Fakhrizadeh kill

Source: TW

[THE FORGOTTEN MASTERSTROKE]

1/25 Wires, electronics, explosives, and other wares were smuggled into Iran over the course of a year. Covertly. One small piece at a time. All meant for in situ assembly. When finally put together, the contraption weighed nearly a ton. At its heart was a Belgian-made FN MAG machine gun. Image 2/25 As should be an easy guess, this was in preparation for an assassination. The year was 2020. Target? A high-profile IRGC asset, big enough to enjoy the highest levels of State protection. You likely guessed Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, but you’re wrong. 3/25 This was someone else, just as important to the Islamic regime, if not more, but remarkably under popular radar. Soleimani was taken in January, on foreign soil. This one would meet his fate in November.

And barely 60 miles from Tehran. 4/25 Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was known as the “father of Iran’s nuclear program” as a physicist and a professor. But he was also an officer in the IRGC. By November 2020, Mossad had been tracking him for over a decade. The precision required for his elimination was unparalleled. Image 5/25 Fakhrizadeh, unlike Soleimani, was shrouded in mystery. He avoided public appearances, lived under tight security, and disregarded the constant threat of assassination. But Mossad had a different plan in mind—one that would capitalize on his confidence. 6/25 Preparations had started in 2019 although Fakhrizadeh had been in the crosshairs since as far as 2007. Shortly after Suleimani’s elimination, Mossad director Yossi Cohen, US Secretary of Defense Mike Pompeo, CIA director Gina Haspel, and President Trump had a series of huddles. 7/25 A hit this big could not proceed without American blessings. The target was too ambitious and fresh after Suleimani, Iran was too unpredictable. The geopolitical ramifications of an operation like this were immense. At least that’s what it was thought. 8/25 The blessings came through and preparations moved into high gear by June. That Khomeini’s response to Suleimani’s hit was tepid at best (beyond empty rhetoric, that is) was a good sign. The Islamic regime seemed too weak to respond in kind. 9/25 Trump was facing an election where Biden seemed like a favorite. This was bad news for America as Biden had already promised to resuscitate the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA. Under Trump, America had withdrawn from the commitment. 10/25 For Netanyahu, it a successful hit on Iran’s top nuclear scientist could be a gift as it would derail the deal even if Biden won. For Trump, it could be a shot in the arm for his campaign and a huge ego boost as the final nail in the coffin of Obama’s legacy. 11/25 On November 27, Fakhrizadeh and his wife were en route to their country home in Absard, a small city to the east of the national capital. They’d been vacationing in a private resort on the Caspian Sea. The ride was a black Nissan Teana which he was driving himself. 12/25 This precisely is the confidence Mossad had planned to exploit. An asset like Fakhrizadeh was to never travel unarmored. But here he was in a sedan as armored as yours and mine. An asset like Fakhrizadeh was to never drive. But here he was on the driving seat, with his wife in the passenger seat next to him. 13/25 Fakhrizadeh was no stranger to assassination bids. He had “escaped” a few himself in the past. Perhaps that was the source of his miscalculated confidence. Miscalculated because what he had escaped were no bids but carefully orchestrated false flags to lull him into precisely this kind of complacence. 14/25 He was warned. He disregarded. Although there was a convoy of armed guards behind his car, it would soon prove futile.

The route Fakhrizadeh was taking to Absard, there was a junction on the main road where anyone headed to Absard had to take a U-turn.

At this very junction lay an abandoned blue Nissan Zamyad pickup truck. 15/25 The truck looked every bit abandoned. Nobody could ever tell that it wasn’t there a few weeks ago. That it had been carefully placed there for a reason. Not by a bored owner but by Mossad’s Iranian agents.

The truck was loaded with cameras and explosives. 16/25 The feed from the cameras was being closely monitored by men and women sitting far beyond Iran’s borders, thousands of miles away. The objective was, as is apparent by now, to make this Fakhrizadeh’s last trip anywhere.

But there was nobody at the junction. 17/25 The Belgian machine gun had been installed on the “abandoned” Nissan, but there was nobody to operate it.

It was all going to be done remotely.

On board electronics had been programmed to account for things like recoil and time delays that could change the shot’s trajectory. 18/25 The cameras were to monitor the vehicle’s speed real-time, and the on-board algorithms were to adjust the contraption’s physics accordingly. It was a highly sophisticated piece of hardware and software engineering and reported to employ even artificial intelligence in its processing. 19/25 For all his complacence, Fakhrizadeh couldn’t be too careful. While confident nothing would happen on the way, his security detail was still not so sure about his holiday home in Absard. What if it were bugged? What if someone planted a bomb there? Or an assassin in the closet? 20/25 All legitimate fears, which is why just as the convoy approached the junction, one of the security cars pulled ahead to comb the destination before the man arrived.

No one had the faintest idea what lurked at the junction itself. 21/25 Just before the junction there was a speed bump. The convoy had no choice but to slow down. The interval was enough to get a clear identification of the target.

As soon as Fakhrizadeh’s Nissan came within range of the abandoned Nissan, and his identity was confirmed, a hit team relayed its affirmation to a sniper. 22/25 The sniper had his finger on the trigger. Not the machine gun’s trigger but that of a device that operated the machine gun remotely.

And it was a go.

In less than 60 seconds, 15 bullets were sprayed on Fakhrizadeh’s car. 23/25 The vehicle swerved and came to a stop. And from it emerged Fakhrizadeh. This was a fatal mistake.

Still within clear range, three fresh bullets ripped through his spine killing him instantly. The operation was almost over. One last bit remained. 24/25 Before that last bit, confused guards looked around hoping to spot an assailant. Finding none confused them further. Where did the volley come from? Who fired? There was nobody around!

Another push of a button far far away and the last bit concluded in a fireball as the abandoned Nissan went up in a glorious explosion. 25/25 This last sequence was key to the whole operation. Nobody knows how the contraption had been put together. Blowing up the truck, ensured all evidence was gone.

To this day, nobody knows for sure who in Iran was involved and how the whole thing came through. But you know the most remarkable thing about this operation that makes Mossad the masters of surgical assassinations?

Only Fakhrizadeh died.

Not even the wife sitting inches away from him in the passenger seat. Not a single guard who stepped out during the volley of shots. Forget dying, nobody was even hit.

In terms of precision and understatement, Mossad has few parallels and Fakhrizadeh’s assassination is just one illustration thereof.

Trump lost the election anyway, but America never returned to the nuclear deal and Iran never retaliated to its nuclear father’s assassination.