Mechanism design
Engineer / implement social choice function. Mech design in making protocols for computer network problems: algorithmorithmic mechanism design. Electronic market design: mech design in electronic markets.
Set of alternatives A. L: set of all linear orders over A. Preference order of \(p_{i}: >_{i}\).
Social welfare function
\(F:L^{n} \to L\).
Properties
Unanimity: \(F(<^{n}) = <\). Dictatorship. Independence of irrelevant attributes: \(F((<{i}))\) between alternatives \(a{1}\) and \(a_{2}\) depends only on \(\set{a_{1}<{i} a{2}}\).
(Arrow): Every social welfare fn over A with \(|A|>2\) that satisfies unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives is a dictatorship.
Social choice function
\(f:L^{n} \to A\). Eg: Elections; markets: allocation of goods and money; auctions; government policy; runs of network protocols.
Voting methods
Ways of finding outcome of multicandidate (\(>2\)) elections.
Majority vote won’t work: Condorcet paradox. Strategic voting: \(p_{i}\) lies about his preference in order to get some one to win.
Strategic manipulation
Incentive compatible mechanism: No \(p_{i}\) can be better off by lying about his prefs.
VCG mechanism
Maximizes social welfare: \(\sum_{i} u_{i}(a)\). A general scheme: fix specific functions to suit need.
Auctions
1st price auction. 2nd price auction. Generalized 2nd price auction: winner pays a price between 1st price and 2nd price.
Combinatorial auctions
Each \(p_{i}\) has a utility for every subset of goods: \(u_{i}(S): S \subseteq A\).
Search auctions
How to order the list of ads? Payment per click \(u_{i}\). Clicks \(p_{i}\) get: \(n_{i}\). Find \(argmax_{i} u_{i}\). Or find \(argmax_{i} n_{i}u_{i}\).
\tbc
Prediction markets
Markets whose purpose is to find a probability. People who buy low and sell high are rewarded for improving the prediction, those who buy high and sell low are punished for degrading it.