०८

Desirous of investigating cases, the king shall enter the court, with a dignified demeanour, along with Brāhmaṇas and councillors, versed in counsel.—(1)

प्रजानां पालनं राज्ञो वृत्तिर् विहिता । सा चात्र ।

• शस्त्रास्त्रभृत्त्वं क्षत्रस्य वणिक्पशुकृषीर् विशः ।

• आजीवनार्थं शूद्रस्य द्विजातीनां निषेवणम् ॥ (म्ध् १०.७९)

• एवं नृपो वर्तमानो लोकानान् आप्नोत्य् अनुत्तमान् ॥ इति ।

तथा धर्मो वर्धते लोके । अन्येषाम् अपि वर्णानां क्षत्रियवृत्त्या जीविनाम् अस्त्य् एव राज्याधिकारः ।

• यः कश्चित् सर्वलोकानाम् पालकश् च नृपः स्मृतः ।

• कर्मनिष्ठा च विहिता लोकसाधारणे हिते ॥

परिपालनं च पीडापहारः । द्वयी च पीडा, दृष्टा अदृष्टा च । तत्र दुर्बलस्य बलीयसा धनहरणादिना बाध्यमाना दृष्टा पीडा । इतरस्य तु विध्यतिक्रमजनितेन प्रत्यवायेनामुत्रिकदुःखोत्पादनम् अदृष्टपीडा । प्रजा हि द्वेषमत्सरादिभिर् इतरेतरम् अयथावद् आचरन्ति, कुपथेन यान्ति, अदृष्टदोषेण बाध्येरन् । अतश् च राज्यनाशः । प्रजैश्वर्यं हि राज्यम् उच्यते । तासु विनश्यन्तीषु कस्य राज्यं स्यात् । व्यवहारादयो ऽतः ।शास्त्रदण्डेन व्यवस्थाप्यमाना न भयात् पृथक् प्रचलन्ति, तथा चोभयथापि रक्षिता भवन्ति । धनदण्डश् च राज्ञः, करशुल्कादि¹ वा । एतदन्या² धर्मिष्ठजीविका न भवतीति वृत्तिपरिक्षयाद् अपि राज्यावसादः । अतो राज्यस्थित्यर्थं व्यवहारदर्शनं कर्तव्यम् ।

• तद् इदानीम् उच्यते । व्यवहारश् चात्र वादिप्रतिवादिनोर् इतरेतराशनोद्धाराय³ वृत्तिर् उच्यते । अथ वा ऋणादानादयः पदार्था एव विप्रतिपत्तिविषयाः सन्तो विचारगोचरसमर्थतया कर्तव्या इति । दिदृक्षुर् इत्य् उक्त्वा “पश्येत् कर्याणि” (म्ध् ८.२) इति सामानाधिकरण्यम् । पुनश् च प्रत्यवमर्शः “तेषाम् अद्यम् ऋणादानम्” (म्ध् ८.४) इति । तान् पदार्थान् विचारयेद् इति संबन्धः । वक्ष्यमाणाधिकृतपुरुषाधिष्ठितः प्रदेशः सभा । प्रवेशस् तदभ्यन्तरभावः । किम् एक एव प्रविशेत् । नेत्य्⁴ आह ब्राह्मणैः सहेति । अथ मन्त्रज्ञैर् इति कस्य विशेषणम् । न तावन् मन्त्रिणः, मन्त्रित्वाद् एव सिद्धेः । न हि मन्त्रम् अजानानो मन्त्रीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । नापि ब्राह्मणानाम्, व्यवहारदर्शने ऽधिकृतानां तत्परिज्ञानम् अदृष्टाय⁵ स्यात् ।

• अत्रोच्यते । ब्राह्मणविशेषणम् एवैतत् । ते ह्य् अमन्त्रज्ञा⁶ भूत्वा निरपेक्षम् अवधारयन्तः स्युः । अन्यथा राज्ञो ऽनर्थम् आवहेयुः । तथा हि महामत्याश्रितः कश्चिज् जनपदेन व्यवहरन् सहसा जितो यदि न दण्ड्यते धनं वावष्टभ्य न दाप्यते, तदा समत्वेन व्यवहारदर्शनं न कृतं स्यात्, पक्षपातम् अशक्तिं वास्य जनपदा मन्येरन् । अथ दण्ड्यते, महामात्यक्षोभाद् अपि प्रकृतिविकृतं स्यात् । मन्त्रज्ञास् तु सन्तः संशयितारो यदि निर्णेतव्यस्य केनचिद् अपदेशेन प्रसङ्गरोधं कृत्वा रहसि राजानं परिबोधयन्ति “अनयोर् विवादिनोर् अयं जीयते ऽयं जयतीति, व्यवहारस् त्व् अस्माभिर् न तदानीम् एव निर्णीत इति स्वामी प्रमाणम्” । तत्र राजैवं विदित्वा महामात्यम् आदेशयति “त्वदीयो मनुष्यो जीयते, मम हनिर् मा भूद् इति संप्रति निर्णयो ऽवधीरितः । त्वम् एव तथा कुरु यथैष मनुष्यः संधीयते, बाधास्य व्यपनीयते” । ते मन्त्रिणो वादेयवाक्या मनुष्याणां सर्वेषाम् अनर्थ्यां च प्रवृत्तिं प्रतिबध्नन्ति ।

अन्ये तु काकाक्षिवद् उभयविशेषणम् अर्थबेदेन मन्त्रज्ञपदं मन्यन्ते । यदा मन्त्रिणो विशेष्यन्ते तत्तद्धातुतत्परिज्ञानं⁷ मन्त्रज्ञानम् । ब्राह्मणपक्षे तु कार्यार्थसमभावश् च । मन्त्रिब्राह्मणानां न प्रवेशमात्रम् एव, किं तर्हि निर्णयं “पश्येत्” (म्ध् ८.२) इत्य् उत्तरत्रवाक्याद्⁸ यथायोग्यम्,⁹ इतरथा अदृष्टाय प्रवेशः स्यात् । अतो नैकाकी निर्णयं कुर्यात्, किं तर्हि तैः सह निरूप्येति ।
विनीतः वाक्पाणिपादचापलरहितः । वेपतो ह्य् अनर्थः स्यात् । पार्थिवग्रहणान् न क्षत्रियस्यैवायम् उपदेशः, किं तर्ह्य् अन्यस्यापि पृथिव्याम् अधिपतेर् देशेश्वरस्य, न ह्य् अन्यथा¹⁰ राज्यम् अविचलितं भवतीति ॥ ८.१ ॥

It has been laid down that the protection of the people is a duty of the king; and this duty has been described in the following text: (a) ‘As a means of livelihood, to carry arms and weapons for the Kṣatriya, and to trade, to rear cattle and agriculture for the Vaiśya, and the serving of the twice-born for the Śūdra’—(10.79). The king who acts up to this attains unexcelled regions; and in this manner virtue prospers among the people.

Other castes also, who may be living the life of the Eṣattriya, are entitled to kingship:—‘Whoever happens to be the protector of the people is regarded as the king, Lord-Protector; and their duty has been ordained to consist in the good of the common people.’ By ‘protection’ here is meant the removal of troubles.

Troubles are of two kinds —seen and unseen. It is a case of ‘seen trouble’ when the weaker man is oppressed by the stronger, who takes away by force his belongings; and it is a case of ‘unseen trouble’ when the latter person suffers pain in the other world, through the sin accruing to him on account of his having transgressed the law (by taking what did not belong to himself). People very often act towards pne another in hatred, jealousy and so forth, and hence going by the wrong path, they become subject to ‘unseen’ evils; and thence follows the disruption of the kingdom; since it is only the prosperity of the people that is called ‘kingdom’; so that when the people are in trouble, where would the ‘kingdom’ lie?

It is for this reason that when cases are investigated and decided in strict accordance with the ordinances of scriptures, people, through fear, do not deviate from the right path; and hence they become protected against both kinds of trouble. Then again, in as much as for the king there is no other lawful moans of livelihood except the fines imposed upon criminals, and the taxes and duties, any obstacles in the proper administration and collection of those leads the kingdom into trouble.

From all this it follows that for the sake of preserving the kingdom, the investigation of cases is necessary, and it is this that is now described.

The term ‘vyavahāra,’ ‘case,’ is the name given to that action of the plaintiff and the defendant which they have recourse to for the purpose of reclaiming their rights. Or, it may stand for the non-payment of debts and such other matters themselves, which often become the subjects of dispute and as such fit for investigation, which thus becomes the duty of the king.

The term ‘desirous of investigating’ is to be construed with ‘shall investigate the suits’ (of the next verse) and the said ‘points of dispute’ are referred to in detail again (in verse 4)—‘Of these, the first is non-payment of debts, etc.’; the construction being that ‘he shall investigate all these matters.’

The ‘court’ is that place which is presided over by the officer going to be described below;—‘entering’ means going into the place.

The question arising as to whether or not the king shall enter the Court, alone, unattended, the text adds—‘along with Brāhmaṇas.’

Question.—“What does the adjective ‘versed in counsel’ qualify? It cannot qualify the ‘councillors’; as the said qualification is implied by the very name ‘councillor,’ for one who does not know the art of counselling can never be called a ‘councillor.’ Nor can it qualify the ‘Brāhmaṇas’; because since they are entrusted with the work of investigating cases, the knowledge of counsel (if prescribed) could be prescribed only for some transcendental purpose.”

To the above we offer the following reply: The qualification is of the ‘Brāhmaṇas’; if they were ignorant of counsel, they would arrive at random and wrong conclusions, and thereby bring trouble to the King, for instance, if a certain ordinary person were to file a suit against some one connected with the Chief Minister,—and the latter happens to lose the case,—then, if he were not fined, or if he were not forced to pay up the fine, the administration of justice would not be impartial; and the people would come to the conclusion that the King is cither partial or too weak-minded;—on the other hand, if the man were fined, this would displease the Chief Minister, and that also would lead to trouble among the people. In such cases, if the investigating officers happen to be ‘versed in counsel,’ then, whenever they are in any such suspense, they postpone the proceedings of the case, under some pretext, and advise the King in private, to the following effect—‘You please do something yourself, whereby the man may be made to compromise between these two parties,—this party loses and that party wins the case,—but the case has not been disposed of by us; the decision now rests with your Majesty.’ Thereupon, the King, having come to know the facts of the case, orders the Chief Minister to the following effect—‘Your man is going to lose his case,—but for the present the decision has been postponed, in order that your prestige may not suffer; it is for you to do something whereby the other party may be appeased and his grievance removed.’ Upon this the Minister, whose advice is accepted by all men, takes steps to stop the evil propensities of all men.

Others hold that, just as the single eye of the crow operates in both sockets, so the epithet ‘versed in counsel’ is applicable to both, ‘Brāhmaṇas’ and ‘councillors,’ but in different senses: when qualifying the ‘councillors,’ being ‘versed in counsel’ connotes the knowledge of the details of the cases; and when qualifying the ‘Brāhmaṇas,’ it connotes impartiality.

The Brāhmaṇas and the Councillors are not to enter only; but they are to help, in the best manner they can, in the ‘investigating of suits’ (spoken of below). If this were not meant, then their ‘entering’ could only be intended to serve some transcendental purpose. Thus the sense is that the King shall not decide cases by himself alone, but in consultation with the councillors and Brāhmaṇas.

‘With a dignified demeanour’;—i.e., free from fickleness of speech, hand and feet. If he were fickle, there would be trouble.

The use of the term ‘pārthiva,’ ‘king,’ implies that the teaching here addressed is meant not only for one who is Kṣatriya by caste, but for others also, who may happen to be owners of land and a kingdom. Because unless he dues what is here laid down his sovereignty does not become duly established.—(1)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 600), which explains ‘mantrajñaḥ’ as ‘arthaśāstrajñaḥ’, ‘learned in the Science of Polity’, and deduces the sense that the person who tries cases should act up to the principles of the Science of Polity, in so far as they are not incompatible with the Dharmaśāstra, the Ethical Science.

It is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 18), to the effect that having entered the court, the king shall carry on the work, in association with learned men and with councillors;—in Vyavahāramayūkha (page 2) in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 1b):—in Kṛtyakalpataru (3a), which has. the following notes—‘Vyavahārān’, points of dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant,—‘didṛkṣuḥ’, with a view to determine,—‘pṛthivīpatiḥ,’ includes non-Kṣatriyas also,—‘mantrajñaiḥ’, persons conversant with the method of doing business in due accordance with the exigencies of time and place,—this qualifies ‘brāhmaṇaiḥ’, ignorant Brāhmaṇas being prone to give hasty advice and thereby create trouble,—‘mantribhiḥ’ stands for experienced councillors;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 4a).

**(verses 8.1-2)
**

Gautama (13.26).—‘The king or the judge ora Brāhmaṇa learned in the scriptures shall examine the witnesses.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.2).—‘Let the king or the minister transact the business on the bench.’

Viṣṇu (3.72).—‘Let the king try causes himself, accompanied by well-instructed Brāhmaṇas.’

Do. (71.60).—‘Near the Fire, Deities and Brāhmaṇas, he shall raise the right arm.’

Yājñavalkya (1.359).—‘Every day, he shall look into cases himself, surrounded by members of the Assembly.’

Do. (2.1).—‘The king shall try causes, accompanied by learned Brāhmaṇas, in strict accordance with legal scriptures,—being free from anger and avarice.’

Yama (Aparārka, p. 596).—‘The king, assisted by the minister, free from all love and hatred, shall carefully look into the causes of contending parties.’

Nārada (Do. p. 599).—‘The king composedly looking into cases himself obtains bright fame here and reaches the regions of Indra.’

Śukranīti (4.5.7, 9-13).—‘Vyavahāra i s that which, by discriminating the good from the evil, ministers to the virtues of both the people and the king, and furthers their interests. The king should attentively look after law-suits, freeing himself from anger and greed, according to the dictates of the legal scriptures,—in the company of the Judge, the Minister, the Brāhmaṇa and the Priest. He should never singly try cases of two parties, or hear their statement. Neither the wise king nor the Councillors are to hold a trial in secret.’

Śukranīti (4.5.85).—‘The King should enter the court modestly, together with the Brāhmaṇas and the Ministers versed in state-craft,—with the object of investigating cases.’

Kātyāyana (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra).—‘The King shall be accompanied by those permanent members who are experienced, having hereditary connections, the best of the twice-born, expert in the sacred law and in the science of polity.’

Kātyāyaṇa (Parāśaramādhava–Vyavahāra, p. 17).—‘That place is called Dharmādhikaraṇa, Court, where the truth regarding suits is investigated in pursuance of the legal scriptures.—The king shall enter the court after having finished all his daily duties, and after having duly honoured, with flowers and ornaments, his preceptor, astrologers, physicians, deities, Brāhmaṇas and Priests.’

Do. (Vīramitrodaya-Vyavahāra, p. 14).—‘If the King looks into lawsuits, with the assistance of the Judge, the Minister, the Brāhmaṇa and the Priest, he attains heaven.’

Do. (Vyavahāratattva, p. 2).—‘Accompanied by the Judge, the Minister, the Brāhmaṇa and Priest, the King himself shall determine their victory or defeat.’

Bṛhaspati (1.4-5).—‘The king, his chosen representative Judge, other Judges, the Law, the Accountant and the Scribe, Gold, Fire, Water, and the Bailiff are the ten components of the Court; in which the King examines causes with due attention.’

Do. (1.20 et. seq.).—‘Let the King try causes, attended by these Judges, after having entered the Court, in a sitting or standing posture. Having risen early in the morning and performed ablutions according to rule, and having honoured the elders, astrologers, physicians, deities, Brāhmaṇas and domestic priests.’

Do. (27.25).—‘Let the King every day examine in common with learned Brāhmaṇas, the suits preferred by litigants, as also those instituted by the King himself.’

मात्स्यम्यायनिवृत्त्या लोकस्थित्यर्थम् अयं व्यवहारान् द्रष्टुम् अन्वेषणशीलः ब्राह्मणैः सह पार्थिवः यान् उपरिष्टाद् वक्ष्यति “यस्मिन् देशे निषीदन्ति विप्रा वेदविदस् त्रयः” इति तैः सह । यतस् तेषाम् इदं विशेषणं क्रियते मन्त्रज्ञैर् इति । एवं च यदि वेदविदो ऽपि सन्तो मन्त्रज्ञा न भवन्त्य् अधिकलक्षणप्राप्त्यर्थम् इदं तद्विशेषणम् । लोकव्यवहारज्ञा मन्त्रज्ञाः । मन्त्रिभिश् चैव मन्त्रज्ञैर् इति समानं पूर्वविशेषणम् । इयांस् तु विशेषः- मन्त्रिणो राजतन्त्रव्यवहारज्ञा नियोगत इष्यन्ते, इतरत्र तु न प्रतिषेधः । अतस् तान् अप्य् एवं विशिनष्टि । विनीतः प्रविशेत् सभाम् । विनीतो ऽनुद्धतवेषालङ्कारः । सभां वक्ष्यमाणाम् “ब्रह्मणस् तां सभां विदुर्” इति । सत्य् अपि च ब्राह्मणस्य धर्मोपदेष्टृत्वे गुरुत्वे च व्यवहारदर्शने ब्राह्मणो न प्रधानीक्रियते । असमर्थो ह्य् असाव् अल्पपरिग्रहत्वाद् अकार्यकारिणो वशीकर्तुम् । क्षत्रियस्य तु करशुल्कप्रीतिभोगदण्डपरिक्रयेण प्रजापालनोपदेशात् परिग्रहमहत्त्वं वृत्तिमतो ऽर्थगृहीतम्, यतः प्रजासंरक्षणार्थम् अकार्यकारिणां निग्रहे तस्य सामर्थम् अस्ति । एवं च सति व्यवहारदर्शने क्षत्रियः प्राधान्येनोपदिश्यते । अथ वादृष्टप्रयोजन एव क्षत्रियस्य व्यवहारदर्शनोपदेशः । व्यवहरणं व्यवहारः । इहैको ऽपि स्वार्थ[संबन्धितया] व्यवहर्तीतरो ऽप्य् अन्यथेत्य् एवं विविधं नानावहरणम्, विरुद्धं वेतरेतरहरणं व्यवहारः ॥ ८.१ ॥

001 A king, desirous of investigating law cases, must enter his court of justice, preserving a dignified demeanour, together with Brahmanas and with experienced councillors.

There, either seated or standing, raising his right hand, subdued in dress and ornaments, he shall look into the suits of the suitors.—(2)

आसीनः धर्मासनोपविष्टः । स्थितः निषिद्धगतिर् अनुपविष्ट एव । स्थानासनयोश् च व्यवस्थितो विकल्पः कार्यविशेषापेक्षः । गरीयसि कार्ये बहुवक्तव्य उपविष्ट आसीनः, लघीयसि स्वल्पवक्तव्ये स्थितः । क्रममाणस्य सर्वथा प्रतिषेधः । स हि मार्गावलोकनपरो नार्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोर् निपुणतो वचनम् अवधारयेत् ।

अन्ये त्व् अदृष्टार्थं तथा मन्यन्ते । तपस्विब्राह्मणादिषु¹¹ विवादिषु स्थितेषु स्थितः आसीनेष्व् आसीनः ।
पाणिम् उद्यम्येति । उत्तरपाणिम्¹² उद्धृत्योत्थानं कृत्वेत्य् अर्थः । सूत्रकृतो ऽयं व्यतिक्रमः¹³ सर्वदा विहितत्वाद् व्यसनोपव्यानम् एतत् । तेनायम् अर्थः- हस्त उत्क्षेप्तव्यः, न पुनः समीपवर्तिनि संलग्नः कर्तव्यः । प्रश्ननिषेधावसरे च तेनाभिनेतव्यम्, न तु प्रव्याणादिना । अनेन व्यवहारदर्शनेन तात्पर्यं ख्यापितं भवति । प्रायेण हि पुरुषाः¹⁴ कार्येषु प्रयत्नवन्तो हस्तम् उद्यच्छन्ति । यथासुखोपविष्टं व्रजति कर्तारं ततश् च परिजने तद् एतद् राजा चित्तं¹⁵ न ददाति सभ्यैर् निर्भयैर् वयं जिता इति । पाणिग्रहणं बाहूपलक्षणार्थम् । केवलस्य हि हस्तस्य यावद् व्यवहारदर्शनं व्यापारणं पीडाकरम् । न चायम् अदृष्टार्थ उपदेशः ।

विनीतवेषाभरण इति । पूर्वश्लोके बाह्याभ्यन्तरेन्द्रियविषयावधानार्थो ऽभिहितः । अयं तावल् लोकानां¹⁶ शालीनतया सुखोपसर्पणार्थः¹⁷ । उद्धतवेषे¹⁸ हि रजनि¹⁹ तथाविधानाम् अप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । अत उद्धतवेषाभरणं²⁰ न कथंचित् स्यात्²¹ । वेषः²² केशवसनविन्यासादिविशेषः । आभरणं कर्णिकादि । तत्र उद्धतवेष²³ ऊर्ध्ववस्त्रो जवनरक्ताम्बरधारितेत्यादि । उद्धताभरणो²⁴ दीप्तिमद्बहुरत्नालंकारो बहुहारश्²⁵ च । स ह्य् आदित्य इव दुर्निरीक्ष्यः सामान्यजनानां विशेषतो ऽभियुक्तानाम् । पश्येद् इति सभाप्रवेशस्य प्रयोजनम् आह । पश्येद् विचक्षणः ।

• अयं च राज्ञो दर्शनापदेशो दण्डप्रणयने यथास्थानार्थप्रतिपादनपर्यन्तो भविष्यति । तात्पर्यं²⁶ तस्यैव रक्षाधिकारः प्रयुक्तः स्यात् । ईदृशस्य च दर्शनस्यान्येषाम् असंभावनाद् अनधिकारः । सर्वेषां संशयच्छेदमात्रफलं²⁷ तु व्यवहारदर्शनं प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशवद् विदुषो ब्राह्मणस्यास्त्य् एव । उक्तं हि “धर्मसंकटेषु ब्रूयात्” इति । तथैकवर्ग्याणां वाणिज्यकर्षकपशुपालप्रभृतीनां स्ववर्गसामयिकार्थविप्रतिपत्ताव् अन्यस्यां वोत्कृष्टनिर्णयाद् भूतिर्²⁸ इति तथाविधव्यवहारदर्शने नियोगः । तथा हि पठितम् ।

• कुलानि श्रेणयश् चैव गणाश् चाधिकृतो नृपः ।

• प्रतिष्ठा व्यवहाराणां गुर्वेभ्यस् तूत्तरोत्तरम् ॥ इति । (न्स्म् मा १.७)

• तत्र “कुलानि” बन्धुजनसमूहः । तैर् या व्यवस्था कृता ततो न विचलितव्यम् । अथ तत्र नाश्वस्युस्²⁹ तवैते ऽधिकतरं संबन्धिन इति वदन्तस्³⁰ ततः श्रेणिषु निवेदितव्यम् ।

• “श्रेणयः” समानव्यवहारजीविनो वणिक्प्रभृतयः । तेषां बन्धुभ्यो ऽधिकगुरुत्वम् । बान्धवा हि³¹ ज्ञातिधर्मभयाद् विचलितं न नियच्छन्ति । श्रेणयस् तु राजगमनेन श्रेणिधर्मो राजपुरुषप्रवेशात् परिभवनीयत्वेन नश्यतीति अविचलनार्थं प्रतिभूग्रहणपूर्वकं विचारयन्ति य एतस्माद् विचलति³² । परिषदि दण्डो दातव्यश् चलितुं वापि त्वया न देयम् इति ।

• “गणाः” गणशश् चारिणो गृहप्रासादादिकरा मठब्राह्मणादयश् च । ते स्वगणिनां व्यवहारं³³ पश्येयुः । तत्राविचलार्थम्³⁴ उपसदः कर्तव्याः । पूर्वे समानकर्मजीविन एकाकिनो ऽपि, इमे तु संभूयकारिण इति विशेषः । श्रेणिभ्यः संभूयकारितया विवादिनो भूमिज्ञत्वात् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये तु कुलानीति मध्यस्थपुरुषान् आहुः । ते हि कार्याभ्यन्तरा अश्रेणिकृता एव निर्णेतारः ।

• “अधिकृतः”³⁵ त्रैविद्यो विद्वाण् ब्राह्मणः । तस्य हि धर्मसंकटेषु प्रवक्तृत्वं विहितम् । तस्य पूर्वेभ्यो गुरुत्वं वैदुष्यात् । नृपस्यापि गुरुत्वम् अतिशयशक्तित्वाद् अतः स्वयं विदुषा नृपेण निर्णीते नास्त्य् एतत् ।

• यो मन्येताजितो ऽस्मीति यो न्यायेनापि पराजितः । (य्ध् २.३०९)

• द्विगुणं दण्डम् आस्थाय तत् कार्यं पुनर् उद्धरेत् ॥ (न्स्म् मा १.५६) इति ॥

• अन्येषु करणेष्व् एतद् भवति । तत्र ह्य् अस्ति वचनावसरो नाधिकृतैः सम्यक् निर्णीतं राज्ञा तु विवेचिते किं वक्ष्यतीति ।

• अर्थान्तरम् — नृपैर् “अधिकृतो” राजस्थानीयब्राह्मणः । तथान्यस्य गृहिणः स्वतन्त्रस् तु गृहे गृहीति स्वातन्त्र्यस्मरणाद् दण्डपर्यन्तो ऽस्त्य् एव व्यवहारः सुपरीक्षितो भवति, वासनाविनयार्थं श्रुतिग्राह्यप्रसक्तशिष्यसुताद्याः “अन्यत्र दण्डाच् छारीरात् पतनीयाच्³⁶ च कर्मणः” इति । स्वल्पे ऽपराधे गृहस्थ एव राजायते । महति व्यतिक्रमे राजनिवेदनम् एवोचितम् इत्य् अस्यार्थः ।

अतश् च यत् कैश्चित् पश्येद् इति परिसंख्यार्थत्वम् आरोप्य ब्राह्मणादीनाम् अधिकार आशङ्कितः पुनश् च क्लेशेन समर्थितः, तद् अयुक्तम्, विषयभेदाद् अधिकारभेदात् । स्वविषयो हि राज्ञो दण्डावधिकः, ब्राह्मणादीनां निर्णयावधिः । अधिकारो ऽपि भिन्नः । राज्ञो राज्यस्थितिप्रयोजनम्, इतरेषां संसयच्छेदादेर् अपरोपकारकत्वम् । अतो नो वृत्तिसंकराशङ्कैव³⁷ नास्ति । कार्यो विप्रतिपत्तिनिरासः । अर्थिनां विप्रतिपन्नयोर् हि साम्यं व्यवहारदर्शने राज्ञा कर्तव्यम् । नो चेत् संविदाने को राज्ञः स्वाधिगमे निरोधः । कायकशुद्धौ हि श्वानिरोधवान् इति वक्ष्यामः ³⁸ ॥ ८.२ ॥

‘Sealed’—sitting on the judgment-seat.

‘Standing’—not moving, nor seated.

‘Sitting’ and ‘standing’ constitute the only two possible alternatives, to be adopted in accordance with the gravity of the business. If the suit is an important one, and there is much to be said (by the parties), he shall he seated; whereas if the suit is a light one, and there is not much to be said, he shall remain standing. in either case, moving about is absolutely precluded. While moving, his attention would be fixed upon the path he is treading, so that he could not rightly grasp what is being said by the two parties.

Others have explained that the rule here laid down is with a view to some transcendental results; and that what is meant is that when the parties consist of ascetics or Brāhmaṇas, and these remain standing, the King also shall remain standing, but on their being seated, he also shall be sealed.

‘Raising his hand’—i.e., holding the hand high. This (if taken literally) would militate against what the Sūtra-kāras have said regarding the upper garment being always under the right arm. Hence all that the text means is that the hand shall he lifted up, and not allowed to be in contact with any other person near at hand. In fact, this is to be done only when the King is disallowing a certain question. This shows that he is alert and carefully watching the proceedings of the case. For as a rule, whenever a man is devoting great attention to any work, he holds his arms high. If, on the other hand, he sits at ease, the defeated party is likely to say—‘The King does not pay attention to the case, hence the members of the court, not fearing him, have decided the case against us.’

‘Hand’ here stands for the arm; otherwise if one were to keep the hand only lifted up throughout the proceedings, this would be extremely painful. Nor is the advice offered with a view to any transcendental purpose.

‘Subdued in dress and ornaments’—What was meant by ‘dignified demeanour’ in the preceding verse was that he should keep control over his external and internal organs in relation to their respective objects; and this was with a view to being easily accessible to even the most modest suitors. If he were too gaudy in his appearance, it would be difficult for the more modest suitors to retain their presence of mind.

It is for this reason that gaudy dress and ornaments should be avoided. ‘Dress’ stands for the making up of the hair and clothes; ‘ornaments’ for ‘Karṇikā’ (the lotus-shaped Ear-ornament) and the rest. So ‘gaudy dressing’ would consist in the wearing of richly-coloured clothes and so forth. If the King is gaudily dressed and wearing brightly be-jewelled ornaments, it could be as difficult to look at him as at the sun, for ordinary people, specially for the accused (who would thus lose their presence of mind during the trial).

‘Look into.’—This declares the purpose for which the King; is to enter the Court-room.

This teaching regarding the King himself ‘looking into’ the suits is with special reference to the inflicting of punishments; and applies to the entire investigation, ending with the full setting forth of the statements of both parties. And the intention is that by doing this he would be fulfilling his duty of ‘protecting’ the people. Such ‘looking into’ cases not being possible for other persons, no one else could be entitled to it. As for helping in the settling of doubtful points, this result of the investigation interests all persons; and as such like the rules relating to expiations, this also falls within the province of the learned Brāhmaṇa; specially as in connection with the latter it has been declared that ‘he shall speak out on difficult points of law.’ Similarly when a case is being investigated where the parties belong to the same profession,—such for instance as traders, cultivators, cattle-breeders, etc.,—if other persons belonging to the same profession And that the points in dispute are such as would affect them all, then they are all entitled to take part in the investigation.

In this connection they declare as follows (Nārada, 1.8)—‘(a) Families, (b) Guilds, (c) Tribes, (d) Authorised person, and (e) the King constitute the very foundation of case-proceedings; and among these the following is superior to the preceding.’

Of these,

(a) the term ‘families’ stands for the body of relations; the parties shall not deviate from the decision arrived at by these,

(b) If however one party should have no confidence in these, and should say—‘these persons are more nearly related to you,’—then the case shall he referred to the guilds,—this term ‘guild’ standing for a body of trailers and others who may he following the same profession; these persons are weightier than relatives; because the latter, through fear of relations, do not always exercise a check upon the person who deviates from the right path; while the members of a guild fight shy of any matter relating to themselves going before the King, as that would lend the King’s officers ah opportunity for interfering in the work of their guild; and hence they always take from the parties concerned sufficient security against their deviating from the decision arrived at, before they proceed to investigate a dispute; the understanding with the person standing security being that if the party deviate from the decision arrived at by the guild, he shall pay a stipulated line, or he should not let him deviate from it.

(c) ‘Tribes’—consist of persons who always move about in groups; e.g., masons, temple0priests, and so forth. They would investigate the cases of disputes arising among themselves; and for the enforcing of decisions they shall appoint committees. The difference between these two (‘Guilds’ and ‘Tribes’) is that the former consists of persons following the same profession and they can act singly also, whereas Tribes always act collectively. And it is because the Tribes act collectively that the disputants are afraid of them. According to others however, the term ‘Families’ stands for neutrals; and such persons, even though not members of the same guild, are conversant with all the ins and outs of the case, and as such capable of coming to a decision,

(d) The term ‘authorised person’ stands for the Brāhmaṇa learned in the Vedas; it has been laid down that such Brāhmaṇas are entitled to speak on all disputed points of law. Such a person is superior to the foregoing, because of his learning.

(e) The King’s superiority rests upon his great power. It is for this reason that when a case has been decided by the learned King, there is no occasion for what is laid down in the following words—‘If a party, even though legally defeated, thinks that he has not been justly defeated, he shall be fined twice the amount of the suit, and the case re-opened’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 306); this is what applies to other cases (decided by others), For in the case of these latter there may he some ground for asserting that ‘the judges have not decided rightly’; but when the King himself has decided it, what can he said against it?

Another explanation of the term ‘authorised person’ is that it stands for the Brāhmaṇa who has been appointed by the King to act as his substitute. Similarly the ordinary householder also would be an ‘authorised person,’ so far as his own household-affairs are concerned,—this being in accordance with the declaration that ‘the householder is master in his own house,’ which means that ho is free to deal with all disputes within his own household, up to the infliction of punishment,—specially with a view to proper discipline among his children and pupils; but he may deal with all cases, except the inflicting of bodily punishment, or the doing of acts conducive to depravity. What is meant is that in the case of minor offences the householder himself acts like the King, while in that of serious offences, it is necessary to report to the King.

From all this it follows that there is no basis for the doubt raised by some people regarding the right of the Brāhmaṇa and others to pronounce judgments,—on the ground that the injunction contained in the present verse that the King ‘shall look into the suits’ precludes all other persons,—or, for the great trouble that they have taken to establish that right. Because the right of the several persons pertains to different kinds of cases. The King’s right exteṇḍs up to the infliction of punishments, while that of the Brāhmaṇa and others extends only up to the pronouncing of judgments,—this latter right is distinct from the former. Then again, the motive of the King in looking into cases consists in the proper administration of his kingdom, while that of the others lies only in settling doubtful points for the benefit of other people. So that there is no possibility of cross-purposes arising.

The ‘suits of sailors’ consist in the settling of disputes. Whenever disputes arise between two persons, settlements should be brought about by the King by means of careful investigation. Otherwise if the parties come to an agreement themselves, where would he the supremacy of the King?—(2)

‘Raising his right arm’—See 4.58.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 600);—the second half in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 2);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 18) in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (p. 2a);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 52), which says that ‘seated or standing’ is meant to predude lying down and walking;—in Kṛtyakalpataru (3a), which has the following notes:—‘Vinīta’ is calm and dignified’—‘pāṇimudyamya’, taking the hand out of the upper wrapper, i.e., having gathered together his clothes,—‘paśyet’ determine, decide,—‘kāryāṇi,’ non-payment of debt and so forth;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 40).

**(verses 8.1-2)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.1].

[आसीनस् तपस्विविद्वद्]ब्राह्मणगुरुवर्जम् इतरजनस्य पश्येत्; स्थित्वो वापि तपस्विप्रभृतीनां वर्णोत्तमानाम् । स्थितो वापि तपस्विप्रभृतीनां वर्णोत्तमानाम् । पाणिग्रहणं बाह्पलक्षणार्थम् । यस्माद् ब्रह्मसभैषा । तथा चोक्तम् अग्न्यगारादिषु [दक्षिणबाहूद्धरणम् । विनीत]वेषाभरणं हि राजानं सुखम् उपसर्पिष्यन्त्य् अर्थिनः । अथ वायम् अस्यादृष्टप्रयोजन एव नियतशास्त्रस्यार्थवत्त्वाय । यत एवं पश्येत् कार्याणि कार्यिणाम् अर्थिनाम्, न स्वयमुत्पाद्यकार्याणि, ये[षु न शास्त्रोप]देशस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टम् । यतो ऽयम् अर्थिविषयो व्यवहारदर्शनोपदेश इत्य् गम्यते । यतो ऽयम् अर्थिविषयो व्यवहारदर्शनोपदेश इति गम्यते । एवं च सत्य् अविधित्वं समर्थ्[इत्]अं भवति । इतरथा हि परिग्रहवत्स्व् अन्येषूपदेशस्य परिसंख्या [न स्यात् । न] चैकस्योपदेशस्योभयत्र सामर्थ्यम् अस्ति, एकार्थत्वाद् वाक्यस्य । एवं च स्वपरिग्रहे ब्राहणादीनां (?) व्यवहारदर्शनम् अप्रतिषिद्धं भवति । ननु च कार्यिणां [कार्याणीति अर्थिनाम् इति] तेन वक्ष्यति “नोत्पादयेत् स्वयं कार्यम्” इति तदनुवाद एवायम् अस्वार्थः प्रसङ्गत इह विज्ञेयः; अथ वा भवत्व् अस्येह स्वार्थ उपदेश उत्तरत्र त्व् अनुवादो विशेषार्थः, “नाप्य् अस्य पुरुष” इति ॥ ८.२ ॥

यद् उक्तं “पश्येत् कार्याणि कार्यिणाम्” इति, अत्र कारणं वक्तव्यम् । अत इदम् आरभ्यते तत्कारणप्रसिद्ध्यर्थम् ।

002 There, either seated or standing, raising his right arm, without ostentation in his dress and ornaments, let him examine the business of suitors,

[He shall look into the suits]—day after day, one by one,—falling as they do under eighteen heads,—according to principles deduced from local usage and from the scriptures.—(3)

पूर्वेणार्धेन निर्णयहेतवः कथ्यन्ते । उत्तरेण विवादपदसंख्यानिर्देशः । “पश्येत्” इति पूर्वश्लोकाद् अनुषज्यते, “कार्याणि” इति च । प्रत्यहं पश्येत् कार्याणि प्रतिदिवसगमने³⁹ व्यवहारनिर्णयः कर्तव्यः । हेतुभिर् इति । हेतुर् निर्णयसाधनम् । स च द्विविधः । प्रमाणरूपो व्यवस्थारूपश् च । तत्र प्रमाणरूपो ऽर्थनिर्णयहेतुः साक्ष्यादिः । व्यवस्थारूपो यतो ऽसत्ये वार्थनिश्चये व्यवहारः संतिष्ठते । यथा सत्यशपथ उभयानुमत एकः साक्षी यद्य् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिभ्याम् अभ्युपगतप्रमाणभावः सभ्यैर् अपरीक्षितो ऽपि निर्णयहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते । न त्व् अपरीक्षितस्य⁴⁰ पुंसो वचनाद् असत्य् आप्तत्ववेदने ऽर्थनिश्चयः⁴¹ । प्राश्निकानाम् अभ्युपगमे ऽपि व्यवस्था हेतुर् भवति ।

• सा च व्यवस्था द्विविधा- साधारण्य् असाधारणी च । देशभेदाश्रयभेदात् सापि द्विविधा- अविरुद्धा विरुद्धा च । अविरुद्धा — यथा केषांचिद् दाक्षिणात्यानाम् अपुत्रा स्त्री भर्तर्य् उपरते सभास्थाणुम् उपारोहति, तम् उपारूढा अधिकृतैर् परीक्षिता⁴² कृतलक्षणा तत्क्षणान्तरं⁴³ सपिण्डेषु ऋक्थं⁴⁴ लभते । तथोदीचां लभ्यमानां कन्यां याचमानाय भोजनं यदि दीयते, तत “इयं तुभ्यं दत्ता” इत्य् अनुक्ते ऽपि प्रतिश्रुता भवति । विरुद्धा च — क्वचिद् देशे वसन्ते धान्यं युज्यते शरदि द्विगुणं प्रत्यादीयते । तथानुज्ञातभोग आधिर् द्विगुणे ऽपि तदुत्थधने प्रविष्ट आ मूलहिरण्यदानाद् भुज्यत एव । एषा हि “अशीतिभागं गृह्णीयात्” (म्ध् ८.१४०) “कुसीदवृद्धिर् द्वैगुण्यं नात्येति” (म्ध् ८.१५१) इति विरुद्धा ।

• तत्र भेदाश्रया देशदृष्टहेतुशब्देनाभिहिताः । शास्त्रदृष्टास् तु हेतवः शास्त्रे पठिताः । ते च केचन शास्त्रकारैः कल्पितव्यवस्थाः, केचिद् यथावस्त्ववस्थिता अनूदिताः⁴⁵ । तत्र कल्पितव्यवस्था यथा- लेख्यं, यथोपभोगः, साक्षिणश् च । अनुमानं तु⁴⁶ वस्तुनियतं “यथा नयत्य् असृक्पातैर् मृगस्य मृगयुः पदम्” (म्ध् ८.४४) इति । यद्य् अपि सर्वं लौकिकं न शास्त्रकारवचनात्⁴⁷ प्रामाण्यं लभते,⁴⁸ तथापि⁴⁹ लौकिकम् एव, तस्मिन्⁵⁰ क्वचिच् छास्त्रम् आश्रयितव्यम् । या च यदीदृशे⁵¹ चापराध इदं दिव्यं इयता च कालेन भोगः प्रमाणम् इति, लौकिकम् अपि तच् छास्त्रदृष्टम् इत्य् उक्तम् । तस्यां च व्यवस्थायां शास्त्रकाराणां मूले संभवति सा प्रमाणम् । या त्व् असंभवतन्मूला सा नादरणीया । यथा लेख्यकर्मपाठः-

• उभयाभ्यर्थितेनैवं मया ह्य् अमुकसूनुना ।

• लिखितं ह्य् अमुकेनैव लेखकस् तत्त्वतो लिखेत् ॥ इति । (य्ध् २.९१ )

यस्यादाव् एव लेखकः स्वनाम निवेशयेद् “इदं नामाहम् अमुष्यपुत्रो लिखामीदम्” इति, न कश्चिद् दोषः स्यत् । स ह्य् एवमर्थं नाम निवेशयति “अनेनेदं लिखितम्” इति लेखक उपलक्षितो⁵² यथा स्याद् । यदि ह्य् असौ लेखकः प्रमाणान्तरेण प्रत्ययितो भवति ततस् तल्लिखितं प्रमाणम् । यदि चासाव् आत्मानं स्वगोत्रनाम्ना नोपलक्षयेत्, ततः कस्य प्रत्ययितता प्रमाणान्तराद् अन्विष्यताम् । अथ तु लेख्यान्तरदर्शनेनान्येन वा हेतुना विशिष्टलेखक इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं स्याद् अनुपलक्षितो ऽपि न कश्चिद् दोषः । तत्र यदि लेखको न लिखेत् “मयेदं लिखितम्” इति, भवेद् एव तादृशं लेख्यं परिपूर्णलक्षणम् । एषा च लेखकपरीक्षा तत्रोपयुज्यते । अत्र⁵³ लेखकस्य साक्षित्वान्तर्भावो ऽन्येषां साक्षिणाम् अल्पत्वात् । यत्र त्व् अन्ये बहवः प्रत्ययिताः साक्षिणः स्वहस्तारूढाः सन्ति तत्र लेखकसंबन्धिनी प्रत्ययितता नोपयुज्यते । तथेयम् अपरा व्यवस्था ।

• लिखितं लिखितेनैव साक्षिमच् चैव साक्षिभिः ।

• साक्षिभ्यो लिखितं श्रेयो लिखितेन तु साक्षिणः ॥ (न्स्म् १.१२५)

नास्याम् अपि व्यवस्थायां किंचिन् निबन्धनम् अस्ति । तथा हि द्विविधं लेख्यम्- स्वहस्तकृतं परहस्तकृतं च । परहस्तकृतम् अपि द्विविधम्- स्वहस्तलेखकलिखितम् अधिकृतलेखकलिखितम् । तद् एतत् परहस्तकृतं सर्वप्रकारं साक्ष्यात्मकम् एव, तत्र “साक्षिभ्यो लिखितम्” इति भेदानुपपत्तेः । इदं हि तस्य लक्षणम्-

• साक्षिणः स्वस्वहस्तेन पितृनामादिपूर्वकम् ।

• तत्राहम् अमुकः साक्षी लिखेयुर् इति ते समम् ॥ (य्ध् २.८९) इति ।

नाप्य् एकहस्तलिखितस्य प्रामाण्यम् इष्यते, यथैकस्य साक्षित्वे । अथायं भेदहेतुः साक्षिणो हस्तारूढास् त एव लेख्यम् इति, नानेन विशेषेण श्रेयस्त्वं भवति । प्रत्ययितता हि श्रेयस्त्वे हेतुः । सा चोभयत्रापि परीक्ष्या । तस्माद् ईदृशे लेख्ये साक्षिद्वैध्यन्यायः- “बहुत्वं परिगृह्णीयात्” (म्ध् ८.७३) इति । अधिकृतत्वम् अपि न विशेषः । परीक्षितो ऽधिक्रियत इत्य् एतत् तत्राधिक्यम् । न च सर्वे राजाधिकृताः सुपरीक्षिता भवन्ति । यदि तु निरुपधिस्⁵⁴ तादृसश् चेद् अत्यन्तगुणयोगात् स्याद् उपेयाद् एवासौ एक एव संवादकत्वम् । तथा हि राजाग्रहारशासनान्य् एककायस्थहस्तलिखितान्य् एव प्रमाणीभवन्ति । दातुः स्वाहस्तक्यं स्वयम् अभ्युपगमः “इयद् अस्मान् मया गृहीतम् इत्दं चास्मै दातव्यम्” इति । तत्र यदि पश्चात् ब्रूते “न गृहीतम्” इति तदा पूर्वनिबद्धं ब्रुवाणैर् जीयते । तत्र साक्षिणाम् अवसर एव नास्ति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु च यदीयाल् लेख्याद् अभ्युपगतम् एतद् अनेनेत्य् अवगम्यते, उत्तरकालं च स एवाह “न गृहीतम्” इति, तत्रोभयोर् अभ्युपगमयोः केन हेतुना पूर्वेणोत्तरो⁵⁵ बाध्येत न पुनर् उत्तरेण पूर्वः⁵⁶ । तुल्यत्वाद् विरुद्धत्वसंशयः । ततश् च प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारणम् एव युक्तम् ।

• भवेद् एवं यदि तुल्यता स्यात् । “न गृहीतम्” इति ह्य् अभ्युपगमो लोभादिनापि संभवति । न त्व् अगृहीत्वानुन्मत्तो “गृहीतम्” इति ब्रूयात् । तत्रापि यदि ब्रूयात् “प्रतिदत्तम्” इति, लेख्यं तु न संपादितम्, असंनिधानात् प्रतिलेख्यं च न गृहीतं लेखकासंनिधानात् कार्यान्तरे ऽतिपातिनि त्वरावत्वान् नात्रास्त्य्⁵⁷ एव प्रमाणान्तरस्य साक्ष्यादेर् अवसरः ।

• यद् अपि “लिखितं लिखितेन” इति नैषा परिभाषा वस्तुसामर्थ्यायाताम् अवगतिं बाधितुं शक्नोति । दृश्यन्ते हि धनिकहस्तगतलेख्यं⁵⁸ क्रमेण संशोधयन्तो न च पृष्ठे संशोधितं धनम् अभिलिखन्ति- “अद्य तावद् इदं दत्तम्, प्रातर् अन्यद् आनीयैकीकृत्योपर्य् आरोपयिष्यामि, सर्वं वा कतिपयैर् अहोभिः संशोध्य लेख्यं पाटयिष्यामि” इति । नान्यवस्तुतो संबन्धः⁵⁹ । धनिकेन चोपरुद्धस्यासंभवत्य् अंशमूललाभधने⁶⁰ संशुद्धिभागमात्रे दीयमाने कुत अयं⁶¹ तत् प्रभवति “न ददाति यावत् प्रतिलेख्यं न दत्तम्” इति । यदि चैषा परिभाषा “लिखितं लिखितेनैव” इति तदा बलोपधिकृतत्वं⁶² कथं विचार्यताम् । न हि तत्र लेख्यान्तरसंभवः । तेन यथात्र सत्य् एव लेख्ये तन्निश्चयार्थं प्रमाणान्तरं⁶³ व्यापार्यते तद्वद् अन्यत्रापि व्यापारणीयम् । यथा कश्चिद् आवेदयेत्- “अस्य⁶⁴ प्रययं गत्वा लेख्यं मया कृतम् अनेनोक्तः सद्यः पुण्याहकारणम्⁶⁵ इमां च धनमात्रां गृहाण,⁶⁶ श्वस् ते सर्वं दातास्मीत्य्⁶⁷ उक्त्वा सैव धनमात्रा दत्ता परिशिष्टं न दत्तम्” इति, तदास्त्य् एव साधकान्तरव्यापारणावसरः⁶⁸ । तत्र यद्य् अधमर्णस्यास्मिन् प्रकारे साक्षिणः सन्ति तदाभिहिते लेख्य आभासीकृते⁶⁹ श्वोदानम् उत्तमर्णेन साधनीयम् । अथ तयोर् अपि रहसि परिभाषेयम् अभूत् तदा दैव्याः क्रियाया अवसरः । अथ तु तस्याम् अपि व्यभिचरित्वाद् अनाश्वासः सत्यशपथेन व्यवस्था कार्या ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु एवं सति स्वहस्तलेख्यं प्रमाणान्तरसंवेदसापेक्षत्वाद् अप्रमाणम् एव । तत्र “विनापि साक्षिभिः सिध्येत्” (य्ध् २.९२) “स्वहस्तपरिचिह्नितम्”⁷⁰ (य्ध् २.९६) इति विरोधः । अनेनैव न्यायेन प्रत्यक्षं दीयमानं द्रव्यं न पश्यति । केवलं तत्समक्षं गृहीत्वा परिभाष्यते “इयद् इदम् अस्मान् मया गृहीतम्” इति । ते ऽपि साक्षिणः स्युः । तत्रापि शक्यते वक्तुम् “अस्य प्रत्ययं गत्वा प्रपन्नो⁷¹ ऽहम्” इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">उक्तम् अत्र न स्मृतिविरोधाद् वस्तुस्थितिर् आहन्तुं⁷² शक्यते । अपि च यत्रास्य वचनस्यावसरो नास्ति तत्र प्रमाणं⁷³ भविष्यति । क्वचिन् नास्ति । यत्र चिरकालं तिष्ठति धनिकहस्ते लेख्यं यदि हि तेन⁷⁴ धनं दत्तम्, तदा कथम् अनेन वा नाम न मार्गितं लेख्यं न त्याजितम् इति । न हि चिरकालम् उपेक्षा⁷⁵ वस्तुनीदृशे⁷⁶ संभवति । मिथ्यावादिता त्व् अस्यानुमीयते । तथा चोक्तम्-

• सद्यस् त्र्यहाद् वा कार्येषु बलं राज्ञो निवेदयेत् । इति ।

यत्र वा भोग्यबन्धो न च भोग आम्नातो ऽपहारकालस् तत्र विप्रतिपत्तौ विनापि साक्षिभिः स्वहस्तलेख्यं न ह्य् अधमर्णा वक्तुं लभन्ते “प्रीत्या त्वयैतद् उक्तं संप्रति त्यज” इति । न च पूर्वोक्तस्य वचनस्यावसरः । कृतं लेख्यं ततो दास्यामीत्य् उक्त्वा न दत्तम् इति । यदि न दत्तं कथं बन्धभोगो मर्षितः ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु चैवं सति लेख्यसहायो भोगः प्रमाणं स्यात् । केवलस्य तु भोगस्य प्रामाण्यम् आमनन्ति । “लिखितं साक्षिणो भुक्तिः” (न्स्म् १.६५) इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">किम् इदं प्रत्युक्तं पर्यनुयुज्यामहे । विशिष्टकालो भोगः प्रमाणं न भोगमात्रम् । एवं हि पठ्यते “यत् किंचिद् दशवर्षाणि” (म्ध् ८.१४७), तथा “पश्यतो ऽब्रुवतो भूमेर् हानिर् विंशतिवार्षिकी” (य्ध् २.२४) इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">कस् तर्ह्य् अस्यार्थो “लिखितं लिखितेनैव” (न्स्म् १.१२५) इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">व्याख्यातम् अन्यैः । कर्तृविशेषसंशये ऽनेनैतल् लिखितं न वेति, लिखितेन निश्चिततत्कर्तृकेण निश्चीयते । यत् तु साक्षिसमक्षं तत्र कृताकृतसंदेहं साक्षिभिर् हरति⁷⁷ । त एव तत्र प्रमाणम् । न तत्र तत्कृतलेख्यान्तरदर्शनम् उपयुज्यते । बुद्धिपूर्वेषु च ऋणादानादिषु केवलेभ्यः साक्षिभ्यो लिखितं श्रेयः । साक्षिणो हि विस्मरेयुर् अन्यतरेण वा संबन्धं गच्छेयुर् अन्यद् वा पातकस्यासाक्षित्वे हेतुम् आसादयेयुः । लेख्यं त्व् अभियोगवत आत्माधीनतया सुरक्षम् इति साक्षिभ्यः श्रेयस्त्वं तस्य । एतद् एवाह “लिखितेन तु साक्षिणः” (न्स्म् १.१२५) इति । स्वहस्तप्रतिष्ठेन विस्मृतम् अप्य् अर्थं वृत्तम् इति मन्यते । मृता वा साक्षिणस् तद्धस्तप्रत्यभिज्ञानेन⁷⁸ प्रमाणीभवन्ति ।

व्याख्यानान्तराणि भर्तृयज्ञेनैव सम्यक् कृतानीति तत एवावगन्तव्यानि सर्वथा प्रमाणमूलानि । स्मृतिकारणव्यवस्थानुवर्तितव्येति⁷⁹ । न च स्मृतेर् एव⁸⁰ प्रमाणकल्पना युक्ता । न हि व्यवहारस्मृतिर् वेदमूला शक्यते वक्तुम्, सिद्धार्थरूपत्वात् प्रत्यक्षाद्यवगम्यत्वाज् जयपराजयप्रकाराणाम् । सिद्धो ह्य् अयम् अर्थः । एवं व्यवहारे जीयत इतरः, इतरो जयतीति । यद् अप्य्⁸¹ अत्र लिङ्गश्रुतिः सापि “हरीतकीं भक्षयेद् आरोग्यकामः” इतिवद् अवसेया । ईदृशेषु विधिस्वरूपेषु प्रत्ययेषु द्रव्यशुद्धेः प्रसङ्गेनार्थो विवेचित इति न पुनः प्रयतामहे ।
अष्टादशसु मार्गेषु । मार्गो⁸² विषयो विवादस्य । एतान् अर्थान् उद्दिश्य पुरुषाः प्रायेण विवदन्ते । निबद्धानि⁸³ कार्याणि प्रयोजनान्य् अर्थसिद्धय इति यावत् । तान्य् उत्तरत्र दर्शयिष्यामः । पृथक् पृथक्, प्रादान्यम् एतेषाम् आह । एतानि प्रयेकं प्रयोजनानि⁸⁴ न पुनः परस्परम् अन्तर्भवन्ति । यथान्यान्य् अनुषङ्गादिष्व् अन्तर्भवन्ति । नैवम् एतानि⁸⁵ । अनुषक्तानि तु सहस्रशः सन्ति ॥ ८.३ ॥

The first half of the verse describes the means of forming a decision, and the second mentions the number of the heads of dispute.

The verb ‘shall look into’ of the preceding verse has to be construed with the present verse,—as also the noun ‘the suits’; the full sentence being ‘day after day he shall look into the suits’; i.e., every day he shall decide cases.

‘According to principles.’—‘Principles’ are the means of coining to a decision; and they are of two kinds—(l) in the shape of evidence and (2) in the shape of custom. The means leading to decisions that are in the shape of ‘evidence’ are in the form of witnesses and so forth; and those in the form of rules are such as—(a) ‘the investigation of a suit can be regarded as complete only when precise decision has been arrived at regarding its subject-matter.’ A single witness, who is true to his oath, and who has been cited by both parties, who have also vouched for his veracity,—even though he may not have been examined by the members of the court,—becomes a reliable means of arriving at the right decision; but no decision can ho arrived at on the strength of the words of any such single person as is not known to be truthful and has not been examined, as there is in the former ease; and hence such a single witness cannot he regarded as helping the forming of a decision, even though the persons investigating the case may be agreed upon it.

Customs also are of two kinds—general and special. These again are of two kinds—congruous and incongruous, in reference to places and times. As an instance of the ‘Congruous’ custom we have (a) the case where among certain people of the South, a childless woman, on the death of her huśand, goes up to the pillar of the court of justice, and while there, if, on being examined by the officers of the court, she is found to be untainted and possessed of the necessary qualifications, she obtains her inheritance;—or (b) the case where among the people of the North, if food is given to a person seeking for a bride, then she becomes betrothed to him even though the actual words ‘I shall give her to you’ may not he uttered. And as an instance of the ‘incongruous’ rule, we have (a) the case where in some countries grains are lent out during the Spring, and double the quantity is realised during the Autumn,—or (b) when an article is mortgaged on the understanding that it shall be enjoyed by the mortgagee, even if the total amount of debt accruing become double of the price of that article, and the total from the very beginning is paid in gold, yet the enjoyment of it remains unmolested;—now all this is ‘incongruous,’ being incompatible with the law that ‘the interest shall accumulate to only 80 per cent.’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyarahāra, 37), and that ‘the accumulated interest shall not exceed the double of the principal’ (Manu, 8.151).

These customs based upon the nature of the countries affected are what are mentioned in the text by the words ‘principles based upon local usage’; and as regards the ‘principles based upon scriptures,’ these are declared in the scriptures themselves. Of these latter some are rules that have been propounded by the writers themselves, while others only codify the actually existing state of things. As an instance of the rule propounded by the writers we have—(a) ‘Facts are ascertained in accordance with written documents, possession and witnesses,’—as says manu (8.41) ‘Just as the hunter infers the position of the prey by means of the drops of blood (so should the king infer the facts of a case).’ Though no worldly usage can be regarded as authoritative as against the word of scripture-writers, yet in certain cases it becomes necessary to have recourse to the words of ordinary men of the world; e.g., ‘under such and such conditions such and such an ordeal should be had recourse to,’ ‘weight is to be attached to possession lasting for such a time.’ Such rules, even though based upon ordinary usage, are included under ‘principles based upon scriptures’ But among such rules, those are to be regarded as authoritative which are found to have some support in the scriptural texts; while those that are found to be without such support are not to be so accepted. For instance, there is the rule regarding the order of words in documents—‘By me, entreated by both parties, who am the son of so and so, this has been written by so and so—thus exactly shall the scribe write down’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 88). In reality however, there would be no harm if the scribe were to write down his own name first—‘I so and so, the son of so and so, am writing this.’ Because the only purpose for which he writes all this is with a view to show that the document has been written by such and such a person; so that so long as the name of the scribe is put down, there is nothing objectionable in it. If the scribe is known, from other sources, to be a trustworthy person, then what is written by him is regarded as reliable; so that if he were to omit the name of his family, and thus fail to indicate precisely who he is, whose reliability would the persons concerned investigate, on the basis of other sources of information? But if from his writing, or by some other means, the writer be recognised as a particular well-known scribe, then there would be no harm even if he were to omit his indicative characteristics. In this case, even if the scribe were to omit to write that ‘this has been written by me, so and so,’ there would be enough to indicate who the writer is. And it is in such cases that the examination of the scribe comes useful; and he becomes counted among ‘witnesses,’ specially when there are few other witnesses. When however there are many trustworthy witnesses ready at hand, there is not much use in investigating the trustworthiness of the scribe.

Similarly there is another rule—‘Documentary evidence is rebutted by documentary evidence, and witnesses (oral evidence) by witnesses; documentary evidence is superior to witnesses; hence witnesses are rebutted by documentary evidence.’ (Nārada, 1.145). For this rule also there is no foundation. For ‘documentary evidence’ is of two kinds: (1) written by the party himself, and (2) written by another person. The latter again is of two kinds—(a) written by a scribe who volunteers to do the writing, and (b) written by an authorised scribe. The document written by another person again is, in every way, of the nature of a witness; so that there is no ground for the distinction made by the rule, in the words ‘documentary evidence is superior to witnesses,’ specially because the ‘witness’ has been thus defined (by Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 87)—‘The witnesses shall, with their own hands, write down their names, preceded by the names of their father, adding that I, so and so, am a witness.’ Similarly, no reliability attaches to what has been written by a single man, just as it does not attach to a single witness. It might be argued that it is only when ‘witnesses’ set down their hands to something that they become ‘documentary evidence.’ But this difference cannot make the one ‘superior’ to the other. Because trustworthiness is the only ground for ‘superiority’; and this trustworthiness is equally yet to be examined in both cases. It is for this reason that in a case when there is a conflict between the two kinds of evidence, the judge should accept that which is the more numerous of the two. ‘Being authorised’ also cannot be regarded as a ground of distinction; because even so, the ‘superiority’ could only consist in the fact that it is only one who has been tested that is ‘authorised’; but as a matter of fact, all persons ‘authorised’ by the King are not necessarily thoroughly ‘tested.’ If some one happened to be possessed, of extremely high qualifications and were absolutely free from all defects, then he, even alone, could be accepted as sufficient corroboration. As for instance, the deeds of land-grants bestowed by the King are accepted as authoritative, even though written by a single Kāyastha scribe. In a case where there is documentary evidence written by the hand of the person who is not paying a debt, wherein he admits that ‘I have received so much from this person, and so much has to be paid to him,’—if he should happen to deny it and say ‘I have not received anything from him,’—then the party producing the aforesaid document wins the case outright, and there is no occasion for the appearance of any witnesses at all.

“It is only on the strength of the man’s writing that it is concluded that the debt is admitted by him,—and subsequently also the same man asserts, that he has not received anything; now between these two assertions, on what grounds is the latter rejects in favour of the former, and not the former in that or the latter,—both of them being equally open to doubt, by reason of mutual contradiction? In fact under such circumstances it is only right that other kinds of evidence should he called in.”

This would be so, if there were equality (between the two assertions). As a matter of fact, however, the assertion ‘I have not received anything’ may he due to the man’s avarice and such other causes; whereas the assertion ‘I have received such and such a thing’ could never he made by any sane person without having actually received it. In the case in question, even if the man were to say that he has repaid the debt, but did not obtain the written acquittance receipt, either because a writer was not at hand, or because being engaged in some other business he was in a hurry,—even so there would be no need and occasion for the calling of any further evidence, in the shape of witnesses, etc.

As regards the dictum quoted above (from Nārada), it cannot set aside a conviction derived from the very nature of things.

For instance, it is often found that people go on repaying debts due to rich persons, and yet do not have the payments noted on the back of the document, the idea in the man’s mind being either that ‘so much I have paid to-day, and tomorrow I shall bring in more and then have the total sum entered at the same time,’ or that ‘in a few days I shall repay the entire amount and then have the document torn off’;—but when pressed by the rich creditor, he may be unable to clear off the entire debt, and the only amount paid remains what had been on the first day, the creditor would deny even that payment on the ground that the receipt was not given;—now in this case if the court were to insist upon the dictum that ‘documentary evidence can be rebutted only by documentary evidence,’—then how could it take into consideration at all the possibility of force or fraud (on the part of the influential creditor)? for there is no possibility of any documentary evidence; and in this case, even though there is documentary evidence on one side, yet, for the purpose of coining to a right conclusion, other forms of evidence are called in; and the same could be done in other cases also. For instance, in a certain case, one of the parties (the debtor) might say—‘trusting this man, I executed this deed for the entire sum, and the creditor told me that I may receive a part of the sum that day, as for certain reasons he was not in a position to pay the whole sum then, and that he would pay the balance the next day; but the sum paid on the first day was all that he gave me, and the balance was never paid’; and in this case there is certainly an occasion for the calling in of other kinds of evidence. And if the debtor can produce witnesses in corroboration of his statement, then the document (produced by the creditor) becomes impugned, and it becomes necessary for the creditor to prove that he did pay the balance the next day. If the conversation between the parties (regarding the part payment) were held in private (and there be no witnesses to corroborate the statements one way or the other),—then there comes the occasion for having recourse to ordeals. If however there be no full confidence in ordeals,—on the ground of these being not always infallible,—then decision should he arrived at by means of oaths.

“If such be the case, then the document written by the man’s own hand becomes untrustworthy, since it stands in need of corroboration by other kinds of evidence. And this is contrary to the dictum that ‘even without witnesses, what is written by the man’s own hand should be conclusive evidence.’ It is on the analogy of this same reasoning that in a case where a person has not seen the sum being actually paid by the creditor, but in his presence the debtor has admitted that ‘such and such an amount has been received by me from him,’—such a person is accepted as a real ‘witness’; though in this ease it is open to the debtor to say ‘it was through my trust in the man that I admitted the payment.’”

This argument we have already answered by saying that mere incompatibility with a Smṛti-text cannot set aside the real facts of the case. In certain cases the aforesaid statement (of the debtor—that ‘I repaid a certain sum but did not have it entered on the back of the document’) could be wholly out of place; and in such cases, the document would certainly be accepted as reliable evidence. For instance, in a case where the document has remained in the creditor’s hands for a long time, the question naturally arises if the debtor really repaid the debt, why did he not seek out the document and receive it back; such a matter cannot be neglected or overlooked for such a long time; and from this it is inferred that what the debtor states is a lie.’ It is in view of this that it has been laid down that ‘if there has been any wrongful force used in regard to any business, one should report it to the King either at once or within three days.’ Again, in a case where there is mortgage, but the exact period of the mortgage is not definitely fixed, and dispute arises on that account, if there is a document written by the debtor, but without witnesses,—it is not open to the debtor to assert—‘you said this (made this condition) at the time through your love (for the thing), but now please give up to me the mortgaged article’; nor would this be an occasion for his making the statement referred to above—viz., ‘I executed the deed, the man said he would give me the sum mentioned therein, but he never actually gave it to me’; because if the debt was not advanced, why did he permit the creditor to retain and make use of the mortgaged article?

“If such be the case, then the evidence in the case would consist of the said possession accompanied by the document; while what the writers on law declare is that possession by itself is sufficient evidence; as assorted in such texts as—

‘Documents, witnesses, possession, etc., etc.’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 22).”

Why is this objection urged against us, when we have already answered it: What is accepted as evidence is possession for a definite period of time, and not mere possession. What the texts state is—‘Whatever is retained for ten years, etc.’ (manu, 8.147), and ‘One loses possession of a landed property, if for twenty years he perceives and speaks of it as being actually possessed by another person’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 24).

“What then is the exact meaning of the dictum that ‘documentary is rebutted only by documentary evidence?’”

Others have explained this to mean (a) that when there is a doubt regarding the writer of a certain document, as to whether or not it has been written by a certain person, this can he ascertained only with the help of another writing obtained from that person;—(b) that where the deed has been written before a certain witness, the doubt as to whether or not it has been written by the man can be removed only by means of witnesses; as the latter are the only evidence possible in the case; so that in this case there is no use in producing another writing of the man;—(c) that in a case where the payment of the debt is being intentionally withheld, documentary evidence is superior to mere witnesses; because it is possible for witnesses to forget things, or to collude with one party or the other, or become tainted with some defect which would disqualify them as proper witnesses; as for the document on the other hand, this would he in charge of the plaintiff and as such perfectly safe; and thus it is that documentary evidence is superior to witnesses. This is what is meant by the dictum that ‘witnesses are rebutted by documentary evidence’; because even though the man may have forgotten a certain fact, if he sees some writing of his own bearing testimony to it, he is convinced of its being true; or when the witnesses are all dead, if their writing is recognised, it is accepted as evidence.

Other explanations have been supplied by Bhartṛyajña, and may be learnt from his own work.

Though it is true that in all cases Smṛti-texts form the source of authority, yet rules have to be laid down for meeting special cases; and it cannot be right to depend entirely on Smṛti-texts; specially because it cannot be said that the Smṛti-texts bearing upon legal proceedings are all based upon the Veda; because the winning or losing of cases deals with well-accomplished things (while the Veda bears upon things to be accomplished) and is amenable to Perception and other forms of cognition;—e.g., that ‘one who acts like this is defeated, while he who acts thus wins’ is a well-accomplished fact. Even the few indications of these that are found in the Veda are to be regarded as being on the same footing as the assertion—‘One desiring freedom from disease should eat the Harītakī (which only describes a perceptible fact). the exact significance of such Injunctive Vedic passages has been discussed by us in the section on the ‘Purification of things’ (under Discourse 6, Verse 110 et seq.); hence we are not going to do the same thing over and again.

The objects of dispute fall within eighteen ‘heads’; it is only with regard to these that disputes arise among men. Mutually nugatory acts are not conducive to the fulfilment of any useful purpose,—as we are going to show later on.

Each of these eighteen ‘heads’ is important by itself; as each by itself becomes the object of dispute, and no one of them is included in any other. The various ramifications of these are included under each head; if these ramifications were to be enumerated separately, there would be thousands of them.—(3)

‘Vināpi sākṣibhiḥ etc.’—(Medhātithi, p. 793, l. 24)—This is a clear reference to Yājñavalkya (Vyavahāra, 89).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 18), and again on p. 31, in support of the view that the king shall decide cases relating to all the eighteen points of dispute, on the basis of local customs and also of ordeals and other methods prescribed by the scriptures;—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 2a);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 57);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (3a), which has the following notes:—‘Deśadṛṣṭa hetu’ are those special means of coming to a decision which are effective in the place concerned,—of the custom obtaining among the people of the North and those of the Central land, of feeding the person who comes to ask for the hand of a girl, which feeding means a distinct promise to marry the girl,—‘śāstradṛṣṭa hetu’ stands for witnesses and the rest;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 4a).

Gautama (II. 19-24).—‘His administration of justice shall be regulated by the Veda, the institutes of the sacred law, the subsidiary sciences and the Purāṇa; the local laws, the customs of castes and families—which arc not opposed to the sacred laws—have also authority. Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans have the authority to lay down rules for their respective classes. Having learnt the state of affairs from those who have authority to speak, the King shall give the decision. Reasoning is a means for getting at truth; coming to a conclusion through that, he shall decide properly.’

Vaśiṣṭha (1.17).—‘Manu has declared that the peculiar laws of countries, castes and families may be followed in the absence of revealed texts.’

Do. (16.4-5).—‘Let him reason properly regarding an offence; he who reasons properly regarding an offence, in accordance with the sum of the science of the first two castes is equitable towards all living beings.’

Kātyāyana (Parāśaramādhava, p. 31).—‘The King shall decide suits according to the Śāstras; where there are no texts to guide him, he shall decide in accordance with local custom.’

Bṛhaspati (1.23).—‘Having entered the Court in the forenoon, together with elders, ministers, and attendants, he should try causes and listen to expositions of the Purāṇas, Law-codes and Rules of Polity.’

Do. (1.33).—‘People who arc ignorant of the customs of the country, unbelievers, despisers of the sacred books, insane, irrate, avaricious or diseased should not he consulted in the decision of causes.’

Do. (27.24).—‘Such customs as are not opposed to the laws of the country and castes or other corporations—the King should establish in accordance with the sacred law.’

Nārada (3.5).—‘The members of the royal court of justice must be acquainted with the sacred law and with rules of precedence,—noble, not avaricious and impartial towards friend and foe.’

Matsyapurāṇa (Rājadharma, 215.50).—‘He shall attend upon Brāhmaṇas versed in the Veda and the sciences.’

Agnipurāṇa (234.7-9).—‘He shall then see the preceptor and having received his blessings, enter the Court; therein he shall see the Brāhmaṇas, Ministers and Councillors; and then proceed to try the law-suits, holding consultations with the Councillors.’

Bṛhaspati (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra).—‘Suits shall be decided by the king or by the learned Brāhmaṇa appointed as Judge.’

अष्टादशसु मार्गेषु व्यवहारस्थानेष्व् ऋणादानादिषु वक्ष्यमाणेषु पृथक् पृथङ् निबद्धानि, देशाचारव्यवस्थया कर्षकवणिक्पशुपालादिषु धर्मेण, शास्त्रव्यवस्थया च शास्त्रोक्तैर् हेतुभिः साक्षिशपथादिभिः प्रत्यहम् अग्लायमानो राजा पश्येत् कार्याणि कार्यिणाम् । यद्य् अपि लौकिकान्य् अपि शास्त्रोक्तानि लिङ्गानि “बाह्यैर् विभावयेल् लिङ्गैः,” “तथानुमाने[न] नयेद् धर्मस्य नृपतिः पदम्” इत्य् एवमादीनि, तथापीदं लौकिकप्रमाणानुवादि । शास्त्रलक्षणम् तु प्रमाणं शाक्षिशपथादि । यद्य् अपि च लौकिकप्रमाणानुवाद इह शास्त्रे ऽस्ति कुतश्चित् कारणात्, तथापि शास्त्रं लोकम् एव प्रमाणीकरोति केषुचित् कार्येषु । तथा च वक्ष्यति “समुद्रयानकुशला देशहालार्थदर्शिणः” इत्य् एवमादि । अतः पृथग्देशग्रहणं न्याय्यम् ॥ ८.३ ॥

तानि च व्यवहारवसूनीमानि निर्दिश्यन्ते ।

003 Daily (deciding) one after another (all cases) which fall under the eighteen titles (of the law) according to principles drawn from local usages. and from the Institutes of the sacred law.

पाठक्रमापेक्षम् ऋणादानस्याद्यत्वं प्राथम्यम् । अथ वा मुख्यम् आद्यम् । अनेन हि वनवासिनो ऽपि स्पृश्यन्ते । ऋणादानानुषक्तम् अनृणादानम् एव च । यथा “ऋणं ते मया दत्तं शुद्धिलेख्यं प्रयच्छ” इत्यादि । नैतद् ऋणादानम्, अनुक्तं तु तत्रेति तद् व्यपदेश्यम् । तथा

• ऋणं देयम् अदेयं च येन यत्र यथा च यत् ।

• दानग्रहणधर्माश् च । (न्स्म् १.१) इति ।

तत्र देयम् ऋणं स्वकृतं पितृकृतं च यय च ऋक्थं हरेत् । अदेयं स्वक्र्तं द्विगुणाद् अधिकं पितृकृतं च द्यूतादिभागेनेति पुत्रण् भर्त्रा पित्रा चेति । तथा,

• न स्त्री पतिकृतं दद्याद् ऋणं पुत्रकृतं तथा ।

• अभ्युपेताद् ऋते यद् वा सह पत्या कृतं भवेत् ॥ (न्स्म् १.१३)

यद्य् अपि देयम् इत्य् अत्रैतद् अन्तर्भूतं तथापि द्यूतादिकृतं विशेषानपेक्षं स्वरूपतो देयम्, इदं तु कर्तृनियमाद् इति गोबलीवर्दवद् भवति चेद् भेदो यावद् इति द्वैगुण्यपर्यन्तं तत्रापि भेदः पूर्ववत् । “यत्र” इति पाठे देशकालग्रहणम् । यत्रैव गृहीतं तत्रैव देयम् । सत्यां धनिकेच्छायां देशान्तरे ऽपि । सति संभवे कालो ऽपि । शरद्य् अनिच्छेत्त्य् उक्तम्⁸⁶ । “ग्रैष्मे वा सत्सु सस्येषु यदा वास्य धनागमं मन्येत” इति । “यथा” सति संभवे सर्वम् । असति कश्चिद् अंशो यावत् क्रमेण संशुद्धम् इति । सर्वभावेन⁸⁷ परिक्षीणेन “कर्मणापि समम्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इति । “दानग्रहणधर्माः” इति साक्षिलेख्यादयः ।

पारुष्ये दण्डवाचिके इति । दण्डश् च वाक् च दण्डवाचं “द्वन्द्वाच् चुदषहान्तात्” (पाण् ५.४.१०६) इति समासान्तस् तद् अस्यास्तीति “अत इनि ठनौ” (पान् ५.२.११५) इति ठन् । स्त्रीपुंधर्म इति । स्त्रीसहितः पुमान् इति शाकपार्थिवादिवत् समासः । स्त्री च पुमांश् चेति विग्रहे स्त्रीपुंसस्हर्म इति स्यात् ॥ ८.४–६ ॥

पाठक्रमापेक्षम् ऋणादानस्याद्यत्वं प्राथम्यम् । अथ वा मुख्यम् आद्यम् । अनेन हि वनवासिनो ऽपि स्पृश्यन्ते । ऋणादानानुषक्तम् अनृणादानम् एव च । यथा “ऋणं ते मया दत्तं शुद्धिलेख्यं प्रयच्छ” इत्यादि । नैतद् ऋणादानम्, अनुक्तं तु तत्रेति तद् व्यपदेश्यम् । तथा

• ऋणं देयम् अदेयं च येन यत्र यथा च यत् ।

• दानग्रहणधर्माश् च । (न्स्म् १.१) इति ।

तत्र देयम् ऋणं स्वकृतं पितृकृतं च यय च ऋक्थं हरेत् । अदेयं स्वक्र्तं द्विगुणाद् अधिकं पितृकृतं च द्यूतादिभागेनेति पुत्रण् भर्त्रा पित्रा चेति । तथा,

• न स्त्री पतिकृतं दद्याद् ऋणं पुत्रकृतं तथा ।

• अभ्युपेताद् ऋते यद् वा सह पत्या कृतं भवेत् ॥ (न्स्म् १.१३)

यद्य् अपि देयम् इत्य् अत्रैतद् अन्तर्भूतं तथापि द्यूतादिकृतं विशेषानपेक्षं स्वरूपतो देयम्, इदं तु कर्तृनियमाद् इति गोबलीवर्दवद् भवति चेद् भेदो यावद् इति द्वैगुण्यपर्यन्तं तत्रापि भेदः पूर्ववत् । “यत्र” इति पाठे देशकालग्रहणम् । यत्रैव गृहीतं तत्रैव देयम् । सत्यां धनिकेच्छायां देशान्तरे ऽपि । सति संभवे कालो ऽपि । शरद्य् अनिच्छेत्त्य् उक्तम्⁸⁶ । “ग्रैष्मे वा सत्सु सस्येषु यदा वास्य धनागमं मन्येत” इति । “यथा” सति संभवे सर्वम् । असति कश्चिद् अंशो यावत् क्रमेण संशुद्धम् इति । सर्वभावेन⁸⁷ परिक्षीणेन “कर्मणापि समम्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इति । “दानग्रहणधर्माः” इति साक्षिलेख्यादयः ।

पारुष्ये दण्डवाचिके इति । दण्डश् च वाक् च दण्डवाचं “द्वन्द्वाच् चुदषहान्तात्” (पाण् ५.४.१०६) इति समासान्तस् तद् अस्यास्तीति “अत इनि ठनौ” (पान् ५.२.११५) इति ठन् । स्त्रीपुंधर्म इति । स्त्रीसहितः पुमान् इति शाकपार्थिवादिवत् समासः । स्त्री च पुमांश् चेति विग्रहे स्त्रीपुंसस्हर्म इति स्यात् ॥ ८.४–६ ॥

पाठक्रमापेक्षम् ऋणादानस्याद्यत्वं प्राथम्यम् । अथ वा मुख्यम् आद्यम् । अनेन हि वनवासिनो ऽपि स्पृश्यन्ते । ऋणादानानुषक्तम् अनृणादानम् एव च । यथा “ऋणं ते मया दत्तं शुद्धिलेख्यं प्रयच्छ” इत्यादि । नैतद् ऋणादानम्, अनुक्तं तु तत्रेति तद् व्यपदेश्यम् । तथा

• ऋणं देयम् अदेयं च येन यत्र यथा च यत् ।

• दानग्रहणधर्माश् च । (न्स्म् १.१) इति ।

तत्र देयम् ऋणं स्वकृतं पितृकृतं च यय च ऋक्थं हरेत् । अदेयं स्वक्र्तं द्विगुणाद् अधिकं पितृकृतं च द्यूतादिभागेनेति पुत्रण् भर्त्रा पित्रा चेति । तथा,

• न स्त्री पतिकृतं दद्याद् ऋणं पुत्रकृतं तथा ।

• अभ्युपेताद् ऋते यद् वा सह पत्या कृतं भवेत् ॥ (न्स्म् १.१३)

यद्य् अपि देयम् इत्य् अत्रैतद् अन्तर्भूतं तथापि द्यूतादिकृतं विशेषानपेक्षं स्वरूपतो देयम्, इदं तु कर्तृनियमाद् इति गोबलीवर्दवद् भवति चेद् भेदो यावद् इति द्वैगुण्यपर्यन्तं तत्रापि भेदः पूर्ववत् । “यत्र” इति पाठे देशकालग्रहणम् । यत्रैव गृहीतं तत्रैव देयम् । सत्यां धनिकेच्छायां देशान्तरे ऽपि । सति संभवे कालो ऽपि । शरद्य् अनिच्छेत्त्य् उक्तम्⁸⁶ । “ग्रैष्मे वा सत्सु सस्येषु यदा वास्य धनागमं मन्येत” इति । “यथा” सति संभवे सर्वम् । असति कश्चिद् अंशो यावत् क्रमेण संशुद्धम् इति । सर्वभावेन⁸⁷ परिक्षीणेन “कर्मणापि समम्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इति । “दानग्रहणधर्माः” इति साक्षिलेख्यादयः ।

पारुष्ये दण्डवाचिके इति । दण्डश् च वाक् च दण्डवाचं “द्वन्द्वाच् चुदषहान्तात्” (पाण् ५.४.१०६) इति समासान्तस् तद् अस्यास्तीति “अत इनि ठनौ” (पान् ५.२.११५) इति ठन् । स्त्रीपुंधर्म इति । स्त्रीसहितः पुमान् इति शाकपार्थिवादिवत् समासः । स्त्री च पुमांश् चेति विग्रहे स्त्रीपुंसस्हर्म इति स्यात् ॥ ८.४–६ ॥

पाठक्रमापेक्षम् ऋणादानस्याद्यत्वं प्राथम्यम् । अथ वा मुख्यम् आद्यम् । अनेन हि वनवासिनो ऽपि स्पृश्यन्ते । ऋणादानानुषक्तम् अनृणादानम् एव च । यथा “ऋणं ते मया दत्तं शुद्धिलेख्यं प्रयच्छ” इत्यादि । नैतद् ऋणादानम्, अनुक्तं तु तत्रेति तद् व्यपदेश्यम् । तथा

• ऋणं देयम् अदेयं च येन यत्र यथा च यत् ।

• दानग्रहणधर्माश् च । (न्स्म् १.१) इति ।

तत्र देयम् ऋणं स्वकृतं पितृकृतं च यय च ऋक्थं हरेत् । अदेयं स्वक्र्तं द्विगुणाद् अधिकं पितृकृतं च द्यूतादिभागेनेति पुत्रण् भर्त्रा पित्रा चेति । तथा,

• न स्त्री पतिकृतं दद्याद् ऋणं पुत्रकृतं तथा ।

• अभ्युपेताद् ऋते यद् वा सह पत्या कृतं भवेत् ॥ (न्स्म् १.१३)

यद्य् अपि देयम् इत्य् अत्रैतद् अन्तर्भूतं तथापि द्यूतादिकृतं विशेषानपेक्षं स्वरूपतो देयम्, इदं तु कर्तृनियमाद् इति गोबलीवर्दवद् भवति चेद् भेदो यावद् इति द्वैगुण्यपर्यन्तं तत्रापि भेदः पूर्ववत् । “यत्र” इति पाठे देशकालग्रहणम् । यत्रैव गृहीतं तत्रैव देयम् । सत्यां धनिकेच्छायां देशान्तरे ऽपि । सति संभवे कालो ऽपि । शरद्य् अनिच्छेत्त्य् उक्तम्⁸⁶ । “ग्रैष्मे वा सत्सु सस्येषु यदा वास्य धनागमं मन्येत” इति । “यथा” सति संभवे सर्वम् । असति कश्चिद् अंशो यावत् क्रमेण संशुद्धम् इति । सर्वभावेन⁸⁷ परिक्षीणेन “कर्मणापि समम्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इति । “दानग्रहणधर्माः” इति साक्षिलेख्यादयः ।

पारुष्ये दण्डवाचिके इति । दण्डश् च वाक् च दण्डवाचं “द्वन्द्वाच् चुदषहान्तात्” (पाण् ५.४.१०६) इति समासान्तस् तद् अस्यास्तीति “अत इनि ठनौ” (पान् ५.२.११५) इति ठन् । स्त्रीपुंधर्म इति । स्त्रीसहितः पुमान् इति शाकपार्थिवादिवत् समासः । स्त्री च पुमांश् चेति विग्रहे स्त्रीपुंसस्हर्म इति स्यात् ॥ ८.४–६ ॥

004 Of those (titles) the first is the non-payment of debts, (then follow), (2) deposit and pledge, (3) sale without ownership, (4) concerns among partners, and (5) resumption of gifts,

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

005 (6) Non-payment of wages, (7) non-performance of agreements, (8) rescission of sale and purchase, (9) disputes between the owner (of cattle) and his servants,

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

006 (10) Disputes regarding boundaries, (11) assault and (12) defamation, (13) theft, (14) robbery and violence, (15) adultery,

Of these the first is (1) Non-payment of Debt; (then) (2) Deposits, (3) Selling without ownership, (4) Joint concerns, (5) Non-delivery of what has been given away,—[4]—(6) Non-payment of wages, (7) Breach of Contract, (8) Recision of Sale and Purchase, (9) Dispute between the Owner and the Keeper,—[5]—(10) Disputes regarding Boundaries, (11) and (12) Assault, physical and verbal, (13) Theft, (14) Violence, (15) Adultery,—[6]—(16) Duties of man and wife, (17) Partition, and (18) Gambling and Betting;—these are the eighteen topics that form the basis of law-suits.—(4-7)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

**(verses 8.4-7)
**

‘Non-payment of debt’ is regarded as ‘first,’ foremost, only by reason of the order in which the several heads are found mentioned in the law-books. Or ‘first’ may mean ‘the most important,’—its ‘importance’ lying in the fact that it affects even those who live in the forests.

Connected with the ‘non-payment of debt’ is also the subject of the ‘non-granting of the acquittance-receipt’; when, for instance, the debtor says to the creditor ‘I have repaid your debt, now let me have the acquittance receipt.’ This ‘nongranting of the acquittance-receipt’ is not the same as the ‘non-payment of debt’; but though not directly denoted by that term, it is implied by it.

What are included under the head of ‘non-payment of debt’ are thus enumerated (by Nārada, 3.17)—‘What debt is payable and what non-payable,—when, how and to what extent?—as also the methods of delivery and receipt.’

Now ‘payable debt’ is that contracted by one’s self, that, contracted by his father, and by one whose property he inherits.

‘Non-payable debt’ is that contracted by one’s self, if (along with the interest) it exceeds the double of the principal, or that contracted by his father in gambling, etc.,’ as declared in the text—‘That contracted by the son, or husband or father, etc.’ (Says Nārada, 3.17)—‘A woman may not pay the debt contracted by her husband, or by her son, unless she has promised to pay it, or if the debt he one contracted by her jointly with her husband.’ Though all this is included under ‘payable debt,’ yet when it happens to be such as is contracted in gambling, etc., then by itself, irrespective of all other peculiar circumstances, it becomes ‘non-payable’; but all this ‘payability’ or ‘non-payability’ is in relation to the person called upon to pay; and bonce the names ‘payable’ and ‘non-payable’ may he taken as similar to the expression ‘gobalībarda’ (i.e., generally speaking, by itself, the debt is payable, but under special circumstances, pertaining to the person and the relationship to the original debtor, etc., it becomes non-payable).

‘To what extent’ (in Nārada’s text) means—‘up to the limit of the double of the principal’; the distinction here also being as before. If we read ‘yatra’ (in Nārada’s text), this term would refer to the place and time of payment; the idea being that the debt shall he repaid where it was taken; but if the creditor so wish it, it may he paid at another place also. The time of payment also should as nearly as possible be the same. As regards time, it has been said that there is no desire to repay debts during the Autumn, the most suitable time being either the Summer, when the harvest has been gathered in, or whenever an income is expected.

‘How’ (in Nārada’s text);—i.e., so far as possible, the entire debt shall be paid; if this be not possible, then by instalments, till the whole is cleared off; and lastly, in the event of the debtor being entirely reduced to penury, he shall clear off the debt by service, as declared in verso 177 below.

‘The methods of delivery and receipt,’—i.e., the signature of witnesses, the execution of deeds and so forth.

‘Assaults, physical and verbal’ (verse 6);—the compound ‘daṇḍavācike’ is formed in accordance with Pāṇini 5.4.106, the final ‘ṭhan’ affix being added according to 5.2.115.

‘Duties of man and wife’ (verse 7);—the compound ‘strīpumān’ is to be expounded as ‘striyā sahitaḥ pumān,’—the compound belonging to the same class as the compound ‘śākapārthivaḥ.’ If it were formed as ‘stṛī ca pumaṃśca,’ the resultant compound would be ‘strīpuṃsadharmaḥ’ (according to Pāṇini 5.4.77).—(4-7)

(verse 8.4)

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2. 5);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 3 b);—in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 1) which explains ‘anapākarma’ as ‘non-delivery’;—in Aparārka (p. 596);—in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 1);—in Smṛtisāroddhāra (p. 325);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 3 b);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (12b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 89b).

(verse 8.5)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p, 596);—in Mitākṣarā (on 2.5);—in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 1), which explains ‘anuśayaḥ’ as ‘paścāttāpaḥ’, ‘revoking—in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 1.)—in Smṛtisāroddhāra (p. 325);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 3b);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (12b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 896).

(verse 8.6)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p, 596);—in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 1);—in Mitākṣarā (on 2.5);—in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 1);—in Smṛtisāroddhāra (p. 325);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 3b);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (12b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 89b).

(verse 8.7)

‘Vyavahārasthitau’—‘Giving rise to law-suits’ (Govindarāja);—‘in deciding law-suits’ (Nārāyaṇa),

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2.5);—in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 1), which explains ‘dyūta’ as ‘gambling with inanimate objects’ and ‘samāhvayaḥ’ as ‘gambling with animals,’ and notes that though theft, adultery, defamation and assault are all only forms of ‘crime’ (‘Sāhasa’) yet they have been mentioned separately, also, on the analogy of such expressions as ‘Gobalīvarda .’

It is quoted in Aparārka (p. 596), which explains ‘padāni’ as ‘sthāna’, ‘viṣāya’, ‘subjects;’—in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 1);—in Smṛtisāroddhāra (p. 325);—in Nṛṣiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 3b);—in Kṛtya kalpataru’ (12b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 89b.)

On verses 1-7 Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 4a) has the following notes:—‘Vyavahārān,’ business described above,—‘pārthivaḥ,’ the anointed Kṣatriya;—the term ‘nṛpaḥ’ implies that what is here enjoined applies also to those who, though not themselves kings, are appointed by the king to work for him;—‘seated or standing’ may be options to be determined by the king’s capacity, or by the respectability or otherwise of the parties appearing before him the raising of the right arm is for calling the attention of suitors; the dress etc. are to be humble, so that the parties may not be confounded by his gorgeous attire;—‘pratyaham’ shows that cases should be tried every day ;—‘ deśadṛṣṭa’ are those customs and arguments that may have local application, such as the customs regarding the betrothal of girls (described above) among ‘northerners.’

**(verses 8.4-8)
**

Nārada (1.16 et. seq.).—‘Recovery of Debt, Deposits, Partnership, Resumption of Gift, Breach of Contract of Service;—Non-payment of wages, Sales effected by a person other than the rightful owner, Non-delivery of sold chattel, Recission of Purchase, Transgression of a Compact, Boundary-disputes, Mutual Duties of Husband and Wife, Law of Inheritances, Heinous offences, Abuse, Assault, Games, and Miscellaneous;—these are the eighteen topics of legal procedure.’

Bṛhaspati (2.5 et. seq.).—‘Law-suits are of two kinds, according as they originate in demands regarding wealth or ininjuries. Law-suits regarding wealth are divided into fourteen kinds; and those regarding injuries into four kinds. (1) Lending money on interest, (2) Deposits (and Treasure Trove), (3) Invalid gifts, (4) Concerns of Partnership, (5) Nonpayment of wages, (6) Disobedience, (7) Disputes concerning Land, (8) Sale without ownership, (9) Revocation of sale and purchase, (10) Breach of agreements, (11) Law between wife and husband, (12) Theft, (13) Inheritance and (14) Gambling.—These are the fourteen titles regarding wealth.—(l) and (2) Two kinds of Insults, (3) Violence and (4) Criminal connexion with the wife of another man,—these are the four titles originating in injury.’

विवादास्पदनिर्देशो ऽत्र चतुर्भिः श्लोकैः । आद्यं मुख्यम् । ऋणव्यवहारो ह्य् एष वनवासिनो ऽपि स्पृशति, अतो ऽस्य मुख्यतोच्यते ॥ ८.४–७ ॥

007 (16) Duties of man and wife, (17) partition (of inheritance), (18) gambling and betting; these are in this world the eighteen topics which give rise to lawsuits.

Taking his stand upon eternal morality, he shall form his decision on the suits of men who mostly carry on disputes in regard to the aforesaid points.—(8)

भूयिष्ठग्रहणं प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थम् । अन्ये ऽपि व्यवहारहेतवः सन्ति । यथा निवसनार्थं त्वया मे वेश्म दत्तम्, तत्र किम् इत्य् अर्वाग् वत्सराद् अन्यस्मै ददासीति । न चेदं दत्तानपकर्म, न ह्य् अत्र स्वत्वनिवृत्तिर् अस्ति, भोगानुज्ञामात्रं वसतः । तथा मदीयस्थण्डिलाभिमुखं त्वया वेश्मनि गवाक्षं कृतम् इति । धर्मं शाश्वतम् आश्रित्येति । अर्थकामाव् अशाश्वतौ । अथ वा शाश्वतो धर्म अनिदंप्रथमतो या व्यवस्था ताम् अनुपालयेत् । या त्व् इदानींतनैः प्रवर्तिता साशाश्वतत्वाद् अनादरणीया ॥ ८.८ ॥

The addition of the adverb ‘mostly’ is for the purpose of indicating the importance of the said heads of dispute. As a matter of fact, there are several other points of dispute also; e.g., (a) ‘you gave me this house to live in; why then do you give it to another person before the lapse of a year?’ This cannot he regarded as included under ‘non-delivery of what has been given away’; because in this case there is no surrendering of ownership (which is a necessary condition in gifts); the dweller is only permitted to dwell in the house;—again, (b) ‘you have made a window in your house in front of my platform.’

‘Taking his stand upon eternal Morality’;—Wealth and Pleasure are not ‘eternal.’ Or, the term ‘eternal morality’ may mean that he should follow that law or custom the beginnings of which cannot be traced; while he should not pay heed to such customs as may have been adopted only by the present generation; as such custom is not eternal.—(8)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 596);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (12b).

**(verses 8.4-8)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verses 8.4-7].

एतानि व्यवहार[व]स्तूनि प्रधानभूतानि । तद्भेदानाम् आनन्त्याद् अशक्यो ह्य् अशेषतो निर्देशः कर्तुम् । भूयिष्ठवचनाच् चैव तद्व्यवहारवस्तुबहुत्वं गम्यते । अनुक्तानाम् अपि शास्त्रानुसारिण्या प्रज्ञया धर्मं शाश्वतम् आश्रित्य कार्यनिर्णयं कुर्यात् । पितृपितामहादिप्रवर्तितम् अप्य् उत्सृज्यान्याय्यम् यत् कार[णात्] प्रायेण कृतानुसारी लोकः, विशेषेण तु राजान इति । अतो ऽयम् “आस्थीयते यत्न” इति, सामान्यश् चायम् उपदेशः । विशेषास् त्व् अस्य विषये वक्ष्यन्ते ॥ ८.८ ॥

008 Depending on the eternal law, let him decide the suits of men who mostly contend on the titles just mentioned.

When he himself may not carry on the investigation of suits, he shall appoint a learned Brāhmaṇa to do the work of investigation.—(9)

• अष्टादशपदाभिज्ञं प्राड्विवाकेति संज्ञितम् ।

• आन्वीक्षिक्यां च कुशलं श्रुतिस्मृतिपरायणम् ॥

कुतश्चिद् अतिपातिकार्यान्तरव्यासङ्गाद् अपाटवाद् वा यदि स्वयं न पश्येत् तदा विद्वान् ब्राह्मणो नियोज्यः । विद्वत्ता च या व्यवहारविषया सा तदधिकारत एवार्थगृहीता । न हि यो यन् न जानाति स तत्राधिकारम् अर्हति । धर्मशास्त्रपरिज्ञानं तु रागद्वेषदोषेण विपरीतार्थावधारणनिवृत्त्यर्थम् उपयुज्यते । धर्मज्ञस् तु सतोर् अपि रागद्वेषयोः शास्त्रभयेन न⁸⁸ विपर्येत्य् इत्य् उपयोगवद् धर्मशास्त्रपरिज्ञानम् । व्यवहारदर्शनं तु तदर्थगृहीतम् । येन विना न शक्यते व्यवहारनिर्णयः कर्तुम्, तद्विज्ञानं तदधिकाराक्षिप्तम् । यत् तु ज्ञात्वान्यथा क्रियते तन्निवृत्तिर् उपदेशान्तरविषया । वक्ष्यति चैवमर्थं यत्नान्तरम् अपि- “वेदविदस् त्रयः राज्ञश् च प्रकृतो विद्वान्” (म्ध् ८.११) इति । शास्त्रान्तरपरिज्ञानं तु व्यवहारे ऽधिक्रियमाणस्यादृष्टाय स्यात् । “नियोज्यो विद्वान् स्यात्” इति पठितव्यम् । नियुञ्ज्याद् इति, नियुञ्जीत “स्वराद्यन्तोपसृष्टात्” (पत् इ- २९०, ओन् पाण् १.३.६४) इति हि कातीया आत्मनेपदं स्मरन्ति ॥ ८.९ ॥

The Brāhmaṇa who is thus appointed should be ‘conversant with the eighteen points, well versed in the Science of Reasoning, fully learned in the Veda and the Smṛtis,—being called the Investigating Judge.’

If, either on account of being absorbed in some other more important business, or on account of his inherent incapacity, the king does not investigate the suits personally, then he should appoint a ‘learned’ Brāhmaṇa. The ‘learning’ here meant is that pertaining to legal proceedings, and the man’s appointment itself is indicative of his possession of that learning; because no man deserves to be appointed to do a work which he does not know. A knowledge of the Science of Morality also comes useful, for the purpose of precluding the possibility of wrong decisions being taken under the influence of love or hate. If the man is conversant with Morality, even though love or hate may be present in his mind, yet, through fear of the said Science of Morality, he does not allow himself to be misled_(;) and it is thus that a knowledge of the Science of Morality comes in useful. As for the knowledge of legal procedure, its presence is already implied; when the man is appointed to do the work of deciding legal cases, it follows that he is possessed of that knowledge without which such cases cannot he decided. The injunction regarding the impropriety of the man knowingly perverting his judgment is contained in other texts; and with a view to avoiding this our author is going later on to lay down other Measures: e.g., ‘Three persons learned in the Veda, and the learned man appointed by the king, etc.’ (verse 11). As for the knowledge of Sciences other than these, if it were made a necessary qualification for the man appointed to investigate legal cases,—such knowledge could only be regarded as meant for some unseen transcendental purpose.

‘Niyojyo vidvān syāt’ would be the right reading (in place of tadā niyuñjyād vidvāṃsam’); because ‘niyuñjyāt’ is grammatically wrong, the right form being ‘niyuñjīta’; as Kātyāyana’s Vārtika on Pāṇini 1.3.66 ordains the Ātmanepada ending for the root ‘Yuj’ preceded by prepositions ending in a vowel.—(9)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 21), which adds that the Brāhmaṇa so appointed is called the ‘Prāḍvivāka,’ ‘judge,’ who is to try the suits exactly in the same manner as has been laid down for the king; It adds a text from Nārada explaining the name ‘Prāḍvivāka—‘The Prāḍvivāka is so called because he puts questions (prāṭ) upon the subject-matter of the suit and investigates it (Vivāka).—It is quoted also in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 36);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (8a);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 10b).

Gautama (13.26).—‘The King or the Judge or a Brāhmaṇa learned in the scriptures shall try the suit.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.2).—‘Let the King or his minister transact the business on the bench.’

Viṣṇu (3.73).—‘Or let him entrust a Brāhmaṇa with the judicial business.’

Yājñavalkya (2.3).—‘The Brāhmaṇa knowing the entire Dharma shall be appointed by the King to try law-suits, if, under pressure of business, he is unable to look into them himself.’

Bṛhaspati (1.24).—‘Let the King, or a member of the twice-born caste officiating as Chief Judge, try causes acting on principles of equity, and abiding by the opinion of the judges and the doctrine of the sacred law.’

Śukranīti (4.5.23-34).—‘Where the King cannot personally attend to the administration of justice, he should appoint a Brāhmaṇa who is versed in the Vedas, self-controlled, highborn, impartial, unagitated and calm, who fears the next life, is religious-minded, active and devoid of anger. If the Brāhmaṇa is not learned enough, the King should appoint a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya who is versed in the sacred law; but he should never appoint the Śūdra, The king should always appoint men of the caste to which he himself belongs; as most members of the royal caste are likely to be well-qualified.’

Nārada (Parāśaramādhava-Vyavahāra, p. 22).—‘He is called the Chief Judge who,—fully acquainted with the eighteen titles of law and with the eight thousand subdivisions thereof, skilled in Logic and other sciences, and thoroughly versed in revealed and traditional lore,—investigates the law relative to the case in hand by putting questions and passing decisions according to what was heard or understood by him.’

Kātyāyana (Parāśaramādhava-Vyavahāra, p. 22).—‘When no Brāhmaṇa is available, the King shall appoint a Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya versed in legal lore; but he shall avoid the Śūdra.’

Prajāpati (Smṛticandrikā).—‘The anointed King or the learned Brāhmaṇa, seated on the seat of judgment, shall investigate the suits quietly.’

यदा कुतश्चिन् निमित्तान्तरतः स्वयं नृपतिः कार्यं न पश्येत्, तदा नियुञ्ज्याद् ब्राह्मणं कार्यदर्शने, नान्यवर्णं धर्मज्ञं व्यवहारज्ञम् अपि सन्तम्, ब्राह्मणम् अपि च विद्वांसं ब्राह्मणज्ञेयेष्व् एव शास्त्रेषु । तद्वर्तिधर्मानतिलङ्घनार्थोच्यते- व्यवहारदर्शनार्था तु विद्वत्तार्थगृहीतत्वाद् अशासनीया (?) ॥ ८.९ ॥

009 But if the king does not personally investigate the suits, then let him appoint a learned Brahmana to try them.

That man, accompanied by three assessors, shall enter the excellent Court, and either seated or standing, shall investigate the suits on behalf of the king.—(10)

सभ्यैर् इति जातिविशेषानुपादाने ऽप्य् उत्तरत्र विप्रग्रहणात् (म्ध् ८.११), “ब्राह्मणैः सह” (म्ध् ८.१) इति च पूर्वत्र ब्राह्मणग्रहणात्, ब्राह्मणा एव विज्ञायन्ते । त्रिग्रहणं त्व् एकद्वयोः प्रतिषेधार्थम् । त्रिप्रभृतयस् त्व् इष्यन्त एव । साक्षिप्रकरणे चैतद् वक्ष्यामः । सभाम् एव प्रविश्याग्राम् इति । राजस्थानापत्त्या सभां प्रविश्य स्थानासनेषु⁸⁹ तद्धर्मेषु पुनर्वचनं प्रदर्शनार्थं धर्मान्तरनिवृत्त्यर्थं वा । तेन राजस्थाने नोपविशति ॥ ८.१० ॥

‘Assesors’;—though the caste of these persons is not specified here, yet in view of the Brāhmaṇa being mentioned later on (in 11), and also of the phrase ‘along with Brāhmaṇas’ (in verse 1 above), it follows that these also should be Brāhmaṇas.

The number is mentioned as ‘three’ simply with a view to preclude the possibility of only one or two men being appointed: what is meant is that three or more men shall be appointed. This we shall explain in detail under the section dealing with Witnesses.

‘Shall enter the excellent Court.’—Though entering the court as the king’s representative, he shall stand or sit on such a seat as is proper for himself. The repetition of ‘standing or sitting’ serves either to indicate the right posture for him, or to preclude other postures. The meaning of this is that he should not sit upon the king’s throne.—(10)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 21);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 37);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (8a);—in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 10b);—and in Rājanītiratnākara (p. 15b).

Śukranīti (4.5.77).—‘The Chief Judge is the speaker, the king is the President, the councillors are the investigators.’

Śukranīti (4.5.85-86).—‘The King should enter the court modestly, together with the Brāhmaṇas and Ministers versed in state-craft, with the object of investigating the cases.’

राजन्य् अस्वस्थशरीर कार्यान्तरव्याकुले वा सभाम् एव प्रविश्याग्रां न ततो ऽन्यत्र; न स[भायाम् अपि] राजासनम् अधिरुह्य, किं तर्हि सभायाम् एवान्यासनस्थः । आसीनः स्थित एव वेति स्थानासनयोर् विकल्पः । उक्तं प्रयोजनम् । सभायां साधवः सभ्याः, ते चोक्तविशेषणा एव सन्तो राजस्थानीयब्राह्मणसहाया एव भवेयुः ॥ ८.१० ॥

अग्र्या सभ्येत्य् उक्तिम्, यतस् तदर्थम् इदम् उच्यते ।

010 That (man) shall enter that most excellent court, accompanied by three assessors, and fully consider (all) causes (brought) before the (king), either sitting down or standing.

That place, where three Brāhmaṇas learned in the Veda sit, as also the learned Brāhmaṇa appointed by the king,—they regard as the ‘Court of Brahman.’—(11)

उक्तं सभां प्रविश्य व्यवहारान् पश्येद् इति । सभाशब्दश् च लोके गृहप्रासादविशेषे वर्तते “मयेन निर्मिता दिव्या सभा हेमपरिष्कृता” इति । क्वचित् पुरुषविशेषसंघटिता सभेति तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं सभाया लक्षणम् आह । यत्र त्रयो ब्राह्मणा वेदविदः संनिधीयन्ते, राज्ञश् च संबन्धी प्रकृतो ऽधिकृतो विद्वान् इति । अथ वा प्रकृतो ऽनन्तरश्लोके संनिहितः । सेह सभाभिप्रेता । ब्रह्मग्रहणं स्तुत्यर्थम् । यथा ब्रह्मणः सभा निरवद्यैवम् इयम्⁹⁰ अपीति ॥ ८.११ ॥

It has been declared that ‘having entered the Court, he shall look into the cases.’ As regards the word ‘sabhā,’ in ordinary language it is used in the sense of a particular apartment of the house; e.g., in the Mahābhārata it is said that the ‘excellent gold-burnished sabhā was built by Maya—sometimes it is also used in the sense of an assemblage of particular men. In order to preclude these two meanings of the term, the author states the definition of the ‘Sabhā,’ ‘Court,’ meant in the present context.

That place where three Brāhmaṇas learned in the Veda are brought together, as also the learned Brāhmaṇa appointed by the king,—or the person mentioned in the preceding verse,—that is the ‘Sabhā’ meant here.

The name of ‘Brahman’ has been mentioned for the purpose of extolling the Court; the sense being that ‘the Court constituted as here stated is as unexceptionable as that of Brahman himself.’—(11)

This verse is quoted in Smṛtitāttva (II, p. 199), to the effect that the court becomes a true ‘Court,’ only by reason of the presence of the duly qualified Brāhmaṇa-judge appointed by the king;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 46), which explains ‘prakṛtaḥ’ as the appointed judge;—in Kṛtyakalpataru (8b);—in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 36 and 11b), which says that no stress is meant to be laid upon the number three, as the number may be larger, up to seven; what is meant is that they shall not be less than three;—and in Rājanītiratnākara (p. 17a).

Bṛhaspati (1.11).—‘That assembly is equal in sanctity to a sacrificial session in which there sit seven, or five or three Brāhmaṇas, who are acquainted with the world, with the Veda and with Law.’

Bṛhaspati (1.5).—‘A Court of Justice is composed of ten members; and an assembly of this sort, in which the King examines the cases attentively, is comparable to a religious session.’

Śukranīti (4.5.50-52).—‘The assembly in which there are seven, five, or even three Brāhmaṇas versed in human affairs, the Vedas and the Dharmaśāstras is like a sacrificial session.’

Śukranīti (4.5.72).—‘The ten requisites in the administration of justice are—the king, officers, councillors, smṛti-books, accountant, clerk, gold, fire, water and one’s own men.’

Nārada (3.18).—‘That is not a court where there are no elders; they are not elders who do not pass a just, sentence; that is not just sentence where there is no truth; that is not truth which is vitiated by error.’

त्रिग्रहणान् नावेदविदस् ते स्युः; दण्डापूपिकया चत्वारो ऽपि न विरुद्ध्यन्ते । राज्ञश् च सहायं प्रकृतो विद्वान् इ[त्य् अनु]वाद उत्तरार्थः । ब्रह्मणस् तां सभां विदुः । केचित् तु ब्राह्मण इति पठन्ति । तद् अयुक्तम् । उक्तत्वाद् अस्य जातेः- “तदा नियुञ्ज्याद् विद्वांसं ब्राह्मणं कार्यकर्शने” इति पूर्वत्र । ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणं सभास्तुत्यर्थं युक्त[ं, ब्रह्म]सभेति । अथ वा “विनीतः प्रविशेत् सभाम्” इत्य् उक्तं यत्, तदुपलक्षणार्थम् इदम् उक्तम् । यद्मिन् देश निषीदन्ति इत्य् एवमादि लौकिकसभानिवृत्त्यर्थम् ॥ ८.११ ॥

011 Where three Brahmanas versed in the Vedas and the learned (judge) appointed by the king sit down, they call that the court of (four-faced) Brahman.

In a court where Justice is pierced by Injustice, and the members of the Court do not remove that dart, these members also become pierced.—(12)

(अग्रे व्याख्यानम्।)

[The Bhāṣya has nothing to say on this verse.]

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 5a and 10b).

Śukranīti (4.5.16).—‘The King who does not perform his civic duties well certainly rots in hell.’

Nārada (3.89),—‘Where justice is slain by injustice and truth by falsehood, the members of the court, who look on with indifference, become doomed to destruction. When justice, hit by injustice, enters a court, and the members do not extract the dart from the wound, they are hit by it themselves.’

Bṛhaspati (1. 34-36).—‘Of the Tree of Justice, the Brāhmaṇa is the root, the King is the stem and branches, the ministers are its loaves and blossoms, just government is its fruit;—renown and wealth are the sap of its fruit; a dignified station, invincibility, esteem among men, and eternal residence in Heaven constitute the enjoyment of its fruit.—Having recognised these advantages in justice, the King should be equitable towards litigants, and should pass a just sentence, discarding avarice and other evil propensities.’

Kātyāyana (Smṛticandrikā, p. 47).—‘Where a decision is taken by councillors against the laws, there justice is slain by injustice. If the king happens to be inclined to act unjustly, the councillors shall not remain neutral; if they do remain neutral, they become degraded.’

धर्म इति] तस्य वेधो ऽन्यथादर्शनम् । तत्फलं तु धर्मव्यवस्थाभङ्गहेतोर् अधिकृतब्राह्मणस्येदम् उच्यते । शल्यं चास्य न कृन्तन्ति विद्धास् तत्र सभासदः- शल्यम् इव शल्यप्रतिष्ठाहेतुत्वात् अस्य [यदि] न कृन्तन्त्य् एते पुन[ः] सभासदः विद्धाः सन्तः प्राग् एव । यतश् चैतद् एवम् अतो ऽसम्यक् प्रवर्तमानो राजा प्रकृतो वा ब्राह्मणस् सभ्यैर् नानुमन्तव्यः, व्यतिक्रमाद् धर्मवेधभयात् ॥ ८.१२ ॥

अतः ।

012 But where justice, wounded by injustice, approaches and the judges do not extract the dart, there (they also) are wounded (by that dart of injustice).

One should either not enter the Court at all, or he should speak out what is equitable; one who either spe aks nothing, or speaks falsely, becomes tainted with sin.—(13)

अनेनार्थेन द्वयं विप्रतिषिध्यते । प्रतिपन्नाधिकारेण मिथ्यादर्शनं न कर्तव्यम् अन्येन च क्रियमाणं नोपेक्षणीयम् । तत्रोभयथा दोषः । अब्रुवन्न् अन्येन विपरीते ऽनुष्ठीयमाने तूष्णीम् आसीनो हस्तक्षेपेण वा शास्त्रन्यायविरुद्धं⁹¹ ब्रुवन् किल्बिषी पापभाग् भवति । तेन नैषा प्रत्याशा कर्तव्या । द्वितीयः प्राड्विवाको मिथ्या पश्यति, स एव योज्यते⁹², अहं तूष्णींभूत उदासीनः किम् इत्य् एनसा योक्ष्य इति । सभाप्रवेशनिषेधेन चात्र व्यवहारदर्शनाधिकारप्रतिपत्तिः प्रतिषिध्यते । सभा वा न प्रवेष्टव्येति । व्यवहारदर्शनाधिकारो न प्रतिपादनीय इत्य् अर्थः । प्रतिपन्नश् चेत् समञ्जसं वक्तव्यम् । अनेन त्व् अनधिकृतस्यापि यदृच्छया संनिहितस्य मिथ्यापश्यत्सु सभ्येषु विदुषस् तूणींभावं नेच्छन्ति । तथा च “नियुक्तो वानियुक्तो वा धर्मज्ञो वक्तुम् अर्हति” । अथ राजपुरुषपर्यनुयोग आशङ्क्यते किम् इत्य् अनधिकृतो ब्रवीति, ततश् च तत्प्रदेशाद् अपसर्तव्यम् । तद् इदम् उक्तम्- “दुर्बलहिंसायां चाविमोचने⁹³ शक्तश् चेत्” इति (ग्ध् २१.१९) ॥ ८.१३ ॥

M G J: ca vimocane

M G DK: yojayati

M G: śāstrānyāviruddhaṃ; DK (1: 34): śāstrājñāviruddhaṃ

What is asserted here forbids two things—(a) he who has accepted the appointment (of a Judge) should not be unjust, and (b) he should not slur over the injustice committed by others; since both these involve sin.

‘Speaks nothing’;—i.e., he who remains silent when another person is committing an injustice,—or he who interferes in the investigation and then says what is not compatible with the scriptures or with justice—‘becomes tainted with sin’—i.e., comes to partake of the sin. Hence the man should not entertain the hope that—‘it is another judge who is judging wrongly, and he may incur sin, I am only sitting silent and indifferent, why should I he affected by the sin?’

By the prohibiting of entrance into the Court what is forbidden is the accepting of the appointment of a judge to investigate cases; so that what is meant by the sentence ‘one should not enter the Court’ is that ‘he should not accept the appointment of the investigating judge, or, if he does accept it, he should speak out what is just.’

This has been taken to imply that when even an unauthorised person happens.to be present, if he finds that the judges are acting wrongly, he should not remain silent. To this end wo have the assertion—‘Authorised or unauthorised, the man who knows what is just should always speak out’ (Nārada 2.2). If he fear molestation at the hands of the king’s officers as to why he should speak, when he is not authorised to do so,—then he should go away from that place. In support of this we have the following assertion—‘When a wrong is being inflicted upon a weak person, if one does not save him from it, he incurs sin, only if he hag the power to gave him’ (Gautama, 21.19).—(13)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 604);—in Mitākṣarā (on 2.2), in support, of the view that the assessors duly appointed incur sin if they do not, check the king in the event of his taking an illegal course; but as regards other people present, these incur sin only if they either speak falsely or suppress the truth,—and not for not checking the king;—and again on 2.83;—and also in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 12a).

Śukranīti (4.5.53, 55).—‘The man who knows Dharma can speak, whether appointed or not appointed. Either one should not come to the Court, or should speak truthfully. That man is a sinner who keeps silent or utters falsehood.’

Nārada (3.10).—‘Either the judicial assembly must not be entered at all, or a fair opinion should be delivered. That man who stands mute or delivers an opinion contrary to justice, is a sinner.’

Nārada (3.14).—‘He who, having entered the Court, delivers a strange opinion, ignoring the true state of the case, resembles a blind man who, regardless, swallows fish together with the bones.’

सभा व न प्रवेष्टव्या वक्तव्यं वा समञ्जसम् ।

व्यवहारप्रदर्शनाधिकारो वा न प्रतिपत्तव्यो राजतः सभ्यैः, वक्तव्यं वा प्रतिपन्नाधिकारैस् तत्र समञ्जसं सत्यम् । येन —

अब्रुवन् विब्रुवन् वापि नरो भवति किल्बिषी ॥ ८.१३ ॥

न केवलं विब्रुवन् किल्बिषी भवति, किं तर्हि अब्रुवन्न् अपि । अतो न “सभ्यैर् अयम् उपेक्षणीयो ऽन्यथा पश्यन् राजप्रकृतो ऽयं करोत्य् एवम्, तद् एवं न वयम्” इति नात्रौदासीन्याद् यूयम् उच्यध्वम् ॥ ८.१३ ॥

तथा चाहुः ।

013 Either the court must not be entered, or the truth must be spoken; a man who either says nothing or speaks falsely, becomes sinful.

Where justice is destroyed by injustice, or truth by falsehood, while people are looking on,—there the members of the court also are destroyed.—(14)

धर्मः⁹⁴ शास्त्रन्यायदेशनियता व्यवस्था । सा चेद् अधर्मेण⁹⁵ तद्व्यतिक्रमरूपेण हन्यते विनाश्यते ऽर्थिना प्रत्यर्थिना । तथा सत्यम् अनृतेन साक्षिभिर् हन्यते । प्राड्विवाकादयश् च प्रेक्षन्ते न तत्त्वम् उद्धरन्ति, ततस् ते हताः शवतुल्या भवन्तीति निन्द्यते । तस्मान् नार्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विपरीतम् आचरन्तौ सभासद्भिर् उपेक्ष्यौ, साक्षिणश् च । धर्माधर्मग्रहणेन सत्यानृतग्रहणेन वा सिद्धौ,⁹⁶ श्लोकपूरणम् उभयोर् उपादानम् । अतो विषयभेदेन व्याख्यातम् ॥ ८.१४ ॥

‘Justice’ is decision arrived at in strict accordance with the scriptures, reasoning and local customs;—if this is

‘destroyed by Injustice,’—i.e., set aside by the reverse of justice,—by either the plaintiff or the defendant;—similarly where ‘truth is destroyed by falsehood’—by the witnesses;—and all the time the judges and the other people in the Court remain looking on, and do not try to draw out the real facts,—then these men also are ‘destroyed,’—i.e., become as good as dead corpses. This is meant to be a deprecation of the judges, etc.

For these reasons the members of the Court shall not connive at any misrepresentations being made by the parties or by the witnesses.

In as much as the mention of ‘Justice and Injustice’ only, or of ‘Truth and Falsehood’ only, would have been sufficient, the mention of both would have to be regarded as serving the purpose of tilling up the metre; hence it has been explained as referring to two distinct sets of persons (the parties and the witnesses).—(14)

Nārada (3.89).—‘Where justice hit by injustice enters a Court, and the members do not extract the dart from the wounds, they are hit by it themselves. Where justice is slain by injustice, and truth by falsehood, the members of the Court who look on with indifference, become doomed to destruction.’

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 604).—(Same as Nārada.)

यत्र धर्मो ह्य् अधर्मेण

व्यवस्था चाव्यवस्थया पूर्वापरादिविप्रतिषेधानुमोदनादिलक्षणया,

सत्यं यत्रानृतेन च ।

कूटसाक्षिभिः,

हन्यते प्रेक्षमाणानां हतास् तत्र सभासदः ॥ ८.१४ ॥

तस्मात् सभ्यैर् नोदासीनैर् भवितव्यम् । न साक्षिणः कुर्वन्तीति सभ्या मुच्यन्ते ॥ ८.१४ ॥

एवं च सति ।

014 Where justice is destroyed by injustice, or truth by falsehood, while the judges look on, there they shall also be destroyed.

Justice, blighted, blights; and justice, preserved, preserves; hence justice should not be blighted, lest blighted justice blight us.—(15)

न भयाद् अन्यथादर्शनं कर्तव्यम्, यतो धर्मो व्यतिक्रान्तः सन् हन्ति, नो ऽर्थी⁹⁷ तत्सहायो राजा वा । तथा धर्म एव पालितः सर्वतो भयम् अपनुदति । नापकर्तुम् अर्थ्यादयः⁹⁸ क्रुद्धाः शक्नुवन्ति । तस्माद् एवंजानता,⁹⁹ “सुखदुःखे धर्माधीने” इति, धर्मो न हन्तव्यः इति । यदि वयं धर्मं हन्मस् तदा सो ऽस्मान् सर्प इव रोषितः प्रतिहन्तीत्य् अतो धर्मो हतः सन् मा अस्मान् वधीद् इत्य् आत्मपरित्राणार्थं धर्मो रक्षितव्यः ॥ ८.१५ ॥

Judgment should not be perverted, through fear; because justice, when violated, ‘blights’— our prosperity, as also the prosperity of the sinful party and his helpers.

Similarly, when ‘preserved,’ justice removes dangers from all sources; so that even though angered, the party (defeated) cannot do any harm.

‘Hence’—i.e., knowing this, that happiness and unhappiness are based upon morality, one should not violate morality (or justice). If we violate justice, justice shall, like an enraged serpent, strike back at us; so lest justice blight us—i.e., with a view to saving ourselves,—we should preserve justice.—(15)

This verse is quoted in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 17a);—in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 15);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 48);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (11b).

Mahābhārata (3.313.38).

Mahābhārata (Vana, 314.131).—‘If protected, justice protects; if slain, it slays; therefore I shall never renounce justice; lest justice, being slain, may slay ourselves.’

एवम् अभिप्रायेण राजप्रकृतो ऽवबोध्यते- “धर्मप्रसादाद् इदम् आधिपत्यं ते प्राप्तम्”, येन न राजप्रसादात् । अतो न धर्मं हन्तुम् अर्हति । एकेवचनाच् च लिङ्गाद् औपरिष्ठके श्लोके, “तस्माद् धर्मं न लोपेयेत्” इत्य् अस्माद् राजप्रकृतो, न सभासदो बहुत्वात् ॥ ८.१५ ॥

यतश् च निर्वचनम् इदम् ।

015 ‘Justice, being violated, destroys; justice, being preserved, preserves: therefore justice must not be violated, lest violated justice destroy us.’

For Justice is the revered ‘Vṛṣa,’ Bull; and he who commits the violation, ‘alam,’ of it, him the gods regard as ‘vṛṣala,’ low-born; hence one shall not violate Justice.—(16)

वृषलशब्दनिर्वचनेन मिथ्यादर्शी निन्द्यते । न जातिवृषलो वृषलः, किं तर्हि, यो वृषस्य कामवर्षिणो धर्मस्य अलंकुरुते । निवृत्तिवचनः अलंशब्दः । स वृषल इत्य् एतम् अर्थम् देवाः प्रतिपन्नाः । मनुष्यास् तु यदि जातिशब्दम् एव मन्यन्ते, कामं मन्यन्ताम्, प्रमाणतरास् तु देवाः । ते चानेन प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तेन वृषलशब्दप्रोयोगं मन्यन्ते । देवग्रहणम् अर्थवादः । तस्मात् “श्राद्धकाले वृषलैर् न प्राप्तव्यम्”, “हन्तव्यो वृषलश् चौरः,” इत्याद्यासु क्रियासु मिथ्यादर्शी ब्राह्मण एव वृषलशब्देन ग्रहीतव्य इति । अतो वृषलत्वं मा प्रापम् इति धर्मं न लोपयेत्, न नाशयेद् इति । वृषलत्वाध्यारोपो निन्दा ॥ ८.१६ ॥

By means of the explanation of the term ‘vṛṣala,’ the judge who perverts justice is censured. The title of ‘vṛṣala’ (low-born) does not apply to one who is so by caste—i.e., the śūdra,—but he who ‘commits the violation’ (‘alam’) of the Bull, ‘vṛṣa,’—i.e., he who showers all blessings;—the particle ‘alam’ denoting violation, perversion.

The opinion that such a person is ‘vṛṣala’ is held by the gods; if it is taken as denoting a caste, it may be so taken; but the gods are more authoritative, and they accept the denotation of the term as here explained.

The mention of the ‘gods’ is only a commendatory exaggeration.

For the reason here explained, in all such texts as—(a) ‘no vṛṣala should come in during the performance of a śrāddha,’ or ‘the vṛṣala thief should be killed,’—the term ‘vṛṣala’ should be taken as standing for the Brāhmaṇa that perverts truth.

Consequently one should not violate Justice, lest he become tainted with the character of the ‘vṛṣala’; the application of this character to the Brāhmaṇa being a form of deprecation.—(16)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 447), in support of the interpretation of ‘vṛṣala’ as ‘one devoid of dharma’;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (11a).

(verses 8.16-17)

Mahābhārata (Śānti, 90.16).—‘Justice is the sacred Bull, Vṛṣa; he who brings about his destruction, laya, is called the Vṛṣala; therefore one should never renounce justice.’

Do. (Anuśāsana, 173.14.16).—‘When one abandons his body, Dharma alone goes with him. Dharma is the only helper for men in the other world.’

न जातिवृषल एव वृषलः, किं तर्हि विकर्मणात्र वृषलो भवति । तथा च सति किं ब्राह्मणजातिस् ते करिष्यति व्यतिक्रमाद् अधर्मेण ग्रस्यमानस्य । यत्कारणाद् राजनियुक्तब्राह्मणोपालम्भ एवायम् ॥ ८.१६ ॥

इदम् अपरं प्रसंख्यानम् अधिकृतब्राह्मणव्यवस्थार्थम् उच्यते ।

016 For divine justice (is said to be) a bull (vrisha); that (man) who violates it (kurute ’lam) the gods consider to be (a man despicable like) a Sudra (vrishala); let him, therefore, beware of violating justice.

Morality (Justice) is the only friend who follows one even after death; everything else perishes along with the body.—(17)

भयाद् धर्मातिक्रमो न कर्तव्य इत्य् एतत् “धर्म एव हतो हन्ति” इत्य् अनेनोपदिष्टम्, स्नेहतो न कर्तव्य इत्य् अनेनोपदिश्यते । यत एकः सुहृद् धर्मः, तत्र स्नेहो भावनीयः । अन्यो ऽपि मनुष्यः सुहृत्¹⁰⁰ कार्यम् अपेक्ष्य जहाति जीवनम् । यो ऽपि स्याद् अत्यन्तमित्रं तस्यापि सौहार्दम् आ निधनात् । धर्मस् तु मृतम् अपि पुरुषम् अन्वेति । अतो न सुहृदपेक्षया मिथ्यादर्शनम् उपेक्षा वा¹⁰¹ कर्तव्या ।

• भार्या पुत्रो मित्रम् अर्थाश् च रिक्थम्

• नश्यन्त्य् एते देहनाशे नरस्य ।

• धर्मस् त्व् एको नैनम् उज्झत्य् अजस्रं

• तस्माज् जह्यात् पुत्रदारान् न धर्मम् ॥

यद् अन्यद् धर्माद् भार्यादि, तत् सर्वं शरीरेण समं सह नाशं गच्छति । धर्माद् अन्यो मृतं न परित्रातुं कश्चित् समर्थ इत्य् अतः सुहृद्बान्धवानुरोधाद् अपि धर्मो न हातव्यः ॥ ८.१७ ॥

What has been declared in verse 15 is that Morality or Justice should not be perverted, through fear; and the present verse declares that it should not be perverted through love either.

In as much as Morality (Justice) is the ‘only friend,’ it is for this that one should cultivate it. Ordinary men often abandon their friends even during life; even in the case of those that are very great friends, the friendship lasts only till death. Morality on the other hand, follows the man even when dead. Therefore even for the sake of friendship, one should not either pervert justice or connive at its perversion.

In this sense there is the following saying—‘Wife, son, friends, riches and wealth—all these are lost when the man’s body is destroyed; it is Morality alone which never abandons him; hence one might abandon his sons and wife, but never Morality.’

Everything else, in the shape of wife, son and so forth,—except Morality—perishes with the body; i.e., except Morality nothing is able to save the man on death; so that even for the sake of friends and relations, Morality should not be abandoned.—(17)

This verse is quoted in Hitopadeśa 1,59;—in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 14);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 17a);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (11a).

(verses 8.16-17)

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.16].

यतः सुहृन्मित्राद्य् अपेक्षयापि न धर्मो मोक्तव्यः । अन्यथा हि तदुपेक्षया न केवलम् अपराधिनः प्रत्यवायो ऽन्यथादर्शने, किं तर्हि —

017 The only friend who follows men even after death is justice; for everything else is lost at the same time when the body (perishes).

One quarter of the Injustice falls on the man who commits it, one quarter on the witness, one quarter on the members of the Court and one quarter on the king.—(18)

न चैषा मनिषा कर्तव्या- “अर्थिना प्रत्यर्थिना वान्यतरस्य भूम्याद्य् अपह्रियते स एव भूम्यपहारदोषभाग् भविष्यति । वयं तु तदकारिणः किम् इति दोषवन्तः स्याम” यतस् तत् पापं चतुर्धा विभज्यते । अर्थवादश् चायम् । न ह्य् अन्यकृतस्यैनसो ऽन्यत्र गमनम् अस्ति । तेषाम् अपि मिथ्यादर्शननिषेधातिक्रमाद् उत्पद्यते पापं मिथ्यालम्बनम्, राज्ञः स्वयम् अपश्यतो ऽप्य् अधिकृतराजस्थानीयादिदोषाद् दोषवत्त्वम् । यदि वा¹⁰² राजाधिकृतो मिथ्याचरितेन ज्ञापितः, पराजितं दुष्टं न निगृह्णीते न च पुनः सम्यक् निर्णयं करोति, ततः सो ऽपि पापभाग् भवति । अधिकृतोपलक्षणार्थं वा राजग्रहणम् । यदा राजा स्वयं मिथ्या पश्यति तदा दुष्यति । यदा राजस्थानीयस् तदा तस्य दोष इत्य् अर्थः ॥ ८.१८ ॥

The judges should not entertain any such idea as the following—‘Between the plaintiff and the defendant, one or the other is taking what belongs to the other,—so that he will incur the sin of wrongful possession of the land,—we are not committing the act,—why then should we be participators in the sin?’ Because as a matter of fact, the said sin is divided into four parts.

This verse is a purely supplementary exaggeration; because in reality the sin committed by one man does not go to another. What happens then is that on the judges also falls the sin of transgressing the law that forbids unjust decisions. On the king, though he does not personally investigate the case, there does fall the sin resulting from the sinful act of the judges appointed by him and acting as his representatives. Or if, on being apprised, by the defeated party, of the unfair dealings of the authorised judges, he does not punish the dishonest officer, and does not take steps to come to a just decision, then also he becomes a participator in the sin. Or, the ‘King’ in the text may be taken as standing for the judge appointed by him; the sense being that when the king himself decides the case wrongly, the sin falls upon him, whereas when his representative does so, the sin falls upon the latter.—(18)

‘Sabhāsadaḥ’—‘People assembled in Court’ (Kullūka and Rāghavānanda)‘Judges’ (Govindarāja).

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2.305), to the effect that in the case of miscarriage of justice, every one of those persons should be punished;—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 15);—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 5a).

Baudhāyana (1.19.8).—‘Of injustice in decisions, one quarter falls on the party in the cause, one quarter on his witnesses, one quarter on all the judges, and one quarter on the King.’

Gautama (13.11).—‘If the sacred law or the rules are violated, the guilt falls on the witnesses, the Assessors, the King, and the offender.’

Nārada (3.12).—‘One quarter of the iniquity goes to the offender, one quarter goes to the witness; one quarter goes to all the members of the Court; one quarter goes to the King.’

Hārīta (Vyavahāratattva).—‘Of injustice, one quarter falls on the perpetrator, one quarter on the witness, one quarter on all the members of the Court and one quarter on the King.’

यतो नैवम् उपेक्षा कर्तव्या, “कर्ता साक्षिणो वा दोषेण संबध्यन्ते, किम् अस्माकम् उदासीनानां भविष्यति” इति । असम्यग्व्यवहारदर्शने हि सर्वत्रैनो विभज्यते । यद्य् अपि चैनसो ऽन्येन कृतस्य विभागो नास्ति, दोषसंबन्धार्थवादस् त्व् अनेन न्यायेन प्रदर्श्यते असम्यग्दर्शननिवृत्त्यर्थम् ॥ ८.१८ ॥

018 One quarter of (the guilt of) an unjust (decision) falls on him who committed (the crime), one quarter on the (false) witness, one quarter on all the judges, one quarter on the king.

Where, however, the person deserving of censure is actually censured, there the king becomes sinless, the members of the court become freed, and the sin falls upon the perpetrator.—(19)

एष एवार्थो विपर्ययेणोच्यते । यत्र दोषवान् दोषं गोपयितुं न लभते प्रकटीक्रियते तदीयो दोषः, तत्र सर्वं साधु संपद्यत इति । “यत्र धर्मः” (म्ध् ८.१४) इत्य् अत आरभ्य मिथ्यादर्शनोपेक्षणप्रतिषेधार्थं निन्दाप्रशंसाभ्यां शुभाशुभफलदर्शनार्था अर्थवादाः ॥ ८.१९ ॥

The same idea is stated conversely.

Where the guilty person is not able to hide his guilt, and his guilt is duly exposed, then everything turns out to be right.

From verse 14 onwards we have a set of supplementary exaggerations, containing praises and condemnations indicating the good and bad results,—put forward for the purpose of forbidding the actual committing of injustice, as also the conniving at it (being committed by others).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 604);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 26), to the effect that the king becomes absolved from all sin if he shows complete impartiality;—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200) which adds the following notes:—‘Kartāram’ means the ‘speaker’, the perjuror,—the term ‘rājā’ here stands for the Judge, —‘anenāḥ’ means ‘free from sin’;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 48);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 5a).

Nārada (3.13).—‘The King is freed from responsibility, the members of the Court obtain their absolution, and the guilt rests on the offender,—when the guilty person is punished.’

Bodhāyana (1.19.8).—‘When he who deserves condemnation is condemned, the King is guiltless and the judges free from blame; the guilt falls on the offender alone.’

Hārita( Vyavahāratattva).—(Same as Manu.)

एवं सम्यग्व्यवहारदर्शने,सर्वम् इदं साधु संपद्यत इति अर्थप्राप्तो ऽप्य् अयम् अर्थो वाक्यस्वाभाव्याद् अनूद्यते ॥ ८.१९ ॥

019 But where he who is worthy of condemnation is condemned, the king is free from guilt, and the judges are saved (from sin); the guilt falls on the perpetrator (of the crime alone).

Even a so-called Brāhmaṇa, who makes a living by his caste only, may, at pleasure be the propounder of the Law for the king,—but not a Śūdra under any circumtsances.—(20)

उक्तं ब्राह्मणैः सह धर्मनिर्णयं कुर्यात्, मन्त्रिभिश् च मन्त्रज्ञैः । तत्र मन्त्रिणां जातेर् अविशेषितत्वाच् छूद्रा अपि सभां प्रविष्टा मन्त्रित्वाद् अनुज्ञातव्यवहारनिर्णयास् तद्रता धर्मव्यवस्थां कथंचित् संस्कृतबुद्धयो ब्रूयुः । न च सर्वत्र व्यवहारे स्मृतिशास्त्रपरिज्ञानम् उपयुज्यते, येन तदभावाद् अर्थलुप्तत्वाद् अनर्थकः शूद्रप्रतिषेध आशङ्क्येत । तथा हि जयपराजयकारणानि लौकिकप्रमाणवेद्यान्य् एव साक्ष्यादीनि, अयं साक्षी धार्मिको न चैतस्य केनचित् संबन्धेन संबन्धी । अयं त्व् असाक्ष्य् असकृद् दृष्टव्यभिचारत्वाद् इत्य् एवमादि शक्यते व्युत्पन्नबुद्धिना स्वयम् उत्प्रेक्षितुं न स्मृतिशास्त्रैकगोचरः¹⁰³ । अतः प्राप्तस्य प्रतिषेधो ऽयं । न च मन्त्रित्वे पुरोहितवज् जातिनियमः । तथा हि “तैः सार्धं चिन्तयेत्” (म्ध् ७.५६) इत्य् उक्त्वा ततो ब्राह्मणेन सह चिन्तयेद् इति (म्ध् ७.५८) । तेनायम् अर्थो यद्य् अपि कथंचिच् छूद्रो न्यायलेशात् समधिगच्छेत् तथापि राजाधिकरणे विवदतो मन्त्री निग्रहाधिकृतो वा न किंचित् प्रब्रूयात् । पूर्वश्लोकार्धः प्रतिषेधशेषतया¹⁰⁴ व्याख्येयः । न हि जातिमात्रोपजीविनो वैदुष्यादिगुणरहितस्य धर्मप्रवक्तृत्वनियोगः शक्यो वक्तुं तस्यैव रूपपरीक्षायां “तस्माद् विषं भक्षय मा चास्य गृहे भुङ्क्था” इतिवत् प्रतिषेधशेषभूतम् इदम् अनुज्ञानं न पुनर् अनुज्ञानम् एव । अत एव कामम् इत्य् आह । कामशब्दप्रयोगे हि विधित्वं व्याहन्यते ।

अन्ये तु ब्रुवते । ब्राह्मणस्य प्रवक्तृत्वविधानात् तदा नियोज्यो विद्वान् स्याद् ब्राह्मण इति क्षत्रियादयस् त्रयो ऽपि वर्णा निषिद्धास् तत्रेह पुनः शूद्रप्रतिषेधो विद्वद्ब्राह्मणाभावे क्षत्रियवैशयोर् अभ्यनुज्ञानार्थ इति । शेषं समानम् ।
जातिमात्रम् उपजीवतीति मात्रशब्दो ऽवधारणे । ब्राह्मणजातिम् एव केवलाम् उपाश्रित्य जीवति नाध्ययनादीन् गुणविशेषान् निर्गुणत्वात् । ब्रुवशब्दः कुत्सायाम् ॥ ८.२० ॥

It has been said above (under verse 10) that the king shall decide cases helped by Brāhmaṇas and by three men well versed in council. Now, in as much as the caste of these councillors has not been specified, it might so happen that Śūdras might enter the Court, and being ‘councillors,’ it would be permissible for them to decide cases, and being possessed of cultured minds, they might pronounce their opinions on matters relating to the Law; specially in all legal proceedings a knowledge of Smṛti-texts is not essential, on account of not possessing which the Śūdra could be precluded from pronouncing judgments. As a matter of fact, grounds of victory and defeat (in legal proceedings),—such as witnesses and other kinds of evidence—are such as are amenable to the ordinary means of knowledge. For instance, a man possessed of cultivated intelligence can easily find out that ‘such and such a person is a right witness, and not related, by any relationship, to the party citing him,’ or that ‘such another person is not a right witness, having several times been found to have lied’; and such matters are not cognisable means of Smṛti-texts only.

Thus then the present verse contains the prohibition of a possible contingency.

Nor is there any definite rule regarding the caste of the ‘Councillor,’ as there is in regard to that of the ‘Priest’; e.g., having declared that ‘he shall with them (the Councillors) consider the questions, etc., etc.’ (7.56), the text does not say that ‘he shall consider these, with the Brāhmaṇas.’ Thus the the meaning of the verse comes to be this—‘even though a Śūdra might learn up hits of Law, and be a Councillor or an officer for inflicting punishments, yet he shall not pronounce any opinion on the merits of cases being investigated in the King’s Court.’

What is said in the first half of the verse is to be explained as supplementary to the above prohibition. Because it cannot be asserted, in any case, that the Brāhmaṇa, who makes a living by his caste and is entirely devoid of learning and other qualifications, should be a propounder of the Law. Hence, when we come to examine its exact significance and form, the affirmation (contained in the first half of the verse) is found to stand on the same footing as the assertion ‘eat poison, but do not eat in his house,’ where also the affirmation (‘eat poison’) is supplementary to the prohibition, and not a real affirmation at all.

It is for this reason that the author has added the term ‘kāmam,’ ‘may, at pleasure;’ the very use of this term deprives the sentence of its injunctive character.

Other people offer the following explanation:—“Inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇa has been specifically declared to be employed as the Propounder of the Law, in such texts as—‘the learned Brāhmaṇa shall be appointed, etc.,’—this in itself excludes all the other three castes, the Kṣatriya and the rest; so that what the prohibition of the Śūdra in the present verse means is that in the absence of Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya may he appointed (hut never the Śūdra).” The rest of it they explain, as above.

‘Who makes a living by his caste only;’—the term ‘mātra,’ ‘only,’ has a restrictive force; the meaning being ‘he who lives only on the strength of his Brāhmaṇa-caste, and not by learning and other qualities, being absolutely devoid of all Brāhmaṇical qualifications.

The term ‘bruva,’ ‘so-called,’ is deprecatory.—(20)

‘Brāhmaṇabruvaḥ’—‘One whose origin is doubtful, but who calls himself a Brāhmaṇa’ (’Kullūka and Rāghavānanda);—‘despicable Brāhmaṇa’ (Medhātithi and Govindarāja);—‘an initiated Brāhmaṇa who does not study the Veda’ (Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 601);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 22);—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200), which supplies the definition of ‘brāhmaṇabruvaḥ’ as ‘the Brāhmaṇa who neither studies nor teaches (the Veda)—in Kṛtyakalpataru (9a);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 11a).

(verses 8.20-21)

Śukranīti (4.5.27).—‘If the Brāhmaṇa he not learned enough, the King should appoint a Kṣatriya or Vaiśya learned in the legal law;—but he shall always avoid the Śūdra.’

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 601).—(Same as Manu.)

Vyāsa (Vyavahāratattva).—‘If the King, leaving the twice-born, tries law-suits with the assistance of Śūdras, he falls.’

राजाधिकृतविद्वद्ब्राह्मणाभावे सति तत्र शास्त्रवित् क्षत्रियवैश्याधिकारार्थो ऽयम् आरम्भः । न जातिमात्रोपजीविनः । कथं कृत्वा । उक्तं हि “तदा नियुञ्ज्याद् विद्वांसं ब्राह्मणं कार्यदर्शने” इति । अत्र ब्राह्मणग्रहणं वर्णत्रयपर्युदासार्थम् इत्य् उक्तम् । एवं च सति तत्प्रतिषेधाद् एव शूद्रप्रतिषेधे सिद्धे पुनः शूद्रप्रतिषेध इह क्रियमाणः क्षत्रियवैश्याभ्यनुज्ञानार्थो विज्ञायते । यस्माद् अकृतकारि हि शास्त्रम् एवं युक्त्यारम्भम् अयुक्तारम्भः भवति । अन्यथा पौनरुक्त्यायुक्त्यारम्भः स्यात् । न च शास्त्रविद्ब्राह्मणाभावे तदभाववैकल्पिकम् अर्थलोपात् जातिमात्रोपजीविनम् अविद्वद्ब्राह्मणम् असमर्थं व्यवहारदर्शने शास्त्रम् अधिकर्तुम् अर्हति । न हि कश्चिल् लोके ऽन्धो रूपदर्शने ऽधिकरोति । एवं च सति नायम् अभाववैकल्पिको ब्राह्मणः । किं तर्हि पर्युदासार्थम् एवेदं वचनं जातिमारोपजी[विनः] । तथा च लोक उभयप्रतिषेध इत्थंभूतेषु वाक्येषु दृश्यते- “कामं विषम् अपि भक्षय, मा चास्य गृहे भुङ्क्थाः” इति । यत् एवम् उभयप्रतिषेधात् क्षत्रियवैश्याभ्यनुज्ञेयम् इति ॥ ८.२० ॥

एवं च सति —

020 A Brahmana who subsists only by the name of his caste (gati), or one who merely calls himself a Brahmana (though his origin be uncertain), may, at the king’s pleasure, interpret the law to him, but never a Sudra.

The kingdom or that king for whom the investigation of Law is done by a Śūdra, while he himself is looking on, suffers, like the cow in a morass.—(21)

पूर्वविधिशेषो ऽयम् अर्थवादः । यस्य राज्ञः शूद्रो धर्मविवेचनं धर्मनिर्णयं करोति, तस्य सीदति नश्यति राष्ट्रं प्रजाः, कर्दमे गौर् इव ॥ ८.२१ ॥

This is a supplementary declaration to the foregoing Injunction.

The construction is—That king for whom the ‘investigation of law’—i.e., decision on legal cases—is made by a Śūdra duly qualified by learning, etc.,—his kingdom,—people, subjects—‘suffers’—is destroyed—‘like the cow in a morass;’—‘paśyataḥ’—‘while he is looking on.’—(21)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 601);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (9b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 11a).

**(verses 8.20-21)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.20].

[यस्य शूद्रस् तु कुरुते] राज्ञो धर्मविवेचनम् ।

ब्राह्मणाधिकारस्थाने,

तस्य सीदति तद्राष्ट्रं पङ्के गौर् इव पश्यतः ॥ ८.२१ ॥

क्षत्रियवैश्यनियोगस्तुत्यर्थो ऽयं शूद्रप्रतिषेध्[अः । तद्विषयम् एवेदम् अप्य् उ]क्तम् —

021 The kingdom of that monarch, who looks on while a Sudra settles the law, will sink (low), like a cow in a morass.

That kingdom where there is a majority of Śūdras, which is infested with non-believers and destitute of twice-born people, quickly perishes entirely, becoming afflicted by famine and disease.—(22)

अयम् अपि पूर्ववद् अर्थवाद एव । प्रकरणाच् च शूद्रभूयिष्ठता विवादनिर्णये तु¹⁰⁵ शूद्रविषया द्रष्टव्या । यत्र शूद्रा भूयांसो विवादनिर्णयकारास् तद् राष्ट्रम् आशु विनश्यति दुर्भिक्षव्याधिपीडाभिः । राष्ट्रनाशे च राष्ट्रपतेर् नाश इत्य् उक्तं भवति । नास्तिकाक्रान्तम् इति दृष्टान्तः । यथा नास्तिकैः परलोकापवादिभिर् लोकायतिकाद्यैर् आक्रान्तम् अधिष्ठितम् अतश् च

अद्विजम् । न हि नास्तिकानां ब्राह्मणादिभेदो यथार्थः संकीर्णत्वात् । तद् उक्तं वैद्यवणिग्व्यपदेशादिवद् ब्राह्मणादयः । यत्र वा धर्मसंकटे तु न द्विजाः प्रमाणीक्रियन्ते तद् अद्विजम् ॥ ८.२२ ॥

Like the preceding verse this also is a supplementary declaration.

From the context it is clear that ‘the majority of Śūdras’ is meant with reference to the persons pronouncing judgments upon disputed cases; and the meaning is that—‘where among persons deciding cases there is a majority of Śūdras, such a kingdom perishes quickly, through sufferings caused by famine and disease’; and it follows that from the destruction of the kingdom follows that of the king also.

‘Infested with non-believers,’—i.e., inhabited by such persons as are materialists, denying the existence of other worlds.

‘Destitute of twice-born people’;—‘non-believers’ cannot be regarded as a class distinct from that of Brāhmaṇa and the rest; as that would lead to a cross-division; as has been declared thus—‘Brāhmaṇas and the rest come to hear the titles of physicians, traders and so forth.’ Or, the expression ‘destitute of twice-born people’ may be taken to mean ‘where twice-born persons are not consulted and trusted in connection with difficulties relating to the Law.’—(22)

‘Śūdrabhūyiṣṭham’—‘Where Śūdras form a majority among judges’ (Medhātithi);—‘where Śūdras, i. e., disbelievers, form the majority of inhabitants’ (Kullūka);—‘where Śūdras form the majority among holders of high office’ (Nandana).

Medhātithi does not explain ‘Śūdra’ here as ‘unbelievers’; he has been misrepresented by Hopkins.

शूद्रभूयिष्ठम् इति धर्मानुशासितृशूद्रभूयिष्ठम् इत्य् अर्थः । एतत्साम्[अर्थ्यात् तद्]राष्ट्रं नास्तिकाक्रान्तं भवति । अत्र कारणं वक्ति । यस्माद् अद्विजप्रायं धर्मानुशासितृब्राह्मणरहितम् । युक्तं चैतद् । ईदृग् राष्ट्रं विनश्यति । अयम् अपि श्लोकः पूर्ववत् क्षत्रियवैश्यनियोगस्तुत्यर्थः । न तु जातिमात्रनियोगसुत्यर्थ इत्य् उक्तम् । यदा निराकुलो राजा स्वयं व्यवहारं द्रष्टुम् इच्छति, तदा —

022 That kingdom where Sudras are very numerous, which is infested by atheists and destitute of twice-born (inhabitants), soon entirely perishes, afflicted by famine and disease.

Having occupied the Judgment-seat, with his body covered and mind collected, he shall salute the Guardian-Deities, and then proceed with the investigation of suits.—(23)

धर्मः प्रधानः यस्मिन्न् आसने भवति तद् धर्मासनम् । राजासने हि राज्यस्थित्यानुगुण्येनार्थम् एव प्रधानीकरोति न्यक्कृत्यापि धर्मम् । व्यवहारनिर्णये तु धर्मम् एव प्रधानं आश्रयेद् इत्य् अर्थः, न पुनर् आश्रयभेदो ऽनेन ज्ञाप्यते । संवीताङ्गः वस्त्रादिना स्थगितसरीरः । प्रणम्य लोकपालेभ्य इन्द्राद्यष्टौ लोकपालास् तान् नमस्कृत्य कार्यदर्शनम् आरभेतेत्य् अदृष्टार्थम् एतद् द्वयम् अङ्गसंवरणं लोकपालप्रणामश् च । समाहितः अनन्यचित्तः कार्यदर्शने । एवं हि दृष्टार्थं भवति । प्रणामविशेषणं वा समाहितग्रहणम् । यद्य् अप्य् अत्र किंचिद् उक्तम् एव प्रतिभाति तथापि पद्यग्रन्थत्वान् नातीव पौनरुक्त्यम् । लोकपालेभ्य इति चतुर्थी संप्रदाने । कथं । क्रियाग्रहणं संप्रदानसूत्रे चोदितम् “श्राद्धाय निगृह्णते” “पत्ये शेते” (पत् इ- ३३०) इत्याद्यर्थम् । न च क्रियाग्रहणं गृह्णात्यादिविषयम् एव, भाष्ये ऽनुक्तत्वात् ॥ ८.२३ ॥

‘Judgment-seat,’— that seat upon which the pronouncing of judgments is the principal work done. When he is seated upon his royal throne, the king regards ‘wealth’ as conducive to the prosperity of the kingdom, to be the most important matter, even in preference to ‘morality’; but when he is engaged in deciding suits, he regards ‘morality’ or ‘Justice’ as the most important thing;—this is what is implied by the name ‘judgement-seat,’ which does not mean that ‘morality’ or ‘Justice’ is a quality of the ‘scat.’

‘With his body covered,’—i.e., having his body covered up with cloth and such other things.

‘He shall salute the guardian-deities,’—how down to the eight ‘Guardians of the People, Indra and the rest’;—‘he shall proceed with the investigation of suits.’

These two acts—covering up of the body and saluting the Guardian deities—are laid down with a view to some transcendental result.

‘With mind collected,’— with his mind concentrated, hot turning towards any other thing. This serves a visible purpose.

Or, the phrase ‘with collected mind’ may be taken as modifying the verb ‘salute.’

Though what is asserted here appears to have been already said before, yet, in as much as the treatise is a metrical one, repetition cannot he very strongly objected to.

In ‘Lokapālebhyaḥ’ ‘to the Guardian Deities,’ the Dative ending denotes the recipient of a gift; since under the Sutra dealing with the Dative, it has been held (by the Vārtika) that that also is a ‘recipient’ for whose sake a certain act is done; e.g., ‘śrāddhāya nigṛhṇate’ (‘He keeps himself in check for the sake of the performance of Śrāddhas’), ‘patye shete’ (‘Lies down for the sake of her husband’). Nor can the said assertion he regarded as restricted to the two roots here mentioned (in the two examples); as no such restriction is mentioned in the Bhāṣya.— (23)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 41) in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, pp. 2a and 5b);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 70);—and by Jimūtavāhana (Dāyabhāga, p. 4a).

Bṛhaspati (1.21-23).—‘The King having risen early in the morning and performed ablutions according to rule, and having shown due honour to elders, astronomers, physicians, deities, Brāhmaṇas and domestic priests,—should enter the Court-room, decorated with flowers, ornaments and fine clothes, with a cheerful countenance. Having entered the Court in the forenoon, together with the elders, ministers and attendants, he should try cases and listen to the exposition of Purāṇas, Law-Codes and Rules of Policy.’

Śukranīti (4.5.85-87).—‘The King should enter the Court modestly, together with the Brāhmaṇas and the Ministers versed in state-craft, with the object of investigating cases. He should proceed with the work after taking the seat of justice.’

Saṃvarta (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra).—‘Bowing to the Guardians of the Regions, the King shall enter the splendid Court and carry on the work of protecting the people by looking into their suits.’

धर्मार्थम् आसनं धर्मासनम् । तत्रोपविश्य संवीताङ्ग इत्य् अनुवादात् विनीतवेषाभरणत्वस्यापूर्वगुणसंबन्धेन । समाहितो व्यवहारदर्शने । प्रणम्य लोकपालेभ्यः सभालेख्यस्थेभ्यः स्वस्थानेभ्यो वा वाङ्मनसाभ्यां कार्यदर्शनम् आरभेत् । व्यवहारदिदृक्षोर् दृष्टार्थो ऽयं विधिर् निर्देशो नृपतेः, अदृष्टार्थो वा शास्त्रस्यार्थवत्त्वाय ॥ ८.२३ ॥

023 Having occupied the seat of justice, having covered his body, and having worshipped the guardian deities of the world, let him, with a collected mind, begin the trial of causes.

Understanding both ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ to be only ‘Justice’ and ‘Injustice,’ he shall look into all the suits of the suitors, according to the order of the castes.—(24)

धर्माधर्मव् एव केवलाव् अर्थानर्थौ- न गोहिरण्यादिलाभो ऽर्थस् तद्विपर्ययो वानर्थः । किं तर्हि, धर्म एवार्थो ऽनर्थश् चाधर्म इति बुद्ध्वा हृदि निश्चित्य कार्याणि पश्येत् । अथ वार्थानर्थाव् अपि बोद्धव्यौ धर्माधर्माव् अपि । धर्मस्य सारता बोद्धव्यार्थस्य फल्गुता । अथ वा यत्र महान् अनर्थः स्वल्पश् चाधर्मस् तत्रानर्थं परिहरेत् । शक्यो हि महतार्थेनेषद् अधर्मो दानप्रायश्चित्तादिना निराकर्तुम् । संनिपाते च व्यवहारिणां बहूनां वर्णक्रम आश्रयितव्यः । एष च दर्शने क्रमो वर्णानां यदा सर्वेषां¹⁰⁶ तुल्यपीडा भवति । यदा त्व् अवरवर्णस्याप्य् आत्ययिकं कार्यं महद् वा तदा “यस्य चात्ययिका पीडा” इत्य् अनेन न्यायेन तद् एव प्रथमं पश्येत् न क्रमम् आद्रियेत । राज्यस्थित्यर्थो हि व्यवहारनिर्णय इत्य् उक्तम् अतो न यथाश्रुतम् आश्रयणीयम् ॥ ८.२४ ॥

‘Justice and Injustice’ alone are desirable and undesirable. It is not that the ‘desirable’ consists in the obtaining of cattle, gold and other things, or that the ‘undesirable’ in the reverse thereof; in fact it is ‘Justice’ that is ‘desirable’ and ‘Injustice’ that is ‘undesirable’;—‘understanding’ this—i.e., having come to this conclusion in his mind,—‘he shall look into the suits.’

Or, the text may mean that the king shall examine what is ‘desirable,’ and what is ‘undesirable,’—and also what is ‘Justice’ and what is ‘Injustice.’ That is, he should realise the importance of ‘Justice’ and the unimportance of what is merely ‘desirable;’ or that when the element of ‘undesirability’ is very large, and that of ‘Injustice’ very small,—there he shall avoid the former; because it is possible for a slight ‘Injustice’ to be set aside by the larger ‘desirable’ factor through gifts and expiatory rites.

In the event of several suitors coming up at the same time, he shall take them up in the order of their castes; but this order of investigation based upon castes is to be observed only when the troubles of all the suitors are of the same degree; when, on the other hand, the business of the lower caste is very urgent or very important, then this should he taken up first, in accordance with the maxim ‘he whose trouble is urgent, etc., etc.’; and in this case the order of the castes is not to be strictly observed. It has already been said that the investigation of cases is for the purpose of maintaining order in the kingdom; so that the rules laid down need not always be followed literally.—(24)

‘Arthānarthāvubhau buddhvā dharmādharmau ca kevalau’—Medhātithi has given three explanations of this (See Translation):—‘Fully realizing the wordly evils and advantages, but paying due heed to Dharma and Adharma as alone conducive to spiritual results’ (Kullūka);—‘discriminating the righteous and the unrighteous, and taking up the righteous first’ (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana);—‘knowing what will please and what displease the people and understanding what is just and what is unjust’ (Govindarāja).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 46), as laying down the order in which the king is to take up the cases, when several come up at the same time;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 80);—in Kṛtyakalpataru, (16b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 19a).

Śukranīti (4.5.113-117).—‘The King with the Ministers after receiving the plaintiff duly should first console him and then commence the trial, he should then enquire of the plaintiff standing submissively before him —What is your business? What is your complaint? Do not be afraid—by what ruffian and under what circumstances hare you been molested?’

Bṛhaspati (1.24).—‘Let the King, or a member of the twice-born caste officiating as Chief-Judge, try causes, acting on principles of equity, and abiding by the opinion of the judges, and by the doctrine of the sacred law.’

Nārada (1.31, 31, 35).—‘A King who acts justly must reject error when brought forward, and seek truth alone; because prosperity depends on the discharge of duty. Therefore let a King, after having seated himself on the seat of judgment, be equitable towards all beings, discarding selfish interests and acting the part of Yama Vaivasvata. Attending to the dictates of the Law, and adhering to the opinion of the Chief-Judge, he should try causes in due order, exhibiting great care.’

Bṛhaspati (Parāśaramādhava- Vyasa, p. 46).—‘Where two complainants arrive accusing each other and claiming the first hearing, the King shall admit them, either in the order of their castes, or in accordance with the comparative seriousness of the complaints.’

Kātyāyana (Do.).—‘Between two mutual complainants, that man should be treated as the plaintiff whose hurt or complaint is more serious,—and not necessarily the man who appears first before the court.’

Nārada (Do.).—(Same as Kātyāyana.)

राष्ट्रसंप्रसादकोपाव् अर्थानर्थौ राज्यतन्त्रानुकूलप्रतिकूलौ, परत्र च धर्माधर्मौ दृष्टानपेक्षौ संपश्येत्, कार्यदर्शनम् आचरेत् । यद् वा अर्थानर्थौ वैरानुबन्धेतरनिमित्तौ बुद्ध्वेति । संनिपाते च व्यवहाराणां वर्णक्रमेणाश्रयेत् । पश्येत् कार्याणि कार्यिणाम् इत्य् उक्तम्- तत् पुनर् व्यवहारदर्शनम् अनुमानतो विशेषेण, यतस् तदर्थम् अभिधीयते —

024 Knowing what is expedient or inexpedient, what is pure justice or injustice, let him examine the causes of suitors according to the order of the castes (varna).

He shall discover the internal disposition of men by external signs: by variations in their voice, colour and aspect, as also by means of the eye and by gestures.—(25)

तथा चेदम् आह । अनुमानेनापि सत्यानृतवादिता व्यवहारतः साक्षिणां च निश्चेतव्या इति श्लोकार्थः । अतश् च स्वरादिग्रहणं प्रदर्शनार्थम् । तेन यन् निश्चितलिङ्गं¹⁰⁷ तेन परिच्छिन्द्याद् इत्य् उक्तं भवति, न पुनः स्वरादिभिर् एव, सव्यभिचारित्वात् तेषाम् । अनुचितसभाप्रेवेशा हि महाप्रकृतिदर्शनेन सत्यकारिणो ऽपि स्वभावतो विक्रियन्ते । प्रगल्भास् तु संवृताकारा भवन्ति । स्वरश् च वर्णश् चेङ्गितं च स्वरवर्णेङ्गितानि, तेषाम् आकाराः स्वरवर्णेङ्गिताकाराः । आकारो विकारः । स्वाभाविकानां हि स्वरादीनाम् अन्यथात्वम् । तैर् विभावयेन् निश्चिनुयात् । भावम् अभिप्रायम् अन्तर्गतं मनुष्याणां विवादिसाक्ष्यादीनाम् । तत्र स्वरस्य विकारो वाचि गद्गदरुदितादि । वर्णस्य गात्ररूपविपर्ययादि । इङ्गितं स्वेदवेपथुरोमाञ्चादि । चक्षुषा संभ्रमक्रोधदृष्टिपातेन । चेष्टितेन हस्तनिक्षेपभ्रूविक्षेपादिना¹⁰⁸ । स्वसंवेदम्¹⁰⁹ चैतत्, यद् गूह्यमानम् अप्य् अभिप्रायं स्वरादयः प्रकाशयन्ति निपुणतो लक्ष्यमाणाः । यतः प्रसिद्धम् एतेषां गूड्ःआभिप्रायप्रकटनसामर्थ्यम् ॥ ८.२५ ॥

What the verse means is that in course of the investigations the veracity or otherwise of witnesses should he found out by means of Inference also;—and the mention of ‘voice,’ etc., is only by way of illustration; what the meaning therefore is, is that it shall be ascertained by means of such sure indiations as may be possible, and not necessarily only by ‘voice’ and other things mentioned here; for the simple reason that these latter are not always infallible; e.g., in many cases persons who are not used to the presence of great men become flurried, even though they be quite truthful; while those that are pert manage to hide their real feelings.

The compound ‘svaravarṇeṅgitākāraiḥ’ is to be expounded as—by the ākāra—variations in—their ‘svara,’ ‘voice’—‘varṇa’ ‘colour’—and ‘iṅgita,’ ‘aspect’;—the ‘change’ referred to being modifications undergone by men’s ordinary ‘voice’ and the rest

By means of these he shall ‘discover’—ascertain—the ‘internal disposition’— intention—‘of men’— of suitors and witnesses.

The ‘change of voice’ occurs in the form of faltering, being choked with tears and so forth;—that of ‘colour’ in the form of sudden changes of complexion and so forth;—that of ‘aspect’ in the shape of perspiration, trembling, thrilling of hairs and so forth.

‘By means of the eye’;—i.e., by suddenly casting on them an angry look.

‘By gestures,’—i.e., by the movement of the hands, the eye-brows and so forth.

It is a fact of common experience that voice and the rest, if carefully watched, disclose the most hidden feelings;—the fact of these being indicative of hidden feelings being well known among men, as we find in ordinary experience.—(25)

‘Iṅgita’—‘Perspiring, trembling, horripilation and so forth’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Rāghavānanda);—‘casting down the eyes &c,’ (Kullūka);—‘aimlessly moving about the arms &c.’ (Nārāyaṇa).

‘Ākāra’—‘Manner’ compounded with ‘svara-varṇa-iṅgita’ collectively, (Medhātithi and Rāghavānanda);—‘aspect, e.g., pallor, horripilation, sweating’ (Govindarāja, Kullūka, and Nārāyaṇa) who take the term independently—copulatively compounded with ‘svara’ &c.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 620);—in Smṛtitattva (p. II, 218),… which adds the following notes:—‘Svara,’ such as choking voice,—‘varṇa,’ abnormal pallor and so forth,—‘iṅgita,’ i. e., sweating, trembling and horripilation—‘ākāra,’ disfigurement,—‘cakṣuṣ,’ timid, or piteous look,—‘ceṣṭita,’ the manner of standing and moving. It adds that all these, being uncertain indications, have to be regarded as inferior to witnesses and other kinds of direct evidence;—in

Kṛtykalpataru, (21b), which has the following notes:—‘Vibhāvayet,’ determine, ascertain,—‘bhāvam,’ motive, intention, ‘nṛṇām,’ of the two parties and of the witnesses,—‘ākāra’ transformation in the natural voice and other things,—that of ‘svara’ appears in the form of trembling and so forth, that of ‘varṇa’ in the shape of paleness and so forth;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 30a), which adds the following notes:—‘Svara’ stands for the choking of the voice and so forth,—‘varṇa’ for the ‘darkness of complexion,’ and so forth,—‘iṅgita’ for perspiration, trembling and the like,—‘ākāra’ for the raising of the eye-brows and so forth—‘cakṣu’ for the timid look,—‘ceṣṭita’ for the listless changing of position.—(25)

(verses 8.25-26)

Nārada (6.10-11).—‘When the face changes colour, or the voice falters, or the features look suspicious, when they do not give evidence in public, when they make impossible statements as to place and time, when there are doubts regarding their place of residence, when they indulge in expense for bad purposes, when they have been previously convicted of larceny, when they keep bad company, or when documents speak against them,—they may be convicted as thieves,—not by the possession of stolen goods alone.’

Yājñavalkya (2.13-15).—‘If he shifts his position, licks the ends of his mouth, perspires in his forehead, his face becomes pale, speech is dry and halting, talks much and inconsistently, is not pleasant in the eye or in his speech, twists his lips, the natural condition of his mind, speech and body becomes changed,—such a person, whether he be a complainant or a witness, should be regarded as at fault or wicked.’

Rāmāyaṇa (Vyavahāratattva, p. 31).—‘The man cannot hide his internal feelings entirely, without showing some slight shadow of it in his external appearance; it becomes exposed even against his will.’

स्वरश् च वर्णश् चङ्गितं च स्वरवर्णेङ्गितानि । आकारः शरीरेन्द्रियवैकृत्यम् । स्वरवर्णेङ्गितानि च तान्य् आकारश् च स्वरवर्णेङ्गिताकाराः । तैः स्वरवर्णेङ्गिताकारैः सामान्यविशेषधर्मेणायं निर्देशः । तत्र वैचित्र्यम् । स्वरवैकृत्यं गद्गदादिः । वर्णो गात्ररूपविपर्ययः । लिङ्गितं स्वेदवेपथुरोमाञ्चादिः । चक्षुषा चक्षुर् विकारेण । चेष्टितेन च हस्तभ्रूविक्षेपादिना । तद् एवम् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोः साक्षिणां वानृतभावभाषितं स्वरादिविपर्ययेण प्रत्यक्षम् अपि वेदनीयं विजानीयात् । सामान्यमात्रोपदेशो ऽयम् । केचित् त्व् आहुः सव्यभिचारत्वाद् अनुमानस्य व्यवहारस्थितिः साक्षिभिः स्यात्, अविद्यमानेषु तु साक्षिष्व् अनुमानम् अप्य् आश्रयणीयम् । तद् एतद् अन्याय्यम् । यद्य् अनुमानं व्यभ्चारि दृष्टं ननु साक्षिवचनागमो ऽपि तथा दृष्टः । अथात्रविवेकयत्नान् निर्णयः । एवम् अनुमानादिष्व् अपि भविष्यति । यदि चानुमानं व्यभिचारि कथम् अविद्यमानेषु साक्षिषु तन्निर्णयार्थम् उपादेयम् इत्य् आचक्षीत । तस्माद् युक्तोपदेशम् अनुमानम् । तथा च कृत्वा व्यवहाराद् अन्यत्रापि लौकिकैः ॥ ८.२५ ॥

025 By external signs let him discover the internal disposition of men, by their voice, their colour, their motions, their aspect, their eyes, and their gestures.

The inner mind is indicated by such variations as those of aspect, gait, gesture, speech, and by changes in the eye and the face.—(26)

तथा हि, लोके¹¹⁰ दृष्टशक्तितानेन¹¹¹ श्लोकेन स्वरादीनां पूर्वोक्तार्थाधिगमेन दर्शयतीत्य् अपौनरुक्त्यम् । तत्राक्रियन्ते विक्रयन्त इत्य् आकारा इङ्गितादयः । इङ्गितं व्याख्यातम् । व्यक्तिभेदाद् बहुवचनम् । गतिः पूर्वश्लोकाद् अत्राधिका । सा प्रस्खलन्ती स्वभावतो ऽन्यथाभूता । भाषीतं पौर्वापर्यविरुद्धं वचनम् । वक्त्रविकार आस्यविशेषादिः । शेषं पूर्वश्लोक एव व्याख्यातम् । एतैर् विकृतैर् अन्तर्गतं चित्तं लौकिकैर् अन्यत्रापि गृह्यत इति समासार्थः ॥ ८.२६ ॥

What this verse does is to support, by ordinary experience, what has gone in the preceding verse; hence there is no repetition.

‘Ākāra’ is that which changes, variations; such as aspect and the rest.

‘Aspect’ has already been explained; the plural number is used in view of there being numerous individual aspects.

‘Gait,’—this is in addition to what has gone in the preceding verse; it means the ordinary gait of a man being tripped or otherwise altered.

‘Speech’—inconsistent and contradictory statements.

‘Changes in the face’—the mouth being parched and so forth.

The rest has all been explained under the previous verse.

By means of the variations of all these the innermost heart is indicated even in ordinary life; such in brief is the meaning of the verse.—(26)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 260);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 43);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 112);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (22a), which has the following notes:—‘Iṅgita’ stands for perspiration, thrilling of the hair,—‘vikāra’ of the eye, the look of love or anger,—‘ceṣṭita’, throwing about of the hand and so forth,—‘gatyā’ halting gait and so forth;—‘ceṣṭita’, inconsistent and contradictory statements,—‘vaktra vikāra’, drying of the mouth &c—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 30b).

(verses 8.25-26)

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.25].

आकरणं आकारः शरीरेन्द्रियविकरः । अस्य सामान्यवचनस्यायं विशेषः । आकारैः तैश् तद्विकारैर् इङ्गितादिभिः व्य्वहाराद् अन्यत्रापि चापराभिप्रायो लोके गृह्यते । एवं व्यवहारकाले ऽप्य् अधिकृतैर् अद्विष्टैर् अरक्तैश् च निपुणतो दत्तप्रणिधानैर् ग्राह्यम् । एवं च पूर्वश्लोकशेष एवायं विज्ञेयः ॥ ८.२६ ॥

026 The internal (working of the) mind is perceived through the aspect, the motions, the gait, the gestures, the speech, and the changes in the eye and of the face.

The king shall take care of the property owned by a minor, till such time as he may return from the teacher’s house, or till he may have passed his minority.—(27)

उच्यते । विवादपदताम् एवैतद् विषयान् निवर्तयितुम् इदम् आरभ्यते¹¹² । बालधनं राज्ञा स्वधनवत् परिपालनीयम् । अन्यथा पितृव्यादिबान्धवा मयेदं रक्षणीयं मयेदम् इति विवदेरन् । न चान्यः प्रसङ्गो ऽस्ति । आशङ्क्यमानव्यवहारवच् च । न केवलेषु राजधर्मेषूपदिश्यते अतो ऽस्मिन्न् एवावसरे वक्तव्यम्¹¹³ । बालो दायादो ऽस्य तद् इदं बालदायादिकम् । दायादः स्वाम्य् अत्रोच्यते । बालस्वामिकं धनं तावद् राजा रक्षेद् यावद् असौ समावृत्तः गुरुकुलात् प्रत्यागतः यावद् वातीतशैशवः अतिक्रान्तबालभावः । अयं च विकल्पः । यो गृहशैशवो भवति तदर्थम् अतीतशैशवम् उच्यते । यस् तु व्रतकः स निवृत्ते ऽपि शैशवे¹¹⁴ आ समावर्तनात् प्रतिपाल्यधनः स्यात् । अथ वा द्विजातीनां समावर्तनम् अवधिः, अन्येषां शैशवात्ययः ॥ ८.२७ ॥

An objection is raised—“The subject that was introduced was the investigation of suits; where then was the occasion for the protecting of the property of minors?”

Answer.—This subject has been introduced here, just with a view to show that the property of minors does not come within the scope of legal proceedings; it has to be protected by the king, like his own property; otherwise the minor’s uncles and other relatives would quarrel among themselves, each asserting—‘I shall take care of it.’ There is no connection of this subject with the present context. It has had to be introduced here,—and not along with the exclusive ‘Duties of the King,’—because in regard to this people may have the notion that even such property may form the subject of legal proceedings.

‘Bāladāyādi’—that of which a minor is the ‘dāyāda,’ i.e., owner, in which sense the term is used here. The property owned by minors shall be taken care of by the king, till such time as he may return from the teacher’s house, or till he may have passed his minority. This second alternative of passing the minority is meant for those who pass their childhood in their own home (and are not handed over to an Ācārya). In the case of one however who has entered the teacher’s house as a Religious Student, even though he may have passed his minority, his property shall have to be looked after until he returns from the teacher’s house. Or, the meaning may he that in the case of twice-born persons, the ‘return’ shall be the limit, while in that of others, it shall be the ‘passing of minority.’—(27)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 598), which explains ‘Bāladāyāgatam’ as ‘belonging to a minor’ and ‘ānupālayet’ as ‘should guard it against co-parceners’;—and in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 244).

Gautama (10.48).—‘The property of infants must be protected until they attain their majority or complete their studentship.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.8-9).—‘The King shall protect the property of persons unfit to transact business;—but when a minor comes of age, his property must be made over to him.’

Viṣṇu (3.65, Vivādaratnākara, p. 598).—‘The King shall protect the property of infants, of people without protectors and of women.’

Śaṅkha-Likhita (Do., p. 599).—‘The King shall protect the property of infants, of persons unable to transact business, and of the wives of the Vedic Scholar and the Warrior. Ownerless properties revert to the King.’

Baudhāyana (Do.).—‘Until sons are able to transact, business, they shall keep their property along with the accrued profits carefully till they attain majority.’

Agnipurāṇa (Rājadharma, 222.18-19).—(Same as Manu, reading ‘bālaputrāsu’ in place of ‘baśāputrāsu.’)

Kātyāyana (Do.).—‘If a man dies leaving an infant, son, the relations shall protect his property.’

रिक्थ] इति नित्यं धनम्, समासार्थः । एवं च सत्य् अमातृपितृको ऽयम् अनाथः सामर्थ्याद् विज्ञायते । यतस् तद्धनं तावद् राज्ञा रक्ष्यमाणं तिष्ठेत् यावद् अयं समावृत्तः । समावृत्तिस् त्व् अस्य संव्यवहारक्षमत्वोपलक्षणार्थः । एवं च सति समावृत्तम् अपि शिशुं सन्तं न प्रतिपादयेद् असमर्थम् अववित्तसं[व्यवहारे । यावद् वातीतशैशवः], असमावृत्तो ऽपि । सामर्थ्यापेक्षत्वात् प्रतिपादयेद् इत्य् उक्तम् । अनाथवित्तसंरक्षणोपदेशप्रकरणाद् इदम् अन्यम् उच्यते तद्रूपम् ॥ ८.२७ ॥

027 The king shall protect the inherited (and other) property of a minor, until he has returned (from his teacher’s house) or until he has passed his minority.

There shall be similar protection in the case of barren women, of son-less women, of women devoted to their husbands, and of widows faithful to their husbands,—when their family is extinct, and when they are in distress.—(28)

यः कश्चिद् अनाथस् तस्य सर्वस्य धनं राजा यथावत् परिरक्षेत् । तथा चोदाहरणमात्रं वशादयः । एवं प्रजापालनम् अनुष्ठितं भवति । पूर्वस् तु श्लोकः कालनियमार्थः । वशा वन्ध्या । अपुत्रा असमर्थपुत्रा अविद्यमानपुत्रा दुर्गतपुत्रा वा । वशाश् चापुत्राश् चेति द्वन्द्वः ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु च वशाप्य् अपुत्रैव ।

सत्यम् । उभयोपादानं तु सत्य् अपि भर्तरि तस्याः संरक्षणार्थम् । तस्यां ह्य् अधिविन्नायां भर्ता निरपेक्षो भवति ।
निष्कुलाग्रहणं तासां विशेषणम् । यासां न कश्चिद् देवरपितृव्यमातुलादिः¹¹⁵ परिरक्षको ऽस्ति, स्त्रीत्वाच् च स्वयम् असमर्थाः, बान्धवास् तु मत्सरिणः, तासां एतद्¹¹⁶ उच्यते । बन्धुभिर् हि स्त्रीणां शीलशरीरधनानि रक्षितव्यानि । तद् उक्तम् ।

• विनियोगो ऽस्ति रक्षासु भरणे च स ईश्वरः ।

• परिक्षीणे पतिकुले निर्मनुष्ये निराश्रये ॥

• तत्सपिण्डेषु वासत्सु पितृपक्षः प्रभुः स्त्रियाः ।

• पक्षद्वयावसाने तु राजा भर्ता प्रभुः स्त्रियाः ॥ (न्स्म् १३.२७–२९)

• या तु स्वयम् एव कथंचिच् छक्ता, न तत्र बान्धवानां व्यापारो ऽस्ति । अत एवाह- आतुरास्व् इति । असामर्थ्यम् एतेन लक्ष्यते ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्यैस् त्व् आतुरभर्तृका आतुरा व्याख्याता । अविधवापि भर्तुर् असामर्थ्याद् राज्ञैव रक्ष्या स्याद् इति । निर्मनुष्याणाम् एतत् । कुलं बन्धुजातं यासां नास्ति ताः निष्कुलाः ।

अन्ये तु कुलटां निष्कुलाम् आहुः । तासाम् अपि वेशाद्युपार्जितं धनम् अपतितानां राज्ञा रक्ष्यम् । अस्मिंश् च पक्षे स्वतन्त्रनिष्कुलाग्रहणम् ।
पतिव्रतासु विधवासु । मृतभर्तृका विधवा । धव इति भर्तृनाम । तद्विरहिता विधवा । सा¹¹⁷ चेत् पतिव्रता भवति¹¹⁸ । तदा सा रक्ष्यधना¹¹⁹ । व्यभिचाररतानां तु स्त्रीधनानर्हत्वं स्मृत्यन्तरे पठ्यते-

• अपकारक्रियायुक्ता निर्लज्जा चार्थनाशिका ।

• व्यभिचाररता या च स्त्रीधनं न तु सार्हति ॥ इति ।

तस्यास् तु निष्काशनं विहितम् । निष्काशनं च प्रधानवेश्मनो बहिरवस्थापनम्, न तु निर्वासनम् एव । यतः पतितानाम् अपि तासां गृहान्तिके वासो भकाच्छादनमात्रदानं च विहितम्-

• एवम् एव विधिं कुर्याद् योषित्सु पतितास्व् अपि ।

• वस्त्रान्नपानं देयं च वसेयुश् च गृहान्तिके ॥ (म्ध् ८.१८७)

तेन यः कश्चित् स्त्रीणां निर्वासनविधिः “स्त्रीधनं द्रव्यसर्वस्वम्” इत्यादिषु श्रूयते, स एवंविषय एव द्रष्टव्यः । तथापि याद्वद् भिक्षोत्सर्पणादिना किंचिद् अर्जितं तद् अर्हत्य् एव, न बान्धवा अपहरेयुः । इह त्व् अस्मिन्न् एव निमित्ते आधिवेदनं विहितम्, न तु स्त्रीधनापहारः । तथा ह्य् आह-

• मद्यपासाधुवृत्ता च प्रतिकूला च या भवेत् ।

• व्याधिता चाधिवेत्तव्या हिंस्रार्थघ्नी च सर्वदा ॥ (म्ध् ९.८०)

अतश् च मानवस्मृतिबलेन च “स्त्रीधनं न तु सार्हति” इत्य् एषा स्मृतिर् एव व्याख्यायते । आधिवेदनिकं स्त्रीधनम् एषा नार्हति, नैतस्यै देयम् इत्य् अर्थः । यद् उक्तम्- “अधिविन्नस्त्रियै दद्याद् आधिवेदनिकं समम्” (य्ध् २.१५२) इति, न तु प्राग्दत्तम् अस्या अपहर्तव्यम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">वयं तु ब्रूमः । पुरुषद्वेषिण्या व्यभिचाररतायाश् च युक्त एवापहारः । यत इहाप्य् उक्तम्-

• अतिक्रामेत् प्रमत्तं या मत्तं रोगार्तम् एव वा ।

• स त्रीन् मासान् परित्याज्या विभूषणपरिच्छदा ॥ (म्ध् ९.७८)

भूषणपरिच्छदैर्¹²⁰ वियुक्ता कर्तव्येत्य् अर्थः ॥ ८.२८ ॥

Whoever may be without a protector, that person’s property shall he taken care of by the king; the ‘barren’ women and the rest being mentioned only by way of illustration. It is only thus that the ‘protection of the people’ becomes accomplished. The preceding verse lays down the period of time during which the said protection of the property is necessary.

‘Vaśā’—barren woman.

‘Sonless woman’—one who has no son, or whose son is incapable, or whose son is in a bad condition.

Between vaśā and aputrā we have the copulative compound.

“The barren woman also is sonless.”

True, but both have been mentioned for the purpose of showing that even though her husband he alive, the said woman may be looked after; as on account of her being superseded (by another wife taken by her husband), her husband may neglect her.

‘Whose family is extinct’;—this is added with a view to indicate those who have no protector in the shape of husband’s younger brother, or paternal or maternal uncle, and being women, are themselves incapable of looking after their own property,—and whose other relations are jealous of her property. Otherwise, as a rule, the character and property of women should be looked after by her relations; as has been thus declared—‘On the husband lies the burden of supporting and protecting the woman, for which he is capable; when the husband’s family becomes extinct, and there is no man left and no standing, and there are no Sapiṇḍas even left, her father’s people become her protectors; when both families are extinct, the king is the supporter and protector of the woman’ (Nārada, 13-28 to 29).

When the woman herself is, somehow, capable of taking care of herself, then there is nothing done by the relations; it is in view of this that the text has added —‘of women in distress’;—this epithet indicating inability. Others have explained the term ‘women in distress’ to mean ‘those whose husbands are in distress’;—even a woman whose husband is alive becomes a tit object for the king’s care, if her husband is incapable of taking care of her. This applies to the case of women in whose family there are no men left to take care of them. The epithet ‘whose family is extinct’ thus means ‘those who have no family, i.e., relations.’

Others have explained the term ‘niṣkulā’ to mean the misbehaved woman; of those women also the property acquired by means of their beauty has to be protected by the king.

According to this explanation the term ‘niṣkulā’ has to be taken by itself (and not as qualifying the other terms).

‘Widows faithful to their husbands’;—‘vidhavā,’ ‘widow,’ is one whose husband is dead;—‘dhava’ being a synonym for ‘husband’; and she who is deprived of the dhava is ‘vidhavā,’ ‘widow.’ Till such time as she remains faithful to her husband, she deserves to have her property looked after by the king. In the event of her being unfaithful, she does not deserve to have any property at all, as we read in another Smṛti text—‘She who is bent upon doing injury, who is devoid of modesty, who wastes money, who is addicted to misconduct—such a woman does not deserve to have property.’ Such a woman is to be banished; and this ‘banishment’ shall be only in the form of being driven away from the main apartment of the home, and not in being driven away entirely; because even in the; case of such women as have become outcasts the scriptures have laid down that they shall be; provided with a separate dwelling-house, clothing and food:—‘In the case of outcast women also, this same action should be taken; clothing, food and water should be provided for them and they should live near the house.’ In view of this, wherever.we find an injunction regarding the banishment of such women,—e.g., in such texts as ‘the woman’s entire property, etc., etc.,’—the ‘banishment’ should be understood to be of the nature just explained. And she deserves to retain what she may have saved from the fond that is granted her; this the relatives shall not take away.

So far as the present treatise (of Manu) is concerned, in regard to such women what has been proscribed is supersession, and not. the confiscation of property; as has been declared (under 9.80)—^(‘)She who drinks wine, misbehaves, or is disobedient, or diseased, or mischievous, or wasteful, shall always he superseded.’ Hence on the strength of Manu’s text, the above-quoted text as to the; unfaithful wife not deserving any property has to be explained as follows:

“Such a woman shall not receive that property which she should have received on account of her super-session; that is, she shall not receive what has been enjoined as to be; given to her in the following text—‘To the superseded wife shall he given a compensation for her supersession.’ But what may have been given to her before that shall not be taken away from her.”

Our opinion however is that in the case of the woman who is inimical to her husband, or addicted to misbehaviour, confiscation of property is only right, and proper; since in Manu also (9.78) it has been declared that—‘She who disregards her husband when she is maddened, or drunk, or diseased, shall be abandoned for three months, having been deprived of her ornaments and clothes’;—i.e., she shall be deprived of her ornaments and clothes before being abandoned.—(28)

‘Niṣkulāsu’—‘Those women who have no brother-in-law, or uncle to take care of them’ (Medhātithi and

Rāghavānanda);—‘harlots’ (‘others’ in Medhātithi);—‘those maidens whose family is extinct’ (Govindarāja);—‘those who have no Sapiṇḍas’ (Kullūka).

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 512), which adds the following notes:—‘Vaśā’, barren woman,—‘aputrā’, one who has lost her son,—‘Niṣkulā’ one who has lost all her paternal and maternal relations.

Viṣṇu (3.65).—(See under 27.)

Agnipurāṇa (Rājadharma, 222.20).—(Same as Manu.)

वशा वन्द्या, अपुत्रा स्त्रीप्रजा मृतप्रजा वा उभे अपि चैते सामर्थ्याद् विधवे विज्ञेये । निष्कुला कन्याइवापितृमातृका । पतिव्रता [भर्त्रभावे ऽव्यभिचारिणी । विधवा भर्तृरहिता] । विधवापतिव्रता सामर्थ्याद् गृह्यते, प्रोषितपुत्रा वा । एतासाम् अपि यत् स्त्रीधनं भर्तृधनं वा तद् अपि राज्ञा स्वबन्धुभ्यो रक्षितव्यम् । यथा बा[लरक्थस्य तथानाथधन्]आनाम् एव च राज्ञा सामान्यतो रक्षणं कर्तव्यम् इत्य् अनुशासनम् । अनाथानां त्व् अत्र विशेषेणोपदेशो युक्त आदरार्थः ॥ ८.२८ ॥

028 In like manner care must be taken of barren women, of those who have no sons, of those whose family is extinct, of wives and widows faithful to their lords, and of women afflicted with diseases.

While these women are alive, if their relatives should appropriate their property,—on them the righteous king shall inflict the punishment of thieves.—(29)

बान्धवानां स्त्रीधनम् अपहरताम् अयं चोरदण्डः । ते हि बहुभिर् उपधाभिर् अपहरन्ति । अस्वतन्त्रैषा स्त्री किं ददाति किं वा भुङ्क्ते वयम् अत्र स्वामिन इति अचौराशङ्कया चोरदण्डो विधीयते । जीवन्तीनां तासां स्वबान्धवा देवरादयस् तद्धनं ये हरेयुस् ताञ् छिष्यात् पृथिवीपतिर् निगृह्णीयात् । चौरदण्डो¹²¹ वक्ष्यमाणः-

• येन येन यथाङ्गेन स्तेनो नृषु विचेष्टते ।

• छेत्तव्यं तत् तद् एवान्यत् तन् मनोर् अनुशासनम् ॥ इति । (म्ध् ८.३३४)

स्वबन्धुभ्यश् चैतद् विशेषेण राज्ञा रक्षितव्यम् । चौररक्षा तु स्वराष्ट्रविषया विहिता ॥ ८.२९ ॥

This ‘punishment of thieves’ has been laid down for those relatives who should appropriate the property of women. They appropriate her property in manifold wavs; giving out., for instance, that—‘she is not mistress of herself as regards what she gives away and what she enjoys,—I am the real owner of the; property.’

It is in view of the possibility of people thinking that such misappropriators are not ‘thieves’ that the text lays down the ‘punishment of thieves’ for them.

‘While they are alive, if the relations’—brother-in-law and others—‘should appropriate their property,—on them the king shall inflict punishment,’—shall punish them.

The ‘punishment of thieves’ is going to be described later on (verse 334)—‘With whatever limb a thief operates against men, each of those limbs the King shall cut off, in order to prevent the repetition of the act.’

What the verse means is that the property of helpless women should be specially guarded against her own relations; guarding against thieves being the duty that has been laid down for the King as owing to the entire kingdom.—(29)

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2.147), in support of the view that except the husband, no co-parcener should lay hands upon the property of women during their life-time;—in Aparārka (p. 752), to the effect that when the woman is dead, her relations do have a right to her Strīdhana property;—in Vivādaratnākara (p. 512); and in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 70).

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 752).—‘While the woman is alive, her husband or sons or brother-in-law or relations have no power over her strīdhana; if they take it from her, they should be punished.’

Agnipnrāṇa (Rājadharma, 222.21).—(Same as Manu.)

जीवद्वचनान् मृतानां तासां बान्धवा एव यथा संनिकर्षं तदीयधनस्येषत इति ज्ञापयति । वक्ष्यति चानपत्यधनस्य सपिण्डादिषु प्रतिपत्तिम् । अत एव च चोरशङ्कायां चोरवत् ते दण्डम् अर्हन्ति । इदं चान्यद् इत्थंभूतम् एव प्रसङ्गाद् उच्यते —

029 A righteous king must punish like thieves those relatives who appropriate the property of such females during their lifetime.

Property, the owner whereof has disappeared, the King shall keep for three years; up to three years the owner may receive it; but after that the King (shall take it).—(30)

यद् द्रव्यं स्वामिनो नष्टं प्रमादात् कथंचित् पथि गच्छतो भ्रष्टम्, अरण्ये कान्तारे वा स्थापयित्वारण्यपालैर् अन्यैर् वा राजपुरुषैर् लब्धं राजसकाशम् आनीतम्, तद् राज्ञा¹²² रक्षां कृत्वा राजद्वारे राजमार्गे वा प्रकाशं स्थापयितव्यम् । पटहघोषणेन वा कस्य किं हारितम् इति प्रकाशयितव्यम् । यतः प्रदेशाल् लब्धं तस्मिन्न् एव प्रदेशे रक्षिपुरुषाधिष्ठितं कर्तव्यम् । एवं त्रीणि वर्षाणि स्थापयितव्यम् । तत्र्आर्वाक् त्रिभ्यो वर्षेभ्यो यः कारणत आत्मीयं ज्ञापयेत् तस्योद्धृतवक्ष्यमाणषड्भागादिभागकं समर्पयितव्यम्, परतः स्वकोष्ठे प्रवेशनीयाम् इति ।

• प्रनष्टः स्वामी यस्य रिक्थस्य तत् प्रनष्टस्वामिकम् । प्रनष्टो ऽविज्ञातः । रिक्थं धनम् । त्रयाणाम् अब्दानां समाहारस् त्र्यब्दम् । त्रिवर्षवत् त्र्यब्दे ङीबभावः । अब्दशब्दः संवत्सरपर्यायः । निधापयेत् स्थापयेत् । अर्वाक् त्र्यब्दात् पूर्वं त्रिभ्यो वर्षेभ्यः, हरेत् स्वामी स्वीकुर्यात् । अर्वाक्शब्दो ऽवधौ दिग्देशादिकात् पूर्वम्¹²³ आह ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये तु नृपतिर् हरेद् इति भोगानुज्ञानम् अपहारम् आहुः । न हि ऊर्ध्वम् अपि त्रिभ्यो वर्षेभ्यः परकीयस्य द्रव्यसापहारो युक्तः । तस्मात् त्रिभ्यो वर्षेभ्य ऊर्ध्वम् अनागच्छति स्वामिनि राज्ञा¹²⁴ भोक्तव्यम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">तैर्¹²⁵ अयं श्लोकः कथं व्याख्यानीयः- “यत् किंचिद् दशवर्षाणि” (म्ध् ८.१४७) इति । यदि च परकीयस्यापहारो न युक्त इत्य् उच्यते भोगो ऽपि नैव युक्तः । परकीयं¹²⁶ वस्त्रादिवद् भुज्यमानं नश्यत्य् एव । तत्रानपहारोपचारो युक्तः, भुक्तेर्¹²⁷ एवापहारफलस्य सद्भावात् । गजतुरगादेस्¹²⁸ तु कीदृशो भोग इति वाच्यम् । तस्मान् न यथाश्रुतार्थत्यागे कारणम् अस्ति । हरतिश् च गृह्णात्यर्थे असकृद् दृष्टप्रयोग ऋक्थं हरेद् इत्यादौ । तस्त्मात् परेण नृपतिर् हरेत् स्वीकुर्याद् इत्य् अयम् एवार्थः ॥ ८.३० ॥

कथं पुनः स्वामी प्रनष्टे धने स्वामित्वं ज्ञापयेत् । अत¹²⁹ आह ।

When some one has lost something,—it having dropped on the ground while he was going along the road, or in the forest,—and the conservator of the forests, or some other official of the King, finds it and brings it to the King,—the King shall arrange for its safe keeping and have it kept exposed to view at the royal gate or on the public road, and made it known by heat of drum if any one has lost anything; or he shall have it kept in charge of keepers on the spot where it was found. For three years he shall thus keep it.

Then, before the lapse of three years, if some one reports with proofs that the property belongs to him, then it should he made over to him, after deducting the sixth part of it, which is said (in verse MM) to be the King’s share; and after the lapse of three years the King shall take the property into his own treasury.

That ‘riktha,’ ‘property,’ is said to be ‘praṇaṣṭasvāmika,’ of which the owner has ‘disappeared’—i.e., cannot he traced.

‘Tryabdam’ denotes the aggregate of three years; the feminine affix being absent, just as it is in the compound ‘trivarṣam.’ The term ‘abda’ is synonymous with ‘year.’

‘Shall keep’—shall have it deposited.

‘Up to three years,’—i.e., before the period of three years is over,—‘the owner may receive it,’—assert, his ownership.

The term ‘arvāk,’ ‘up to’ denotes limit, and indicates priority of time or place.

Others have explained the sentence ‘the king shall lake it’ to convey the permission to him to enjoy the property. What these people mean is that even after the lapse of throe years, it would, not be right for the King to ‘take’ or possess what belongs to another person; and hence what is meant is that after the lapse of three years, if the lightful owner does not turn up, the King shall enjoy the usufruct of the property.

But how will these people explain the verse ‘Whatever an owner sees enjoyed by others during ten years, and though present, says nothing, that he shall not recover’ (8.117)? Further, if it he asserted that the ‘taking away’ of another man’s property cannot be right,—then the using also of such property cannot be right. Specially as another man’s property in the shape of clothing and the like, becomes unfit by use. For these reasons it is only right that the mention of ‘taking away’ should he taken to mean actual possession; specially as enjoyment, which is the fruit of possession, would be present (according to the other view also). Then again, what sort of ‘enjoyment of usufruct’ would there ho in the case of such property as the elephant, the house and the like?

Thus then, there is no reason for abandoning the direct literal meaning of the words; specially as the root ‘hṛ,’ ‘to take away,’ has often been found to be used in the sense of possession, as in such phrase ‘riktham haret,’ ‘shall take possession of the property.’ Hence what the sentence means is that after three years the King shall ‘take’—i.e., take possession of—the property.—(30)

This rule is meant for only such property as does not belong to a Brāhmaṇa—says Nandana.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 778), which notes that the rule (relating to the keeping of the property for three years) pertains to the case of property belonging to Brāhmaṇas with exceptional qualifications;—in Mitākṣarā on 2.38, which notes that the meaning is that for three years, the property must be kept in safe custody; if the owner turns up before the lapse of one year, the entire property should be handed over to him; but if he turns up after one year then a portion of the property is to be taken by the king as fee for keeping it; the proportion being specified below in verse 33; it adds that the last clause, permits the king to spend the property after three years, only in the case of the owner not turning up at all.—It is quoted again under 1.173, where it is noted that the period of three years is meant for the case of the owner being a Brāhmaṇa ‘endowed with learning and character.’

It is quoted in Madanapārijāta (p. 226), which notes that this only permits the king to make use of the property (not to make it his own). In view of what the Mitākṣarā and Aparārka have said, it is interesting to note that Madnapārijāta reads ‘abdam’ and ‘abdāt’, which clearly puts down the period as one year only.

It is quoted in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 87), which also notes that the rules refer to the property of a Brāhmaṇa learned in the Veda.

This is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Rājanīti, p. 266), which adds the following notes:—Reading this text along with Yājñavalkya (2-33), we take the rule to be that, if the owner turns up before the lapse of one year, the entire property should be made over to him, but if after that, the king should take from it his own share;—for three years he should keep the property in the same condition in which it was found; and after that he is permitted to spend out of it;—and if the owner turns up after three years, then the king should take out of it his own share, which should be equal to that of the owner,—giving the fourth part of the royal share to the man who found the property.

It is quoted in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Āhnika, p. 36a and Vyavahāra, p. 27b).

Gautama (10.36-38).—‘Those who find lost, property, the owner of which is not known, shall report it to the King. The King shall cause it to be proclaimed and hold it in his custody for a year. After that one-fourth of the value of the property goes to the finder and the remainder to the King.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.19-20).—‘Property entirely given up goes to the King. If it be otherwise, the King with his ministers and the citizens shall administer it.’

Yājñavalkya (2.33).—‘The property lost and found, the King shall make over to him to whom it belongs; if he fails to substantiate with proofs his claim to it, he shall he punished with fine equal to the value of the property.’

Do. (2.172).—‘If a man obtains from another person the property that had been stolen or lost,—without reporting it to the King—he should he fined 96 Paṇas.’

Yājñavalkya (2.173).—‘When a stolen or lost property is brought to the King by the customs-officers or by village-officers, the owner thereof shall get it if he turns up before one year; after that the King shall take it himself.’

Agnipurāṇa (Rājadharma, 222.16-17).—(Same as Manu.)

Arthaśāstra (p. 96).—‘If the owner of the lost property proves his ownership, he obtains what had been lost and recovered. If he fails to prove his ownership, he is fined the fifth part of the value of the article: and the article becomes the lawful property of the King; if the owner takes forcible possession of the article lost and found, he is to he fined the first amercement. Property lost and found should remain deposited in the Customs Office; and after three fortnights, it is to he handed over to the rightful owner or surrendered to the royal treasury.’

परेण त्र्यब्दान् नष्टस्वामिकस्य धनस्य राज्ञो भोगानुज्ञा, नापहरणम् अस्य । येनोर्ध्वम् अपि त्र्यब्दात् स्वामिन्य् आगते न युक्तं तद् अपहर्तुम्, न हि शक्यं न्यायविरोधेन शास्त्रविरोधेन चार्थकल्पनायां परस्वग्रहणम् अभ्यनुज्ञातुम् । न चार्वाक् त्र्यब्दाद् धरेत् स्वामीत्य् अनेनोर्ध्वं त्र्यब्दात् स्वामिनो ऽस्वामित्वम् इत्य् उच्यते । किं तर्हि परेण नृपतिर् हरेद् इत्य् अस्य भोगो ऽतिसर्गविधेर् वा संबन्धो ऽनूद्यते वाक्यस्वाभाव्यात् । एवं च सत्य् ऊर्ध्वम् अपि त्र्यब्दाद् आगत्य —

030 Property, the owner of which has disappeared, the king shall cause to be kept as a deposit during three years; within the period of three years the owner may claim it, after (that term) the king may take it.

He who says ‘this is mine’ should be questioned in proper form; and the owner ought to receive the property after having correctly described the colour, the number and other details regarding it.—(31)

यः कश्चिद् आगत्य “ममेदं स्वं द्रव्यम्” इति ब्रूयात्, सो ऽनुयोज्यो यथाविधि । अनुयोज्यः प्रष्टव्य इत्य् अर्थः । को ऽसाव् अनुयोगविधिः । “को भवान्, किं द्रव्यं हारितम्, किंरूपम्, किंपरिमाणम्, किंसंख्याकम्, संपतितम् अपतितं वा, यदि पतितं कस्मिन् देशे, तथा कुत आगमितं त्वया” इत्य् एवं पर्यनुयोगः कर्तव्यः । स यदि संवादयति रूपसंख्यादीन् । रूपं प्राणिवस्त्रादिविषयं शुक्लं वस्त्रं ¹³⁰गौर् वेत्येवमादि । तथा संख्या दश गावो वा युगानि वा । आदिग्रहणाद् धस्तादिप्रमाणं सुवर्णादिपरिमाणं प्रकीर्णरूपकं वा । एतत् सर्वं संवादयति तदासौ स्वामी भवति । अतस् तद् द्रव्यम् अर्हति स्वीकर्तुम् । संवाद उच्यते- यादृशम् एकेन प्रमाणेन परिच्छिन्नं तादृशम् एव यद्य् अनेन¹³¹ परिच्छिद्यते । रूपसंख्यादिग्रहणं च प्रदर्शनार्थं स्वामित्वकारणानाम् अन्येषाम् अपि साक्ष्यादीनाम् ॥ ८.३१ ॥

The author explains in what, manner the rightful owner shall establish bis ownership over the lost property.

Whenever any one comes and says ‘this is my property,’ ‘he should be questioned in proper form.’—‘Questioned,’ i.e., examined.

“What is the proper form of questioning?”

The questioning could be done in the following manner:—What is the article that has been lost? Of what colour? Of what size? What is the number of things? Was it dropped or not dropped? If it was dropped, at which place was it dropped? Whence did you obtain it?

If he gives a correct account of the colour, number and other details; ‘colour’ of animals, clothes and the like: ‘the cow or the cloth lost was white’; similarly the ‘number’: ‘there were ten cows or yokes.’ ‘Other details’—such as, e.g., if it was gold what was its weight, if it was in a lump or a definite shape. If he gives a correct account of all this, then he establishes his ownership, and as such ‘ought to receive the property.’

An ‘account’ is called ‘correct,’ when it is found that what it describes is in exact agreement with what is known by other means of knowledge.

The mention of ‘colour, number and other details’ is only by way of illustration, and; implies also the producing of witnesses and other evidence of ownership.—(31)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 347), which adds the following notes’—‘anuyojyaḥ’ ‘should be questioned’,—‘rūpam’, ‘white and so forth’,—‘saṅkhyā,’ ‘four, five &c’,—the term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the ‘kind’ character and such other details regarding lost property.

It is quoted in Madanapārijāta (p. 226);—and in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Āhnika, p. 36a).

**(verses 8.31-32)
**

Agnipurāṇa (Rājadharma, 222-17-18).—(Same as Manu.)

Yājñavalkya (2-33.2173 (?)).—(See under 29 and 30.)

स्वामित्वकारणाख्याने सति ।

031 He who says, ‘This belongs to me,’ must be examined according to the rule; if he accurately describes the shape, and the number (of the articles found) and so forth, (he is) the owner, (and) ought (to receive) that property.

If he does not provide a correct account of the place and time, and also the colour, form and size of the lost article, he deserves a fine equal to that article.—(32)

मिथ्या प्रवर्तमानस्य दण्डो ऽयम् उच्यते । यो न ज्ञापयति नष्टस्य धनस्य देशं कालं च, अस्मिन् देशे काले वा हारितम्, तत्त्वतः परमार्थतह्ṁ वर्णं शुक्लादिकम्, रूपं पटी शाटकयुगं वेत्यादिकम् आकारम्, प्रमाणं पञ्चहस्तायामं सप्तहस्तमात्रं वा, अवेदयानः, तदा तत्समं यावति द्रव्ये मित्थ्याप्रवृत्तस् तत्तुल्यं दण्डम् अर्हति ॥ ८.३२ ॥

This verse lays down the penalty for preferring a false claim.

He who does not provide a ‘correct’—true—account of the time and place of the lost article—that ‘it was lost at such a time and at such a place’;—‘colour’ white and the rest; ‘form’—that ‘it was a piece of cloth, or a pair of petty-coats’ and so forth; ‘size’—that^(‘)it was five cubits or seven cubits in length’;—if he fails to give a correct account of all this, then he deserves a fine equal to the property to which he had laid a false claim.—(32)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 347).

**(verses 8.31-32)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.31].

तत्र शुक्लादिर् वर्णः, आकारो रूपम्, संख्यापलाग्रपरिमाणं प्रमाणम् । नियमेन चात्र तच्छुद्ध्यर्थो दण्डः ॥ ८.३२ ॥

032 But if he does not really know the time and the place (where it was) lost, its colour, shape, and size, he is worthy of a fine equal (in value) to the (object claimed).

Property that has been lost and found should remain in the charge of specially deputed (officials); and the thieves that he may detect in connection with this, the king shall cause to be killed by an elephant.—(33)

आददीत गृह्णीयात् षष्ठं भागं दशमं द्वादशं वा प्रनष्टलब्धाद् द्रव्यात् । अवशिष्टं स्वामिने ऽर्पयेत् । तत्र प्रथमे वर्षे द्वादशो भागो द्वितीये दशमस् तृतीये षष्ठ इति । अथ वा रक्षाक्लेशक्षयापेक्षो भागविकल्पः । सतां धर्मम् अनुस्मरन् शिषानाम् एष समाचार इति जानानः ॥ ८.३३ ॥

‘Pranaṣṭādhigatan’— that which has been lost and then found, i.e., at first lost and subsequently found.

‘Should remain in charge of officials specially deputed’—whose chief duty is to take care of the property.

While it is thus kept, if thieves should happen to steal it,—then these thieves the King shall cause to be killed by an elephant.

The specification of the ‘elephant’ can only he with a view to some invisible (transcendental) result.—(33)

Which particular part of the property is to be taken by the king in any particular case shall depend upon the length of time for which it has been kept by the king (Medhātithi and Rāghavānanda),—or on the trouble involved in keeping it (Medhātithi and Govindarāja),—or on the character of the owner (Kullūka and Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2.33), which concludes that dining the first year, the king should hand over to the owner the entire property, keeping nothing for the state,—during the second year he should keep for the state the twelfth part of it,—during the third year, its tenth part,—and during the fourth year and onwards, the sixth part; and in every case the fourth part of the royal share should be given to the man who found the property.—This is again quoted in the same work under 2.173, where also the same explanation is accepted.

It is quoted in Aparārka (p. 778), which declares that whether the king shall take the larger or smaller share shall depend upon the trouble involved in the keeping of the property.

It is quoted in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 87), which accepts the explanation given in the Mitākṣarā, and adds that the rule that the king should take the whole property after the lapse of three years is meant for those cases where the owner of the property is not known; but in cases where it is known that such and such an article has been forgotten here by this or that man,—the property has to be handed over to him, even though he may turn up after the lapse of three years.

It is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 347), which adds the following notes;—‘Praṇaṣṭādhigatāt’ means ‘out of the property that was lost, discovered and kept in custody;’—the alternatives regarding the portion to be taken by the king are based upon the amount of trouble involved in the keeping of the property;—this rule is meant for the case of property other than the ‘single-hoofed’ and the rest mentioned in Yājñavalkya (2.174).

It is quoted in Madanapārijāta (p. 226);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Rājanīti, p. 265), which adds the following notes:—‘Praṇaṣṭa’ means ‘fallen away from the possession of the owner—if some such property has been found by the customs-officer or other officers guarding the place, and brought over to the king,—then out of that, if the owner should turn up to claim it during the first year, the king should hand over to him the whole of it,—if during the second year, he should keep for the state the twelfth part of it,—during the third year, the tenth part, and during the fourth year and onwards, the sixth part, adding that the increased share is justified by the increased trouble involved in keeping the property for a longer period.

It is quoted in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 27b).

(verses 8.33-34)

Arthaśāstra (p. 96).—‘In the case of the loss of property in the shape of a biped, the owner shall pay five Paṇas as the fee; in that of one-hoofed animals, 4 Paṇas; in the case of cows and buffaloes, 2 Paṇas; in that of small cattle, one fourth of a Paṇa; in the case of gems and minor metals, five per cent, of the value.’

Gautama (10.36-38).—(See under 30.)

Yājñavalkya (2.174).—‘The owner should give to the Under 4 Paṇas in the case of a one-hoofed animal, 5 in the ease of man, two in the ease of buffaloes, camels and cows, and a fourth Paṇa in the case of sheep or goat.’

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara).—‘If a man recovers his own property that had been lost, he shall report it to the King; and he shall take it only after he has proved his honesty.’

ऊर्ध्वम् एव त्र्यब्दाद् अधिगतस्वामिकम्, न तु सर्वं प्रत्यर्पयेत् । किं तर्हि उद्धृतषड्भागादिभागं प्रत्यर्पयेत् । षड्भागादिग्रहणव्यवस्था च गुणापेक्षया संरक्षणश्रमव्यपेक्षया च नियम्यते ॥ ८.३३ ॥

033 Now the king, remembering the duty of good men, may take one-sixth part of property lost and afterwards found, or one-tenth, or at least one-twelfth.

Out of the property that has been lost and found, the king, remembering the duty of good men, shall take the sixth part, or the tenth, or the twelfth.—(34)

प्रनष्टम् अधिगतं प्रनष्टाधिगतं पूर्वं प्रनष्टं पश्चाद् अधिगतम् । अधिष्ठितं युक्तैस् तत्परैर् आरक्षपुरुषैस् तिष्ठेत् । तथास्थितम् अपि यदि केचन चौरा¹³² गृह्णीयुस् तान् राजा इभेन हस्तिना घातयेत् । हस्तिग्रहणम्¹³³ अदृष्टार्थम्¹³⁴ ॥ ८.३४ ॥

‘Shall take’—sieze—either the sixth or the tenth or the twelfth part—of the property lost and found, and make over the remainder to the owner. During the first year, he shall take the twelfth part, during the second year, the tenth part, and during the third year, the sixth part. Or, the option regarding the share may be based upon the amount of trouble entailed in taking care of the property.

‘Remembering the duty of good men,’—i.e., knowing that such is the practice among cultured people.—(34)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 347), which adds the following notes:—‘Praṇaṣṭādhigatam’, ‘was first lost and then recovered’;—‘yuktaiḥ’, ‘carefully devoted to guarding the property—‘ibhena’, ‘by means of an elephant’;—and in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 149). which notes that the ‘guarding’ is to be done by the king’s officers, and explains ‘ibhena’ as ‘by an elephant’.

(verses 8.33-34)

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.33].

अस्वामिकत्वाद् अस्य प्रयत्नेन रक्षणार्थम् इदम् उच्यते । युक्तानां च रक्षिणां हस्तिवधो दृष्टप्रयोजनः ॥ ८.३४ ॥

034 Property lost and afterwards found (by the king’s servants) shall remain in the keeping of (special) officials; those whom the king may convict of stealing it, he shall cause to be slain by an elephant.

In regard to a treasure-trove, if a man says truly ‘this is mine,’—from him the king shall take the sixth part, or only the twelfth part.—(35)

निखातायाम् भूमौ गुप्तं स्थापितं धनं निधिर् उच्यते । वर्षशतिका वर्षसहस्रिकाश् च निधयो भवन्ति । तत्र यदि भूमेर् विदार्यमाणायाः कथंचित् केनचिन् निधिर् आसाद्यते, स तु राजधनम् । तथा च गौतमः- “निध्यधिगमो राजधनम्” (ग्ध् १०.४३) इति । एतच् चास्मर्यमाणनिधातृके निधौ द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्याख्याता षष्ठं लबेतेत्य् उक्तम् । अयं तु श्लोको यत्राख्यातैव निधाता तत्पुरुषो वा पितृपितामहादिश् तद्विषयो द्रष्टव्यः । ममायं निधिर् इति यो ब्रूयात् सत्येन प्रमाणेन ज्ञापयेद् इत्य् अर्थः । तस्याददीत षड्भागम् इति । निश्चिते तत्स्वामिकत्वे राज्ञः षष्ठादिभागग्रहणम् । विकल्पश् चाख्यातृगुणापेक्षया ॥ ८.३५ ॥

Treasure secretly buried under the ground is called ‘nidhi,’ ‘treasure-trove.’ There are treasure-troves that have lain under the ground for a hundred, or even a thousand years. If, when the ground is being dug, such a treasure-trove is somehow found by some one, it belongs to the state. As says Gautama (10.43)—‘Treasure-trove when found is state-property.’ But this applies only to the case of a treasure-trove the original hoarder of which is not known. And with regard to this it has been laid down that one who reports the find is to receive the sixth part of it.

The present verse refers to the case where the original hoarder is either the person reporting the find himself or a descendant of his.

‘If a man says “this is mine” truly’—i.e., on reliable evidence,—‘from him the King shall take the sixth part’—at which the King’s share is fixed. That is, the King is to take the sixth part out of that treasure-trove of which the rightful owner has been discovered with certainty.

The option regarding the ‘sixth’ or ‘twelfth’ part is based upon the qualities of the finder.—(35)

The amount to be taken depends ‘upon the character of the finder’ (Medhātithi, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda),—or ‘on the caste of the finder’ (Nārāyaṇa),—or, ‘on the time, place, the caste of the finder and so forth’ (Govindarāja).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 641), which adds that the amount of the royalty shall be determined in due accordance with the character (of the claimant, and of the treasure);—in Mitākṣarā (on 2.34-35), which notes that the proportion of the royalty is to be determined by considerations of the caste of the claimant, the nature of the place and time and such other details;—in Vivādaratnākara (p. 642), which adds the following notes:—‘Nidhi’ here stands for ‘treasure buried underground long ago and forgotten’,—whether the king shall receive the sixth or twelfth part shall depend upon the virtuous character or otherwise of the person claiming it.

It is quoted in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 88), which appears to take the meaning to be that the king shall take the sixth part for the state, and also the twelfth part for the person who discovered the treasure.

It is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Rājanīti, p. 269), which adds that the exact proportion shall depend upon the time and upon the qualifications of the owner of the treasure;—and that this refers to treasure belonging to others than the Brāhmaṇas.

Viṣṇu (3.63).—‘Of treasure anciently hidden by themselves, men of all castes excepting Brāhmaṇas, shall give a twelfth part to the King.’

Yājñavalkya (2.35).—‘When some one has discovered hidden treasure, the King shall take the sixth part of it. In cases where the find is not reported to the King, on coming to know of it, he shall take the whole of it, and also fine the finder.’

Vaśiṣṭha (3.13).—‘If anyone finds treasure, the owner of which is not known, the King shall take it, giving one-sixth to the finder.’

Gautama (10.43-45).—‘Treasure-trove is the property of the King,—excepting such as is found by a Brāhmaṇa who lives according to the law. Some people declare that a finder belonging to a non-Brāhmaṇical caste also, who reports the find to the King, shall obtain the sixth part of its value.’

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara, p. 343).—‘If a man finds treasure hidden by some one else, he shall take it to the King; all treasure-trove, to whomsoever it may have belonged, should go to the King; except that belonging to the Brāhmaṇa.’

Viṣṇudharmottara (Vīramitrodaya-Rājanīti, pp. 269-270).—‘Having obtained a treasure-trove, the King shall keep half of it in his Treasury; and the other half the righteous King shall make over to Brāhmaṇas.’

राजानाधिगतम् अध्गतं वा यो निधिं प्रवादयेद् आत्मीयं कारणतः तस्य श्रोत्रियत्वाद्यपेक्षया भागविकल्प आश्रयितव्यः प्रतिपत्तिकारणविसंवादे च —

035 From that man who shall truly say with respect to treasure-trove, ‘This belongs to me,’ the king may take one-sixth or one-twelfth part.

But he who speaks falsely shall, be fined the eighth part of his property, or a smaller fraction, on calculation, of that same treasure-trove.—(36)

यस् तु मयायं निहितो मत्पूर्वजेन वेति¹³⁵ प्रतिज्ञां न साधयति सो ऽसत्यवादी¹³⁶ दण्ड्यः । यावत् तस्य वित्तम् अस्ति, ततो ऽष्टमं भागं तस्यैव वा निधानस्याल्पीयसीं कलां मात्रां भागम् इत्य् अर्थः । न तु तद् एव द्रव्यं सुवर्णादिकं दापयेत्, किं तु तत्परिमाणम् अन्यद् वा सममूल्यं यया धनमात्रया दण्डितो ऽवसादं न¹³⁷ गच्छेद् विनयं वा ग्राह्येत । अनुबन्धादिविशेषापेक्षया पुरुषगुणापेक्षया च विकल्प आश्रयणीयः । आतिशायनिकात् पूर्वदण्डात् स्वल्पो दण्ड इति ज्ञापयति । तेन यस्य बहु वित्तं स्वल्पो निधिः, तत्र निध्यपेक्षां मात्राम् अष्टमांशम्¹³⁸ अर्थाधीनां दण्ड्यः । सा ह्य् अल्पीयसी भवति ॥ ८.३६ ॥

But when the man, who has made the statement ‘this treasure was hoarded by me, or by my forefathers,’ fails to prove this,—then being a liar, he should be fined the eighth part of what his own property may be,—or a smaller fraction of that same treasure-trove, it is not necessary that he should he made to pay in the same metal, gold or otherwise, as that which has been found; he may pay in some other metal of equal value to the former; the exact amount of the fine being such as does not ruin the culprit, and yet teaches him a lesson.

The option is based either upon the peculiarity of the attendant circumstances of each case, or the qualities of the person concerned. That this is so is indicated by the fact that the latter punishment is lighter than the former one, which is excessive. Thus then, where the man is possessed of a large property, and the treasure concerned is small, there the fine shall not be in proportion to the latter; in this case the fine shall be in proportion to the man’s property; the former would be too little (to be a deterrent).—(36)

The amount of the fine depends on the circumstances of the case and the virtues of the offender (Medhātithi),—or only on the virtues of the offender (Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda).

The first half of this verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 641);—and the whole verse in Vivādaratnākara (p. 642), which adds the following notes:—‘Alpīyasīm kalām’ implies that’the fine is to be imposed in such a manner that the entire treasure may not become absorbed,—this being meant for those cases where the exact extent of the entire-property is not known.

Agnipurāṇa (Rājadharma, 222.16).—(Same as Manu.)

Viṣṇu (3.64).—‘The man, who falsely claims property hidden by another as having been hidden by himself, shall he condemned to pay a fine equal in amount to the property falsely claimed by him.’

Yājñavalkya (2.35).—(See under 31.)

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara, p. 642).—‘If a man recovers his own lost property, he shall report it to the King; and if he makes good his claim, he shall take it; otherwise he would be suspected.’

यथा धनमात्रया दण्डितो ऽवसादं न गच्छेद्, विनयं [च] ग्राह्येत तावतीम् अर्थमात्रां दापयेत् । पुरुषविशेषापेक्षया च दण्डविकल्प आश्रयितव्यः ॥ ८.३६ ॥

036 But he who falsely says (so), shall be fined in one-eighth of his property, or, a calculation of (the value of) the treasure having been made, in some smaller portion (of that).

A learned Brāhmaṇa, having found treasure buried by his forefathers, shall take it wholly; as he is the master of everything.—(37)

¹³⁹विद्वान् ब्राह्मणः पूर्वैः पित्रादिभिर् उपहितं निधिं यदा पश्येत् तदा सर्वम् एव्आददीत, न राज्ञे पूर्वोक्तं भागं दद्यात् । अस्यार्थवादः- सर्वस्याधिपतिर् हि सः । तथा चोक्तम्- “सर्वं स्वं¹⁴⁰ ब्राह्मणस्येदम्” (म्ध् १.१००) इति । एतच् च्आसेषतो ग्रहणं यो ब्राह्मणस्वामिक एव निधिः । यस् त्व् अविज्ञातस्वामिकः तस्मिन् विद्वद्ब्राह्मणदृष्टे¹⁴¹ ऽप्य् अस्त्य् एव राज्ञो भागः । यतो वक्ष्यति “निधीनां तु पुराणानाम्” (म्ध् ८.३९) इति ॥ ८.३७ ॥

M G: vijñeyaḥ brāhmaṇadṛṣṭo

All read: sarvasvaṃ

M G DK (1: 1956; 4: 1342) add at beginning: yadā

When a learned Brāhmaṇa finds the treasure that bad been buried by his forefathers—father, grandfather and so forth,—then ‘he shall take it wholly,’ and shall not hand over to the king the aforesaid part of it.

In support of this the text adds a supplementary exaggeration—‘as he is the master of everything,’—as has been declared under 1.100.

The rule here laid down applies to the case where the treasure belongs to the Brāhmaṇa; when however its rightful owner is not known, then, even though it may have boon found by a ‘learned Brāhmaṇa,’ the king’s share has to be paid; as it is going to be declared (in 39) that—‘of all ancient hoards…… the king is entitled to one-half.’—(37)

‘Pūrvoyanihitam’—‘Deposited by ancestors’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa);—‘deposited in former times’ (Kullūka).

Gautama (10.43-44).—‘Treasure-trove is the property of the King;—excepting such as is found by a Brāhmaṇa who lives according to the Law.’

Vaśiṣṭha (3.14).—‘If a Brāhmaṇa following the six lawful qualifications finds the treasure, the King shall not take it.’

Viṣṇu (3.58).—‘A Brāhmaṇa who has found treasure may keep it entire.’

Yājñavalkya (2.34).—‘The learned Brāhmaṇa shall take the treasure; since he is the master of all.’

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara, p. 643).—‘If a man comes by treasure hidden by another, he shall present it to the King; as all Treasure-trove is the property of the King, except what belongs to the Brāhmaṇa. The Brāhmaṇa also, coming by hidden treasure, shall report it to the King, and it is only when it is made over to him by the King that he should enjoy it; if he failed to report the find, he would be a thief.’

Agnipurāṇa (222. 14).—‘The Brāhmaṇa finding hidden treasure, shall take it all to himself.’

एवं च सति ऽममायम्” इत्य् अस्मिन् पूर्वविधाव् अब्राह्मणविषयं भागस्य विकल्पेन ग्रहणम् । अविद्वद्ब्राह्मणविषयं वा ॥ ८.३७ ॥

037 When a learned Brahmana has found treasure, deposited in former (times), he may take even the whole (of it); for he is master of everything.

When the king himself finds a hoard buried of old under the ground, he shall give one-half of it to the Brāhmaṇas and have the other half put in his treasury.—(38)

यो राज्ञा स्वयं निधिर् अधिगतस् तस्मान् निधेर् अयं ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दाननियमो राज्ञः । कोशशब्देन वित्तसंचयस्थानम् उच्यते । पुराणं निहितं क्षिताव् इति निधिरूपानुवादः ॥ ८.३८ ॥

When the king himself has found treasure, this text lays down that he shall give one-half of it to the Brāhmaṇas.

The term ‘Treasury’ stands for the place of hoarding.

‘Buried of old under the ground’;—this describes the nature of the treasure-trove.—(38)

Gautama (10.43).—(See under 37.)

Viṣṇu (3.56-57).—‘Of a Treasure-trove he must give one half to the Brāhmaṇas;—he may deposit the other half in his Treasury.’

Yajñavalkya (2.34).—‘Having found a Treasure-trove, the King shall give half of it to Brāhmaṇas;—the learned Brāhmaṇa however, may take the whole of what he finds; since he is the master of all.’

Agnipurāṇa (222.14).—‘The King shall deposit half of it in the Treasury and give the other half to Brāhmaṇas; the good Brāhmaṇa however takes the whole of the hidden treasure that he has found.’

राज्ञो ऽयं निध्यधिगमे दाननियमः । न त्व् अन्यस्य, वचनसामर्थ्यात् ॥ ८.३८ ॥

038 When the king finds treasure of old concealed in the ground let him give one half to Brahmanas and place the (other) half in his treasury.

Of ancient hoards, as also of minerals under the ground, the king is entitled to his share, by reason of his protecting them,—he being the lord of the soil.—(39)

अन्येनापि दृष्टस्य निधे राज्ञा भागः पूर्वोक्तो ग्रहीतव्य इत्य् अस्य विधेर् अर्थवादो ऽयम्- निधीनां हि पुराणानाम् इति । धातूनाम् एव च क्षितौ- अयं त्व् अप्राप्तविधिः । सुवर्णरूप्यादिबीजम्¹⁴² मृदः सिन्दूरकालाञ्जनाद्याश् च धातवः । सुवर्णाद्याकरभूमीर् यः खनति, यो वा पर्वतादिषु गैरिकादिधातून् उपजीवति, तेनापि पूर्ववद् राज्ञे भागो दातव्यः । अर्धभाग् इति अर्धशब्दो ऽंशमात्रवचनः समासनिर्देशात्, यथा ग्रामार्धो नगरार्धम् इति । नपुंसकलिङ्गस् तु समप्रविभागः । इह तु समासे लिङ्गविशेषप्रतिपत्त्यभावात् पूर्वस्य¹⁴³ चशब्दवशात्¹⁴⁴ षड्दशद्वादशादेर् भागस्य प्रकृतत्वात् तद्वचनो विज्ञायते । अर्धं भजत एकदेशं गृह्णातीत्य् अर्थः । अत्र हेतुः, रक्षणाद् इति । यद्य् अपि क्षितौ निहितस्य केनचिद् अज्ञानान् न राजकीयरक्षोपयुज्यते, तथापि तस्य बलवतापहारः संभाव्यते । अतो ऽस्त्य् एव रक्षाया अर्थवत्त्वम् । एतदर्थम् एवाह- भूमेर् अधिपतिर् हि सः । प्रभुर् असौ भूमेः । तदीयायाश् च भुवो यल् लब्धं तत्र युक्तं तस्य भागदानम् ॥ ८.३९ ॥

The clause—‘of ancient hoards, etc’— is supplementary to the before-mentioned rule that the king should take one-half of the treasure even when it is found by other persons;—while the clause ‘of minerals under the ground’ lays down what has not been mentioned before. Gold, silver and other metals in their crude form, as also red lead, black collyrium and other substances (in their crude form) are what are called ‘minerals.’ So that the man who operates golden and other mines, as also one who makes his living by digging out red chalk and such substances from mountains, has to pay the king’s share.

‘Ardhabhāk,’ ‘is entitled to a share’—The term ‘ardha’ here should be taken as standing for share or part in general; because it occurs in a compound; just as in the compounds ‘nagarārdha’ and ‘grāmārdha’ (which mean part of the city, part of the village); it is only when it is used in the neuter form that it means exactly half; in the present instance however, as it occurs in a compound and its gender is not ascertainable, it has to be taken as standing for the sixth or twelfth part, which has been spoken of in the present context. ‘He is entitled to his share’;—this means that he takes a part of it.

The reason for this is stated—‘on account of his protecting them’—Though when the treasure is buried under the ground, there is no need for any royal protection, yet it is open to the risk of being taken away by some powerful person; so that there is need for the king’s care. It is with a view to this that it has been added—‘he being the lord of the soil’;—he is the master of the soil, so that when something has been obtained out of the soil that belongs to him, it is only right that he should receive his share out of it.—(39).

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Rājanīti, p. 267), which adds that this verse is supplementary to 38, and notes that the second half, which the king should deposit in his treasury (in terms of verse 38), is to be so kept with the clear purpose of handing it over to the rightful claimant when he turns up.

Gautama (10.43-45).—‘Treasure-trove is the property of the King,—except that which is found by a Brāhmaṇa living according to Law;—some declare that a non-Brahmaṇa also finding hidden treasure and reporting it to the King, shall receive one-sixth of its value.’

Vaśiṣṭha (3.13).—‘If any one finds treasure, the owner whereof is not known, the King shall take it, giving one-sixth to the finder.’

Viṣṇu (3.58-62).—‘A Brāhmaṇa finding treasure shall keep it entire; a Kṣatriya finding treasure must give one-fourth of it to the King, another fourth to Brāhmaṇas and keep half to himself; a Vaiśya finding treasure must give a fourth part to the King, one-half to Brāhmaṇas and keep the remainder to himself. A Śūdra finding treasure should divide it into twelve parts and give five parts to the King, five to Brāhmaṇas and keep two parts to himself. Let the King compel him who having found treasure does not report it to the King and is found out afterwards—to give up the whole.’

Y ājñavalkya (2.35).—‘If some one else finds a treasure, the King shall take the sixth part of it; if he has not reported it to the King and is found out, he should be compelled to deliver the treasure and also pay a line.’

Agnipurāṇa (222.14).—(See under 38.)

अर्धभाग् अंशभाक्, अर्धशब्दो ह्य् अंशे ऽपि दृश्यते । “अर्धिकः कुलमित्रश् च” इति । एवं च सत्य् अंशप्र्कॢप्तिर् द्रष्टृगुणापेक्षया राजाभिप्रायेण वा कल्पयितव्या । तथा च समप्रविभागार्थो ऽप्य् अर्धशब्दः ॥ ८.३९ ॥

039 The king obtains one half of ancient hoards and metals (found) in the ground, by reason of (his giving) protection, (and) because he is the lord of the soil.

Property stolen by thieves should be restored by the king to men of all castes; by retaining such property, the king imbibes the sin of the thief.—(40)

चौरैर् यन् नीतं किंचिद् धनं तद् राजा प्रत्याहृत्य नात्मन्य् उपयुञ्जीत । किं तर्हि, य एव मुषितास् तेभ्य एव प्रतिपादयितव्यम् । सर्वग्रहणेन च चण्डालेभ्यो ऽपि देयम् इति । “चौराहृतम्” इत्य् अन्यस्मिन् पाठे चौरैः आहृतम्¹⁴⁵ इति विगृह्य साधनं “कृता” (पाण् २.१.३२) इति समासः । पाठान्तरे “चौरहृतम्” इति “तृतीया” (पाण् २.१.३०) इति योगविभागात् पूर्ववद् वा समासः । अयं त्व् अत्रार्थः- यच् चौरैर् हृतम् अशक्यप्रत्यानयनं तद् राज्ञा स्वकोशाद् दातव्यम् ।

उत्तरश्लोकार्ध¹⁴⁶ एवं योजनीयः- राजा तद् उपयुञ्जान इति । अनेकार्थत्वाद् धातूनाम् उपपूर्वो युजिर् लक्षणया वाप्रतिपादन¹⁴⁷ एव द्रष्टव्यः । यो ह्य् अन्यस्मै प्राप्तकालं धनं न ददाति, स्वप्रयोजनेषु विनियुङ्क्ते, तेन तदीयम् एव तदुपयुक्तं भवतीति युक्तम् उच्यते- राजा तद् उपयुञ्जानश् चौरस्याप्नोति किल्बिषम् । किल्बिषं¹⁴⁸ पापम् ॥ ८.४० ॥

When any property is stolen by thieves, the king should recover it; but he should not use it himself; he should restore it to the persons that may have been robbed.

The use of the term ‘all’ implies that stolen property shall be restored to Caṇḍālas also.

If we read ‘caurāhṛtam’ (in place of ‘chaurairhṛtam’), the compound should be expounded as ‘chaurebhyaḥ āhṛtam’—i.e., recovered from thieves—in accordance with Pāṇini 2.1.32. If we adopt the (third) reading ‘chaurahṛtam,’ the compounding would be in accordance with Pāṇini 2.1.30.

What is meant is that if the property stolen by thieves is incapable of being recovered, it should be made good by the king out of his own treasury.

The second half of the verse—‘By making use, etc.’—should be construed as follows:—The participle ‘upayuñjānaḥ’—derived from the root ‘yuja’ with the preposition ‘upa’—should be taken to indicate figuratively non-restoration; the sense being that ‘if the king does not restore to the person concerned the property that is his due, and if he uses that property for his own purposes’, then it is said to be ‘retained’ by him; and ‘by retaining such property the king imbibes the sin of the thief,’—‘kilviṣa’ meaning sin.—(40)

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 2.36), which adds:—(a) If the king recovers the stolen property from the thieves and keeps it for himself, he takes the sin of the thief, (b) if he ignores the theft, then the sins of the people fall upon him; (c) if, having tried his best to recover the stolen property, he fails to do so, he should make good the loss out of his own treasury.

Gautuma (10.46-47).—‘Having recovered property stolen by thieves, he shall return it to the owner;—or he shall pay its value out of his own treasury.’

Āpastamba (2.26.8) (2.268?).—‘The King’s officers should ho made to repay what is stolen within the boundaries of their charge.’

Viṣṇu (3.66-67).—‘Having recovered the goods stolen by thieves, let him restore them entire to their owners, to whatever caste they may belong. If he is unable to recover them, he must pay their value out of his own treasury.’

Yājñavalkya (2.36).—‘The King should give to the people, what has been stolen by thieves; if he does not give it, he incurs the sin of stealing.’

Vyāsa (Aparārka, p. 641).—‘If the King is unable to recover what has been stolen by thieves, he shall make it good out of his own treasury.’

Nārada (6.16 et seq.).—‘He on whose land robbery has been committed must trace the thieves to the best of his power; or else, he must make good what has been stolen, unless the footmarks can be traced from that ground into another man’s ground. When the footmarks, after leaving that ground, are lost and cannot be traced any further, the neighbours, inspectors of the road and governors of that region shall be made responsible for the loss. When a house has been plundered, the King shall cause the thief-catchers, the guards and the inhabitants of that region to make good the loss, if the thief is not caught.’

अस्मिन् पाठे राज्ञानीतस्वद्रव्यः पोषयितव्यश् चोरैर् अपहृतस्याशक्यादाने । चोराहृतम् इति पाठे तु अयम् अर्थः- चोरेभ्य आहृत्य राजा न भागं तस्मात् कंचिद् उपाद[द्यात् किं तु स्व]स्थानं प्रतिपादयेत् । एवं च धर्मयशसी तेनापरित्यक्ते भवतः ॥ ८.४० ॥

040 Property stolen by thieves must be restored by the king to (men of) all castes (varna); a king who uses such (property) for himself incurs the guilt of a thief.

The king knowing his duty shall determine the law for each man, after haying duly examined the provincial laws pertaining to each caste, the law’s of guilds, as also the laws of families.—(11)

कुरुकापिशकाश्मीरादिदेशो नियतावधिः जनपदम् । तत्र भवा धर्मा जानपदाः । केचित्¹⁴⁹ तत्र भवन्ति ये तद्देशव्यपदेशैर् अनुष्ठीयन्ते । अथ वा तन्निवासिनो जना मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीतिवत् जनपदशब्देनाभिधीयन्ते । तेषाम् अनुष्ठेया जानपदाः । “तस्येदम्” (पाण् ४.३.१२९) इति तद्धितः । जातेर् जानपदा जातिजानपदा इति षष्ठीसमासः । जातिमात्रविषया देशधर्मा राज्ञा परिपालनीयाः । समीक्ष्य विचार्य — किम् आम्नायैर् विरुद्धा अथ न, तथा पीडाकराः कस्यचिद् उत न — एवं विचार्य, ये ऽविरुद्धाश् तान् प्रतिपादयेद् अनुष्टापयेद् इत्य् अर्थः । तथा च वक्ष्यति “सद्भिर् आचरितं यत् स्यात्” (म्ध् ८.४६) इति ।

• अथ वा जातयश् च ते जानपदाश् चेति विशेषणसमासः । जातिशब्देन च नित्यत्वं लक्ष्यते । प्रशंसामात्रं चैतत् देशधर्माणाम् । यथा जातिर् नित्या एवं¹⁵⁰ देशधर्मा अपि शास्त्राविरुद्धा नित्याः । ते नित्यवद् अनुष्ठेया दृष्टार्था¹⁵¹ गोप्रचारोदकक्षरणादयः । यथा ग्रामीणा अत्र प्रदेशे गावो न चारणीया इति समयम् आश्रयन्ति कस्यचित् कार्यस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं तत्र यो व्यतिक्रामति स राज्ञा दण्ड्यः ।

• अथ वा जनपदे भवा जानपदा देशनिवासिन उच्यन्ते । जात्या जानपदा जातिजानपदाः । जातिर् जन्मोत्पत्तिर् इति यावत् । एतेन देशसंबन्धस्य¹⁵² पुरुषाणां नित्यता लक्ष्यते । ये तद्देशजास् तद्देशाभिजनास् तन्निवासिनश् च गृह्यन्ते, तेषां सर्वविशेषणविशिष्टानाम्¹⁵³ अनिदंप्रथमतो जाता ये धर्मास् ते जातिजानपादशब्देनोच्यन्ते । “वृद्धाच् छः” (पाण् ४.२.११४) इति तद्धिते प्रसक्ते छान्दसत्वाद् अणेव कृतः ।

• अथ वाभेदोपचारात् पुरुषशब्दस् तत्संबन्धिषु धर्मेषु प्रयुक्तः । तेनायं¹⁵⁴ देशनियमो धर्माणां स एवंविधात् पुरुषात् प्रतिद्रष्टव्यः । एते हि देशधर्मा म्लेच्छानां¹⁵⁵ न पुनर् आर्याणाम् । ते¹⁵⁶ हि तिर्यक्समानधर्माणो ऽन्यत्रानधिकृताः स्वसमाचारप्रसिद्धं धर्मम् अनुतिष्ठन्ति मातृविवाहादि¹⁵⁷ । सो ऽयं¹⁵⁸ सार्वभौमेन न¹⁵⁹ निवारणीयः । स्वदेशाचारवतां तेषां जातिधर्मो ऽयं¹⁶⁰ जनपदनिवासबन्धेनाभ्यनुज्ञानात्,¹⁶¹ आम्नायविरोधो¹⁶² ऽप्य् अत्र नास्ति । अधिकृतानां विरोधात् विरोधो न तिरश्चाम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु “अहिंसा सत्यम् अक्रोधः शौचम् इन्द्रियसंयमः” (म्ध् १०.६३) इति प्रतिलोमाधिकारेणैवोक्तम् । म्लेच्छाश् च प्रतिलोमा¹⁶³ एव । तत्र यदि मातृविवाहे मूत्रोत्सर्गे चोदकशुद्ध्यभावे न दुष्यति, क इन्द्रियसंयमः कीदृशं वा शौचम् इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">उक्तम् एतत् । आर्यावर्तमध्यवर्तिनाम्¹⁶⁴ एते धर्माः शौचादयः । चातुर्वर्ण्ये तु तत्तद्देशनियमो¹⁶⁵ धर्माणां नास्ति । केचिद् अदृष्टार्था देशधर्मा इति वक्ष्यामः ।

एककार्यापन्ना वणिक्कारुकुसीदिचातुरिकादयः¹⁶⁶ । तेषां धर्माः श्रेणीधर्माः । यथा केचन वणिङ्महत्तरा वचनेन परिच्छिन्नं राज्ञो भागं प्रयच्छन्ति — “इमां वणिज्यां वयम् उपजीवाम एष ते राजभागो ऽस्माकं यावल् लाभो ऽस्तु न्यूनो ऽधिको वा” । तत्र राज्ञाभ्युपगते वणिज्ये लाभातिशयार्थं राष्ट्रविरोधिनीं चेतरेतरव्यवस्थां कुर्वन्ति — इदं द्रव्यम् इयन्तं कालम् अविक्रेयम्, अयं राज्ञो ऽपदेशेनार्थो¹⁶⁷ दण्डः पतति, देवतोत्सवार्थो वा । तत्र यदि कश्चिद् व्यतिक्रामति स एवं श्रेणीधर्मव्यतिक्रामन् दण्ड्यः ।

कुलधर्मा इति । कुलं वंशः । तत्र प्रख्यातमहिम्ना पूर्वजेन धर्मः प्रवर्तितो भवति यो ऽस्मद्वंशजः कुतश्चन धनं लभेत स नादत्वा ब्राह्मणेभ्यो ऽन्यत्र विनियुञ्जीतेत्यादयो धर्माः । तथा, सति योग्यत्वे य एव पूर्वपुरुषाणां याजकाः कन्यादिसंप्रदानभूता वा त एव कार्याः¹⁶⁸ । तदतिक्रामन् राज्ञो ऽनुष्ठापयितव्यः । एतेषां च सामवायिकत्वाद् अधर्मत्वशङ्कया पुनर्वचनम् । न चायं संविद्व्यतिक्रम इति वक्ष्यामः ॥ ८.४१ ॥

Kuru, Kāśī, Kaśmīra and other regions with fixed boundaries are called ‘provinces,’ and laws obtaining in those are called ‘provincial’; by which are meant those laws that are observed by the people living in the province and called after it. Or, the term ‘province’ may stand for the inhabitants of the provinces, just as the men on the platform are called the ‘platform,’ when it is said that ‘the platforms are crying’; and the laws observed by these people would, in that case, he called ‘provincial’;—the nominal affix ‘aṇ’ being added in accordance with Pāṇini 4.3.120.

The compound ‘Jātijānapadāḥ is to be compounded as ‘jāteḥ-jānapadāh’; the meaning being ‘those provincial laws that pertain to each caste’; and these have to be maintained by the king.

‘Having examined,’—i.e., duly considered the following points—(a) are these law’s contrary to the scriptures or not? (b) are they the source of trouble to some people or not?

After having duly considered all this, he shall ‘determine’—cause to be observed—those laws that are found, on examination, to be not incompatible (with the scriptures or with the people’s convenience); as it is going to be declared later on (verse 46)—‘What may have been practised by the good, etc., etc.’

Or, the compound ‘Jātijānapadāḥ’ may be expounded in such a manner as to make ‘jāti’ the qualification of ‘janapada’; the term ‘jāti’ in this case would indicate eternality, and would be only a laudatory epithet to ‘provincial laws’; the idea being that ‘just as genus is something eternal, so are the provincial laws also, in so far as they are not contrary to the scriptures’; all such visibly useful acts as the feeding of cattle, the storing of water in reservoirs and so forth being such as ought to be performed at all times.

Thus the meaning is that when the men of a certain village have laid down the rule that ‘cattle should not be taken to graze at such and such places,’ then if some one, for some purpose of his own, breaks this rule,—he shall be punished by the king.

Or, the term ‘jānapada’ may stand for those born in the province; i.e., the inhabitants of the province; and the compound ‘jātijānapadāḥ’ being expounded as ‘jātyā jānapadāḥ,’ and ‘jāti’ standing fot birth,—it would signify the eternal relationship between the province and the men born there; and the term ‘jātijānapadāḥ dharmāḥ’ would stand for those laws whose beginning cannot be traced, and which relate to the duly qualified persons among those born and living in a particular province. And though in this case the proper nominal affix to use would have been ‘cha’ (giving the form jānapadīya), according to Pāṇini 5.2.114, yet it is the ‘aṇ’-affix that has been used; this anomaly being permissible as a ‘Vedic anomaly.’

Or, it may be that the term ‘jātijānapadāḥ’ though directly denoting the inhabitants, has been applied here to their laws,—the two being regarded as identical; so that the phrase serves to restrict the scope of the law referred to,—this restriction being deduced from the men themselves; the sense thus is that the laws referred to pertain only to the men of certain localities, and not to all the Ārgas,—the former being such as have a morality akin to that of the lower animals, and not entitled to the performance of any other duties, they perform only such acts as are in keeping with their own customs; such, for instance, as the marrying of their own mother and so forth;—and as such in the performance of such acts, these men shall not be prevented by the king having his sway over the whole world (thence also over the barbarians); because such practices ane permitted by their ‘tribal custom,’ sanctioned by the geographical position oi the locality inhabited by them. Nor could such practices he regarded as ‘contrary to the scriptures’; because the incompatibility of scriptures has a meaning only for persons entitled to the scriptural acts, and not to lower beings.

An objection is raised—“In Manu (10.63), such duties as h armlessness, truthfulness, absence of anger, purity and control of the senses have been laid down in reference to the irregularly mixed castes; and barbarians also belong to the same category as those castes; so that if such men would not he committing something wrong in marrying their mother, or in not using water after urinating, what sort of ‘control of the senses’ or ‘purity’ would there be for them?”

This has been already answered. Purity and other duties pertain to the inhabitants of the whole of Āryāvarta; and so far as the four castes are concerned, there is no restriction of place regarding the duties pertaining to them.

Some people have held that the restriction as to the locality of the ‘laws’ pertains to some transcendental results;—as we shall point out later on.

There are people following a common profession; such, as tradesmen, artisans, money-lenders, coach-drivers and so forth; and the laws governing these are ‘guild-laws.’ E.g., certain principal tradesmen offer to the king his royal tax fixed upon verbally by their declaring before the king—‘we are living by this trade, let the tax thereupon be fixed at such and such a rate, be our profits more or less’; now on the king agreeing to this, they join together and lay down certain rates among themselves, which are calculated to bring thorn larger profits and likely to be detrimental to the interests of the kingdom,—e.g., (a) ‘Such and such a commodity should not be sold during such and such a time,’ (a) ‘such and such is to be the tax payable either to the king or towards the celebration of some religious festival,’ and so forth. And if any one transgresses such rules, he shall be punished for acting against ‘guild-laws.’

‘Laws of families’;—‘Family’ means race; some remote ancestor of well-known fame may have laid down the rule—‘whenever any of my descendants earns wealth, he shall not make use of it without having first given something out of it to Brāhmaṇas’;—and such rules are what are meant by ‘laws of families’; or such rules as ‘priests and bridegrooms shall be selected out of those same families out of which they have been selected by one’s forefathers, provided that suitable men are available therefrom.’ One who acts against such laws shall be punished by the king.

These have been reiterated here with a view to preclude the idea that such laws govern only particular groups of men and as such cannot he regarded as ‘Equity’ proper.

The transgression of these laws does not fall within the category of ‘Breach of Contract,’ as we shall show later on.—(41).

‘Jānapada’—‘Of districts’ (Medhātithi, and Kullūka Govindarāja);—‘of the inhabitants of one and the same village’ (Nārāyaṇa).

The customs here referred to are those that are not repugnant to the Scriptures (Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda).

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 65), which has the following notes:—‘Śreṇi-dharma’ customs established among such communities as those of the tradesmen and artisans, e.g., ‘such and such things are not to be sold on such a day’,—‘Kuladharma;’ e.g., ‘in this family the piercing of the ears is to be done in the fifth year’in Kṛtyakalpataru (p. 6b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 9b), which has the following notes:—‘Jātijānapada’, laws relating to tribes, castes and to localities,—‘Śreṇī’ stands for the corporation of persons belonging to the same profession,—‘Svadharma’, the law promulgated by the king himself.

Gautama (11.10, 11, 20, 21).—‘Those who leave the path of duty, he shall lead back to it;—for it is declared that he obtains a share of the spiritual merit gained by his subjects. The laws of countries, castes and families, which are not opposed to the scriptures, also have authority. Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans have authority to lay down regulations for their respective classes.’

Āpastamba (2.15.1).—‘The above considerations dispose also of the law of custom which is observed in countries or families.’

Bodhāyana (1.2.1-8).—‘There is a difference of opinion regarding live practices in the South and in the North. He who follows those practices in any other country than where they prevail, commits sin; for each of those practices, the custom of the country should he the authority. Gautama declares that this is wrong; and one should not take heed of any of these practices, because they are opposed to the traditions of the cultured.’

Vaśiṣṭha (1.17).—‘Manu has declared that the peculiar laws of countries, castes, and families may he followed in the absence of revealed texts.’

Do. (19.7).—‘Let the King, paying attention to all the laws of countries, castes and families, make the four castes fulfil their particular duties.’

Viṣṇu (3.3).—‘To keep the four castes and the four orders firm in the practice of their several duties.’

Yājñavalkya (1.360).—‘Families, castes, guilds, corporations and the provinces,—when those deviate from the paths of their duty, the King should check them and bring them round to the right path.’

Śukranīti (4.5.89-91)—‘The King should perform his duty by carefully studying the customs that are followed in countries and are mentioned in the scriptures, as well as those that are practised by castes, villages, corporations and families. Those customs that have been introduced in the country, caste or race should be maintained in the same condition; for otherwise the people get perplexed.’

Nārada (1.7).—‘Families, guilds, corporations, one appointed by the King and the King himself are invested with the power to decide law-suits,—each succeeding one being superior to the one preceding in order.’

Bṛhaspati (1.26-30).—‘Cultivators, artisans, artists, money-lenders, persons belonging to particular religious sects and robbers should adjust their disputes according to the rules of their own profession. The King shall cause the disputes of ascetics and of persons versed in sorcery and witchcraft to be settled by persons familiar with the three Vedas, and not decide them himself, for fear of rousing their resentment. Relatives, companies of artisans, assemblies, and other persons duly authorised by the King should decide law-suits among men, excepting causes concerning violent crimes; Meetings of Kindred, companies of artisans, assemblies and chief judges are declared to he the resorts for the passing of sentences,—to whom he whose cause has been previously tried may appeal in succession.’

Bṛhaspati (2.26.28).—‘When a decision is passed in accordance with local custom, logic or the opinion of traders, the issue of the case is over-ruled by it. When the King, disregarding established custom, passes sentence, it is called the edict of the king, and local custom is over-ruled by it. The time-honoured institutions of each country, caste and family should be preserved intact; otherwise the people would rise in rebellion.’

जातिधर्मः प्रसिद्धः । [जाति ब्राह्मणादिः, तच् च नित्य]त्वेनोच्यते, शास्त्रलक्षणत्वात् । जानपदः सामयिकः, न शास्त्रप्रमाणः, गोप्रचारोदकरक्षणादिः । श्रेणीधर्मो वणिक्कारुककुशीलवानां स्वकार्यसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवर्ति[तः । त]म् अपि धर्मं राजा प्रतिपादयेत् । न सामयिको ऽयम् इत्य् अनास्था कर्तव्या । यदि च राजा सामायिकेष्व् अनादरं कुर्यात्, ततो व्यवस्थाभङ्गा मात्स्यन्यायः प्रवर्तते ॥ ८.४१ ॥

041 (A king) who knows the sacred law, must inquire into the laws of castes (gati), of districts, of guilds, and of families, and (thus) settle the peculiar law of each.

For men following their respective occupations,—even though living at a distance,—come to be liked by the people, while they remain firm in their own duties.—(42)

पूर्वोक्तस्य जानपदादेर् धर्मस्य दृष्टादृष्टतानेन प्रदर्श्यते । स्वानि कर्माणि कुलस्थित्यनुरूपाणि ये कुर्वन्ति ते दूरस्था अपि प्रिया भवन्ति । सर्वस्यान्यो निकटवर्ती संसर्गातिशयात् प्रियो भवति । स्वकर्मकारी तु दूरस्थ एव प्रियः । स्वे स्वे कर्मण्य् अवस्थिता इत्य् अनेन परकर्माननुष्ठानम् आह । ये न परकर्माणि कुर्वन्ति ते सर्वस्य प्रिया भवन्तीति श्लोकार्थः ॥ ८.४२ ॥

This verse shows that the aforesaid ‘local’ and other laws serve both visible (temporal) and invisible (spiritual) purposes.

‘Their respective occupations,’—in accordance with the condition of their families;—the men who follow these^(‘)come to be liked.’ As a rule it is only men living near each other that come to be liked; but the man who follows his own occupation is liked also when he is at a distance.

‘While they remain firm in their own duties’;—this stands for not encroaching upon the work of other persons;—the meaning of the verse being that—‘those who do not encroach upon the work of others come to be liked by all men.’—(42).

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (6b).

Śukranīti (4.5.92, 100).—‘Those customs that have been introduced in the country, caste or race should be maintained in the same condition. Those whose customs have been received by traditions and have been practised by their own ancestors are not to he condemned for following them.’

Atrisaṃhitā (12).—(Same as Manu.)

सामयिकधर्मानुपालनप्रशंएयम् (?), प्ररोचनार्था ॥ ८.४२ ॥

042 For men who follow their particular occupations and abide by their particular duty, become dear to people, though they may live at a distance.

Neither the king himself nor any servant of his shall promote a suit; nor shall he suppress a suit that has been brought up by another person.—(43)

कार्यं विवादवस्तु । तद् राजा स्वयं न प्रवर्तयेत् । कस्यचिद् दूष्यस्योपघातार्थं धनिनो वा धनग्रहणार्थं न तदीयम् ऋणिकम् अन्यं वापराद्धम् उद्वेजयेत्- एष ते धारयति किम् इति ममाग्रतो नाकर्षसि, एतेन वा तावद् अपराद्धं यावद् अहम् एनं निपातयामि — इत्य् एवं राज्ञा न कर्तव्यम्, सत्य् अपि द्वेषे धनलोभे वा । न च प्रापितम् आवेदितम् अन्येनार्थिना ग्रसेत निगिरेन् नोपेक्षेतेति यावत् । अवधीरणायां निगिरेद् इति प्रयुज्यते । तत्समानार्थश् च ग्रसतिः । तथा च वक्तारो भवन्ति यावत् किंचिद् अस्योच्यते तत् सर्वं निगिरति न किंचिद् अयं प्रतिवक्ति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये तूत्तरं श्लोकार्धम् एवं व्याचक्षते । न च प्रापितं व्यवहाराद् अन्येन प्रकारेण्आर्थं धनं ग्रसेत स्वीकुर्यात् । यदि हि राजा छललेशोद्देशिकया धनदण्डे प्रवर्तेत ततः परलोके दोषो द्रष्टव्यः । स्वराज्ये¹⁶⁹ चोपघातः स्यात् ।

अथेदम् अपरं केषांचिद् व्याख्यानम् । नोत्पादयेत् स्वयं कार्यं राजा । साक्षाद् उपलभ्याप्य् अकार्यकारिणं न स्वयं किंचिद् ब्रूयात्, तस्य पराधीनेन यावद् व्यवहारेण नाकृष्टः । येन व्यवहारदर्शनम् एव पराजितस्य निग्रहाय भवति, न राजा । एतच् च ऋणादानादिष्व्¹⁷⁰ एव द्रष्टव्यम् । ये तु स्तेनसाहसिकादयः कण्टकस्थानीयास् तान् राजा स्वयम् एवावगम्य गृह्णीयात् । शेषं समानम् ।
नाप्य् अस्य पूरुष इति अस्य राज्ञः पुरुषो ऽधिकारी मनुष्यः ॥ ८.४३ ॥

‘Suit’—object of dispute;—none such shall the king himself ‘promote’—i.e., cause to be instituted;—for encompassing the injury of some hated persons, or for obtaining the wealth of some rich person, he shall not instigate his debtor or some other person who may have suffered at his hands, saying to him—‘you should do such and such a thing, why do not you bring it up before me?—or, ‘you have been injured by him, I shall have you avenged’;—any such thing the king shall not say, even though his hate or greed for riches be great.

When a suit has been ‘brought up’—presented before him—he shall not ‘suppress’—hush up, ignore, it. The verb ‘nigiret,’ ‘swallow,’ is often used in the sense of ignoring; and the root ‘gram’ (used in the text) is synonymous with ‘ni-gira’ People make use of such expressions as—‘everything that is said to-day he swallows up, and he does not answer it.’

Others explain the latter half of the verse as follows:—‘He shall not appropriate—make his own—any artha, i.e., money, that is brought to him in any manner save through the suit.’ If the king were to inflict fines in an unfair manner, he would he incurring evil in the next world and bring trouble on his kingdom.

The following is yet another explanation offered by others:—‘The king himself shall not promote a suit’;—i.e., even, though he may get at the offender directly, he himself shall not say anything, until the man has been brought before him by the man against whom the offence has been committed, in a regular suit. Because it is only after the man has been defeated in the suit brought by the other party that it is time for the king to perform his duty of inflicting the legal punishment. But this applies only to the non-payment of debts and similar subjects; as for thieves and criminals,—who are like ‘thorns’ in the kingdom,—these the king shall capture and punish, even when he catches them himself. The rest of the verse is as explained before.

‘Nor any servant of his’;—‘servant,’ i.e., person holding an office under him.—(43)

‘Anyena’—‘By another’,—i.e., the plaintiff (Medhātithi),—‘the plaintiff or the defendant’ (Kullūka).

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (on 22.5), where Bālambhaṭṭī offers the following explanations of the second half of the verse:—(a) The king should not entertain any suit illegally brought up by any one;—or (b) he shall not ignore a suit brought forward by any one;—(c) (if we adopt the reading ‘na cāprāpitam’) ‘he shall not admit into the proceedings any facts not presented by either of the two parties to the suit.’ The Subodhinī reproduces the same explanations.

It is quoted in Aparārka (p. 605), which adds the following notes:—‘Kāryam’ here means ‘suit,’ ‘dispute’;—any proved fact that may be adduced during the hearing of the suit, the king should not ignore or set aside;—in Kṛtyakalpataru (13b), which explains ‘na graset’ as ‘he should not ignore’;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 15b).

Gautama (13.27).—‘The litigant shall humbly go to seek the judge.’

Pitāmaha (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 61).—‘The King shall not himself or through his officers, promote law-suits; nor through anger or through greed or through affection, shall he suppress a suit; nor shall he, on his own account, institute suits not brought up by the parties concerned.’

Nārada (Do.).—‘The King shall not, either for asserting his power or through greed for making money out of it, create law-suits among people who have no disputes among themselves.’

नोत्पादयेत् स्वयम् उपजापेनार्थिनः कस्यचिद् उपघातस्य पौरजानपदस्य द्वेषाद् धनवतो वा लोभेन राजा, नापि तत्प्रकृतो व्यवहाराणां द्रष्टा राजब्राह्मणः । न चाप्रापितं व्यवहारेण तस्माद् अन्येन प्रकारेण ग्रसेद् अर्थं कथंचन । अथ वा पाठान्तरं व्याख्यायते, न च प्रापितं व्यवहाराद् अन्येन प्रकारेण ग्रसेद् अर्थं कथंचन । अथ वा पाठान्तरं व्याख्यायते, न च प्रापितं व्यवहाराद् अन्येन प्रकारेण ग्रसेद् अर्थं कथंचन । अन्यथा हि लोभाद् राज्ञः प्ररलोकोपघातश् च स्यात्, दृष्टश् च राज्यतन्त्रोपघातदोषः । अन्यस् त्व् आह नोत्पादयेत् स्वयं कार्यं राजा साक्षाद् अप्य् उपलभ्याकार्यकारिणम्; नापि तत्प्रकृतो राजपुरुषः, येन व्यवहारदर्शनम् एव जयपराजयोर्, इष्टेन तु राजेति नियमो राज्ञः उच्यते । अतो ऽस्य स्वयं दृष्ट्वाप्य् अतिक्रमकारिणम् उत्सृजतो न दोषो ऽस्ति । येन राज्ञा विनार्थिना स्वप्रत्ययेन व्यवहारे ऽवस्थाप्यमाने लोभरागद्वेषप्रतीतौ राज्यतन्त्रविरोधः प्रसज्यते । एवं च बृहस्पतिसमेनापि व्यवहारेणाप्राप्यमाणं न ग्राह्यम् । तथा ह्य् अस्य सर्वलोकानुरञ्जनाद् धर्मराजतन्त्रयशांसि प्रथन्ते । एवं च साक्षिप्रत्याख्यानेनाप्य् अनुमानप्रमाणशुद्धिम् आस्रित्य व्यवहारेषु तत्प्रधानः स्याद्, आन्वीक्षिक्यां चाभिविनीतः । तत्र दृष्टान्तम् आह पूर्वश्लोकार्धेन ॥ ८.४३ ॥

043 Neither the king nor any servant of his shall themselves cause a lawsuit to be begun, or hush up one that has been brought (before them) by (some) other (man).

Just as the hunter discovers the foot-print of the deer by the drops of blood, so should the king discover the right by means of inference.—(11)

यद् उक्तं न स्वयं दृष्ट्वापि राजा सहसा कंचिद् आक्रमेत वा निगृह्णीयाद् यतः नर्मणाप्य् एतत् संभवति । कथं पुनर् एतद् अवगन्तव्यम्,¹⁷¹ किं परिहासकृतम् एतद् उत क्रोधाद्यनुबन्धकृतम् इति । अत आह अनुमानेन्ऐतज् ज्ञातव्यम् । यथा मृगयुर् मृगव्याधो विद्ध्वा मृगं नष्टं दृष्टिपथाद् अपक्रान्तं छिद्रनिसृतैर् असृक्पातैः स्रवद्भिः शोणितैः पदं मृगस्य नयत्य् आसादयत्य् एवं राजानुमानेन परोक्षे प्रत्यक्षे वार्थकारणं निश्चिनुयात् । धर्मश् च कृतव्यवहारविषयस् तत्त्वावगमः । उक्तस्याप्य् अनुमानस्य पुनर्वचनं स्मृतिदार्ढ्यार्थम् ॥ ८.४४ ॥

It has been said above that the king himself shall not, in a hurry either haul anyone up or punish him for any offence; and the reason for this lies in the consideration that it is quite possible that the act that the king regards as an ‘offence’ might have been done in joke. Now the question arises—how is it to be ascertained whether the act has been done in joke or through malice and such other causes?

It is in answer to this question that it is said that ‘this is to be ascertained by means of inference.’—Just as the ‘hunter’—fowler—‘discovers’—gets at—‘the foot-print’ of the deer that has been wounded and disappeared from view by means of the drops of blood flowing from the wound,—in the same manner the king should discover the root-cause of the suit—which may be not perceptible,—by means of inference.

The term ‘dharma,’ ‘right,’ here stands for the real facts of the case.

The restriction of ‘inference’ as a means of finding out truth, already mentioned before (in verse 3), is for the purpose of emphasising the point.—(44)

Cf. 12.104; also the Mahābhārata 12.132.21.

‘Padam’—‘Footsteps’ (Medhātithi and Govindarāja)—and ‘lair’ (Kullūka and Rāghavānanda).

This verse is quoted in, Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 30);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 56);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (5a).

Gautama (11.23-24).—‘Reasoning is a means of getting at the truth; coming to a conclusion through that, he shall decide properly.’

Āpastamba (2.29.6).—‘In doubtful eases they shall give their decision after having ascertained the truth by inference, ordeals and the like.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.4-5).—‘Let him reason properly regarding an offence; finally the offence will become evident thereby.’

Nārada (1.38).—‘As a huntsman traces the vestiges of a wounded deer in a thicket by the drops of blood, even so let the King trace justice.’

Do. (1.40).—‘When it is impossible to act up to the precepts of sacred law, it becomes necessary to adopt a method founded on reasoning.’

Bṛhaspati (1.32).—‘The insight of kings surpasses by far the understandings of other persons, in the deciding of the highest, lowest and middling disputes.’

Mahābhārata (12.132.21).—‘Just as of a wounded deer, one foot-print leads to another through the blood-mark, so oven shall the King trace the steps of justice.’

तथा च प्रत्यक्षागमाव् उत्सृज्यानुमानप्रधानो व्यवहारगतौ स्याद् इत्य् अनुमानप्रशंसैषा । येन [न] सर्वः लोकप्रत्यक्षो योग्यो ऽर्थः न्याय्या स्तुतिः या प्रत्यक्षागमप्रत्याख्यानेन वेदितव्या । तथा च शेषशेषिभावाद् अपुनरुक्तौ पूर्वोत्तरश्लोकौ । अधुना व्यवहारेषु परमार्थावधारणार्थम् इदं द्रष्टुः प्रसंख्यानम् उच्यते ॥ ८.४४ ॥

044 As a hunter traces the lair of a (wounded) deer by the drops of blood, even so the king shall discover on which side the right lies, by inferences (from the facts).

When engaged in judicial proceedings, the king shall keep his eye upon the truth, upon the object, upon himself, the witness and upon the place, the time and the aspect.—(45)

व्यवहारविधौ व्यवहारकर्मणि स्थितः प्रवृत्तो न केवलं व्यवहाराक्षराणि संपश्येद् यावद् एतद् अपरं सत्यादि ।

तत्र सत्यस्य दर्शनं — यद्य् अप्य् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोर् अन्यतरेण शालीनतया परिपूर्णाक्षरं नाभिहितं तथापि यदि राजा प्रमाणान्तरतः पूर्वोक्ताद् वानुमानाद् एव कथंचिद् ईदृशो ऽयम् अर्थ इति निश्चेतुं पारयेत् तदा तद् आश्रयेन् नोपेक्षेत, अनेनैतन् न सर्वम् उक्तम् इति । तद् उक्तम्- “छलं निरस्य भूतेषु व्यवहारान् नयेन् नृपः” (य्ध् २.१९) इति ।

अर्थस्य दर्शनम् — अर्थशब्दो धनवचनः प्रयोजनवचनो वा । तत्र यदि महान्तम् अर्थम् आसादयेत् तदा त्यक्त्वाप्य् अन्यानि राजकार्याणि नोद्विजेत, व्यवहारेक्षणं कुर्याद् एव । अथ वा यदि कश्चिद् ब्रूयात् साक्षिभिर् अर्थ एतस्माद् गृहीतो ऽन्येन वा सभ्येन¹⁷² तत्र निरूपयितव्यं यद् एतद् व्यवहारपदं यदि स्वल्पं न संभवति धनग्रहणम् । अथ गुरु सभ्याः साक्षिणश् च दैन्यं गतास् तदा संभावनीयं प्रमाणान्तराच् च निश्चेतव्यम् ।

एतच् चात्मानं साक्षिणं कृत्वा गवेषणीयम् । एतद् उक्तं भवति । कण्टकशोधनन्यायेन चारैश् चारयेत् । अथ वात्मानं संपश्येद् आत्मनो ऽवस्थां संपश्येत् कोशक्षयं महाकोशतां वा । अस्मिन् पक्षे साक्षिण इति स्वतन्त्रं पदम् ।

देशस्य दर्शनम् — क्वचिद् अल्पो ऽप्य् अर्थो महत्त्वम् आसादयति, महान् अपि यो ऽन्यत्र स क्वचिल्¹⁷³ लघु भवतीति । एतद् देशस्य दर्शनम् ।

एवं कालो ऽपि द्रष्टव्यः।

रूपं व्यवहारवस्तुस्वभावः । तस्य गुरुलघुतां पश्येद् इति ।

अन्यैश् तु व्याख्यातम् । सत्यार्थयोः सारफलतां पश्येद् आत्मानं साक्षिणं कृत्वा¹⁷⁴ । एतद् उक्तं भवति । अर्थात् सत्यं गुरुत्वेन महाप्रयोजनत्वाद् उभयोर् लोकसाधनरूपतयाश्रयितव्यम् । अर्थस् त्यक्तव्यो ऽसारत्वात् । देशः स्वर्गादिः सत्यसमाश्रयप्राप्यः । कालश् चिरं तत्र वासः । रूपं सुरूपं सुन्दरं महोहरम् । एतद् एव विपरीतम्, सत्यत्यागेन केवलार्थसमाश्रयणात् ॥ ८.४५ ॥

‘When engaged in’—dealing with—‘judicial proceedings’— the king shall attend, not only to the mere letter of the suit itself, but also to truth, etc.

(a) ‘Keep his eye upon the truth’;—even though the plaintiff or the defendant, through shyness, may not have stated his case fully, yet if the king is enabled,—either on the strength of other proofs, or by means of the ‘inference’ mentioned above,—to find out what the actual facts of the case are, then he shall, by all means accept them,—and not reject them, simply because the party concerned did not state them in full. This is what has been thus declared—‘Having sifted all fraud, the king shall decide the case on facts.’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra 19.)

(b) ‘Keep eye upon the object’;—the term ‘artha,’ ‘object,’ denotes wealth or purpose. The meaning thus is that if he obtains a large amount of wealth (as the legal fee), then he shall even give up all other business of state and not hesitate to take up the ease brought up; in fact he shall begin the investigation at once. Or, the meaning may be that if some one tells him that the witnesses in the case, or some member of the Court, have received large amounts in bribe from such and such a party,—then he should examine this statement in the following manner.—‘If the cause of the suit is insignificant, the acceptance of a large bribe is not possible;—but if the cause is worth much, and the members of the court and the witnesses are in poor circumstances, then it is just possible’; and the truth shall he found out by other means. This is to be done by making (c) ‘himself’ the ‘witness’ (d). That is to say, with a view to tracing out the bad characters in his kingdom, he shall get spies to find out the truth.

Or ‘having an eye upon himself’ (e) may mean that he must attend to his own circumstances,—i.e., he should see whether his treasury is depleted or full.

Under this construction ‘witness’ is an independent word (and not in apposition to ‘himself,’ as in the former interpretation).

(e) ‘Having an eye upon the place’;—in certain places even a small object becomes great, while in another even a great object becomes small. This is what is meant by ‘having an eye upon the place.’

(f) Similarly he should have his eye upon the time also.

(g) ‘Aspect’ stands for the nature of the cause; he shall find out whether it is important or unimportant.

Others have explained the verse as follows:—‘He shall find out the real nature of (a) the truth and (b) the object of the suit, by making (c) himself the witness (d); that is to say, he shall find out that truth is more important than any object, since it accomplishes very important ends and is useful in both worlds, and hence he should always have recourse to truth, and ignore the object, which is devoid of essence. (e) ‘Place,’ in this case stands for heaven and the other regions, obtainable by means of truth; (f) ‘time’ for a prolonged stay in other regions, and (g) ‘aspect’ for the beauty of the celestial damsels. And the reverse of all this is obtained by the renouncing of truth and the following of other objects.—(45).

‘Artham’—The value of the suit and the motive behind it’ (Medhātithi);—‘such suit as deals with things of value, like cattle, gold and the like’ (Kullūka);—‘money realisable by fine’ (Nārāyaṇa);—‘the aim’ (Nandana).

‘Ātmānam sākśiṇam’—‘Looking upon himself as the witness’; or ‘looking upon his own position, and that of the witness adduced’ (Medhātithi);—Kullūka and others have the latter explanation only.

^(‘)Deśam kālam’—‘Considerations of the place and time of the offence committed’ (Medhātithi and Rāghavānanda); ‘what is befitting the time and place’ (Kullūka);—‘customs of the country and what is befitting the time’ (Nārāyaṇa); ‘place of offence and age of the offender’ (Govindarāja); ‘Heavy and continued residence there’ (‘others’ in Medhātithi).

‘Rūpam’—‘Aspect of the case’ (Medhātithi, Kullūka and Nandana);—‘looks of the parties’ (Narāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda);—‘beauty of the celestial damsels’ (‘others’ in Medhātithi),

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (p. 5a), which has the following notes:—‘Satyam paśyet’, the meaning is that even though the statements of the two parties are not clear enough to justify a decision, yet if, by inference and other means, the king is able to form some decision, he should fix upon that;—‘artham’, gold, cattle and other kinds of property;—‘ātmānam’, he should look upon himself as participating in the effects of the trial;—‘rūpam’, form of the object in dispute, i.e., its importance or otherwise.

Yājñavalkya (2.19).—‘The King shall investigate suits, by setting aside mistake or casuistry by facts.’

Nārada (1.29-31).—‘Truth rests on true facts; Error is what rests on mistake of facts. Ordeals even are rendered nugatory by artful men; therefore let no mistake be committed in regard to place, time, quantity and so on. A king who acts justly must reject error when it is brought forward and seek truth alone; because prosperity depends on due performance of duty.’

सत्यार्थयोः सारफल्गुतां पश्येद् आत्मानं साक्षिणं कृत्वा, तथात्मनो महति स्थाने स्वर्गादौ धर्मेणावस्थानम्, अवस्थानकालं च तस्य महान्तम् । अथ वा कालं च आयुषः, इहाल्पं जरसाभिभवाद्; आत्मनो रूपविपर्ययः अनेकव्याधियोगाच् च । अथ वा रूपं तनुमनस्तृप्तिकरं निरवद्यम् अप्रत्यनीकं निरतिशयसुखोपभोगं च स्वर्गवासिनाम् अभिसमीक्ष्यार्थत्यागेन सत्यं परिगृह्णीयात् स्वर्गप्राप्तिसाधनम् । अथ वा पाठान्तरम् अस्येदम् अन्यत्- “सत्यम् अर्थेषु” व्यवहारेषु संपश्येत् । न छलम् इति छलप्रतिषेधार्थो ऽयम् आरम्भयत्नः । शेषम् अन्यद् यथोक्तम् ॥ ८.४५ ॥

045 When engaged in judicial proceedings he must pay full attention to the truth, to the object (of the dispute), (and) to himself, next to the witnesses, to the place, to the time, and to the aspect.

What may be found to have been observed in practice by the good and the righteous twice-born men, that he shall ordain for countries, families and castes,—provided that it is not antagonistic.—(46)

सन्तः प्रतिषिद्धवर्जकाः, धार्मिकाः विहितानुष्ठायिनः । यद्य् अप्य् एक एव शब्द उभयम् अर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं शक्नोति तथापि भेदोपानानाद् विषयविभागेनैवं व्याख्यायते । तैर् यद् आचरितम् अनुपलभ्यमानश्रुतिस्मृतिवाक्यं तद् देशकुलजातीनां प्रकल्पयेद् अनुष्ठापयेत् । अविरुद्धं श्रुतिस्मृतिभिर् उपलभ्यमानाभिः । यद् उक्तम् “जातिजानपदान् धर्मान्” (म्ध् ८.४१) इत्य् अत्र श्लोके देशकुलाद्याचारस्य प्रामाण्यम्, तस्यानेन विशेषः कथ्यते । आम्नायेनाविरोधे¹⁷⁵ तत् प्रमाणम्, न विरोधे तत् प्रमाणम् । तेन दृष्टार्थान्य् अपि ग्रामदेशराजकार्याणि शास्त्राविरुद्धान्य् आदरणीयानि, न विरुद्धानि । यथा क्वचिद् देश ऋणिक आत्मानं विक्रय्य धनं दाप्यते । तच् च “कर्मणापि समम्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इत्य् अनेन विरुद्धम् । अन्यच् च श्लोकेन दर्शितम् । अन्यस्य त्व् आचारस्य शिष्टसंबन्धितयैव प्रामाण्यम् उक्तम् “आचारश् चैव साधूनाम्” (म्ध् २.६) इति । न च तद्विरुद्धार्थसमाचरणेन साधुत्वम् उपपद्यते । तस्माद् यन् नादृष्टाय¹⁷⁶ तद्विषयो ऽयम् उपदेशः ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्यस् त्व् आह । देशान्तरे धार्मिकैः सद्भिर् द्विजैर् यद् अविरुद्धं¹⁷⁷ श्रुत्या स्मृत्यन्तरेण वाचर्यते तद् देशान्तरे ऽपि राजा प्रकल्पयेत् । यथा उद्वृषभयज्ञादय उदीच्येषु प्रसिद्धास् ते प्राच्यैर् दाक्षिणात्यैः प्रतीच्यैश् चानुष्ठेयाः । कुतः । आचाराद् धि स्मृतिर् अनुमातव्या, स्मृतेः श्रुतिः । सा च यद्य् एवम् अनुमीयते “उदीच्यैर् एतत् कर्तव्यम्” इति, तत्र तद्धितस्य बहुष्व् अर्थेषु स्मरणात् “तत्र जातः” (पाण् ४.३.२५), “तत्र भवः” (पाण् ४.३.५३), “तत आगतः” (पान् ४.३.७४), तम् अभिप्रस्थितः “शेषे” (पाण् ४.२.९२) इति चैतस्य लक्षणविकारोभयरूपत्वाद्¹⁷⁸ अन्येष्व् अप्य् अर्थेषु प्रतिपदम् अनुपातेषु¹⁷⁹ तद्धितस्मरणान् नास्त्य् उदीच्यो नाम, य उदीच्यशब्देन निवर्त्येत । ततश् च पुरुषमात्रेणैतत् कर्तव्यम् इत्य् आपतति, देशसमाख्याया नियतनिमित्तत्वाभावेनानियामकत्वात् । अथैवं वाक्यम् अनुमीयेत- “उदीच्यां जातेन तद्देशवासिना वा,” तद् अपि व्यभिचारि । तत्र जातो ऽपि¹⁸⁰ नान्यत्र करोति, तन्निवास्य् अप्य् अन्यत्र जातो न करोत्य् एव । अथ “उदग्देशाभिजनस् तन्निवासी च” इति- अनित्यत्वाद्¹⁸¹ अभिजननिवासयोस् तद् अपि न युक्तम् एव । न हि जातिगुणगोत्राणीवाभिजननिवासौ नित्यौ । तस्मान् नित्यस्य¹⁸² कस्यचिद् अनुष्ठातॄणाम् अवछेदकस्यानुपपत्तेः सर्वविषया धर्माः । न देशधर्मा नाम केचन सन्ति । अनेनैव न्यायेन कुलधर्मा अपि ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">कथं तर्हि “देशधर्माः कुलधर्माः” इति च स्मृतिकारैर् भेदेन व्यपदिश्यन्ते ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">उक्तं दृष्टार्था नियता व्यवस्था । तत्र धर्मस् तस्य च नियम उपपद्यत इति उक्तम् । कुलं च गोत्रैकदेशः । यस् तु कृत्स्नगोत्रधर्मः, यथा “न वासिष्ठा वैश्वामित्रैः संबध्नीयुः”¹⁸³ इति, स नित्यत्वाद् गोत्रव्यपदेशस्य नित्य एवेति¹⁸⁴ विरम्यते ॥ ८.४६ ॥

यत् सर्वेषु व्यवहारपदेषु साधारणं तद् उक्तम् । विशेषविवक्षायाम् इदम् आह ।

‘Good’—those who eschew what is forbidden;—‘righteous’—those who do what is enjoined. Though either one of these two words would have sufficed to express what is meant, yet they have both been used; that is the reason why we have explained them as having two different meanings.—What is practised by such persons, and in support of which we do not find any Śruti or Smṛti texts,—‘that he shall ordain’—cause to be acted up to—‘for countries, families and castes’;—‘provided that it is not antagonistic’—to directly perceptible Śruti and Smṛti texts.

Verse 41 has declared the authoritative character of ‘provincial laws, laws of families, etc., etc.’; and the present verse adds the qualification that such laws shall be not opposed to the scriptures. Local and king-made laws also, even when they pertain to temporal affairs, are to be obeyed only when they are not contrary to the scriptures. For instance, in some places the debtor is made to repay the debt by selling himself; and this is contrary to the Smṛti text—‘by service also the debt may be liquidated, etc.’ (Manu, 177); as is shown under that verse. Further, under 2.6, the authority of Practice (usage) has been explained as based only upon the fact of its being connected with (observed by) cultured men; and no man can be called ‘cultured’ if he acts contrary to the scriptures. Hence the present Terse is meant to be applicable to such practices as do not pertain to spiritual matters.

Another writer explains the text as follows:—What is practised by the good and righteous twice-born men in one country, the king should introduce in another country also, if it is found to ho not antagonistic to Śruti and Smṛti texts. E.g., the bull-sacrifice and other similar acts that are well known among the people of the North should be made to be performed by the people of the East, South and West also. Because from usage, we deduce the corresponding Smṛti, and from this latter the corresponding Śruti; so that if the text thus deduced on the strength of the practice of the northerners were in some such form as that such and such a sacrifice shall he performed by the udīcyas, people of the north’—then since the nominal affix conveys several such meanings,—such as (a) birth, (b) source, (c) origin, (d) destination and (e) supplement,—all which fall within one or other of the two categories of ‘distinctive’ feature and ‘modification,’—none of these as denoted by the nominal affix in the term ‘udīcya’ could help to mark off any people that could be called ‘udīcya’ ‘northerner’; so that the meaning of the said deduced text would come to be that every man should perform the act in question; specially as the exact denotation of names of countries is always vague. Even if the text deduced were in the form—‘the act is to be done by one who is born in the north, or who lives in that country,’—then this would not be compatible with facts; since as a matter of fact, a man, even though horn in a particular country, does not follow its usage when he lives elsewhere, or even though a man may be living in a certain country, he does not adopt its practice if he is not born there. If again, the terms used were ‘the native or inhabitant of such and such a country,’ then also, in as much as nativity and habitation are always uncertain, this also would not be right; neither nativity nor habitation is fixed to the same extent as one’s caste or qualities or race. Thus there being no such term as would infallibly single out the performers of the acts in question, they should he taken as to be performed by all men; so that there is no such thing as ‘local usage.’ The same reasoning holds good regarding ‘family usage’ also.

“If this is so, then how is it that smṛti-writers mention ‘local usage,’ ‘family usage’ and ‘caste-usage’ as distinct from one another?”

It has been already explained that the restriction of the acts concerned is for temporal purposes; and in this sense the restriction regarding acts is quite reasonable.

‘Family’ is a part of ‘race.’ The duty that is laid down for the entire race,—such as people of the Vaśiṣṭha-race shall not mix with those of the Viśvāmitra-race,’—are to be regarded as binding, since race-names are fixed for all time.—(46)

According to Medhātithi this verse permits the king to admit the authority of only such local and family customs and practices as are not contrary to Śruti and Smṛti,—Kullūka, Nārāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda, however, take it to mean that he is to accept as authority only such scriptural rules of conduct as are not contrary to local and family customs,—According to ‘others’ (mentioned by Medhātithi) what, the verse means is that ‘whatever virtuous practices the king finds being followed in one country, those he shall introduce in other countries also, if they are not contrary to scriptural texts.’

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 25), which says that family and country customs are to be regarded as right, but only when they are not repugnant to Śruti and other authoritative sources of knowledge.

Gautama (11.20).—‘The laws of countries, castes and families, which are not opposed to sacred texts, have authority.’

Āpastamba (2.15.1).—‘The law of custom observed in particular countries and families.’

Kātyāyana (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 58).—‘Therefore the King shall decide suits according to the scriptures; in the absence of texts bearing upon the subject, he shall come to a decision on the basis of the custom obtaining in the land. That is called the custom of a land which has been followed for all time and which is not repugnant to Śruti or Smṛti.’

Pitāmaha (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 58).—‘Whatever is done by the elders,—be it right or wrong,—in accordance with the practice prevalent in the land or in the family, is called custom. For villages, corporations, cities, guilds, traders and army, suits should be dealt with according to custom;—so says Bṛhaspati. When the dispute lies between parties belonging to these same corporations, etc., their custom is the determining factor; but when it lies between them and others, then it is to be dealt with according to the scriptures.’

सद्भिः प्रतिषिद्धवर्जकैः, धार्मिकैश् च विहितार्थानुष्ठातृभिः । अथ वा धार्मिकैः सद्भिः, सच्छब्दः सत्तार्थो न पुनरुक्तसामर्थ्याद् । उभयविशेषणैर् ब्राह्मणैः । अथ वा सद्भिर् अध्ययनविज्ञानवद्भिः, धार्मिकैश् च शास्त्रार्थस्थैर् यद् आचरितं स्यात्, तद् देशकुलजातीनां वेदस्मृतिशास्त्राविरुद्धं प्रकल्पयेत् । तथा च स्मृत्यन्तरं “शिष्ट्[आचारश् च शास्त्राविरुद्धं] प्रमाणम्” । न तु तद्विरोधि, शुकशारिकाभक्षणादि । एवं च यच् छिष्टैः कथंचित् कदाचित् चाचरितं गृह्यमाणार्थतया तद् राज्ञा निर्वर्त्यम् । अथ वा जातिजानपदादिधर्माणाम् उ[पदेशार्थो ऽयम् आर]म्भः । ते हि दृष्टार्था अपि सन्तः शास्त्राविरुद्धा एव राज्ञा कर्तव्याः । न तद्विरोधिनः । यतः “जातिजानपदं धर्मं” श्लोकशेष एवायम् । एवं चास्यापौनरुक्त्यं विज्ञेयम् ।

यत् त्व् आह सद्भिर् आचरितं यत् स्याद् इत्य् एतच् छ्लोकार्थम् । देशान्तरे धार्मिकैः सद्भिर् यद् आचर्यते अविरुद्धं श्रुत्या स्मृत्यन्तरेण वा तद् देशान्तरे ऽपि राजा [प्रकल्पयेत्, तद्देशस्थ्]आन् करायेत् (?) । तथा कुलैकदेशकालनियतम्, कर्णवेधादि यद् आचर्यते, तद् अपि कृत्स्ने कुले प्रकल्पयेत् । एवं विजातिनिमित्तो यो विवाहकाले ऽध्य्[आयादिः प्रवर्तितो भवति तम्] अपि सर्वस्यां जातौ प्रकल्पयेत् । राजावष्टम्भाच् चैषां धर्मानां प्रथनम् (?) अवस्थितिश् च यथा स्याद् इत्य् अवम् अर्थं राजधर्षूच्यते । कृतपरिभाषं व्यवहारदर्शनम् अधुना प्रस्तूयते ॥ ८.४६ ॥

046 What may have been practised by the virtuous, by such twice-born men as are devoted to the law, that he shall establish as law, if it be not opposed to the (customs of) countries, families, and castes (gati).

On being prayed by the creditor for the recovery of money from the debtor, he shall make the debtor pay to the creditor the money proved to be due.—(47)

“सोपचयं कालान्तरे दास्यामि” इति यो धनम् अन्यस्माद् गृह्णाति सो ऽधर्मर्णः । यस् तु “सोपचयं प्रत्यादास्यामि” इति प्रयुङ्क्ते स उत्तमर्णः । संबन्धिशब्धाव् एतौ । अधमर्णस्यार्थः । अर्थो धनं प्रकरणाद् यद् एवोत्तमर्णाय देयं तद् एवोच्यते । तस्य सिद्धिर् उत्तमर्णं प्रति निर्याणम्¹⁸⁵ । द्वितीयो ऽर्थशब्दः प्रयोजनवचनः । अयं समुदायार्थः । उत्तमर्णेन यदा राजा चोदितो भवत्य् अधमर्णेन यो गृहीतो ऽर्थः स मे सिद्ध्यतु, दापयतु, भवान्, राजा त्व् अधमर्णात् तदा दापयेद् धनिकस्यार्थम् । धनम् अस्यास्तीति धनिकः । उत्तमर्ण एव च प्रसिद्ध्या धनिक उच्यते । दापयेद् इति संबन्धाच् चतुर्थी प्राप्ता । सा त्व् अपूर्णत्वात् संप्रदानभावस्य न कृता । यथा घ्नतः पृष्ठं ददाति, रजकस्य वस्त्रं ददातीति । न ह्य् अत्र मुख्यो ददात्यर्थः । इहाप्य् उभयोः स्वत्वस्य भावाद् उभयोः स्वत्वाभावाद् अपरिपूर्णो ददातीत्यर्थः ।

किम् उत्तमर्णवचनाद् एवासौ दापयितव्यः । नेत्य् आह- विभावितम् इति । यदा निश्चितेन प्रमाणेन धारयतीति प्रतिपद्यते । अथ वा विभावितः स्वयं प्रतिपन्नः । यतो विप्रतिपन्नस्य वक्ष्यति “अपह्नवे ऽधमर्णस्य” (म्ध् ८.५२) इति । कथं पुनः स्वयं प्रतिपन्नो विभावित इत्य् उच्यते । नैष दोषः । विस्मरणे स्वहस्तलेख्यादिना स्वयं प्रतिपन्नश् च भवति । विभावितश् चाप्रतिपन्नश् च जानानो ऽपि मिथ्याप्रतिपन्नः ॥ ८.४७ ॥

The rules that are applicable to all suits in common having been described, the author now proceeds to lay down those relating specifically to each of the several kinds of suits.

The man who receives money from another person on the understanding that at some other time he would re-pay it with interest is called the ‘debtor’; and he who lends the money on the understanding that he is doing it with a view to being repaid with interest is called the ‘creditor.’ These two are relative terms.

‘Money from the debtor’;—from the context it is clear that this phrase stands for what is due to the creditor; and the ‘recovery’ of this means its repayment to the creditor. The second ‘artha’ stands for purpose, ‘for.’ Thus the meaning of the whole is that—‘when the king is prayed—petitioned to—by the creditor to the effect that he may be pleased to make the debtor repay what he had borrowed from him,—then the King shall make the debtor pay the money to the creditor.’

‘Dhanika’ is one who has money; and it is the creditor who is called, in ordinary parlance, ‘Dhanika.’ In view of the verb ‘make to pay.’—the right case-ending to use would have been the Dative, yeṭ iṭ has not been used, because the man has not yet become the actual recipient. We have similar usage in such expressions as ‘ghnataḥ pṛṣṭham dadati’ (the man offers his back to the striker), ‘rajakasya rastram dadāli’ (makes over the clothes to the washerman); in neither of these cases have we the Dative ending, because there is no transference of ownership; and in the absence of such transference, the act of giving is not completed.

The question arising as to whether the King is to make the debtor pay simply because the creditor says it is his due, the answer is no,—he shall make him pay only what is proved to be due;—i.e., only when the King has assured himself, by indubitable proof, that, the man does really owe the amount; or ‘vibhāvitam’ may be taken to mean ‘admitted’; since the method to be employed regarding disputed debts is going to be laid down below, under verse 52.

“But how can ‘vibhāvita’ mean admitted?”

There is no force in this objection; it is quite possible that he may have forgotten about the debt, but on being shown his own writing (on the deed), he comes to admit it himself; so that though he did not admit it before, he comes to admit it afterwards; or it. may he that even though knowing all along that he did borrow the money, he might dissemble in the beginning (before the producing of the document).—(47)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 76), which adds the following explanation;—‘when the debtor has received something,—and the creditor approaches the king for the recovery of that, then the king should have the creditor’s dues paid to him by the debtor;—if it is adhamarṇavibhāvitam, that is, if it is proved by the creditor that the amount claimed is really due from the debtor’;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (80b).

The clear meaning, specially in view of verse 51, appears to be ‘if the debt is admitted by the debtor.’

Viṣṇu (6.20-22).—‘If a creditor sues before the King and fully proves bis demand, the debtor shall pay as fine to the King a tenth part of the sum proved. The creditor, having received the sum due, shall pay a twentieth part of it. If the whole demand has been contested by the debtor, and even a part of it only has been proved against him, he must pay the whole.’

Matsyapurāṇa (Rājadharma, 227.4),—‘The man who, having received a loan, does not repay it in due course, should be compelled to repay it, and should also he fined the first amercement.’

अधमः ऋणे अधर्मर्णः । को ऽसौ । गृहीता । कस्य हेतोः । येनासौ तद् ऋणं सोपचयं प्रतिदेयं परिगृह्णाति, अशक्यसंशोध्यं बहुक्लेशं च । दाता तूत्तमर्णः । येनासौ सोपचयं प्रत्यादेयं ददाति । अतश् चोत्तम ऋणे दीयमाने भवति । एवं च सति कालेन द्विगुणीभूते अद्विगुणीभूते वा यदाधमर्णो याच्यमानस् तद्धर्नं न ददाति तदा तस्य सिद्ध्यर्थम् उत्तमर्णेन चोदितो राजा धनिकस्यार्थं दापयेद् अधमर्णाद् अधमर्णं वा । सामान्यो ऽयं व्यवहारनिर्देशः ॥ ८.४७ ॥

047 When a creditor sues (before the king) for the recovery of money from a debtor, let him make the debtor pay the sum which the creditor proves (to be due).

Having determined the means by which the debtor may be able to get his money, he shall, by those same means, make the debtor pay up.—(48)

नेहाप्राप्तार्थाद् उत्तमर्णाद् राज्ञे भागं वक्ष्यत्य् अधर्मणाद् दण्डम् । तत्र स्वभागतृष्णया राजान उपायान्तरेण धनमार्गणं धनिकानां कारयेयुर् अतस् तन्निवृत्त्यर्थम् इदम् उच्यते । यैर् यैर् वक्ष्यमाणैर् उपायैः स्वधनं पूर्वप्रयुक्तम् उत्तमर्णो लभेत तैस् तैर् अधमर्णं दापयेत् । संगृह्य स्थिरीकृत्य । अनेनैवोपायेनैतस्माद् एतल् लभ्यत इत्य् एतन् निश्चित्येत्य् अर्थः । अथ वानुकूलम् उपसान्त्वनं संग्रहः¹⁸⁶ । उत्तमर्ण एव उत्तमर्णिकः । उत्तमं च तद् ऋणं चोत्तमर्णम् । तद् अस्यास्तीत्य् उत्तमर्णिकः । “अत इनिठनौ” (पाण् ५.२.११५) इति रूपम् । एवम् इतराव् अपि । सर्वधनादिषु प्रक्षेप्तव्याव् अन्यत्र वीरपुरुषको ग्राम इतिवद् बहुव्रीहिणैव सामानाधिकरण्यस्य मत्वर्थे चोक्तार्थाविशेषेण समासः । मत्वरीयश् च दुर्लभः¹⁸⁷ । वृद्धिलाभार्थं प्रयोगविषयं धनम् ऋणम् । द्वौ च तस्य संबन्धिनौ प्रयोक्ता ग्रहीता च । प्रयोजकस्य च तद् उत्तमं भवति । स्वतन्त्रो धनदाने प्रत्यादाने च । इतरस्य सोपचयदानाद् बह्वायामत्वाच् चाधमत्वम् । व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं त्व् एतत् । रूढ्यैव त्व् एतौ प्रयोक्तृग्रहीत्रोर् वाचकौ । के पुनस् तत्रोपाया इत्येतत्प्रदर्शनार्थ उत्तरश्लोकः ॥ ८.४८ ॥

It is going to be laid down later on that when the debtor is forced to repay the creditor’s dues, a certain percentage has to be paid to the King by the debtor, by way of penalty; so that it might be possible for the King to fall into the temptation of decreeing, without having recourse to other possible means, the creditor’s suit and thereby adding to his own income; in order to guard against thiis [this/thus?], we have the present text.

The King shall make the debtor pay up, by those means,—going to be described—by which the creditor may receive his money;—‘saṅgṛhya’ ‘having determined,’ i.e., having ascertained that ‘by such and such moans alone would the creditor receive his due.’ Or the root ‘graha’ in ‘saṅgṛhya’ may be taken as denoting persuasion.

The term ‘uttamarṇika’ is the same as ‘uttamarṇa,’ ‘creditor’; i.e., he who has the ‘debt,’ ‘ṛṇa,’ to his ‘good,’ ‘credit,’ ‘uttama’; the word being formed with the affix ‘ṭhan,’ according to Pānini 5.2.115; similarly with the other term also (‘adhamarṇikah’). Money advanced for the earning of interest is called ‘ṛṇa,’ ‘debt’; and there are two parties to it, the giver and the receiver; for the giver the debt is to the good, ‘uttama,’ as in the matter of giving it and receiving it he is an independent agent; for the receiver on the other hand, it is to the bad, ‘adhama,’ because it is a source of trouble to him or account of his having to pay interest on it.

These explanations however are offered only by way of explaining the literal signification of the terms; in reality, they have their denotation as referring to the giver and receiver—fixed purely by conventional usage.

The next verse explains what are the ‘means’ referred to in this verse.—(48)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 67), which explains ‘Saṅgṛhya’ as ‘vaśīkṛtya, ‘compelling’;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (78b).

Bṛhaspati (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 382).—‘The debtor who has admitted the loan should be made to pay by such methods as are conciliatory and so forth; also by such means as force, confinement in the house and the rest.’

प्रतिपन्नार्थम् अधमर्णं सान्त्वनादिभिर् उपायैर् उत्तमर्णचोदितो दापयेत् । नास्य तन्त्रोत्सादनं कुर्याद् इत्य् एवम् अर्थम् उपायनिर्देशः । धर्मः प्रथमः । एवं चोभयोर् अप्य् अविरोधाद् राज्ञानुग्रहो ऽनुष्ठितो भवति । ते च सामान्यत उक्ताः दापनोपाया विशेषतो निर्दिश्यन्ते ॥ ८.४८ ॥

048 By whatever means a creditor may be able to obtain possession of his property, even by those means may he force the debtor and make him pay.

He shall make the advanced money repaid by means of (a) good faith, (b) tactful transaction, (c) trick, (d) moral pressure, and (c) force, the fifth.—(49)

तत्र धर्मस्कन्धकरीत्या स्तोकं स्तोकं ग्रहणम् — “इदम् अद्य, इदं श्व, इदं परश्वः, यथा कुटुम्बसंवाहो ऽस्यैवं वयम् अपि तव कुऋउम्बभूताः संविभागयोग्याः” — इत्यादि पठितप्रयोगो धर्मः । यस् तु निःस्वः स व्यवहारेण¹⁸⁸ दापयितव्यः । अन्यत्र कर्णोदकवद् धनं दत्वा कृषिवाणिज्यादिना व्यवहारयितव्यम् । तत्रोत्पन्नं धनं तस्माद् ग्रहीतव्यम् । यस् तु व्यवहारो राजनिवेद्यस् तस्य सर्वोपायपरिक्षये योज्यत्वाद् बलग्रहणेन¹⁸⁹ च गृहीतत्वात् । यस् तु साक्षान् न ददाति विद्यमानधनो ऽपि स छलेन दापयितव्यः । केनचिद् अपदेशेन विवाहोत्सवादिना कटकाद्याभरणं गृहीत्वा न दातव्यम्, यावद् अनेन तद् धनं न दत्तम् । आचरितम् अभोजनगृहद्वारोपवेशनादि । बलं राजाधिकरणोपस्थानम् । तत्र राजा साम्नाप्रयच्छन्तं निगृह्य च प्रपीड्य दापयतीति । न तु¹⁹⁰ स्वगृहसंबन्धिधनादि बलम्, यतः “प्रकृतीनां बलं राजा” इति पठ्यते अस्मिन्न् एव प्रसङ्गे उशनसा ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये तु राज्ञ एवायम् उपदेश इति वर्णयन्ति, राजधर्मप्रकरणात् । राजा ज्ञापित उपायैर् एनं दापयेत् पराजितं स्वयं प्रतिपन्नं च । न तु सहसावष्टभ्य सर्वस्वं धनिने प्रतिपादनीयः । यत उभयानुग्रहो राज्ञा कर्तव्यः । सर्वस्वदाने चाधर्मणस्य कुटुम्बोत्सादः स्यात् सो ऽपि न युक्तः । उक्तं हि-

• नावसाद्य शनैर् दाप्यः काले काले यथोदयम् ।

• ब्राह्मणस् तु विशेषेण धार्मिके सति राजनि ॥ इति ।

तस्मात् किंचन वृद्ध्या संदापनीयः । कुटुम्बाद् अधिकधनसंभवे सर्वं दापनीयः । सर्वासंभवे च “कर्मणापि समं कुर्यात्” (म्ध् ८.१७७) इति । अन्यस्मिन् व्याख्याने छलाचारौ राजानम् अज्ञापयित्वा न कार्यौ ॥ ८.४९ ॥

(a) ‘Dharmeṇa,’ ‘by means of good faith’;—i.e., receiving little by little;—‘so much to-day, so much to-morrow, so much the day after to-morrow;—just as it behoves him to maintain his family, so also is it his duty to help me,—I also am a member of his family and as such a sharer in his wealth,’—the use of such language constitutes ‘good faith.’

(b) The man who has absolutely no property should be made to repay the debt by ‘tactful transaction’; on the same principle on which, for the purpose of drawing out water from the ear one puts more water into it, the creditor should advance to the debtor more money, in order to enable him to have recourse to agriculture or trade or some other means of acquiring wealth, and then receive from him the wealth thus obtained. The ‘vyavahāra’ that consists in filing a suit before the King is not what is meant by the term as used hero; since one should have recourse to this only when all other means have failed, and as such it is included under ‘force.’

(c) When, even though possessed of the requisite wealth, the debtor does not pay in a straight manner, he should be made to pay by means of ‘trick’; i.e., under some such pretext as that of a marriage-ceremony or some such occasion, he should borrow from him a bracelet or some such ornament, and not return it until the debt has been cleared off.

(d) ‘Moral pressure’;—by giving up food and constantly sitting at the man’s door and so forth.

(e) ‘Force’;—presenting one’self before the King’s court; where the King shall have the man called quietly and by inflicting some punishment make him pay up. The ‘bala’ of the text does not mean the creditor’s strength in the shape of his relatives and wealth, etc.; because of the maxim that the ‘force’ or ‘strength’ of the subject lies in the King, which has been propounded in connection with the present context.

Others have explained the verse ṭo mean that by the means here enumerated the King shall have the debt repaid;—and their reason for saying so lies in the fact that it occurs in the context dealing with the duties of the King. The sense of the verse thus is that ‘when the amount claimed has been either admitted by the debtor or decreed by the court, the King shall make him pay it up by these methods;—and he shall not, all at once, have the entire property of the debtor handed over to the creditor; since the kindly treatment of both parties constitutes the King’s duty: and if the debtor’s entire property were handed over to the creditor, his whole family would perish, and this would not be right. To this end we have the declaration—‘Without absolutely ruining him, the debtor should he made to pay little by little, according to his income, specially so in the case of the Brāhmaṇa,—when the King is righteous.’ So that the man should be made to pay the principal along with a small amount as interest; but in the event of the man possessing wealth more than what is needed for the maintenance of his family, he should be made to pay the entire amount of the claim; and if this be not possible, then ‘the debt shall be liquidated by service, etc.’ (8.177).

In the former explanation, the creditor shall not have recourse to ‘trick’ or ‘moral pressure,’ without notifying the same to the King.—(49).

‘Vyavahāreṇa’.—‘By business-transaction: advancing more money to the debtor with which, as capital, the latter would carry on some trade, with the profits of which he would gradually clear off the older debt also’ (Medhātithi);—‘by law-suit’ (Govindarāja, Kullūka and Narāyāṇa; noted but rejected by Medhātithi);—‘by threatening a suit’ (Nandana);—‘by forced sale of property’ (Rāghavānanda).

Both Buhler and Hopkins represent Medhātithi as explaining this term to mean ‘forced labour’. But there is nothing in Medhātithi to show this. What Medhātithi means is quite clear, and it is made clearer by the illustration given by him of ‘karṇodaka’; it is a common practice in India that when water gets into the ear and cannot be easily got out, people pour more water into it, and along with this latter, the former water also flows out.

This verse is quoted in and Aparārka (p. 645), which adds the following notes:—‘dharma:’ is ‘truth’,—‘vyavahāra’, stands for such evidence as is documentary, oral and so forth,—‘chala’ is trick,—‘ācaritam,’ ‘custom of the country’,—‘balam’ means oppression by starving and so forth.

It is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 67);—and in Mitākṣarā (on 2.40), which adds the following notes:—‘dharmeṇa,’ i.e., ‘by truthful persuasion’,—‘vyavahāreṇa’, i.e., ‘by adducing witnesses, documents and other kinds of evidence’,—‘chalena’, i.e., borrowing from him ornaments and other things under the pretext of some ceremonies &c. in the family,—‘ācaritena’, i.e., by starving,—the fifth method being the application of ‘bala’, force, in the shape of keeping him chained and so forth;—by these methods is the creditor to recover the money that he had advanced on interest.

It is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 191);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 19a);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (78b).

Nārada (4.122).—(Same as Manu.)

Kātyāyana (Vivādaratnākara, p. 67).—‘When the debtor is openly arrested and brought before the assembly of men and kept there till he pays—this, being in consonance with the custom of the country, is called Legal Proceedings. By beating, by arresting, by work, by law-suit, and first of all, by peaceful persuasion,—should the creditor obtain repayment of his dues.’

Nārada (1.122).—‘By the mode consonant with religion, by legal proceedings, by fraud, by customary mode, and fifthly, by force, a creditor may recover what he has lent.’

Bṛhaspati (11.54 et seq.).—‘When a debtor has admitted a debt, it may he recovered from him by the expedients of friendly expostulation, by moral suasion, by artful management, by compulsion and by confinement in the house. When a debtor is caused to pay by the advice of friends and kinsmen, by friendly remonstrances, by constant following, or by the creditor starving himself, it is termed Moral Suasion. When a creditor with a crafty design, borrows something from the debtor and withholds it as a pledge, and thereby enforces payment of the debt, it is termed Artful Management;—when the debtor is fettered and conducted to the creditor’s house, where he is compelled by beating and other forcible means, to pay the debt, it is called Compulsion;—when the debtor is made to pay by confining his son, wife, or cattle, or by sitting at his door, it is termed Confinement in the House.’

धर्मेण साम्नानुद्वेजयन् शनैर् दापयेत्, शपथेन वा संप्रतिपत्तौ । तावद् एवम् अप्रतिपत्तौ व्यवहारेण वक्ष्यति; छलेन वानेकप्रकारेणापि विश्वास्य; आचरितेन वाभोजनगृहद्वारोपवेशनादिना लोकसमाचरितेन; बलेन वा स्वगृहबन्धनादिना मा भूद् अस्यार्थक्षयो राजसमावेशनेन । एवं च सत्य् अत्र नास्ति कश्चिद् धर्मातिक्रमो, यस्माद् अतः —

049 By moral suasion, by suit of law, by artful management, or by the customary proceeding, a creditor may recover property lent; and fifthly, by force.

The creditor who shall himself recover his money from the debtor should not be prosecuted by the king, for recovering what is his own property.—(50)

उक्तस्यैवार्थस्य स्पष्टीकरणार्थः श्लोकः । न छलादिनोपायेन स्वेच्छय्ओत्तमर्णो ऽधमर्णाद् धनं संसाधयन् राज्ञा किंचिद् वक्तव्यः- “माम् अविज्ञाप्य किम् इत्य् अस्माद् आभरणादि स्वधनसंशुद्ध्यर्थं व्याजेन छद्मना गृहीतम्,¹⁹¹ गृहीत्वा वा¹⁹² किं नास्मै प्रतिप्रयच्छसि” इति ॥ ८.५० ॥

This verse serves to make clear what has been said before. If the creditor recovers his money from the debtor by means of ‘trick’ and the other methods, the King shall not tell him anything, such as—‘why did you, without informing me, take from him by trick or fraud, his ornament, etc., for the purpose of recovering your debt? Why do you not return it to him?’—(60)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 74), which explains the meaning to be that if a creditor adopts any of the five methods mentioned in the preceding verse, he should not be prevented by the king from doing so and in Kṛtyakalpataru (p. 80a).

Viṣṇu (6.18).—‘A creditor recovering, by any means, the loan advanced by him shall not be reproved by the King.’

Yājñavalkya (2.40).—‘If a creditor tries to recover an admitted debt, he shall not be reproved by the King.’

Nārada (1.123).—‘A creditor who tries to recover his loan from the debtor must not be checked by the King, both for secular and religious reasons.’

स्वगृहसंरोधनादि च कुर्वन्न् अकार्यकारीति कृत्वा राज्ञा नाभियोक्तव्यः । उत्तमर्णप्रतिपन्नस् तावद् एवं यथासंभवम् उपायैर् दाप्यः । यः पुनर् इतरः तम् —

050 A creditor who himself recovers his property from his debtor, must not be blamed by the king for retaking what is his own.

The man who denies a debt shall be made to pay the creditor’s due, proved by evidence, as also a small fine, according to his means.—(51)

सत्य् अपि विभावके प्रमाणे यो न स्वयं प्रतिपद्यते न तस्य छलाद्युपायप्रयोगः कर्तव्यः । किं तर्हि राजैव तेन ज्ञपयितव्यः । तत्र राज्ञाकारिते ऽर्थे ऋणे ऽपव्ययमानम् अपह्नुवानम्, “नास्मै किंचन धारयमि” इति वदन्तं, कारणेन साक्षिलेख्यभुक्त्यात्मकेन विभावितं धारयामीति प्रतिपादितं दापयेद् उत्तमर्णाय धनम् । दण्डलेशं च स्वल्पं दण्डं दण्डमात्रम् इत्य् अर्थः । अन्यत्र दशमं भागं¹⁹³ वक्ष्यति । यस् तु तावद् दातुम् अशक्तः सो ऽल्पम् अपि दशमाद् भागाद् दण्डं दापयितव्यः । अथ वा यः प्रमादात् कथंचिद् विस्मृत्यापजानीते तस्यायं यथाशक्ति दशमभागाल्पतो दण्डः । कारणं प्रमाणं त्रिविधम् । तद् अन्यैर् इह संभवतीति परिगणितम् । तथा चाहुः-

• यत्र न स्यात् कृतं पत्रं साक्षी चैव न विद्यते ।

न चोपलंभः पूर्वोक्तो दैवी तत्र क्रिया भवेत् ॥ इति ॥ ८.५१ ॥

Even in the presence of convincing proof, if the debtor does not himself admit the debt, then recourse should not be had to ‘trick’ and the other means,—the King should be informed of it; and when summoned by the King, if the man ‘denies the debt,’—saying ‘I do not owe him anything’—then, on its being ‘proved by evidence’—in the shape of written document, oral witnesses and possession,—and the man being made to confess that he does owe the debt,—he shall make the debtor repay the ‘creditor’s due,’—‘as also a small fine,’ a small penalty, which shall, later on, he fixed at the tenth part of the claim.

If the man he unable to pay the whole fine, he may be made to pay a fine even less than the tenth part. Or, the favour of the fine being inflicted according to the man’s means,—even less than the tenth part—may be taken as pertaining to the case of the man who denies the debt (not through perversity, but) through having forgotten all about it, through carelessness.

‘Evidence,’ proof, is of three kinds; thus enumerated elsewhere—‘If one did not have a written deed executed, nor is there a witness, nor previous claiming, there the only means is the supernatural one (ordeal).’—(51)

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 76), which adds the following notes:—‘Āpavyayamānam’, ‘denying’,—‘Karaṇena,’ ‘by evidence, documentary and otherwise’,—‘vibhāvitam’, ‘faced, convinced’;—such a debtor the king shall compel to pay the amount to the creditor;—and by reason of the man having denied what was true, the king shall exact from him a slight fine also.

It is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 153), which adds that this rule is meant for the case where the debtor is a well behaved Brāhmaṇa;—in Vyavahāratattva (p. 61);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (p. 80b).

Viṣṇu (6, 19-20).—‘If the debtor, forced to discharge the debt, complains to the King, he shall be fined in an equal sum. If a creditor sues before the King and fully proves his demand, the debtor shall pay to the King, as fine, the tenth part of the sum proved.’

Bṛhaspati (11.62).—‘A debtor denying his liability shall be compelled to pay, on the debt being proved, in court, by a document or by witnesses.’

करणप्रतिपादितस्य दशभागदण्डं वक्ष्यति ।

ऋणे देये प्रतिज्ञाते पञ्च्कं शतम् अर्हति ।
अपह्नवे तद्द्विगुणं तन् मनोर् अनुशासनम् ॥ इति । (म्ध् ८.१३९)

इयं तु निर्धनस्य दशभागं दातुम् अशक्तस्य गुणवतो वा या काचिद् दण्डमात्रोच्यते इति व्यवस्थार्थम् । न तु निःस्व इत्य् उत्सृज्येत । करणं च यत् संदिग्धे वस्तुनि निर्णयसाधनम्, तत् पुनस् त्रिप्रकारम् । एवं चोशना पऋहति, “यत्र न स्यात् कृतं पत्रं करणं च न विद्यते, न चोपालम्भः पूर्वोक्तस् तत्र दैवी क्रिया भवेत्” । इदानीम् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोर् व्य्वहरतोर् जयपराजयन्यायो वक्तव्य इति यत् इदं तन्निर्देशार्थं प्रकरणम् आरभ्यते ॥ ८.५१ ॥

051 But him who denies a debt which is proved by good evidence, he shall order to pay that debt to the creditor and a small fine according to his circumstances.

On denial by the debtor, when asked in court to pay the debt, the complainant shall produce a witness, or adduce (other) evidence.—(52)

यदा राज्ञा प्राड्विवाकेन वा संसदि व्यवहाराधिकरणादिदेशे “देह्य्¹⁹⁴ उत्तमर्णाय धनम्” इति उक्तस्यापह्नवो ऽपलापः¹⁹⁵ अधर्मेण भवति, तद्आभियोक्ता¹⁹⁶ धनस्य प्रयोक्तोत्तमर्णो¹⁹⁷ दिशेद् देशं साक्षिणं प्रमाणभूतं निर्दिशेत् । अन्यद् वा कारणं लेख्यादि । देशशब्देन लक्षणया धनप्रयोगप्रदेशवर्तिनां साक्षिणाम् उपादानात्, कारणशब्दः¹⁹⁸ सामान्यशब्दो ऽपि गोबलीवर्दवत् साक्षिव्यतिरिक्तं लेख्यादिकारणम्¹⁹⁹ आचष्टे । ततश् च पाठान्तरम् “कारणं वा समुद्दिशेत्” इति । अस्याप्य् अयम् एवार्थः ।

अथ वायम् अन्यः पाठः “अभियुक्तो दिशेद् देशम्” इति । अयं वार्थः । यत्राधमर्णो देहीत्य् उक्तः प्रतिजानीते “सत्यम् एव धनं प्रतिदत्तं तु तत्” इति,²⁰⁰ यद् असाव् अभियोक्तासीत् स एवाभियुक्तः संवृतः । स चाभियुक्तः संदिशेद् देशम्- “कस्मिन् देशे त्वया मे पर्तिदत्तम्” । कालं च निर्दिशेत्, देशग्रहणस्य प्रदर्शनार्थत्वात् । कारणं²⁰¹ वा समुद्दिशेत् । “अस्ति भो²⁰² किं कारणं²⁰³ तव प्रतिपादने तत् समुद्दिश” इत्य् एवम् ब्रूयात् । अथ वा दिशेद् देश्यम्- यत् तस्मिन् काले नार्हं साक्ष्यादिप्रदर्शनं²⁰⁴ कारणं²⁰⁵ वेति । वाशब्दः चशद्बस्य स्थाने ॥ ८.५२ ॥

When, in a court of justice, the debtor is asked by the King or the judge to repay the debt to (lie creditor,—if this is followed by ‘denial’ or evasion by him,—then the ‘complainant,’—i e., the lender of the money, the creditor—shall ‘produce a witness’ who would prove his case ,—‘or adduce other evidence’—in the shape of a document, etc.

The term ‘deśa’ (lit. place) indicates the man present at the place (where the money was lent); and though the term ‘kāraṇa,’ ‘evidence,’ stands for all forms of evidence, and as such includes the witness also, yet here it should be taken as standing for ‘evidence other than witnesses,’ according to the maxim of ‘the cow and the bull’ (‘Go-balīvarda’ where the term ‘go,’ being applicable to both the cow and the hull, is taken to mean the cow only); so that the phrase ‘shall adduce evidence’ must mean ‘shall adduce other forms of evidence.’

Or, the reading may be ‘abhiyukto diśeddeśam,’ and the meaning of this would be as follows:—The debtor, on being asked to pay, answers the claim by saying ‘it is true that I borrowed the money from him, but I paid it hack’; and when this happens, the man who was the complainant becomes the defendant, and on being thus made the defendant, he should question the debtor regarding the place— at what place did you repay the debt’?—as also regarding the time,—the mention of ‘place’ being only by way of illustration;—‘or he shall adduce other evidence’ ‘(of non-payment)’; i.e., he should say ‘I have got other means of proving my claim’; or it may mean that ‘if he is unable to produce the witness he should show why ho is so unable’; and in this case the particle ‘vā,’ ‘or,’ should be taken to mean ‘ca,’ ‘and.’—(52)

‘Deśam’—There is no difference in the meaning assigned to the word by Medhātithi and Kullūka,—both taking it in the sense of ‘witness’; the meaning ‘place’, attributed to Medhātithi, is however found in Nandana In his interpretation of Medhātithi, Buhler has been misled by the explanation that Medhātithi has provided by another reading. (See Translation).

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (24b), which adds the following explanation:—When on being questioned in court by the king or the judge, the debtor denies all transaction with the creditor, then the latter who

is the plaintiff, should name the witnesses and cite other proofs in the form of written documents and so forth:—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 29b), which explains ‘deśam’ as ‘witness’, expounding it as ‘diṣati artham yathādṛṣṭam’ and quotes Medhātithi’s explanation on ‘karaṇam’ also, which it explains as ‘other proofs’; it remarks that Medhātithi reads ‘kāraṇam vā samuddishet.’

Bṛhaspati (11.62).—(See under 51.)

Kātyāyana (Vivādaratnākara, p. 67).—‘The debtor shall be openly arrested and kept in restraint before the assembly of the people, until he repays the dues, in accordance with the custom of the country.’

इदानीम् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोर् व्यवहरतोः सामान्ये जयपराजयकारणम् उपदिश्यते । गृहीतार्थ्आपह्नवे ऽधमर्णस्य कदा देहीत्य् उक्तस्य प्रयोक्त्रा प्राड्विवाकेन वा संसदि व्यवहारस्थाने न स्वैरकथासु, अभियोक्ता प्रयोक्ता दिशेद् दानाधिकरणदेशम् । अत्र च देशग्रहणं सामर्थ्यात् साक्ष्युपलक्षणार्थम् । एवं चार्थग्र[हणकाले विद्य्]अमानान् द्रष्टॄन् ब्रूयाद् इति यावत् । अतश् चैतद् एव । यस्माद् आह करणम् वा समुद्धिशेत् पत्रसंज्ञं व्यवहारस्थान एव । अतश् च गम्यते देशग्रहणं करणोप[लक्षणार्थम् इति] । गृहीतार्थप्रतिपादकम् इत्य्, अस्याप्य् अयम् एवार्थः पाठान्तरस्य । अथ वा अपह्नवे ऽधमर्णस्य व्याजेन देहीत्य् उक्तस्य संसदि प्रयोक्त्रा दत्तं [मया इत्य् उक्ते], इदानीम् अभियुक्तओ दिशेद् देशम् । देसग्रहणं च निदर्शनार्थत्वात् कालार्थम् अपि द्रष्टव्यम्, “कस्मिन् देशे काले त्वया मम प्रतिदत्त्ं धनम्” इति । करणं [वा समुद्दिशेत्] अग्रे प्रतिपादककरणं भवतो धनप्रतिपादने । अथ वा अभियुक्तो देशेद् देश्यम् इति देश्यं देष्टव्यम् । यथा गृहीतं कथयेत् । अन्यद् उभयत्र समानम् ॥ ८.५२ ॥

052 On the denial (of a debt) by a debtor who has been required in court to pay it, the complainant must call (a witness) who was present (when the loan was made), or adduce other evidence.

He who mentions the wrong place,—or who, having mentioned it, retracts,—or who does not understand that his previous and subsequent statements are contradictory;—(53)

उक्तम् एवाधर्मर्णे ऽपह्नुवाने धनिना राजा ज्ञापयितव्यः- “ईदृशी च ज्ञापना कर्तव्या । अस्मिन् देशे ऽस्मिन् काल इदं धनम् इयद् वैतेन मत्सकाशाद् गृहीतम्” । स च पृष्टो भावयति- “नैतस्मिन् देशे ऽहम् अभवं यो ऽनेन च ग्रहणकाल उपदिष्टः” तद् अदेशं दिशति²⁰⁶ । अथ वा देशसाक्षिणो व्याख्यातास् तान् साक्षिणो देशकालाव् असंभवतो निर्दिशति । निर्दिश्य देशादिकम् अपजानीते “नैतन् मया निर्दिष्टम्” इति । यश् चाधरोत्तरान् अर्थान् पौरस्त्यानौपरिष्टांश् च विगीतान् विरुद्धान् अभिहितान् नावबुध्यते । यद् वा पूर्वं वक्तव्यं तत् परस्माद् वक्ति यत् परतस् तत् पूर्वं क्रमभेदं च वचनगतम् आत्मनो नानुसंधत्ते । “हीनः स इति निर्दिशेत्” (म्ध् ८.५७) इति सर्वत्र क्रियानुषङ्गो भविष्यतीति ॥ ८.५३ ॥

It has been said before that on the debtor denying the debt, the creditor complains to the King ,—i e., the complaint shall be lodged in the form—‘At such and such place, at such and such time, such and such an amount of money was borrowed from mo by this man’;—and on being questioned, he may say ‘I was not at the place at the time,’ referring to the place and time that have been alleged by him as those at which the money was borrowed: and in this case he ‘mentions the wrong place.’ Or, the term ‘deśa’ may stand for the witness; and the text means ‘if he cites as witness a person whose presence at the time and place of the transaction is impossible.’

Having alleged the place, time, etc., ‘if he retracts,’—saying ‘I did not say this.’

He who does not understand that his ‘previous statement’—what he had alleged before—and his ‘subsequent statement’—what he alleges afterwards—are ‘contradidory’;—or if he does not realise the discrepancy in his own behaviour.

‘Such a person shall be declared to have failed’—this verbal clause (occurring in verse 57) has to be construed with each verse (from 53 to 57).—(53)

Medhātithi is again misrepresented by Buhler; he does not read ‘apadeśyam’, the reading adopted by him being ‘adeśam’. Nārāyaṇa also reads the same, not ‘apadeśyam.’—Nandana reads ‘adeyam’, not ‘apadeśyam.’ Buhler has apparently confused verse 53 with 54, where Medhātithi reads ‘apadeśam’ for ‘apadeśyam.’

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 108), which has the following explanation—‘One who cites an impossible witness, or having cited a possible one, says that he has not cited him, or one who does not perceive inconsistencies in his own statement, is to be non-suited;’—in Kṛtyakalpataru (p. 22b), which has the following notes:—‘Adeśam’ (which is its reading for ‘adeśyam’), a place where the parties have never met;—‘adharottarān arthān’, “former and latter”—‘vigītān’, contradictory;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 31b), which adds the following notes:—‘Ādeśyām dishati’, ‘says what is irrelevant or indecorous,—he who having said something says he did not say it’—‘who does not comprehend the inconsistencies in his own past and present statements’.

**(verses 8.53-57)
**

Yājñavalkya (2.16).—‘If one party tries to enforce his claim by himself, though it has been disputed,—or if on being called, he runs away, without saying anything, he should be non-suited and also fined.’

Kātyāyana (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 107).—‘If a party on being directed to speak out, does not speak, he should be immediately confined; and on the next day he should be declared to be non-suited.’

Nārada (Aparārka, p. 621).—‘If a party proceeds to enforce his claim without applying to the King, he should be immediately punished and his claim not allowed.’

Nārada (2.32-33).—‘One who takes to flight after haying received the summons, one who remains silent, one who is convicted of untruth by the deposition of witnesses, and one who makes a confession himself;—these are the four kinds of persons defeated, avasanna. One who alters his former statements, one who shuns judicial investigation, one who fails to appear, one who makes no reply, one who absconds on receiving the summons;—these are the five kinds of persons non-suited, hīna.’

Nārada (2.41).—‘A man convicted by his own confession, one defeated through his own conduct, one whom the judicial investigation has proved to be in the wrong,—these three deserve to have their final defeat declared at the hands of judges.’

Bṛhaspati (5.5-6).—‘One who absconds after receiving the summons, one who remains silent, one convicted by the deposition of witnesses, and one who admits the correctness of the charge;—these are the four losers of the suit. One who absconds loses the suit after three fortnights; one who remains silent, after a week; one convicted by the deposition of witnesses and one who has confessed, immediately.’

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 622).—‘After having declared his plaint, if he renounces it and says something else, then, having taken up a different position, he becomes non-suited. Having reduced his statement to writing, if subsequently he says something more or less than that, he becomes non-suited. After having preferred his claim, if he says I did not say this, or if he contradicts his former statement, he also should he declared to he non-suited. After having named his witnesses, if he, of his own accord, does not bring them up for deposition, he should be declared to be non-suited, after thirty days.’

अदेशं गृहीतुर् यश् च दिशति अदेश्यं वर्थवस्तु; निर्दिश्यापह्नुते च यः देशं देश्यं वा; यश् चाधरोत्तरान् अर्थान्, देशाद् अन्यान्य् अपि कालद्रव्यरूपसंख्यादीन् विगीतान् पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धान् नावबुद्ध्यते, “हीनं तम् इति निर्दिशेत्” इति वक्ष्यत्य् अर्थिनम् इतरं वा ॥ ८.५३ ॥

053 (The plaintiff) who calls a witness not present at the transaction, who retracts his statements, or does not perceive that his statements (are) confused or contradictory;

He who, having put forward a statement, subsequently retracts; and who on being questioned regarding a fact (previously) duly alleged, does not support it;—(54)

पूर्वेणार्धेनोक्तस्यार्थस्य निगमनम् । उत्तरेणानुक्तो ऽर्थ उच्यते । यद् उक्तम् “अदेशं यश् च दिशति निर्दिश्यापह्नुते च यः” (म्ध् ८.५३) इति स एवार्थः अपदिश्येत्य् अस्य । अदेश एव्आपदेशः । तम् अपदिश्य कथयित्वा पुनः पश्चाद् अपधावत्य् अपसरति “नैतौ देशकालौ मम निश्चितौ, यावत्सु देशकालो ऽवधारयति तावद् अयं मह्यम्” इति पश्चाद् ब्रवीति । सो ऽपि तस्माद् अर्थाद् धीयते ।

सम्यक् प्रणिहितं चार्थम् अनाकुलं निश्चितम् उक्तं यदा पृच्छ्यते, तदानेनोक्तं²⁰⁷ तत्र किं ब्रवीषि केन वा प्रमाणेन स्वपक्षं साधयसीति पृष्टो न संधत्ते²⁰⁸ कथान्तरं प्रसौति — “विचारावसानेन किल मे पराजयो भवतीति कालम् उपक्षिपमि” इति — तस्यापि पराजय एव । अथ वापदेशो व्याजस् तम् अपदिश्य्ओपन्यस्य यो ऽपसरति “अधुना मे महती पीडा समुत्पन्ना न शक्नोमि प्रतिवक्तुम्,” अलीकादिना वा प्रस्थितः सो ऽपि हीयते ॥ ८.५४ ॥

The first half of the verse only re-iterates what has been said before, and it is only the second half that puts forward something new. What had been said in the first half of the preceding verse is exactly what is meant by the first half of the present verse.

‘Who having put forward a statement,’—having said something—‘subsequently retracts,’—deviates from it, saying

‘I am not sure about the time and place’………,—ho also fails in his suit.

Having once ‘duly’—with certainty, and clearly—‘alleged a fact’,—if, ‘on being questioned about it’—what do you means?—By what evidence do you prove your case?’—if he loses faith in the allegation clearly made by himself, and proceeds to talk about irrelevant matters, with the motive that—‘after due investigation I am sure to lose the case, I may just as well get over a little time,’—then such a person also fails in his suit.

Or, the term ‘apadeśa’ may stand for fraud; the meaning being that if after having set up a fraud, he slinks away from it, saying—‘I have a severe headache now, I cannot answer any questions,’—or if he opens his case with false statements,—then also he fails in his suit.—(54)

‘Praṇihitam’—‘Duly stated by himself’ (Kullūka and Nandana);—‘stated by himself in the plaint’ (Govindarāja); ‘duly ascertained’ (Rāghavānanda and Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru which has the following notes:—‘Apadiśya’, having put forward,—‘apadeśam’, pretext,—‘apadhāvati’,—retracts,—‘samyak praṇihitam artham,’ what has been stated clearly and definitely,—‘pṛsṭaḥ’, questioned as to what he has to say as against the statement of the other party, or what proofs he has in support of his own statement;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 31b), which has the following explanations:—‘He who slinks away from the court under some pretext’,—‘who does not pay heed—by answering,—to what has been said by others, even though fully comprehending what has been said’;—it quotes Medhātithi as reading ‘adeśam’ and reproduces his several explanations.

**(verses 8.53-57)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.53].

अपदिश्यापदेशं च, अपदेश्यं वा, पुनर् यस् त्व् अपधावति, अन्यथा ब्रवीति, “अनेन मम हिरण्यं गृहीतम्” इत्य् अपदिश्य पक्षान्तरे पुत्रं भृत्यं वा निर्दिशति, “कस्मिंश्चित् काले देशे वा व्यवहारस् त्वया कृतः” इति यदैवमादि पृच्छ्यते राज्ञा प्राङ्विवाकेन वा तत् सम्यक् पृष्टंनाभिनन्दति, मा भूद् इति विचारणया परमार्थदर्शनम् ॥ ८.५४ ॥

054 Or who having stated what he means to prove afterwards varies (his case), or who being questioned on a fact duly stated by himself does not abide by it;

He who secretly converses with the witnesses in a place not fit for conversation, or who does not like the question being investigated, or who falls back;—(55)

असंभाषणार्हे देशे उपह्वरादौ साक्षिभिः सह संभाषत एकाकी तद्भेदाशङ्कया । निरुच्यमानं पृच्छ्यमानं निरूप्यमाणं वा प्रश्नं विचारवस्तु नेच्छति किंचिद् राजकार्यम् उद्दिश्य राजपुत्रामात्याद्यनुग्रहेण²⁰⁹ च काललाभं करोति । यश् चापि निष्पतेत् । वक्ष्यमाणम् एव क्रियापदं “स हीयते” (म्ध् ८.५६) इति । यद् एवोक्तम् “पुनर् यस् त्व् अपधावति” (म्ध् ८.५४) इति स एवार्थः “यश् चापि निष्पतेत्” इति । पुनर्वचने प्रयोजकम् उक्तम् । अत्यन्तपौनरुक्त्यं²¹⁰ मा भूद् इति कश्चिद् विशेष आश्रयितव्यः ॥ ८.५५ ॥

‘In a place not fit for conversation’—i.e., hidden from others,—‘who converses with the witnesses, secretly’—i.e., alone, for fear of being overheard.

‘Who does not like the question,’— the matter under enquiry—‘being investigated’; and on the pretext of some work for the King himself, or by the favour of the Prince or the Minister, etc., manages to gain time;—and ‘who falls back,’—‘such a person fails’ is the verbal phrase to be construed here.

The ‘falling back’ mentioned here is the same as the ‘refracting’ mentioned before (in verse 51). the purpose of such repetition of the same idea has already been explained. We have to adopt some such distinction in order to guard the text against the charge of containing absolutely needless repetitions.—(55)

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (22b), which has the following notes:—‘Asambhāṣye’ ‘in a place where no conversation should be held,’—‘niṣpatet,’ ‘should go away without mentioning his destination’;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 31b).

**(verses 8.53-57)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.53].

सभातो ऽन्यत्रोपह्वर एकाकी साक्षिभिः सह संभाषते मिथः । असाव् अपि साक्षिभेदाशङ्कया जीयते । साक्षिणश् च पृच्छ्यमानान् नेच्छति, केनचिद् व्याजेन व्यवहारगतेनैव राजतन्त्रानुग्रहप्रदर्शनेन वा साक्षिप्रश्नकाले कार्यान्तरव्यासङ्गेन केनचिद् व्यवहारस्थानान् निष्पतिः, राजोपकारप्रदर्शनेन वेत्य् उक्तम्, यतः “तस्माद् अर्थात् स हीयते” इत्य् एवं वक्ष्यति ॥ ८.५५ ॥

055 Or who converses with the witnesses in a place improper for such conversation; or who declines to answer a question, properly put, or leaves (the court);

—He who, on being ordered to speak, does not speak; or who does not prove what he has asserted;—or who does not grasp the previous and subsequent statements;—such a person fails in that suit.—(50)

उक्तार्थ एव श्लोको ऽयं श्लोकान्तरैर् दृश्यते । पुनर्वचने च प्रयोजनम् उक्तम्- “बहुकृत्वो ऽपि पथ्यं वेदितव्यम्” इति । अक्षरार्थस् त्व् अर्थिना निःशेषिते पूर्वपक्षे प्रतिवादी “ब्रूह्य् अस्मिन् वस्तुनि” इति पृष्टो यदि न ब्रूयात्, पुनः पुनः पृच्छ्यमानो²¹¹ ऽपि । यो हि सम्यग् उत्तराभावान् मिथ्योत्तरवादित्वाद् अमुनैव मे पराजयो भवति तूष्णीभूतस्य तु मे संशय एव पराजये इत्य् अनया बुद्ध्या नोत्तरं ददाति, सो ऽपि जीयते । वक्ष्यति चात्र कालावच्छेदम् “न चेत् त्रिपक्षात् प्रब्रूयात्” (म्ध् ८.५८) इति । सद्यो ह्य् आकृष्टस्य पूर्वपक्षार्थानवबोधाद् उत्तराप्रतिपत्तेर् युक्तं कालहरणम् । अत्र च दिवसैः पञ्चभिर् दशभिर् द्वादशभिर् वा ईषद् ईषद् वदतस् त्रिपक्षसमाप्तिः, न त्व् इयन्तं कालं तूष्णीभाव एव । यश् चातो ऽधिकः कालः, “संस्थितो ऽपि कच्चित् संवत्सरं प्रतीक्षेताप्रतिभावायाम्²¹²” (ग्ध् १३.२८) इति, न युक्तम् आदर्तुं यतो ऽप्रतिभा²¹³ यदि²¹⁴ प्रतीक्षाकारणम् सा चेत्²¹⁵ संवत्सराद् ऊर्ध्वं भवतीति किम् इत्य् अकारणम् । न चैष नियमः केनचित् प्रकारेणावगम्यते²¹⁶ ऽप्रतिभावतः²¹⁷ संवत्सरेण प्रतिभा भवतीति । तस्मात् तावन्त्य् एवाहान्य् उपेक्षा युक्ता यावद्भिः पूर्वपक्षार्थावधारणं भवत्य् उत्तरं च प्रतिभाति । एतच् चामुकस्य मन्दधियो ऽप्य् एतावन् मात्रैर् अहोभिर् भवतीति नाधिकं कालम् उपेक्षणीयम् ।

• पूर्वपाक्षिकस्य तु तद् अहर् एव स्वार्थविनिवेशनं युक्तम् । यत इदम् एष मे धारयतीदं वानेन ममापकृतम् इति निश्चितं तस्य भवति । स्वेच्छया ह्य् असौ प्रवर्तते । केवलं तस्मै स्वपक्षम् आवेदयते किम् इत्य् अनिश्चितः स्वार्थो भवति । उत्तरपाक्षिकस् त्व् अविदितसंबन्धस् तदानीम् एव राजपुरुषैर् आनीयमानः कथम् इव स्वपरपक्षौ निश्चिनुयात् । पक्षद्वयनिरूपणं हि तद् अस्य तदानीम् एवापतति । नान्यथोत्तरपाक्षिको भवति । तस्मात् पूर्वपाक्षिकस्य साध्ये वस्तुनि तदहःपूर्वपक्षसमाप्तिर् द्विदिवसलाभो वा । उभाव् अपि चैतौ पक्षौ स्मृत्यन्तरपरिगृहीतौ । तथा ह्य् आह-

• सुनिश्चितबलाधानः पूर्वपक्षी भवेत् सदा ।

• दशाहं द्वादशाहं वा स्वपक्षं परिशोधयेत् ॥ इति ।

तथेदम् अपरम् “ततो ऽर्थी लेखयेत् सद्यः प्रतिज्ञातार्थसाधनम्” (य्ध् २.७) ।

• या तु संवत्सरपरीक्षा सा मूलासंभवाद् अप्रमाणम् । न हि व्यवहारस्मृताव् अष्टकादिवद् वेदमूलता शक्यते वक्तुम्, अकार्यरूपत्वाद् अर्थस्य । प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वे च तदसंभवः प्रतिपादितः ।

• एषापि त्रिपक्षोपेक्षा न सर्वत्र । यत् उक्तम्-

• साहसस्तेयपारुष्यगोऽभिशापात्यये स्त्रियाम् ।

• विवादयेत् सद्य एव कालो ऽन्यत्रेच्छया स्मृतः ॥ इति । (य्ध् २.१२)

• साहसादौ हि चिरम् उपेक्ष्यमाणे ऽपरम् आराध्नुयात्²¹⁸ । अतः सद्यो विवादो विधीयते । न चात्रास्मृत्यादयो²¹⁹ ऽनुक्तहेतवः संभवन्ति । साहसादिकारणं हि तदानीम् एव राजानं वेदयेत् । तीव्रसंवेगता हि तत्र भवति । वस्त्राद्यपहारेण²²⁰ तदुपेक्षायां रागशङ्का²²¹ भवति । साक्षिणस् तत्र यदृच्छया संनिहिता अपि भवन्ति । ते हि देशान्तरं गता नमजात्यादिभिर् न विज्ञायन्ते । ततः स्वाभाविकप्रमाणाभावः ।

• किं च ऋणादानादिषु कदाचिद् इतरेतरं संदधते । न तत्र राज्ञो हस्तप्रक्षेपः । प्रायेण²²² च संशुद्धौ नानुस्मृतिर्²²³ उपयुज्यते तदा कियद् दत्तम् इति । साहसकारी तु राज्ञावश्यं निग्रहीतव्य इतरेण संधीयमानो ऽपि । तस्माद् ऋणादिषु कालहरणं साहसादिषु सद्य इति स्थितम् । तद् उक्तम्-

• गहनत्वाद् विवादानाम् असामर्थ्यात् स्मृतेर् अपि ।

• ऋणादिषु हरेत् कालं कामं तत्त्वबुभुत्सया ॥ (न्स्म् मा १.३८)

यदा संकुलः पूर्वपक्षो भवति तदा गहनत्वान् न शक्यते ग्रहीतुम् । अनाकुलो विलुप्तक्रमो ऽपि गृहीतः प्रतिवचनकाले महत्वान् न शक्यते सर्वेण स्मर्तुम् इति स्मृत्यन्तरस्यार्थः ।

उक्तं च न विभावयेत् । साध्यं वस्तु निर्दिश्य न साधयति साधनस्याभावात्, विपक्षे वा भावात् । न च पूर्वापरं विद्यात् । उक्तम् एतत् । तस्माद् अर्थाद् व्यवहारवस्तुनः स हीयते पराजितो भवतीत्य् अर्थः ॥ ८.५६ ॥

This verse is found to state what has been already mentioned in the foregoing verses. The use of such repetitions has been already explained on the ground that wholesome advice should be repeatedly driven home.

The meaning of the words of the text is as follows:—The plaint having been filed and duly expounded by the complainant, when the defendant is asked to make his statement regarding the matter of the plaint, if he does not make a statement, even though repeatedly asked to do so; i.e., he who, having no proper answer to make, does not give any answer at all, thinking that if ho gave an unsuitable reply, his defeat would be certain, whereas if he kept quiet, it would be doubtful, also fails in his suit.

The time-limit in connection with the filing of the answer is going to be laid down (under 58)—‘If he does not file the answer within three fortnights, etc.’ When the man is suddenly dragged to the court, since he does not know what the complaint against him is, he cannot find the right answer at once, and hence it is only right to grant a postponement, but when the law fixes the time-limit being fixed at ‘three fortnights,’ what is meant is that so many days are to be granted to the defendant, who proceeds to file portions of his answer within five, ten or twelve days,—and not that he is to keep absolute silence for such a long time. As for the law that allows of more time,—e.g., in the text ‘In some cases he may wait for one year, when there is non-understanding’ (Gautama, 13.28),—this should not be followed in practice; because if ‘non-understanding’ is sufficient cause for delay, why should it cease to be so after the lapse of one year only? Nor can there be any certainty as to the man, who does not grasp the plaint during one year, being able to grasp it after that time. Hence the postponement granted should he just for that period of time which may he regarded as a fair interval for the understanding of the suit and the finding of the answer. So that no more time shall be granted than what may be considered sufficient for a man of oven dull intelligence for the said purpose.

As regards the plaintiff, it is only right that he should file his plaint on the same day (that he presents himself before the Court); as he already knows that ‘such and such a man owes me such an amount,’ or that ‘such and such a man has done me this wrong’; and he takes action also entirely upon his own choice. So that when the man is setting forth his own case, why should he have a doubt upon any point (for the clearing of which he should need time)?

As for the defendant, on the other hand, he does not know anything about the complaint, when he is suddenly hauled up by the King’s officers; how then can he have any definite notion regarding either the plaint or the answer? He is in fact called upon to understand the plaint and find its answer at the spur of the moment; otherwise he would not be a ‘defendant’ at all.

Thus then, for the Plaintiff, it is necessary to complete his plaint, in regard to the case he has to prove, on the same day; or he may be granted two or three days. Both these views have been accepted by other Smṛtis:—e.g. (a) ‘The complaint should be always prepared with a definite idea of the ease and its proofs,’ and again: ‘He may strengthen his case for ten or twelve days’; and (b) ‘The plaintiff shall immediately set forth his case in writing’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 7).

As for the view that ‘postponement may be granted for one year,’ there is no authority for it, and as such it cannot be accepted. We cannot always assume the presence of Vedic texts corroborative of such Smṛti-texts as bear upon judicial proceedings,—in the same manner as we do in the case of the Smṛti texts dealing with the Aṣṭakā -offering; because the judicial proceeding is not of the nature of an act to be done. In fact, we have already shown that such assumption is not possible in the case of matters amenable to other moans of knowledge (than verbal authority).

This postponement of the complaint is not to be granted in all cases; since it has been laid down that—‘In the case of heinous crimes, of theft, of assault, of charges in connection with cows, of wrong done to the life and property of women, the defendant should be made to answer the charge at once; in other cases the time has been declared to be allowable according to the wish of the Court’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 12). In the case of heinous crimes and the rest, if a long postponement were granted, then, during the interval, the defendant might propitiate the other party. It is for this reason that immediate answer has been required. Specially as in such cases, there can be no lapse of memory or other causes that would justify the postponement of the answer; because as a rule charges of heinous crimes are laid before the King immediately, for the simple reason that in such oases there is great urgency. For instance, in the case of the theft of clothes, there is always the chance of its former colour being altered during the interval. Then again, in such cases such witnesses as may have happened to be present by chance would he immediately available, while (if postponement were granted) they would have gone to other places, and, as their name and caste, etc., would not he known, they could not be traced and found. So that there would naturally be absence of requisite proof.

Further, in the case of non-payment of debt and other matters, the parties may settle it between themselves, in which the King cannot interfere; for when the case has been amicably settled, it is no business of the King’s to enquire how much of the claim has been paid. As for the criminal, on the other hand, it is the duty of the King to punish him, even though he may have come to terms with the plaintiff. For these reasons, the conclusion is that there shall he postponement only in the case of non-payment of debt and such cases, while in the case of crime, etc., immediate answer shall be demanded. To this end wo have the following declaration—‘In the case of non-payment of debt, etc., postponement may he granted, for the purpose of finding out the truth, as disputes on such matters are intricate, and there is possibility of the defendant being incapable of supplying the answer at once, or of his having forgotten the facts of the case’;—and the meaning of this Smṛti text is that in a case, where the plaint happens to be an intricate one, it is only natural that being so intricate, it cannot he grasped Jut the spur of the moment,—and every one cannot remember, after the lapse of a long time, all the details clearly and in the correct order, in order to be able to offor a suitable answer.

‘And does not prove what he has asserted,’—i.e., having put forward the case he has to prove, he fails to establish it, because he has no proofs, and not because he has no opponent (against whom he would have to establish it).

‘Who does not grasp the precious and subsequent statements’;—this has been already explained (under 53).

For the said reasons, the person fails in the matter of the suit; i.e., is defeated.—(56)

‘Pūrvāparam’—‘The plaint and its answer’ (Medhātithi);—‘the proof and the matter to be proved’ (Kullūka);—‘what should be said first and what afterwards’ (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (22b) which says that ‘brūhi’, ‘speak out’ has to he reiterated for the sake of firmness;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 31b).

**(verses 8.53-57)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.53].

ब्रूहीत्य् उक्तश् च न ब्रूयात् प्रतिपादनकाले पराभव[भीत्या नोत्तरं ददाति । उक्तं च न वि]भावयेत् साक्षिभिः, अभावाद् वा तेषां विवक्षासम्यग्दर्शनाद् वा । न च पूर्वापरं विद्यात्- साक्षिगतम् अन्यत्र व्यवहारगतम् उक्तम् एव । तस्माद् अर्थात् स हीयते ॥ ८.५६ ॥

056 Or who, being ordered to speak, does not answer, or does not prove what he has alleged; or who does not know what is the first (point), and what the second, fails in his suit.

Having asserted that he has witnesses, and on being asked to name them, if he does not name them,—him also, on these grounds, the judge shall declare to have failed in his suit.—(57)

ज्ञातारः साक्षिणः पुरुषा मम सन्तीत्य् उक्त्वा यदोच्यते कथ्यताम् इति तदा तूष्णीक आस्ते — न तान् देशनामजातिभिर् विशेषणैः कथयति — तदा एतैः प्रयेकं पूर्वम् उक्तैः कारणैर् इह हीनो ऽसौ व्यवहाराद् भ्रष्ट इति । धर्मस्थो धर्माधिकरणस्थः प्राड्विवाको निर्दिशेन् निश्चितं ब्रूयाज् जितो ऽयम् इति । यथैव विपक्षबाधकप्रमाणावृत्त्या²²⁴ पराजय एवं स्वपक्षसाधनाभावाद्²²⁵ अपि । अभावनिश्चयश् च पुनः पुनर् अवसरे ऽनुपन्यासात् कारणान्तरस्य चानुपन्यासे ऽभावाद् इति ।

ज्ञातार इति तृन्नन्तम् एव । तत्रेदम् इति द्वितीयान्तं युज्यते, “खलर्थत्ट्नाम्” (पाण् २.३.६९) इति षष्ठीनिषेधात् । हीनं तम् इति द्वितीयान्तः पाठः । इतिशब्दः प्रकारार्थो द्रष्टव्यः । एभिर् उक्तैः प्रकारैर् अन्यैश् चैवंविधैर् हीनं तन् निर्दिशेत् । यदा तु वाक्यार्थपरामर्शः तदा हीनो ऽसाव् इति पाठः । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मत्वाद् द्वितीयाया अभावः ।

एते पराजयहेतवः । न त्व् आकारेङ्गितादिवद् व्यभिचारिणः²²⁶ । यो हि पुनः पुनर् विचारावसरे न संनिधीयते संनिहितो नोत्तरं प्रतिवक्ति²²⁷ तत्र निश्चितम् इदं भवति नास्य जयहेतुर् अस्तीति । यदि च सर्वदैवानुत्तरवादिनं न पराजयेद् राजा ततो व्यवस्थाभङ्ग आपद्यते । पौर्वापर्यानवबोधस्²²⁸ त्व् इङ्गितादिवद् द्रष्टव्यः । यः सर्वकालं वाग्मी प्रगल्भं प्रतिपत्तिमांस् तस्येङ्गितादयो ऽन्यथाभवन्तः पराजयहेतौ प्रमाणान्तरेणानिश्चिते ऽपि लिङ्गदर्शनस्थानीया उपोद्बलका भवन्ति ॥ ८.५७ ॥

The term ‘jñātāraḥ’ stands for witnesses. Having said that ‘I have witnesses,’ he is ordered—‘name them’; thereupon, if he does not name them, indicating their residence, name and caste;—then, on each of the above-mentioned grounds, he should be regarded as having failed.

‘Dharmasthaḥ’ is one who has been appointed to try cases,—the Judge; and he should pronounce him to have failed, saying ‘this man is non-suited.’

Just as one loses his case by the other party adducing proofs establishing the contrary of his contention, so does he lose it also by the absence of proofs in support of it; and this absence of proofs is ascertained by the fact of their not being adduced by the party at the right time, even though repeatedly asked to do so,—as also by the adducing of proofs to the contrary.

‘Jñātāraḥ’ ends in the ‘tṛn’ affix; and as such it should govern a noun in the Accusative case, the use of the Genitive being precluded by Pāṇini, 2.3.69.

The right reading being ‘hīnam tam’—the particle ‘iṭi’ should be taken as denoting kind;—the sense being—‘on these, and on other similar grounds, the Judge shall declare him to have failed’;—if, on the other hand, the particle ‘iti’ he taken as referring to the whole sentence, then the correct reading would he ‘hīno’-sau’; because the whole sentence being the object of the verb, there would be nothing to justify the use of the Accusative ending (in ‘hīnam tam’).

These grounds of defeat are infallible, unlike the aspect, gestures, etc. (of the parties), which are fallible.

If at the time of the enquiry, a party does not present himself,—or oven though presenting himself, does not offer any answer,—then it becomes certain that there are ne grounds for the man succeeding in his suit. If the King were not to non-suit the party who never offers an answer, then the entire judicial machinery would become upset.

As regards the man not perceiving the inconsistency between his first and subsequent statements,—this has to be treated on the same footing as gesture and other indicative signs. In the case of a man who throughout is very talkative and bold and clever, gestures and other indicatives are not infallible guides; and being similar to indirect verbal indicatives, they are only regarded as corrobarative of the decision regarding defeat or victory taken on other grounds.—(57)

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (22b), which explains ‘dharmasthaḥ’ as ‘one who is occupying the judgment seat’;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 31b), which explains the construction as—‘mā,’ mām, ‘gnātāraḥ,’ persons knowing that what I state is true, &c., &c., as being, according to Medhātithi, but goes on to add, that according to the Ācārya,’ ‘meti’stands for ‘me-iti,’ the sandhi being explained as a Vedic anomaly. It notes the reading, ‘Santi jñātāra ityuktvā,’ as found in Kalpataru, but rejects it as an unauthorised reading.

**(verses 8.53-57)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.53].

सर्वथा साक्षिभ्यो ऽन्यैः प्रेतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिपादकैः कारणैर् अविभाव्यमाने वस्तुनि । साक्षिणः शरण् । । । [कार]णैर् यथोक्तैर् असत्प्रत्ययवचनैर् हीनम् इत्य् एव निर्दिशेत् । अर्थिनम् इतरं वा, उभयतः संभवात् पराजयहेतूनाम् । धर्मस्थः करणैर् एतैर् हीनं तम् इति पराजयकारणं विज्ञेयम् । इतिकरणं चैवंशब्दार्थे । तथा च व्याख्यातम् । इदानीम् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोर् वचनकालनियमार्थम् इदम् आरभ्यते ॥ ८.५७ ॥

057 Him also who says ‘I have witnesses,’ and, being ordered to produce them, produces them not, the judge must on these (same) grounds declare to be non-suited.

If the complainant does not speak out, he shall be imprisoned and pined, according to law. If the other party does not answer within three fortnights, he becomes defeated according to law.—(58)

अभियोक्ता अर्थी राज्ञान्तिकं कंचन²²⁹ पुरुषम् आहूय यदि व्यवहारपदं न कथयति, तदा निष्प्रयोजनाद् बध्यो²³⁰ दण्ड्यश् च । दण्डबन्धने दण्डपरिमाणे च गुणवत्तां प्रत्यर्थिन आह्वानेन च हानिम् अपेक्ष्य कल्पनीयानि । अतस् तदहर् एवार्थिना विवदितव्यम् । प्रत्यर्थी तु न चेत् त्रिपक्षाद् ब्रूयाद् इत्य् अर्थः — तदा नासौ दण्ड्यो बन्धयितव्यो वा । किं तर्हीयता कालेनोत्तरे सत्य् अपराजित एव । धर्मं प्रति । धर्मत एवायं पराजयो न छलम् इत्य् अर्थः । त्रिपक्षाद् इति पात्रादिषु द्रष्टव्यस् तेनेकाराभावः । अर्थतत्त्वम् अस्य लोकस्यास्माभिः प्राङ् निरूपितम् ॥ ८.५८ ॥

If the ‘complainant’—plaintiff—having gone to the King, and on getting the other party summoned,—does not state his case, then, on account of haring done all this needlessly, ‘he shall be imprisoned and fined’; whether the punishment shall be imprisonment or fine, and what shall be the exact period and amount of these, should he determined in accordance with the nature of the case and the loss entailed upon the other party on account of being summoned. For this reason it is necessary for the complainant to state his case on the same day.

As for the defendant, ‘if he does not answer within three fortnights,’—then he shall not be either imprisoned or fined; in fact, if he does not answer the charge within the time, he loses the case.

‘According to law’;—such defeat would be quite legal, and not illegal.

‘Within three fortnights’;………… (?)

The real meaning of this verse has been explained by us above (under verse 56).—(58)

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (22b).

Nārada (2.2).—‘Tho defendant, immediately after having become acquainted with the plaint, shall write down his answer, which must correspond to the tenour of the plaint; or, let him deliver his answer on the next day, or in three days, or in seven days.’

Bṛhaspati (4.1-6).—‘When the plaint has been well-defined, a clear exposition given of what is claimed and what not, and the meaning of the plaint fully established, the judge shall cause the answer to be submitted by the defendant. If the defendant does not make an answer fully meeting the contents of the plaint, he shall be compelled to pay by gentle remonstrance and other methods;—kindly speeches constitute gentle remonstrance, intimidation is pointing out danger.’ Force consists of depriving one of his property, or striking or confining him. When a man makes no answer, even though all methods have been employed, he is defeated and liable to punishment after a week. When the defendant asks for time, through timidity or terror or failing memory, time shall be granted to him. He shall bo allowed time extending to one day, or three days, or five days, or seven days, or a fortnight, or a month, or three seasons, or a year, according to his circumstances.’

अभियोक्ता न चेद् ब्रूयात्, न लेखयेद् व्यवहारं राज्ञः स्वकार्यनिर्वेदनानन्तरम् एव । तत्रायं बन्धनार्हो दण्डार्हश् च स्यात् । गुणवद्व्यवहारवस्त्वपक्षया चैतयोर् नियोगविकल्पसमुच्चयाः प्रकल्प्याः । चशब्दाद् ब्(व्?)अधदण्डवाग्दण्डयोर् अपि यथोक्तसामर्थ्याद् । अत्र संहवो विज्ञेयो गुणान् अतिक्रमेण धर्मतः पराजितस्य सोपधत्वात् कारणान्तरतः, येन सुविहितार्थेन ह्य् अर्थिना भवितव्यम् । अथ केनचित् प्रमाकरणान्तरेणायम् अकुटिलो निरुपधत्वाद् विज्ञायते । अतो नायं ब् (व्?)अधदण्डादिः पदार्थः स्यात् । तथा चोक्तम्, धर्मं प्रतिपराजितस्य नान्यथा प्रत्यर्थिनः । इदानीम् अर्थिकालाद् अन्यः प्रतिवचनकालो निर्दिश्यते । न चेत् त्रिपक्षात् प्रब्रूयात् प्रतिब्रूयाद् इत्य् अर्थः । अतो बध्यो दण्डश् च धर्मतो, धर्मं प्रति पराजितः सन्, नेतरथेत्य् उक्तम् । अधुना जितस्यार्थिनः प्रत्यर्थिनो वा दण्डनियमार्थम् अयम् आरभ्यते श्लोकः ॥ ८.५८ ॥

058 If a plaintiff does not speak, he may be punished corporally or fined according to the law; if (a defendant) does not plead within three fortnights, he has lost his cause.

If one falsely denies a debt, or if the other falsely demands it,—these two, proficient in dishonesty, should be made by the king to pay a fine double that sum.—(59)

येन पञ्चसहस्राणि दत्तानीति प्रमाणान्तरान् निश्चितम् — लेख्यादौ तु करणे दश²³¹ समारोपितानि — प्रमाणान्तरं संवत्सराख्यम् इति निश्चित्येदम् अपश्यत् केवलेन लेख्यप्रमाणेन सर्वत्र प्रवर्तमानः — छलव्यवहारीति²³² द्विगुणं दण्ड्यः²³³ । यस्य तु विस्मृत्याप्य् अन्यथाप्रवृत्तिर् आशङ्क्यते तस्य दशकं शतम् । एवम् इतरस्यापि । न तु सर्वापह्नवे दशभाग एकदेशापह्नवे द्विगुणम् इति । किं तु शाठ्याद् अन्यथाप्रतिपद्यमानौ द्विगुणं दण्ड्यौ । विस्मृतिदारिद्र्याभ्यां दण्डम् उत्तरम् । यो यावन्तम् अर्थम् अपह्नुवीत अपजानीते ऽधर्मर्णः — मिथ्या यावति²³⁴ विपरीतं धनं वदेद् उत्तर्मर्णः — तावत् ताव् उत्तमर्णाधमर्णाव् अधर्मज्ञौ । द्विगुणं दमम् । तद् इत्य् अपह्नूयमानधनपरामर्शः । यावद् अपह्नुतं ततो द्विगुणं दमो दण्डः । अधर्मज्ञग्रहणाच् च लिङ्गान् निश्चितछलविषयो ऽयं दण्ड इत्य् उक्तम् ॥ ८.५९ ॥

In a case where on the strength of other proofs it has boon decided that the creditor had lent only 5,000, while the sum entered in the document is 10,000; from this it is understood that, the creditor has been dishonest in his dealings, having thought that, as other kinds of evidence would be admissible only for one year, he would get what he would prove by moans of the documentary evidence only; and being found to be dishonest, he should ho fined double the amount. But in a case where there may he a doubt as to whether the fraud had been committed intentionally, or only through carelessness, the fine shall be only ten per cent.

Similarly in the case of the defendant also. It is not that if he denies the whole claim, the tine shall be ten per cent, and if he denies it only partly, then double the amount. As a matter of fact, when they are found to be dealing dishonestly, they shall he fined double the amount; while if their behaviour is found to be due to either negligence or poverty, the fine shall be only ten per cent.

When ‘one’—i.e., the debtor—‘denies the debt,’ and when the other, i.e., the creditor—‘falsely’—dishonestly—demands it;—then both these, the creditor as well as the debtor would be ‘proficient in dishonesty,’ and should be fined ‘double the sum’;—‘the sum’ standing for what is denied; so that the sense is that the fine shall be double the sum that was denied.

The addition of the term ‘proficient in dishonesty’ indicates that the penalty is imposed for proved dishonesty.—(59)

Verses 59-61 are not omitted by Medhātithi, as wrongly asserted by Hopkins.

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 77), which adds the following explanation:—When the defendant, through dishonest motives, denies the claim,—or when the plaintiff prefers a false claim,—both those are dishonest dealers, and they should be punished with a fine, which is the double of the amount of the claim;—in Vivādacintāmaṇi (p. 34), which says that this rule refers to cases where the culprit is very wealthy;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (80b).

Vyāsa (Vivādaratnākara, p. 77).—‘He who makes a false claim should be made to pay twice the value of the claim.’

Yama (Do., p. 78).—‘If the debtor, even though possessed of the requisite means, does not repay the debt, through dishonesty, he should be compelled by the King to pay, having realised from him double of his debt.’

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara, p. 78).—‘If the debtor, even though possessed of the requisite means, does not repay the debt, through dishonesty, he should be compelled by the King to repay, after taking from him the twentieth part of the claim as fine.’

Yājñavalkya (2.11).—‘If a party makes a false statement, and the other party proves it to he so, then the former shall pay to the King a fine equal to the amount of the claim. The man who makes a false claim shall pay to the King a fine equal to double the amount of the claim.’

यो यावन् निह्नुवीतार्थं मिथ्या यावति वा वदेत् ।

अर्थी प्रत्यर्थी वा ।

तौ नृपेण ह्य् अधर्मज्ञौ दाप्यौ तद्द्विगुणं दमम् ॥ ८.५९ ॥

तस्माद् अपह्नुताद् अभियोगाच् च मिथ्याभियोक्तारं निह्नवकं च सोपदेशं [यत्] किंचित् प्रतिपद्यमानं तद्द्विगुणं दापयेत् । साक्ष्युपलक्षणार्थम् इदं प्रकरणम् अधुनोच्यते ॥ ८.५९ ॥

059 In the double of that sum which (a defendant) falsely denies or on which (the plaintiff) falsely declares, shall those two (men) offending against justice be fined by the king.

On having been summoned and questioned, if one denies it,—then he siiall be convicted by the man seeking for his due by means of at least three witnesses, in the presence of the king and the brāhmaṇas.—(60)

यः कृतावस्थ आहूतो ऽभियुक्तो गृहीतप्रतिभूश् च राजसकाशे प्राड्विवाकेनान्यैर् वा पृच्छ्यते किम् अस्मै धारयसि नेति पृष्ठः सन्न् अपव्ययते ऽपह्नुते²³⁵ । धनैषिणा स्वधनं पूर्वप्रयुक्तम् आत्मनः साधयितुम् इच्छता । साक्षिभिर् भाव्यो विप्रतिपन्नः प्रतिपादयितव्यः । त्र्यवरैः । त्रय अवरे येषां तैस् त्र्यवरैः । अवरम् अपचयातिशयम् आह । यद्य् अत्यन्तं न्यूनास् तदा त्रयः स्युः । अन्यथा त्रिभ्य ऊर्ध्वम् । नृपब्राह्मणसंनिधाव् इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु च तेषाम् एव यैर् न्यायः प्रारब्धस् तत्र तत्संनिधान एव साक्षिप्रश्नः प्राप्तः । किम् अनेन नृपब्राह्मणसंनिधाव् इति ।

नैवम् । प्रमाणपुरुषप्रेषणेनापि साक्षिप्रश्न उपपद्यत इति । साक्षात् प्रष्टव्य इति पुनर्वचनम् ॥ ८.६० ॥

Being ‘summoned’— called, complained against, and let off on security,—‘and questioned’— in the presence of the King, either by the judge or by other members of the Court—‘Do you, or do you not, owe this amount to this person?’—if the man denies it; ‘then he shall he c onv icted,’—proved to be wrong—‘by the man seeking for his due’—i.e., by the person who is desirous of proving that the sum had been really lent by him,—‘by means of at least three witnesses’;—the compound ‘tryavara’ means ‘of whom three is the least number,’ the term ‘avara’ standing for the minimum; the meaning being that if they are to be fewest, they should he three; otherwise they should he more than three;—in the presence of the King and the Brāhmaṇas.’

An objection is raised:—“The witnesses are naturally to be questioned before the persons by whom the case has begun to be tried; why then should it ho asserted that this has to be done in the presence of the King and the Brāhmaṇas?”

There is no force in this. It is just possible that the witnesses might be questioned by deputing a trustworthy person to go to them; hence with a view to emphasise that the witnesses should be questioned personally by the trying persons, it has been reiterated here.—(60)

Nārada (2.26).—‘When the defendant denies the claim, the plaintiff has to prove his claim, unless the denial should have been in the form of a special plea. What the plaintiff has fully stated in the plaint, that he must substantiate by adducing evidence at the third stage of the trial.’

Nārada (1.147 (?)).—‘In doubtful cases, when two parties are quarrelling with one another, the truth has to be gathered from witnesses, whose knowledge is based on what has been seen, heard or understood by them.’

Bṛhaspati (5.1-3).—‘When litigants are quarrelling in a court of justice, the Judges, after examining the answer, shall adjudge the burden of proof to either of the two parties. The Judges………… having determined to which party the burden of proof shall be adjudged, that person shall substantiate the whole of his declaration by documents or other proofs. The plaintiff shall prove his declaration, and the defendant his special plea.’

Āpastamba (2.29.7).—‘The witness shall answer the questions put to him, according to the truth, in the morning, before a kindled fire, standing near water, in the presence of the King, with the consent of all, after having been exhorted by the Judges to be fair to both sides.’

Gautama (13.1).—‘In disputed cases the truth shall be established by means of witnesses.’

Yājñavalkya (2.69). ‘Witnesses should be at least three.’

एकस्य साक्षित्व प्रतिषेधाद् द्वयोर् अपि साक्षित्वं त्रित्वापवादाद् भविष्यति, अन् केवलं त्रयाणाम् ॥ ८.६० ॥

060 (A defendant) who, being brought (into court) by the creditor, (and) being questioned, denies (the debt), shall be convicted (of his falsehood) by at least three witnesses (who must depose) in the presence of the Brahmana (appointed by) the king.

I shall declare now what sort of persons should be made witnesses in suits by wealthy men, and how the truth should be told by them.—(61)

साक्षिलक्षणोपन्यासः श्लोकः । यादृशाः साक्षिणो यज्जातीया यद्गुणयुक्ताश् च धनिभिर् उत्तमर्णैर् व्यवहारेषु धनप्रयोगादिषु कर्तव्यास् तादृशान् वक्ष्यमाणेन कथयिष्यामि । यथा च ऋतं सत्यं²³⁶ वाच्यं वक्तव्यं पृष्टैः सद्भिस् तैः, पूर्वाह्ण इत्यादि, तम् अपि प्रकारं वक्ष्यामीति ॥ ८.६१ ॥

The verse introduces the section dealing with witnesses.

‘What sort of persons’—i.e., of what, castes and with what qualifications.

‘Wealthy men’—creditors.

^(‘)Suits’—dealing with money-transactions.

I shall describe now what sorts of witnesses shall he adduced; and also how the truth should be told by them, when questioned,—this also I shall explain.—(61)

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 256);—and in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 173).

**(verses 8.61-63)
**

Baudhāyana (1-19.13).—‘Men of the four castes who have sons may be witnesses, excepting Śṛotriyas, the King, ascetics and those destitute of human intelligence.’

Viṣṇu (8.8).—‘Descendants of a noble race, who are virtuous and wealthy, sacrifices, zealous in the practice of religious austerities, having male issue, well versed in the holy law, studious, veracious, acquainted with the three Vedas and aged—shall be witnesses.’

Yājñavalkya (2.68.69).—‘Persons devoted to austerities, charitable, of noble families, veracious, heedful of righteousness, straightforward, with sons, wealthy, devoted to acts prescribed in the Śruti and in Smṛtis;—such persons shall be witnesses;—they shall be at least three in number; the caste of the witnesses being consonant with the caste of the parties; or members of all castes may be witnesses for all eases.’

Bṛhaspati (7.16).—‘There should be nine, seven, five, four or three witnesses; or two only, if they are learned Brāhmaṇas, are proper; but let him never examine an only witness.’

Gautama (13.2.3).—‘Witnesses shall be many, faultless as regards the performance of their duties, worthy to be trusted by the King, and free from affection for, or hatred against, either party;—they may be even Śūdras.’

Bṛhaspati (7.28),—‘Those may be witnesses who are in the habit of performing religious acts enjoined in the Vedas and Smṛtis, free from covetousness and malice, of respectable parentage, irreproachable, zealous in austerities, liberal and sympathetic.’

Āpastamba (2.29.7).—‘A person possessed of good qualities may be called as a witness, and he shall, answer the questions.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.28).—‘Śrotriyas, men of unblemished form, of good character, men who are holy and love truth, are fit to be witnesses;—or men of any caste may give evidence regarding men of any other caste.’

Nārada (1.153-154).—‘The witnesses shall be of honourable family, straightforward and unexceptionable as to their descent, their actions and their fortunes. They shall not be less than three in number, unimpeachable, honest and pure-minded. They shall be Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas or Vaiśyas or irreproachable Śūdras. Each of these shall be witness for his own order; or all of them may be witnesses for all.’

धनव्यवहारे च साक्षिणां लक्षणम् उच्यमानम्, अन्येष्व् अपि व्यवहारेषु कार्यसामान्याद् अविरोधाच् चेत्थंभूता एव प्रतीयेरन् ॥ ८.६१ ॥

061 I will fully declare what kind of men may be made witnesses in suits by creditors, and in what manner those (witnesses) must give true (evidence).

Householders, men with sons, respectable natives, and men of the kṣatriya, vaiśya and śūdra castes are competent to act as witnesses, when cited by suitors;—and not any and every person, except in emergencies.—(62)

कृतदारपरिग्रहा गृहिणः । गृहशब्दो दारेषु वर्तते । ते हि स्वकलत्रपरिभवभयान् न कूटम् आचरन्ति । आत्मनि केचिन् निरपेक्षा अपि भवन्ति²³⁷ । अन्यदेशान्तरगमनेनात्मानं रक्षयिष्याम इहैव च क्वचिद् गुप्ता भविष्यामो धनं मित्रं वार्जयाम इत्य् अनया बुद्ध्या अनृतम् अपि वदन्ति । कुटुम्बिनस् तु स्वकुटुम्बभयात् क्व वात्मानं न परिरक्षिष्याम इति दूरं कृत्वा कुटुम्बस्य सापेक्षतया राजदण्दभयान् नान्यथा प्रवर्तन्ते ।

पुत्रिण इति । पुत्रस्नेहात् पुत्रिणः । अपुत्रदारश् च साक्षिप्रश्नकाले साद्वाचारो ऽपि कदाचिन् न संनिहितो भवति । स हि नैकस्मिन् देशे आस्थानवान् भवति । एवं मौला अपि व्याख्येयाः । मौला जानपदास् तद्देशाभिजनाः । ते हि स्वजनज्ञातिमध्ये पापभीरुतया न मिथ्या वदन्ति । मूलं प्रतिष्ठा, सा येषाम् अस्ति ते मौलाः । अर्थकथनम् एतत् । तद्धितस् तु भावार्थ एव कर्तव्यः । यो हि यत्र भवः²³⁸ सो ऽपि तस्यास्तित्य् अविरुद्धम् ।

क्षत्रविट्शूद्रयोनयः । न ब्राह्मणः । सर्वदा ह्य् अस्याध्ययनाध्यापने विहिते, अन्वहं वाग्निहोत्रहोमः । तत्र दूरस्थे राजनि धर्मोपरोधो ऽस्य मा भूद् इत्य् असौ न कर्तव्यतयोपादीयते । यदृच्छयावगतार्थस् तु साक्ष्यन्तराभावे गरीयसि कार्ये मुख्यतमः स साक्षी । तथा च “ब्रूहीति ब्राह्मणं पृच्छेत्” (म्ध् ८.८८) इति साक्षिप्रश्नो भविष्यति । योनिशब्दः प्रत्येकम् अभिसंबध्यते । क्षत्रं²³⁹ योनिर् उत्पत्तिः कारणम् अस्यासौ क्षत्रयोनिः । क्षत्रियजातीय इत्य् अर्थः । क्षत्राद् वा योनिर् जन्मास्येति पञ्चमीति योगविभागात् समासो ऽप्य् उक्तः । अर्थिना यदोक्तं भवत्य् एते मम साक्षिणः तदा²⁴⁰ साक्षिकर्मणि योग्या भवन्ति । ये तु स्वयम् आगत्य साक्ष्यं ददति न ते साक्षिणः ।

अनापदि । आपत् साक्ष्यन्तराभाव इति केचित् । तद् अयुक्तम् । विसंवादकत्वम् असाक्षित्वे कारणम् । तत्संवादकान्तराभावे नापैति । न वयं ब्रूमः — प्रतिषिद्धसाक्षिभावा²⁴¹ विद्यमानानृताभिधानहेतवो ऽर्थसंबन्द्यादयो वास्याम् अवस्थायां प्रतिप्रसूयन्ते — किं तर्हि येषां कदाचिद् आहूयमानानां धर्मविरोधो भवति श्रोत्रियादीनां तेषाम् अविद्यमानेष्व् अन्येष्व् अनुभूतार्थानाम् इदं प्रत्यनुज्ञानं न पुनर् अनृतानाम् ॥ ८.६२ ॥

‘Householders’—persons who have married; the term ‘gṛha,’ ‘house,’ standing for wife. Through fear of trouble falling upon their wives, these men do not act dishonestly; there are many who may be indifferent in regard to consequences to themselves personally, and may give false evidence, thinking thus—‘I shall save myself by going away to some other country, or even in this country I shall hide myself and acquire wealth and friends’; but when they have a family they have fears regarding the family and, setting aside all ideas of fleeing away and keeping themselves safe, and, in the best interests of the family, desist from dishonest dealings, through fear of punishments being inflicted upon their family.

‘Men with sons;’—through love for their sons, such men shun all dishonest dealings; and further, people who have no wife and children, even though they may be quite honest, may not be available (meettai th)? of the evidence being taken; because such people do not have any fixed abode.

‘Maulāḥ,’ ‘respectable natives’;—this also is open to the same explanation. The terms stand for natives born in the country; these, being afraid of committing a sinful act among their own people, do not tell lies. the term ‘maula’ denotes ‘those who command mūla or respect’; but this is only an explanation of the denotation of the term; and the nominal affix denotes nativity. Men born in a country generally live there; so there is no incongruity in this.

‘Men of the kṣatriya, vaiśya and śūdra castes,’—not the Brāhmaṇa, as for him, constant study and teaching have been prescribed,—or the daily offering of the Agnihotra offerings; so that if the King were at a distance from him, and he were summoned to appear before him, it would load to a dereliction of his duty; and it is with a view to guard against this that he is not mentioned as fit for being cited as a witness. But if the Brāhmaṇa happens to know all about the case, and there are no other witnesses, and the case is an important one,—then he is the most important witness. It is with a view to these latter cases that the exact form of question for the Brāhmaṇa-witness is going to be laid down:—‘This Brāhmaṇa shall be examined by being asked to speak’ (verse 88 below).

The term ‘yoni’ (in the compound ‘kṣatra-viṭ-śūdra-yonayaḥ’) is to be construed with each of the preceding terms; the meaning being ‘those of whom the kṣatriya is the yoni or origin,’ i.e., those of the kṣatriya caste; or the right explanation of the compound may be with the Ablative—‘kṣatrāt yoniḥ janma yasya,’ ‘he whose birth is from the kṣatriya caste.’

These persons become competent witnesses only when the suitor declares—‘these are my witnesses.’ Those who come and volunteer to give evidence are not real ‘witnesses.’

‘Except in emergencies’.—Some people have explained that the ‘emergency’ meant here is the absence of other witnesses. But this is not right. Because untruthfulness is the only thing that disqualifies one from being a proper ‘witness’; and this disqualification does not cease, simply because other truthful witnesses are not available. We do not mean to say that the phrase (‘except in emergencies’) permits the admissibility as witnesses of such persons as have been definitely declared to be disqualified, or of those who have reasons to depose falsely, or those who are interested in the case; all that we mean is that in the event of no other witnesses being available, the saving clause permits the calling of such Vedic scholars and other persons as may be conversant with the facts of the case, whose summoning might interfere with these religious practices,—and not of admitted liars.—(62)

‘Maulāḥ’—‘Natives of the place’ (Medhātithi);—‘heads of families or friends.’

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 665);—and in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 256).

**(verses 8.61-63)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.61].

श्रोत्रियस्य साक्षित्वे प्रतिषेधाद् ब्राह्मणस्याश्रोत्रियस्यास्ति साक्षित्वम् इति गम्यते । अन्त्यजस्य प्रतिषेधाद् धीनोत्कृष्टानाम् अपि शूद्राणां ग्रहणं प्रतीयते ॥ ८.६२ ॥

062 Householders, men with male issue, and indigenous (inhabitants of the country, be they) Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, or Sudras, are competent, when called by a suitor, to give evidence, not any persons whatever (their condition may be) except in cases of urgency.

In all law-suits trustworthy men of all the castes, fully conversant with morality and free from avarice, should be made witnesses; the reverse of these should be avoided.—(63)

आप्ता अविसंवादका यथादृष्टार्थवादिनः येषां लोको विप्रलम्भकत्वं न संभावयति, धर्मानुष्ठानपरा ये ख्याताः । सर्वधर्मविदः श्रौतं स्मार्तम् आचारनिरूढं च सर्वं धर्मम् — इह नरकः फलम् इह स्वर्ग इत्य् एवं निरवशेषम् — जानन्ति ते ह्य् अनृताभिधाने नरकं पश्यन्तो बिभ्यति । अलुब्धा उदारसत्वा न स्वल्पं धनं बहु मन्यन्ते । एकैकस्य समस्तानि दर्वाणि विशेषणानि, साक्षिक्रियायां गुणभूतत्वाद् गुणे च साहित्यस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । सर्वेषु वर्णेष्व् इति । सर्वकार्येषु²⁴² न जातिनियमो ऽस्तीत्य् उक्तं भवति । यत् पुनर् जातिव्यवस्थावचनं तद् उपरिष्टाद् वक्ष्यामः । तद् एतद् उक्तं भवति । सर्वैः कार्यिभिः सर्वे वर्णा यथासंभवं साक्षिणः कर्तव्याः । कार्येषु ऋणादानादिषु । यथोक्तलक्षणात्²⁴³ विपरीतांस् तु वर्जयेत् । यद्य् अपि विशिष्टेष्व् अभिहितेषु तद्विपरीतानां प्रसङ्ग एव नास्ति तथापि लौकिको ऽयं पर्युदासः । प्रायेण हि लौकिका अन्यं विधायान्यं²⁴⁴ तद्विपरीतं निषेधयन्ति । तथा च भवन्ति वक्तारः — “क्रिया हि द्रव्यं विनयति नाद्रव्यम्” इति । किं चाविसंवादकत्वम्²⁴⁵ इह प्रधानं साक्षिलक्षणं तच् च न विधिमुखेन शक्यावसानम्, किं तु विसंवादकरणाभावमुखेन । न ह्य् अविसंवादकत्वं प्रत्यक्षदृश्यम् । तद् धि यथार्थाभिधानम् । श्रोत्रग्राह्ये च वस्तुनि कुतः प्रत्यक्षो यथार्थनिश्चयः । प्रत्यक्षत्वे हि नैव साक्ष्यवगमो ऽन्विष्यते । न च सर्वत्र परोक्षे वस्तुनि शब्दावगम्ये प्रमाणान्तरसंवादसंभवः । तस्माद् यानि भूयस्त्वेन मिथ्याभिधानकरणतया दृष्टानि तदभावनिश्चयेनाविसंवादकत्वम्²⁴⁶ अनुमीयते²⁴⁷ । अतस् तत्प्रदर्शनार्थो ऽयम् उपक्रमो विपरीतांस् तु वर्जयेद् इति ॥ ८.६३ ॥

‘Trustworthy,’—who never say what is not in conformity with facts; who always state facts as they are actually seen; with regard to whom people never have any suspicion of being liars.

‘Fully conversant witḥ morality’;—who are always engaged in the performance of their religious duties, and who know them; i.e., who act up to all that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis and sanctioned by usage, and who know everything regarding what leads to heaven and what to hell. Such people, perceiving that the telling of lies will lead to hell, are afraid of untruth.

‘Free from avarice,’—i.e., of magnanimous temperament, not liable to regarding a little wealth as much.

Each individual witness should he possessed of all these qualification; these are stated as subsidiary to the act of giving evidence; and combination is always intended in regard to what are subsidiaries.

‘Of all castes’;—that is to say, there is no restriction regarding castes. As regards the rule relating to the restriction of castes, that we shall explain later on. The meaning of the present text therefore is that ‘men of any caste, according as they be available, should ho cited as witnesses by all suitors.’

‘In all suits,’—such as non-payment of debt and the rest.

Those who are the ‘reverse’ of those specified above ‘should be avoided.’— Though as a matter of fact, when specially qualified persons have been specified, there is no possibility of the admission of those who are the ‘reverse’ of them,—yet the preclusion is in accordance with popular usage: ordinary men are often found to assert one thing and deny its contrary (in the same sentence); e.g., they are found to say—“an operation alters a material substance, and not what is not material.’ Further, the chief qualification of witnesses is truthfulness; and this cannot be ascertained in its positive form; in fact it can be ascertained only negatively, by finding out that the man does not pervert truth; this latter again is not perceptible because what the ‘non-perverting of truth’ means is the telling of truth, and in regard to what cm only be heard by the ear, bow can there he any perceptible cognition of the truth of what is stated by the words? If the facts were perceptible, there would be no need for seeking for any witnesses. And in regard to all things cognisable by means of words,

there is no amenability to any other means of cognition. So that it is only when it is found that in a certain person all those conditions are absent which are found to be conducive to telling lies, that the veracity—i.e., his incapability to pervert truth—conies to be inferred. Thus it is with a view to indicate this that we have the words ‘the reverse of these should be avoided.’—(63)

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 256 and 281);—and in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 177).

**(verses 8.61-63)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.61].

विपरीतांस् तु वर्जयेद् इत्य् अर्थसिद्धस्याप्य् अनुवादो वाक्यस्वाभाव्याद् आदरार्थः । सर्ववर्णग्रहणाच् चात्र ब्राह्मणस्यापि साक्षित्वं प्रतीयते । श्रोत्रियस्य प्रतिषेधाद् इतरस्य ॥ ८.६३ ॥

063 Trustworthy men of all the (four) castes (varna) may be made witnesses in lawsuits, (men) who know (their) whole duty, and are free from covetousness; but let him reject those (of an) opposite (character).

Neither interested persons, nor relations, nor helpers, nor enemies, nor persons of proved corruption, nor those afflicted with disease, nor the corrupted should be made witnesses.—(64)

तानीमानि संभाव्यमानमिथ्याभिधानकरणत्वेन पठ्यन्ते । तत्र अर्थसंबन्धिन उत्तमर्णाधमर्णाद्याः । उत्तमर्णा ह्य् अधमर्णवचनेन पराजीयमानास् तदानीम् एव रोषावेशवशितः²⁴⁸ स्तम्भयन्ति धनं प्रयादतुम् अधमर्णम् । अतो ऽसौ²⁴⁹ संनिहितधनिकचित्तम् अनुवर्तमानः तदनुगुणं वक्तुं शक्नोति²⁵⁰ । तस्माद् असौ न साक्षी । उत्तमर्णो ऽपि निर्धने ऽधमर्णे व्यवहारजयाच् च धनप्राप्तौ मह्यम् अयं प्रतिदास्यतीत्य् अनया बुद्ध्या कदाचित् तत्पक्षानुगुणं वक्तीति सो ऽप्य् असाक्षी ।

अथ वार्थः प्रयोजनं यस्य साक्षिणो विवादिभ्यां किंचित् प्रयोजनं साध्यम्, तेन वा तयोः, स उपकारगन्धान् न साक्षी । यो वा व्यवहारगतेनार्थेन समानफलः । इत्य् एवंप्रकार्आर्थसंबन्धिनः ।

आप्ता मित्रबान्धवतया²⁵¹ कार्याभ्यन्तराः पितृव्यमातुलादयः । सहायाः प्रतिभूप्रभृतयो । वैरिणः प्रसिद्धाः । दृष्टदोषा अन्यत्र कृतकौटसाक्ष्याः । अन्यद् वा प्रतिषिद्धम् आचरितवन्तः । व्याध्यार्ता रोगपीडिताः । न पुनर् ईषद्रोगिण इत्य् आर्तग्रहणम् । पीडितस्य हि क्रोधविस्मृत्यादयो मिथ्यावचने संभाव्यन्ते । दूषिताः पातकिनो ऽभ्यस्तोपपातकाश् च । दृष्टदोषग्रहणं तु तेषाम् एव कृतनिग्रहाणां परिग्रहार्थम् । ते हि राजभिर् धृतदण्डग्राहितविनयत्वान्²⁵² न संप्रति दूषीता भवन्ति ॥ ८.६४ ॥

The following persons are named, as showing those persons in whose case causes for telling lies are likely to be present.

Among these are (1) ‘interested persons’ —i.e., persons standing related to each other in the relation of the creditor, the debtor and so forth. If a person loses a ease through the deposition of one who happens to be his debtor, he is likely to become enraged at that very time and to press the debtor for immediate repayment of the debt; in view of this the debtor is likely to be swayed by a desire to keep the creditor pleased; and as such he cannot he a witness. Similarly, in a suit filed by the debtor against some one, his creditor would be swayed by the consideration that if the penniless suitor won his case, he would he able to repay his own dues; and as such he would he likely to depose falsely in his favour; for this reason he also cannot be a true witness.

Or, ‘interest’ mean purpose, object; thus persons who have some end in view,—who stand to gain from either party,—or from whom either party is likely to gain something—are called ‘interested’—their interest in the case being similar to that of the parties themselves.

‘Relations’—friends and relations knowing the insand outs of the case,—e.g., paternal and maternal uncles, etc.

‘Helpers’—those who have stood security and others similarly situated.

‘Enemies’—what these are is well known.

‘Persons of proved corruption,’—those who have home false evidence in other cases, or who have committed other forbidden acts.

‘Afflicted with disease,’—i.e., those affected by serious,—not paltry-ailments; this is what is implied by the term ‘afflicted.’ Those labouring under such afflictions are likely to lose temper, to forget things and to perjure themselves.

‘Corrupted,’— those who have committed a mortal sin, or have repeatedly committed minor sins. the term ‘of proved corruption’ is meant to refer to those who hare been convicted of, and punished for, a serious crime. Such persons are no longer regarded as ‘corrupted,’ because they have been brought under discipline by having paid to t he king the penalty for their sin.—(64)

‘Arthasambandhinaḥ’—‘Persons having money-dealings with either of the two parties’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda);—‘having an interest in the suit’ (Nārāyaṇa and Medhātithi, alternatively); ‘who have received benefits from the parties’ (Nandana).

‘Sahāyāḥ’—‘Sureties and the like’ (Medhātithi);—‘Servants’ (Kullūka and Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 66);—in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī, (p. 281);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 10a);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (29b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 49a), which says that these texts set forth those qualities, which make a man unreliable as a witness, and it reproduces Medhātithi’s explanations of the words.

**(verses 8.64-67)
**

Gautama (13.2).—(See under 63.)

Āpastamba (2.29.7).—(See under 63.)

Vaśiṣṭha (16.28).—(See under 63.)

Viṣṇu (8.2-4).—‘The King cannot be made a witness; nor an ascetic, nor a learned Brāhmaṇa, nor a gamester, nor a thief, nor a person who is not his own master, nor a woman, nor a child, nor a perpetrator of violence, nor one overaged, nor one intoxicated or insane, nor a man of ill-repute, nor an outcast, nor one tormented by hunger or thirst, nor one oppressed by a sudden calamity, nor one wholly absorbed in evil passions;—nor an enemy or a friend, nor one interested in the subject-matter, nor one who does forbidden acts; nor one formerly perjured; nor an attendant; nor one who, without being appointed, comes and offers his evidence.’

Yājñavalkya (2.70-71).—‘The following are not to be made witnesses:—Woman, child, aged person, gamester, one intoxicated or insane, one accused of a heinous crime, actor, heretic, forger, one with defective organs, outcast, a near relative, or one related in business, friend, enemy, thief, one addicted to violence, those beset with perceptible faults, one despised (by good men).’

Baudhāyana (1.19.13).—(See under 62.)

Nārada (1.157-162).—‘Incompetent witnesses have been declared by the learned to be of five sorts: (1) Actually declared by law to be incompetent, (2) incompetent on account of depravity, (3) incompetent by reason of contradiction, (4) one of uncalled for deposition, (5) one of intervening decease. (1) Learned Brāhmaṇas, devotees, aged persons and ascetics are those who have been declared by law to be incompetent, without any reason being given for it;—(2) thieves, robbers, dangerous characters, gamblers and assassins are incompetent by reason of their depravity, there is no truth to be found in them;—(3) if the statements of witnesses called by the King do not agree, they are rendered incompetent by reason of contradiction,—(4) he who, without being appointed to be a witness, comes of his own accord to make a deposition, is called a spy in the law-books and he is unworthy to bear testimony;—(5) where can any person bear testimony, if the claimant is no longer in existence, whose claim should have been heard? Such a person is rendered incompetent by reason of intervening decease.’

Nārada (1.177-192).—‘Those must not be examined as witnesses who are interested in the suit; nor friends or associates or enemies or notorious offenders or persons stained with a heavy sin;—nor a slave or an impostor, or one not admitted to Śrāddhas; nor a child, nor an oil-presser, nor one intoxicated, nor a mad man, nor a careless man, nor one distressed, nor a gamester, nor one who sacrifices for the whole village;—nor one engaged in a long journey, nor a merchant who travels to transmarine countries, nor a religious ascetic, nor one sick or deformed; nor a simple man, nor a learned Brāhmaṇa, nor one who neglects religious practices, nor a eunuch nor an actor;—nor an atheist, nor an apostate, nor one who has forsaken his wife or his fire, nor one who makes illicit offerings, nor an associate who eats out of the same dish as oneself, nor an adversary, nor a spy, nor a relation, nor one related by the same womb;—nor one who has proved an evil-doer, nor a public dancer, nor one who lives by poison, nor a snake-catcher, nor a poisoner, nor an incendiary, nor one who has committed a minor offence;—nor one oppressed by fatigue, nor a ferocious man, nor one who has relinquished worldly appetites, nor one penniless, nor a member of the lowest castes, nor one leading a bad life, nor one still a student, nor an oilman nor a dealer in roots;—nor one obsessed by a demon, nor an enemy of the King, nor a weather-prophet, nor an astrologer, nor a malicious person, nor one self-sold, nor one of deficient limbs, nor one living by prostitution;—nor one with bad nails or black teeth, nor one who betrays his friend, nor a rogue, nor a dealer in spirituous liquor, nor a juggler, nor an avaricious or cruel man, nor an enemy of the company of traders or of an association;—nor one who takes animal-life, nor a leather-manufacturer, or a cripple, or an outcast, or a forger, or a quack, or an apostate, or a robber, or one of the King’s attendants;—nor a Brāhmaṇa who sells human beings, cattle meat, bones, honey, milk, water or butter; nor a member of a twice-born caste who is addicted to usury;—nor one who neglects his duties, nor a judge, nor a bard, nor one who serves low people, nor one who quarrels with his father, nor one who causes dissension. These are the incompetent witnesses. When a heinous crime, or a robbery or adultery or defamation has been committed, the King should not inquire too strictly into the character of the witnesses. A child also cannot be made a witness; nor a woman, nor one man alone, nor a cheat, nor a relation, nor an enemy. By the consent of both parties even one man alone may become a witness in a suit.’

Bṛhaspati (7.29-30).—‘The mother’s father, the father’s brother, the wife’s brother, maternal uncle, brother, friend and son-in-law are inadmissible as witnesses in all disputes. Persons addicted to adultery or to drinking, gamblers, calumniators, insane, suitering, violent persons and unbelievers cannot act as witnesses.’

नार्थसंबन्धिनो नाप्ता न सहाया न वैरिणः ।
न दृष्टदोषाः कर्तव्याह्

अन्यस्मिन् व्यवहारे कूटसाक्षित्वेन

न व्याध्यार्ता न दूषिताः ॥ ८.६४ ॥

ते हि स्मृतिप्रमाणाद् उभयत्र न स्युः । निमित्तेन च प्रतिषेधाद् अनार्तो व्याधितो ऽपि स्यात् । पातकोपपातकाभिशंसा दूषितो ऽपि न स्यात् ॥ ८.६४ ॥

064 Those must not be made (witnesses) who have an interest in the suit, nor familiar (friends), companions, and enemies (of the parties), nor (men) formerly convicted (of perjury), nor (persons) suffering under (severe) illness, nor (those) tainted (by mortal sin).

The king should not be made a witness; nor craftsmen, nor actors, nor a Vedic scholar, nor one in holy orders, nor one who has renounced all attachments.—(65)

त्वं मे साक्षी भविष्यसीति व्यवहारकृता धनविसर्गादिकाले साक्षित्वे नृपतिर् नाध्येषितव्यः । तस्य हि सक्ष्यं ददतः पक्षपातम् आशङ्केरन् । प्रभुत्वाद् वा ददतो ऽन्यतरस्य कार्यनाशः । न च साक्षिधर्मेण प्रष्टुं युज्यते । तद्देशवासी च यद्य् अपि लेखादिना संवदयेत् तथापि साक्षिधर्मं सर्वं न कुर्याद् इति तदेशवासिनो राज्ञः साक्षिकरणप्रतिषेधः²⁵³ ।

कारुकादीनां स्वकार्योपरोधशङ्कया । संगत्या च ते जीवन्ति । स्वभावश् चैष जानपदानां यत् स्वयं निश्चितवन्तो ऽपि “जीवामहे वयम्” इति जिताः साक्षिकादिभ्यो रुष्यन्ति । ततश् च सार्वलौकिकी संगतिः कारुकादीनाम् उच्छिद्यते । किं च प्रकृतिपरिलघुत्वात् तेषां वृत्तेश्²⁵⁴ चलयितुम् अपि शक्यन्ते । तथा च पक्षपातं भजेरन् ।

श्रोत्रियस्य तु साक्षित्वे कर्तव्यता प्रतिषिध्यते राजवन् न पुनर् अप्रत्ययिततया²⁵⁵ । न हि श्रोत्रियत्वं प्रामाण्यं विहन्ति, जनयत्य् एव विशेषतः । न हि श्रोत्रियत्वं विसंवादहेतुतयोपलब्धम् । एवम् उत्तरत्रापि ।

कारुकाः शिल्पोपजीविनः सूपकारायस्कारादयः । कुशीलवाः नटनर्तकगायनाद्याः । श्रोत्रियो वेदपाठकः । यस् त्व् अध्ययनतत्परः स इह गृह्यते । अथ वा श्रोत्रियत्वं कर्मानुष्ठानोपलक्षणार्थम् । तेनानुष्ठानपरस्य तद्विरोधतया प्रतिषेधः । लिङ्गस्थो ब्रह्मचारी । परिव्राजकपाखण्डलिङ्गधारिणस् तु कुशास्त्रवर्तित्वाद् एवाप्राप्ताः । सङ्गेभ्यो विनिर्गता वेदसंन्यासिनो गृहस्थाः । सङ्गः अभ्यासतो²⁵⁶ विषयोपभोगः, दृष्टार्थकर्मारम्भो वा ॥ ८.६५ ॥

At the time that one is lending out money, the king should not he made a party to the transaction by being requested to the effect ‘yon shall he my witness.’ Because if the king gave evidence, people would suspect him of partiality,—being all-powerful as he is; and tin’s would lead to the detriment of the interest of one or the other;—nor would it be proper to question the king in the same manner as an ordinary witness. Though being an inhabitant of the same place, the king might corroborate statements by means of written notes, yet what is forbidden is his appearance as a regular witness of the ordinary class.

As for craftsmen and the rest, they should not be made witnesses for fear of injury to their business. These men live by the good-will of the people; and it is human nature that though men know (that their case is false), yet the mere consideration that they are losing it leads them to bear a grudge against the witnesses and others; and thus the universal goodwill of the artisan and the rest becomes lost, further, in as much as these men are of mean nature, they are prone to being diverted from the path of honesty, and hence becoming partial.

As regards the ‘Vedic scholar,’ what is denied is not his trustworthiness, but the propriety of his appearing as a witness; just as in the case of the king. Because the foot of the man being a ‘Vedic scholar’ does not deprive him of his trustworthiness; on the contrary, it only intensifies it to a special degree; and (his for the same reason that Vedic scholarship has never been found to be the instigator of perjury.

Similarly with those that follow.

‘Craftsmen’—those that make a living by some crafts; such as cooks and the like.

‘Actors’—dancers, singers and so forth.

‘Vedic scholar’—one who studies the Veda; the person meant here is one who is always engaged in Vedic study. Or, ‘Vedic scholarship’ may be taken as indicating the performance of religions rites; and in that, case the prohibition would apply to one who is engaged in such performance;—the work of the witness being prejudicial to such rites.

‘One in holy orders’—the Religious student. As for those who merely wear the badge of the Wandering Mendicant, or of the heretical orders,—these are inadmissible on the ground of their following the heretical scriptures.

‘One toko has renounced attachments’—This stands for those householders who have ‘renounced the Veda.’ ‘Attachment’ means either the repeated enjoyment of sensual objects, or the undertaking of acts for ordinary worldly purposes—.(65)

‘Kuśīlava’—‘Actors, dancers singers and so forth’ (Medhātithi);—‘actors’ (Nārāyaṇa);—‘actors and so forth’ (Govindarāja and Kullūka);—‘singers’ (Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 66);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 10a);—in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 281);—in Smṛticandrikā, (Vyavahāra, p. 177);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (80b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 49b), which reproduces Medhātithi’s, explanation.

**(verses 8.64-67)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.64].

नृपतेः साक्षित्वप्रतिषेधः सत्यविभावने ऽपि तस्य पक्षपरिग्रहाशङ्कया अवचनेन च परिक्षयो जानपदानाम् । अथ वा समानदेशस्य राज्ञः अवश्यत्वात् प्रतिषेधः । अथ वा व्यवहारद्रष्टू राज्ञः साक्षित्वम् अयुक्तम् । कारुका नित्यव्यापृताः कुशीलवा नित्यप्रोषिताः । सर्वजनपदसंबन्धेन वा, तेषाम् अनृताशङ्कया तत्प्रत्यवायाद् [असाक्षित्वम्] । श्रोत्रियस्य धर्मोपरोधाशङ्कया तदानयनपीडाशङ्कया च । एतेन लिङ्गस्थो व्याख्यातः । अथ तु सोपधः सुतरां तस्य प्रतिषेधो युक्तो । नृ । । । त्रियत्वान् अन् यायापराभिः (?) ॥ ८.६५ ॥

065 The king cannot be made a witness, nor mechanics and actors, nor a: Srotriya, nor a student of the Veda, nor (an ascetic) who has given up (all) connexion (with the world),

—Not one wholly dependent, nor one under pupilage, nor a paid servant, nor one who adopts forbidden occupations, nor one too old, nor a minor, nor a single person, nor one belonging to the lowest class, nor one with defective organs;—(66)

अध्यधीनशब्दो ऽत्यन्तपरतन्त्रगर्भदासादौ रूढ्या वर्तते । अन्ये तु तुल्यसंहितत्वाद् “अध्याधीनः” इति पठन्ति । अध्याधीनो बन्धकीकृतः । वक्तव्यो ऽनुशास्यः शिष्यपुत्रादिः, आचार्याधीनत्वात् । अथ वा कुष्ठादिना कुत्सितकायः । दस्युः भृतिदासः वैतनिकः “स ह्य् उपादासयति” कर्माणीति नैरुक्ते निरुक्तः । तस्य च दिवसभृतत्वान् नात्यन्तपारतन्त्र्यम् अस्तीति पृथग् उपदेशः क्रियते । कर्मजीवनत्वापत्तौ तथाविधानां जीविकोच्छेदः, लघुवृत्तित्वाच् च लोभादिसंभवेनाप्रत्ययिततापि । चौरस्य तु शब्दान्तरोपादानान् न दस्युग्रहणेन ग्रहणम् । कठिणहृदयो वा दस्युः क्रूरचेष्टः । विकर्मकृच् छास्त्रविरुद्धं यः कर्म करोति । यथा ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियवृत्तिं वैश्यो वेत्यादि । वृद्धो वयःपरिणामाद् असंस्मृतिः । शिशुर् बालो ऽप्राप्तव्यवहारः । एकः²⁵⁷ त्र्यवरग्रहणेनैकस्याप्राप्तेः प्रतिषेधो द्वयोः कस्यांचिद् अवस्थायाम् अभ्यनुज्ञानार्थः, यथा त्रिहस्ताचारोपत्रे²⁵⁸ । यद्य् अपि तत्र तृतीयलेखको न²⁵⁹ भवति तथापि लेखनमात्रस्य व्यापारो न साक्षित्व इति कस्यचिद् इयम् आशङ्का स्यात् । अन्त्यो बर्बरचण्डालादिः, स्ववर्गाद्²⁶⁰ अन्यत्र । शूद्रयोनित्वेन प्राप्तस्य प्रतिषेधः । विकलेन्द्रियो ऽन्धबधिरादिः, शरीरपीडयोपलब्धिर् विकलत्वाच् च ॥ ८.६६ ॥

‘One wholly dependent’:—this term is applied by usage to the horn slave and such other persons who are entirely subservient to other persons.

Others read ‘adhyādhīna,’ which means a prisoner.

‘One under pupilage’—the son or the pupil (of either party), who is entirely under the sway of the Teacher. Or the term ‘vaktaryaḥ’ may he taken as standing for one whose body has been deformed by leprosy or some such disease.

‘Dasyu’ here stands for the servant engaged on fixed wages,—so called because he ‘accomplishes work’ (), as explained by the followers of the Nirukta. Since such a servant is engaged on daily wages, he is not absolutely dependent on others; that is why he has been mentioned separately. As persons belonging to this class live upon the wages earned, they would become deprived of their livelihood (if they deposed against their employer); and further, as their living is small, they are liable to corruption, hence untrustworthy also. As for the thief or robber (who also is called ‘dasyu’), as he is mentioned by a separate word (in the next verse), he cannot be taken as spoken of here by means of the term ‘dasyu.’ Or, the term ‘dasyu’ may stand for a hard-hearted person, one of cruel disposition.

‘Vikarmakṛṭ’ is one who adopts an occupation forbidden by the scriptures; e.g., the Brāhmaṇa adopting the occupation of the Kṣatriya, or the Kṣatriya that of the Vaiśya and so forth.

‘Too old.’—One who is too old is subject to lapses of memory.

‘Minor,’—one who is too young and not yet entered business.

‘A single person’—in as much as ‘at least three’ has already been laid down,—which leaves no possibility of citing a single witness—the prohibition of ‘a single person’ is to be taken as permitting under certain circumstances, the citing of only two witnesses. Otherwise, in a case where, it being laid down that a document must be attested by three persons,—people might be led to think that if the third attestor is not present, the other two persons may write, but they are not admissible as a ‘witness.’

‘Person belonging to the lowest class’— the barbarian, the Caṇḍāla and so forth. These are percluded here, because they might be regarded as admissible by reason of their having their origin in the Śūdra-caste (who is permitted in verse 60).

“One with defective organs’— with his perceptive faculties rendered defective by bodily disease.—(66)

‘Vaktavyaḥ’—‘Son or pupil or such others as can be ordered about’ (Medhātithi and Rāmacandra);—‘one whose body is disfigured by leprosy or such other diseases’ (Medhātithi, alternative);—‘despised by reason of misconduct’ (Nārāyaṇa, Kullūka, Rāghavānanda and Nandana).

‘Dasyu,’—‘Servant receiving wages’ (Medhātithi. Govindarāja and Rāghavānanda);—‘cruel man’ (Medhātithi, alternative, Kuljūka and Rāghavānanda); ‘low-caste man’ (Nandana)‘murderer’ (Rāmacandra).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 66)—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 10a);—in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 281);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 177);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (30b), which explains ‘adhyadhīnaḥ’ as one who is held in bondage;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 49b), which reproduces Medhātithi’s explanations.

**(verses 8.64-67)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.64].

अध्यधीनो गर्भदासः, अत्यन्त[परतन्तत्वात् । अनुशास्या अ]पीति वक्तव्यो ऽङ्गव्यसनः कुष्ट्यादिश् च । स च जात्यन्तरे दोषाशङ्कया । एवं कर्मावशेषेणेति वक्ष्यति । दस्युर् दासह्- उपसादयति कर्माणि क्षपयतीति । [अपि च] दस्युस् तस्करः । न विकर्मकृत्, अधार्मिकत्वात् । वृद्धशिश्वोर् अतीताप्राप्तव्यवहारत्वात् प्रतिषेधः । एकस्य साक्षित्वप्रतिषेधस् “त्र्यपरैर्” इति सिद्धः, यतः [अस्मिन् श्लोके] एकस्यापि विशेषनिषेधात् पाक्षिकः पूर्वश्लोकः । अयं पुनः प्रतिषिद्धप्रतिप्रसवार्थः । [एकस्यै]व साक्षित्वम् “एको ऽलुब्धस् तु साक्षी स्यात्ऽ इति वक्ष्यति । अन्त्यः शूद्रः, तस्य च विधिप्रतिषेधात् पाक्षिकं साक्षित्वं गुणापेक्षया । अथ वा चण्डालो ऽन्त्यः । तथा वक्ष्यति “स्त्रीणां साक्ष्यं स्त्रियः कुर्युः” इति शूद्रान् अभिधार्य “अन्त्यानाम् अन्त्ययोनयः” इति । वर्णापसदमात्रं वा । विकलेन्द्रियो विसंज्ञत्वात् प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ ८.६६ ॥

066 Nor one wholly dependent, nor one of bad fame, nor a Dasyu, nor one who follows forbidden occupations, nor an aged (man), nor an infant, nor one (man alone), nor a man of the lowest castes, nor one deficient in organs of sense,

—Nor one afflicted, nor one intoxicated, nor one demented, nor one tormented by hunger and thirst, nor one oppressed by fatigue, nor one tormented by love, nor one who is in a rage, nor a thief.—(67)

आर्तो बन्धुधनादिनाशेन । मत्तो मद्यमदक्षीबः । अपस्मारगृहीत उन्मत्तः पिशाचकी । क्षुत्तृष्णोपपीडितो बुभुक्षापिपासाभ्यां व्यथितः । श्रमः कायचेष्टाधिक्येन दूराध्वगमनयुद्धादिनोत्पन्नस् तेन्आर्तः पीडितः । कामः स्त्रीसङ्गाभिलाषस् तेन्आर्तो विप्रलंभो ऽत्यन्तसंयोगो²⁶¹ द्वाव् अपि तावत् प्रत्ययौ चित्तोपप्लवात् तत्साधने च विप्रलंभाशङ्कया च । क्रुद्धो ऽन्यस्मिन्न् अपि बहुतरक्रोधः । स हि क्रोधेन व्याप्तचित्तत्वान् न यावद् अनुभवति नाप्य् अनुभूतं स्मरति । तस्करश् चौरः । यद्य् अप्य् असौ विकर्मकृत् तथापि भेदोपादानाद् गोबलीवर्दन्यायो द्रष्टव्यः ॥ ८.६७ ॥

‘Afflicted’—by the death of relatives and friends.

‘Intoxicated’—senseless through wine.

‘Demented’—seized by epilepsy, or obsessed by ghosts.

‘Tormented by hunger or thirst’—Suffering from the pangs of hunger or thirst.

‘Fatigue’—caused by much physical labour, involved in walking long distances, engaging in battle and so forth;—‘oppressed’ by it.

‘Love’—Desire for intercourse with women. One who is separated from his beloved, as also one who is too much with her,—both of them are untrustworthy, on account of their mind being engrossed in the loved one, or in the fear of being separated from her.

‘In rage’—who is too angry with some person,—even other than the parties of the suit; such a person having his mind entirely taken up with rage is unable to perceive things rightly, or to remember them correctly.

‘Thief’;—even though the thief also is ‘one who adopts a forbidden occupation,’ yet since ho has been mentioned separately, it has to be explained on the analogy of the expression ‘go-balīvarda’ (‘cows and hulls’).—(67)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 66);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 10a);—in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 281);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 177);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (30b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 49b).

**(verses 8.64-67)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.64].

आर्तो बन्धुविनाशादिना । एवं चोक्तव्याध्यार्ताद् अन्यो ऽयम् । मत्तोन्मत्तौ प्रसिद्दौ क्षुत्तृष्णोपपीडितश् च । क्रुद्धः क्रोधनत्वाद् अप्रत्ययवृत्तिः । तस्करो गोबलीवर्दन्यायेन विकर्मकृद्उपदेशाद् विज्ञेयः ॥ ८.६७ ॥

067 Nor one extremely grieved, nor one intoxicated, nor a madman, nor one tormented by hunger or thirst, nor one oppressed by fatigue, nor one tormented by desire, nor a wrathful man, nor a thief.

—Woman should give evidence for women; and for twice-born persons similar twice-born men, virtuous śūdhas for śūdras, and men of the lowest caste for the lowest men.—(68)

यत्र पुमांसाव् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ तत्र स्त्रीणां साक्ष्यं नास्ति । यत्र तु स्त्रिया सह पुंसः कार्यं स्त्रीणाम् एव चेतरेतरं स्वल्पम्, तत्र भवन्त्य् एव स्त्रियः साक्षिण्यः । न चायं नियमः स्त्रीणां स्त्रिय एव साक्ष्यं कुर्युर् न पुमांसः । केवलं पुंविषये व्यवहारे क्वचिद् एव स्त्रीणां साक्ष्यं यतो “अस्थिरत्वात्” (म्ध् ८.७७) इति हेतुर् उपात्तः । भवन्ति काश्चन स्त्रियो ब्रह्मवादिन्य इव सत्यवादिन्यः स्थिरबुद्धयश् च ।

द्विजानां सदृशा द्विजाः । यः प्रमाणतरो द्विजः स विसदृशं शङ्क्यमानप्रमाणभावम् अपि दिशन् साक्ष्ये न श्रद्धेयवचनो भवति । यतस् तथाभूतेन प्रमाणभूत एव द्रष्टव्यः । स हि तस्य सदृशः । सदृशानां हि समानदेशस्थानम्²⁶² इतरेतरकार्यज्ञत्वं च संभाव्यते । इतरस्य तु तत्प्रदेशसंनिधिर् यत्नेन साध्यः । सदृशयोस् त्व् औचित्यात्²⁶³ सिद्ध एव । एवं हीनस्य हीनगुणो ऽपि सदृशाद् ग्रहीतव्यः । न तूत्कृष्टगुणो न ग्रहीतव्यः । सादृश्यं जात्या शिल्पादिना वा गुणेन क्रियया वा श्रुताध्ययनादिकया समानशीलतया च । एतच् च नातिमहति कार्ये द्रष्टव्यम् । न हि हीनगुणेषु प्रययितता निश्चीयते ।

अन्त्यानां चण्डालश्वपचादीनां तादृशा एव्आन्त्ययोनयः । अन्ते भवा अन्त्याः । सा योनिर् उत्पत्तिकारणं येषां इति विग्रहः । प्रदर्शनं चैतत् । ये समाना जातिशिल्पशीलादिभिस् तेषाम् इहानुक्तानाम् अपि वणिक्कारुकुशीलवादीनाम्, हेतोः समानत्वात् ॥ ८.६८ ॥

In the case where both plaintiff and defendant are males, the evidence of females is not admissible; when however the suit lies between a male and a female, or between two females,—there women do appear as witnesses. But there is no restriction as to women alone—and no men,—being witnesses for women. In fact it is only in suits relating entirely to males that woman are admissible as witnesses only in special cases, since the only reason that is given for excluding women is their fickleness, but there are some women who are as truthful as the best propounded of the Veda and as steady.

‘For twice-born persons similar twite-born men’ As for the twice-born person of the higher class, and hence more trustworthy,—he may make certain statements whose veracity may be doubted,—and hence his words are not absolutely reliable. In fact the witness should be one who is accepted by the parties as reliable; and this is possible only when he belongs to the same class; as it is only men of the same class who by reason of living in the same place are expected to know all about one another’s transactions; while for others, it would be difficult to come into sufficiently close proximity with men of the lower strata; which, on the other hand, is always available for men of the same class. Similarly for men of inferior qualities, men of the same kind are to be witnesses; though this does not mean that persons with higher qualifications are not admissible.

The ‘similarity’ here meant may be—(a) in caste, or (b) in occupation, or (c) in qualities, or (d) in action, such as the studying of the Veda and so forth, or (e) in character.

But all this restriction is not meant to be applicable to very important suits; because as a rule much reliability is not found in men with inferior qualifications.

‘Far men of the lowest class’—such as the Caṇḍāla and the rest—men of the same low class. The compound ‘antya-yonayaḥ’ is to be expounded as those who have their yoni or origin in the lowermost stratum.

This is meant to be only illustrative. The same rule holds good regarding other classes of people,—such as craftsmen, actors and so forth,—for whom also the witnesses should be ‘similar’—in caste, occupation, character, etc.; though these have not been mentioned in the text; because the same reason is present in their case also.—(68)

‘Sadṛśāḥ’—‘Inhabitants of the same place, of the same caste, same occupations, same qualifications’ (Medhātithi);—‘of the same caste’ (Kullūka) ‘of the same caste and equally virtuous’ (Govindarāja).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 665);—in Mitākṣarā (on 2.68);—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 214);—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 9b);—in Kṛtyakalpataru, 30b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 47a).

Vaśiṣṭha (16.30).—‘Let the King admit women as witnesses regarding women; for twice-born men, twice-born men of the same caste; good Śūdras for Śūdras, and men of low birth for men of the low caste.’

Yājñavalkya (2.69).—‘Or all men may be witnesses for all castes.’

Nārada (1.153).—‘Among companies of artisans, or guilds of merchants, artisans or merchants shall be witnesses; and members of an association among other members of the association; persons living outside, among those living outside; and women among women.’

Nārada (1.156).—‘If in a company of artisans or guilds of merchants, or in any other association, anyone falls out with his associates, they should not bo made witnesses against him; for they all are his enemies.’

अर्थव्यवहारेषु स्वस्थवृत्तयः आत्मनो जात्यादिसादृश्येन साक्षिणः स्युः, अर्थप्रयोक्तारो ऽन्ये वार्थसंबन्धिनः । एवं च प्रदर्शनार्थत्वाद् अस्य तापसप्रव्रजितवणिक्कुशीलवगोपालकादीनां सादृश्येन साक्षिणः स्युः । तथा च ऽक्षत्रविट्शूद्रयोनयः” इति सामान्यनिर्देशो ऽयं द्रष्टव्यः । अर्थव्यवहारेभ्यस् त्व् अन्यत्र —

068 Women should give evidence for women, and for twice-born men twice-born men (of the) same (kind), virtuous Sudras for Sudras, and men of the lowest castes for the lowest.

In the case of anything done in the interior of a house, or in a forest, or in the case of injury to the body,—any person who may be cognisant of the facts may give evidence on behalf of the parties to the suit.—(69)

अन्तर्वेश्मनि यत् कार्यम् अतर्कितोपनतं वाग्दण्डपारुष्यसंग्रहस्तेयसाहसादिरूपम्, अरण्ये वा तादृशम् एव, शरीरे च पीड्यमाने तत्काले दस्युभिर् अन्यैर् वा यतः कुतश्चिद् गृहीतम्, यो वा धननिमित्तं प्रतिभूत्वेन स्थापितः, न च साक्षिणो लब्यन्ते न वा तावत्कालं प्रतिपालयन्ति,²⁶⁴ रहसि चोक्तो वार्थम् आददते अप्रकाशम् — तादृशे विषये यः कश्चिद् अनुभावी स साक्षित्वेन ग्रहीतव्यः । अनुभावी साक्षाद् द्रष्टा । यः कश्चिद् इति न जातिनियमः, सदृशं च तदा नास्तीत्य् आह ।

अन्तर्वेश्मनीति विरलजनोपलक्षणार्थम् । तेन शून्यदेवतायतनादीन्य् अपि विरलजनानि गृह्यन्ते । तथा चारण्यग्रहणम् अस्यैवार्थस्य प्रदर्शनार्थम् ।

अन्ये तु शरीरस्यापि चात्यय इत्य् अन्यथा व्याख्यानयन्ति । कार्यशरीरस्यातिपाते यः कश्चित् साक्षी । यत् कार्यम् अनुष्ठीयमानम् अतिपतत्य् उत्तरकालम् अशक्यानुष्ठानं तत्र साक्षिणां जातिलिङ्गवयःसादृश्यकसंबन्धाभावादिनियमो नास्ति । एतद् एवोत्तरेण दर्शयति ॥ ८.६९ ॥

‘In the interior of a house,’—any sudden act that may be committed, in the shape of defamation or assault or incest or theft or other crimes;—in the forest—if any of the said crimes are committed;—or when the body is hurt by robbers or by other similar persons, and property is robbed;—or when some one has stood security for a debt, but there are no witnesses to it; or even though there were any, they could not wait till the time of the trial;—or when the debt is repaid in private;—in all such cases, any person ‘who may be cognisant of the facts’— who may have witnessed the transaction in question,—there being no restriction as to caste, or of similarity of standing and the like.

The phrase ‘in the interior of a house’ stands lor a secluded place in general; so that uninhabited temples and such places also become included. The mention of the ‘forest’ also indicates the same thing.

Others have explained the clause ‘śarīrasyāpi vātyaye’ to mean ‘when the entire structure of the case is going to fall through, any man can be cited as a witness’; i.e., when a case having been instituted is going to fall through, and there is no chance Of its being re-instituted, then there should be no restriction as to the caste, or sex, or age, or rank or relationship and the like. This is what is further explained in the following verse.—(69)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 671), which adds that ‘anubhāvi’ means an eye-witness, one who has actually seen the occurrence;—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 214);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 181), which explains’ ‘anubhāvi’ as ‘one conversant with the facts of the case’;—in Kṛtyakalpataru (3a), which explains ‘anubhāvi’ as ‘one who has had anubhāva, experience’;—and in ‘Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 51a), which has the same explanation of ‘anubhāvi.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.29).—‘Men of any caste may give evidence regarding men of any caste.’

Yājñavalkya (2.69).—(See under 68.)

अतिपातिनि कार्ये ऽन्तर्वेश्मादिष्व् असदृशो ऽपि साक्ष्यं कुर्यात् । तथा च सति —

069 But any person whatsoever, who has personal knowledge (of an act committed) in the interior apartments (of a house), or in a forest, or of (a crime causing) loss of life, may give evidence between the parties.

In the event of (proper witnesses) not forthcoming, evidence may be given by a woman, by a minor, by an aged person, by a pupil, by a relative, by a slave, or by a servant.—(70)

स्त्रियेति लिङ्गव्यत्यय उक्तः । बालेन स्थविरेण वेति वयोव्यत्ययः । शिष्येणेत्यादिना संबन्धिनः प्रतिप्रसवः । एतच् च प्रदर्शनम् एवंविधानां नियमानां व्यभिचाराय । तेन जातिसादृश्ये²⁶⁵ ऽपि नाद्रियेते । सुहृद्वैरिदृष्टदोषादयस् तु नेष्यन्ते । येषां किंचिद् असत्याभिधानकरणत्वं दृष्टं नापि व्यापकं²⁶⁶ ते न प्रतिसूयन्ते । येषां तु बहुव्यापकं क्वचिद् एव गुणातिशयं चेति व्यभिचरेत् ततः क्वचिद् एव तत्साक्षिणः । उक्तं च ।

• एकः सहस्राल् लभ्येत न सौहार्दान् न शात्रवात् ।

• नार्थसंबन्धतो वापि पुरुषो ऽनृतम् आचरेत् ॥ इति ।

• असंभवे ऽन्येषां साक्षिणां स्त्रियापि कार्यम् । किम् । साक्ष्यम् इति पूर्वश्लोकाद् अनुषज्यते । शिष्येणेति मौखस्रौवसंबन्धप्रदर्शनार्थम्²⁶⁷ एतत् । बन्धुनेति अहार्योत्पत्तिकायौनसंबन्धप्रतिप्रसवः²⁶⁸ । सत्य् अपि संबन्धत्वे यो नातिप्रत्यासन्नः स गृह्यते । तेन भ्रातृव्यमातुलश्वशुर्यादयो न साक्षिणः । तथाविधे हि बन्धुशब्दो रूढः । दासेनेति स्वस्वामिसंबन्ध उपलक्ष्यते । न स्वाम्य् उपाध्यायो याजकश् च सर्वंविधे विषये साक्षिणः । दासो गर्भदासः । भृतको वैतनिकः²⁶⁹ ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु चासामर्थ्याद् बालादयः साक्षित्वे निरस्ताः । न ह्य् एते साक्ष्यम् अवधारयितुं शक्नुवन्ति बुद्धेर् अस्थैर्यात् परिपाकादिभिर् दोषैस् तद् आपदि प्रतिप्रसूयमानसमञ्जसम् इति, न ह्य् आपदि शक्तिर् अस्याविर्भवति । यो हि ब्रूयात् “न वा²⁷⁰ नवौदनः पक्तव्यः; सत्य् अग्नौ तु पक्तव्यः” इति तादृग् एतत् स्यात् ।

नैष दोषः । एवम् अर्थम् एवोत्तरश्लोक आरभ्यते ॥ ८.७० ॥

The mention of ‘woman’ thus permits departure from the rule laying down the sex of the witness; that of ‘minor’ and ‘aged person’ that prescribing his age; and that of ‘pupil’ makes an exception in favour of relations in general;—this being mentioned only by way of illustration, indicating the admissibility of persons similarly circumstanced; hence the restrictions regarding caste or position also are not to be strictly observed. But dear friends, or enemies or persons of proved dishonesty.are not admissible in any case; nor any one in whom there is suspicion of the presence of motives for telling a lie, or those who have been found to be unreliable. Those however who have been found to be only slightly unreliable, but otherwise endowed with superior qualifications, may, in some cases, serve as witnesses. On this point we have the following assertion—‘There may be one man among a thousand who would not tell a lie, under the influence of friendship or enmity or some other interested motive.’

In the event of other witnesses not forthcoming, even a woman ‘may give evidence,’—this clause being construed from the preceding verse.

‘Pupil’—indicates tutorial and sacerdotal relationship in general.

‘Relative’—this term makes an exception in favour of what cannot be avoided; the sense being that even though the man may bear some relationship to the parties, if he is not very nearly related, he may be admitted. Hence the cousin, the uncle, the brother-in-law and such other near relatives should not he made witnesses, the name ‘relative’ being, in ordinary usage, applicable to these persons.

‘Slave’—indicates the relation of ownership in general; that is why the master, the teacher and the priest are not to be made witnesses in any kind of suit. The term ‘slave’ stands for the born slave and ‘servant’ for one who serves on wages.

“The minor and others have been excluded on the ground of incapacity,—they are incapable of realising what is evidence, because of their mind being fickle and undeveloped; so that any exception in their favour, oven in connection with emergencies, cannot he right. For certainly even in an emergency they do not acquire the right capacity. In fact, such an exception would he similar to the case where a man having said ‘fresh rice shall not he cooked,’ adds ‘but if there is no fire it shall be cooked?’

There is no force in this objection; as it is in view of these considerations that we have the next verse.—(70)

This rule refers to the cases contemplated in the preceding verse (Govindarāja and Kullūka),—‘to the last of these cases only’ (Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 671), which adds that the women and others mentioned here to be admissible as witnesses should be understood to be only such as are free from the disqualifications of being prejudiced or wickedly inclined and so forth.

It is quoted in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 214);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 70);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 181);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (32a).

(verses 8.70-72)

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, pp. 670-671).—‘In cases of disobedience of the royal edict, of adultery, of violent crimes, of theft and of assaults,—one should not be particular regarding the admissibility of witnesses. In the case of occurrences within a house, or at night, or outside the village, if a suit is brought forward, the King shall not be very particular regarding the admissibility of witnesses.’

Uśanas (Aparārka, pp. 670-671).—‘A slave, a blind man, a deaf man, women, children, very aged persons and others,—if they are not connected with the parties—may he witnesses in the case of crimes of violence. All those persons who have been declared to he incompetent witnesses may he admitted as witnesses according to the gravity of the case. But even so a child, or a single person, or a woman, or forger, or a relative or an enemy should not be admitted; as they would he found to depose falsely; the child would do it through ignorance, the woman through inherent untruthfulness, the forger by reason of his being a habitual wrong-doer, the relations through their affection, and the enemy as a means of revenge.’

Gautama (13.9).—‘There can be no objection against any witness in a case of criminal hurt.’

Viṣṇu (8.6).—‘In cases of theft, of violence, abuse and assault, and of adultery, the competence of witnesses should not be examined too strictly.’

Yājñavalkya (2.72).—‘All persons may be witnesses in cases of adultery, of theft, of assault and of violent crimes.’

Nārada (1.189).—‘In cases of heinous crime, or robbery, or adultery, or one of the two kinds of assault, he should not enquire too strictly into the character of the witnesses.’

Nārada (1.188).—‘Slaves, impostors and other incompetent witnesses enunciated shall nevertheless be witnesses in suits of especially grave character.’

सादृश्यापवादार्थः एवं च सति यथा स्त्र्यादीनां सादृश्याभावे ऽप्य् असदृशा एव क्वचिद् भवन्ति, एवं बालादीनाम् अपि क्वचिद् विवादे साक्षित्वं विज्ञेयं प्रतिषिद्धानाम् अपि सताम् । उक्तेभ्यश् च बालादिभ्यो ऽत्र श्लोके ये ऽप्य् अनुक्ताः प्रतिषिद्धाश् च तेषाम् अपि प्रतिप्रसवो निर्देशनार्थत्वाद् बालानां विज्ञेयः । ननु च कारणतः प्रतिषिद्धानां बालादीनां साक्षित्वे पुनस् तेषाम् उपदेशो न न्याय्यः । प्रतिषेधकारणस्यावस्थितत्वाद् इति ॥ ८.७० ॥

यत् इदम् अनुमानं तद् विशुद्ध्यर्थम् आह-

070 On failure (of qualified witnesses, evidence) may given (in such cases) by a woman, by an infant, by an aged man, by a pupil, by a relative, by a slave, or by a hired servant.

In the event of minors, aged and diseased persons deposing falsely in their evidence, the Judge should make up his mind regarding the speech being irregular; so also in the case of men with disordered minds.—(71)

अयम् अस्यार्थः । नेहात्यन्ताप्राप्तनिबद्धभ्रान्तबुद्धयो बालादयो गृह्यन्ते येनारभ्यो ऽर्थ उपदिष्टः स्यात् । किं तु ये शक्नुवन्त्य् अवधारयितुं न चातिस्थिरचेतसस् तेभ्यः अनुज्ञायन्ते । तेषां वचनम् अनुमानेन परीक्ष्यम् । यदि संबद्धं वदन्ति न च खलन्ति न शङ्क्यमानदोषेण केनचित् संगतास् ततः प्रमाणं । तद् आह तेषां मृषा वदताम् अस्थिरां वाचं जानीयात् । एतद् उक्तं भवति । वाचो ऽस्थैर्येण मृषात्वं निश्चिनुयात् । तत्र वाचो ऽस्थैर्यं पदानाम् इतरेतरम् असंगतिः, अस्फुटापरिपूर्णाक्षरत्वं च । एतच् च बालादीनाम् अवस्थोपलक्षणार्थम् । ये च वयसा व्याधिना वाप्य् अवस्थाम् इयतीं गता यद् अन्यद् विवक्षन्तो ऽन्यद् उच्चारयन्ति तच् चाव्यक्तं न ते साक्षिणः । एतत् प्रत्यक्षवेद्यम् असाक्षित्वकारणम् । अन्यत् तु रागद्वेषधनलोभादिसाधारणम् अनुमानतः परीक्ष्यम् । तच् चोक्तम् एव । उत्सिक्तचेतसः प्रकृत्यैवोपप्लुता अधीरधियः ॥ ८.७१ ॥

The meaning of this is as follows:—

The present verse is not meant to admit such minors and others as are either in absolute bondage or with disordered minds,—and hence entirely inadmissible. If it did so, it would be laying down something wholly new. The persons indicated by this as admissible are, in fact, those who are capable of understanding things, but whose minds are not quite steady. And what is meant is that the words of such persons should be fully examined with the help of reasonings, and they should be admitted as reliable only if it is found that they speak coherently and are not tainted with any suspicious signs of corruption. This is what is meant by the words—In the event of their deposing falsely the judge should make up his mind regarding the speech being irregular. That is to say, the falsity of the deposition should be deduced from its irregularity;—this ‘irregularity’ consisting in the incoherence of the statements and the absence of explicitness and clear utterance.

All this is meant to indicate the condition of the minor and other persons; the meaning being that those who have been reduced, either by age or by disease, to a condition in which desiring to say one thing they utter something quite different, and that also indistinctly, should not be made witnesses. This ground for inadmissibility as witness can always be ascertained by direct perception; the other grounds,—such as the presence of love or hatred or avarice and so forth,—can be found out only by investigation; as has been already declared.

‘So also in the cate of men with disordered minds,’—i.e., those who are inherently of unsound mind.—(71)

Nandana is misrepresented by Hopkins.

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 196), which explains ‘Utsiktamanasām’ as ‘impatient’;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (32b).

(verses 8.70-72)

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.70].

केन । सत्यानृतवचनविभागार्थेनानुमानेन, उक्तं च “बाह्यैर् विभावयेल् लिङ्गैः” इत्यादि, “यथा नयत्य् असृक्पातैः” इति च । एवं चानुमानोपदेश इदमर्थो भवति । यदि यथोक्तानां साक्षिणाम् असंभवे साहसादिषु प्रतिषिद्धा अपि साक्षिणो भवन्त्य् अनुमानेन विशोध्यन्ते, अप्रतिषिद्धाश् च कदाचित् । एवं च सति —

071 But the (judge) should consider the evidence of infants, aged and diseased men, who (are apt to) speak untruly, as untrustworthy, likewise that of men with disordered minds.

In all cases of violence, of theft and adultery, and of assault, verbal and corporeal,—he shall not investigate the character of the witnesses.—(72)

सहो बलम्, तद् आश्रित्य यत् क्रियते तत् साहसम् । राजवाल्ल्भ्येन महापक्षतया स्वशरीरबलेन बलवदाश्रयेण वा यद् अकार्यकरणं तत् साहसम्, यथा²⁷¹ वस्त्रपाटनाग्निदाहकेशछेदादि । अन्यत् प्रसिद्धम् । अत्र साक्षिणो न परीक्ष्याः । “गृहिणः पुत्रिणः” (म्ध् ८.६२) इत्य् एवमादिरूपपरीक्षात्र प्रतिषिध्यते । या तु व्यभिचारहेतुतया शङ्क्यते रागद्वेषधनलोभादिरूपा सा कर्तव्यैव । दृष्टमूलत्वाद् अस्याः स्मृतेर् इत्य् उक्तम् ॥ ८.७२ ॥

‘Sāhasa,’ ‘violence’;—‘taha’ means ‘force’; and what is done by force is ‘sāhasa,’ ‘violence’; whenever an improper act is done by a man, either on the strength of his being the king’s favourite, or of his having a large following, or of his own bodily strength, or of the help of some powerful person,—it is called ‘sāhasa,’ ‘violence.’ e.g., the tearing of cloths, the burning by fire, the cutting of the hands, and so forth.

The rest are all well known.

In such oases the character of the witnesses need not be investigated;—this precludes the investigation that has been laid down above, under verse 60, et seq.; that investigation, on the other hand, which bears upon doubt regarding the man’s reliability, on account of the presence of love, hatred, avarice and the like,—that must be done. The placing of this limitation upon what is laid down in the text is justified by the consideration that the present treatise is known to have a visible source, in the person of a personal author; as has been explained before.—(72)

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (32a);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 50b).

(verses 8.70-72)

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.70].

वस्त्रपाटनोल्कादहनकेशछेदनादिष्व् अप्रत्ययकारी पुरुषः क्रोधचापलप्रभवेषु । स्तेयादीनि प्रसिद्धानि । एवमादिषु न परीक्षेत साक्षिणम्, “गृहिणः पुत्रिणः” इत्य् एवमादिना लक्षणेन । अर्थसंबन्धादिभिस् तु सामर्थ्यात् परीक्ष्या एव “अनुमानेन” । प्रतिषिद्धा अपि सन्तः परीक्ष्या एव साक्षिणो ऽनुमानतः । एवं चानुमानोपदेष्(श्?)ओ ऽत्रार्थवान् भवतीत्य् उक्तः । यत्र पुनः साक्षिणां समगुणानां विप्रतिपत्तिः, तत्र —

072 In all cases of violence, of theft and adultery, of defamation and assault, he must not examine the (competence of) witnesses (too strictly).

On a conflict among witnesses, the king shall accept the majority; in the case of equality (of number) those possessed of superior qualifications; and in the case of conflict between equally qualified witnesses, the best among the twice-born.—(73)

यत्र भूमिभागादौ विप्रतिपत्तिर् द्वाभ्यां च भोगसाधनं साक्षिणो निर्दिष्टाः । ते अ केचिद् अर्थिनो भोगम् आहुर् अपरे प्रत्यर्थिनः । तत्र बहूनां वचनं ग्राह्यम् । समसंख्येषु तु ये गुणैर् उत्कृष्टा बहुगुणा इत्य् अर्थः । एकेन वा गुणेन दृष्टपुरुषार्थोपकारिणा²⁷² सातिशयेन युक्ताः । गुणवतां समगुणानां भेदे जातिर् आदर्तव्या । सर्वसाम्ये शपथः । अन्यद् वा तत्समानम्²⁷³ ।

बहुत्वं परिगृह्णीयात् । बहूनां वचनं प्रमाणीकुर्यात् । द्वैधं परस्परविरुद्धार्थाभिधानम् ॥ ८.७३ ॥

In a dispute over the possession of land, eg., when several witnesses have been cited in proof of possession, if some depose to possession by the plaintiff, while others to that of the defendant,—then the king shall accept the statement of the majority.

When the number on both sides are equal, he shall Accept the statement of those ‘possessed of superior qualifications,’—i.e., of a larger number of qualities, or of a single quality, but in a very large degree, very much to the benefit of mankind.

When there is a conflict between two equally qualified witnesses, preference has to be given to the higher caste.

Lastly, when both sets are equal in all respects, then recourse should he had to ordeals, or some other similar means of discrimination.

‘Accept the majority’—i.e., accept as true the statement of the majority.

‘Conflict’—making contradictory statements.—(73)

‘Dvijottamān’—Brāhmaṇas’ (Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa;—‘righteous Brāhmaṇas’ (Kullūka and Raghavānanda).

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 211);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (32a).

Viṣṇu (8.39).—‘If there is contradictory evidence, let the King decide by the majority of witnesses; if there is equality in number, by superiority in virtue; if there is parity in virtue, by the evidence of the best among the twice-born.’

Yājñavalkya (2.78, 80).—‘When there is contradiction, the evidence of the majority should be accepted; when the number of witnesses is equal on both sides, then the evidence of those better qualified should he accepted; when there is contradiction among witnesses equally qualified, the evidence of those should be accepted who are possessed of the best qualifications. Even after the witnesses have deposed, if other witnesses, either better qualified or in larger numbers, come forward to depose to the contrary, the former witnesses should be rejected as false.’

Nārada (1.229).—‘When there is conflicting evidence, the majority of witnesses decides the matter. If the number of witnesses is equal on both sides, the testimony of those should be accepted as correct whose veracity is not liable to suspicion. If the number of such witnesses is equal on both sides, the testimony of those should be accepted who are possessed of a superior memory.’

Bṛhaspati (7.35).—‘In a conflict among witnesses, the testimony of the majority should be accepted; when the number is equal on both sides, the testimony of the more virtuous ones; when the virtuous witnesses are divided, the testimony of those specially eminent for the performance of righteous acts; whenever those are divided, the testimony of those endowed with superior memory.’

विधिविप्रतिपत्ताव् एष एव न्यायः । अनुमाने यथोक्ते, क्वचिच् च शपथाद्य् अपि वक्ष्यति- “असाक्षिकेषु त्व् अर्थेषु । । । शपथेनापि लम्भयेत्” इति । अपि च “जागर्ति भगवान् धर्मः” । स एव साम्ये ऽपि सति केनचित् कारणेनात्मानं दर्शयति । द्विजोत्तमान् इति चेदं लिङ्गं ब्राह्मणानां साक्षित्वे तथा चोक्तम् “आप्ताः सर्वेषु वर्णेषु” इति । न चैतद् उक्तवर्णानुवादार्थं सर्वग्रहणम् । किं तर्हि ब्राह्मणवर्णावबोधार्थम् । तथा च कृत्वैवमादीनि लिङ्गानि श्रोत्रियप्रतिषेधस्य ॥ ८.७३ ॥

073 On a conflict of the witnesses the king shall accept (as true) the evidence of the) majority; if (the conflicting parties are) equal in number, (that of) those distinguished by good qualities; on a difference between (equally) distinguished (witnesses, that of) the best among the twice-born.

Evidence based upon what is directly seen and is heard is admissible; and a witness, telling the truth in such cases, does not fall off from spiritual merit or worldly prosperity.—(74)

अत्रोच्यते । साक्षी व्यवहरिष्यता कर्तव्यः “त्वं मे साक्षी भविष्यसि” इत्य् उक्तम् । तत्र य एवम् अनुक्तः²⁷⁴ स न प्राप्नोति । एवम् अर्थम् इदम् उच्यते । यस् तत्रे संनिहितः कथंचिद् अनुभविता त्वं स्मर्तुम् अर्हस्य् अवयोर् अमुम् अर्थम् इत्य् एवम् अनुक्ते ऽपि भवत्य् एव साक्षी । समक्षदर्शनात् साक्षाद् अनुभावाच् छ्रवणाच् च । समक्षशब्दानुषङ्गः कर्तव्यः । यत् कुतश्चिद् एकेन श्रूयते ततो ऽन्येन तत् परंपराश्रुतं तेन परंपराश्रावी न साक्षी । यथैतेनेदम् अकार्यं कृतम् इदम् अस्मै वा धारयतीति लोकप्रसिद्ध्यागतम्, न तु प्रमाणतः । तत्र समक्षदर्शनं साक्षाद् अनुभवनम् अर्थविषयम् ऋणप्रयोगदण्डपारुष्यादि साक्षाद् दृष्टं चक्षुर्व्यापारेण वाक्पारुष्यं तथेदम् अस्मान् मया गृहीतम् इत्य् एवमादिविषयं शब्दश्रवणम् । यद्य् अपि दृशिर् उपलब्धिमात्रवचनः तथापि²⁷⁵ वृत्तानुरोधितया श्रोत्रज्ञानं श्रवणं भेदेनोपात्तम् । एतावच् चात्र विवक्षितम् । प्रंआणतो येनानुभूतं स साक्षी । समक्षशब्दग्रहणं प्रमाणमात्रोपलक्षणार्थम् । तेनानुमानादिनाप्य् अनुभूतम् अनुभूतम् एव । अत आप्तागमाच् छ्रुतम् अप्रत्यक्षम् अपि प्रमाणम् । उत्तरस् तु श्लोकार्धो ऽनुवाद एव, सत्यवचनस्य विहितत्वात्, असत्यवादिनो धर्मार्थहानेश् च प्रमाणान्तरावगतत्वात् ॥ ८.७४ ॥

“It has already been said (under 69) that evidence may be given by any person who may be ‘cognisant of the facts of the case’; why then should any inadmissibility be suspected, in view of which it is now said that evidence on the basis of what is seen and heard is admissible?”

Our answer is as follows:—It has been said that the witness shall be warned by the person who he is going to file his suit, saying—‘you shall be my witness’; so that people might think that if a person has not been so warned, he shall be inadmissible; it is in view of this that the present declaration has been made. The meaning is that if a person happens to be close by when a certain transaction is being gone through and is cognisant of the facts, he is admissible as a witness, even though ho may not have been warned by the parties, saying ‘you will please bear in mind this transaction between us.’

The term ‘directly’ has to be construed with ‘what, is seen’ as also with ‘what is heard’; so that if some one bears of a fact from one person, and from the former some one else hears it, then the person who has heard of it at second hand is not admissible as a witness; as it is only on hearsay, and not on the basis of any direct source of knowledge, that the man would know that ‘this man has committed such and such a crime,’ or that ‘he owes such and such a sum to that man.’

‘What is directly seen’—means direct knowledge of the facts of the case, bearing upon loan-transactions, assaults and so forth; i.e., when these occurrences are actually wen with the eye; or ‘directly heard’ in the case of verbal assaults,—such as ‘I shall take away your wife,’ and so forth,—and such admissions by the debtor as that ‘I have borrowed such and such a sum from that man,’ and so forth.

Though the root ‘dṛśi,’ ‘to see,’ denotes all forms of apprehension (and as such includes auditory perception also), yet ‘what is heard’ has been mentioned separately for the purpose of filling up the metro. All that is meant is that ‘a person who has a right knowledge of the facts is admissible as a witness’; and the phrase ‘what is seen’ is meant to stand for all valid kinds of knowledge; so that what is known by inference is also regarded as ‘known’; similarly also all trustworthy Revelation, which is an authoritative means of knowledge in regard to imperceptible things also.

The second half of the verse is merely re-iterative, the telling of truth having been already enjoined before, and the fact of the liar losing both spiritual merit and worldly prosperity being already known from other sources of know ledge.—(74)

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāratattva (p. 26);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (27a), which says that ‘samakṣadarśana’ and ‘śravaṇa’ stand for all forms of valid knowledge, hence the meaning is that that man is a witness who possesses a right knowledge of the subject-matter of the enquiry;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 44b).

Bodhāyana (1.19.7).—‘In order to gain the good opinion of men, a witness shall give evidence in accordance with what he has seen or heard.’

Viṣṇu (8.13-14).—‘The evidence of witnesses is of two kinds—what was seen and what was heard. Witnesses are free from blame if they give true evidence.’

Nārada (1.148).—‘He should he considered as a witness who has witnessed a deed with his own ears or eyes; with his ears, if he has heard another man speaking; with his eyes, if he has seen something himself.’

Bṛhaspati (7.8-13).—‘That witness is denominated a messenger who is a respectable man, esteemed and appointed by both parties, and has come near them to listen to the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant. He is a spontaneous witness who declares that he has witnessed the transaction, after having approached the court of his own accord, while a cause is being heard. That witness who communicates to another man what he has heard, at a time when he is about to go abroad, or is lying on his death-bed, should he considered as an indirect witness. He also is called an indirect witness who repeats, from his own hearing or from hearsay, the previous statements of actual witnesses. He is called a secret witness to whom an affair has been entrusted or communicated by both parties, or who happens to witness the transaction. The King himself, having heard the statements of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, may act as a witness.’

दर्शनश्रवणाभ्यां साक्षित्वसिद्धिः, न तु निबन्धनतः । अतो ऽन्तरेणापि निबन्धनं साक्षी स्याद् एव । एतावांस् तु साक्षिणो नियमः । निबन्धेनापि पृष्टेन सता सत्यं वक्तव्यम् इति । येन —

074 Evidence in accordance with what has actually been seen or heard, is admissible; a witness who speaks truth in those (cases), neither loses spiritual merit nor wealth.

A witness asserting, in an assembly of noble men, anything apart from what he has seen and heard, falls downwards into hell after death and becomes shut out from heaven.—(75)

असत्याभिधाने साक्षिणां फलदर्शनार्थम् इदम् । दृष्टश्रुतशब्द उपलब्धिपर्याय इत्य् उक्तम् । तस्माद् अन्यद् अनुपलब्धम् । तच् चेद् ब्रवीति । आर्याः सभ्याः सम्यक्कारिणः । तेषां संसदि सभायाम् अवाङ् अधोमुखः नरकं²⁷⁶ यामं यातनास्थानं²⁷⁷ गच्छति । प्रेत्य मृत्वा स्वर्गाच् च हीयते भ्रश्यति । यद् अप्य् अनेन स्वर्गारोहणिकं कर्म कृतं तद् अपि कौटसाक्ष्यपापस्य गुरुत्वात् प्रतिबध्यते । न तु स्वर्गस्य कर्मणः पापेनान्येन नाशः । स्वफलविधित्वात् कर्मणाम् अन्यत्र प्रायश्चित्तेभ्यः ॥ ८.७५ ॥

The present verse describes the results accruing to the witness who deposes falsely.

The term ‘seen and heard’ is synonymous with ‘apprehended,’ as has been already explained; ‘apart from this’ is what is not apprehended, or known to him;—if he asserts any such thing, ‘in an assembly of noble men,’—in the court consisting of honourable persons,—he ‘falls downwards’—headlong—‘into hell’—to a place where he undergoes punishments at the hands of the god Yama;—‘after death’—‘and becomes shut out from heaven,’—i.e., falls down. That is, even though he may have committed deeds entitling him to go to heaven, yet he becomes shut out from it, by virtue of the more serious nature of the sin of perjury. It is not that the ‘Karma’ calculated to carry him to heaven is destroyed by this sin; since every act is conducive to the fulfilment of its own reward (and does not interfere with that of others), with the sole exception of the Expiatory Rites (which have no results of their own, and only tend to nullify those of the corresponding sinful acts).—(75)

‘Saṃsadi’—‘In the Court’ (Medhātithi);—‘in an assembly of Brāhmaṇas’ (Govindarāja).

‘Svargāt hīyate’—‘Falls off from heaven which he may have earned by meritorious acts’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka and Nandana);—‘even after passing through hell, he cannot get into heaven’ (Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 200);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (38a).

Gautama (13.7).—‘Heaven is the reward of witnesses, if they speak the truth; in the contrary case, hell.’

Baudhāyana (1.19.14-15).—‘If the witness rightly recollects the facts of the case, he will receive commendation from the most eminent men;—in the contrary case, he will fall into hell.’

Āpastamba (2.29.9-10)—‘If he tells an untruth, hell will he his punishment after death;—if he speaks the truth, his reward will be heaven and the approbation of all beings.’

Viṣṇu (8.14).—‘Witnesses are free from blame, if they give true evidence.’

न केवलं धर्मानुत्पत्त्या स्वर्गाद् धीयत इत्य् उक्तम् । अयं च पूर्वश्लोकशेष एवार्थवादः, तथा च संबन्धेन दर्शित एवायम् अर्थः । यतश् च दर्शनश्रवणाभ्यां साक्षित्वसिद्धिः, न निबन्धात् ॥ ८.७५ ॥

075 A witness who deposes in an assembly of honourable men (Arya) anything else but what he has seen or heard, falls after death headlong into hell and loses heaven.

Even though not put down as a witness, if a person happens to see or hear anything in regard to a case,—when he comes to be questioned about it, he should speak out exactly as he has seen or heard it.—(76)

उच्यते । लेख्यारूढस्य व्यापारविशेषाद्युक्तं साक्षित्वं न पुनर् अनारूढस्य । आरोहणस्यानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गाद् उभयोः साक्षित्वे²⁷⁸ । अत एताम् आशङ्काम् अपनेतुम् इदम् उच्यते । पूर्वस् तु श्लोको यत्रानुकाः²⁷⁹ साक्षिणः । अयं तु यत्र ससाक्षिकं लेख्यम् ।
अनिबद्धो लेक्यम् अनारूढो ऽपीत्य् अर्थः । ईक्षणश्रवणे व्याख्याते । शेषं सुबोधम् ॥ ८.७६ ॥

“Under verso 74 it has been already declared that even though a man may not have been originally appointed as a witness, his evidence, as bearing upon what is directly known to him, is admissible; what then is the use of saying again that ‘even though not put down, etc., etc.’? What additional information is provided by this verse?

People might be led to think that—‘when a man has been put down as a witness on the original document, his evidence is admissible as a matter of course,—but not so that of one who has not been so put down,—for if both were admissible, then there would be no point in entering any witnesses upon the document.’ It is with a view to set aside this idea that the author has added the present verse. The former verse refers to cases where no witnesses have been put down, while this refers to a case where the document is duly attested by witnesses.

‘Not put down’—not entered in the document.

‘Seeing’ and ‘hearing’ have been already explained.

The rest is clear.—(76)

‘Anibaddhaḥ’—‘Not entered as a witness in the document’ (Medhātithi),‘—but accidentally present at the transaction’ (Kullūka, Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāratattva (p. 26);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (28a);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 46a), which explains ‘anibaddhaḥ’ as ‘not cited or entered.’

Viṣṇu (8.12).—‘An appointed witness having died or gone abroad, those who have heard the tacts from him may give evidence.’

Śukranīti (4.5.392).—‘A person present in court must depose truly as to what he has seen or heard, when asked, even though he may not have been cited as a witness.’

Nārada (1.161).—‘He who, without having been appointed to ho a witness, comes of his own accord to make a deposition, is termed a spy in the law-books; he is unworthy to bear testimony.’

Do. (1.166).—‘If a witness dies or goes abroad after having been appointed, those who may have heard his statement may give evidence; for indirect proof makes evidence.’

उपसंहारार्थः श्लोकः ॥ ८.७६ ॥

076 When a man (originally) not appointed to be a witness sees or hears anything and is (afterwards) examined regarding it, he must declare it (exactly) as he saw or heard it.

A single man, free from covetousness, may be a witness, but not many women, even though pure,—because the understanding of women is not steady,—nor other men who are tainted with defects.—(77)

एकस्य पुनः प्रतिषेधो लोभादिरहितस्य प्रतिप्रसवार्थः । तेन सत्यवादितया निश्चित एको ऽपि साक्षी भवत्य् एव । स्त्रियस् तु न कथंचित् साक्ष्यम् अर्हन्त्य् अल्पा वा बह्व्यो वा । शुच्यो ऽपीति गुणवत्यो ऽपीत्य् अर्थः । अत्र हेतुः- स्त्रीबुद्धेर् अस्थिरत्वाद् इति । प्रकृतिर् एषा स्त्रीणां यद् बुद्धेश् चापलम् । गुणास् तु यत्नोपार्जिता अपि प्रमादालस्यादिना व्यपयन्त्य् अतः स्वाभाविकम् अस्थैर्यं तिष्ठेद् एव । यथामयाविनो घृतादिनोत्पन्ने ऽप्य् अग्नेः स्थैर्ये स्वल्पेनापि प्रमादे पुनः सहजामयावितानुवृत्तिः । अतो ऽनया शङ्कया गुणवतीष्व् अपि तासु नाश्वासः । यत् तु “स्त्रियाप्य् असंभवे कार्यम्” (म्ध् ८.७०) इति तद् यत्र तत्क्षणाद् एव पृच्छ्यन्ते । यत्रेयम् आशङ्का न भवति केनचिद् आसां संचलितं मन इति । यत्र तु कालव्यवधानं तत्र जीयमानेन कदाचिद् अनुकूल्यन्ते इति न क्वचित् साक्षिन्यः ।

दोषैश् चान्ये ऽपि ये वृताः । रोगादिभिर् दोषैर् ये स्त्रीभ्यो ऽन्ये ऽपि पुरुषा वृता आक्रान्ता भूयिष्ठदोषा इत्य् अर्थः । के पुनर् अमी दोषा नाम । उक्तं च । रागादयः शास्त्रप्रतिषिद्धाः शङ्क्यमानव्यभिचारहेतुभावाः । यद्य् अपि केवलेन स्वशब्देनैवोक्ता दोषाः तथाप्य् अनुक्तपरिग्रहार्थम् इदम् अपुनरुक्तम् । सामान्यविशेषाभिधानं हि सर्वत्र ग्रन्थकारा अनुमन्यन्ते ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये त्व् अकारप्रश्लेषेण “अलुब्धो ऽप्य् एको न साक्षी” किं पुनर् लुब्ध इत्य् एवम् आचक्षते । तथा च द्वयोर् अभ्यनुज्ञानं भवति ।

शुच्य इतीकारो दुर्लभो “वोतो गुणवचनात्” (पाण् ४.१.४४) इति विधानात् । “कृदिकारात्”²⁸⁰ इति केचित् समर्थयन्ते ॥ ८.७७ ॥

The evidence of a single person having been declared to be inadmissible, the present verse lavs down an exception in favour of one who is free from covetousness. So that if a man is known to be truthful, he is certainly admissible as witness. But women are never admissible,—be they one or many,—‘even though pure’—possessed of high qualifications; and the reason for this is that ‘the understanding of women is not steady’; fickle-mindedness is the very nature of women; while other qualifications are acquired, and as such liable to lapses through carelessness, idleness and so forth; so that their inherent fickleness remains as a constant factor. Just as in the case of a dyspeptic,—even though a certain amount of appetite may have been regained by the use of butter and other things, yet even the least neglect on their part, brings on the inherent Dyspepsia again. Consequently, on account of this uncertainty, there can be no confidence in women, even though they be highly qualified.

As for the declaration (in 70) that ‘in the event of no witnesses being available, women may be made witnesses,’—that refers to cases where they can be immediately questioned, and there is no possibility of their mind being tampered with by any person. When however there has been an interval of time, it is quite possible that they may be won over by the party whoso case is weak and who is in fear of losing it. So that in such cases their evidence is not admissible at all.

‘Other men tainted with defects;—even persons other than women,—and men,—who are ‘tainted’—beset—with such defects as love, hatred and so forth; i.e., men in whom those defects abound to a every large extent.

Though Love, Hatred and the rest, as being forbidden by the scriptures, have, already been declared by name to be sources of suspicion and dishonesty,—yet they are referred to here again, for the purpose of including those that have not been so mentioned by name, and all writers sanction the mentioning of the general and special aspects of the same tiling.

Some people have adopted the ‘a’ before ‘lubdha’ and construed the verse to mean that ‘even though free from covetousness, a single man cannot be a witness,—how much less then one who is covetous,’—and hence as permitting the evidence of two men.

Though the form ‘śucyaḥ’ is impossible, in view of Pāṇini 4.1.44, yet some people justify it as being in accordance with the Vārtika on 4.1.45—(77)

This verse is quoted in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 213), which adds the following notes:—‘Eko’ lubdhastu sākṣī’ is the reading adopted by Kullūka Bhaṭṭa; the other reading—‘eko lubdhastvasākṣī’—adopted by Jīmūtavāhana, is not right; because as a matter of fact, even several avaricious men would be asākṣī, and hence there would be no point in the term ‘ekaḥ.’ But admitting this reading, the verse could be taken as not admitting the evidence of one ‘avaricious man’, and thereby admitting that of one man who is free from avarice, even though he be ignorant of law. It is for this reason that Viśvarūpa and others have explained the meaning to be that when accepted by both parties, even a single man may be admitted as witness, and they have not laid stress upon the condition that he should be ‘conversant with law;—‘Dośaiḥ’ stands for theft and so forth.

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (32a).

[Vide Texts under 64 et seq.]

Yājñavalkya (2.72).—‘Even a single man may ho admitted as a witness, by the consent of both parties, if he is versed in Dharma.’

Nārada (1.188).—‘Slaves, impostors and others described as inadmissible as witnesses shall he witnesses in suits of a specially grave character.’

Nārada (1.192).—‘By the consent of both parties, a single man may become a witness in a suit. He must be examined in public as a witness,—though he has been mentioned (in the Texts) as an incompetent witness.’

Do. (1.190-191).—‘A woman cannot he a witness; a woman would speak falsely from want of veracity.’

एकस्य सत्य् अपि प्रतिषेधे गुणातिशयाद् अलुब्धस्याभ्यनुज्ञार्थम् इदम् । अपि चालुब्धः, अपीत्य् उभयत्रापि बोद्धव्यः । शुच्यो ऽपीत्य्- अयम् एव वालुब्धो ऽप्य् एको न साक्षी स्यात् । उत्तरविवषार्थश् चायम् आरम्भः । एवं स्त्रियो बह्व्यः शुच्यो ऽपि न स्युः, यथैको ऽलुब्धो ऽपि, तासां हि बुद्धेर् धर्मार्[थाभ्याम् अस्थिर]संबन्धः । व्याख्यानं शास्त्रविरोधान् नात्पेशलम्, यत् एकस्य लोभात् प्रतिषेधाद् वैतयोर् अलुब्धयोर् अभ्यनुज्ञानार्थम् इदम्, अन्यत्रापि च प्रतिषे[धस्य पुरुषस्त्री]तुल्यत्वात् । एवं च सति बह्व्यः शुच्यो ऽप्य् अलुब्धा अपि प्रकरणात् स्त्रियो न स्युः, स्त्रीबुद्धेर् अस्थिरत्वाद् इत्य् उक्तम् । दोषैर् नयैर् अपि ये वृताः पुरुषा अति[रिकत्वत् अलुब्धा अपि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते], किं पुनर् अन्यत्र । पुनर्वचनं चास्य यदर्थं तद् उक्तम् एवात्र ॥ ८.७७ ॥

077 One man who is free from covetousness may be (accepted as) witness; but not even many pure women, because the understanding of females is apt to waver, nor even many other men, who are tainted with sin.

What the witnesses state naturally, in relation to the case, should be accepted; apart from this what they state from considerations of righteousness, is useless.—(78)

साक्षिणो यत् स्वभावेन व्यावहारिकं ब्रुवन्ति तद् ग्राह्यम् । यत् तु स्वभावाद् विचलितारुणया²⁸¹ धर्मबुद्ध्या²⁸² धर्मार्थं ब्रूयुस् तद् अपार्थकम् अग्राह्यम् इत्य् अर्थः । यद्यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य²⁸³ वचनं तत् स्वभावतः । यत् त्व् अन्यथा “मा भूद् अस्य तपस्विनो मद्वचनेन बाधः” इत्य् अनया बुद्ध्या, तद् अपार्थकम् । यथा केनचिद् आवेदितं भवति “अनेनाह माक्रुष्टः” इति । तत्र परेणापह्नुतम् । साक्षिण आहुः- “सत्यम् आक्रुष्टः,²⁸⁴ नर्मणा²⁸⁵ न तु रोषेण”²⁸⁶ इति । तत्राकृउष्ट²⁸⁷ इत्य् एतत् साक्षिणां वचो ग्राह्यम् । नर्मेणेत्य्²⁸⁸ एतद् उत्तरवादिनानुक्तत्वाद् अपृष्टम् उक्तम् अपि न ग्राह्यम् ।

व्यावहारिकं व्यवहारगतम् । अपगतप्रयोजनम् अपार्थकम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये व्याचक्षते । यद् अप्रगल्भादिभिः स्खलितपदम् उदाहरन्ति न तावता तद् अनादेयं किं तु स्वभाव एषाम् उपलक्षितव्यो ऽनुमानेन- किम् अमी अप्रागल्भ्यात् स्खलन्ति उतासत्याभिधायितयेति ।

तत् तु प्राग् उक्तम् । न चाक्षरार्थ इत्य् उपेक्ष्यम् ॥ ८.७८ ॥

What the witnesses state naturally in regard to the case should he accepted; on the other hand, what they state, not quite naturally, but ‘from considerations of righteousness’ ‘is useless’,—i.e., should not he accepted. The describing of things exactly as they were seen is what is meant by ‘natural statement what is otherwise than this,—i.e., what is stated with the motive that what is said may not cause suffering to the poor party concerned,—‘is useless’; e.g., when one party complains—‘I have been insulted by this person’—and the other denies it, the witness may say—‘yes, ho was insulted, but in joke, not through malice’; and in this case, the statement ‘the man has been insulted’ should he accepted; while the qualifying statement ‘in joke,’—which had not been put forth by the defendant—and was made by the witness unasked (gratuitously)—need not he accepted.

‘In relation to the case’—pertaining to the suit.

‘Useless’—futile.

Others explain the verse as follows:—It may so happen that through shyness, a witness deposes in a halting manner,—but that alone need not be made a ground for rejecting his statement; what is to be done is that the nature of the witness should he examined by reasoning, and then it should be determined that ‘this person speaks haltingly through shyness, what he says, however, is quite true?

But the real meaning is as explained above; so much attention need not be paid to this other explanation.—(78)

‘Svabhāvena’—‘Quite naturally’—‘not out of compassion’ (Medhātithi, who says nothing regarding ‘depending on women’ as Buhler wrongly puts it),—‘not out of fear and the like’ (Kullūka);—‘the reliability or otherwise of the witness is to be ascertained after due consideration of his Svabhāva, character, and not from the manner of bis giving evidence’ (‘others’ in Medhātithi),—‘without hesitation, quickly’ (Nārāyaṇa);—‘in accordance with truth’ (Govindarāja and Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 80);—and in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 282).

Śukranīti (4.5.396).—‘One should accept the evidence of witnesses given spontaneously, not through force; after the evidence has been once given by the witness, he shall not be repeatedly cross-examined.’

स्वभावेनेति सभायां] ग्रामिणाम् अन्येषां चाप्रागल्भ्याद् अप्रतिभानकम्पादयो जायन्ते । तेषां व्यावहारिकं ब्रुवतां स्वभाव उपलक्षयितव्यो ऽनुमानतः पुरुषशीलतो वा, किम् एषाम् अमी मिथ्यावचनकृताः कम्पादयः उताप्रागल्भ्याद् अनुचितमहाजनसमवायाद् वा । येन ह्य् अनुमानागम्यं कुंचिन् नास्ति । एवं धृष्टप्रागल्भ्यानाम् अपि स्वभावो ऽवधारणीयः ॥ ८.७८ ॥

078 What witnesses declare quite naturally, that must be received on trials; (depositions) differing from that, which they make improperly, are worthless for (the purposes of) justice.

The investigating Judge shall question the witnesses assembled in the court, in the presence of the plaintiff and the defendant, gently exhorting them in the following manner.—(79)

सभायाम् अन्तः सभान्तः । शौण्डादित्वात् समासः (च्ड़्। पाण् २.१.४०) । व्यवहारदेशगता उभयोर् अर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोः संनिधाने ऽनुयोक्तव्या वक्ष्यमाणेन विधिना । सान्त्वयन् अपरुषं ब्रुवन्²⁸⁹ । पारुष्येण हि प्राड्विवाकाद् बिभ्यतो ऽप्रकृतिस्था न²⁹⁰ सर्वं स्मरेयुः, संस्कारभ्रंशहेतुत्वाद् भयस्य । प्राड्विवाको राज्ञा व्यवहारदर्शनाधिकृतो रूढ्योच्यते । यद्य् अप्य् अवयवार्थो राजन्य् अपि संभवति। पृच्छति विविनक्तीति, तथापि²⁹¹ भेदेन प्रयोगदर्शनम्- “अमात्यः प्राड्विवाको वा यः कुर्यात् कार्यम् अन्यथा” (म्ध् ९.२३४) इति । पृच्छतीति प्राट्, “क्विब्वचिप्रच्छिश्रिद्रुश्रुप्रुवां दीर्घो ऽसंप्रसारणं च” इति प्राट् । विशेषेण धर्मसंकटेषु विवेक्तीति विवाटः । “कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्” (पाण् ३.३.११३) इति । कर्तरि घञ् । “चजोः कु घिण्ण्यतोः” (पाण् ७.३.५२) इति कुत्वम् । प्राट् चासौ विवाकश् च प्राड्विवाकः ॥ ८.७९ ॥

‘In the court’—inside the court room; the compounding being in accordance with Pāṇini 2. 1.40;—those who have presented themselves at the place of the trial; should he questioned ‘in the presence of the plaintiff and the defendant’—both;—they being ‘gently exhorted’ in the manner described below,—not addressed harshly; because if addressed harshly, they would become frightened of the judge, and thereby losing the normal condition of their mind, they would he unable to recall all the details of the case; because fright always deprives people of their memory.

‘Prāḍvivāka’ Investigating ‘Judge’ is the name given to the officer appointed by the king to try cases. Though the name, in its literal significance of ‘questioning and judging’ applies to the king also, yet we find the two names used separately, in such texts as—‘If the Minister or the Judge (Prāḍvivāka) should pervert the details of a suit, the king himself shall look into it, etc.’ (Manu. 9.234.)

In the term ‘prāḍvivāka,’ ‘prāṭ’ means one who questions, ‘pṛchati;’ it being derived from the root ‘prach’ to ‘question’ with the nominative affix ‘kvip’; the elongation of the vowel and the change into ‘ṭ’ being analogous to the case of the roots ‘vaci,’ ‘śri,’ ‘dru’ ‘śru,’ ‘pru.’ ‘Prāṭ’ is the qualifying epithet to ‘vivāka,’ which means ‘one who judges or investigates knotty legal cases’;—the nominative affix ‘ghañ’ being added in accordance with Pāṇini 3. 3. 113, and the change of ‘ca’ into ‘ka’ being in accordance with ‘Pāṇini’ 7.3.52. the term prāḍvivāka thus means the questioning or Investigating Judge.—(79)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 75) in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 18);—in

Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 198);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b), which explains ‘sabhāntaḥ’ as ‘in court’, and ‘anuyuñjīta’ as ‘should question.’

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

Śukranīti (4.5.398-414).—‘The witness should be interrogated, after being well-governed by oaths, teachings of Purāṇas, narration of great merits of virtue and the great sins of falsehood:—“Where, when, how, whence and what have you seen or heard,—whether written by the man himself or caused to be written by somebody,—speak truly all that you know.” The witness who gives true evidence attains happy life hereafter and unrivalled fame in this world—this is the remark of Brahmā, etc.’ (the rest as in Manu 83-85).

Nārada (1.198 and 200).—‘After having summoned all the witnesses and hound them down firmly by an oath, the Judge shall examine them separately. They should be men of tried integrity and conversant with the circumstances of the case. By sacred texts extolling the excellence of truth and denouncing the sinfulness of falsehood, let him inspire them with deep awe, as follows—(Verses 201 to 228—201, 208, 209 being the same as Manu 93, 98, 99 respectively)’.—[All this is to be addressed to all witnesses; Manu reserves 89 to 101 for Śūdra witnesses only.]

Gautama (13.5).—‘Witnesses shall not speak singly, or without being asked.’

Āpastamba (2.29.7).—‘A person who is possessed of good qualities may be called as witness and shall answer the questions put to him, according to the truth…… after having been exhorted to be fair to both sides.’

Viṣṇu (8.24 et seq.).—‘Let him exhort the witnesses with the following speeches—“Whatever places of torture await the killer of a Brāhmaṇa and other great criminals… those places of abode are ordained for a witness who gives false evidence; and the fruit of every virtuous act he has done, from the day of his birth to his dying day, shall he lost to him. Truth makes the sun spread his rays; Truth makes the moon shine; Truth makes the wind blow; Truth makes the earth bear all things; Truth makes waters flow; Truth makes the fire burn. The atmosphere exists through truth; so do the gods; and so do the offerings. If veracity and a thousand horse-sacrifices are weighed against each other, truth ranks even higher than a thousand horse-sacrifices. Those who, acquainted with the facts, and appointed to give evidence, stand mute, are equally criminal with, and deserve the same severe punishment as, false witnesses.” After having addressed him thus, let the King examine the witnesses in the order of their castes.’

Yājñavalkya (2.73-75).—‘He shall address the following words to the witnesses standing near the plaintiff and defendant—“He who hears false witness goes to those regions which are reserved for people committing heinous offences, and other crimes, for incendiaries, for murderers of women and children. Whatever virtuous act you may have done during a hundred lives, understand that all that will go to the party whom, by your false evidence, you make lose the suit.”’

Baudhāyana (1.19.9 et seq.).—‘The wise man should address an appointed witness in the following manner:—“Whatever merit thou hast acquired, etc., etc.”’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.32-34).—‘Depose, O witness, according to the truth; expecting thy answers, thy ancestors hang in suspense, as to whether they shall rise or fall, etc., etc.’

अधुना साक्षिणां सत्यवचनार्थो योगो ऽत ऊर्ध्वं वर्तिष्यते । प्राङ्विवाको ब्राह्मणो राजाधिकृतो विडान् न राजा सामर्थ्यात् । तथा च वक्ष्यति “अमात्यः प्राड्विवाको वा यत् कुर्युः कार्यं अन्यथा” इति । “क्विब्वचिप्रच्छ्यायतस्तुकटप्रुजुश्रीणां दीर्घो ऽप्रसारणं च” इत्य् अनेन । पृच्छतीति प्राट्, पृष्ट्वा विषेषेण धर्मसंकटेषु विशिष्टं वा वक्ष्यति विवाकः, प्राट् चासौ विवाकश् चेति प्राड्विवाकः । पृच्छति चासौ विविनक्ति चेति यावत् एष प्राड्विवाको धर्मज्ञो ब्राह्मणः । साक्षिणो ऽनुयुञ्जीत विधिनानेन वक्ष्यमाणेन संत्वयन्न् अपारुषम् । किं कारणम्, प्रकृतिस्थो यथा सत्यं ब्रूयात् साक्षी ॥ ८.७९ ॥

079 The witnesses being assembled in the court in the presence of the plaintiff and of the defendant, let the judge examine them, kindly exhorting them in the following manner:

‘What you know of the mutual transaction between these two persons regarding this suit,—all that may you declare freely; since you are witnesses in this matter.’—(80)

यज् जानीथ अस्मिन् व्यवहारवस्तुनि अनयोर् मिथः प्रत्यक्षं²⁹² रहसि वा चेष्टितं वृत्तं तत् सर्वं सत्येन तथ्येन ब्रूत कथयत । युष्माकं ह्य् अत्र साक्षिता भवताम् अत्र प्रामाण्यम् । युष्मद्वचनाधीने सत्यानृते । इत्य् अनेन प्रोत्साह्यन्ते । साक्षिभूता²⁹³ अस्मिन् कार्य इति सामान्यनिर्देशे ऽप्य् अखिलवस्तुश्रावणं सामर्थ्याद् द्रष्टव्यम् । न ह्य् अश्रुतविशेषाः प्रश्नविषयं वेदितुम् अर्हन्तीति ॥ ८.८० ॥

‘What you know in regard to the matter of this suit, any transaction, secret or open, that may have been carried on between these two persons,—all that declare freely; since you are witnesses in this suit.

‘You are the sole authority in this matter; truth and untruth are in your hands’—thus addressed the persons cited as witnesses become encouraged.

‘In this matter.’—Though the text mentions this formula in its most general form, yet, in as much as it is not possible for any person to be a witness regarding all things, it follows that the subject-matter of the suit should be stated here. Because until they are informed of the details they cannot understand the question.—(80)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 75);—in Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 18);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.79].

एवं सत्यवचनार्थो ऽयम् अधुनार्थवादः प्रक्रियते ॥ ८.८० ॥

080 ‘What ye know to have been mutually transacted in this matter between the two men before us, declare all that in accordance with the truth; for ye are witnesses in this (cause).

‘The witness, telling the truth in his evidence, attains irreproachable regions, also unsurpassable fame; such speech is honoured by Brahmā himself.—(81)’

इतः प्रभृति सत्यवचनार्थः साक्षिणाम् अनुयोगविधिः । सत्यं वदन् लोकान् स्वर्गादिलक्षणान् अनिन्दितान् अगर्हितान् अभिप्रेतफलभोगहेतून् लभते साक्षी । जातिवचनो वा लोकशब्दः । शुभे जन्मनि जायत इत्य् अर्थः । अस्मिंश् च जन्मनि कीर्तिः ख्यातिर् अनुत्तमा²⁹⁴ यस्या अन्यद् उत्तमं प्रकृष्टं नास्ति, तां लभते । साधुवादो जनेनास्मै दीयते । यस्माद् एषा च वाक् सत्या सरस्वती ब्रह्मणा प्रजापतिना पूजिता ॥ ८.८१ ॥

From this verse onward the text lays down the manner in which the witnesses are to be exhorted.

By telling the truth, the witness attains ‘irreproachable regions,’ in the shape of Heaven and the rest, which are the source of desirable results.

Or, the term ‘l oka’ may be taken in the sense of ‘caste’; the sense in that case would he that ‘he is born in a happy future life.’

In the present life also, he obtains ‘unsurpassable fame’—renown, superior to which there is none; i.e., people bestow praise upon him.

Such—truthful—speech is honoured by Brahmā, Prajāpati, himself.—(81)

Hopkins is again wrong in saying that “this verse is omitted by Nandana.”

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 75);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 53b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 8.79].

दृष्टादृष्टफलसंबन्धेनेयं स्तुतिः सत्यवचनार्था । न च केवलं सत्यस्यावचनाद् एतद् यथोक्तं न भवति, किं तर्हि प्रत्यवायश् चापरः । तथा प्रदर्शयति ॥ ८.८१ ॥

081 ‘A witness who speaks the truth in his evidence, gains (after death) the most excellent regions (of bliss) and here (below) unsurpassable fame; such testimony is revered by Brahman (himself).

‘Stating the untruth in his evidence, he becomes firmly bound in Varuṇa’s fetters, helpless during a hundred births. One should, therefore, give true evidence.’—(82)

पूर्वेण दृष्टादृष्टशुभाशुभप्रदर्शनेन सत्यवचने साक्षिणः प्रोत्साहिताः । अनेन विपरीताभिधाने दुःखोत्पत्तिदर्शनम् । सत्यवचनार्थम् एवैतत् । साक्षिणः कर्म साक्ष्यम् । तत्रासत्यं ब्रुवाणो वारुणैः पाशैर् बध्यते पीड्यते । भृशम् अत्यर्थम् । विवशः परतन्त्रीकृतः सर्वचेष्टासु वाक्चक्षुर्गतास्व् अपि । शतं यावज् जन्मनि वारुणाः पाशा घोराः सर्परज्जवो जलोदराणि वा । एतद्दोषपरिहारार्थं सत्यं वदेद् इति विधिः । आजातीर् इति नायं मर्यादाभिविध्योर् आङ् । तथा सति पञ्चमी स्यात् । तस्माद् उपसर्गो ऽयम् अनर्थकः, प्रलम्बत²⁹⁵ इतिवत्²⁹⁶ । द्वितीया चेयं आवृत्तिश् चात्र गम्यते । शतं जन्मान्य् आवर्तते उदरगृहीतः ॥ ८.८२ ॥

The preceding verse encourages the witnesses by putting before them the spiritual and temporal results following from the telling of truth; the present verso describes how results accrue from saying what is contrary to truth; and the purpose of this also is to induce the witness to tell the truth.

‘Sākṣya,’ ‘evidence,’ is the work of the witness; in that work, stating what is not true, the man becomes ‘bound’—tormented—‘in Varuṇa’s fetters,’—‘firmly’—to a very great extent;—‘helpless’— rendered totally dependent on others, even in regard to the operations of speech and the eyes,—‘during a hundred births.’

‘Varuṇa’s fetters’ are in the shape of terrible snakes or in the form of the disease of dropsy.

In order to guard against such calamities, the witness should state the truth;—such is the sense of the injunction implied by the text.

In the term ‘ājātīḥ,’ the initial ā is not the indeclinable ‘āṅ’ which denotes limit; for, if it were that or we would have the Ablative ending. Hence it is to be taken as a preposition meaning nothing; just like the preposition ‘pra’ in such words as ‘pralambate’ and the like. The case-ending also is the Accusative. What the term signifies is repetition; the meaning being that the man sutlers from dropsy repeatedly during one hundred births.—(82)

“Dropsy is a disease specially attributed to Varuṇa (see Ṛgveda 7.89.1, and the story of Śunaḥśepha, Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.15). The fetters of Varuṇa are mentioned as the punishment of liars in the Atharva Veda, 4.16.6.”—Buhler.

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 199);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b), which explains ‘śatam-ājātīḥ’ as ‘during a hundred lives’;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 53b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.79.

यस्मात् —

082 ‘He who gives false evidence is firmly bound by Varuna’s fetters, helpless during one hundred existences; let (men therefore) give true evidence.

‘By truth is the witness purified, by truth does merit grow: hence the truth should be spoken by witnesses of all castes.’—(83)

पूयते शुद्ध्यत्य् अन्यस्माद् अपि पापान् मुच्यत इति यावत् । शेषं गतार्थम् ॥ ८.८३ ॥

‘Purified’—becomes pure; i.e., purged of other sins also. The rest is clear.

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.79.

येन —

083 ‘By truthfulness a witness is purified, through truthfulness his merit grows, truth must, therefore, be spoken by witnesses of all castes (varna).

‘The soul itself is the soul’s witness, and the soul itself is the soul’s refuge; disregard not your soul, the best witness of man.’—(84)

एष एवार्थो विस्पष्टीक्रियते उत्तरेण श्लोकेन ॥ ८.८४ ॥

This same idea is made clear in the next verse.

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 199);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b),—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 53b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.79.

084 ‘The Soul itself is the witness of the Soul, and the Soul is the refuge of the Soul; despise not thy own Soul, the supreme witness of men.

‘The sinners indeed think that “no one sees us”; but the gods see them, as also their own inner personality.’—(85)

नशब्दो व्यवहितः । पापकृतः कूटादिकारिण एवं जानते । न कश्चिद् अस्मान् पश्यतीति । इतिकारेण मन्यतेर् वाक्यार्थः कर्मेति प्रतिपाद्यते । न नः कश्चित् पश्यतीत्य् एष वाक्यार्थः । तांस् तु देवा वक्ष्यमाणाः पश्यन्ति । स्वस्यान्तरात्मा । तद् उक्तम् “आत्माइव ह्य् आत्मनः साक्षी” (म्ध् ८.८४) इति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">ननु कः पुनर् अयं पापचारी, तस्य च को ऽन्यो द्रष्टा । यावतात्मैव कर्ता शुभाशुभानां चान्तरपुरुषो द्रष्टेति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">सत्यम् । तस्यैव देवतात्वम् अध्यारोप्य भेदेन कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशो ऽनृतनिवृत्त्यर्थः । देवतारूपं त्वं जानीषे²⁹⁷ । तात्त्विकम् आत्मीयम् आन्तरं रूपं शारीरम्, तथा बाह्यम् अनात्मीयम् असारम्, एतदुपभोगार्थं मा दुष्कृतं कार्षीर् इति प्रोत्साह्यते । अतो “मावमंस्थाः स्वम् आत्मानम्” मावज्ञासीर् “नृणां साक्षिणम् अनुत्तमम्” (म्ध् ८.८४) । अन्यो हि साक्षी अस्मिन्न् एव लोके, अयं तु मृतस्यापि साक्ष्यं ददाति । तस्माद् एतस्माद् भेतव्यम् । असत्यवादी²⁹⁸ कदाचिन् मन्यते- “आत्मान्तरं प्रतिपन्नस्य किम् एष मे द्रष्टापि करिष्यति” इति । तन् न । “गतिर् आत्मा तथात्मनः”²⁹⁹ (म्ध् ८.८४) । आत्मानम् अन्तरेणान्या गतिर् नास्ति । न हि द्वाव् आत्मानाव् एकस्य भवतः ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते परमात्मा साक्षी संसार्यात्मानो नियोज्या इति भेदः ॥ ८.८५ ॥

के पुनस् ते देवा रहस्य् अपि प्रच्छन्नं पापम् आचरन्तं ये पश्यन्ति, अत आह ।

The particle ‘na’ is misplaced.

‘Sinners’—perjurors and others—‘think’—feel—that ‘no one sees us’;—the particle ‘iti’ shows that the whole clause is the object (of the verb ‘think’);—the construction of the clause being ‘na naḥ kaścit paśyati.’

‘The gods’—named in the next verse—‘see them’; as also their own sinner soul. This is what is meant by the assertion that ‘the soul is the soul’s witness.’

“But who is it that commits the sin? And who apart from him is the one that sees? In fact it is the soul itself that does all that is good or evil, and certainly there is no other ‘inner personality’ that sees it.”

True; but the same soul has been represented as a ‘god,’ and as such spoken of as the doer of the act (of seeing); and this has been done for the purpose of preventing the man from telling a lie, the sense of the exhortation thus is—

‘You know that the real nature of your true personality is divine, which is within the body, while your exterior body is not your soul;—hence, for the nourishing of this latter, do not commit a single act;—hence too do not disregard or despise your soul, the best witness of man. Other witnesses give evidence only in this world, while the soul hears evidence even after death; hence one should be afraid of such a witness.’

The liar may be led to think—‘when I am born again with another soul, what will my present soul, which is the seer, be able to do to me?’ But this is not so; since ‘the soul is the soul’s refuge’ (verse 84). Apart from his soul, there is no refuge for man; and there are not two souls for a single man.

Others hold that the difference is that the soul spoken of as the ‘witness’ is the supreme one, while the souls born in the persons of the world are those that are under his sway.—(85)

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 199);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b),—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 53b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.79.

आत्माइव ह्य् आत्मनः साक्षी गतिर् आत्मा तथात्मनः ।

एतस्मात् कारणात् —

मावमंस्थाः स्वम् आत्मानं नृणां साक्षिणम् उत्तमम् ॥ ८.८४ ॥
मन्यते वै पापकृतो न कश्चित् पश्यतीति नः ।

इह प्रकरणाद् अनृताभिधायिनः पापकृत इत्य् उच्यन्ते । सामर्थ्यात् तु सर्वस्य व्यतिक्रमकारिण इदं ग्रहणम् —

तांश् च देवाः प्रपश्यन्ति स्वश् चैवान्तरपूरुषः ॥ ८.८५ ॥

085 ‘The wicked, indeed, say in their hearts, “Nobody sees us;” but the gods distinctly see them and the male within their own breasts.

‘Heaven, earth, water, heart, moon, sun, fire, death-god, wind, night, the two twilights, and morality know the conduct of all corporeal beings.’—(86)

हृदयशब्देन हृदयायतनो लिङ्गपुरुष उच्यते । दिवादीनां³⁰⁰ द्रष्टृत्वम् अचेतनेषु चैतन्यम् आरोप्यते³⁰¹ । दर्शनान्तरे तु महाभूतानि देवतात्मतया चेतनान्य् एव । तथा च³⁰² पृथिवी भारावतरणाय ब्रह्माणम् उपागमद् इति वर्ण्यते । सर्वगतत्वात् तेषां न किंचिद् अप्रत्ययम् अस्तीति सर्वशरीरिणां वृत्तं शीलं चात्मनः कायगतं शुभम् अशुभं च जानते ॥ ८.८६ ॥

The question ending as to who are the gods that see the sin committed secretly and in private, the text puts forward present verse.

The term ‘heart’ stands for the subtle spirit located in the heart. The Heaven and the rest are spoken of as ‘seers’ figuratively;—though they are insentient, they are represented as sentient. According to other philosophical systems, all the great elemental substances are portions of gods, and as such actually sentient; e.g., it is described that the earth went to Brahmā, in order to seek for help in relieving her of the burden of sinners.

The gods being all-pervading, there is nothing unknown to them; hence they know the conduct and character, as also the good and bad points in the body of the soul.—(86)

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 200);—in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b),—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 53b).

**(verses 8.79-86)
**

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.79.

देवास् ते इत्य् उच्यन्ते — अन्तरपूरुषः स्वक्षेत्रज्ञो ऽन्तर्यामी परमात्मा । एवं च न रहस्य् अपि पापं वर्तयेद् न को ऽपि । यतश् चैतद् एवम् । अतस् तेषां नियम उच्यते

086 ‘The sky, the earth, the waters, (the male in) the heart, the moon, the sun, the fire, Yama and the wind, the night, the two twilights, and justice know the conduct of all corporeal beings.’

In the presence of gods and Brāhmaṇas, during forenoon, the judge, pure himself, shall ask the twice-born persons, who have been purified and are facing either the north or the east, to give evidence.—(87)

देवा दुर्गामार्तण्डादयः प्रतिमाकल्पिताः । शुचीन् कृतस्नानाचमनादिविधीन् । शुचिः प्रष्टा स्वयम् अपि तथाविध एव स्यात् । ऋतम् इति श्लोकपूरणार्थम् एव । प्रसिद्धम् अन्यत् ॥ ८.८७ ॥

‘Gods’—Durgā, Sūrya and the rest, set up in the form of images.

‘Purified,’—i.e., who have performed the rites of bathing, mouth-rinsing and so forth.

‘Pure,’—the judge himself should have purified himself in the same way.

‘Truth,’—this is a mere re-iteration of what is already implied; and it servos the purpose of filling up the metre.—(87)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 673);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 78);—in Vyvahāramayūkha (p. 18);—in Vyavahāratattva (p. 32);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 203);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b).

Āpastamba (2.29.7).—(See under 79.)

Viṣṇu (8.19).—‘Let the Judge summon the witnesses at the time of sunrise, and examine them after having bound them by an oath.’

Nārada (1.198).—‘After having summoned all the witnesses, and bound them down firmly by oath, the Judge shall examine them separately; they should be men of proved integrity and conversant with the circumstances of the case.’

Bṛhaspati (7.22, 23).—‘Knowing all this, the witness should give evidence according to truth. After putting off his shoes and his turban, he should stretch out his right hand, and declare the truth, taking in his hands, gold, cowdung or blades of kuśa grass.’

यथा च ते प्रष्टव्यास् तथेदं ब्राहणादि(?)जात्याश्रयनियमकारि शास्त्रम् उच्यते ॥ ८.८७ ॥

087 The (judge), being purified, shall ask in the forenoon the twice-born (witnesses) who (also have been) purified, (and stand) facing the north or the east, to give true evidence in the presence of (images of) the gods and of Brahmanas.

He shall question the Brāhmaṇa with the word ‘speak,’ the Kṣatriya with ‘speak out the truth,’ the Vaiśya by sins pertaining to kine, grain and food, and the Śūdra by all the sins.—(88)

क्व पुनर् इयं तृतीया गोबीजकाञ्चनैर् इति । यदि तावत् पृच्छेद् इति क्रियासंबन्धात् करणम् उच्यते, तद् अनुपपन्नम् । शब्दो हि तत्र करणम्, नार्थः ।

नैष दोषः । यथा गवादीनि प्रश्नकरणत्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते तथा व्याख्येयम् । पातकैर् इत्य् उभयशेषो विज्ञेयः- गोबीजकाञ्चनैः पातकैर् इति । तेनायम् अर्थो भवति । गोबीजकाञ्चनविषयैः पातकप्रदर्शनैः पृच्छेद् इति । “गां हृत्वा हत्वा वा यत् पातकं तद् भवति तव मिथ्या वदतः” इति प्रश्नवाक्यं पठितव्यम् । एवं वक्ष्यमाणैः पातकैः शूद्रं पृच्छेत् । पातकशब्दस् तु पातकप्रदर्शनार्थेष्व्³⁰³ अभिधानेषु द्रष्टव्यो मुख्यानां प्रश्नकरणत्वाभावाद् इत्य् उक्तम् ॥ ८.८८ ॥

“On what basis do we have the instrumental ending in gobījakāñcanaiḥ? If it be said to be due to these being instruments in the act of questioning, that cannot be; as it is the word (and not the kine, etc.) that are the instruments, a means of questioning.”

There is no force in this objection. We have to construe the words in such a manner as to make the ‘kine,’ etc., instruments of the questioning. The word ‘pātakaiḥ,’ ‘sins’ has got to be construed both ways, so that we have the phrase ‘gobījakāñcunaiḥ pātakaiḥ,’ which gives the meaning that ‘he should ask them by mentioning sins pertaining to the kine, grains and gold,’ i.e., the form of the question to be employed should he—‘if you tell a lie, you would he incurring the same sin that follows from stealing or killing the cow.’

Similarly, by mentioning the sins going to be enumerated (in the next verse), he should question the Śūdra. The term ‘sin’ here should he taken as standing for words expressing sins; because the sins themselves could not be the means or instrument of the questioning, as pointed out above.—(88)

‘Gobījakañcanaiḥ’—‘Threatening him with the guilt of all offences committed against kine and the rest’ (Medhātithi) ‘with the guilt of the theft of kine etc.’ (Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda);—‘with the loss of his kine etc.’ (Nārāyaṇa);—‘by making him touch the cow and other things’ (Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—and in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 78), where however the first half is read as “sasyena śāpayedvi??aṃ kṣanniyaṃ vāhanāyudhaiḥ”;—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 215), which adds:—The Vaiśya is to be admonished with the words:—‘those sins would accrue to you which are involved in stealing the cow etc. if you tell a lie and the Śūdra with the words—‘all kinds of sins would fall on you etc. etc.’;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (33b).

Viṣṇu (8.20-23).—‘The Brāhmaṇa witness, the Judge shall exhort to declare,—the Kṣatriya, to declare the truth:—the Vaiśya he shall address thus:—‘Thy kine and gold shall yield thee no fruit”;—the Śūdra he should address thus:—“Thou shalt have to atone for all heavy crimes.”’

Nārada (1.198).—‘He shall cause the Brāhmaṇa to swear by truth, the Kṣatriya by his conveyances and weapons, the Vaiśya by his cows, grain or gold; and the Śūdra by all sorts of crimes.’

पातकार्था अनुयोगाः पातकशब्देनोच्यन्ते, मिथ्यावचनप्रतिषेधार्थाः । इदं चापरं ब्राह्मणस्य साक्षित्वेन निदर्शनम् ॥ ८.८८ ॥

088 Let him examine a Brahmana (beginning with) ‘Speak,’ a Kshatriya (beginning with) ‘Speak the truth,’ a Vaisya (admonishing him) by (mentioning) his kine, grain, and gold, a Sudra (threatening him) with (the guilt of) every crime that causes loss of caste;

‘Whatever regions have been assigned to the slayer of the Brāhmaṇa, to the murderer of women and children, to the betrayer of friends and to the ingrate,—those same shall be thine if thou speakest falsely.’—(89)

ब्राह्मणं हत्वा ये लोका नरकादिलक्षणाः प्राप्यन्ते तत्कारिभिस् ते तव भवन्ति मिथ्यावदतस् तस्मात् सत्यं ब्रूहीत्य् अनुयोगः । यश् च मित्रं द्रुह्यति ब्राह्मणादीन् दारसर्वस्वापहरणादिना³⁰⁴ नाशयति — यश् च कृतम् उपकारं विस्मृत्य तम् एवोपकर्तारम् अपकरोति — यत् तस्य कृतघ्नस्य³⁰⁵ परत्र दुःखं तद् अवाप्नोति ॥ ८.८९ ॥

‘Those regions, in the shape of hell and the rest, which are reached by those persons who have killed a Brāhmaṇa, shall he yours, if you tell the untruth; therefore you should tell the truth,’—such is the exhortation.

‘The betrayer of friends’—he who ruins the Brāhamaṇa and others by depriving them of their wife and property.

‘The ingrate’: ho who forgets the benefits conferred upon him, and causes injury to that same person who had conferred those on him; and the perjuror suffers the same pains that befall such a person.—(89)

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 78);—in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 215);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35a).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

089 (Saying), ‘Whatever places (of torment) are assigned (by the sages) to the slayer of a Brahmana, to the murderer of women and children, to him who betrays a friend, and to an ungrateful man, those shall be thy (portion), if thou speakest falsely.

‘Whatever merit, good man, you may have acquired since your birth, would go to the dogs, if you speak falsely.’—(90)

शुनो गच्छेन् निष्फलं स्याद् भवत इत्य्³⁰⁶ अर्थः । अन्ये तु³⁰⁷ दोषप्रदर्शनार्थं श्वगमनवचनम् । यथा कृच्छ्रेण महता सुवर्णाद्युत्तमद्रव्यम् अर्जयित्वाशुचिप्रवाहे त्यजेत् तादृक् सुकृतं भवति । न पुनर् अन्यकृतस्य सुकृतस्यान्यत्र गमनम् अस्तीत्य् असकृद् उक्तम् एतत् ॥ ८.९० ॥

‘Would go to the dogs’—would be futile, so far as you are concerned. Others however explain that ‘going to the dogs’ is indicative of positive harm; the sense being—‘the merit of the man becomes thrown away, in the same manner in which a man, having earned, with great difficulty, gold and other excellent treasures, were to throw it all into an unclean stream’: it has been pointed out more than once that the merit acquired by one person cannot go over to another.—(90)

Cf. 3.230 and 11.122.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 78);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35a).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

090 ‘(The reward) of all meritorious deeds which thou, good man, hast done since thy birth, shall become the share of the dogs, if in thy speech thou departest from the truth.

‘You think yourself, blessed man, that “I am alone”; but there ever sits in your heart the silent watcher of virtue and vice.’—(91)

पुण्यपापयोर् ईक्षिता द्रष्टा मुनिस् तूष्णींभूतः ॥ ९.९१ ॥

कः पुनर् असौ मुनिः । भयातिशयप्रदर्शनार्थम् आह ।

‘Watcher’—seer—‘of virtue and vice—‘mauni’—silent.—(91)

Cf. The Mahābhārata 1.74.28.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—and in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

091 ‘If thou thinkest, O friend of virtue, with respect to thyself, “I am alone,” (know that) that sage who witnesses all virtuous acts and all crimes, ever resides in thy heart.

‘The, god Yama, the son of Vivasvat, who sits in your heart,—if you have no quarrel with him, you need not visit the Gaṅgā, nor the Kurus.—(92)

य एष³⁰⁸ यमः सर्वप्राणिनां देहधनाद्युच्छेदकारी³⁰⁹ यातनाभिश् च निगृह्णीतेति श्रुतिपथम् आगतो भवतः, सो ऽयं तव हृदये वर्तते, न विप्रकृष्टः । स च³¹⁰ कृतापराधम् अधुनैव यमयति³¹¹ । मा चैवं मनसि कृथाः- एष आत्मा मदीयो माम् उपेक्षिष्यत इति । न ह्य् एतस्य कश्चिद् आत्मीयः । तेन चेद् अविवादः स चेत् प्रसन्नः प्रत्ययितः³¹² किं गङ्गागमनेन स्नानार्थिनः पापशुद्धये, किं वा कुरुक्षेत्रगमने ऽस्ति प्रयोजनम् । यत्फलं पापप्रमोचनलक्षणं ततः प्राप्यते तद् इहैवाविसंवादिनि परमात्मनि । न हि पापकारिण आत्मा निर्विशङ्को भवति । किं मे ऽन्तः³¹³ स्याद् एतेनेति । नास्तिकस्यापि किंकथिका कदाचित् भवत्य् एव । गङ्गानदी पावयन्ती । कुरुक्षेत्रं तु देश एव पावनः ॥ ८.९२ ॥

With a view to strike terror in the heart of the man, it is next described who is the ‘silent watcher’ (mentioned in the preceding verse).

You have heard of the God, who is the destroyer of the body and property and other things belonging to all living beings, and who punishes them with torments; that God resides in your heart, and not away from you; in the event of committing a wrong, he will punish you immediately;—and do not think that being your own sold, ho will ignore your fault; because no one is his ‘own.’

‘If you have no quarrel with him’—if he is satisfied with you and trusts you, then what would be the need for your going to bathe in the Gaṅgā for the cleansing of your sins? What too would be the need for going to Kurukṣetra? For the reward of going to these places consists in the destruction of sins and acquiring of merit; and all this is obtained by the man here and now, if he is at pence with the Supreme Self (within him). As a matter of fact, the soul of a sinner is never free from fear; the unbeliever also has doubts regarding what is going to happen to him at death.

The Gaṅgā is a river that purifies: and in ‘Kurukṣetra’ it is the land itself that purities.—(92)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—and in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204), which explains ‘Kūrun’ as ‘Kurukṣetra.’

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

092 ‘If thou art not at variance with that divine Yama, the son of Vivasvat, who dwells in thy heart, thou needest neither visit the Ganges nor the (land of the) Kurus.

‘He who gives false evidence shall go for alms, with a potsherd, to the house of his enemy,—naked and shorn, tormented with hunger and thirst, and blind.’—(93)

कपालं शरावादिपात्रैकदेशः सुबोधम् ॥ ८.९३ ॥

‘Potsherd’—a piece of the cup or some other earthenware pot. The rest is easily intelligible.—(93)

Hopkins remarks that ‘gṛham’ is the reading of Medhātithi (for ‘Kulam’). But there is nothing in the Bhāṣya to show this.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35a).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

093 ‘Naked and shorn, tormented with hunger and thirst, and deprived of sight, shall the man who gives false evidence, go with a potsherd to beg food at the door of his enemy.

‘Headlong, in blind darkness shall the sinner fall into hell, who, on being interrogated in the course of a judicial investigation, answers the question falsely.—(94)

निमित्तं पृष्टो यो वितथम् असत्यं वक्ति स तेन किल्बिषेन पापेन गृहीत ऊर्ध्वपादो ऽधोमुखो महति गाढे तमसि नरकं यातनास्थानं तत्प्राप्नोतीत्य् अर्थः । अन्यस्मिंस् तमसि किंचिद् दृश्यते तत्र तु न किंचिद् एवेत्य् अन्ध्अग्रहणम् ॥ ८.९४ ॥

On being questioned regarding the subject-matter of the investigation, if one should state what is not true,—by that sin he falls into ‘hell’—the place of punishment—with his feet held upwards and the head hanging below—into intense darkness. In ordinary darkness, people can see something, but in the darkness referred to, nothing can be seen; hence the epithet ‘blind.’—(94)

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (35a);—in Aparārka (p. 674);—and in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 204).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

094 ‘Headlong, in utter darkness shall the sinful man tumble into hell, who being interrogated in a judicial inquiry answers one question falsely.

‘He who, having entered the court, bears testimony to what is contrary to facts and what he has not seen, swallows fish along with the bones,—just like a blind man.’—(95)

अर्थवैकल्यं सत्याद् अपेतं भाषते । यथा कण्टका अशिता³¹⁴ भक्षिता जनयन्ति न तादृशीं मत्स्याः प्रीतिं जनयन्ति । यदा धनलोभेन काचित् प्रीतिमात्रा भवति तथापि महादुःखं³¹⁵ भवतीति सकण्टकमत्याशनोपमा ॥ ८.९५ ॥

The pleasure produced by the eating of the fish is not equal to the pain caused by the swallowing of the bones; similarly, there is a slight pleasure produced by the little money that is received (as bribe), but the subsequent suffering is very great; it is on this basis that the analogy of fish-eating has been cited.—(95)

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 205), whiqḥ says that according to some

people, this and the preceding two verses are to be addressed to witnesses of the lower order only; hence in ordinary cases, after ‘kurūn gamaḥ’, the exhortation should begin with ‘yāvato bāndhavān &c.’ (verse 97);—these exhortations are to be addressed to Śūdras and to poverty-stricken twice-born persons also;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35b).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

095 ‘That man who in a court (of justice) gives an untrue account of a transaction (or asserts a fact) of which he was not an eye-witness, resembles a blind man who swallows fish with the bones.

‘The gods do not regard any person in this world as superior to him, whom his knowing soul does not distrust, while he is speaking.’—(96)

यस्य वदतः साक्षिणो विद्वान् सत्यानृते जानानः क्षेत्रज्ञो ऽन्तर्यामी पुरुषो नातिशङ्कते किम् अयं सत्यं वक्ष्यत्य् अनृतं वेत्य् एवं नाशङ्कते, निश्चितम् एवैष सत्यं वक्तीति यस्यात्मा निर्विशङ्कः तस्मात् पुरुषान् नान्यं श्रेयांसं श्रेष्ठं प्रशस्ततमं पुरुषं देवा जानते ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">कः पुनर् अयं वेदिता । कश् च ततो ऽन्य आशङ्किता । एक एव ह्य् आत्मा स्वप्रयत्नद्वारेण वाचम् ईरयन् वेदिता संपद्यते । स एव तद्धर्मेण किं कथं स्याद् इत्य् एवंरूपेणाशङ्काख्यानेन युज्यते । तत्र भेदानुपपत्तिः ।

सत्यम् एतत् । काल्पनिकेन भेदेनैवम् उक्तम् । यथा हन्त्य् आत्मानम् आत्मनेति ॥ ८.९६ ॥

‘While he is speaking’—while the witness is giving evidence.

‘Knowing,’—cognisant of what is true and what is not true.

‘Soul’—the Inner Guide.

‘Does not distrust,’—has no doubt as to whether the man will tell the truth or not; is sure that ho will tell the truth.

He whose innermost soul is so confident,—to such a person the gods regard no one as ‘superior’—more praiseworthy.

“Who is the speaker, and who, apart from him, is the distruster? In fact, the soul is one only; when he, through his effort, utters speech, he becomes the speaker; and the same entity that comes to have ‘distrust,’ when he is faced by doubts regarding what and how tilings are going to happen; so that there cun be no difference between the two.”

This is quite true; but the statement in the text is based upon an assumed distinction; just like the statement ‘one injures his soul by his own soul’ (Bhagavad-gitā).—(90)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35b).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

अष्टौ श्लोकाः शूद्रशपथानुयोगार्थाः । एवम् एभिर् अनेकैर् वाक्यार्थप्रकारैः सत्यवचनार्थाः संप्[अद्यते] । यथा ब्राह्मणादिवर्णानुयोगानाम् ॥ ८.८९–९६ ॥

096 ‘The gods are acquainted with no better man in this world than him, of whom his conscious Soul has no distrust, when he gives evidence.

‘Listen now, gentle friend, in due order, how many relatives, by number, one destroys by giving false evidence, in what cases.’—(97)

द्रव्यविशेषानृताश्रयाः पापविशेषाः कूटसाक्षिण इत्य् एतत् प्रदर्शनार्थं प्रकरणम् आरभ्यते । तत्रायं श्लोकः संबोधनद्वारेणोपदिश्यमान³¹⁶ आदरार्थः संपद्यते । यद् गुह्यं मिथ उपदिश्यते तद् यथाकथंचिद् भवतीत्य् अवधारितं ग्रहणं नातिगुरु इदं त्व् अतिमहाप्रयोजनम् अवहितैः श्रोतव्यम् इति ।

सौम्येति चैकवचनम् अनेकशिष्यसंनिधाने भृगाव् एव विवक्षितम् । यस्मिन् साक्ष्य इति व्यधिकरणसप्तमी । यस्मिन् द्रव्यभेदभिन्ने व्यवहारे यत् साक्ष्यं तत्र तन्निमित्तं यद् अनृतम् इत्य् एषा विषयसप्तमी । अपरा “यस्य च भावेन” (पाण् २.३.३७) इति । अथ वा द्रव्यभेदात् साक्ष्यभेदः, तत्र समानाधिकरण एव । तावत इति परिमाणे व्युत्पाद्यते । तत्र यत् प्रभूतनिमित्तम् अपि परिमाणं संभाव्यते, शिशून् स्त्रियो वृद्धान्³¹⁷ इत्य् अतो³¹⁸ विशिनष्टि- संख्ययेति । अनुपूर्वश इति सुखप्रतिपत्तये ऽनुपूर्वेण ह्य् अभिधीयमानं सुखेन प्रतीयते । आनुपूर्वी च संख्यागतात्राभिप्रेता । तस्या एव वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् “पञ्च पशु” इत्यादि” ॥ ८.९७ ॥

The present text introduces a section where it is pointed out that the degree of sin committed by the perjurer varies with the nature of the matter of the suit.

When this fact is asserted in the form of an address, it serves the purpose of indicating its importance, when something is said in secret, it is regarded as some slight matter, not of any importance; but what is said now is important, and hence should be listened to with attention,—such being the implication of the hortatory form adopted.

The term ‘gentle friend,’ in the singular form, is intended for Bhṛgu alone from among the several whom Manu is instructing.

‘Yaṣmin sākṣye’;—the two locatives are not in apposition; the meaning is—‘the false evidence that is given in regard to a certain subject-matter’;—so that the locative denotes ‘matter,’ while the locative absolute means something quite different. Or the diversity in the evidence being in accordance with the diversity in the matter, the two locatives may be in apposition also.

The term ‘tāvat’ is generally used to denote extent; and as extent is of various kinds, the author specifies it as being ‘by number.’

‘In due order,’—for the purpose of easier understanding; when a subject is stated in due order, it becomes easily understood. The ‘order’ meant here is with reference to the number; as it is number that is going to be described in the following verses.—(97)

‘Hanti’—‘Destroys—i.e., leads to hell’ (Medhātithi on 98, and Nārāyaṇa and Kullūka);—‘makes to fall from heaven, or makes to be born among lower animals’ (Rāghavānanda);—‘incurs the guilt of killing them’ (Kullūka, alternative).

‘Saumya’—Addressed to Bhṛgu (Medhātithi), but later on under 99, he rejects the view and says that it must be taken as addressed to the witness giving evidence.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 205);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru, (35b).

(verses 8.89-97)

[See the texts under [79 et seq.]]

कूटसाक्षिणाम् एतत् तामि (?) कालपरिमाणार्थम् अधुना प्रकरणं आरभ्यते सर्वजातिसाक्ष्यार्थं सामर्थ्यात्, न केवलं प्रकरणाच् छूद्राणाम् एव । अतश् च चित्तप्रणिधानार्थं सर्वेषाम् एवायं श्लोक आरब्धः । कथं नाम । चित्तप्रणिधानाः साक्षिणः श्रुत्वैतन्मित्यावचनप्रत्यवायम् अतिमहन्तं निवर्तेरन् मिथ्यावचनाद् इति ॥ ८.९७ ॥

097 ‘Learn now, O friend, from an enumeration in due order, how many relatives he destroys who gives false evidence in several particular cases.

‘He destroys five by false evidence regarding animals; he destroys ten by false evidence regarding kine; he destroys a hundred by false evidence regarding horses, and a thousand by false evidence regarding men.’—(98)

पशुनिमित्तम् अनृतम् । शाकपार्थिववत् समासः (पत् इ- ४०६) । पञ्चबान्धवांश् चानृतं हन्ति । ततश् च तेषां नरकपातनम् । मातापितरौ जायामिथुनं चापत्यम् इति पञ्च ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">कथं पुनर् अन्यकृतेनैनसान्यस्य फलम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">अन्यकृतेन पुण्यपापादिनान्यस्य स्वर्गनरकादिप्राप्तिः³¹⁹ संसर्गाद् इति ब्रूमः । तैर् अयं परित्यज्यत इत्य् उक्तं भवति । अथ वा तैर् हतैर् यत् पापं तद् अस्य भवतीत्य् अघ्नन्न् अपि हन्तीत्य् उच्यते, अदृष्टकार्यतुल्यत्वात् ।

• अर्थवादश् चायं न तत्कार्योपदेशः । तत्कार्योपदेशे हि हिंसाप्रायश्चित्ती स्यात् । कौटसाक्ष्यप्रायश्चित्तम् एतद् भवति । उत्तरोत्तरसंख्यादिवृद्धिः प्रायश्चित्तगौरवार्था न पुनर् विवक्षितैव । तेनोत्तरोत्तरस्य गरीयः प्रायश्चित्तम् इत्य् उक्तं भवति ।

अयं पुरुषः कस्य दास इत्य् एवं संशये यद् अनृतं तत् पुरुषानृतम् उच्यते ॥ ८.९८ ॥

The compound ‘paśvanṛtam’ is to be expounded as ‘paśunimittam-anṛtam,’ ‘false evidence regarding animals,’—on the analogy of the compound ‘śākaparthivaḥ.’

False evidence destroys five relatives;—this ‘destroying’ consists in making them fall into hell;—the five relatives being—(1) the father, (2) the mother, (3) the wife and (4-5) a couple of children (son and daughter).

“How can the result of sin committed by one accrue to another?”

Our answer is that it is on account of association that one person goes to heaven or to hell, by virtue of the virtuous or vicious acts committed by another.

What is really meant is that the perjurer is abandoned by the said relatives;—or, that ho incurs the sin that would accrue from the killing of the relations; and hence even though not actually killing them, he is described as ‘destroying’ them, on the ground that the spiritual effect of the two acts is the same.

This however is a purely hortatory exaggeration; and it is not meant that the man actually commits the act; if this latter were meant, then the man would be subject to the expiatory rites prescribed in connection with the actual killing of the said relatives; while as a matter of fact, the perjurer is subjected to only those sites that have been prescribed in connection with the sin of perjury.

The gradual increase in the number (of relatives destroyed) is meant to indicate the increasingly heavier character of the expiation necessary; and the statements are not meant to be taken as literally true. Hence all that is meant is that each succeeding act of perjury (mentioned) makes the man liable to a heavier expiation than the preceding one.

On being questioned as to the person to whom a certain slave belongs, if the witness deposes falsely,—it is a case of ‘false evidence regarding men.’— (98)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—in Smṛtisaroddhāra (p. 336);—in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 220), which says that ‘pañca’, ‘five’, qualifies ‘bandhavān’ ‘relations,’ who have been mentioned in the preceding verse;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 205);—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35b).

Baudhāyana (1.19.12-13).—‘By false testimony regarding gold, he ruins three ancestors; by false testimony regarding small cattle, he ruins five; by false testimony regarding kine, he kills ten; he ruins a hundred by false evidence regarding horses, and a thousand by false evidence regarding man; a witness who speaks falsely about land ruins the whole world.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.34).—‘He kills five by false testimony regarding a maiden; ten by false testimony regarding kine, a hundred by false testimony regarding a horse, and a thousand by false testimony regarding a man.’

Gautama (13.14-15).—‘By false evidence concerning small cattle, a witness kills ten; by that regarding cows, horses, men, or land,—in each succeeding case, ten times as many as in the one preceding; or, by false evidence regarding land, the whole human race.’

पूर्वापरान् । यद् अयम् आह —

098 ‘He kills five by false Testimony regarding (small) cattle, he kills ten by false testimony regarding kine, he kills a hundred by false evidence concerning horses, and a thousand by false evidence concerning men.

‘Deposing falsely in regard to gold, he kills the born as well as the unborn; by false evidence regarding land, he kills all; never tell a lie regarding land.’—(99)

कथं पुनर् अजातानाम् असति संसर्गे परकीयेन संयोगो येनेदम् उच्यते हन्ति जातान् अजातांश् चेति ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">उक्तम्, अर्थवादो ऽयम् इति । सर्वं भूम्यनृतं वदन्³²⁰ । मा वादीः भूमिसंबन्ध्य् असत्यम् । “स्मोत्तरे लङ् च” (पाण् ३.३.१७६) इति³²¹ । मा वादीर् इत्यादरार्थम् अप्य् एतत्³²² प्रत्यक्षं संबोधनम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">का पुनर् इयं भूमिर् नाम ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">यद् एतत् पृथिवीगोलकं पर्वतावष्टंभनं सागरावधि प्रसिद्धम् ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">नन्व्³²³ इयत्याः कः स्वामी, को वापहर्ता । न हि सार्वभौमः कश्चिद् अस्ति । तथा च गाथा भूमेः- “न मा मर्त्यः कश्चन दातुम् अर्हति” (श्ब् १३.७.१.१५) । न कश्चित् सार्वभौमो ऽस्तीत्य् अभिप्रायः । “विश्वकर्मन् भौवन मां दिदासिथ”³²⁴ विश्वकर्मन्³²⁵ भौमनेति पितृव्यपदेशेन स्वनाम्ना च राज्ञो आमन्त्रणं³²⁶ श्रुतम् । माम् असौ दातुम्³²⁷ इच्छतीति । उपमैंष्यति³²⁸ सलिलस्य मध्ये निमज्जे ऽहम्, सलिलस्य मध्यम् । एवं संकल्पं वृथा संकल्पितवति त्वयि सलिले मज्जामि । सलिलमज्जनेन नैष्फल्यम् अत्र दानसंकल्पस्याह । यथा सलिले निक्षिप्तं निष्फलम् एवम् एतद् अपीति । मृषैष कश्यपाय संगरः । तवैष संगरः प्रतिश्रवः प्रतिज्ञानं कश्यपाय ददामीति मोघो वध्यो ऽस्तु, सर्वसादारणाहं सर्वजनोपभोग्या । केवलं राजानो रक्षानिर्बन्धमात्रभाज इत्य् अभिप्रायः । अत एतावत्या भूमेर् न दानापहारसंभव इति कुतो विवादः ।

• span style=“text-decoration-underline;">सत्यम् । यथैवायं भूमिशब्दो ऽत्र वर्तते एवं क्षेत्रग्रामस्थण्डिलादाव् अपि । तत्र च संभवत्य् एव स्वाम्यम् । प्रत्यक्षस्यैव दानापहाराव् इति न किंचिद् अनुपपन्नम् । अपहारश् चास्या यादृशेन रूपेण अपहारः गृहादेर् न वीरुद्विछेदः । अतश् च यः परकीये क्षेत्रे चक्रम्येत मृदो वा कश्चिद् आदद्यान् नासौ भूम्यपहारी स्यात् । मीमांसकैर् उक्तम् “न भूमिः स्यात् सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्” (प्म्स् ६.७.३) इति ।

• एकदेशवचनं च भूमिशब्दम् अधिकृत्य भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनो दानधर्मेषु पठितवान्-

• परैर् अप्य् अनुमन्तव्यो दानधर्मो नृपैर् भुवि ।

• अक्षयो हि निधिर् ब्राह्मो विहितो ऽयं महीभृताम् ॥ इति ।

कृत्स्नगोलकाभिप्रायम् एव नादेयत्वं भूमेर् विश्वजिति मीमांसकर् उक्तम्- “न भूमिः स्यात् सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्” (प्म्स् ६.७.३) इति । सर्वान् पुरुषान् प्रतिचंक्रमनादियोग्यतयाविशिष्टा भूमिः स्वामीकर्तुम् अशक्या कथं दीयत इत्य् अर्थः । अस्मिंस् तु पक्षे ग्रामनगरादि विश्वजिति दातव्यम् ।

अन्ये तु पठन्ति “अन्तरेण सदः पत्नीशालं च दक्षिणा नयन्ति” इति भूमौ गुणविधेर् अस्यासंभवात् क्षेत्रादेर् अप्य् अत्र दानम् ।
वदन्न् इति चैकवचननिर्देशात् “शृणु सौम्य” (म्ध् ८.९७) इति साक्षिविषयम् एवैतत् संबोधनम्, न शिष्यविषयम् । “शूद्रम् एभिस् तु पातकैः” (म्ध् ८.८८) इत्य् अत आरभ्य, यावन्तो मधमपुरुषनिर्देशास् (म्ध् ८.९२) ते सर्वेषां पातकभूयस्त्वसमानाख्यातरूपाद्येकवाक्यत्वाच् छूद्रानुयोगार्थाः । “अन्धः शत्रुगृहं गच्छेत्” (म्ध् ८.९३) इत्य् अत आरभ्य, सर्वे साक्षिविषया अनुयोगाः । आख्यातवैरूप्येन प्रकरणस्य विच्छेदात्, मध्यमपुरुषे समानार्थक्रमत्वात्, कर्तव्यो गच्छेद् इति प्रथमपुरुषनिर्देशः पूर्वाधिकारनिवृत्त्यर्थः ॥ ८.९९ ॥

Question—“How can association with the sinful person affect those not yet born,—that it is said that the man kills the born as well as the unborn?”

It has been already pointed out that all this is merely a hortatory exaggeration.

‘He kills all by deposing falsely in regard to land; never tell a lie regarding land’;—this direct form of address has been adopted for the purpose of indicating the gravity of the offence.

Question—“What is it that is called Land?”

Answer—It is what is known as globe, the earth with hilly protuberances, extending to the ocean.

Objection—“But who can be the owner of all this extensive earth? Who too can take it away by force? For there is no king over the whole earth. To this effect there is the earth’s song addressed to Viśvakarman Bhauvana,—the latter term being his name derived from his father’s—‘no mortal can give me away’;—which means that there is no one who owns the entire earth,—‘I shall sink into the midst of the water, having heard that he is desirous of haring intercourse with me,’—this sinking within water implying the futility of the gift,—‘vain is thy promise to give me away’—‘just as what Is thrown into the water becomes useless, so also is your promise to give the Earth to Kaśyapa useless.’ (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, 13. 7. 1. 15). The meaning of all this is that the earth is the common property of all men, to be equally enjoyed by all; and kings are appointed only for taking care of it. Thus then, cither the giving away or the taking away of the whole extent of this earth being impossible, how can there be any disputes regarding its possession?”

Answer—True; but, just as the entire earth is spoken of as ‘bhūmi,’ ‘land,’ so also are Holds, villages and platforms and over these latter, ownership is certainly possible; and the making over or the taking away also of such ownership is directly perceptible; the ‘taking away’ of this consists in asserting ownership in an improper manner; and the mere dismantling of a house or the cutting of a tree does not constitute the act of ‘taking away.’ Hence if a man walks over another man’s land, or takes clay out of it, ho is not said to ‘take away the land.’

“But the Mīmāṃsakas have declared that ‘It cannot be the land, because it is common to all’ (Jaimini, 6. 3. 3) [where the word ‘land’ stands for the whole earth].”

But the term is found to be used in the sense also of parts of the earth, by the revered Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana, who has declared as follows, in course of the description of the duty of charity—‘On the earth the king should permit the duty of charity by others also; this is a sacred treasure laid down for kings’ [which refers to the gift of land]. As for the assertion of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding ‘land’ being ‘common to all,’—this refers to the entire globe, to roam about over which all men are equally entitled, and which therefore, cannot he owned by any one; how then could it be given away? In accordance with this view, villages and towns can be given away at the Viśvajit sacrifice. Others however quote the words ‘they present as sacrificial fee, the bhūmi with the exception of the platform and the wife’s room,’—and explain, that, since any such exception would not be applicable to the entire earth, the giving must refer to fields and such other parts of it only.

In view of the term ‘vadīḥ’ (singular) in this verse, the words ‘listen, gentle sir’ (of verse 97) should he taken as addressed to the witness, and not to the pupil.

All the words in the second person contained in verse 88 onwards (up to 92) are meant to be addressed to the śūdra witness, as is clear from the gravity of the offence indicated, and also from the similarity in the verbal forms used;—while from verse 93 onwards are to be addressed to all witnesses. That such a break in the construction is intended is shown by the adopting of a different verbal form;—the Second Person is used in the former set of verses while in the latter we have the Third Person, which clearly indicates dissociation from the previous context.—(99).

‘Sarvam hanti’—‘Destroys everything—i. e., incurs the guilt of killing all animate beings’ (Kullūka and Govindarāja);—‘destroys even more than a thousand beings’ (Nārāyaṇa);—‘destroys the entire universe’ (Nandana).

Baudhāyana (1.19.12).—(See under 98.)

Gautama (13.6).—‘By false evidence regarding land, one destroys the whole human race.’

नन्व् इयं श्रुतिर् विरुध्यते । “न मां मर्त्यः कश्चन दातुम् अर्हति” इति । अतश् च स्वामित्वाभावः । तदभावाद् व्यवहाराभावः । ततश् च वादाभावे तदनृतदोषाभावः साक्षिणाम् इति । तच् च न । अर्थापरिज्ञानात् । न हि कश्चित् समर्थः कृत्स्नाम् दातुं विजयस्याभावाद् इत्य् एषो ऽत्रार्थः, दानापहारमिथ्यावचनेषु गुणदोषप्रदर्शनशास्त्रारम्भसामर्थ्यात् । तथा च व्यासादयः- “षष्टिवर्षसहस्राणि स्वर्गे तिष्ठति भूमिदः, आच्छेत्ता चानुमन्ता च तान्य् एव नरके वसेत्” इति । भूमिछलार्थत्वेव दानापहारादय इत् केचित् । तच् चैतद् विचारणीयम् । मीमांसादर्शणं तु “न भूमिः स्यात् सर्वान् प्रत्य् अविशिष्टत्वात्” इति सर्वान् दक्षिणार्थान् गुणविधीन् प्रत्य् अविशिष्टत्वात् । दक्षिणाद्रव्येषु हि गुणः श्रूयते “अन्तरेण सदः पत्नीशाले दक्षिणां नयन्ति” इति । स चायं गुणविधिर् अत्यन्ताशक्यः पृथिव्याम् । ततो ऽस्माद् अन्यत्राप्य् अपहारदोषः स्यात् । एवं च तद्विवादे ऽनृतदोषः साक्षिणां सिद्धः । सर्वस्य च कार्यस्य पृथिवीकारणत्वात् तद् अनृते सर्वं हन्तीत्य् उच्यते । एवं च पुरुषाभिनयेन स्मृतिः सादरं वारयति मा स्म भूम्यन्र्तं वदिः ॥ ९.९९ ॥

099 ‘By speaking falsely in a cause regarding gold, he kills the born and the unborn; by false evidence concerning land, he kills everything; beware, therefore, of false evidence concerning land.

‘That concerning water they declare to be similar to that concerning land; as also that relating to the sexual enjoyment of women, and to gems, water-born as well as granitic.’—(100)

कूपतडागादिस्थे महति जले स्वल्पे वा³²⁹ भूमिवद् दोषः । स्त्रीणां भोगे च मैथुनाख्ये- केनेयं स्त्री भुक्ता मैथुनधर्मेणेति । अब्जेषु रत्नेषु मनयो रत्नानि मुक्ताद्याः । अश्ममयेषु वैडूर्यादिषु । रत्नेष्व् इति संबध्यते । द्विविधान्य् एव रत्नानि जलजान्य् अश्ममयानि च । अतो रत्नग्रहण एव कर्तव्ये विशेषणद्वयोपादानं श्लोकपूरणार्थम् । अद्भ्यो जातान्य् अब्जानि । अश्मनो विकारा अश्ममयानि ॥ ८.१०० ॥

०२

The sin accruing from false evidence relating to the water—much or little—contained in wells, tanks and other reservoirs—is similar to that in the ease of land.

‘Sexual enjoyment of women’;—i.e., in answer to the question—‘by whom has this woman been ravished sexually.’

‘Water-born gems,’—such as the pearl;—‘granitic gems’—the emerald and the like;—the term ‘gems’ being construed both ways. There are various kinds of gems, waterborn and granitic; hence all that was necessary was to mention the ‘gems’ only; and the mention of the qualifying epithet must he taken only as serving the purpose of filling up the metre.

‘Water-born’—produced in water.

‘Granitic’—formed from stones.—(100)

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 205),—and in Kṛtyakalpataru.

Gautama (13.18-19).—‘By false evidence regarding water, one incurs the same guilt as in that regarding land; likewise by false evidence regarding criminal intercourse.’

100 ‘They declare (false evidence) concerning water, concerning the carnal enjoyment of women, and concerning all gems, produced in water, or consisting of stones (to be) equally (wicked) as a lie concerning land.

‘Having noticed all these evils proceeding prom perjury, speak out directly everything exactly what you have seen and heard.’—(101)

ऊहापोहौ वर्जयित्वा यथादृष्टं यथाश्रुतं चादृष्टं¹ तत्वेन ब्रूहि ॥ ८.१०१ ॥

Give up all suspense and hesitation, speak out what you have seen and heard.—(101)

‘Añjasā’—‘Without hesitation or śilly-shallying (Medhātithi);—‘truly’ (Govindarāja and Kullūka);—‘quickly’ (Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 674);—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 205), which explains ‘añjasā’ as ‘with a clear heart’;—and in Kṛtyakalpataru (35b).

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 675).—‘When they have assembled, they should say exactly what they have seen or heard.’

[[See texts under 74.]]

अमी पञ्च श्लोकाः सर्वसाक्षिसाधारणाः, अमृतवचनप्रतिषेधविद्वेषणार्था अर्थवादाः, न फलविधयः । अकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्रणाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् । एवं च प्रतिपुरुषं शास्त्राधिकारो हीयेत । आनर्थक्यं चास्य स्यात् । येन स्वकृतकर्मफलभोगः शास्त्रस्यार्थवत्त्वम् । अतः शास्त्रविरोधान् न्यायविरोधाच् च प्रतिषेधार्थवादा एवैते विज्ञेयाः ॥ ८.१००–१०२ ॥