04 Mechanism design

Mechanism design

Engineer / implement social choice function. Mech design in making protocols for computer network problems: algorithmorithmic mechanism design. Electronic market design: mech design in electronic markets.

Set of alternatives A. L: set of all linear orders over A. Preference order of \(p_{i}: >_{i}\).

Social welfare function

\(F:L^{n} \to L\).

Properties

Unanimity: \(F(<^{n}) = <\). Dictatorship. Independence of irrelevant attributes: \(F((<{i}))\) between alternatives \(a{1}\) and \(a_{2}\) depends only on \(\set{a_{1}<{i} a{2}}\).

(Arrow): Every social welfare fn over A with \(|A|>2\) that satisfies unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives is a dictatorship.

Social choice function

\(f:L^{n} \to A\). Eg: Elections; markets: allocation of goods and money; auctions; government policy; runs of network protocols.

Voting methods

Ways of finding outcome of multicandidate (\(>2\)) elections.

Majority vote won’t work: Condorcet paradox. Strategic voting: \(p_{i}\) lies about his preference in order to get some one to win.

Strategic manipulation

Incentive compatible mechanism: No \(p_{i}\) can be better off by lying about his prefs.

VCG mechanism

Maximizes social welfare: \(\sum_{i} u_{i}(a)\). A general scheme: fix specific functions to suit need.

Auctions

1st price auction. 2nd price auction. Generalized 2nd price auction: winner pays a price between 1st price and 2nd price.

Combinatorial auctions

Each \(p_{i}\) has a utility for every subset of goods: \(u_{i}(S): S \subseteq A\).

Search auctions

How to order the list of ads? Payment per click \(u_{i}\). Clicks \(p_{i}\) get: \(n_{i}\). Find \(argmax_{i} u_{i}\). Or find \(argmax_{i} n_{i}u_{i}\).

\tbc

Prediction markets

Markets whose purpose is to find a probability. People who buy low and sell high are rewarded for improving the prediction, those who buy high and sell low are punished for degrading it.