(Section 17)
It is hazardous for the ruler of men to trust others, for he who trusts others will be controlled by others. Ministers have no bonds of flesh and blood which tie them to their ruler; it is only the force of circumstance which compels them to serve him. Hence those who act as ministers never for a moment cease trying to spy into their sovereign’s mind, and yet the ruler of men sits above them in indolence and pride. That is why there are rulers in the world who face intimidation and sovereigns who are murdered. If the ruler puts too much trust in his son, then evil ministers will find ways to utilize the son for the accomplishment of their private schemes. Thus Li Dui, acting as aid to the king of Zhao, starved the Father of the Ruler to death.1 If the ruler puts too much trust in his consort, then evil ministers will find ways to utilize the consort for the accomplishment of their private schemes. Thus the actor Shi aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shensheng and to set Xiqi on the throne.2 Now if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
Moreover, whether one is ruler of a state of ten thousand chariots or of a thousand only, it is quite likely that his consort, his concubines, or the son he has designated as heir to his throne will wish for his early death. How do I know this is so? A wife is not bound to her husband by any ties of blood. If he loves her, she remains close to him; if not, she becomes estranged. The saying goes, “If the mother is favored, the son will be embraced.” But if this is so, then the opposite must be, “If the mother is despised, the son will be cast away.” A man at fifty has not yet lost interest in sex, and yet at thirty a woman’s beauty has already faded. If a woman whose beauty has already faded waits upon a man still occupied by
thoughts of sex, then she will be spurned and disfavored,3 and her son will stand little chance of succeeding to the throne. This is why consorts and concubines long for the early death of the ruler.
If the consort can become queen dowager and her son ascend the throne, then any law she issues will be carried out, any prohibition she decrees will be heeded. She may enjoy the delights of sex as often as she ever did while her late lord was alive and may rule a state of ten thousand chariots in any way she pleases without fear of suspicion. This is why we have secret poisonings, stranglings, and knifings. As the Spring and Autumn Annals of Tao Zuo4 says, “Less than half of all rulers die from illness.” If the ruler does not understand this, then he lays himself open to revolt on all sides.
Thus it is said: When those who stand to profit by the ruler’s death are many, he is in peril.
The charioteer Wang Liang was good to his horses, and Goujian, the king of Yue, was good to his men, the one so that they would run for him, the other so that they would fight for him. A physician will often suck men’s wounds clean and hold the bad blood in his mouth, not because he is bound to them by any tie of kinship but because he knows there is profit in it. The carriage maker making carriages hopes that men will grow rich and eminent; the carpenter fashioning coffins hopes that men will die prematurely. It is not that the carriage maker is kindhearted and the carpenter a knave. It is only that if men do not become rich and eminent, the carriages will never sell, and if men do not die, there will be no market for coffins. The carpenter has no feeling of hatred toward others; he merely stands to profit by their death. In the same way, when consorts, concubines, and heirs apparent have organized their cliques, they long for the ruler’s death for, unless he dies, their position will never be really strong. They have no feeling of hatred toward the ruler; they merely stand to profit by his death. The ruler therefore must not fail to keep close watch on those who might profit by his death.
Though the sun and moon are surrounded by halos, the real danger to them comes from within.5 Prepare as you may against those who hate you, calamity will come to you from those you love.
Therefore the enlightened ruler does not rush into any undertaking that he has not properly studied beforehand nor does he eat any
unusual foods. He listens to reports from afar and scrutinizes the men close to him in order to ascertain the faults of those within and without the palace. He examines the agreements and disagreements in debate in order to determine how the various factions in the government shape up. He compares proposals and results to make certain that words are backed up by facts. He demands that what comes after shall match what went before, governs the masses according to the law, and carefully checks on the various motives of all. If he can make certain that men do not receive any unearned rewards nor overstep their authority, that death penalties are justly handed out and no crime goes unpunished, then evil and malicious men will find no opening to carry out their private schemes.
If too much compulsory labor service is demanded of the people, they feel afflicted, and this will give rise to local power groups. When local power groups have arisen, they will begin exercising the right to exempt the people from labor service, and once they are able to do this, their leaders will grow rich on bribes. To afflict the people and thereby enrich men of influence, to create power groups and thereby relinquish your authority to your ministers are not the way to bring long-lasting benefit to the world. Hence it is said, if labor services are few, the people will be content; if the people are content, there will be no opportunity for men to exercise undue authority on the lower levels and power groups will disappear. Once power groups have been wiped out, then all right to dispense favors will reside with the sovereign.
It is obvious that, under normal conditions, water will overcome fire. But if a kettle comes between them, the water will bubble and boil itself completely dry on top, while the fire goes on burning merrily away underneath, the water having been deprived of the means by which it customarily overcomes fire. It is just as obvious that government should be able to put an end to evil in the same way as water overcomes fire. But if the officials whose duty it is to uphold the law instead play the part of the kettle, then the laws will be clear only in the mind of the ruler alone, and he will have been deprived of the means by which to prohibit evil.
Judging from the tales handed down from high antiquity and the incidents recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals, 6 those men
who violated the laws, committed treason, and carried out major acts of evil always worked through some eminent and highly placed minister. And yet the laws and regulations are customarily designed to prevent evil among the humble and lowly people, and it is upon them alone that penalties and punishments fall. Hence the common people lose hope and are left with no place to air their grievances.
Meanwhile the high ministers band together and work as one man to cloud the vision of the ruler. In order to demonstrate that they have no private schemes, they pretend on the outside to be at odds with one another, though in secret they are friendly enough, acting as ears and eyes for each other to spy out flaws in the ruler’s defense.
The ruler, his vision thus clouded and obstructed, has no path by which to obtain true information; though he retains the name of sovereign, he has lost the reality, and his ministers are free to enforce the laws as they please. This is what happened to the Son of Heaven of the Zhou dynasty. If the ruler lends even a little of his power to others, then superior and inferior will change places. Hence it is said that no ministers should be allowed to borrow the power and authority of the ruler. 7
1“Father of the Ruler” was a title assumed by King Wuling of Zhao when he abdicated in 291 B.C. in favor of his son, King Huiwen. In 294 B.C. his palace was surrounded by soldiers headed by the high minister Li Dui, and after some three months of confinement he died of starvation. Shiji 43.
2Lady Li, a later consort of Duke Xian of Jin, succeeded, with the aid of a court actor named Shi, in casting suspicion on the heir apparent, Shensheng, and forcing him to commit suicide in 656 B.C. Her own son by the duke, Xiqi, was then made heir apparent and succeeded to the throne in 651 B.C. Guoyu, Jinyu 2.
3Omitting the si, which is superfluous.
4This work is otherwise unknown.
5Han Feizi is probably referring to the folk tale of the toad that lives in the moon and the three-legged crow that lives in the sun, which were said to cause the eclipses of these bodies. It is not certain how much the men of Han Feizi’s time understood about the true nature of eclipses, but here he finds it convenient for his argument to regard them as internally caused.
6It is not clear whether this refers to the chronicle of the state of Lu, supposed to have been compiled by Confucius, which bears this title, or is a generic term for
the chronicles of the various feudal states.
7The text of the latter half of this paragraph is rather scrappy and disorganized, and it has been surmised that parts of it may actually be bits of commentary that have erroneously been copied into the text.
FACING SOUTH1
(Section 18)
This is where rulers go wrong: having assigned certain ministers to office, they then try to use unassigned men to check the power of the assigned. They justify this policy by claiming that the interests of the assigned and the unassigned will be mutually inimical, but in fact the rulers find themselves falling under the power of the unassigned, for the men they are trying to check today are the men whom they used in previous days to check others. If the rulers cannot make the law clear and use it to restrain the authority of the high ministers, then they will have no means to win the confidence of the people at large.
If the ruler of men discards the law, and instead attempts to use some of his ministers to control others, then those who love each other will band together in groups for mutual praise, and those who hate each other will form cliques for mutual slander. With praise and slander striving to shout each other down, the ruler will become bewildered and confused.
Those who act as ministers believe that, unless they can somehow establish a fine reputation or persuade someone to make a special plea for them, they will never advance in office; that unless they turn their backs on law and concentrate power in their own hands, they can never wield authority; and that unless they rely upon a mask of loyalty and good faith, they can never circumvent the prohibitions. Yet these three types of behavior in fact serve only to delude the sovereign and destroy the law. So the ruler of men must make certain that, no matter how wise and capable his ministers may be, they are never allowed to turn their backs on the law and concentrate power in their own hands; no matter how worthy their actions may be, they are never allowed to presume upon their achievements and snatch rewards that belong to others; no matter how loyal and trustworthy they may be, they are never allowed to
discard the law and circumvent the prohibitions. This is what it means to make the law clear.
The ruler of men is sometimes misled in undertakings and blinded by words. These are two dangers which he must not fail to consider carefully.
Ministers come blithely forward with a proposal for an undertaking and, because the funds they ask for are small, the ruler is duped by the proposal; misled as to its true nature, he fails to examine it thoroughly, but instead is filled with admiration for the men who made it. In this way ministers are able to use undertakings to gain power over the ruler. This is what it means to be misled in undertakings, and he who is so misled will be beset by hazard.
If, when a minister comes forward with a proposal, he asks for meager funds but, after he has retired to put it into effect his expenditures are very large, then although the undertaking may produce results, the proposal was not made in good faith. He who speaks in bad faith is guilty of a crime and, though his undertaking has achieved results, he should receive no reward.2 If this rule is obeyed, then the ministers will not dare to dress up their words in an effort to delude the sovereign.
The way of the ruler is to make certain that, if what a minister says beforehand does not tally with what he says later, or what he says later does not tally with what he has said previously, then although he may have fulfilled his task with distinction, he is condemned to certain punishment. This is what it means to hold your subordinates responsible.
If a minister is planning to bring a proposal for some undertaking before the ruler but fears that it will meet with criticism, he will be certain to announce beforehand, “Anyone who questions this undertaking does so simply out of jealousy.” The ruler, with these words firmly fixed in his mind, will pay no further heed to the advice of other ministers, while they for their part, fearful of the effect of such words, will not venture to question the undertaking. When these two circumstances prevail, then truly loyal ministers will go unheeded and only those who have managed to acquire a reputation will be put in charge. This is what it means to be blinded by words, and he who is so blinded will end up in the power of his ministers.
The way of the ruler is to make certain that ministers are called to account for the words they speak and are also called to account for the words they fail to speak. If the beginning and end of their words fail to tally, if their arguments lack proof, then they are called to account for what they have spoken. If they attempt to evade responsibility by saying nothing, although they hold important positions, then they are called to account for not speaking. The ruler of men must make certain that, when his ministers speak, he understands the beginning and end of what they say and can hold them responsible for matching it with facts; and when they fail to speak, he must inquire into the causes for their reticence and hold them responsible for that as well. If this is done, then ministers will not dare to speak out recklessly, nor will they dare to remain silent, for they will know that both speech and silence will be equally called to account.
When the ruler of men wishes to carry out some undertaking, if he does not acquire a clear understanding of all the factors involved, but simply makes obvious his desire to carry it out, then the work will bring no profit, but on the contrary will invariably end in loss. He who comprehends this will know that he must proceed on the basis of principle and discard the factor of desire.
There is a proper way to initiate undertakings. If you estimate that the income from a particular undertaking will be large and the outlay small, then the project is practical. But a deluded ruler does not understand this. He estimates the income but not the outlay, and though the outlay may be twice the income, he fails to comprehend that this is a loss. Thus in name he appears to have profited but in fact he has not; the success is small but the loss great. An achievement can be called successful only if the income is large and the outlay small. But if men are allowed to expend large sums of money without incurring blame and still take credit for the meager successes they achieve, then the ministers will think nothing of spending large sums to accomplish a small aim. Only small gains will be achieved, and in addition the ruler will suffer loss.
Those who have no understanding of government always tell you,
“Never change old ways, never depart from established custom!” But the sage cares nothing about change or no change; his only concern
is to rule properly. Whether or not he changes old ways, whether or not he departs from established customs depends solely upon whether such old ways and customs are effective or not.
If Yi Yin had not changed the ways of Yin and Taigong had not changed the ways of Zhou, then Tang and Wu would never have become kings. If Guan Zhong had not reformed the ways of Qi and Guo Yan had not altered those of Jin, then dukes Huan and Wen would never have become dictators. 3
In general, those who disapprove of changing old ways are simply timid about altering what the people have grown used to. But those who fail to change old ways are often in fact prolonging the course of disorder, while those who strive to gratify the people are after some selfish and evil end. If the people are too stupid to recognize the signs of disorder, and their superiors too fainthearted to adopt reforms, then government has gone awry.
The ruler of men must be enlightened enough to comprehend the way of government and strict enough to put it into effect. Though it means going against the will of the people, he will enforce his rule. In proof of this, we may note that Lord Shang, when he came and went at court, was guarded by iron spears and heavy shields to prevent sudden attack.4 Similarly, when Guo Yan instituted his new policies in Jin, Duke Wen provided himself with bodyguards, and when Guan Zhong first began his reforms in Qi, Duke Huan rode in an armored carriage. All these were precautions against danger from the people.
For the people, in their stupid and slovenly way, will groan at even a small expenditure and forget the great profits to be reaped from it. 5
1I.e., being a ruler; see above, p. 24, n. 5.
2Supplying a sui before you and reading bu instead of bi.
3Yi Yin and Taigong were sage ministers who aided King Tang, the founder of the Yin or Shang dynasty, and King Wu, the founder of the Zhou, respectively. Guan Zhong (d. 645 B.C.) was adviser to Duke Huan of Qi (see above p. 32, n. 4). Guo Yan, whose surname is given in other works as Gao or Xi, performed a similar service for Duke Wen (636–628 B.C.) of Jin. These last two rulers constitute the first and second of the so-called Five Ba—dictators or overlords.
4On Lord Shang, the Legalist minister of Duke Xiao of Qin, whose severe measures made him extremely unpopular with the people, see pp. 83–84 above.
5The section closes with a passage of 34 characters, the meaning of which is almost impossible to make out. It deals with historical anecdotes that are otherwise unknown, and in addition the text appears to be corrupt. It has seemed best, therefore, to omit it altogether.