impurities, even so knowledge (which is the very essence of the soul) is not created by the shedding of imperfections. Again, water or space is not created by the digging of a well. Only that which has all along existed is rendered manifest. How can the non-existent ever come into being? Likewise. qualities, such as jñana, are not created but only manifested by the destruction of evil qualities (heyaguna); for, in truth, they are the eternal qualities of the soul”.218 For this very reason the Sūtrakāra says, That is why (the individual soul is) a knower”. 219 References to origination of knowledge, its loss, doubt, certainty and the like explained. The usage of the different expressions, doubt (samsaya) and cer- tainty (niscaya) and the like220 has reference either to the different relations of objects to consciousness, which has thus been shown to be the essence of the soul, or to the consciousness that has entered into those relations.221 Indeed, certainty is the close conjunction of conscious- ness with a single object. Loose conjunction of the same with several 217. Visnu-Purana, VI, vii, 22. 218. V ṣṇudharmottara 104. 55-57. Compare Vedanta-sútra-sampadyavir- bhavassvena šabdat. IV. iv. 1. 219. Vedanta-sútra II iii 19. 220. And the like’ includes pleasure and pain. 221. One does not usually speak of objects with consciousness as being either doubtful or certain. On the contrary, it is knowledge that is described as being either doubtful or certain. Hence the second alternative. See Rangaramanuja’s tika on Nyayasiddhañana, p. 274. Atmasiddhi 131 objects simultaneously constitutes doubt.229 The conjunction following from impression of previous knowledge (jnanavasana) constitutes recollection (smrti); and so on with the rest. It has already been stated that what is called knowledge is the conjunction of the object with consciousness which is an attribute of the soul. It cannot be said that since conjunction exists in both (the object and consciousness), the object also would have to be considered the knower. For conjunction with the object is not met with in the object itself. Indeed, the object is in conjunction with consciousness, as with external light. Although illumination is only relation with light, the source of light alone, such as the sun, rather than the pot and the like is considered to be the manifester. If it be suggested that in as much as light is dependent upon the sun, the latter alone is considered the pos- sessor of this quality (light) and that the manifestation of other objects is due to the conjunction with this quality, (we reply) if that be so, in the present case also, the description ‘He knows’ legitimately applies only to the self who gets into contact with objects through the aid of consciousness, in as much as the latter is his quality. From all this it has to be concluded that the soul has certainly consciousness for its essential nature, and is aware of itself at all times: and that in regard to other objects (besides itself), owing to various causal conditions, it has to be said ‘He knows’, ‘He does not know’.

• Drdhasamyogah samŝayah is the reading found in all manuscripts and printed books. The correct reading is adrdha samyogah, See Nyaya Parisuddhi, Memorial Edition, page 30.

222. When we are in doubt as to whether the distant object is a post or a per- son, consciousness is in conjunction with two objects-the post and the person. As two mutually contradictory presentations cannot be given simultaneously in a single cognition, some maintain that in the state of doubt there are really two cognitions ; and that these arise in such a quick succession that they appear to be almost simul- taneous. On this view, the conjunction of consciousness with the object is adráha (unsteady). Even on the view that in the state of doubt there is but a single cogni- tion presenting two objects simultaneously, the cenjunction of consciousness with the objects may be characterised as adraha. Here adṛdhasamyoga will mean conjunc- tion involving mutual contradiction’. See Nyaya-Parisuddhi, Memorial edition, p. 30.

• 132 Siddhitrayam Though the soul is selfluminous, there is need of scripture to make its nature clearly known. Although the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and distinctly. That is why the several arguments which have been advanced by the teachers of old, and which are consistent with the reasons employed for demonstrating the true nature of the soul, and the scriptural texts are held in esteem. Not deriving any satisfaction from these, (for, after all, they could only lead to paroksa jñāna). persons who have got rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of yama (restraint) niyama (discipline) and other means of yoga223 endeavour to secure immediate knowledge (aparoksa jñāna) of the distinctness of the self from everything other than itself-a knowlege which arises from (1) the removal of impurities, such as, tamas and rajas, by the process of purification by fire (putapaka), in other words, by the practice of mental control, and (ii) the predominance of the sattva quality. Since the fact that this immediate knowledge arises at the culmination of the, highest stage of concentration is not called in question by any of the rival disputants, no attempt is here made to establish it. Thus, with the aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the practice of yoga, the soul which is in itself self-luminous, is manifested more clearly and explicitly. INQUIRY INTO THE DURATION OF THE SOUL The soul is eternal. Pūrvapakṣa: The Buddhistic view that the soul is momentary.

33. Henceforth, the inquiry into the duration of the soul may be taken up. Maintaining that momentariness follows from the very fact
34. Yama (restraint). niyama (discipline), asana (posture). prāṇāyāma (con- trol of breath), pratyābāra (withdrawal of senses from their objects), dharaṇā- (concentration). dhyana (meditation), and samadhi (realisation), constitute the eightfold (aştanga) yoga. Of these, the first, namely, yama signifies non-injury (ahimsa), truth-speaking (satya), abstinence from stealing (asteya), brahmacarya and giving up of possesions (aparigraha). Niyama denotes the cultivation of virtues, such as, purity (šauca). contentment (samtosa), fortitude (tapas), study (svadhyāya) and devotion to God (Isvara-pranidhana). See Yoga-sutra II, 28-32. Atmasiddhi 133 of existence, and holding (also) that the root cause of all miseries is only the belief that the soul is eternal. the followers of the Buddhistic doctrines assert that the soul is momentary; and their argument is as follows:-Whatever exists is momentary; the soul exists; (and, therefore, it is momentary.) Should it be asked how momentariness follows form the mere fact of existence, (it may be replied) because existence cannot be attributed to what is not momentary’. Since it is impossible to attribute existence to what cannot lead to fruitful activity, not even that of being the object of the comprehension of the Omniscient Being, the existence of objects is no other than the quality of leading to fruitful activity. And this (fruitful activity) is invariably associated only with momentariness: since it cannot be met with in that which is not moment- ary: for herein its invariable associates, namely, action all at once and action in a successive series. are absent. How could these, viz, action all at once and action in a successive series, be regarded as being associated with fruitful activity? How. again, could they be said to be absent from what is not momentary? (It is replied) Well, listen (to what follows)’: Objects may be said to bring about fruitful activity in one of two ways, either all at once or in succession and there is no other possibility. In the case of these two (alternatives), as in that of being and not-being, if one is absent, the other is bound to exist; hence in the matter of objects generating fruitful. activity, there could be no third possibility; therefore, fruitful activity is invariably associated with action, successive or non-successive. And activity taking place all at once, and action that is successive cannot be met with in what is not momentary Note : All the manuscripts of Atma siddhi examined are incomplete and end here. Evidently the rest of the work has been irretrievably lost. ISVARA SIDDHI 24 In order to establish the truth that the universe runs its course under the control of some one person, let us. at the very outset, state the prima facie view on the matter. THE MIMAMSAKA VIEW In regard to this question, the Mimāmsakas say :-A person endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be posited: for such a person is beyond the reach of all the pramāņas that could possibly help to prove his existence; (besides) there are several conclusive means of proof running counter to belief in such a person To make the matter clear-(It may be asked) is it perception or some other pramāņa that proves h’s existence? (If the reply is : perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception (laukika-pratyakṣa) or super-normal perception (yaugika pratyakṣa)? Laukikapratyakṣa cannot prove the existence of God The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each of the senses and being limited (to the here and now), it cannot serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul; for, with its aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and so on, cannot be apprehended, The instrument of knowledge which could reval a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning all these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific capacities of the different senses) in certain objects whieh are capable of coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of a person (endowed with such greatness)? 136 Siddhitrayam Nor could yoga pratyakṣa prove the existence of God. Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving his existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it would, like intuitive insight (pratibha), scarcely be perception. Besides, (there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the senses or not? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses or of the internal sense? It cannot originate from the outer senses: for it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary causes, namely, contact with the objects appropriate thereto, give rise to knowledge concerning those object. That is why there is no possibility of knowledge concerning all things, (e. g.) silver, bygone objects, and whatever is screened from view arising from the senses, such as, the tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, there can be no contact: for contact presupposes two bases, and in the absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer senses). When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things? This may be expressed in syllogistic form :-That which produces a certain effect. when in association with a given auxiliary cause, cannot produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause; for example, the seed which produces the sprout, when in association with the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of soil and the like The external senses, in association with the auxiliary cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in conformity with this principle. the outer senses do not also lead to knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be concluded that the knowledge generated by the external senses cannot override the rule herein mcntioned with regard to objects (that they should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses). Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and other Isvara Siddhi 137 internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard to knowledge of external objects the manas were admitted to be the unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become superfluous. It would follow therefrom that none could be either blind or deaf. To express it in syllogistic form:-Without seeking the assistance of the outer organs. manas, whose precise mode of apprehending exter- nal objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external perception: for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of that given entity; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of colour) in darkness. Impossible even for the senses that have acquired supernormal powers through drugs, charms, austerities and yogic concentration to establish the existence of God It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs administer- ed by perfected souls, of mantras (charms). austerities (rapas) and yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etc.) have for their result only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses; and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse qualities as colour and taste. To put the matter in syllogistic form:-The excellence of the skill belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds; for it is sensory excellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot make known bygone things and the like. 18 138 Siddhitrayam Yogic concentration even of the end stage incapable of proving God. Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance (smrti) and illusion (vibhrama), and has no chance whatever of reaching the shore of validity (pramanya). There is much less chance of trying to enchance its validity by stating that, it is perceptual knowledge. If it were a perception, how could it transcend the well-known limitations with regard to objects? If it were to transcend these, how could it still be perceptual in character? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means of proof in regard to the person endowed with superhu.nan power of expériencing all things. No pramāna other than perception is competent either to prove the ex- istence of God. It cannot be any other pramaņa either. (If it be) is that other pramāņa infernce or scripture (agama)? If it is inference, is that viseşatadṛṣṭa or samanyat dṛṣṭa? (It cannot be visesiodṛṣṭa; for) concerning the existence of God, who is beyond the reach of all the means of proof, no inference can arise; since the birth of the latter is dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (avinābhāva) between the hetu and the sadhya, which, in its turn, presupposes the direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomi- tant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference (lng 1) of the sa nanyatodṛṣṭa variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent to create all things and to perceive them directly. THE NYAYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. The world, concerning which the question is raised:-Is it, or is it not, due to divine creation?-is subservient to a single intelligent entity: for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability Isvara Siddhi 139 to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to belong to its author. Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxili- ary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are intended1. The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the moun- tain and the wide ocean, are effects; hence it has to be concluded that they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity. It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablishd for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the arrangement of the parts. All objects, commencing from wholes which are not themselves the parts of other wholes (antyavayavi) and ending with the diads (dvvanukas), are known to be constituted by the peculiar combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance with the scale of wholes; hence it follows that ultimately four different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the world. As for the auxiliary cause (upakarana), it must be the unseen powers (adtṣṭa) in the shape of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) existing in all individual souls (kṣetrajña) for the initial movement (parispanda) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause (asamavayikarana) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit (adrṣṭa) which are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the jivas, a help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by them. The self-same jivas who derive this help are the very persons for whom (sampradana) the universe is intended. For the reason that these jivas are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be inferred with the aid of a mark of inference (linga) of the samanyatodṛṣṭa variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as understood from the Adhikaraṇa-siddhanta, is different from these finite souls, who is competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with a knowledge
35. Compare Papinis sütra-karmana yamabhipraiti sa sampradanam. I. iv. 32. 140 Siddhitrayam of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which is natural to him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of unsurpassed excellence. THE MIMĀMSAKA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYAYIKA VIEW The Mimāmsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the out- come of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To make the matter clear-What is the precise significance of the statement that the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious entity? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity. (it may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon him? Is it their origin or continuance or activity? On the first two alternatives, the illustrative example cited would be defective in not possessing the sadhya. Indeed, the body is not dependent for its origin and continuance upon a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in the enjoyment of the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body must also, equally with the person who owns it, be responsible for its origin and continuance; since they are endowed with unseen powers (adṛṣṭa) appropriate to that enjoyment. The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which is in the form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and the like, which are offered as the paksa (minor term) in your argument; hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in com- mon in both the minor term (paks 1) and the illustrative example (sapakṣa). Should it be said that dependence’ means having an activity subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, theIsvara Siddhi 141 argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of vyabhicara. Again, when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of (matter), the addition of the qualification endowed with a knowledge of the material cause and so on’ is superfluous. The argument proves what is already proven If the aegument were to establish only dependence upon a conscious entity, then, the arugument is liable to be charged with the defect of proving what is already well-established; for this world has been created by our own past deeds (karma) as something fit for enjoyment by conscious beings, experiencers (bhokta). It is proper to admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants, for this hypothesis has the merit of economy of thought (laghava). It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such as sacrifice (yajňa) and gift (dāna). Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate building materials is not required for agency; because earth and other elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not secure at any time total annihilation or creation. (It is futile to contend that as yaga and dana become the causes of creation only through the mystic power (apūrva) which they generate and as this power is imperceptible to the jiva, he cannot be the agent; for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such as ‘apūrva’, may not be perceptible; but, surely, the act itself possessing this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their 142 Siddhitrayam respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds. The Mimamsaka objection that since the earth, the ocean etc cannot be made, they cannot be said to have a cause. Moreover, only that which it is possible to make. and whose material cause can possibly be known. is found everywhere to have a conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (ie, it is impossible to make them, and their material cause cannot to known). it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respective effects of different causes. It is even more difficult to conceive how their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-po, which is known to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must have for its cause a sentient being possessing a knowledge of that kind’ (i.e., knowledge of upadana, upakarana and the like.) Your argument would only establish the reverse of what you seek 10 prove i.e. it would not prove an omniscient Lord buronly a finite individual. Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality. and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason (hetu) cited by you, establishing as it does a knower answering to this description, is able to be charged with viruddha dosa. For it establishes the very reverse of ommiscience and lordship.over the universe which is sought Isvara Siddhi 143 to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause of the world. (The Mimāmsaka continues :)-There is no room for the objec- tion that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, if the thir g proved (lingin) is open to any pramana other than that on which it is at the moment based, this other pramana itself would dispel the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the mark of inference (linga). In the present case, however, when a person who transcends the reach of all other pramānas and who is competent to create all things is desired to be proved, the reason (hetu) will, in addition to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative evidence. The possibility of proving the precisely opposite conclusion i. e. that the world is not created. The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of dissolution (pralaya) the jivas are destitute of senses, body and other means of enjoyment, no sorrow could be experienced by them; as a consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the perception of persons afflicted by sorrow; hence, with the absence of the vapaka (the invariably concomitant), namely, personal gain and mercy, there must be the absence of the vyapya (that which is inherent), namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard to the past deeds of jivas, his independence would be lost. The argument that the nimitta karana need not know the upadāna karana and hence one who is not omniscient could be cause. Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like; for 144 Siddhitrayam in respect of activitios, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes. The Mimamsaka concludes his argument Hence, in as much as the hetu, namely, ‘being an effect’ is liab’e (for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the defects of being unestablished (asiddha), adverse (viruddha: and anekanta (straying), it is impossible that the universe should have for its cause a person like the one suggested by you. This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus:-(1) Phenomena. such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that. like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects.. or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible; for, unlike jars and the like, they are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (.e.. pralaya) is not characterised by the absence of the world: for it is also a period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do not have God for their agent; for, like the jar. they are effects. (5) God is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body. THE NAIYAYIKA REPLY TO THE MIMĀMSAKA CONTENTION To these arguments of the Mimamsaka the Naiyayika replies- The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth (ks and other substances; because, like the jar etc., they are endowed with parts, or with activities while they are yet big in magnitude, or with forms while they are big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower generality (samanya-viseṣa) while they are open to external perception and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about which it could be said ‘This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and none else is.’ Isvara Siddhi Meeting the charge that there is no vyapti 145 The contention that that alone can be said to be created which it is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can possibly be known may be true enough: but the capacity to do and the power to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (kşiti) and the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that. there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. No restriction to the effect ‘The scope of activity is only this much’ is noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone; and if such a restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and other causes, and to control and direct the same. The nature of adhiṭshāna defined. As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the jiva, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control (adhisthāna) consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (dravya) this proximity takes the form of conjunction (samyoga); and in regard to their qualities, it is inherence (samavaya) in that wherein there is con-” junction (samyukta). Coming to activity (pravṛtti), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely change of place (parispanda). With regard to merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), their activity is simply their coming into associa- tion with appropriate place (desa) and times (kala) and other auxiliary causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds. It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from merit and demerit themselves;* for these and all other things not controlled *In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without the negative particle. ’tabhyam dharmadharmabhyam phalam. But from the context it is clear that the text should be ’na ca tabhyam…” 19 146 Siddhitrayam by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves; since they are devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such as place and time, the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent being, is indeed incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post (yupa). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already included in the paksa (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the. case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any intelligent agent, produces the sprout by its own effort) the foregoing argument commits the fallacy of vyabhicara is the outcome of the ignor- ance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge of vyabhicara by citing the instance of pleasure and the like stands con- demned. The jiva cannot be nimitta karana of the world It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply because they are accepted by both the rival disputants; for the jiva’s incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is well-established (Rather than admitting a separate entity. God, would it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the hidden to finite souls themselves? The answer is in the negative) for what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not con- tradictory to, what is known. It is not well-established that the incapa- city to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God, as it belongs to the jivas; because by means of other pramaņas the capacity to per- ceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely as- certained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all things and to direct them; for ‘being an effect’ is invariably concomitant wtih ‘dependence upon a competent agent.’
36. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appro- priate bodily responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral changes, it may be urged that the argument is vitiated by vyabhicara dosa. Isvara Siddhi 147 The untenabiitly of the contention that the argument only establishes attributes opposed to omniscience etc. The objection raised already (vide p. 142), namely that, as the hetu points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to the absence of lordship, it establishes only the reverse of the qualities intended to be proved, is highly superficial: for. clearly, the hetu in question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like.3 In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other things or ignorance concerning them; for, in as much as it would only lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the absence of the cap icity to produce other things does not follow there- from. When the production of an effect may well take place solely with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production. Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to be invariably concomitant (vyapaka), namely, ignorance of other things and incapacity to effect them,’ concerns all things other than the effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertain- ing to all things; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter” is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no better; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the argument is liable to be charged with yyabhicara dosa in view of the fact that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able to assert Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object is fit to become an agent.” ·
37. The reading found in all books is … asa marthyam jñānam…’ but it ought to be …asamarthyamajñānam…’
38. All books examined read kevelavyatirekasiddheḥ,’ Perhaps a better. reading would be ‘kevalam vyatirekasiddheḥ.’ 148 Siddhitrayam There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a person endowed with a body; for this contention is liable to be charged with anekanta dosa in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming a body. Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already associated with a body; for, then it would be impossible for the yogin to take up several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of the soul it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body the soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital breath (pran) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure a fresh body. What is needed for creation is controlling activity and not the body. Moreover. the body which is the object of the controlling activity on the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be included in the very body of the definition of the controller; for one and the same thing being at once the agent and the object in the self- same activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintained that control, which is simply the possession of an effort conducive to the activity of the body, is known to belong only to him who is in conjunction with the body which is sought to be controlled, it has to be replied: ’let it be admitted that the controller should be related to the object controlled, since the control of a given object is impossible to him who is unrelated to it.’ (It may be asked) How is it determined that this relation need not be the bodily relation? (The reply is) “It is for this reason, namely, that other objects also. such as the measuring rod, are controlled by by one who is merely related related to them.. Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity. namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation like the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of the cosmos exists in God. Activity can be initiated without the instrumentality of the body i. e. mere samkalpa suffices It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity in things other than the body is done only with the aid of the body; for Isvara Siddhi 149 it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with the hand. This objection too is untenable; for the extraction and the scattering of the poison that has entered one’s body is observed to be effected by another person by the mere exercise of his will. When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to cause movements in other things arise? (The reply is) Then is it con- tended that it is the body that wills? If that is so, in its absence there will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, but) is the instrument (karana) in the act of willing, it may be replied “not so”; for the mind (manas) is the instrument of willing. Has God, then, a manas? (The answer is) “Quite so”. If it be said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have to be attributed to God, the reply is “not so.” For this objection is set aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the hetu that it is an effect. Morcover, since even when the body perishes contact with manas. has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the argument is vitiated by anekanta dosa. In fact, only that much which is relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what is perceived is admitted. Since a person whose body occupies a limited area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit and demerit, is incapable of creation the world composed of the primal elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimita- ble knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his will. No need to entertain any doubt on the ground that in the case in point many of the characteristics differ from those found in the illustrative example. If it be said that in instances such as the jar no invariable relation between the character of being an effect and an agent of this descrip- 150 Siddhitrayam tion is observed. (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experien- ced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous quantity of fuel, ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a diffe- rent description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in general with fire in general, in consideration of the inductive relation of the paksa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in examples, such as the pot, to have an invariable concomitance with dependence upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth and the like, points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing them and is hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire is found, the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size. and other characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as the absence of lordship (anisvaratva), the possession of fragmentary knowledge, the characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the absence of lordship (anisvaralva). the possession of fragmentary knowledge. the character of owning a body, of being subject to merit and demerit, and of being human, universal concomi- tance of an effect with an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to make it, is ascertained. Hence. there is no special feature marking off these two cases,Isvara Siddhi 151 Adducing special illustrations to strengthen the conclusion that the divine creator is vastly different from the human agent. (Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases coming under that vyapti. For example) :-When an object, which is in conjunction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses move- ment, is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the possession of touch, how can the minds whose eonjunction with the soul is inferred from consciousness, pleasure and other special qualities of an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (sparsa)? When what is com- posed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch?6 When either the colour (rupa) or the contact (sparsa) of fiery objeets must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour?– If it be said that it is so admitted (i. e, that the eye is devoid of explicit rupa or sparsa) for the reason that the belief in the special” qualities (i.e., explicit rupa or sparsa) appropriate to the respective
39. The Naiyayika raises this objection against the Prabhakara school, and not against the Bhatta school, of Mîmāmsa; for the former believes that manas is atomic, while the latter maintains that manas, like the atman, is all-pervasive (vibhu). And on the Naiyayika view that there cannot be any samyoga between two vibhudravyas, manas cannot be in conjunction with the soul.
40. Some entities constituted of vayu, such as prana, viyāna, udana and samana, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, prana is said to dwell in the heart (hrdi); and samana, in the navel (mabhi). And the air outside is cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the entire body for its adhisthana and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it the object of the sense of touch. 152 Siddhitrayam cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension (yogyanupalabdhi). even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e., the eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to exist in other cases as well). there would be an end to all inference; (it may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because snch an admis- sion would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice. Other arguments to establish the existence of Isvara In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dis- pure, act under the direction of an intelligent person; for they are non- sentient and whatever is a non-sentient object, acts in this way: for example, the ball and other non-sentient objects, (2) All activities, internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes; be- cause, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument they are effects. (3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible;’ because, like the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4) The world is dependent upon the will of a person; for, like our own body, it is devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under the control of a single intelligent entity (i. e., God): for by standing in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their activities, like 7 In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the text commencing after the word योग्यानुपलन्धिबाधितत्वात् and ending with तद्वदेव is suggested:- 20 Isvara Siddhi 153 the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person; because, like a country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient and nonsentient entities. The text of Isvara-Siddhi available is only this much. तदस्युपगमेऽनेकनियम दर्शनविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च पक्षधर्म तावललभ्यार्थविशेषाव वोधकानेक श्रुत्यादिमानवाथ प्रसङ्गाश्च समर्थकर्तृपूर्वत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियवं कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वोत्पाकमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धि मत्कर्तारमद्वितीयं पुरुषधौरेयं साधयतीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तरतमभावापन्नवैचित्र्यवत्तत्तत्कार्येषु कार्यत्वमेव तत्तदनु गुणं कर्तारमनुमाषयति चेत्, महीमहींधरादिरूपजगद्यतकार्यत्वमपि तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयतीति कैमुत्य सिद्धेऽर्थे ब्यर्थोऽयं निरीश्वरमीमांसकस्यास दुरभिनिवेश: । दृश्यन्ते ह्यस्मिन्नर्थे अन्ये च हेतत: ( 1 ) त्रैकालिकं कुत्स्नं जगत् तदनुगुणशक्तयादिगुणगणवदायत स्थितिलयकं, अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनत्वात्, अतिकुशलैकायत्तस्थित्यादिकतया प्रमित चित्रप्रतिमादवत् । (2) विभूतिपदाभिधेयं कृत्स्नं एकाधेयविधेयशेषभावं तच्छरीरत्वात्, मच्छरीरवत् । Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains no substantial change. These arguments are:- • (1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future possesses a continuance and a destruction which are subject to a person endowed with a group of qualities, such as power appropriate thereto; because it has mani- fold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind; for example, pictures and dolls which are well-known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression vibhúti possess the characters of being supported by (ādheyatva), being controlled by (vidheyatva ), and existing for the sake of (sesātva) a person; for in the manner of one’s own body, they constitute his body. SAMVIT SIDDHI Enquiry into the significance of the text “Brahman exists, one only without a second’. It is contended that the upanisadic text “Brahman (exists) one only, without a second” denies the existence of everything other than Brahman. Against this contention we argue as follows:-In what light is the compound word advitiya to be understood? Is it a tatpuruşa or a bahuvrihi compound? ‘Advitiya’ cannot be taken as a tatpurusa compound If it is the former, the significance of the latter part of the compound word must be considered as primary. Does the latter part declare that Brahman is ‘different from’ or ‘similar to’ or ‘opposed to’ dvitiya (the second)? In none of these alternatives does the text deny the existence of something other than Brahman. A second entity is clearly established if the word advitiya signifies ‘different from’ or ‘similar to. If it means ‘opposed to the second’, then Brahman must be either a first or a third entity; for what stands opposed to the second is ’the first’ or ’the third.’ Therefore, hosts of objects, three and more, along with the single entity untouched by duality (i.e., all objects with the exception of the second) do assuredly exist uncontradicted. Since the term ’the second’ (dvitiya) has the implicit designation (upalakṣaṇa) of also the third, the fourth and so forth, it may be urged that the negative particle denies everything other than Brahman (and not merely the second). But the reply is “Not so.” The denial of a second entity should not be inferred from this expression; it only asserts that Brahman is something different from’ or ‘opposed to’ or ‘similar to the second.“1
41. Tadanya-tadviruddha-tadabhāvesu naň. 156 Siddhitrayam If it is said that Brahman may be described as that which has no trace of duality, then words such as satya which define Brahman would turn out to be erroneous definitions (for they imply substance-attribute relation). If the expression advitiya were to denote merely the absence of a second, Brahman would be self-existent, and, as such, the negative particle could not be associated with the term Brahman. ‘Being without a second’ cannot be a qualification of Brahman, Were it a qualification, it would (as already shown) follow that Brah- man is either the first or the third entity. Nor can it be taken as a bahuvrihi compound Even if the word is taken as a bahuvrihi compound, it would follow that all objects exist. All objects of the three worlds, which, in relation to Brahman, could be spoken of as the first, the third, fourth and so on, would exist safely without any danger of ever being contradicted: for all that is denied is merely the possession of a second. Moreover, if the word is taken as a bahuvrihi compouud the significance of the negative found in the compound cannot be said to be associated with anything else; for it is only in the event of there being a true relation (of Brahman) with something else that the genitive case implied in the compound (that for which there is no second) would be appropriate. (It is only if the phrase ’not having a second’ could be attributed to something, that advitiya could be taken as a bahuvrihi compound). The phrase ‘The absence of a second’ does not mean Brahman itself nor an attribute thereof. For it is essentially negative, while Brahman is really not negative. Nor could it be an attribute of Brahman; (for according to the opponent, Brahman is devoid of qualities). Thus the existence of the world is not contradicted by scriptural texts speaking of reality as non-dual. The existence of the world is established by the sources of knowledge (pramāņas) relevant thereto. Their verdict is further confirmed by scriptural testimony. Samvit Siddhi 157 The significance of the expression Advitiya (the view of the visiṣṭadvaitin.) The real significance of the text “Reality exists one only and without a second (advitiya)"-may now be explained. The person who is considered advitiya is one who neither has. nor had, nor will have an equal or a superior capable of being counted as a second. How could the world be referred to as a second when it is but a small fraction of the entire collection of entities which constitute His possessions and which are under His sway (vibhava)? The statement “The paramount ruler of the Cola country now reigning is without a second in this world is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him. It does not deny the existence of his servants. sons, consort and so on. Similarly, the whole host of devas, asuras and men, the four-faced Brahma and the cosmic egg form but a small part of a drop from the ocean of the greatness (mahima) of the possessions (vibhuti) of Lord Visņu who is the Lord of all, who is touched neither by sorrows (klesas) nor by merits. demerits (karma) or (vipaka) and so forth, and who is the seat of the sixfold qualities of knowledge (jñāna) and the like, and whose greatness cannot even be conceived by the mind. Which person, who counts with his fingers the oceans as seven, is capable of counting the waves, foam, bubbles and drops of water found therein ? Just as the presence of the rays of the sun is not contradicted by the statement-“There is but a single sun in the sky, and not two”- and just as when objects are counted the number (sankhya), which is different therefrom is not counted, in the same way in which the objects are counted, even so when Brahman is declared to be without a second, the existence of His possessions is not denied. Texts such as- “All beings constitute but a quarter of Him, three-fourths remaining immortal in heaven’s declare that the entire cosmos is but a mode of Brahman. Other sruti texts in support of the siddhantin’s view Sruti and smrti texts, such as the following, purport to show that the world is a mode (prakāra) of Brahman. “His possessions are
42. Yoga Sutra, 1, 24.
43. Puruşa-Sukta. 158 Siddhitrayam so immense. He is greater than these”. “That wherein he does not cognise anything other than Brahman is the highest of all (Bhumā)”’;5 “He is sure to be afflicted with fear who sees anything as different from Brahman (i. e.. anything as not belonging to Brahman)”: “He before whom the cosmic egg and the entire universe pale into insignificance, just as an atom does before Mount Meru.” The world consisting of objects which are liable to modification and which are either moveable or immoveable exists for purposes of speech. The unchanging and ultimate cause of all these is sat alone. Just as sparks are not different from fire wherefrom they take their rise, even so the effect is not different from its cause. That the effect is not different from its cause is shown by numerous illustrations, such as clay, iron, seed and so forth. Without being nourished by Brahman’s power, fire would not be capable of burning even a blade of grass; water would not be capable of drowning; and the wind would be unable to move. “By an understanding of the one Supreme Being, all become known.” With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smrti texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of sentient and non-sentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul. The possessions of Brahman are not contradicted by these passages. Refutation of the view that the world is illusory: Should it be contended that their existence is denied, then it would follow that all activities. sacred and secular, nay even the knowledge of Brahman would cease to be: because everything (other than Brahman) would be illusory. I have already refuted the contention that although objects are in fact illusory, perceptual experience and the
44. Purusa-Sukta 5 Chand Up., VII. 24. 1.
45. Tait. Up., II. 7. Samvit Siddhi 159 like are not contradicted, in so far as objects are said to possess phenomenal reality (vyavahārika satyatva). Thus, it follows that, since the world is the possession of Brahman, its existence is not contradicted by the knowledge afforded by the upaniṣads. namely, that Brahman is without a second. The objector might ask: If the world exists, how could negative judgments (such as “There is no jar”) arise? We ask him in reply “If the world were non-existent, how could affirmative judgments (like “There is a jar’) arise?. The untenability of the view that the world is at once sat and asat.. (Should it be said that since both negative and affirmative cogni- tions do arise, the world is at once sat and asat, it is replied that) sat and asat cannot characterise the self-same entity; for they are contradic- tory qualities When contradictory qualities are attributed to the self-same entity on the strength of contradictory cognitions of ’existence’ and ’non existence’, there is no certainty as to which of them is true. For this reason, the Jains declare that existence and non-existence could be attributed to the world. Since the cognition of non-existence presupposes awareness of existence, the Sankhyas maintain that the world is a always characterised by existence. In order to get over the contradiction presented by the mutually opposed qualities arising from the cognition of existence and non-exist- tence, some thinkers, rejecting both the features of reality and unreality, assert that the world cannot be defined either as sat or as asat (sada- sadanirvacaniya.) Finding that in regard to different times and places, both existence and non existence could characterise jars and other objects, yet others believe that both existence and non-existence may characterise the world on the basis of certain well-defined spatial and temporal differences. 160 Siddhitrayam When doubt is engendered as a result of the keen controversy that rages between these rival theorists, a decision in regard to this matter is arrived at by us in accordance with the Mimamsaka theory. If a person were to cognise the jar as being at once existent and non-existent, then only could the contradictory features of satva and asatva be attributed to the jar simultaneously. Since our cognitions take the following from-“This exists here at this moment” or “It is not here at present”-as a consequence of differences of space, time and states, it has to be inferred that, on the basis of such distinctions of space, time and states, satva and asatva could be attributed simultan- eously to the jar. Hence, it may be concluded that reality and unreality may both be attributed to the jar and the like on the basis of differences of space, time and so forth. This doctrine need not now be considered, as it has already been refuted. Relation with space and time is intelligible only in the case of sat (i.e. The asat could not be in contact with space and time). How. then, could it be maintained that the unreal acquires reality with the aid cf its relation with space and time? For relation (sambandha) is what is found in two relata. Thus the real (sat) always possesses the feature of reality. It is impossible for causal factors, however powerful, to create the quality of existence in what is essentially unreal. Hence the universe which has a beginning and end must be included in the category of reality. It has already been said that what does not exist at the begin- ning and in the end must also be non-existent in the middle. Therefore, from the certain fact of its existence now, let it be admitted that the world exists at all times. Since unreality can never be created, it always belongs to the unreal, as in the case of the sky-flower. There is no distinction between what is absolutely non-existent and what does not exist at an antecedent time in so far as the aspect of non-existence is concerned, (i. e., differences of space, time and state could neither make the unreal real; nor could they make the real unreal).Samvit Siddhi Inquiry into the significance of the text tat tvam asi. 161 (The opponent may ask.-) When in the sixth chapter of the Chandogya Upanisad, taking the instance of Svetaketu, it is declared “Tat,tvam asi,” how could the words ’tat’ and ’tvam’ be assigned their primary meanings? The finite soul which is afflicted by helplessness, misery and sorrow is referred to by the term tvam. The omniscient Being, who has a will that is ever-realised and who is the sea of illimit- able bliss, is the significance of the word ’tat.’ How could these two which are opposed to each other even as light is opposed to darkness, be equated? 0 0 0 0 0 When the qualities found in the object referred to by the term ’tat’ and those belonging to the entity denoted by the term ’tvam’ (are wholly opposed to one another?) …..the view that the terms ’tat’ and ’tvam’ refer to an identical entity has been completely rejected. Whether characteristics such as ignorance and omniscience, suffering and enjoyment be taken as attributes (viseṣaṇas) or as secondary marks (upalakṣaṇas) of the conscious entity, in any case, the meanings of the terms tat and tvam must be different; since, otherwise, contradictory features would have to be attributed to an identical object. Nor is it reasonable to argue that here, as in the judgment “This is that cow”, part of the primary meaning of the two terms is left out so that the terms tat and tvam signify only pure consciousness; for since to the self-luminous object two contradictory features could be attributed on the basis of limiting conditions such as time and place, the statement “This is that cow” is quite legitimate; whereas in the case of self-lumi- nous consciousness there is none of the limiting conditions like time or place to justify the attribution of opposite qualities. 21 Moreover, since in respect of self-luminous consciousness which is wholly without distinctions of any kind, there is nothing to generate the illusion of difference, which is the root cause of misery, the sastras Samvit Siddhi 163 suggesting that none of its alternatives (i.e. bheda being the very essence of the object or different therefrom) is tenable. Further, since non-difference is what dispels the difference of its two substrates and since difference constitutes one objeet not being an- other, you yourself admit the essence of objects (vastu-svarupa) as being, distinct from bhedabheda, talk of the various alternatives as untenable and are thus vanquished by the inconsistency involved in your own position. All attempts to refute distinction by needless discussions, such as-Is it distinct or non-distinct? Is it related to the very essence of objects or not?-are falsified by perception and experience and are thus mere waste of lungs. The cognition “blue” is the same as the awareness “lotus”; for we directly get the apprehension “this is a blue lotus”. When conjunction (samyoga) is the object of perception it is erroneous to raise unnecessary questions such as “Does it relate distinct objects?” even so, when scripture and perception assert the relation of identity (tādātmya) of tat and tvam, such meaningless questions relating to it are knocked down by scripture in the shape of a stick (danda). The scripture which is self-existent (not the work of any person) and which is free from all defects earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite self and the supreme self are identical in this sense. (That the finite self and Brahman are not absolutely identical, as the opponent believes, and that even in mokşa the jiva retains its dis- tinctness is shown by the following description:) Dwelling in the depths of Brahmanubhava, the released soul experiences illimitable joy. Since the enjoyer perishes at the time the fruit of his labours is realised, mokṣa would hardly be sought by man. If pure consciousness alone is left over, we ask: For whom is mokṣa? The view that consciousness is the cause of the world is untenable. Moreover, which consciousness is it that has assumed the form of the world? It could not be the knowledge of the jar; for even in its absence the world is perceived. It is not proper to urge that before this 164 Siddhitrayam knowledge arises and after it perishes in mokşa the world does not exist; for this is contradicted by perception. Nor could it be the knowledge of something else; for, after that knowledge perishes, other objects are perceived. The purvapaksin trying to justify the above contention with examples- The opponent may say that consciousness is one and indivisible, that there is no apprehension of consciousness within knowledge, for objects such as jars are distinct, while consciousness is not, since it is always present. (We may ask) In view of the fact that when the cloth is cognised, jar does not shine forth, how could it be said that know- ledge is always present? The opponent may reply that it is only + jar that is not manifest but that knowledge clearly shines forth. T objection that consciousness does not shine forth as something di from jar, the opponent asks what is the precise significance of expression something distinct from the jar”? (He goes on to add). it denotes consciousness. it does shine forth; and if it signifies something else, such an entity is not said to shine. (He continues) moreover consciousness which, in tts essential nature, is without a form and which is self-luminous is falsely taken to be manifold for no other reason except the multiplicity of objects known. Distinctions are neither ob- jects themselves nor their attributes; nor are they open to perception and inference. The belief in the multiplicity of objects known, such as the jar. is illusory. Hence, (the opponent asks) how could knowledge become manifold on the basis of phenomenal entities like the jar? And much less could that distinction in knowledge be considered real. The contention that consciousness is eternal:- (He goes on to add) Further, self-luminous consciousness has no antece- dent non-existence (prāgabhava) (i.e., consciousness is without a beginning and is eternal); (for should the antecedent non-existence of consciousness exist, it must be apprehended by consciousness itself or by some other means; but) the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not apprehended with the aid of consciousness itself or something else. The Samvit Siddhi 165 first alternative leads to a self-contradictory position; for when con- sciousness is, its own non-existence cannot be. When consciousness does not exist, a congnition for which it is itself responsible-cannot arise’. The second alternative, namely, that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is proved through some other source fares no better, for, consciousness is not the object of anything else. (i.e. Any pramāņa that is to prove the non-existence of consciousness must first cognize consciousness before it could speak of its non-existence. But consciousness is self-luminous and not the object of anything else.) The contention that consciosuness is devoid of attributes. Besides, since distinction and so forth are knowable, like colour, they cannot be the attributes of consciousness. Hence, consciousness is without a second. It is self-luminous. Therefore, those who know Brahman maintain that the foregoing questions regarding the various alternatives, based as they are on the belief that consciousness is manifold, are all the pranks of ignorance. Detailed examinatiom of the advaitc position-consciousness is manifold. To this we reply “Well! all this dogmatic teaching may carry conviction with (bltnd) believers; we are lacking in such faith and search for logical reasons to convince us. Like pleasure and pain, all items of knowledge concerning various objects and obtained by different persons are directly apprehended as being distinct from one another. Distinction is not denied to conjunction (samyoga). desire (iccha) and so forth whose distinction is revealed by the relata. Nor is it admitted that they are not open to perception.” Consciousness cannot be eternal, all-pervasive and unitary “If consciousness is admitted to be eternal and all-pervasive, then all objects should shine forth at all times or none at all. It would not be
46. Vide Atma-siddhi p. 35.
47. This and the succeeding stanza nave been clearly elucidated in Śrutapra- āsikā, Jijñāṣādhikarana p. 89 (Nirnayasagara Press Edition.) 166 Siddhitrayam appropriate to seek to explain why certain objects alone shine and not others on the basis of the proximity or otherwise of objects known; for like ether (ākāsa), consciousness is admitted to be all-pervasive. Nor could this be explained on the basis of the differences in the causes of knowledge; for knowledge is eternal and has, consequently, no cause. Nor yet could it be explained on the basis of the diversity of knowledge itself; for you advocate the theory that knowledge is single. It would then follow that knowledge of sound and the like would have to arise even in the case of the deaf and the blind. Besides there would be no room for the distinction of teacher and pupil.” Untenability of the contention that there is nothing apart from consciousness.” The opponent may object and say, “On our theory there is no ‘all objects’ distinct from consciousness. Hence, there is no propriety in your dogmatic charge that all objects should always be revealed”. To this we reply, “Well, tell me whether they appear but are not different from consciousness. If the former, your explanation of worldly and sacred knowledge is attractive indeed.’ Since, on your theory. neither words nor their meanings shine forth, (it would be impossible to understand the world and much less the tcaching of the scripture). If the latter. your view that consciousness is single would be in jeopardy; for, if the world with its manifold forms is consciousness itself, then consciousness too must be equated with the world and would thus come to be manifold 10 The contention that avidya is the cause of the world and that it is difficult to define it as different and as non-different The opponent may say that since the world is the handiwork of avidya (which cannot be described as being distinct or nondistinct), there is difficulty in deciding whether it is distinct or nondistinct from consciousness. But this is untenable: for avidya is like a waxen jewel which is in contact with the fire of reasoning. To explain the matter
48. Compare Satadůşani, Samvidadvaitabhangavāda (33) 10. Compare Prakaraṇapañcika, 8. Samvit Siddhi 167 fully-.If avidya is said to be merely the absence of knowledge (i.e., if it is a negative principle) its nature would be indefinable (nirupākhya- svabhava), it cannot be responsible for anything (i.e. for creating the world.) What is the significance of the negative particle in avidya? (If avidya is something distinct from vidya (i.e. if it is a positive entity) it would be ludicrous to hold that it is indescribable. (Your) statement that avida cannot be described as being distinct or non-distinct from vidya, but that it is really an entity different from vidya is indeed a fine piece of reasoning! If you were to urge that even this character of its being distinct from vidya is illusory, we reply that, if so, avidya itself would in truth be vidya. And we may ask: when consciousness is pure and is not insentient, while avidya is the reverse. why is avidya not considered to be distinct from vidyā ? What is the term vidya occurring in avidya? Is vidya, whose negation is said to be avidya, consciousness itself or the known or the knower? If it is either the known or the knower, avidya cannot be removed by either of these; for avidya (ignorance) cannot be dispelled by anything other then knowledge. If vidya is knowledge itself, avidya could not possibly exist, since knowledge is eternal. Further, if avidya is the opposite (contradictory) of vidya ignorance cannot exist anywhere; for the entire world is pervaded by vidya which is without a second. If avidya is said to be a negative principle, or something other than vidya or something opposed to it, then (you have to abandon the theory that consciousness (samvit) is without a second. Asrayanupapatti-ayidya cannot dwell in jiva. Moreover, for whom is this avidya? (You may reply that it is) for the jiva. (We ask) who is a jiva? If you were to say the jiva is that to whom avidya is ascribed, (we reply that) this leads to irreconcilable mutual dependence (anyonyäsraya): for there could be no avidya in the 168 Siddhitrayam absence of the jiva, and there could be no jiva without avidya. It could. not be said that this is similar to the relation of seed and sprout; for it is impossible to ascribe origination to the jiva. Nor is Brahman the substrate of avidya. If avidya is said to relate to Brahman, (we ask) how could the omniscient Being be subject to delusion? The character of being afflicted by the delusion that the body is itself the self-a delusion born of avidya- cannot be attributed to Brahman whom the scripture. declares to be omniscient and whose therein to constitute his essential nature.11 omniscience is said Should it be urged that, since it implies apprehension of diversity omniscience must be considered illusory. (we ask the opponent): For the same reason, why should we not treat omniscience, like sabdantara, and so forth, as being other than unreal? Just as śabdantara, abhyasa, sankhya1 and so on. which imply apprehension of difference and which mark off one sastra from another and are considered real, why should not omniscience be treated likewise (i.e., as real)?13 If ignorance were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free being, even as darkness exists in light, then ignorance could never be removed therefrom by anything whatsoever. If it be said that the texts referring to omniscience and other qualities have only validity (vyavahārikaprāmāṇya), while those speak- ing of non-dualism alone have absolute (tättvika-prāmāṇya) we reply that for such a distinction there is no other basis excepting your own dogmaiic assertion.
49. Compare Sataduṣaṇi xada 19. The alternative which conceives avidya as samsargābhāva is here criticised.
50. Vide Pûrva-mimāmsā. II. ii sections 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, II. iii. 11. ,,
51. cf. Śrutaprak āšikā. Jijny sädhikarana- “sastrabhedahḥ karmabhedo vā The Prabhakara view is that the second chapter deals with Sastrabheda; while the Bhatta theory is that it is devoted to a discussion of Karmabheda. Samvit Siddhi 169 (If avidya is treated as the mutual non-existence of jňana (knowledge) it will have vidya for its pratiyogin (that which is denied) and Brahman for its asraya (support); and since jñāna (knowledge, samvit) is identified with Brahman itself, your position really amounts to this, that Brahman is at once the asraya and the pratiyogin of avidya. Against such a position we ask:) How can Brahman which is through and through of the same nature and which is the Highest Reality possess the two mutually opposed qualities of being the asraya (basis) and the pratiyogin (what is denied) of avidya? If the opponent were to reply that, in its aspect as the jiva (pratyak), Brahman is the basis of avidya, and that in its essential nature it is the pratiyogin. (we ask) whence these two aspects? To the possible answer that this distinction of aspects is the result of avidya. we reply that, since avidya, in its turn, depends on this distinction, your position is once again liable to be charged with the defect of mutual dependence (i.e. the fallacy of mutual dependence vitiates both the alternatives viz., that avidyā relates to the jiva and that it relates to Brahman). There is is no escape from anyonyasraya düşana by stating that av.dya is an avastu (unreality). Should the opponent contend that his position really escapes the defect of mutual dependence (anyonya śraya) in as much as avidya is an unreality (avastu) we ask: Then in which entity (vastu) do you notice anyonyasraya) to be a vitiating factor? (i.e. one who rejects everything other than Brahman as illusory cannot cite an object (vastu) where this defect is met with). The character of being a vastu is not responsible for the charge of anyonyasraya being levelled; but when a thing is said to depend for its very existence on its own product, this defect arises. Therefore. it is no proper reply to urge that since avidya is an unreality your position is not open to the charge of anyonyasraya. 22 Avidya cannot be avastu (unreal) Moreover, if avidya is wholly unreal (avastu), we ask: How then does it come to be responsible for worldly activities (vyavahāra)? Wholly 14. cf. Satadüşani vada 19. Here the view that treats avidva as anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence of knowledge) is critically considered. 170 Siddhitrayam fictitious entities like the sky-flower are never noticed to serve the ends of practical life (arthakriyākāri). And your very statement that avidya is a fiction hardly establishes that it is fictitious. If the opponent were to argue that reality is denied to avidya by the negative particle found in the compound word ‘a-vastu, we reply that the negation is negated when single, uncompounded words (vyasta) like ‘jar’ and ‘cloth’ are used to refer to the world which is the handiwork of avidya. Therefore, the opponent must not think of saying that avidya is neither real nor unreal and that, while distinctions are unreal, they appear to be real on the strength of avidya. Is avidya single or manifold? Is the bound soul which is its snbstrate unitary or manifold? State wehther the avidya posited by you as generating and explaining the world-process is single or manifold. State also whether its substrate, viz., the soul in bondage is only one or many. Avidya cannot be single : If avidya is single, this unitary ignorance, having already been expelled by the realisation of Brahman attained by Suka, your effort, to secure final release (mokşa) would indeed be wholly unnecessary. The contention that Suka and others attained mukti is not true. It may be argued (by you as follows-) “In reality there never existed persons such as Vamadeva and Suka; it is only if they existed, it could be argued that avidya. having already been dispelled by their realising Brahman, does not exist at present. Distinctions such as “released souls” and “south in bondage” are projected by my ignorance; for they are perceived, like the world of multiplicity cognised in my dreams. The scriptural text, asserting that final release was attained by them (i.e., Vamadeva and others) as a result of the realisation of Brahman, is as invalid as dream utterances concerning mukti”. Samvit Siddhi Refutation of the above contention 171 We may meet this line of argument thus-How. is another person who contends that the world is projected by his avidya refuted by you? The self-same reason which you advance to prove that the universe is projected by your avidya is also open to him like sarvajnasiddhi (ie. even as the claim that the Buddha is omniscient can also be made on behalf of Kapila). As your doctrine is thus torn by mutually oontradictory assertions, you seem to argue not because you have a case, but because you must be saying something. Just as the statements relating to their (i.e.,. Vamadeva and others) release are no better than dream utterances, your propositions also (viz. that the world is a creation of your avidya and that you must, therefore, endeavour to get rid of it) must share the same fate. Hence, your effort to secure mokşa must indeed be futile. Again, if you could maintain that the scriptural passage mentions that, as a result of Brahma-jñāna, mukti was attained by Vamadeva and others even when it was not attained, we might equally well say that your statement also speaks falsely of mukti as realisable in the future, when, in fact, it is not to be realised. The very examples you adduced, namely, utterances found in dreams, could be cited in support of the opposite contention. (Perhaps your reply is-) “Such a position. viz. that mukti is not something to be realised in future is not unaccepatble to me, because the self is eternally free from bondage and because freedom is ever existent.” Against this it may be urged that since, on this view, all efforts to secure Brahma-vidya are wholly superfluous, your position amounts to invoking in ceremonies just those devils which are intended to be exorcised by them. The contention that mokṣa is an eternally existent state; it has only to be rendered manifest through dhyana etc. The opponent may contend that, although moksa is an eternal state, it is obscured by ignorance and appears, on that account, to be nonexistent; and (he may add) that the fruit of knowledge is the mani-172 Siddhitrayam festation of mokṣa (which has so far remained concealed). The pre- sence of gold on the hand being forgotten, it is searched for; and after realising that it has all the while been on his hand, a person rests content. Even so, it is because of the failure to realise the true nature of the self which is ever free, that bondage is caused to the samsarin, and the nature of the self is manifested by knowledge of Brahman. The unintelligibility of the notion of abhivyakti (manifestation.) Our reply to this is-Tell me what is meant by manifestation (abhivyakti) which is said to result from the knowledge of Brahman. Is it consciousness which is the very essence of self-luminous intelligence? Or is it the knowledge “I am Brahman”? It cannot be the first: for consciousness which constitutes the very essence of Brahman, being eternal, cannot be the result of Brahma-vidya.. Nor could it be said that “manifestation” is merely the knowledge “I am Brahman”; for on your theory. such a knowledge is itself Brahma-vidya. And how, we ask, could it be treated as the result of the latter? Moreover, on your view, this knowledge arises from upanisadic texts such as ‘That thou art’ (tat tvam asi). And, on the principle that whatever has a beginning must have an end, the fear (that mokṣa, may be lost at any time) may afflict even the released soul. Avidya cannot be an obstacle to Brahma-jnāna. Besides, the wise have defined pratibandhaka (obstacle) as that which prevents the appearance of the effect even in the presence of all the causal factors necesssary therefor. In the present case, what was it that was ready to emerge through the operation of its causal factors but failed to appear being prevented by the obstacle of ignorance (avidya)? It cannot be mukti; for it is ever-existent. Nor could it be the knowledge “I am Brahman”; for, in the case of souls in bondage, the full complement of causes necessary for the birth of the apprehension “I am Brahman” not being present, how could it be said that this knowledge is counteracted by avidya? As a matter of fact, this Samvit Siddhi 173 knowledge does not arise at present, not because it is prevented by counter-acting forces, but because of the absence of causal factors. Hence your position is beside the point. Refutation of the view that there is only a single soul. Further the belief that there is only a single soul (in the universe) is really unacceptable:15 for. on your view, ignorance (avidyā), association therewith and the character of bcing jiva are only illusory (i.e, when the very notion of jiya is deemed illusory, its being single must be equally so). The suggestion that the jiva is one, since it appears to be so, is, contradicted by experience: for souls bound to samsara do appear to us to be innumerable. The activities in which bound souls are engaged till the cessation of the cycle of births and deaths are not later shown to be false and are thoroughly unlike dream experiences. The unity of the self sought to be established by reasoning could be disproved by reasoning iteslf. Other souls which possess conflicting thoughts and activities and whose existence is inferred from their diverse behaviour cannot be argued away any more than each person could explain away his own existence. The fire whose existence is inferred is certainly different from observed instances of fire. Similarly where is the difficulty in considering that the souls whose existence is inferred from the behaviour of others are distinct from the self of which each person is directly aware? If it is not conceded that the presence of other selves is inferred from their beha- viour, all activities, sacred and secular, would cease. It is futile to contend that the distinction of consciousness into ‘knower’ and ‘known’ is due to manifold limiting conditions. For (if that were so). the distinction between the various parts of the body
52. cf. Satadüşaņi, vāda 61. 174 Siddhitrayam such as the head and hands must lead to a belief in a plurality of selves within the selfsame body. Besides, if there be only one soul (in the universe), it must experience what is happening in all places, just as the injury to the head, hands or feet is felt by the organism, (On the basis of the observed fact that the soul does not remember its own experiences in former lives, the opponent may assert that it is unnecessary for the self to know what is happening elsewhere. To this we reply that) the self does remember its experiences which took place in the remote past (in former lives) because of factors, such as death, torment in hell and birth-pangs. But as regards what takes place simultaneously (there being no remembrance), the substrates of these experiences cannot be mixed up. How then could the delusion that there is only one soul arise? The untenability of the view that there is a pluraliy of jivas each having its own avidya. It cannot be maintained that social activities can be explained on the basis of a plurality of souls each of which creates, with the aid of its individual avidya, objects perceptible only to itself. How could jivas, who are severally confined within their own dream creations and who are totally ignorant of the activities of others, carry on worldly activity which is possible only to a group of persons interacting with one another? Being endowed with qualities like self-luminosity and unity, consciousness cannot be said to be without a second (advitiya.) Self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasiveness and eternity posited by you as the characteristics of consciousness really contradict your thesis that consciousness is without a second (advitiya). It is idle to argue that these are not the characteristics of consciousness, but that they Samvit Siddhi 175 constitute its very being; these features of consciousness namely, self- luminosity, unity and the like are distinct from one another; besides, while the existence of consciousness is accepted on all hands, keen controversy rages regarding its nature (or characteristics). It cannot be urged that these are illusory and, hence, do not contradict the theory of non-dualism. For these qualities are learnt from upaniṣadic texts which aim at revealing the true nature of reality. greatness and the qualities), let this If, as you say. bliss, self-luminosity, eternity, like are really the essence of Brahman (and not its position be clarified by you. (You must say that) terms such as ‘bliss’ either stand exactly for what the word Brahman signifies or that what are signified by them belong to him (i.e., they are its attributes); or they alone go by the name of Brahman. (None of these alternatives is tenable; for) on the first alterna- tive, there would be no need to employ these different expressions in daily life and in scriptures (the term Brahman being quite sufficient). Besides, as already pointed out, while Brahman is posited as the cause of the world, rival philosophers dispute its nature; hence, they (i.e., Brahman, bliss and so forth) must be distinct. The second alternative is scarcely better; for with these for its qualities, Brahman would. certainly come to be regarded as having distinctions. On the third alternative, since each of these (i.e., bliss and the like) is itself Brahman, there would be a plurality of Brahmans. To obviate this difficulty, it might be said that all these together constitute Brahman even as a collection of trees constitutes a forest. (But even this would fare no better, because, on your theory, Brahman is a partless whole of reality.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (It is unreasonable to argue that these descriptions really teach a partless whole of meaning (akhandartha), just as the statement “The sun is resplendent and luminous” denotes a single, partless reality). 176 Siddhitrayam For the luminosity and splendour existing in the sun are really diffe- rent; and you cannot cite anywhere an instance in support of your con- tention that a partless whole of meaning is conveyed by the text.16 The untenability of the contention that these are not qualities but refer to the absence of certain features- It may be urged that, since the terms jñāna. ananda and the like merely refer to the absence of non-intelligence, suffering and so forth, and thereby denote only a unitary entity, Brahman could not be said to be possessed of distinctions. But this is futile; for this absence must be either real or neither real nor unreal, (None of these is acceptable, for) the first alternative would imply that Brahman is endowed with distinctions. On the second alternative, it would follow that Brahman is non-intelligent. And the third alternative has already been refuted. Besides, on that view, Brahman would scarcely be different from objects like the jar. Moreover, so long as the terms jñānā, ānanda and the like are not taken to signify the features opposed to non-intelli- gence and the like which are said to be excluded they could not really be said to have been eliminated; even as terms signifying the character of non-intelligence (jaḍatva) are incapable of denying these qualities. (Taking his stand on the view that negation is merely the perception of an object when some other perceptible entity is not cognized (e. g. the negation of the jar is no other than the perception of the bare ground) the opponent may argue that Brahman is non-dual, since the absence of non-intelligence is no other than knowledge of pure Brahman, and not an attribute thereof. But even then it would follow that Brahman has distinctions (since knowledge of Brahman will not convey the idea of the absence of non-intelligence, sorrow and the like so long as intelligence, bliss and the like are not attributed to it). It cannot be contended that the world is distinct from sat and asat Is it perception and the like or scripture that establishes the theory that the elements and what is born of them are distinct at once from
53. cf. Satadüşani, vāda 38. Samvit Siddhi 177 reality and unreality? Each one knows for himself that perception and other pramaņas reveal their respective objects as something specific. The cognition of a blue flower in front of the perceiver is not of the same form as that of a white crystal. The apprehension of milk as something sweet is not of the same kind as that of morgosa as something bitter. Thus, all items of knowledge, sacred and secular, are marked off from one another. (The opponent may argue as follows). “True, distinct cogni- tions do arise; but they have no basis in fact.” (To this it may be replied that) if the presence of varied cognitions is admitted, the cause of these must be ascertained. And the senses and reason are their well- known causes; for these cognitions arise whenever they are present, The refutation of the view that pratyakṣa cannot perceive difference:- The opponent may hold the erroneous view that distinction (bheda) cannot be the object of perception, since the object itself (svarupa) and its distinction from other things (bheda) cannot be appre- hended either simultaneously or in succession, and since these two apprehensions are not identical.17 This false view is due to the failure to realise that svarupa and bheda are non-different. In the light of the pratiyogin (that which is denied), the object itself which is revealed by perception is responsibile for the apprehension and belief in multiplicity (bheda-vyavahāra); just as the knowledge of an object in itself leads to manifold negations and just as an object six inches long may (in the light of objects longer or shorter than this) be considered short or long.
54. (Akhaṇḍavākyarthabhañgavāda.) Those who do not subscribe to the notion of difference (bheda) may argue as follows,- “Whoever accepts the notion of difference believes that it is open to perception. Let him state clearly whether the apprehension of an object itself (svarûpa-grahana) and the apprehension of its distinction from other objects (bheda-grahana), which are both the result of perception, are identical with or different from each other. If they are distinct, it may be asked, does perception grasp an object or its distinction from others or both these? If perception is said to grasp both, there is the further question: 23 178 Siddhitra yam Thus the character of possessing distinctions cannot be denied to the world since it is perceived to possess diverse well-defined shapes and forms. (Having shown that perception does not establish that the world is sadasadvilaksana the author proceeds to show that scripture also fails to establish that point.) Since scripture speaks of what has to be accomplished (karya it cannot be considered an authority in this matter (i.e.. with regard to matters of fact, namely, siddha). Even if it be considered authoritative in this regard it cannot be said to teach this unintelligible doctrine; for the different elements of your doctrine do not fit in with one another. (Here it is shown that inference too fails to establish that the world is indescribable as sat or asat). It is argued that avidya and its products cannot be described as unreal (asat), since they are perceived and that it is equally difficult to define them as real (sat), since they are later contradicted. But this does not stand to reason; for (it may well be asked) why should not the Are both these grasped simultaneously or in succession? Svarúpagrahana and bhedagrahana cannot be identified as one; for to treat them as identical would amount to attributing to the self-same experience the contradictory qualities of not depending on a pratiyogin (in the case of svarůpagrahana) and depending upon pratiyogin (in the case of bhedagrahana). It it equally difficult to treat them as distinct; for, if perception were to grasp the objecs (svarupa) only. clearly it cannot apprehend bheda. And perception cannot grasp difference only; since the cognition of difference presupposes apprension of svarupā. Nor is the view that perception apprehends both svarůpa and bheda tenable; for this apprehension must be either simultaneous or successive. But it cannot be simultaneous, since knowledge of difference presupposes cognition of swarupa and remembrance of pratiyogin; while svarůpagrahana does not stand in need of any of these. Nor could svarupa and bheda be grasped in succession; since perception is momentary and cannot last until the experience of bheda which occurs only at the next moment. Vide Prameyamala of Vatsya Varadaguru, Annamalai University Journal. Samvit Siddhi 179 world be treated as real (sat). since it is perceived, and as unreal (asat), since it is later contradicted? Hence it is clear that this notion of avidys (ignorance) is posited by you in ignorance. Is the mithyatva of the world real or unreal? Either alternative goes against the advaitic position. Is the character of unreality (mithyatva) attributed by you to the world of multiplicity unreal or real? It cannot be the former; because if the unreality of the world is itself phenomenal, then the reality of the world becomes irrefutable. It cannot be the latter, because if mithyatva were real then your theory of non-dualism would have to be given up. As already pointed out, all pramānas are known to us as marking off their respective objects from their opposites (asat) and from their distincts (arthāntara). For example, when there arises the awareness, ‘The jar exists.” it rules out the assertion of the non-existence of the jar or of the attribution of clothness to the jar. The opponent may try to meet this by arguing as follows.-“In the cognition “The jar exists’. the word ‘jar’ conveys either the same meaning as ’existence’ (Brahman) or something else. If it is the former it would follow that reality is non-dual: (because other propositions like this, ’the cloth exists’, “tree exists” and so on will convey the same idea, viz.. existence); if it is the latter what is signified by the term ‘jar’ ‘must be incapable of being defined either as sat or asat (sada- sadanirvacaniya). (because the term ghata would then imply some- thing distinct from existence (sadvilakṣaṇa) and would at the same time be (asadvilakṣaṇa) something positive. To this we reply that, if so, you would have to admit that Brahman also, like the jar. is indescribable as sat or asat; for the cardinal teaching of the upaniṣads is “Brahman exists” (asti Brahman). And you yourself have established, with the aid of vedic texts speaking of Brahman being bliss (ananda). reality (sat), and knowledge (jñāna). that Brahman is distinct from bliss and the like. (Logically, in your statement: The world is sadasadanirvacaniya’ the term ‘world’ must 180 Siddhitrayam signify something different from what is describable as sat ro asat) Therefore, it is impossible for you to speak of the world as being distinct from reality and unreality. What is said of one instance should apply to all identical or parallel instances. The knowledge of satta (existence) arising in the case of objects like the jar does reveal the reality of diverse configurations of objects. Existence (satta) is no other than the continuity of objects along with their specific and well-defined forms or configurations which are responsible for their distinction from similar (sajativa) as also from dis- similar (vijātiya) objects. (i.e. from objects of the same class as also from those belonging to other classes.) And it (satta) is no independent entity. How, then, is it at all possible to speak of non-dualism? It it impossible to deny the apprehension of diverse configurations. In the very act of denying dharmas, the ground on which the denial is made shows Brahman to be endowed with dharma. As regards your statement: What is known (i.e. satta) cannot be an attribute of knowledge (Brahman), (we ask:) From this statemens is anything established regarding samvit (consciousness) or not? If it is the former, your doctrine of non-dualism would have to be sacrificed; 18 if it is the latter, your effort is wholly wasted. Therefore, various cognitions which are clearly and readily known to be distinct from one another cannot be identified with objects like the jar which endure (ie., are not momentary, like cognitions.) Refutation of the contention that the invariable concomitance of know- ledge and the known establishes their identity.
55. A variant reading is ‘paksapata’. On this reading the text would mean- “If the former, you must be considered partial (in as much as you attribute nirdharmakatva (the character of having no qualities) to Brahman, while denying all other attributes even when they are established by various pramaņas.) of Srutaprakāsika.. Samvit Siddhi 181 The opponent may argue that objects are not distinct from know- ledge, since they are invariably cognized together. The wise declaro. that the term self-luminous (swayamprakasa) denotes that which is able to manifest itself without depending on anything else. That object which remains unmanifest so long as another does not present itself cannot be considered to be distinct therefrom; just as the falsely per- ceived double moon is non-different from the real moon.19. When know- ledge (vi, ñāna) is not manifest neither the self nor the object is revealed. Therefore, the world-process is an illusory presentation of knowledge.. To this we reply that distinctions, being established by perception which is of superior validity, cannot be explained away by your reasoning. To explain it fully. In the cognition “I know this”, each person. realises in his own experience clearly and distinctly that the three- the knower. the known and knowledge-shine forth separately and without being mixed up with one another. Inference cannot go against the evidence of perception. Surely, it is never inferred that fire not burn, since it is a substance. does Moreover, (in your argument that since thought and things always go together, they must be identical), the hetu (reason) is liable to be charged with the defect of viruddha. For ‘going together’. necessarily implies two objects. Surely knowledge cannot be said to be manifest along with itself; (it can only be manifest along with some object or other). Further, if (on your theory there is no universal (samanya) apart from the different particulars) what goes by the name of knowledge must be unaccompanied by what may be called knowledge in general, each item of knowledge must be said to be manifest in association with all objects; but it is not so.”
56. cf. Sahopalambhaniyamā dabhedo niladaddhiyoḥ | Bhedas ca bhrānti vijñanai drŝya indavivadvaye ||
57. Though this stanza is found earlier in the printed books and manuscripts, this appears to be the proper place.182 Siddhitrayam The opponent may argue that in the state of deep sleep, the stream of pure consciousness alone shines forth uncontaminated by objects such as the jar. Therefore, objects are not distinct from knowledge. Know- led ge (samvit) alone is real: while objects are unreal. To this we reply that it is the prattle of one who fails to realise the contradiction in one’s own statement; for there could be no invariable presentation of thought and things together. if the two were really identical. Moreover, if consciousness could manifest itself without objects, the latter too must present themselves in the absence of consciousness; even as the jar may manifest itself without the presentation of the cloth, which, in its turn may present itself without the awareness of the jar. The Gitartha - sangraha of Sri Yamunacarya

1. In the scripture known as the Bhagavad Gita, Narayana, the Supreme Brahman, is declared. He is attainable by Bhakti alone, which is to be brought about by the observance of one’s own Dharma, aquisition of knowledge and renunciation of attahment.
2. In the first hexad, the performance of desireless Karma and Jñ¤na, with the practice of Yoga in view, is enjoined for the realisation of the self.
3. In the middle hexad, Bhakti Yoga, which can be brought by Karma and Jñana is treated for the attainment fo the exact knowledge of Bhagavan, the Supreme Being, as He is.
4. In the last hexad, which subserves the two preceding hexads, is treated matter (Pradhana) in the primordial condition, matter in its evolved state, the self (Purusa), and Isvara the Ruler of all. Besides, the disciplines relating to work, to knowledge and to devotion are again dealt with by way of supplmenting and completing what has been taught earlier.
5. The treatise was initiated for the sake of Arjuna, who was overtaken by misplaced love and compassion and also perplexity as to what was Dharma and what Adharma, and who took refuge in Sri Krsna.
6. The knowledge of Sankya and Yoga, which comprehend in their scope the eternal self and disinterested activity respecevely, leading to the state of steady wisdom, is taught in the second chapter for removing Arjuna’s delusion.
7. In the third chapter is taught the neen for the performance of works without attachment to any fruits other than the pleasure of the Lord and for the protection of the world, ascribing the agency to the Gunas or placing it in the Lord of all.
8. In the fouth chapter the following matters are treated: His nature is explained by the way. Next it is taught that Karma Yoga has an aspect other than action, i.e., knowledge - aspect. The varieties of Karma Yoga and the eminence of knowledge in it, are emphasised.
9. In the fifth chapter are set forth the ease and quick effeciacy of Karma Yoga, some its elements and the mode of knowledge of Brahman, i.e., the individual self.
10. In the sixth chapter are taught the practice of Yoga (concentration and meditation), the foufold divisions of (successful) Yogins, the means to success in Yoga, and the supremacy of Yoga concerning Himself.
11. In the seventh chapter is taught the exact knowledge of Himself, His concealment by the Prakati, the surrender to Him as the means to overcome this, observations on various types of devotees and the superiority of the man of wisdom among these devotees.
12. In the eight chapter are discussed the distinctions of what are to be understood and acquired by each of the three clasess of devotees those whko are after prosperity, after the true nature of the self and after the feet of the Lord.
13. In the ninth chapter are treated His own eminence, His undiminished supremacy as the Divine even whe He assumes embodiments as Incarnations, the exellence of Mahatmas or devotees who seek God alone, and the discipline of Bhakti of devotion to God.
14. In the tenth chapter are described in detail the infinite auspicious attributes of the Lord and His absolute control over everything, so as to generate and develop Bhakti or devotion to God in the minds of aspirants.
15. In the eleventh chapter, it is stated that the divine eye which can give an immediate vision of Him as He is, was given to Arjuna, and accordingly it is stated that Bhakti is the only means of knowing and attaining Him in the way described.
16. In the twelfth chapter, are taught the superiourity of Bhakti Yoga, the means thereto, the direction for the one unqalified to meditate on the self, the details of the qualities to be acuiried and modes of Sadhana to be practised for that end, and the immense love of the Lord for the devotees.
17. In the thirteen chapter, the nature of the body, the means for the realisation of the self, investigation of the nature of the self, the cause of bondage, and the discrimination between the self and the body are dealt with.
18. In the fourteenth chapter are explained the various ways in which the Gunas bind the self, how they are the agents in respect of all works, and how to eliminate their hold. It also explains how the Supreme Person is the basis of all the three ends attainable, namely heavenly, soverginity, the abidance in the pristine state of the self, and dwelling in the Lord.
19. In the fifteenth chapter in Supreme Person is declared to be other than the self both in Its state of conjunction with non conscient matter and in Its state of pristine purity, because He pervades, sustains and rules over them and the universe.
20. The sixteenth chapter deals first with the disctinctioin between the divine nature and the demoniac natures in order to establish what is truth and what is right conduct, which can be attained by submission to the Sastras.
21. In the seventeenth chapter the following are dealt with: what are not ordained by the Sastras and for that reason wholly demoniac; what are ordained in the Sastras as varied in accordance with the Gunas; and the characteristic of what are established in the Sastras as threefold in terms of ‘Aum’, ‘Tat’, ‘Sat’.
22. The last chapter presents the mental state required for ascribing the agency to the Lord, the necessity of cultivating the Sattvic quality, the spiritual culmination of discharging one’s duties, and Bhakti Yoga which forms the essence of the Gita Sastra.
23. Karma Yoga is resorting to austerity, pilgrimage, charities, sacrifices and such other acts. Jñana Yoga is the abidance in the purified self by those who have controlled their minds.
24. Bhakti Yoga is abidance in meditation and other forms of adoration with one pointed love for the Supreme Being. The three Yogas are interconnected.
25. The obligatory and occasional works are associated with all the three Yogas, as they are of the form kof worship of the Supreme Being. All these Yogas serve as the means for the vision fo the self through Yoga. But Bhakti Yoga can be practised even before gaining the vision of the self. The aspirans can repeat His name, sing hymns, visti holy places, etc., even with superficial love of the Lord.
26. When one’s nescience is removed and one perceives the self as subservient to the Supreme, one attains supreme devotion and through it alone reaches His realm. There is Vaidhi bhakti or discipline - bound devotion, next Para - bhakti (higher devotion of love) and then the final stage Parama - bhakti or pre-eminently suprem love.
27. Bhakti Yoga helps to attaing prosperity or comprehensive sovereginty, if one desires ti. If one desires the self, all these three Yogas serve that purpose, which consist in the attainment of pure Isolation (Kaivalya).
28. The attitude, that the Bhagavan is the ultimate end, is common to all these types of devotees. But if one aspires exlusively for the Lord overlooking the other two till such attainment, the attains Him completely.
29. The Jñani is one who is exclusively devoted to the Lord. His very existence dpends on Him. Contact with Him is his only joy, separation from Him is his only grief. His thought is focused on Him alone.
30. When one has begun to find life’s sole satisfaction in meditation on the Lord, the vision of Him through such meditation, speaking about Him, saluting Him, singing about Him and praising Him - then the operation then the operation of the senses, intellect, mind and vital forces get concentrated on Him.
31. Looking upon all disciplines from performnces of duties to the practice of Bhakti as meant only for pleasing the Lord and not with any extraneous motive, one should abandon all dependence on any other means than Him (the Supreme Person), and remain without any fear of inedaquacy of such resignation in respect of his salvation. (The doctrine of Prapati is taught in this verse).
32. Such a person finds his sole happiness in exclusive and continual service to God. He attains His realm. This work (Gita Sastra) is meant mainly for such a devotee. Such is the summary of the meaning of the Gita. 9/9/2018 1 Sri Yamunacarya◆s Stotra-ratna Sri Yamunacaryas Stotra-ratna Translated by Sriman Kusakratha dasa Yamuna Devi Ahichchhatra, Uttar Pradesh, 5th c. Gupta tattvena yas cid-acid-isvara-tat-svabhava- bhogapavarga-tad-upaya-gatir udarah sandarsayan niramimita purana-ratnam tasmai namo muni-varaya parasaraya I offer my respectful obeisances unto the best of the sages, Parasara, who mercifully composed the gem of the Puranas (Vishnu Purana), and in that book taught the truth about the nature of matter, spirit, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, material sense- gratification, liberation, and the means of attaining liberation. http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 1/13 9/9/2018 2 mata pita yuvatayas tanaya vibhutih Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna sarvam yad eva niyamena mad-anvayanam adyasya nah kula-pater bakulabhiramam srimat-tad-anghri-yugalam pranamami murdhna Sri Nammalvar, the origin of our disciplic succession, is the object of great respect for all Sri Vaishnavas, and for us he is our father, mother, wealth, sons, daughters, and everything. Bowing my head, I offer my respectful obeisances to his feet, which are as beautiful as blossoming bakula flowers. 3 yan murdhni me sruti-sirahsu ca bhati yasmin asman-manoratha-pathah sakalah sameti stoshyami nah kula-dhanam kula-daivatam tat padaravindam aravinda-vilocanasya I shall now glorify lotus-eyed Lord Krishna’s lotus feet, which are splendidly manifest on my head and on the heads of all the Vedas, which are the place where all the pathways of my desires converge, and which are the Deity and the great treasure of our family. 4 tattvena yasya mahimarnava-sikaranuh sakyo na matum api sarva-pitamahadyaih kartum tadiya-mahima-stutim udyataya mahyam namo ‘stu kavaye nirapatrapaya I am so proud and shameless that I shall now offer respectful obeisances to myself, a poet intent on praising bthe Supreme Personality of Godhead whose glories are like a great ocean, even a drop of which cannot be properly understood by Brahma, Siva, and all the demigods. 5 yad va sramavadhi yatha-mati capy asaktah staumy evam eva khalu te ‘pi sada stuvantah vedas caturmukha-mukhas ca maharnavantah ko majjator anu-kulsalayor viseshah Now, even though I am weak and incompetent, as far as I have any knowledge or intelligence, I shall glorify the Lord until I must stop from exhaustion. The Vedas and the Brahma’s many mouths always glorify the Lord. What is the difference between a great mountain and a speck of dust when both are plunged in the depths of the ocean? 6 kim caisha sakty-atisayena na te ’nukampyah stotapi te stuti-kritena parisramena tatra sramas tu su-labho mama manda-buddher ity udyamo ‘yam ucito mama cabja-netra O lotus-eyed Lord, this poet does not expect to earn Your mercy by a display of powerful eloquence. His intelligence is dull and these prayers were composed with great labor. http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 2/13 9/9/2018 7 navekshase yadi tato buvanany amuni Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna nalam prabho bhavitum eva kutah pravrittih evam nisarga-suhridi tvayi sarva-jantoh svamin na citram idam asrita-vatsalatvam O Lord, if You had not glanced on them, these worlds would not exist. Without Your glance how can anything happen? O Lord, it is not surprising that although You are everyone’s friend, You especially love they who take shelter of You. 8 svabhavikanavadhikatisayesitritvam narayana tvayi na mrishyati vaidhikah kah brahma sivah satamakhah parama-svarad ity ete ‘pi yasya mahimarnava-viprushas te O Lord Narayana, what learned Vedic scholar will not accept You as the all-powerful and unlimited Personality of Godhead? Brahma, Siva, Indra, and the liberated residents of Vaikuntha are but drops in the ocean of Your transcendental glory. 9 kah srih sriyah parama-sattva-samasrayah kah kah pundarika-nayanah purushottamah kah kasyaytutayuta-sataika-kalamsakamse visvam vicitra-cid-acit-pravibhaga-vrittam Who is the splendor of the goddess of fortune? Who is the shelter of the pure devotees? Who has handsome lotus-eyes? Who is the Supreme Person? In a fraction of a fraction of a hundred-million-millionth part of whom is this world, filled with wonderful spiritual and material variety, manifested? 10 vedapahara-guru-pataka-daitya-pidady- apad-vimocana-mahishtha-phala-pradanaih ko ’nyah praja-pasu-pati paripati kasya padodakena sa sivah sva-siro-dhritena Who, by giving the most precious gifts and by removing a host of calamities, such as the troubles brought by the demons, the theft of the Vedas, and a host of heavy sins, protects Brahma and Siva? The water from whose feet does auspicious Siva carry on his head? 11 kasyodare hara-virinci-mukhah prapancah ko rakshatimam ajanishta ca kasya nabheh krantva nigirya punar udgirati tvad-anyah kah kena vaisha paravan iti sakya-sankah In whose abdomen is this material world, headed by Brahma and Siva, manifested? Who protects this world? From whose navel was this world born? But for You, who jumps over the world, devours it, and then spits it out? Who can be considered greater than You? 12 tvam sila-rupa-caritaih parama-prakrishtaih http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 3/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna sattvena sattvikataya prabalais ca sastraih prakhyata-daiva-paramartha-vidam matais ca naivasura-prakritayah prabhavanti boddhum O my Lord, those influenced by demoniac principles cannot realize You, although You are clearly the Supreme by dint of Your exalted activities, forms, character, and uncommon power, which are confirmed by all the revealed scriptures in the quality of goodness and the celebrated transcendentalists in the divine nature. 13 ullanghita-trividha-sima-samatisayi- sambhavanam tava parivradhima-svabhavam maya-balena bhavatapi niguhyamanam pasyanti kecid anisam tvad-ananya-bhavah O my Lord, everything within material nature is limited by time, space, and thought. Your characteristics, however, being unequalled and unsurpassed, are always transcendental to such limitations. You sometimes cover such characteristics by Your own energy, but nevertheless Your unalloyed devotees are always able to see You under all circumstances. 14 yad andam andantara-gocaram ca yad dasottarany avaranani yani ca gunah pradhanam purushah param padam parat param brahma ca te vibhutayah The material universe, everything moving within the universe, the ten coverings around it, the modes of nature, the unmanifested stage of matter, the purusha-avatara, the supreme spiritual world, and the Supreme Brahman, are all Your opulences. 15 vasi vadanyo gunavan njuh sucir mridur dayalur madhurah sthirah samah kriti kritajnas tvam asi sva-bhavatah samasta-kalyana-gunamritodadhih You are naturally controlled by the love of Your devotees, generous, virtuous, straightforward, honest, pure, gentle, merciful, charming, steadfast, equal to all, blissful, wise, and saintly. You are a nectar ocean of all auspicious transcendental qualities. 16 upary upary abjabhuvo ‘pi purushan prakalpya te ye satam ity anukramat giras tvad-ekaika-gunavadhipsaya sada sthita nodyamato ’tiserate Desiring to measure one of Your transcendental qualities, the words of the Vedas again and again multiply by a hundred the qualities of the demigod Brahma. Although eternally engaged in this way, they cannot cross beyond even one of Your qualities. 17 tvad-asritanam jagad-udbhava-sthiti- pranasa-samsara-vimocanadayah http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 4/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna bhavanti lila-vidhayas ca vaidhikas tvadiya-gambhira-mano-’nusarinah The creation, maintenance, and destruction of the material universes, the granting of liberation from the cycle of birth and death, a host of other actions You playfully perform, and the words of the Vedas(1), which are the thoughts sheltered deep in Your heart, are all meant for the benefit of they who take shelter of You. 18 namo namo van-manasati-bhumaye namo namo van-manasaika-bhumaye namo namo ’nanta-maha-vibhutaye namo namo ’nanta-dayaika-sindhave Obeisances, obeisances to You, who are beyond the power of words and mind! Obeisances, obeisances to You, the only proper object for the voice’s words or the mind’s thought! Obeisances, obeisances to You, the master of limitless powers and opulences! Obeisances, obeisances to You, who are a limitless ocean of mercy! 19 na dharma-nishtho ‘smi na catma-vedi na bhaktimams tvac-caranaravinde akincano ’nanya-gatih saranya tvat-pada-mulam saranam prapadye I am not a virtuous person, fixed in the principles of religious conduct, and neither am I a great transcendentalist, awakened to spiritual knowledge. In addition to this, I have not the slightest trace of devotion for Your lotus feet. O refuge of the devotees, although I am so unqualified, please permit me to take shelter under Your lotus feet, for I am now lost in this material world, I do not possess anything of value, and I have no place to turn. 20 na ninditam karma tad asti loke sahasraso yan na maya vyadhayi so ‘ham vipakavasare mukunda krandami sampraty agatis tavagre In this world there is not a single abominable deed I have not done thousands of times. Now that my sins are bearing fruit, and I have no place to turn, I come before You. I weep and cry out, “O Mukunda!” 21 nimajjato ’nanta-bhavarnavantas ciraya me kulam ivasi labdhah tvayapi labdham bhagavann idanim anuttamam patram idam dayayah Drowning for a long time in the limitless ocean of repeated birth and death, I have now attained You, who are like a safe shore, and You, O Lord, have now attained the perfect object for Your mercy. 22 abhuta-purvam mama vapi kim va sarvam sahe me sahajam hi duhkham http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 5/13 9/9/2018 kintu tvad-agre saranagatanam parabhavo natha na te ’nurupah Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna What unprecedented calamity has not already fallen on me? I always suffer. Suffering has become second-nature to me. O Lord, it is not right that they who have taken shelter of You be defeated in this way. 23 nirasakasyapi na tavad utsahe mahesa hatum tava pada-pankajam rusha nirasto ‘pi sisuh stanandhayo na jatu matus caranau jihasati O Lord, even if You push me away, I cannot leave Your lotus feet. Even if angrily pushed away, an infant can never leave his mother’s feet. 24 tavamrita-syandini pada-pankaje niveditatma katham anyad icchati sthite ‘ravinde makaranda-nirbhare madhuvrato nekshurakam hi vikshate How can my heart wish anything else now that it is placed at Your lotus-feet, overflowing with nectar? In the presence of a honey-filled lotus a bee does not even see a thorny, dried-up ikshuraka flower. 25 tvad-anghrim uddisya kadapi kenacid yatha tatha vapi sakrit-krito ’njalih tadaiva mushnaty asubhany aseshatah subhani pushnati na jatu hiyate Placed by anyone, at any time, or even only once, palms folded at Your feet dispel all inauspiciousness and create great good fortune. The benefit obtained from those folded palms will never be lost. 26 udirna-samsara-davasusukshanim kshanena nirvapya param ca nirvrittim prayacchati tvac-caranarunambuja- dvayanuragamrita-sindhu-sikarah Quickly extinguishing the forest-fire of repeated birth and death, a single drop from the nectar ocean of love for Your reddish lotus feet, brings great transcendental bliss. 27 vilasa-vikranta-paravaralayam namasyad-arti-kshayane krita-kshanam dhanam madiyam tava pada-pankajam kada nu sakshat-karavami cakshusha When with my own eyes will I see Your lotus feet, which playfully stepped from the bottom to the top of the material world, which quickly remove the sufferings of the surrendered souls, and which are my only treasure? http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 6/139/9/2018 28 kada punah sankha-rathanga-kalpaka- dhvajaravindankusa-vajra-lanchanam trivikrama tvac-caranambuja-dvayam madiya-murdhanam alankarishyati Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna O Lord Trivikrama, when will Your lotus feet, which bear the marks of conchshell, disc, kalpa-vriksha tree, flag, lotus, elephant-goad, and thunderbolt, adorn my head? 29 virajamanojjvala-pita-vasasam smitatasi-suna-samamala-cchavim nimagna-nabhim tanu-madhyam unnatam visala-vakshah-sthala-sobhi-lakshanam O Lord dressed in splendid yellow garments, O Lord as dark as a smiling atasi flower, O Lord whose navel is deep, O Lord whose waist is thin, O tall Lord, O Lord whose broad chest bears a splendid mark, 30 cakasatam jyakina-karkasaih subhais caturbhir ajanu-vilambibhir bhujaih priyavatamsotpala-karna-bhushana- slathalakabandha-vimarda-samsibhih O Lord splendid with four arms that are handsome with marks of the bowstring, that reach to Your knees, and that praise the touch of Your beloved’s garland, lotus, earrings, loosened hair, and ornaments, 31 udagra-pinamsa-vilambi-kundala- lakavali-bandhura-kambu-kandharam mukha-sriya nyak-krita-purna-nirmala- mritamsu-bimbamburuhojjvala-sriyam O Lord whose conchshell-neck is handsome with curling locks of hair and earrings hanging over Your broad shoulders, O Lord the splendor of whose face shames the splendor of lotus and the spotless full moon, 32 prabuddha-mugdhambuja-caru-locanam sa-vibhrama-bhru-latam ujjvaladharam suci-smitam komala-gandam unnasam lalata-paryanta-vilambitalakam O Lord whose eyes are handsome as charming, newly-blossomed lotuses, O Lord who has graceful eyebrow-vines, O Lord whose lips are glorious, O Lord who smiles splendidly, O Lord whose cheeks are delicate and soft, O Lord who has a raised nose, O Lord whose curling locks of hair touch Your forehead, 33 sphurat-kiritangada-hara-kanthika- manindra-kasi-guna-nupuradibhih rathanga-sankhasi-gada-dhanur-varair lasat-tulasya vana-malayojjvalam http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 7/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacaryas Stotra-ratna O Lord splendid with glistening crown, bracelets, necklace, Kaustubha gem, belt, anklets, many ornaments, disc, conch, sword, club, bow, glorious tulasi, and garland of forest flowers, 34 cakartha yasya bhavanam bhujantaram tava priyam dhama yadiya-janma-bhuh jagat-samagram yad-apanga-samsrayam yad-artham ambhodhir amanthy abandhi ca O Lord who made a home for Her between Your arms, O Lord whose dear transcendental abode is Her place of birth, O Lord whose sidelong glance is the resting place of all the worlds, O Lord who churned the ocean for Her sake, 35 sva-vaisva-rupyena sadanubhutayapy apurvavad vismayam adadhanaya gunena rupena vilasa-ceshtitaih sada tavaivocitaya tava sriya O Lord who, with the eternal vision of Your supreme handsomeness, pastimes, and virtues, fills the goddess of fortune with unprecedented wonder, 36 taya sahasinam ananta-bhogini prakrishta-vijnana-balaika-dhamini phanamani-vrata-mayukha-mandala- prakasamanodara-divya-dhamani O Lord seated with Her on the coils of Ananta, which are the abode of great knowledge and strength, and which are splendid with the many glittering jewels on the serpent’s hoods, 37 nivasa-sayyasana-padukamsuko- padhana-varshatapa-varanadibhih sarira-bhedais tava seshatam gatair yathocitam sesha itiryate janaih O Lord for whose sake Ananta assumes many shapes to become Your residence, bed, throne, sandals, garments, pillow, umbrella, parasol, and many other objects, and in this way has become known to the people as Your sesha (paraphernalia), 38 dasah sakha vahanam asanam dhvajo yas te vitanam vyajanam trayimayah upasthitam tena puro garutmata tvad-anghri-sammarda-kinanka-sobhina O Lord before whom stands Garuda, who bears Your splendid footprints, and who is Your servant, friend, carrier, throne, flag, canopy, fan, and three Vedas, 39 tvadiya-bhuktojjhita-sesha-bhojina tvaya nisrishtatma-bharena yad yatha http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 8/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna priyena sena-patina niveditam tathanujanantam udara-vikshanaih O Lord who with merciful glances approves every request made by the dear general of Your army, who eats the remnants of Your food, and to whom You have given complete authority, 40 hatakhila-klesa-malaih sva-bhavatah sadanukulyaika-rasais tavocitaih grighita-tat-tat-paricara-sadhanair nishevyamanam sacivair yathocitam O Lord appropriately served in many ways by a host of companions free from all troubles and filled with the nectar of love for You, 41 apurva-nana-rasa-bhava-nirbhara- prabuddhaya mugdha-vidagdha-lilaya kshananuvat kshipta-paradi-kalaya praharshayantam mahishim maha-bhujam O Mighty-armed Lord pleasing Your queen with charming and clever pastimes that awaken the sweet nectars of many kinds of transcendental love and make many millenniums seem like a moment, 42 acintya-divyadbhuta-nitya-yauvanam sva-bhava-lavanyamayamritodadhim sriyah sriyam bhakta-janaika-jivitam samartham apat-sakham arthi-kalpakam O inconceivable, glorious, wonderful, eternally youthful Lord, O nectar ocean of transcendental handsomeness, O splendor of the goddess of fortune, O life and soul of the devotees, O powerful Lord, O friend in times of need, O kalpa-vaykaja tree to they who offer prayers, 43 bhavantam evanucaran nirantarah prakanta-niahakeaja-manorathantarah kadaham aikantika-nitya-kiaokarah praharajayiajyami sa-natha-jaivitam by serving You constantly, one is freed from all material desires and is completely pacified. When shall we engage as Your permenant eternal servant and always feel joyful to have such a perfect master? 44 dhig akucim avinaitam nirdayam mam alajjam parama-puruaja yo ‘ham yogi-varyagra-gapyaiah vidhi-akiva-sanakadyair dhyatum atyanta-dauram tava parijana-bhavam kamaye kama-vayttah Fie on me! I am unclean, proud, merciless, and shameless! O Supreme Person, I still yearn to become Your companion, an attainment Brahma, aKiva, the Four Kumaras, and the best of the yogis consider far beyond their reach. http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 9/13 9/9/2018 45 aparadha-sahasra-bhajanam patitam bhaima-bhavarapavodare agatiam akarapagatam hare kaypaya kevalam atmasat kuru Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna O Lord Hari, please mercifully accept this person who is a storehouse of thousands of offenses, who has fallen into the terrible ocean of repeated birth and death, who has no place to go, and who now begs shelter from You. 46 aviveka-ghanandha-diao-mukhe bahudha-santata-duahkha-varajiapi bhagavan bhava-durdine pathah- skhalitam mam avalokayacyuta O Lord, O infallible one, please glance on me, from the right path fallen into the calamity of repeated birth and death, where all directions are darkened with clouds of ignorance and filled with a constant monsoon of sufferings. 47 na mayaja paramartham eva me akayapu vijnapanam ekam agratah yadi me na dayiajyase tada dayanaiyas tava natha durlabhah Let us submit one piece of information before You, dear Lord. It is not at all false, but it is full of meaning. It is this: If You are not merciful upon us, then it will be very, very difficult to find more suitable candidates for Your mercy. 48 tad aham tvad-ayte na nathavan mad-ayte tvam dayanaiyavan na ca vidhi-nirmitam etad avyayam bhagavan palaya ma sma jaihaya Without You I have no master, and without me You have no suitable candidate for Your mercy. This is our eternal relationship, ordained by fate. O Lord, please protect me. Do not reject me. 49 vapur-adiaju yo ‘pi ko ‘pi va guapato ‘sani yatha-tatha-vidhah tad aham tava pada-padmayor aham adyaiva maya samarpitah Whatever I possess in terms of this body and its paraphernalia, and whatever I have from the modes of nature, today I offer at Your lotus feet. 50 mama natha yad asti yo ‘smy aham sakalam tad dhi tavaiva madhava niyata-svam iti prabuddha-dhair atha va kiam nu samarpayami te http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 10/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacaryas Stotra-ratna An enlightened person prays, “My Lord, O husband of the goddess of fortune, myself and everything I own is already eternally Your property. How, then, is it possible for me to offer anything to You? 51 avabodhitavan imam yatha mayi nityam bhavadiyatam svayam kripayaivam ananya-bhogyatam bhagavan bhaktim api prayaccha me I know that I am eternally Your property. O Lord, please kindly give me pure devotional service. 52 tava dasya-sukhaika-sanginam bhavaneshy astv api kita-janma me itaravasatheshu ma sma bhud api me janma caturmukhatmana Let me take birth, even as an insect, in the home of they whose only happiness is Your service. Let me not take birth, even as a Lord Brahma, in the home of any other people. 53 sakrit-tvad-akara-vilokanasaya trini-kritanuttama-bhukti-muktibhih mahatmabhir mam avalokyatam naya kshane ‘pi te yad-viraho ’ti-duhsahah Please place me within the sight of the great souls from whom You cannot bear even a moment’s separation, and who, yearning for a single glimpse of Your transcendental form, consider both impersonal liberation and the most intense sense pleasure worthless as a blade of straw. 54 deham na pranan na ca sukham aseshabhilashitam na catmanam nanyat tava kim api seshatva-vibhavat bahir bhutam natha kshanam api sahe yatu satadha vinasam tat satyam madhumathana vijnapanam idam O Lord, I cannot tolerate for a moment my body, it’s breathing, the happiness everyone wants, my self, or anything else kept apart from You. Let them perish hundreds of time. O Lord Madhusudana, this is my actual wish. This is my request to You. 55 durantasanader apariharaniyasya mahato vihinacaro ‘ham nri-pasur asubhasyaspadam api daya-sindho bandho niravadhika-vatsalya-jaladhe tava smaram smaram guna-ganam iticchami gata-bhih O ocean of mercy, O limitless ocean of fatherly love, even though I am misbehaved, animalistic, and a storehouse of great, limitless, beginningless sins, because I meditate again and again on the great host of Your transcendental virtues, I am able to desire in this way without any fear. http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 11/13 9/9/2018 56 Sri Yamunacaryas Stotra-ratna anicchann apy evam yadi punar apicchann iva rajas- tamas-channa-cchadma-stuti-vacana-bhangim aracayam tathapittham-rupam vacanam avalambyapi kripaya tvam evaivam-bhutam dharani-dhara me sikshaya manah Although I have no such desire to praise You, as if I did desire to praise You, I have written these prayers that are only a trick of passion and ignorance. O maintainer of the earth, please kindly accept these words, and please teach my heart what is right. 57 pita tvam mata tvam dayita-tanayas tvam priya-suhrit tvam eva tvam mitram gurur api gatis casi jagatam tvadiyas tvad-bhrityas tava parijanas tvad-gatir aham prapannas caivam sa tv aham api tavaivasmi hi bharah You are my father. You are my mother. You are my beloved son. You are my well- wisher. You are my friend. You are my master. You are the shelter of the universes. I am Your property. I am Your servant. I am Your follower. I have You as the goal of my life. I am surrendered to You. I am Your dependent. 58 janitvaham vamse mahati jagati khyata-yasasam sucinam yuktanam guna-purusha-tattva-sthiti-vidam nisargad eva tvac-carana-kamalaikanta-manasam adho ‘dhah papatma saranada nimajjami tamasi Even though I was born in a great family of pure brahmanas famous in this world, engaged in Your service, fully aware of the truth about the Supreme Person and the modes of matter, and their hearts naturally placed only at Your lotus feet, still, O giver of shelter, I have become the most sinful person, sinking lower and lower into the darkness of ignorance. 59 amaryadah kshudras cala-matir asuya-prasava-bhuh kritaghno durmani smara-para-vaso vancana-parah nrisamsah papishthah katham aham ito duhkha-jaladher aparad uttirnas tava paricareyam caranayoh How will I, uncivilized, degraded, fickle, a breeding-ground of envy, ungrateful, proud, overcome by lust, addicted to cheating, cruel, and sinful, be able to cross this shoreless ocean of pain and serve Your feet? 60 raghuvara yad abhus tvam tadriso vayasasya pranata iti dayalur yasya caidyasya krishna pratibhavam aparaddhur mugdha-sayujya-do ‘bhur vada kim apadam agas tasya te ‘sti kshamayah O Lord Raghuvara, You were kind to a crow that bowed down to offer respect. O Lord Krishna, You granted sayujya-mukti to Sisupala, who offended You in every birth. O Lord, please tell me: What offense will You not forgive? 61 nanu prapannah sakrid eva natha http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 12/13 9/9/2018 Sri Yamunacarya s Stotra-ratna tavaham asmiti ca yacamanah tavanukampyah smaratah pratijnam mad-eka-varjam kim iti vratam te Do You remember Your promise that if a person once surrenders to You and says, “O Lord, I am Yours,” You will give Your mercy to him? Why am I excluded from Your promise? 62 akritrima-tvac-caranaravinda- prema-prakrishavadhim atmavantam pitamaham natha-munim vilokya prasida mad-vrittam acintayitva Not thinking of what I have done, but looking instead at my grandfather, Natha Muni, a great saint full of sincere love for Your lotus feet, please be kind to me. Vaisnava Saints Page 3153846 02933621 DANT ولك LIBRAR http://bvml.org/VS/Y_stotra-ratna.html 13/13 चतुःश्लोकी। [Sri Yamunacarya -otherwise known as Sri Ala- vandar-is the forerunner and spiritual Guru of Ramanuja. He is the author of Mahapurusha Nirnaya, Agamapramanya and Siddhitraya (Atma, Samvit and Isvara Siddhi)-scholarly works of a rather argumentative nature. His Stotra Ratna is a song overflowing with devotion to the Lord. He has written in his own lucid and melodious style another hymn in four verses called Catus- sloki or. Goddess Lakshmi. The four verses say that Lakshmi also has the four qualities which are attributed to Her consort Narayana in the four chapters of the Brahma Sutras. They are: i. He is the cause, efficient and material, of the whole universe; ii. His greatness is unsullied by anything; iii. He is the means by which one has to obtain the highest goal, the supreme bliss and iv. it is Himself. Lakshmi also has these. The first Sloka speaks about the Vibhutis of Goddess Lakshmi, the second about Her greatness which is incomprehensible even to Her omniscient Con- sort, the third about Her grace which grants the different wishes of all and the last speaks about Her charming forms which are ever insepara- ble from, and co-existent with, those of Sri Narayana. The Stotras of the Acaryas who came after, have been based more or less upon this and they elucidate the idea contained herein.] ९७ कान्तस्ते पुरुषोत्तमः फणिपतिः शय्याssसनं वाहनं वेदात्मा विश्व यवनिका माया जगन्मोहिनी । ब्रह्मेशादिसुरत्रजः सदयितस्त्वद्दासदासीजनः श्रीरित्येव च नाम ते भगवति ब्रूमः कथं त्वां वयम् ॥ १ ॥

1. O Goddess ! Purushottama, the greatest Lord of all Souls, (is) your consort; the Lord of the hooded (serpents, Adisesha) (is) your couch and throne; the sovereign of the birds, (Garuda) whose body Vedas are, (is) your vehicle; Maya, the world-enchantress (i. e., Prakriti, composed of the three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) (is) your veil; all the hosts of Gods with their sweethearts (are) your bevy of attendants and maids. Your name itself is Sri. (Possessed of all this greatness, as you are), how can we (ade- quately ) sing your praise ? यस्यास्ते महिमानमात्मन इव त्वद्वल्लभोऽपि प्रभुः नालं मातुमियत्तया निरवधिं नित्यानुकूलं स्वतः । तां त्वां दास इति प्रपन्न इति च स्तोष्याम्यहं निर्भयो लोकैकेश्वरि लोकनाथदयिते दान्ते दयां ते विदन् ॥२॥
2. Your greatness, which is boundless, eter- nal and ever blissful by nature, cannot be com- prehended in its entirety even by your Loving Consort, omnipotent though He be, even as He cannot His own greatness. O the Supreme ९८ Sovereign of the Universe! The Beloved of the Saviour of the Universe! I know you shower your mercy on those who seek refuge in you and so I fearlessly begin to sing (the greatness of) you. For I am both your servant and Prapanna (i.e., refugee). ईषत्त्वत्करुणानिरीक्षणसुधासन् क्षणात् रक्ष्यते नष्टं प्राक्तदलाभतः त्रिभुवनं संप्रत्यनन्तोदयं । श्रेयो न ह्यरविन्दलोचनमनः कान्ताप्रसादाहते संसृत्यक्षरवैष्णवाध्वसु नृणां संभाव्यते कर्हिचित् ॥ ३॥
3. Being blessed by the grace of a particle of the nectar of your merciful glances, the three worlds, non-existent before because of its absence, are saved (i.e., placed free from all troubles) now and are endowed with endless prosperity. For without the grace of the Darling of the heart of the Lotus-eyed (Narayana ), the joy is never possible for the souls anywhere-in this world, in the Kaivalya and in the path of Vishnu (i.e., salvation). शान्तानन्तमहाविभूति परमं यद्ब्रह्म रूपं हरेः मूर्तं ब्रह्म ततोऽपि तत्प्रियतरं रूपं यदत्यद्भुतम् । यान्यन्यानि यथासुखं विहरतो रूपाणि सर्वाणि ता- न्याहुः स्वैरनुरूपरूपविभवैः गाढोपगूढानि ते ॥ ४ ॥
4. With your wealth, splendour and forms suited to His own are inseparably united, theysay, all His forms: that aspect of His which is free from any modification, which is unlimited, which is the Lord of the Great Vibhuti and which is called the Para Brahman; that form (of Vishnu) which is called Brahman, which is marvellously charming and hence more liked by Him; and also all the other forms assumed by Him at his own pleasure to divert Himself. [यत्पदाम्भोरुहध्यानविध्वस्ताशेषकल्मषः । वस्तुतामुपयातोऽहं यामुनेयं नमामि तम् ||]