०२ धर्मस्रोतः

The entire Veda is the root-source of Dharma; also the Conscientious Recollection of righteous persons versed in the Veda, the Practice of Good (and learned) Men, and their self-satisfaction.—(6)

“What is the relevanoy of what is stated in this verse? It is Dharma that has been declared as the subject to be described; and Dharma can be described only by means of Injunctions and Prohibitions. Now as regards the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma, this cannot form the subject of any injunction such as ‘the Veda should be known as the source of Dharma, as the authoritative means of ascertaining Dharma because this fact can be known without its being enjoined in so many words; certainly the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma does not stand in need of being notified by any injunctions of such writers as Manu and others; in fact the authoritativeness of the Veda regarding matters relating, to Dharma is as self-evident as that of Direct Perception,—being based upon the facts that (1) it brings about cognitions that are never sublated, (2) that it is not the work of any person, and as such it is entirely free of any suspicion of falsity that might be due to the defects of such authors, and (3) that the words of the Veda itself are free from all defects.

“It might be argued that—‘what the text does is to refer to the well-established fact of the Veda being authoritative, with a view to indicate that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda.’

“But this explanation cannot be accepted. For this fact also does not need to be stated; as (l) every Smṛti, by its very nature, must, be dependent upon a previous cognition, (2) the chances of mistake in the Smṛtis are precluded by the fact of their being accepted by great men, (3) the super-sensuous things spoken of in the Smṛtis could not be known to M anu and others (by any ordinary means of knowledge), and (4) every man knows it from his own experience that there is “recollection” of things taught in the Veda; so that the only possible view that could be entertained regarding the Smṛtis is that they are based upon the Veda [which, therefore, need not have been re-iterated in the Text]. Further, persons who know the Veda cannot stand in need of any Smṛti for learning what they should do; and lastly, when the Veda itself is the source of Dharma, there can be no need for postulating any other sources (in the shape of Smṛti, etc.).

“Nor is it right to assert that ‘the conscientious recollection of persons versed in the Veda is also merely referred to for the purpose of pointing out the unauthoritative character of the heterodox Smṛtis’; because the unauthoritative character of these latter is already well established by reasoning. For such heterodox people as the Śākya, the Bhojaka, the Kṣapaṇaka and the rest, there is no possibility of any knowledge of the Veda, by virtue of which they might be regarded as authoritative on matters treated of in their Smṛtis; because in the first place they do not admit any connection with the Veda; secondly, they openly declare that the Veda is hot authoritative; thirdly, they contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; and lastly, these Smṛtis clearly prohibit the study of the Veda. If Buddha and others had been students of the Veda, then alone could there be any question as to whether or not their Smṛtis are based upon the Veda. When however, as a matter of fact, any connection with the Veda is not even remotely possible, how could there be any possibility of these being based upon the Veda? On the contrary, these writers themselves put forward an entirely different basis for their codes,—in the form of tradition (handed down through a series of several Buddhas); as for example, in the following words: ‘with my divine eyes I perceive the good and bad conditions of Bhikṣus.’ Exactly in the same manner, all such heterodox people as the Bhojaka, the Pañcarātra, the Nirgrantha, the Anarthavāda, the Pāśupata and the rest hold that their scriptures are the works of gifted personalities, particular deities, capable of directly perceiving the subjects dealt with by them; and they do not admit that Dharma has its source in the Veda; in fact their scriptures contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; e.g., some of these people, holding that death frees the living being from the troubles of living, hold all Killing to be meritorious; and this (reckless) killing is distinctly prohibited in the Veda; similarly, others hold Bathing at sacred places to be sinful, while the Veda directly enjoins daily bathing and living at sacred places; so again, according to some people, the killing of animals at the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice is sinful; and this is against the Vedic injunction laying down the performing of that sacrifice;—lastly, some people hold that all such acts as the offering of libations and sacrifices are entirely selfish, while according to the Veda, which prescribes various deities in connection with the said acts, they are performed for the sake of these several deities. So that there is distinct disagreement between the Veda and the said heterodox scriptures.

“Some people have argued as follows:—

‘In the Veda also we find contradictory assertions e.g., one passage lays down the holding (of the Śodaśī-vessel, at the Atirātra sacrifice), while another says it should not be held; similarly one passage prescribes the time after Sunrise as best suited to the pouring of libations, while another lays down the time before Sunrise; so that it is quite possible that in the Veda itself—either in its lost Rescensions or even in such Rescensions as are not completely lost—there may be found injunctions contrary to a certain Vedic injunction [and these contrary Vedic passages would form the basis for the non-Vedic teachings of the heterodox Smṛtis ]. The number of Vedic Rescensions is endless; how could all of them be known to any one person? And it is quite possible that some of them might have become lost. So that it is quite possible that there may be some such Vedic Rescensional text as contains direct injunctions of such acts as Eating in a vessel made of human bones, remaining naked-skinned and so forth (which have been prescribed in some heterodox scriptures).’

“Our answer to the above is as follows:—We do not deny the possibility of mutually contradictory teachings being found in the Veda; what we mean is that in all such cases (where both the injunctions are equally directly perceived), both injunctions stand upon the same footing, and consequently the two acts are regarded as optional alternatives. In the case in question however (i.e., when the teaching of a heterodox scripture is found to contradict the direct teaching of the Veda), the Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) could only be assumed; but there can be no occasion for the assumption of a text directly contradictory to one that is directly perceived. The mere possibility of a Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) cannot lead to any certainty regarding its actual existence; while the Vedic injunction to the contrary is directly perceptible and certain; and certainly a certain text can never be sublated by an uncertain one. As for the theory of ‘lost Rescensions,’ we shall deal with it in detail later on, in our comments on this same verse. As regards the (orthodox) Smṛtis of Manu and others, their relationship to directly perceptible Vedic texts is quite patent; in some cases they are related to the Vedic mantras, in others to the Vedic deities, and in others again with substances and other details. No such relationship is possible in the case of the heterodox Smṛtis; hence no authority can ever belong to them (for the purpose of re-iterating which fact there could be a reference to the ‘Recollection of persons versed in the Veda.’)

“As regards Practice,—that which consists in what is actually done, with a view to invisible results, by persons learned iu the Veda,—its authoritative character is exactly like that of Recollection (Smṛti); because that also has its basis in the Veda. On the other hand, wrong Practice is generally based upon visible causes (of greed, &c.), and unlearned persons are apt to commit mistakes; hence it can not have any authority at all.

“Similarly with Self-satisfaction.

“If again the authority of the Veda, of Recollection and of Practice were dependent upon the teachings of Manu and others (in the shape of the present verse), on what would the authority of these latter rest? If on other teachings—such as ‘the Smārta Dharma has been expounded by Manu,’—then, whence the authority of these latter? In fact, the ultimate criterion as to what is authoritative and what is not authoritative, would be a purely logical one, and it would not consist in any teaching at all. So that the present verse is absolutely useless; and so also other similar verses that follow.”

“No one regards the Atharva as a Veda: (a) ‘The science is three-fold, consisting of the Ṛk, the Yajuṣ and the Sāman,’ (b) ‘The Sun moves forward, endowed with the three Vedas’ (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 3.12.91), (c) ‘One should keep up the observance of studying the three Vedas’; [all these speak of only three Vedas]. In fact we also find a prohibition regarding the Atharva—‘One should not recite the Atharvaṇas.’ It is in view of all these that people regard the followers of the Atharvaṇa as heretics, beyond the pale of the Vedic Triad.”

“It has been asserted that the Veda consists of injunctions, descriptions, mantras and names, and Dharma is of the nature of what should be done. Now it is only right that the Injunctive passages should be the means of knowing Dharm a; as it is from these that we learn that sacrifice and other acts should he done,—e.g., ‘the Agnihotra should be offered,’ ‘an offering of curds should be made,’ ‘offerings should he made in the morning and in the evening, to Agni and Prajāpati,’ ‘one desirous of attaining Heaven should pour libations into the fire.’ The whole set of these passages points to the particular action of ‘Agnihotra’ as one that should he done; ‘curds’ are the substance to be offered at the same sacrifice, Agni and Prajāpati are the deities to whom the offerings are to be made,—and the ‘desire for heaven’ is the qualifying condition for the performer.

“But in the Veda there are many such passages as—(a) ‘Agni is all the deities, Agni is the divine power of oblations, he invites the Gods and makes offerings to them,’ &c., and again (b) ‘Prajāpati cut out his own fat’ and so forth; and certainly such passages do not lay down anything to be done; all that they do is either to relate some past event or to describe some entirely irrelevant thing. If his own fat was cut out by Prajāpati, let him cut it; what is that to us? Similarly the fact of Agni being all deities does not help in the offerings to Agni; that Agni is the deity to whom the offering should be made having been declared by the word ‘Agni’ itself; if Agni is some other deity, then the mere fact of his being another deity would rule him out as a recipient of that offering. As for inviting, that also is laid down by another passage ‘we invite Agni, O Agni!’ Ac. And lastly, as for the mention of Agni inviting and making offerings to the Gods, this is absolutely meaningless.

“As regards mantras again, there are some,—e.g., (a) ‘There was neither death nor immortality, &.,’ (Ṛgveda, 10.129.2), (b) ‘Sudeva might fall to-day never to return, &c.,’ (Ṛgveda, 10.95.14) and so forth—which either describe some past event or contain a wailing; and what Dharma could such mantras expound? At that time there was neither death, nor immortality, nor life—certainly no living being having been born before creation, there, was no life or death of any one; during the universal dissolution also, there may come about the death of all things, or it may not come about,—it does not teach us anything as to anything to be done. Similarly, Sudeva, a certain highly meritorious godlike man, might to-day fall, i.e.,—might throw himself into a pit—never to return—i.e., after which fall he cannot come back to life;—this is how Purūravas, separated from Urvaśī, bewailed.

Similarly as regards Names,—e.g, as ‘one should sacrifice with the Udbhid,’ ‘one should sacrifice with the Balabhid,’ &c., &c.,—they do not enjoin any act or substance; the enjoining of the action being done by the verb (‘should sacrifice’), and the word ‘Balabhid’ and ‘Udbhid, &c., not being expressive of any substance; specially as the substance for the sacrifice iu question in the form of Soma—is got at from its archetype by virtue of the direct injunction. [that ‘the ectypal sacrifices are to be performed in the manner of their archetypes,’ and the archetype of the Udbhid sacrifice is the Jyotiṣṭoma at which soma-juice is the substance offered]; and hence there is no necessity for twisting the words ‘udbhid,’ &c., to yield the name of some sacrificial material [such as tree or spade, which may be indicated by the etymology of the word ‘udbhid,’ which means ‘that which shoots out’ or ‘that with which digging is done’]. Thus it is clear that no dharma is indicated by the names. How then can it be said that ‘the entire Veda is the root of dharma?’”

“The Śyena and other sacrifices of the kind are in the form of malevolent spells; and partaking of the character of murder, they are distinctly of the nature of ‘Himsā’ (Injury); and since all form of injury is cruel, and all evil spells have been prohibited, these sacrifices must be ‘Adharma,’ the opposite of ‘Dharma’ (sinful). [And since the Veda lays down such sacrifices] the ‘entir’ Veda cannot be the ‘root of Dharma.’ Por ‘Dharma’ has been explained as ‘what should be done,’ and certainly the killing of the Brāhmaṇa is not ‘what should be done.’ How then can the passages laying down such acts be the ‘root of Dharma’? Further, even the animal-sacrifices—Agniṣomīya and the rest,—involve the killing of animals, and as such are very far removed from the character of ‘Dharma.’ That killing is sinful is admitted by all enquiries. To this end it has been said ‘where the killing of living beings is Dharma, what can be Adharma?’”

“It has been held that Recollection is not a reliable means of knowledge; and the reason for this that is given is that Recollection only serves to recall what has been apprehended by other means of knowledge, and does not lead to the apprehension of anything new.”

“It is quite possible that Manu and others have compiled their ‘Recollections’ from imagination, without having actually apprehended what they speak of; in the same manner as certain poets compose a story after having created the whole plot from imagination.”

“But people might he led to perform it by mistake.”

“Who has laid down the law that in the said passage the Injunction is conveyed, not directly by the Arthavāda itself, but by the fact of its being connected with another Injunctive passage? As a matter of fact, the passage itself contains an independent finite verb of its own—‘these four fall’ [and this would serve as the direct prohibition). It might be argued that the verb does not contain the Injunctive affix: But the passage ‘they obtain a standing who per form the Rātrisatra’ also contains no verb ending with the Injunctive affix. It might he argued that—‘in the case of the Rātrisatra, the need for a qualifying condition being distinctly felt, the two sentences (they obtain a standing and they perform the Rātrisatra) come to be taken as syntactically connected, and the necessary injunction is got at by assuming the verb to contain the Let ending.’—But the same may be said in regard to the passage in question also. In fact, there are several injunctions of substances and deities that are obtained from Arthavādas. In a case where the Arthavāda is distinctly subservient to an Injunctive passage,—since this latter injunction would be in need of the mention of a substance or a deity (for the act enjoined) [that may be found mentioned in the corresponding Arthavāda], it may not be improper to take the Arthavāda as simply serving to supply the needs of the corresponding Injunction (and not as enjoining anything independently by itself). In the present instance however (of the Arthavāda passage ‘the theft of gold, etc., etc.’), if we are to seek for an injunction that has no connection with the Arthavāda (and this injunction were sought to be derived from the words of the Arthavāda itself), then this would give rise to a syntactical split; hence it cannot be taken as subservient to the main subject-matter of the context (i.e., the science of the Five Fires); and in the absence of such subserviency, the Arthavāda could not provide any idea of the Prohibition. This is the point on which the case of the Arthavāda in question is not analogous to that of the sentences—‘One should put in wet pebbles’ and ‘Butter is glory’ [where the connection between the two is quite clear].”

‘The view that some Vedic texts have become lost is not accepted by me; as this view necessitates several unwarrantable assumptions. It is far more reasonable to accept the view that the Smṛtis have brought together the injunctions of actions scattered about here and there. In fact even at the present day we find that a person who is surrounded by several Vedic scholars and teachers is capable of composing works after having heard from those persons the several Vedic texts. It is only natural that persons who have actually seen the writer at the time, basing his statements upon direct Vedic texts should accept them as trustworthy; and we also come to have due confidence in them as far as possible. As a matter of fact, the details of performance are indicated by Mantras; and there is indication of them also by Names; there can be no performance, unless there is some sort of indication regarding the nature of the action and the qualifying conditions. For instance, the connection of a particular deity with the Āghāra -offering is indicated by the words of a Mantra; and the reason for this lies in the indicative character of Mantras, which character becomes possible only if the Deity is taken to be indicated by them. When one action enters into the constitution of another well-accomplished one, it does not interfere with the form of this latter [so that when a Deity indicated by the Mantra is introduced into an action enjoined by a distinct Injunctive passage, it does not interfere with the nature of this action]. For instance, in connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice, we find that the desirable result proceeding from it is got at from sources other than its originative Injunction. Thus it is quite reasonable to assume details in connection even with a well-established injunction, specially when the needs of the Injunction are not supplied even by Mantras and Arthavādas.

‘[An objection is raised]—

“The revered Pāṇini has laid down that Injunction is expressed only by the Injunctive and other cognate affixes. So that Mantras and Arthavādas, describing as they do only accomplished entities, can never express an injunction. If then, from theArthavāda, which is not directly injunctive, some sort of Injunction were deduced by means of an indirect interpretation put upon the Arthavāda,—how could any reliance be placed upon such an Injunction? In fact such an interpretation would lead to a syntactical split; specially as (in such arthavādas as they obtain a standing who perform the Rātrisatra) the Rātris tra offerings do not necessarily stand in need of the ‘standing.’ In fact it is only a detail of the direct Injunction (and not that of the vāda) which can be accepted as indicated by supplementary sentences. As regards the prohibition of Theft, etc. (which has been sought to be deduced from the Arthavāda passage ‘the theft of gold, etc., etc.’), this will certainly be amenable to a direct Injunction; and as in the event of the arthavāda being made to yield the necessary injunction, syntactical split would be inevitable. Nor is there any analogy between the Vācastoma and the Aṣṭakā; for in the sacrifice all the details are performed in accordance with injunctions deduced from mantras; while in the case of the Aṣṭakā there are no grounds for regarding the mantra as indicative of any details of performance. Further, no indicative power of the mantra can prompt one to any course of action, unless there is some sort of a general connection; and in the case in question there is no such connection either of context or of any such factor.”

‘To the above objection the following reply is given by those who hold the view that also are the source of Dharma:—(a) In the case of the passage “they obtain a standing, etc.,” even though there is no directly injunctive agency in the form of the Injunctive affix and the rest, yet the idea of injunction is held to be supplied by the conjugational affix let (in the verb “upayanti,” “offer”). (b) Similarly in the case of the verb “patanti” “they fall” (occurring in the passage “Theft of gold, etc.”), or in that of the verb “use corrupt words” (occurring in another arthavāda passage), (c) In connection with the Vācastoma, we have the distinct injunction beginning with the expression ‘sarvadāśa ṭayīḥ anubrūyāt,’—this name “dāśatayī” being applied to the ten Ṛk. verses selected each out of the ten maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda. (d) As regards the general connection (of the mantra) with the action, this is said to be brought about by the force of the Name,—the Gṛhyamantras being named after the acts (with which they are connected). (e) As regards the arthavāda passage “Theft of gold, etc., etc.,” that this is subservient to the Science of the Five Fires is indicated by the fact that it contains a deprecation of the said Theft, etc.; and this cannot be possible except when the Prohibition (of the Theft, etc.) is also implied. That the passage is subservient to the Science of Five Fires is indicated by the trend of the whole context; and the idea that the Theft, etc., should not be done serves to emphasise the said subserviency; and there is no incompatibility between these two [the idea of subserviency and that the acts should not be done ]. Lastly, as regards the view that the Vedic texts in corroboration of the Smṛti rules h ave always been inferred (and never actually found by any one in the Veda),—it stands on the same footing as the notion of long-standing tradition; both would be of the nature of the “blind following the blind”; and we do not perceive any difference between these two views.’

“As a matter of fact, everything that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis is the source of Dharma; and since ‘Śīla’ also is included among the acts thus enjoined, there is no point in mentioning it separately. In fact Manu himself is going to enjoin it in the following verse—‘Day and night one should take care to subdue the senses’ (7.41),—and again—‘When the mind has been subdued, the two groups of five become subdued.’ And it is this ‘subjugation of the mind’ which constitutes the ‘abandoning of love and hate,’ as we shall explain later on.”

“If this is what is meant, it should be stated dearly, in the form ‘the words of Manu and others, are the sources of Dharma’; what is the use of setting forth the characteristics (of the writers)?”

“But it may happen that a man’s mind is satisfied with a prohibited (sinful) act; and this would have to be regarded as Dharma. Again, a man may have hesitation (and doubt) regarding what is enjoined in the Veda; and this latter would h ave to be regarded as n ot‘ Dharma.’”

[ādhāre] māntravarṇako devatāvidhiḥ | ita indra ūrdhvo’dhvaro divi…indravāna svāhesyādhāramādhārayati—ityevamasāvādhāro yadyasyendro devatā

kalpe kalpe kṣayotyattau brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ | śrutismṛtisadācāranirṇetāraśva sarvadā ||

vido’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām | ācāraśvaica sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca ||

dharmamūlaṃ vedamāhuḥ grantharāśimakṛtrimam | tadvidāṃ smṛtiśīle ca sādhvācāraṃ manaḥpriyam ||

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ | etaccaturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣāddharmasya lakṣaṇam ||

śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ | samyaksaṅkalpajaḥ kāmo dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtam ||

dharmeṇādhigato yaistu vedaḥ saparibṛṃhaṇaḥ | te śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā jñeyāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetavaḥ ||

itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet |

amāmnāteṣu dharmeṣu kathaṃ syāditi ced bhavet | yaṃ śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā brūyuḥ sa dharmaḥ syādaśaṅkitaḥ ||

anāmnāte daśāvaraiḥ śiṣṭairūhavadbhiḥ alubdhaiḥ praśastaṃ kāryam |

daśāvarā pariṣat |

catvāro vedadharmajñāḥ parṣat traividyameva vā | sā brūte yaṃ sa dharmaḥ syādeko vā’dhyātmavittamaḥ ||

yenāsya pitaro yātā yena yātāḥ pitāmahāḥ | tena yāyāt satāṃ mārgaṃ tena gacchanna riṣyati ||

yatra śāstragatirbhinnā sarvakarmasu bhārat | tasmin kulakramāyātmācāraṃ tvācared brudhaḥ ||

yat pūrvaṃ manunā proktaṃ dharmaśāstramanuttamam | na hi tat samatikrasya vacanaṃ hitamātmanaḥ ||

vedā(du|rtho)panibaddhatvāt prādhānyaṃ tu manoḥ smṛtaṃ |

• अथोच्यते- न्यायतः सिद्धं वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् अनूद्य मन्वादिस्मृतीनां तन्मूलता वचनेन ज्ञाप्यत इति ।

• तद् अपि न । तत्रापि पूर्वज्ञानसापेक्षत्वात्, स्मरणस्य भ्रान्तिविप्रलम्भादीनां महाजनपरिग्रहादिना निरस्तत्वात्, अतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनस्याशक्यभावाच् च पुरुषस्य च स्वानुभवसिद्धेर् वेदार्थस्मरणस्य वेदमूलतैवावैष्यते । न हि वेदविदां कार्यार्थविषयं स्मरणं¹ संभवति । वेदस्य च मूलत्वेन मूलान्तरकल्पनाया अनवसरः ।

• नाप्य् एतद् युज्यते वक्तुम्- “स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम्” इत्य् एतद् अप्य् अनूद्यते, बाह्यस्मृतीनाम् अप्रामाण्याय, यतस् तासां न्यायत एव सिद्धम् अप्रामाण्यम् । न हि शाक्यभोजकक्षपणकादीनां वेदसंयोगसंभवः, येन तन्मूलतया स्वविषये प्रमाणं स्युः, स्वयम् अनभ्युपगमात्, तैश् च वेदस्याप्रामाण्याभिधानात्, प्रत्यक्षवेदविरुद्धार्थोपदेशाच् च । तत्रासंभवस् तासु स्मृतिषु वेदाध्ययननिषेधात् । सति हि वेदाध्येतृत्वे बुद्धादीनां तन्मूलता स्यान् न वेति जायते विचारणा । यत्र तु तत्संबन्धो दूरापेतस् तत्र का तन्मूलताशङ्का । स्वयं च मूलान्तरं परंपरायातम् अभ्युपगच्छन्ति- “पश्याम्य् अहं भिक्षुकानां दिव्येन चक्षुषा सुगतिं दुर्गतिं च” ।² एवं सर्व एव बाह्या भोजकपाञ्चरात्रिकनिर्ग्रन्थानार्थवादपाशुपतप्रभृतयः स्वसिद्धान्तानां प्रणेतॄन् पुरुषातिशयान् देवताविशेषांश् च प्रत्यक्षतदर्थदर्शिनो ऽभ्युपयन्ति, न वेदमूलम् अपि धर्मम् अभिमन्यन्ते । प्रत्यक्षेण च वेदेन विरुद्धास् तत्रार्था उपदिश्यन्ते । तथा हि, हिंसा चेद् धर्म उच्यते संसारमोचकादिभिः, सा चात्र प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिषिद्धा । तथान्यत्र तीर्थस्नानम् अधर्मो ऽभ्युपेयते, इह तु “अहर् अहः स्नायत्,” “तीर्थानि सेवेत” इति च विधिः । तथाग्निष्टोमीयवधः क्वचित् पापहेतुर् इष्यते, स च ज्योतिष्टोमविधिना विरुद्धः । तथान्ये सर्वान् एव यागहोमान् आत्मार्थान् संमन्यन्ते, देवताभेदविधिभिर् नानादैवत्यास् ते ऽवगमिताः । अतो विरोधः ।

• ये ऽप्य् आहुः, ग्रहणाग्रहणवद् उदितानुदितहोमकालवत् प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविरोधदर्शनात्, स्यात् संभवः शाखान्तरस्योच्छिन्नस्यानुच्छिन्नस्य वा तद्विरुद्धार्थविधिपरस्य । अनन्ता हि वेदशाखाः । ताः कथम् एकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः । उत्सादश् च संभवतीति । तत्र स्यात् तादृशी वेदशाखा यस्याम् अयं नरास्थिपात्रभोजननग्नचर्यादिर् उपदिष्टो भवेत् ।

• उच्यते । न वयं ब्रूमः वेदे³ विरुद्धार्थोपदेशासंभव⁴ इति । किं तु समकक्षत्वात् तयोर् विकल्पितप्रयोगयोर् अव्याघातः । इह तु कल्प्यो वेदः । न च प्रत्यक्षविरोधिकल्पनाया अवसरः । न च संभवमात्रेण तावता निश्चयः । निश्चितस् तु तद्विरुद्धप्रत्यक्षविधिः, अनिश्चितेन न वा निश्चितं बाध्यते । शाखोत्सादपक्षं चात्रैव श्लोके परस्तात् प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः । सर्वत्र च प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिभिर् मन्वादिस्मृतिनां व्यतिषङ्गः, क्वचिन् मन्त्रेण क्वचिद् देवतया क्वचिद् द्रव्यविधिभिः । न च बाह्यासु तत्संभवतीति तासाम् अप्रामाण्यम् ।

• एवम् आचारस्यापि वेदविद्भिर् अदृष्टार्थतयाचर्यमाणस्य स्मृतिवद् एव प्रामाण्यम्, मूलसंभवात् । असाध्वाचारस्यापि दृष्टकारणादिसंभवाद् अविदुषां च भ्रान्त्यादिसंभवाद् अप्रामाण्यम् ।

• एवम् आत्मनस् तुष्टेर् अपि ।

• यदि च वेदस्मृत्याचाराणां मन्वाद्युपदेशसमधिगम्यं प्रामाण्यम्, मन्वादीनां कथम् । तत्राप्य् उपदेशान्तरात् “स्मार्तं च मनुर् अब्रवीत्” इत्यादेः । तत्र कथम् । तस्माद् इदं प्रमाणम् इदम् अप्रमाणम् इति युक्तित एतद् अवसेयम्, नोपदेशतः । तथा चायम् अनर्थकः श्लोकः । एतत्समानरूपा उत्तरे ऽपि ।

• अत्रोच्यते । इह ये धर्मसूत्रकारा अव्युत्पन्नपुरुषव्युत्पादनार्थं पदार्थसंपादनपरतया ग्रन्थसंदर्भान् आरभन्ते, तत्र यथैवाष्टकादीनां वेदात् स्वयं कर्तव्यताम् अवगम्य, परावबोधनार्थम् उपनिबन्धः, एवं प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धस्य वेदप्रामाण्यादेः । सन्ति केचित् प्रतिपत्तारो ये न्यायतस् तत्त्वविवेचनासमर्थाः, ऊहापोहादिरूपबुद्ध्यभावात् । तान् प्रति न्यायसिद्धो ऽप्य् अर्थः सुहृदुपदेशवद् उपदिश्यते । तत्र यन् न्यायतः सिद्धं वेदस्य धर्ममूलत्वं तद् एवानेनानूद्यते- वेदो धर्ममूलम् । धर्मस्य मूलत्वेन वेदो विचार्य युक्त्या सिद्धः, नात्राप्रामाण्यशङ्का कर्तव्या । भवन्ति च लोके प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धानाम् अर्थानाम् उपदेष्टारः- “न त्वयाजीर्णे भोक्तव्यम्, अजीर्णप्रभवा हि रोगाः” । न चैतद् वक्तव्यम्- “ये न्यायतो वेदस्य धर्ममूलत्वं न शक्नुवन्ति प्रतिपत्तुम्, ते वचनाद् अपि न प्रत्येष्यन्ति” । यतो दृश्यते, य आप्तत्वेन प्रसिद्धास् तदीयं वचनम् अविचार्यैव केचन प्रमाणयन्ति । तद् एवं सर्वम् इदं प्रकरणं न्यायमूलम्, न वेदमूलम् । अन्यत्रापि व्यवहारस्मृत्यादौ यत्र न्यायमूलता तत्र यथावसरं दर्शयिष्यामः । अष्टकादीनां यथा वेदमूलता तथात्रैव निर्दिश्यते ।

• वेदशब्देन ऋग्यजुःसामानि ब्राह्मणसहितान्य् उच्यन्ते । तानि चाध्येतॄणां वाक्यान्तरेभ्यः प्रसिद्धभेदानि । उपदेशपरंपरासंस्कृता अध्येतारः श्रुत्वैव “वेदो ऽयम्” इति प्रतिपद्यन्ते, यथा “ब्राह्मणो ऽयम्” इति । तत्र वाक्यसमूहे ऽपि “अग्निम् ईऌए” (र्व् १.१.१), “अग्निर् वै देवानाम् अवमः” (ऐत्ब् १.१.१) इत्यादादौ “सं सम् इद् युवसे” (र्व् १०.१९१.१) “अथ महाव्रतम्” (ऐता १.१.१) इत्यन्ते वेदशब्दः प्रयुज्यते, तदवयवभूतेषु केवलेषु वाक्येष्व् अपि । न च ग्रामादिशब्दवद् गौणमुख्यता विद्यते । तत्र समुदायेषु हि वृत्ताः शब्दा अवयवेष्व् अपि वर्तन्त इत्य् एष न्यायः । ग्रामशब्दो हि प्रसिद्धभूयिष्टप्रयोगः समुदाय एव, “ग्रामो दग्धः” इत्यादिपदसंबन्धात् तदवयवे वर्तते । कतिपयशालादाहे ऽपि लौकिका “ग्रामो दग्धः” इति प्रयुञ्जते । अथ वा तत्रापि समुदायवचन एव । दाहस् त्व् एकदेशवर्ती समुदायसंबन्धितया व्यपदिश्यते । अवयवद्वारक एव समुदायस्य क्रियासंबन्धः । एष एव समुदायस्य क्रियासंबन्धो यो ऽवयवानाम् । न ह्य् अवयवान् परिहाप्य समुदायो द्रष्टुं स्प्रष्टुं वा शक्यते ।

• व्युत्पाद्यते च वेदशब्दः । विदन्त्य् अनन्यप्रमाणवेद्यं धर्मलक्षणम् अर्थम् अस्माद् इति वेदः । तच् च वेदनम् एकैकस्माद् वाक्याद् भवति, न यावान् ऋग्वेदादिशब्दवाच्यो ऽध्यायानुवाकस्मूहः । एवं च “उदाहरणे जिह्वाच्छेदः” (ग्ध् १२.५) इत्य् एकवाक्यविषयो ऽप्य् अयं दण्डः । “कृत्स्नो ऽधिगन्तव्यः” (म्ध् २.१६५) इति कृत्स्नग्रहणं सकलवेदवाक्याध्ययनप्राप्त्यर्थम् । अन्यथा कतिचिद्वाक्यान्य् अधीत्य कृती स्यात्, न पुनः कृत्स्नं वेदम् इति⁵ । अत्रैतन् निरूपयिष्यामः ।

• स च वेदो बहुधा भिन्नः । सहस्रवर्त्मा सामवेदः सात्यमुग्रिराणायनीयादिभेदेन, एकशतम् अध्वर्यूणां काठकवाजसनेयकादिभेदेन, एकविंशति बाह्वृच्या आश्वलायनैतरेयादिभेदेन, नवधा आथर्वणं मौदकपैप्पलादकादिभेदेन⁶ ।

• ननु नैव केचिद् आथर्वणं वेदं मन्यन्ते, यतः “त्रयी विद्या ऋचः सामानि यजूंषि” इति, “वेदैर् अशून्यस् त्रिभिर् एति सूर्यः” (त्ब् ३.१२.९.१), तथा “त्रैवेदिकं व्रतं चरेत्” (च्ड़्। म्ध् ३.१) इत्यादौ न क्वचिद् आथर्वणनामाप्य्⁷ अस्ति । प्रतिषेधश् च श्रूयते- “तस्माद् आथर्वणेन न शंसेत्” इति । अतस् त्रयीबाह्यान् आथर्वणिकान् पाषण्डिनः प्रतिजानते ।

• तद् अयुक्तम्, अविभागेन शिष्टानां वेदव्यवहारात् । “श्रुतीर् अथर्वाङ्गिरसीः” (म्ध् ११.३३) इत्य् अत्रापि व्यवहारः । श्रुतिर् वेद इत्य् एको ऽर्थः । न च वेदशब्दवाच्यताग्निहोत्रादिवाक्यानाम् अपि धर्मप्रामाण्ये कारणम्, इतिहासायुर्वेदयोर् अपि वेदव्यवहारदर्शनात् “इतिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदम्” इति (छु ७.१.२) । किं तर्हि, अपौरुषेयत्वे सत्य् अनुष्ठेयार्थावबोधकत्वाद् विपर्ययाभावाच् च । तच् चाथर्ववेदे ऽपि सर्वम् अस्ति, ज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्मणां यजुर्वेदादिष्व् इव तत्राप्य् उपदेशात् । अभिचारमूलककर्मणां बाहुल्येन तत्रोपदेशाद् अवेदत्वम् इति विभ्रमः केषांचित् । अभिचारा हि परप्राणवियोगफलत्वात् प्रतिषिद्धाः । आथर्वणिकैश् च त एव प्राधान्येनानुष्ठीयन्ते राजपुरोहितैः, अतस् ते निन्द्यन्ते ।

• यत् तु “वेदैर् अशून्यः” (त्ब् ३.१२.९.१) इत्यादाव् अथर्ववेदस्यानिर्देश इति, अर्थवादा एते । किं तत्र निर्देशेनानिर्देशेन वा । मन्त्रभेदाभिप्रायं वैतद् वचनम् “त्रयो वेदाः” (म्ध् २.२३०), “त्रयी विद्या” इत्यादि । न हि चतुर्थं मन्त्रजातम् अस्ति ऋग्यजुःसामव्यतिरेकेण, प्रैषनिविन्निगदेन्द्रगाथादीनाम् अत्रैवान्तर्भावात् । अथर्ववेदे चर्च एव मन्त्रत्वेन समाम्नाताः । अत ऋग्वेद एवायं मन्त्राभिप्रायेण । यस् तु प्रतिषेधः स विपरीतसाधनः, प्राप्तौ सत्यां प्रतिषेधोपपत्तेः । अयं वास्यार्थः- अथर्ववेदाधीतैर् मन्त्रैस् त्रैवेदिकं कर्म न मिश्रयेत् । वाचःस्तोमे सर्वा ऋचः सर्वाणि यजूंषि सर्वाणि सामानि विनियुक्तानि, तत्राथर्ववेदाधीतानां प्रतिषेधः ।

• स वेदो विशिष्टः शब्दराशिर् अपौरुषेयो मन्त्रब्राह्मणाख्यो ऽनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नः, धर्मस्य मूलं प्रामाणं⁸ परिज्ञाने हेतुः । कारणं मूलम् । तच् च वेदस्मृत्योर् धर्मं प्रति ज्ञापकतयैव,⁹ न निर्वर्तकतया, न च स्थितिहेतुतया, वृक्षस्येव ।

• धर्मशब्दश् च प्राग् व्याख्यातः । यत् पुरुषस्य कर्तव्यं प्रत्यक्षाद्यवगम्यविलक्षणेन¹⁰ स्वभावेन श्रेयःसाधनम् । कृषिसेवादि भवति पुरुषस्य कर्तव्यम्,¹¹ तस्य च तत्साधनत्वस्वभावो ऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् अवगम्यते । यादृशेन व्यापारेण कृष्यादेर् व्रीह्यादिसिद्धिः सापि प्रत्यक्षाद्यवगम्यैव । यागादेस् तु साधनत्वं येन च रूपेणापूर्वोत्पत्तिव्यवधानादिना, तन् न प्रत्यक्षाद्यवगम्यम् । श्रेयश् चाभिलषितस्वर्गग्रामादिफलप्राप्तिः सामान्यतः सुखशब्दवाच्या, व्याधिनिर्धनत्वासौख्यनरकादिफलप्राप्तिः सामान्यतो दुःखशब्दवाच्या, तत्परिहारश् च ।

• अन्ये तु परमानन्दादिरूपं श्रेयः ।

• अयं धर्मो ब्राह्मणवाक्येभ्यो ऽवगम्यते लिङादियुक्तेभ्यः । क्वचिच् च मन्त्रेभ्यो ऽपि “वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलान् आलभते” (म्स् ३.१४.१) इत्य् एवमादिभ्यः । तत्र कामपदयुक्तानि वाक्यानि फलार्थम् अनुष्ठानम् अवगमयन्ति- “सौर्यं चरुं निर्वपेद् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः” (त्स् २.३.२.३), वैश्वदेवीं सांग्रहिणीं निर्वपेद् ग्रामकामः" (त्स् २.३.९.२) इति । तानि फलम् अनिच्छता न क्रियन्ते ।

• अन्यानि यावज्जीवादिपदैर् नित्यतया समर्पितानि, तानि न फलहेतोर् अनुष्ठीयन्ते, फलस्याश्रुतत्वात्¹² । न च “विश्वजिता यजेत” इत्यादिवद् अश्रुतफलत्वे ऽपि फलकल्पना, यतो यावज्जीवादिपदैर् विनैव फलेन कर्तव्यतयावगम्यन्ते । तत्राकरणे शास्त्रार्थातिक्रमदोषः । तत्र तत्परिहारार्थं तानि क्रियन्ते ।

• प्रतिषेधानाम् अपि, “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” “सुरा न पेया” इत्य् एषैव वार्ता । न हि फलार्थं प्रतिषिद्धवर्जनम्, अपि तु प्रत्यवायपरिहारार्थम् ।

• अखिलः कृत्स्नः । न किंचित् पदं वर्णो मात्रा वा यन् न धर्माय ।

• अत्र चोदयन्ति । ननु च विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रनामधेयात्मको वेदः, धर्मश् च कर्तव्यतास्वभावः, इत्य् उक्तम् । तत्र युक्तं यद् विधिवाक्यानि धर्म प्रमाणं स्युः । तेभ्यो हि यागादिविषया कर्तव्यता प्रतीयते । “अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति”, “दध्ना जुहोति”, “यद् अग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोति”, “स्वर्गकामो जुहोति” इति । अत्र ह्य् अग्निहोत्राख्यं कर्म कर्तव्यतया प्रतीयते । “दध्ना” इति तत्रैव द्रव्यम् । “यद् अग्नये च” इति देवता । “स्वर्गकामः” इत्य् अधिकारः । यत् तु “अग्निर् वै सर्वा देवता” (ऐत्ब् १.१.४), “अग्निर् एव दैव्यो होता”, “स देवान् आह्वयति च जुहोति च” इत्यादयः, तथा “प्रजापतिर् वपाम् आत्मन उदक्खिदत्” इत्यादय, न तैः किंचित् कर्तव्यम् उपदिश्यते । केवलं पुरावृत्तम् अन्यद् वासांप्रतिकं भूतम् अनुवदन्ति । प्रजापतिना पुरा आत्मनो वपोत्खाता । उत्खिदतु, किम् अस्माकम् एतेन । तथाग्नेर् अपि सर्वदेवतात्मत्वं नाग्नेयकर्मण्य् उपयुज्यते, अग्निशब्देनोद्देशार्थनिवृत्तेः । अन्यदेवत्वे ऽन्यत्वाद् अग्नेर् उद्देश एव नास्ति । आवाहनस्यापि वचनान्तरेण “अग्निम् अग्न आवहे” (त्स् २.५.९.४) इत्यादिना विहितत्वात्, “स देवान् आह्वयति च जुहोति च” इत्यादिर् अनर्थकः । मन्त्रा अपि “न मृत्युर् आसीद् अमृतं न तर्हि” (र्व् १०.१२९.२) “सुदेवो अद्य पतेद् अनावृत्” (र्व् १०.९५.१४) इत्यादयो भाववृत्तपरिदेवनादिरूपार्थाभिधायिनः कं धर्मं प्रमिमते । तस्मिन् काले न मृत्युर् जातो नाप्य् अमृतं जीवितम् । प्राक् सृष्टेर् भूतानाम् अनुत्पन्नत्वान् न कस्यचिज् जीवितम् आसीन् नापि मृत्युः, प्रलये सर्वेषां मृतत्वात् । भवतु वा मृत्युर् मा वा, न किंचिद् एतेन कर्तय्वम् उपदिष्टं भवति । एवं सुदेवो ऽसौ महापुण्यो देवतुल्यो मनुष्यो यो ऽद्य प्रपतेच् छ्वब्र आत्मानं क्षिपेद् अनावृद् आवृत्तिः प्रत्युज्जीवनं यस्मात् प्रपातान् न भवति । उर्वश्या विप्रलब्धः पुरूरवाः परिदेव्यां चक्रे । तथा नामधेयम् । “उद्भिदा यजेत”, “बलभिदा यजेत” इत्यादि न कस्यचिद् अर्थस्य क्रियाया द्रव्यस्य वा विधायकम्, आख्यातेन क्रियाया विधानाद् अद्रव्यवचनत्वाच् च बलभिदादेः । सोमस्य चाव्यक्तचोदनत्वेन प्रकृतितः प्राप्तत्वान् न क्लेशेन द्रव्यवचनता कल्प्यते । तस्मान् नाम्ना न¹³ धर्म उपदिश्यते । अतः कथम् उच्यते कृत्स्नो वेदो धर्ममूलम् इति ।

• उच्यते । अनयैवाशङ्कयाखिलग्रहणं कृतम्, यतः सर्वेषाम् एतेषां धर्मप्रतिपादनपरत्वम् । तथा हि, अर्थवादा नैव विधायकेभ्यो वाक्येभ्यः पृथगर्थाः येन धर्मं न प्रमिमीरन् । विभज्यमानसाकाङ्क्षत्वे विधिपरत्वावगमात्, तत्परत्वे च सिद्धायाम् एकवाक्यतायां, यथा तदर्थानुगुण्यं प्रतिपद्यन्ते तथा व्याख्येयाः । अतः प्रजापतेर् वपोत्खादनवचनं न स्वार्थनिष्ठम् । किं तर्हि, विधिशेषम् । न च विधेयं द्रव्यगुणादि अर्थवादेभ्यः प्रतीयत इति प्रकारान्तरेण विधेयार्थस्तावकत्वेन तच्छेषतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तद् अपि तत्र प्रतीयत एव । इत्थं नाम पशुयागः कर्तव्यो यद् असत्सु पशुषु गत्यन्त्राभावात् प्रजापतिनात्मैव पुशुत्वेन कल्पितो वपा चोत्खिन्ना । यतस् तत्सहितान्य् एव विधायकानि यत्रार्थवादाः सन्ति । यद्य् अपि तैर् विनापि भवति विध्यर्थावगतिः, विध्युद्देशाद् एव “वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलान् आलभते” (म्स् ३.१४.१) इति, तथापि न तेषाम् आनर्थक्यम् । तेषु हि सत्सु न केवलाद् अवगतिः । न च केनचित् कृतो वेदः, येनोच्यते “यथान्यत्र न सन्ति तथात्रापि मा भूवन्” । सत्स्व् अर्थवादेष्व् अस्माभिर् गतिर् वक्तव्या । सा चोक्ता । न चयम् अलौकिको ऽर्थः । लोके ऽपि हि स्तुतिपदानि दृश्यन्ते विधिशेषभूतान्य् एव । यथा भृतिदाने प्रवृत्तस्य स्वामिनः कश्चिद् भृतकः प्रीत्याचष्टे “साधुर् देवदत्तो नित्यसंनिहितः परिचर्याभूमिज्ञस् तत्परश् च” इति । अतो विधेयार्थस्तुतिद्वारेणार्थवादा विधायका एव । तथा क्वचिद् अर्थवादाद् एव विधेयविशेषावगतिः । यथा “अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति” (त्ब् ३.१२.५.१२) । अत्र ह्य् अञ्जनसाधनं सर्पिस्तैलादि यत्किंचिद् विधिनापेक्षितम् । “तेजो वै घृतम्” (ऐत्ब् ८.२०) इत्य् अर्थवादे घृतस्तुत्या घृतम् अध्यवसीयते । एवम् “प्रतितिष्ठन्ति य एता रात्रीर् उपयन्ति” (च्ड़्। ताण्ब् २३.२.४) इति रात्रिष्व् अर्थवादाद् अधिकारावगमः । तस्माद् अर्थवादा अपि धर्ममूलम् ।

• मन्त्रास् तु केचिद् विधायका एव । यथा “वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलान्” (म्स् ३.१४.१) इति । आधारे देवताविधिर् मान्त्रवर्णिक एव । न हि तत्र देवता कर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्ये श्रुता, नापि वाक्यान्तरेण विहिता । मन्त्रस् तु विहितो नियुक्तः “इत¹⁴ इन्द्रः” (त्स् १.१.१२.१) इत्यादिः । अतो ऽस्मान् मन्त्रवर्णाद् देवताप्रतिपत्तिः । सहस्रशश् च मान्त्रवार्णिका देवताविधयः सन्ति । ये ऽप्य् अन्ये क्रियमाणानुवादिनस् ते ऽपि स्मृतिलक्षणं धर्मम् एव बुद्धं कुर्वन्तीति भवति धर्ममूलम् अनुष्ठेयार्थप्रकाशनेन ।

• नाम त्व् आख्यातार्थाद् अभिन्नार्थम् आख्यातार्थवत् सुप्रसिद्धधर्ममूलभावम् । गुणविधयश् च प्रायशो नामाश्रया¹⁵ एव । “शरदि वाजपेयेन यजेत” (आप्श् १८.१.१) “स्वाराज्यकामो वाजपेयेन” (त्ब् १.३.२.३) इति ।

• तस्मात् सिद्धं कृत्स्नस्य वेदस्य धर्ममूलत्वम् ।

• अन्ये तु, शेय्नादिवाक्यानां धर्मोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाभावम् आशङ्कमानाः, निषेधानां च “न लशुनं भक्षयेत्” इत्यादीनाम् अखिलग्रहणं मन्यन्ते । अभिचारा हि श्येनादयो मारणात्मानो हिंसारूपाः । क्रूरत्वाच् च हिंसाया अभिचाराणां च प्रतिषेधाद् अधर्मत्वम् । अतो न कृत्स्नो वेदो दर्ममूलम् । कर्तव्यश् च धर्म उक्तः । ब्रह्महत्यादिश् च न कर्तव्यः । अतः कथं तद्वाक्यानि धर्ममूलं स्युः । किं च, ये ऽपि पशुयागा अग्नीषोमीयादयस् ते ऽपि हिंसासाधकत्वाद् दूरापेतधर्मभावाः । हिंसा हि पापम् इति सर्वप्रवादेष्व् अभ्युपगमः । उक्तं च “यत्र प्राणिवधो धर्म अधर्मस् तत्र कीदृशः” ।

• कथं पुनर् इयम् आशङ्कापनुद्यते । अखिलग्रहणात् । न ह्य् अस्यान्यत् प्रयोजनम् अस्ति । हेतुर् नोक्त इति चेत्, आगमग्रन्थो ऽयं सिद्धम् अर्थम् आह । हेत्वर्थिनो मीमांसातो विनीयन्ते । अस्माभिर् उक्तं य आगममात्रेण प्रतियन्ति तान् प्रत्य् एतद् उच्यते ।

• विवरणकारास् तु युक्तिलेशमात्रं दर्शयन्ति । यद् उक्तम्, स्येनादयः प्रतिषिद्धत्वाद् अधर्म इति, तत् सत्यम् । तथापि प्रतिषिद्धेष्व् अपि तेषु यो ऽत्यन्तप्रवृद्धद्वेषः “न हिंस्याद् भूतानि” इत्य् अतिक्रान्तनिषेधाधिकारस् तस्य ते शत्रुवधलक्षणां प्रीतिम् अनुष्ठीयमानां निर्वर्तयन्तीत्य् एतावतांशेन वेदस्य धर्ममूलत्वं श्येनादिवाक्येष्व् अपि न विहन्यते । निषेधेष्व् अपि यो रागतः प्रवृत्तो हनने स निषेधे नियुज्यते । एतद् एव निषेधस्यानुष्ठानं यन्निषिध्यमानस्याननुष्ठानम् । अग्नीषोमीयादौ तु नैव हिंसाप्रतिषेधो ऽस्ति, द्वेषलक्षणाया लौकिक्या हिंसाया निषेधेन निषिद्धत्वात् । शास्त्रीया तु विधिलक्षणा न निषेधेन विषयीक्रियते, लौकिक्यां चरितार्थत्वान् निषेधस्य । न च सामान्यतो दृष्टेन हिंसात्वाल् लौकिकहिंसावद्¹⁶ वैदिक्याः पापहेतुत्वम् आपादयितुं शक्यते । यतो न हिंसात्वं पापहेतुत्वे कारणम्, अपि तु प्रतिषेधेन विषयीकरणम् । न चात्र प्रतिषेधो ऽस्तीत्य् उक्तम् ।

• कैश्चित् तु मूलशब्दः कारणपर्यायो व्याख्यायते- धर्मस्य वेदो मूलं प्रतिष्ठाकारणं साक्षात् प्रणाड्या च । “स्वाध्यायम् अधीयीत” (ग्ध् ९.२६), “ऋग्वेदं धारयन् विप्रः” (म्ध् ११.२६१) इत्यादिचोदनासु साक्षात्, अग्निहोत्रादिकर्मस्वरूपज्ञापकतया प्रणाड्या ।

• स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् । अनुभूतार्थविषयं विज्ञानं स्मृतिर् उच्यते । तच्छब्देन वेदः प्रत्यवमृश्यते । तं विदन्ति तद्विदः । वेदार्थविदाम् “इदं कर्तव्यम्, इदं न कर्तव्यम्” इति यत् स्मरणं तद् अपि प्रमाणम् ।

• ननु च स्मृतिर् न प्रमाणम् इत्य् आहुः । सा हि पूर्वप्रमाणावगतप्रमेयानुवादिनी नाधिकम् अर्थं परिच्छिनत्तीति वदन्ति ।

• सत्यम् । ये स्मरन्ति तेषाम् आद्यम् एव तत्र शब्दादि प्रमाणम्, नात्मीया स्मृतिः । अस्माकं तु मन्वादिस्मृतिर् एव प्रमाणम् । न हि वयं ताम् अन्तरेणान्यतो ऽष्टकादिकर्तव्यताम् अवगच्छामः । तच् च मन्वादीनाम् ईदृशं स्मरणं तत्कृतेभ्यो वाक्येभ्यः स्मृतिपरंपरायातेभ्यो ऽवसीयते । तस्माच् च स्मरणाद् अनुभूतो ऽयम् अर्थः प्रमाणेन मन्वदिभिर् इति निश्चिनुमो, यत एते स्मरन्ति । न ह्य् अननुभूतस्य स्मरणोपपत्तिः ।

• ननु कल्पयित्वा ग्रन्थम् उपनिबध्नीयुर् अननुभूयैव केनचित् प्रमाणेन,¹⁷ यथोत्पाद्य वस्तु कथानकं केचन कवयः कथयेयुः ।

• अत्रोच्यते । भवेद् एवं यद्य् अत्र कर्तव्यतोपदेशो न स्यात् । कर्तव्यतोपदेशो ह्य् अनुष्ठानार्थः । न च केचित्¹⁸ स्वेच्छया कल्पिते बुद्धिपूर्वव्यवहारिणो ऽनुष्ठातुम् अर्हन्ति । भ्रान्त्याप्य् अनुष्ठानसिद्धिर् इति चेत्, स्याद् अप्य् एकस्य भ्रान्तिः, सर्वस्य जगतो भ्रान्तिर् यावत् संसारभाविनी चेत्य् अलौकिकी कल्पना । न च संभवति मन्वादीनां वेदमूलत्वे भ्रान्त्यादेर् अवसरः ।

• अत एव प्रत्यक्षतो मन्वादयो धर्मान् ददृशुर् इति नाभ्युपगम्यते । इन्द्रियैर् अर्थानां संनिकर्षे यज् ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् । न च धर्मस्येन्द्रियैः संनिकर्षः संभवति, तस्य कर्तव्यतास्वभावत्वात् । असिद्धं च कर्तव्यम् । सिद्धवस्तुविषयश् च संनिकर्षः । अनुमानादीनि तदात्वे यद्य् अप्य् असन्तम् अर्थम् अवगमयन्ति, पिपीलिकाण्डसंचारेण हि भविष्यन्तीं वृष्टिम् अनुमिमते, तथापि न तेभ्यः कर्तव्यतावगतिः । तस्मात् कर्तव्यतास्मरणस्यानुरूपकारणकल्पनायां वेद एवोपदिश्यते । स च वेदो ऽनुमीयमानो मन्वादिभिर् उपलब्धः ।

(१) इदानीम् उत्सन्ना सा शाखा यस्याम् अमी स्मार्ता धर्मा आसन् । तथा किम् एका शाखा, अथ बह्व्यः । तासु च कश्चिद् अष्टकादिः कस्यांचिद् इत्य् एतद् अनुमानं प्रवर्तते ।

(२) अथ अद्यत्वे पठ्यन्त एव ताः शाखाः । किं तु विप्रकीर्णास् ते धर्माः । कस्यांचिच् छाखायाम् अष्टकादीनां कर्मणाम् उत्पत्तिः, कस्यांचिद् द्रव्यं, क्वचिद् देवता, क्वचिन् मन्त्र इत्य् एवं विप्रकीर्णानां मन्वादयो ऽङ्गोपसंहारं सुखावबोधार्थं चक्रुः ।

(३) अथ मन्त्रार्थवादलिङ्गमात्रप्रभवा एते धर्माः ।

(४) अथ अयम् अनादिर् अनुष्ठेयो ऽर्थो ऽविच्छिन्नपारंपर्यसंप्रदायायातो वेदवन् नित्यः ।

(५) उत अस्मदादीनाम् इव मन्वादीनाम् अपि परप्रत्ययानुष्ठानो नित्यानुमेयश्रुतिकः ।

• इत्य् एवमादि बहुविकल्पं विचारयन्ति विवरणकाराः ।

• एतावांस् तु निर्णयः । वैदिकम् एतद् अनुष्ठानम्, स्मार्तानां वैदिकैर् विधिभिर् व्यतिषङ्गावगमात्, अनुष्ठातॄणां च तद् दृष्ट्वानुष्ठानात् । व्यतिषङ्गश् च दर्शितः । क्वचिद् वैदिकम् अङ्गं प्रधानं स्मार्तम्, क्वचिद् एतद् एव विपरीतम्, क्वचिद् उत्पत्तिः, क्वचिद् अधिकारः, क्वचिद् अर्थवाद इति । एवं सर्व एव स्मार्ता वैदिकैर् व्यतिषक्ताः । निपुणतश् चैतन् निर्णीतम् अस्माभिः स्मृतिविवेके-

• स्मार्तवैदिकयोर् नित्यं व्यतिषङ्गात् परस्परम् ।

• कर्तृतः¹⁹ कर्मतो वापि वियुज्येते न जातु तौ ॥

• प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिनिर्दिष्टं ये ऽनुतिष्ठन्ति केचन ।

• त एव यदि कुर्वन्ति तथा स्याद् वेदमूलता ॥

• प्रामाण्यकारणं मुख्यं वेदविद्भिः परिग्रहः ।

• तद् उक्तं कर्तृसामान्याद् अनुमानं श्रुतीः प्रति ॥

विशेषनिर्धारणे तु न किंचित् प्रमाणम्, न च प्रयोजनम् ।

(१) उत्सादो ऽपि संभाव्यते । दृश्यन्ते हि प्रविरलाध्येतृका अद्यत्वे ऽपि शाखाः । ताभ्यः संभाव्यभाव्युत्सादाभ्यो विधिमात्रम् अर्थवादविरहितम् उद्धृत्योपनिबद्धं स्मृतिकारैर् इति कैश्चिद् अभ्युपगम्यते । “ब्राह्मणोक्ता विधयस् तेषाम् उत्सन्नाः पाठाः प्रयोगाद् अनुमीयन्ते” इत्य् आपस्तम्बः (आप्ध् १.४.१०) ।

• अत्र तु यैवं महाप्रयोजना शाखा, यस्यां सर्वे स्मार्ता गार्ह्याश् च सर्ववर्णाश्रमधर्मा आम्नाताः, तस्या उपेक्षणम् असंभाव्यम्, सर्वाध्येतॄणां चोत्सद इत्यादि बह्वदृष्टं प्रकल्प्यम् ।

(२) विप्रकीर्णानां त्व् अर्थवादगहनानां क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थतया च दुर्विज्ञानानां प्रयोगोन्नयनम् अभियुक्तानां न्यायतो निश्चितार्थानां घटते ।

• अस्मिंस् तु पक्षे विरोधद्वयस्यापि प्रत्यक्षश्रौतत्वाद् विकल्पे न²⁰ स्मृतेर् बाधः । स च विशिष्टानां नाभिप्रेतः । स्मृतिकाराश् च बाधम् अनुमेयश्रुतिमूलत्वं च प्रतिपन्नाः । एवम् अप्य् आह गौतमः- “ऐकाश्रम्यं त्व् आचार्याः प्रत्यक्षविधानाद् गार्हस्त्यस्य” इति (ग्ध् ३.३५) । यदि हि मन्वादीनं प्रत्यक्षास् ताह् शाखा अभवन्, केयं वाचोयुक्तिर् “गर्हस्थ्यस्य प्रत्यक्षविधानात्” इति । ननु सर्व एवाश्रमाः प्रत्यक्षविधानाः । स्वमतम् एव चैतद् गौतमेनाचार्यापदेशेनोपदिष्टम् “तस्याश्रमविकल्पम्” (ग्ध् ३.१) इत्याद्य् उपक्रम्यानेनोपसंहृतत्वात्

(३) मन्त्रार्थवादप्रमाणभावो ऽप्य् अविरुद्धः । यद्य् अप्य् अर्थवादा विध्युद्देशस्तुतिपरा न स्वार्थस्य विधायकाः, तथापि केषांचिद् अन्यपरतैव नोपपद्यते यावत् स्वार्थविषयो विधिर् नावगमितः । यथा “स्तेनो हिरण्यस्य सुरां पिबंश् च” (छु ५.१०.९) इत्यादेः पञ्चाग्निविधिशेषतैवम् एतावतैव नोपपद्यते यावद् धिरण्यस्तेयादेः प्रतिषेधो नावगमितः । य एतां विद्यां अधीते स हिरण्यस्तेयाद्य् अप्य् आचरंस् तैश् च संवसन् न पतति, अन्यथा तु पततीत्य् अवगतिर् अविरुद्धा ।

• अथ “विध्युद्देशो विधेः प्रतिपादकः, नार्थवादः” इति केनैषा परिभाषा कृता । “एते पतन्ति चत्वारः” (छु ५.१०.९) इत्य् अत्राप्य् आख्यातश्रवणम् अस्ति । लिङादयो²¹ न सन्तीति चेत्, “प्रतितिष्ठन्ति” (च्ड़्। ताण्ब् २३.२.४) इति रात्रिष्व् अपि नैव लिङ्श्रुतिर्²² अस्ति । अथ तत्राधिकाराकांक्षायाम् एकवाक्यतायां सत्यां पञ्चमलकारादिकल्पनया विध्यवसायः, एवम् अत्रापि भविष्यति । बहवश् च द्रव्यदेवताविधयो ऽर्थवादावगम्याः सन्ति । तत्र यस्य विधेः शेषा अर्थवादास् तद्विधिनैव द्रव्यदेवतादेर् अपेक्षितत्वाद् विशेषसमर्पणमात्रे व्यापारान्तर्गतविशेषावगतिर् अर्थवादाधीना न दोषाय । इह तु तदसंबद्धस्य विध्यन्तरस्येष्यमाणत्वाद् वाक्यभेदापत्तिर् अतश् च न प्रकृतिशेषता । तदभावे च तन्मूला प्रतिषेधावगतिर् न स्यात् । अतश् च “अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति” (त्ब् ३.१२.५.१२), “तेजो वै घृतम्” (ऐत्ब् ८.२०) इत्य् अनेन वैषम्यम् इत्य् आहुः ।

• तद् असत् । सत्य् अप्य् अर्थान्तरत्वे तदेकवाक्यतामूलत्वाद् अस्यावगतेर् नास्ति वाक्यभेदाभिचोद्यापत्तिः । मन्त्राः प्रयोगप्रकाशत्वेन रूपाद् एवावगतास् तस्य प्रयोगस्यान्यतो ऽसिद्धेः प्रकाशकत्वनिर्वहणाय प्रकाश्यम् कल्पयन्ति । न वासतोर् उत्पत्त्यधिकारयोः प्रकाशनम् अष्टकायाः संभवतीत्य् उत्पत्त्यधिकारविनियोगप्रयोगबोधका मन्त्राः । एवं मान्त्रवर्णिकाश् च विधयो ऽप्य् उपगम्यन्ते । यथाघारे देवताविधिः । चतुष्पाद् धि धर्मो ऽभ्युपगतः । तत्राल्पतरांशः श्रुतः, सकलेतरांशबोधहेतुस् तथाविध एव, विधौ संबन्धग्रहणाद् इति । सर्वथा तावत् संभवति वेदसंयोगः ।

• मनुर् बहुभिर् बहुशाखाध्यायिभिः शिष्यैर् अन्यैश् च श्रोत्रियैः संगतस् तेभ्यः शाखाः श्रुत्वा ग्रन्थं चकार । ताश् च मूलत्वेन²³ प्रदर्श्य ग्रन्थं²⁴ प्रमाणीकृतवान् । एवम् अन्ये तत्प्रत्ययाद् अनुष्ठानम् आदृतवन्तो न मूलोपलम्भे यत्नं कुर्वन्ति । अस्माकं चैतद् अनुमानम् ।

• अतो विरोधे सत्य् अपि तुल्ये श्रौतत्वे बाधोपपत्तिः । प्रत्यक्षया श्रुत्या प्रयोगसंपत्तौ श्रुत्यन्तरं प्रत्य् आकाङ्क्षैव नास्ति । यथा सामिधेनीषु साप्तदश्यपाञ्चदश्ययोः पाञ्चदश्येन प्रकृतिर् अवरुद्धा साप्तदश्यं प्रत्यक्षश्रुतम् अपि नाकाङ्क्षति । आभिधानिको ह्य् अर्थः संनिकृष्यते, अभिहितार्थाकाङ्क्षावगम्यं प्रत्ययं विप्रकर्षाद् दुर्बलं बाधते । न चैतावताप्रामाण्यापत्तिः । यथा प्राकृतान्य् अङ्गानि विकृतिषु चोदकप्राप्तानि वैकृतिकैर् विरुद्ध्यमानानि बाध्यन्ते तद्वद् एव द्रष्टव्यम् ।

(४) यत्र संप्रदायाविच्छेदस्²⁵ तत्र च परंपरापत्तिः । न हि तत्र कस्यचित् प्रमाणं प्रवृत्तम् ।

(५) नित्यानुमेयपक्षो ऽपि संप्रदायपक्षान् नातीव भिद्यते । मन्वादिस्मरणस्य वयं मूलं परीक्षितुं प्रवृत्ताः । यदि च तेषाम् अप्य् असाव् अनुमेयो वेदो वयम् इव, न ते स्मर्तारः । न च यः पदार्थो न कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षस् तस्यानुमेयता संभवति, अन्वयासंभवात् । क्रियादिषु सामान्यतो ऽस्त्य् एव संबन्धदर्शनम् । यदि वार्थापत्त्यवसेयाः क्रियादयो न चेहान्यथानुपपत्तिर् अस्ति ।

• तस्माद् अस्ति मन्वादीनाम् अस्मिन्न् अर्थे वेदसंबन्धः, न पुनर् अयम् एव प्रकार इति निर्धारयितुं शक्यम् । द्रढीयसी कर्तव्यतावगतिर् वेदविदां वेदमूलैव युक्ता कल्पयितुं न भ्रान्त्यादिमूलेत्य् अवगत्यनुरूपकारणकल्पना कृता भवति । तत्रोत्सादविप्रकीर्णे²⁶ मन्त्रार्थवादे प्रत्यक्षवेदानां कारणानां संभवात् कल्प्यत्वम् उपशेते । प्रत्यक्षो ऽपि विधिः क्वचिन् मूलत्वेन दृश्यते “न मलवद्वाससा सह संवसेत्” इति (च्ड़्। वध् १२.५) । स चाध्ययने चोपनयने च पठ्यते । तद् एतल् लेशतो ऽस्माभिर् उक्तम् । विस्तरस् तु स्मृतिविवकाज् ज्ञातव्यः ।

• शाखाः काश्चित् समुत्सन्नाः पक्षो नैष मतो मम ।

• पक्षे ऽस्मिन् न प्रमाणं हि बह्वदृष्टं प्रसज्यते ॥

• उपपन्नतरः पक्षो विक्षिप्तानां ततस् ततः ।

• उत्पत्त्यादिसमाहारः प्रायशो दृश्यते ह्य् अदः ॥

• अनेकशिष्योपाध्यायैः श्रोत्रियैर् आदृतो ऽपरैः ।

• शक्तो रचयितुं श्रुत्वा शाखां तां तां कुतश्चन ॥

• उपपन्नस् तदानीं च दृष्टमूलैः परिग्रहः ।

• निश्चयो ऽस्माकम् अप्य् अद्य यथा संभवतः स्थितः ॥

• प्रयोगद्योतका मन्त्रा द्योतनं तस्य नामतः ।

• नर्ते ऽधिकारोत्पत्तिभ्यां प्रयोगस्यास्ति संभवः ॥

• विशिष्टदेवतालाभ आधारे मान्त्रवर्णिकः ।

• प्रकाशकत्वान् मन्त्रस्य तन्निर्वहणहेतुकः ॥

• या सिद्धरूप एकस्मिन् रूपान्तरगतिर्²⁷ भवेत् ।

• न सा स्वरूपनाशाय विश्वजित्य् अधिकारवत् ॥

• प्रतिपन्ने विधौ युक्तं तत्संबन्धार्थकल्पनम् ।

• गतिर् मन्त्रार्थवादेभ्यो न दृष्टा चेद् विधेः क्वचित् ॥

• लिङादिगम्यं²⁸ भगवान् विधिं स्मरति पाणिनिः ।

• न शक्तास् ते विधिं वक्तुं सिद्धवस्त्वभिधायिनः ॥

• व्याख्येयो गुणवादेन यो ऽर्थवादाद् अतत्परात् ।

• अर्थो ऽधिगन्तुम् इष्येत कथं स्यात् तस्य सत्यता ॥

• भिन्द्याद् वाक्यं न प्रतिष्ठा²⁹ साकाङ्क्षा रात्रयो यतः ।

• विशेषे तद्गते युक्ता वाक्यशेषावगम्यता ॥

• स्तेयादीनां निषेधे ऽपि विध्यन्तरगतिर् ध्रुवा ।

• ततश् च वाक्यभेदः स्यान् नोपन्यासस् ततः समः ॥

• वाचःस्तोमे प्रयुज्यन्ते सर्वे मन्त्रविधिश्रुतेः ।

• नाष्टकादौ विशेषो ऽस्ति हेतुर् मन्त्रस्य बोधने ॥

• विना सामान्यसंबन्धाल् लिङ्गं च विनियोजकम् ।

• न च नास्त्य् अस्य³⁰ संबन्धो विना प्रकरणादिभिः ॥

• परिहारं ब्रुवन्त्य् अत्र केचित् तन्मूलवादिनः ।

• रत्रिषु प्रतितिष्ठन्तीत्य् असत्स्व् एव लिङादिषु ॥

• पञ्चमेन लकारेण तदर्थगतिर् इष्यते ।

• पतन्ति न म्लेछितवा इत्यादिषु तथा भवेत् ॥

• ऋचां विधिर् वाचःस्तोमे³¹ सर्वदाशतयीर् इति ।

• दशम्यो मण्डले ऽभ्यस्ता वर्जिताः पठिता बहिः ॥

• सामान्यसंबन्धकारी समाख्यैवेति गीयते ।

• समाख्या गृह्यमन्त्राणां तेन तेनास्ति कर्मणाम् ॥

• पञ्चाग्निविद्याशेषत्वं हिरण्यस्तेननिन्दया ।

• स्तेनो हिरण्यवाक्यस्य न विना तन्निषेधतः ॥

• शेषत्वावगमो ऽर्थात् तु तदकर्तव्यता तु या ।

• द्रढिम्ने शेषतायाः सा न पुनस् तद्विरोधिनी ॥

• नित्यानुमेयपक्षो यो वाप्य् आगमपरंपरा ।

• तयोर् अन्धप्रवाहत्वं न भेदः कश्चिद् ईक्ष्यते ॥

एवं च सति या गौतमेन प्रत्यक्षविधानता गार्हस्थ्यस्योक्ता (ग्ध् ३.३६) सा शब्दस्याव्यवहितव्यापाराभिप्रायेण । श्रवणान्तरं यो ऽर्थः प्रतीयते स प्रत्यक्षः । यस् तु प्रतीते ऽर्थे तत्सामर्थ्यपर्यालोचनया गम्यः स विलम्बितत्वात् प्रतिपत्तेर् न प्रत्यक्ष इति सर्वम् उपपन्नम् ।

• स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् । स्मृतिश् च शीलं च स्मृतिशीले । शीलं रागद्वेषप्रहाणम् आहुः । तच् च धर्ममूलं वेदस्मृतिवन् न ज्ञापकतया, किं तु निर्वर्तकत्वेन । रागद्वेषप्रहाणाद् धि धर्मो निर्वर्तते ।

• ननु च “श्रेयःसाधनं धर्मः” इत्य् उक्तम् । रागद्वेषप्रहाणम् एव च तत्स्वभावम् । तत्रासति व्यतिरेके किम् उच्यते रागादिप्रहाणाद् धर्मो निर्वर्तत इति ।

• उक्तम् अस्माभिः, धर्मशब्दो ऽयं स्मृतिकारैः कदाचिद् विधिनिषेधविषयभूतायां क्रियायां प्रयुज्यते, कदाचित् तदनुष्ठानजन्य आफलप्रदानावस्थायिनि कस्मिंश्चिद् अर्थे । तस्य च सद्भावे शब्द एव प्रमाणम् । यदि हि यागस् तथाविधं वस्त्व् अनुत्पाद्य विनश्येत् तदा कालान्तरे कुतः फलोत्पत्तिः । तद् एतद् वस्तु धर्मशब्देनात्राभिप्रेतम् । तस्य शीलं मूलम् इति न किंचिद् अनुपपन्नम् । तदभिप्राया एव व्यवहाराः ।

• एक एव सुहृद् धर्मो निधने ऽप्य् अनुयाति यः । इति । (म्ध् ८.१७)

क्रियाया अनुष्ठानसमनन्तरम् एव नाशात्, कुतः कालान्तरान्वयः ।

• अत्र चोद्यते । ननु सर्व एव श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो ऽर्थो धर्मस्य मूलम् । शीलस्यापि तत्रान्तर्भावाद् भेदेनोपादानम् अनर्थकम् । विधायिष्यते च ।

• इन्द्रियाणां जये योगं समतिष्ठेद् दिवानिशम् । (म्ध् ७.४४)

• यस्मिञ् जिते जिताव् एतौ भवतः पञ्चकौ गणौ । (म्ध् २.९२) इति ।

अयम् एव मनसो जयो यो रागद्वेषयोः परित्याग इति वक्ष्यामः ।

• केचिद् आहुः- आदरार्थः पृथग् उपदेशः । एतद् धि सर्वकर्मणाम् अनुष्ठान उपयुज्यते, स्वप्रधानं च अग्निहोत्रादिकर्मवत् । सर्ववर्णधर्मश् चायं सर्वाश्रमधर्मश् च । अतः³² सामान्यधर्मलक्षणावसरे ऽस्मिन्न् उच्यते ।

• वयं तु ब्रूमः । समाधिः शीलम् उच्यते । तथा हि “शिल समाधौ” (ध्प् ५२३) इति धतुषु पठ्यते । समाधानं च मानसो धर्मः । यच् चेतसो ऽन्यविषयव्याक्षेपपरिहारेण शास्त्रार्थनिरूपणप्रवणता तच् छीलम् उच्यते । द्वन्द्वश् चायम् इतरेतरयोगे । तेन परस्परसापेक्षयोः स्मृतिशीलयोः धर्मं प्रति प्रामाण्यम् एवाभिप्रेतम्, न पूर्ववन् निर्वर्तकत्वम् । एतद् उक्तं भवति । समाधानवती या स्मृतिः सा प्रमाणम्, न स्मृतिमात्रम् । तेन सत्य् अपि वेदार्थवित्त्वे यद् अतत्पराणां³³ स्मरणं न तद् धर्ममूलम्, भ्रान्त्यादिसंभवाच् छास्त्रार्थावधानशून्यानाम् । चशब्द इह पठ्यते । स तद्विदाम् इत्य् अस्माद् अनन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः । वृत्तानुरोधात् त्व् एवं पठितः । समुच्चयार्थश् चासौ पूर्वप्रकृतस्य च समुच्चेतव्यस्याभावात् तृतीये पादे यत् साधूनाम् इत्य् उक्तं तत् समुच्चिनोति ।

• अतस् त्रीणि विशेषणान्य् अत्राश्रीयन्ते । विदुषाम् उपाध्यायाद् आगमितविद्यानाम्, तथा तदभ्यासपराणाम् अनुष्ठानपराणां च स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् । एतत् सर्वं मन्वादीनाम् आसीद् इति स्मर्यते । नान्यथा तत्कृतेषु ग्रन्थेषु शिष्टानां परिग्रहोपपत्तिः ।

• यद्य् एवं स्पष्टम् एव वक्तव्यम्- मन्वादिवाक्यानि धर्ममूलम् इति । किम् एतेन लक्षणेन ।

• सत्यम् । यः कथंचित् तत्प्रामाण्ये विप्रतिपाद्येत तं प्रति न्यायशास्त्रप्रसिद्धं प्रामान्यहेतुकथनम् एतत् । अद्यत्वे ऽपि यस्यैतद्धेतुसद्भावः सो ऽपि मन्वादिवद् ग्राह्यवाक्यः स्यात् । तथा च विदुषां प्रायश्चित्ताद्युपदेशे । तथाभूता एव परिषत्त्वेन प्रमाणीभवन्ति,

• एको ऽपि वेदविद् धर्मं यो व्यवस्येद् द्विजोत्तमः । इति । (म्ध् १२.११३)

अत एव स्मर्तृपरिगणना “मनुर् विष्णुर् यमो ऽङ्गिराः” (य्ध् १.४) इति निर्मूला । तथा हि पैठीनसिबौधायनप्रचेतःप्रभृतयः शिष्टैर् एवंरूपाः स्मर्यन्ते, न च परिगणनायाम् अन्तर्भाविताः । सर्वथा यम्³⁴ अविगानेन शिष्टाः स्मरन्ति वदन्ति वा एवंविधैर् गुणैर् युक्तम्, तेन चैतत्प्रणीतम् इति, तस्य वाक्यं सत्य् अपि पौरुषेयत्वे धर्मे प्रमाणं स्यात् । इति स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् इत्य् अस्यार्थः ।

• अद्यत्वे य एवंविधैर् गुणैर् युक्त ईदृशेनैव च हेतुना ग्रन्थम् उपनिबध्नीयात्, स उत्तरेषां मन्वादिवत् प्रमाणिभवेत् । इदानींतनानां तु यद् एव तत्र तस्य बोधकारणं तद् एव तेषाम् अस्तीति न तद्वाक्याद् अवगतिः । इदानींतनो हि यावन् मूलं न दर्शयति तावन् न विद्वांसस् तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणयन्ति । दर्शिते तु मूले प्रमाणीकृते ग्रन्थे कालान्तरे यदि कथंचिद् अष्टकादिमूलतुल्यता स्यात्, तदा तेषां शिष्टपरिग्रहान्य् अथानुपपत्त्या तन्मूलानुमानं युक्तम् ।

• आचारश् चैव साधूनाम् । चशब्देन वेदविदाम् इति संबध्यते । पदद्वयेन शिष्टत्वं लक्ष्यते । शिष्टानां य आचारः सो ऽपि धर्मे मूलम् । आचारो व्यवहारः अनुष्ठानम् । यत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिवाक्यानि न सन्ति, शिष्टाश् च धर्मबुद्ध्यानुतिष्ठन्ति, तद् अपि वैदिकम् एव पूर्ववत् प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । यथा विवाहादौ कङ्कणबन्धनादि माङ्गलिकत्वेन यत् क्रियते, या च कन्यायास् तदहर् विवाहयिष्यमाणायाः प्रख्यातवृक्षयक्षचतुष्पथादिपूजा देशभेदेन, तथा चूडासंख्या देशभेदश् च, या चातिथ्यादीनाम् गुर्वादीनां चानुवृत्तिः प्रियहितवचनाभिवादनाभ्युत्थानादिरूपा, तथा पृश्निसूक्तं तृणपाणयो ऽधीयते, अश्वमेधं अश्वस्य घासम् अर्पयन्तः³⁵ । ईदृश आचारः । एषो ऽपि हि स्वभावभेदेन पुरुषाणां मनःस्वास्थ्यदौःस्थ्यादिभेदेनानेकरूपः प्रतिविशेषम् आनन्त्याद् अशक्यो ग्रन्थेनोपनिबद्धुम् । यद् एव बहुशः प्रिय्म् अस्येत्य्³⁶ उपलक्षितम्, तद् एवावसरान्तरे विपरीतं संपद्यते । तथा पर्युपासनं गृहस्थेनातिथेः क्रियमाणं कस्यचित् प्रीतिकरं “ममायं भृत्यवत् तिष्ठति”, अन्यस् त्व् अन्यथा “निर्यन्त्रणया न लभ्यत आसितुम्³⁷ अस्मिन् संनिहिते” इति पर्युपासनयैव विरज्यति । न तत्र सामान्यतः शक्यं वेदानुमानम्, न विशेषतः । अष्टकादीनां तु नियतैकरूपसमस्तप्रयोगस्मरणम् इत्य् एष स्मृत्याचाराणां भेदः ।

• आत्मनस् तुष्टिर् एव च । धर्ममूलम् इत्य् अनुषज्यते, वेदविदां साधूनाम् इति च । अस्याश् च धर्ममूलत्वं प्रामाण्येनैवेत्य्³⁸ आहुः । यत्र ह्य् एवंविधानाम् अनुष्ठेये ऽर्थे मनः प्रसीदति, द्वेषो न भवति, स धर्मः ।

• ननु च यस्य प्रतिषिद्ध एवार्थे मनः प्रसीदेत्, स धर्मः प्राप्नोति । विहिते च किंकथिका स्यात्, स न धर्म इति ।

• एवम् एतत् । ईदृशानां महात्मनां मतिमतां महाप्रभावो मनःप्रसादः, येनाधर्मो ऽपि धर्मताम् एति, धर्मश् चाधर्मताम्, न रागद्वेषादिदोषवताम्³⁹ । यथा रुमायां यत्किंचिद् द्रव्यं प्रविशति तत् सर्वं लवणसात् संपद्यते, एवं वेदविदा सहसोत्पन्नेन मनःपरितोषेण सर्वं निर्मलीक्रियते । अतो यथा प्रतिषिद्धाम् अपि ग्रहणं षोडशिनि विधिनानुष्ठीयमानं न दोषाय । न चात्र ग्रहणवद् विकल्पः । प्रतिषेधा ह्य् आत्मतुष्टिव्यतिरेकेणान्यत्र विषये व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते ।

• अथ वा नैव तेषाम् अधर्मे आत्मा परितुष्यति । यथा विषघ्नीम् एवौषधीं नकुलो दशति नान्याम् । अत उच्यते “नकुलो यां यां दशति सा सा विषघ्नी” इति ।

• इह भवन्तश् चाहुः । ये वैकल्पिकाः पदार्थास् तेषु यस्मिन् पक्षे मनः प्रसीदति स पक्ष आश्रयितव्यः । वक्ष्यति च द्रव्यशुद्धौ प्रायश्चित्तेषु च।

• तस्मिंस् तावत् तपः कुर्याद् यावत् तुष्टिकरं भवेत् । (म्ध् ११.२३२)

• अथ वा यो ऽश्रद्दधानो नास्तिकतया तस्यानधिकारम् आह । नास्तिकस्य हि न वैदिकं कर्म कुर्वतो ऽप्य् आत्मा तुष्यति । अतस् तेन क्रियमाणम् अपि कर्म निष्फलम् एव ।

• अथ वा सर्वकर्मविषयो भावप्रसाद उपदिश्यते । अनुष्ठानकाले क्रोधमोहशोकादि त्यक्त्वा प्रमुदितेन भाव्यम् । अतश् च शीलवद् अस्याः सर्वशेषतया धर्ममूलत्वाभिधानम् ॥ २.६ ॥

[The opponent raises an initial objection]—

“What is the relevanoy of what is stated in this verse? It is Dharma that has been declared as the subject to be described; and Dharma can be described only by means of Injunctions and Prohibitions. Now as regards the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma, this cannot form the subject of any injunction such as ‘the Veda should be known as the source of Dharma, as the authoritative means of ascertaining Dharma because this fact can be known without its being enjoined in so many words; certainly the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma does not stand in need of being notified by any injunctions of such writers as Manu and others; in fact the authoritativeness of the Veda regarding matters relating, to Dharma is as self-evident as that of Direct Perception,—being based upon the facts that (1) it brings about cognitions that are never sublated, (2) that it is not the work of any person, and as such it is entirely free of any suspicion of falsity that might be due to the defects of such authors, and (3) that the words of the Veda itself are free from all defects.

“It might be argued that—‘what the text does is to refer to the well-established fact of the Veda being authoritative, with a view to indicate that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda.’

“But this explanation cannot be accepted. For this fact also does not need to be stated; as (l) every Smṛti, by its very nature, must, be dependent upon a previous cognition, (2) the chances of mistake in the Smṛtis are precluded by the fact of their being accepted by great men, (3) the super-sensuous things spoken of in the Smṛtis could not be known to M anu and others (by any ordinary means of knowledge), and (4) every man knows it from his own experience that there is “recollection” of things taught in the Veda; so that the only possible view that could be entertained regarding the Smṛtis is that they are based upon the Veda [which, therefore, need not have been re-iterated in the Text]. Further, persons who know the Veda cannot stand in need of any Smṛti for learning what they should do; and lastly, when the Veda itself is the source of Dharma, there can be no need for postulating any other sources (in the shape of Smṛti, etc.).

“Nor is it right to assert that ‘the conscientious recollection of persons versed in the Veda is also merely referred to for the purpose of pointing out the unauthoritative character of the heterodox Smṛtis’; because the unauthoritative character of these latter is already well established by reasoning. For such heterodox people as the Śākya, the Bhojaka, the Kṣapaṇaka and the rest, there is no possibility of any knowledge of the Veda, by virtue of which they might be regarded as authoritative on matters treated of in their Smṛtis; because in the first place they do not admit any connection with the Veda; secondly, they openly declare that the Veda is hot authoritative; thirdly, they contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; and lastly, these Smṛtis clearly prohibit the study of the Veda. If Buddha and others had been students of the Veda, then alone could there be any question as to whether or not their Smṛtis are based upon the Veda. When however, as a matter of fact, any connection with the Veda is not even remotely possible, how could there be any possibility of these being based upon the Veda? On the contrary, these writers themselves put forward an entirely different basis for their codes,—in the form of tradition (handed down through a series of several Buddhas); as for example, in the following words: ‘with my divine eyes I perceive the good and bad conditions of Bhikṣus.’ Exactly in the same manner, all such heterodox people as the Bhojaka, the Pañcarātra, the Nirgrantha, the Anarthavāda, the Pāśupata and the rest hold that their scriptures are the works of gifted personalities, particular deities, capable of directly perceiving the subjects dealt with by them; and they do not admit that Dharma has its source in the Veda; in fact their scriptures contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; e.g., some of these people, holding that death frees the living being from the troubles of living, hold all Killing to be meritorious; and this (reckless) killing is distinctly prohibited in the Veda; similarly, others hold Bathing at sacred places to be sinful, while the Veda directly enjoins daily bathing and living at sacred places; so again, according to some people, the killing of animals at the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice is sinful; and this is against the Vedic injunction laying down the performing of that sacrifice;—lastly, some people hold that all such acts as the offering of libations and sacrifices are entirely selfish, while according to the Veda, which prescribes various deities in connection with the said acts, they are performed for the sake of these several deities. So that there is distinct disagreement between the Veda and the said heterodox scriptures.

“Some people have argued as follows:—

‘In the Veda also we find contradictory assertions e.g., one passage lays down the holding (of the Śodaśī-vessel, at the Atirātra sacrifice), while another says it should not be held; similarly one passage prescribes the time after Sunrise as best suited to the pouring of libations, while another lays down the time before Sunrise; so that it is quite possible that in the Veda itself—either in its lost Rescensions or even in such Rescensions as are not completely lost—there may be found injunctions contrary to a certain Vedic injunction [and these contrary Vedic passages would form the basis for the non-Vedic teachings of the heterodox Smṛtis ]. The number of Vedic Rescensions is endless; how could all of them be known to any one person? And it is quite possible that some of them might have become lost. So that it is quite possible that there may be some such Vedic Rescensional text as contains direct injunctions of such acts as Eating in a vessel made of human bones, remaining naked-skinned and so forth (which have been prescribed in some heterodox scriptures).’

“Our answer to the above is as follows:—We do not deny the possibility of mutually contradictory teachings being found in the Veda; what we mean is that in all such cases (where both the injunctions are equally directly perceived), both injunctions stand upon the same footing, and consequently the two acts are regarded as optional alternatives. In the case in question however (i.e., when the teaching of a heterodox scripture is found to contradict the direct teaching of the Veda), the Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) could only be assumed; but there can be no occasion for the assumption of a text directly contradictory to one that is directly perceived. The mere possibility of a Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) cannot lead to any certainty regarding its actual existence; while the Vedic injunction to the contrary is directly perceptible and certain; and certainly a certain text can never be sublated by an uncertain one. As for the theory of ‘lost Rescensions,’ we shall deal with it in detail later on, in our comments on this same verse. As regards the (orthodox) Smṛtis of Manu and others, their relationship to directly perceptible Vedic texts is quite patent; in some cases they are related to the Vedic mantras, in others to the Vedic deities, and in others again with substances and other details. No such relationship is possible in the case of the heterodox Smṛtis; hence no authority can ever belong to them (for the purpose of re-iterating which fact there could be a reference to the ‘Recollection of persons versed in the Veda.’)

“As regards Practice,—that which consists in what is actually done, with a view to invisible results, by persons learned iu the Veda,—its authoritative character is exactly like that of Recollection (Smṛti); because that also has its basis in the Veda. On the other hand, wrong Practice is generally based upon visible causes (of greed, &c.), and unlearned persons are apt to commit mistakes; hence it can not have any authority at all.

“Similarly with Self-satisfaction.

“If again the authority of the Veda, of Recollection and of Practice were dependent upon the teachings of Manu and others (in the shape of the present verse), on what would the authority of these latter rest? If on other teachings—such as ‘the Smārta Dharma has been expounded by Manu,’—then, whence the authority of these latter? In fact, the ultimate criterion as to what is authoritative and what is not authoritative, would be a purely logical one, and it would not consist in any teaching at all. So that the present verse is absolutely useless; and so also other similar verses that follow.”

Our answer to the above objection is as follows:—

The authors of treatises on Dharma proceed to compose their works for the expounding of their subject for the benefit of such persons as are not learned (in the Vedas). Hence it is that having themselves learnt from the Veda that the Aṣṭakā and such other acts should be performed, they incorporate in their own work the injunctions of these acts, for the purpose of conveying the same knowledge to others similarly in the case of such matters as the authoritative character of the Veda [which are known by the Smṛti- writers themselves from the Veda, and yet they proceed to include that information in their work for the edification of persons not equally learned]. As a matter of fact, there are many enquirers who are incapable of ascertaining truth by means of independent reasoning,—not being endowed with an intellect capable of ratiocination; and for the benefit of these persons even a logically established fact is stated by the writers in a friendly spirit. Hence what is herein stated regarding Veda being the source of Dharma is a well-established fact. What the statement ‘Veda is the source of Dharma’ means is that ‘the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma has been ascertained after due consideration, and one should never doubt its authoritative character.’ Even in ordinary experience we find people teaching others facts ascertained by other means of knowledge; e.g. [when the physician teaches]—‘you should not eat before the food already taken has been digested, for indigestion is the source of disease.’ It cannot be rightly urged that “those who are unable to comprehend, by reasoning, the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma, can not comprehend it through teaching either”; for as a matter of fact we find that when certain persons are known to be ‘trustworthy,’ people accept their word as true, without any further consideration. The whole of the present section therefore is based on purely logical facts, and not on the Veda, in other cases also,—e.g., in the case of Smṛtis dealing with law-suits, &c.—what is propounded is based upon logic, as we shall show later on, as occasion arises. How the performance of the Aṣṭakā, etc., is based upon the Veda we shall show in the present context itself.

The word ‘Veda’ here stands for the Ṛg, Yajuṣ and Sāman, along with their respective Brāhmaṇas; all these are fully distinguished, by students, from all other sentences (and compositions). Learners who have their intellect duly cultured through series of teachings, understand, as soon as a Vedic passage is uttered, that it is Veda,—their recognising of the Veda being as easy as the recognition of a man as a Brāhmaṇa. This word ‘Veda’ is applied to the whole collection of sentences,—beginning with ‘Agnimīle purohitam,’ ‘Agnirvai devānāmvarua,’ and ending with ‘atha mahāvāratam’ (Ṛgveda); as also to the several individual sentences forming part of the said collection; and this application of the word is not direct in the one case and indirect in the other,—as is the case with the word ‘village’ as applied (directly) to the entire group of habitations, and (indirectly) to each individual habitation. In the case of the word ‘village’ the twofold usage is based upon the principle that words denoting the composites are also applicable to the components; the word ‘village’ is known to be used generally in the sense of ‘a group of houses,’ and yet in the case of such expressions as ‘the village is burnt,’ it ìb used in the sense of a few individual houses in the village; as it is when people say ‘the village has been burnt,’ when in reality only a few houses have be in burnt. Or, in this ease also the word ‘village’ may be regarded as used in the sense of the group only; and what happens is that it is the burning, which, though really pertaining to only a portion of that group, is spoken of as pertaining to the entire group as related to the said portion; specially as it is only through its components that a composite can have any connection with an act; in fact the composite’s connection with acts can be none other than that of the components; apart from the components, the composite cannot be either seen or touched.

We now proceed to explain the etymology of the word ‘Veda.’ The ‘Veda’ is that from which people derive their knowledge of Dharma, which cannot be known from any other source of knowledge—[ vidanti asmāṭ iti vedaḥ ]; and this knowledge of Dharma is derived from each individual sentence; hence the name is not restricted to the entire collection of Adhyāyas and Anuvākas that go under the name ‘Ṛgveda.’ It is on this understanding that the penalty of having the tongue cut off is inflicted (upon the Śūdra) when he pronounces a single sentence out of the Veda. On the same principle also is the epithet ‘whole’ found in the injunction that ‘the whole Veda should be studied,’ where it serves to indicate the necessity of studying all the sentences contained in the Veda; otherwise (if the epithet ‘whole’ were not there) the learner would be satisfied with the reading of only a few sentences, and would not read the whole Veda. All this we shall explain in detail in the present work.

This Veda is variously divided. The Sāma Veda is said to have a thousand ‘paths’ (i.e., Rescensions), in the shape of ‘Sātya,’ ‘Mugri,’ ‘Rāṇāyanīya’ and so forth; there are a hundred Rescensions of the Yajurveda, in the shape of ‘Kāṭhaka,’ ‘Vājasaneyaka’ and the rest; there are twenty-one Rescensions of the Ṛgveda; and nine of the Atharva Veda in the shape of ‘Modaka’ ‘Paippalādaka,’ and so forth.

[Objection]—

“No one regards the Atharva as a Veda: (a) ‘The science is three-fold, consisting of the Ṛk, the Yajuṣ and the Sāman,’ (b) ‘The Sun moves forward, endowed with the three Vedas’ (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 3.12.91), (c) ‘One should keep up the observance of studying the three Vedas’; [all these speak of only three Vedas]. In fact we also find a prohibition regarding the Atharva—‘One should not recite the Atharvaṇas.’ It is in view of all these that people regard the followers of the Atharvaṇa as heretics, beyond the pale of the Vedic Triad.”

[Answer]—This is not right; all good men agree in regarding the Atharvaṇa as a Veda. In this Smṛti itself (11.33) we find the expression ‘śrutīratharvāṅgirasīḥ,’ where the Atharva is spoken of as ‘śruti,’ and ‘śruti’ is the same as ‘Veda.’

Further [whether a certain Veda is called ‘Veda’ or not is of no import]; when certain passages—those prescribing the Agnihotra and other sacrifices, which all people call ‘Veda’—are regarded as authoritative in matters regarding Dharma, they are so accepted, not because they are called by the name of ‘Veda’;—because the name ‘Veda’ is sometimes applied to Itihāsa and the Āyurveda also, when, for instance, it is said that ‘Itihāsa and Purāṇa are the fifth Veda’ (Chandogya Upaniṣad, 7.1.2), [and yet these are not regarded as authorities on Dharma];—but because they are independent of human agency, and help to make known our duties, and because they are free from mistakes; and all these conditions are fulfilled by the Atharva: such acts as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like are prescribed in the Atharva just as they are in the Yajuṣ and the other Vedas. Some people have fallen into the mistake that the Atharva cannot be Veda because it abounds in teachings of acts dealing with malevolent magic (witchcraft). As a matter of fact, malevolent magic, as leading to the death of living beings, is always prohibited.

[It is described, because] it is employed by the priests of kings who are well versed in magical spells; but it is deprecated.

It has been argued above that “the Atharva is not mentioned among Vedas, in such passages as ‘the Sun moves, endowed with the three Vedas.’”—But the passages quoted are merely declamatory (Arthavāda); it is therefore of no consequence whether or not the Atharva is mentioned among them. Or, the passages that speak of ‘three Vedas,’ ‘the triple science,’ and so forth may be taken as referring to the three kinds of mantras; besides the three kinds of mantras found in the Ṛk, Yajuṣ and Sāma Vedas, there is no fourth kind,—the Exhortations, the Invocations, the lowly recited Prayers and the Hymns to Indra, and such other Mantras being all included under these three. In the Atharva Veda also, the mantras mentioned are all of the ‘Ṛk’ class; hence so far as the classification according to the kind of mantra is concerned, it comes under the ‘Ṛgveda.’

As regards the interdict placed upon the study of the Atharva Veda, it indicates a conclusion quite the reverse of that which it has been cited (by the opponent) to prove: A prohibition is possible only of what is otherwise possible [so that the very prohibition proves that the said study was, and should be, prevalent, except under the circumstances referred to in the interdict]. Or, the passage quoted may simply mean that ‘one should not mix up the performance of acts enjoined in the other three Vedas with that of those prescribed in the Atharva Veda; for instance, during the performance of the Vācastoma sacrifices, the reciting of all Ṛk, Sāman and Yajuṣ mantras is enjoined, and the said prohibition precludes the reciting, at this sacrifice, of the mantras occurring in the Atharva Veda.

The above-described Veda—which is a particular kind of literary compilation, not by any human author, which is divided into several ‘Rescensions,’ and known under the name ‘Mantra-Brāhmaṇa’—is the ‘root’—i.e., the authority, the means of knowing—‘of Dharma.’ ‘Root,’ here means cause. The Veda and Smṛti can be a ‘cause’ only in the sense that they serve to make known,—not in that of producing, nor in that helping to stand, which are the two senses in which the ‘root’ is the cause of the Tree.

The term ‘dharma’ we have already explained above; it is that which a man should do, and which is conducive to his welfare, and of a character different from such acts as are amenable to perception and the other ordinary means of knowledge. Land-cultivation, service, &c., also are conducive to man’s welfare; but this fact of their being so beneficial is ascertained by means of positive and negative induction; and as regards the sort of cultivation that brings a good harvest of grains, this is ascertained by direct perception and other ordinary means of knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of sacrifices being conducive to welfare, and the manner in which they are beneficial, through the intervention of the ‘Apūrva,’—all this is not amenable to perception or other ordinary means of knowledge. ‘Welfare’is that which is, in its most general form, spoken of as ‘pleasure,’ consisting of the attaining what is desirable, in the shape of Heaven, landed property and so forth, and also (b) the avoiding of what is generally spoken of as ‘pain,’ which consists of illness, poverty, unhappiness, Hell and so forth. Others regard the attaining of Supreme Bliss only as ‘welfare.’

This Dharma is learnt from such passages in the Brāhmaṇas as contain the ‘liṅ’ and other injunctive expressions. In some cases we learnt it also from mantras; e.g., from such mantras as ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhale,’ ‘offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’ (Vājasaneyi Samhitā, 24. 20). Among these such passages as contain the word ‘Kāma’ (‘desire’) indicate that the act therein enjoined is to be performed for the purpose of obtaining a definite result; e.g., ‘brahmavarcasakāmaḥ,’ (‘one desirous of acquiring Brahmic glory should offer cooked rice to Sūrya’), ‘Vaiśvadevīm sāṅgrahiṇīṃ nirvapet grāmakāmaḥ’ (‘one desirous of acquiring landed property should offer the Śāṅgrahini to the Viśvedevas’); and the actions thus enjoined are not done by one who is not desirous of obtaining the particular results spoken of. There are other acts which are pointed out as compulsory, by means of such words as ‘yāvajjīvam’ (‘throughout one’s life’) and so forth. These are not performed with a view to any results,—there being no results mentioned as following from them. Nor will it he right to assume, in this case also, a definite result in the shape of Heaven, in accordance with the ‘Viśvajit’—principle (laid down in the Pūrva-Mimānsā Sūtra 4.3.15-16); because the presence of such words as ‘throughout life’ and so forth already indicates that these are to be performed without any reference to results, and the omission of these acts simply involves the sin of disobeying the scriptural injunction. So that it is with a view to avoid this sin that the acts thus prescribed are performed. This same holds good regarding prohibitions—such as ‘the Brāhmaṇa should not he killed,’ ‘wine should not be drunk’; the avoiding of the prohibited act is not for the purpose of any reward, but simply for the purpose of avoiding something sinful;

‘Entire,’—whole. That is, there is not a single word, consonant or vowel (of the Veda) that is not conducive to Dharma.

Some people raise the following objection against this:—

“It has been asserted that the Veda consists of injunctions, descriptions, mantras and names, and Dharma is of the nature of what should be done. Now it is only right that the Injunctive passages should be the means of knowing Dharm a; as it is from these that we learn that sacrifice and other acts should he done,—e.g., ‘the Agnihotra should be offered,’ ‘an offering of curds should be made,’ ‘offerings should he made in the morning and in the evening, to Agni and Prajāpati,’ ‘one desirous of attaining Heaven should pour libations into the fire.’ The whole set of these passages points to the particular action of ‘Agnihotra’ as one that should he done; ‘curds’ are the substance to be offered at the same sacrifice, Agni and Prajāpati are the deities to whom the offerings are to be made,—and the ‘desire for heaven’ is the qualifying condition for the performer.

“But in the Veda there are many such passages as—(a) ‘Agni is all the deities, Agni is the divine power of oblations, he invites the Gods and makes offerings to them,’ &c., and again (b) ‘Prajāpati cut out his own fat’ and so forth; and certainly such passages do not lay down anything to be done; all that they do is either to relate some past event or to describe some entirely irrelevant thing. If his own fat was cut out by Prajāpati, let him cut it; what is that to us? Similarly the fact of Agni being all deities does not help in the offerings to Agni; that Agni is the deity to whom the offering should be made having been declared by the word ‘Agni’ itself; if Agni is some other deity, then the mere fact of his being another deity would rule him out as a recipient of that offering. As for inviting, that also is laid down by another passage ‘we invite Agni, O Agni!’ Ac. And lastly, as for the mention of Agni inviting and making offerings to the Gods, this is absolutely meaningless.

“As regards mantras again, there are some,—e.g., (a) ‘There was neither death nor immortality, &.,’ (Ṛgveda, 10.129.2), (b) ‘Sudeva might fall to-day never to return, &c.,’ (Ṛgveda, 10.95.14) and so forth—which either describe some past event or contain a wailing; and what Dharma could such mantras expound? At that time there was neither death, nor immortality, nor life—certainly no living being having been born before creation, there, was no life or death of any one; during the universal dissolution also, there may come about the death of all things, or it may not come about,—it does not teach us anything as to anything to be done. Similarly, Sudeva, a certain highly meritorious godlike man, might to-day fall, i.e.,—might throw himself into a pit—never to return—i.e., after which fall he cannot come back to life;—this is how Purūravas, separated from Urvaśī, bewailed.

Similarly as regards Names,—e.g, as ‘one should sacrifice with the Udbhid,’ ‘one should sacrifice with the Balabhid,’ &c., &c.,—they do not enjoin any act or substance; the enjoining of the action being done by the verb (‘should sacrifice’), and the word ‘Balabhid’ and ‘Udbhid, &c., not being expressive of any substance; specially as the substance for the sacrifice iu question in the form of Soma—is got at from its archetype by virtue of the direct injunction. [that ‘the ectypal sacrifices are to be performed in the manner of their archetypes,’ and the archetype of the Udbhid sacrifice is the Jyotiṣṭoma at which soma-juice is the substance offered]; and hence there is no necessity for twisting the words ‘udbhid,’ &c., to yield the name of some sacrificial material [such as tree or spade, which may be indicated by the etymology of the word ‘udbhid,’ which means ‘that which shoots out’ or ‘that with which digging is done’]. Thus it is clear that no dharma is indicated by the names. How then can it be said that ‘the entire Veda is the root of dharma?’”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is just in view of these doubts that the Author has added the epithet ‘entire’; by which it is meant that all these passages that have been cited by the objector help in providing knowledge of Dharma.

(A) First, as regards Arthavādas, these are not meant to be construed apart from the injunctive passages; it is only if they were so construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of dharma. As a matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also expressed by the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in question is this—‘it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy, Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.’ That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the fact that whenever we have Arthavādas, they always accompany injunctive passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even without the accompanying Arthavāda,—e.g., in the case of the injunction ‘one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,’ we comprehend the injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence only. The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the analogy of human speeches) that ‘since in one case the injunction has no Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also’;—the Arthavādas are there, we have to construe them; and what we have shown above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for instance, at the time that the master is paying -wages to his servants, some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—‘This Devadatta is a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is always careful about it.’ Thus we find that Arthavādas also serve the purpose of enjoining, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the injunction are got at from the Arthavāda only; for instance, when the injunction says, ‘wet pebbles are to be put in,’ this injunction stands in need of some wetting substance, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it is followed by the Arthavāda ‘Butter is glory,’ this praise of Butter leads us to conclude that Butter is the welting substance to be used. Similarly the Arthavāda ‘those who have recourse to these Rātris become respected’serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers of the Rātri-satra sacrifice. From all this it is clear that Arthavādas also are ‘the root of Dharma.’

(B) Next as regards Mantras, some of them are directly injunctive; e.g., the Mantra ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate’ (‘offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’);—in connection with the Āghāra-offering, the deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra ‘Ita Indra urdhvo’ dhvaraḥ, etc.’ In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely injunctive passage; the particular mantra to be used however is directly enjoined as being the one that begins with ‘Ita Indra’; hence it is from the words of this mantra that we learn the name of the requisite Deity. There are thousand, of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the words of the mantra. Then, there are certain mantras that are only descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of making known Dharma by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what is to be done); and thus these also become ‘root of Dharma’ by indicating what should be done.

(C) Thirdly, as regards the Names, they are never found apart from verbs, and hence, like verbs, they have their character of being the ‘root of Dharma’ well established, Then again, as a matter of fact, the accessory details of sacrifices are generally enjoined through these names (of sacrifices); e.g., (a) ‘In the Śarat season one should perform the sacrifice,’ (b) ‘one desirous of Kingdom of Heaven should perform the Vajapeya’ [in the former we have the injunction of the time of performance, and in the latter, of the Result, and both are mentioned along with the name of the sacrifice ‘Vājapeya’].

Thus it is proved that the ‘entire Veda’ is the ‘root of Dharma.’

Other people have taken the word ‘entire’ as added with a view to the possible objection that no knowledge of Dharma is provided by the Vedic passages laying down the Shu??a (Śyena?) and such other objectionable acts, or by the Prohibitions—such as ‘one should not eat garlic.’

The objection anticipated by these people is as follows:—

“The Śyena and other sacrifices of the kind are in the form of malevolent spells; and partaking of the character of murder, they are distinctly of the nature of ‘Himsā’ (Injury); and since all form of injury is cruel, and all evil spells have been prohibited, these sacrifices must be ‘Adharma,’ the opposite of ‘Dharma’ (sinful). [And since the Veda lays down such sacrifices] the ‘entir’ Veda cannot be the ‘root of Dharma.’ Por ‘Dharma’ has been explained as ‘what should be done,’ and certainly the killing of the Brāhmaṇa is not ‘what should be done.’ How then can the passages laying down such acts be the ‘root of Dharma’? Further, even the animal-sacrifices—Agniṣomīya and the rest,—involve the killing of animals, and as such are very far removed from the character of ‘Dharma.’ That killing is sinful is admitted by all enquiries. To this end it has been said ‘where the killing of living beings is Dharma, what can be Adharma?’”

Now how is this objection anticipated? It is anticipated (say these other people) by the adding of the epithet ‘entire.’ There is no other use for this epithet.

It might be asked why no reason has been given [by Manu, why and how the entire Veda is the root of Dharma]; but our answer is that this is a work in the form of Precept, and as such states well-established conclusions; and those persons who seek after the ‘why’ and ‘wherefore’ of these conclusions are instructed by Pūrvamīmāmsā.’We have already said that this work is addressed to persons who are prepared to learn tilings from Precept alone.

The author of the Vivaraṇa however puts forward a few arguments also:—It has been argued by the opponent that the Śyena and other such sacrifices, being prohibited, must be ‘adharma’ sinful. This is quite true. But even though these acts are prohibited, yet in certain cases it so happens that some people may have their animosity too strong to allow of their submitting to the general prohibition of killing,—in such other passages has ‘no living beings should be killed,’—and such persons derive from the Śyena, the pleasure of killing their enemy; and to that small extent, as conducive to this pleasure, the Śyena may be regarded as ‘dharma’; so that the passage prescribing the Śyena does not cease to be the ‘source of Dharma.’ Secondly, as for prohibitions, it is only a person who is moved by passion to do the killing that is guided by the prohibition; and the acting up to the prohibition only consists in not doing what is prohibited [and this desisting from the prohibited act is meritorious, Dharma ] Thirdly, the prohibition of killing does not apply to the killing that is done in course of the and other such offerings; and what is prohibited by the general prohibition of killing is only that killing in ordinary practice which is done through malice. That killing, on the other hand, which is distinctly enjoined and has scriptural sanction, can never form the subject of prohibition; specially as the prohibition has its use in connection with ordinary killing. Nor is it possible to deduce the sinfulness of the scriptural killing, on the analogy of ordinary killing, from the general proposition that ‘all killing is sinful.’ Because what makes the killing sinful is not merely its character of ‘killing,’ but also the fact of its being prohibited; and we have already pointed out that the prohibition does not apply to the scriptural killing.

Some people explain the word ‘mūla,’ ‘root’ to mean cause;—the meaning being that ‘of Dharma Veda is the root,—the basis, the cause—either directly or indirectly.’ It is the ‘direct cause of Dharma’ in such passages as ‘one should study the Veda,’ ‘one should get up the Ṛgveda, etc.’; and it is the ‘indirect cause’ when it points out the detailed form of the Agnihotra and such other acts.

‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidān’—‘Conscientious Recollection of persons versed in the Veda’;—‘Smṛti,’ ‘Recollection’ is the idea that one has of what has been apprehended before.—The pronoun. ‘tat’ (in the compound ‘tadvidām’) stands for the Veda; and those who know the Veda are called ‘Vedavidaḥ,’ ‘versed in the Veda.’ The meaning thus is that another ‘authority’ (means of knowing) for Dharma. consists in the idea, ‘this should be done, that should not be done,’ entertained by people learned in the Veda.

“It has been held that Recollection is not a reliable means of knowledge; and the reason for this that is given is that Recollection only serves to recall what has been apprehended by other means of knowledge, and does not lead to the apprehension of anything new.”

This is true; for the persons to whom the recollection belongs, it is the original means of knowledge—Trustworthy Assertion or Perception, etc.—that constitutes the reliable source of knowledge; and one’s own Recollection is not a reliable source of knowledge for himself. But for us (ordinary mortals), it is the Recollection of Manu and such other persons that forms a reliable source of knowledge; we have no other means, except the said Recollection, for knowing that the Aṣṭakā and such other acts should be done. That the Recollection of Manu, etc., was actually in a certain form, we learn from the assertions made by themselves that have come down to us through a long line of tradition. And from this Recollection we come to the conclusion that the subject-matter of them was actually apprehended by Manu, etc., by the ordinary means of knowledge; and this is indicated by the fact of the Recollection being there, and no.Recollection being possible without previous apprehension.

“It is quite possible that Manu and others have compiled their ‘Recollections’ from imagination, without having actually apprehended what they speak of; in the same manner as certain poets compose a story after having created the whole plot from imagination.”

The answer to this is as follows:—This might be so, if the works under consideration did not contain teachings regarding what ‘should he done.’ Teachings regarding what should he done are meant to lead to the performance of those acts; and certainly no ìational person can ever perform what is taught on an imaginary basis.

“But people might he led to perform it by mistake.”

One man might fall into such a mistake; that the entire world has fallen into a mistake, and this mistake has persisted ever since the beginning of creation,—this would certainly be a most extraordinary presumption. And when it is quite possible that the assertions of Manu, etc., are based upon the Veda, there is no room for the assumption that in following them.people have fallen into a mistake. We also do not admit that Manu and others directly perceived the Dharmas; because ‘Perception’ is that cognition which follows when the sense-organs are in contact with the objects cognised; and certainly no such contact with the sense-organs is possible for Dharma, for the simple reason that it is what should be done, and what should be done is not an accomplished entity, and it is only an accomplished entity that comes into contact with anything. It is true that (though perception does not apprehend non-existent things) Inference and the other means of cognition do bring about the apprehension of things not existent at the time,—e.g., when people see a line of ants moving along with their eggs, they infer the coming rain; but even these latter means of cognition do not provide any knowledge of what should be done.

All this leads, us to conclude that, in as much as the Recollection pertains to what should be done, it must have a source that is similar to itself; and such source can be the Veda only. The Veda that we thus infer (to be the source of the Recollections) must have been directly perceived by Manu and others and the Vedic texts in which the Dharmas laid down in the Smṛtis were originally prescribed (and which we do not find in the Vedas now) must have been contained in such Rescensions as have been lost.

On this point, the following alternative views suggest themselves as possible:—

(a) The Rescensions may be one or several; and it is inferred that from among these some contain the injunction of the Aṣṭakā and some that of others. (b) Or, it may be that all the Rescensions are available even at the present day; but the details of the Dharmas are scattered about among them; so that while one Rescension contains the originative injunction of the Aṣṭakā, another contains the injunction of the substance to be used at it, a third enjoins the Deity, and yet another lays down the Mantra; and what Manu and other compilers have done is to bring together in one place all these scattered details, with a view to make them more easily understood. (c) Or, that the Dharmas in question have their origin only in the indications of Mantras and Arthavādas. (d) Or, these Dharmas, having been performed by men from time immemorial, and having been handed down by an unbroken line of tradition, must be regarded to be as eternal as the Veda itself. (e) Or, the action of Manu and others also, like that of ourselves, must have been based upon the authority of some other source, and as such their assertions must be based upon such Vedic texts as have always been assumed by inference (and never actually perceived by any one in any Veda).

These and such other alternative views have been fully considered by the author of the Vivaraṇa; and the definite conclusion arrived at is as follows:—The performance of the Aṣṭakā and such other acts laid down in the Smṛtis must be regarded as sanctioned by the Veda; because they are found to be connected with purely Vedic injunctions, on perceiving which latter the performers undertake the performance. The said connexion we have already shown above;—in some cases what is prescribed in the Veda is subservient to what is laid down in the Smṛti, and sometimes it is the contrary; sometimes the Veda contains the originative Injunction of the act in question, sometimes its qualifying conditions, and sometimes it lays out a mere Arthavāda, an eulogistic description. In this manner all those acts that are prescribed in the Smṛtis are connected with Vedic injunctions.

We have discussed this matter fully in the as follows:—

‘Between what is laid down in the Smṛti and what is prescribed in the Veda, there is a close connection. There is not much difference between the two, either as to the character of their performers or to the nature of the acts themselves. Those same persons who perform the acts prescribed in the Veda,—if they also do what is mentioned in the Smṛtis, it follows that these latter have their source in the Veda. The principal criterion of the authoritative character of a certain text is its acceptance by persons learned in the Veda; and the fact of the performing agents being the same in both cases has been put forward (in the Pūrvamīmānsā Sūtra 1.3.2) as a ground for inferring the existence of Vedic texts in corroboration of the Smṛtis.’

For going any further than this and for coming to particulars (as to where these corroborative Vedic texts are to be found etc., etc.), there is no reasonable ground; nor is there any necessity (it being sufficient for our present purpose that all that is contained in the Smṛti has its source in the Veda).

It is quite possible that certain rescensional texts of the Veda may have been lost. Even at the present day we find several such texts as are read by very few students. And some people have held that what the authors of the Smṛtis have done is to bring together the purely injunctive passages, shorn of their accompanying arthavādas, contained in such rescensional texts as were found by them to be likely to be lost (for want of learners). Āpastamba (1.4.10) for instance, says—‘the injunctions are those laid down in the Brāhmaṇas,—their exact words have been lost—but they can be inferred from the details of the actual performance.’

But this theory involves many impossible and unheard of assumptions, such as the neglect of, and the total disappearance of all the learners of, just that Vedic text which was the most useful, being that in which were declared all those Dharmas pertaining to castes and life-stages that are set forth in the Smṛtis and the Gṛhyasūtras.

The other view however is more reasonable,—that learned persons, who have formed definite conclusions of their own on all important matters, should compile a practical compendium of all such injunctions as are scattered over (in various sections of the Veda), beset with arthavādas, and difficult to determine what is conducive to the good of man and what is meant only to complete the sacrificial performance.

But under this hypothesis also, there is this difficulty, that in cases where the Smṛti rule runs counter to a Vedic rule, hoth would have to be regarded as equally directly Vedic, and as such representing optional alternatives; so that the Smṛti could not be set aside by the Veda. And this certainly cannot be accepted by the learned. In fact the authors of the Smṛtis themselves admit that the basis of the Smṛti in the Veda is only inferred, and that the former is always set aside in favour of the latter. For instance, Gautama says (3.35)—‘There is only one life-stage, say the revered Teachers; since the householder’s life is the only one that is directly enjoined.’ If Manu and the other writers (who speak of four life-stages) had actually found the Vedic texts (upon which they based their division of the four stages),—then what would be the sense of the expression that ‘the house-holder’s life is the only one that is directly enjoined (by the Veda)’? For according to the hypothesis under discussion all the four stages would be equally directly enjoined. [Nor is the above-quoted Sūtra the statement of a foreign opinion.] In fact it embodies Gautama’s own opinion, which he has put forward as the opinion of ‘revered teachers.’ This is clear from the fact that he has begun the section with the statement ‘Now as regards the various views that h ave been held regarding the life-stages’ (3.1), and he has concluded with the Sūtra (3.35) quoted above.

The authoritative character of Mantras and Arthavādas (as means of knowing Dharma) is not inconsistent. Though it is true that Arthavādas only serve to eulogise what has been enjoined by an Injunctive sentence, and they do not exercise the function of enjoining anything,—yet there are instances in which even the connection of the Arthavāda with an Injunctive sentence is not possible unless the former has afforded some; idea of an injunction in regard to something expressed by its words. For instance the Arthavāda passage ‘Theft of gold, drinking of wine, etc., etc.’ (Upaniṣad, 5.10.9) cannot be understood as pertaining to the Injunction of the ‘Science of the Five Fires,’ until it is known that the ‘theft of gold’ and the rest are prohibited; the sense of the whole being that ‘he who studies this science of the Five Fires does not fall, even though he commits the theft of gold, etc., or associates with persons who have committed them—otherwise he does fall’?

“Who has laid down the law that in the said passage the Injunction is conveyed, not directly by the Arthavāda itself, but by the fact of its being connected with another Injunctive passage? As a matter of fact, the passage itself contains an independent finite verb of its own—‘these four fall’ [and this would serve as the direct prohibition). It might be argued that the verb does not contain the Injunctive affix: But the passage ‘they obtain a standing who per form the Rātrisatra’ also contains no verb ending with the Injunctive affix. It might he argued that—‘in the case of the Rātrisatra, the need for a qualifying condition being distinctly felt, the two sentences (they obtain a standing and they perform the Rātrisatra) come to be taken as syntactically connected, and the necessary injunction is got at by assuming the verb to contain the Let ending.’—But the same may be said in regard to the passage in question also. In fact, there are several injunctions of substances and deities that are obtained from Arthavādas. In a case where the Arthavāda is distinctly subservient to an Injunctive passage,—since this latter injunction would be in need of the mention of a substance or a deity (for the act enjoined) [that may be found mentioned in the corresponding Arthavāda], it may not be improper to take the Arthavāda as simply serving to supply the needs of the corresponding Injunction (and not as enjoining anything independently by itself). In the present instance however (of the Arthavāda passage ‘the theft of gold, etc., etc.’), if we are to seek for an injunction that has no connection with the Arthavāda (and this injunction were sought to be derived from the words of the Arthavāda itself), then this would give rise to a syntactical split; hence it cannot be taken as subservient to the main subject-matter of the context (i.e., the science of the Five Fires); and in the absence of such subserviency, the Arthavāda could not provide any idea of the Prohibition. This is the point on which the case of the Arthavāda in question is not analogous to that of the sentences—‘One should put in wet pebbles’ and ‘Butter is glory’ [where the connection between the two is quite clear].”

This is not right; for even though the Arthavāda has a distinct meaning of its own, yet since its connection with the Injunction is based upon syntactical connection, there can be no room for any objection as regards syntactical split.

As regards the Mantras, they are, by their very nature, indicative of the form of action; and since the action cannot be got at from any other sources, we are led to assume an act indicated by the Mantra, specially with a view to justify its indicative character. And since in connection with the Aṣṭakā, it is not possible to have an indication of such origination and qualifying condition as are absolutely nonexistent, wo take the Mantras as suggestive of the action, its qualifying condition and its very origination. It is in this way that Injunctions are accepted as supplied by the words of a Mantra. As for instance, the injunction of the Deity of the Āghāra offering (is supplied by the Mantra ‘Ita Indra urdhva, etc., etc.’)

It is admitted on all hands that Dharma has four ‘feet’; now, it is only a small portion of this vast fabric of Dharma that has been directly prescribed in the Veda; and the source of the knowledge of all the remaining factors also must be similar in character to the Veda, for the simple reason that the factors of Dharma can only be known through some sort of an injunction. So that (directly or indirectly) the connection (of Dharma) with Veda is inevitable.

Now (as regards the work of Manu) what happened was that Manu got together pupils who had studied several Vedic texts, as also other Vedic scholars, and having heard from them the several texts, he compiled his work; and he has therefore clearly stated that Vedic texts are the source of what he has written, and thereby established the trustworthy character of his work. Others that came after him performed the several duties, relying upon Mann’s own words, and did not try to trace his words to their source (in the Veda). All this is what we infer (from the circumstances of the case).

Thus even in cases where a Smṛti rule may run counter to what is found to he laid down in the Veda, both must he equally ‘Vedic’ [since the Smṛti also is based upon Vedic texts actually found by the writer]; and yet it is quite reasonable that the former should he discarded in favour of the latter; for when all that we need for the performance of a certain act is found by us in the Vedic text itself, there is no desire on our part to seek for, and infer the existence of, any other Vedic texts (in support of anything that may he found in the Smṛtis). Just as in the case of the Sāmidhenī verses, though the two numbers, seventeen and fifteen, are both equally mentioned in available Vedic texts, yet when we have once found that the number fifteen is applicable to the action in hand, we have no desire to have recourse to the number seventeen, even though this also is directly mentioned in the Veda. Then again, it is only natural that what is directly expressed by the words of a text should set aside what is only indirectly indicated by the requirements of what has been directly expressed, this indicated factor being admittedly remoter and hence weaker than the directly expressed one. But this does not mean that what is indirectly indicated has no force at all. In fact such a case would be analogous to the case where, even though the employment of the details of the archetypal sacrifice at the ectypal one is admissible by the general injunction (that ‘the ectype should be performed in the manner of its archetype’), yet when any such archetypal details are found to be incompatible with those that may be found to be expressly prescribed specifically in connection with ectype, the former are unhesitatingly discarded. [Similarly when the indicated factor is incompatible with the expressed one, it is discarded.]

Under the view [previously put forward as (d)] that the Smṛtis are based upon an unbroken Unit of performers, the position of the Smṛtis would be no better than that of mere current tradition, which does not, at any stage (however longstanding it may have become), attain reliability (based upon direct Vedic support).

The other view [put forward as (e)] also, according to which Vedic texts in support of what they did and wrote were always inferred by Manu and others,—does not differ very much from the view that they are based upon tradition. We have proceeded to examine the source of the Smṛti or Recollection of Manu and others; and if they also only inferred the Vedic texts, just as we are doing now, then, like ourselves, they also would not be recollectors (of Vedic texts). Nor is it possible to infer a thing that has never been directly perceived by any one; as no affirmation (and hence no premiss) could be possible with regard to such a thing. As regards the inference (that has been cited by Śabara), of the motion (of the Sun) and such other things, a general connection (between motion and change of location) is always perceived; or such motion may be deduced from Presumption based on apparent inconsistency. Such basis of presumption however is not available in the case in question.

From all this it follows that in the matter of Dharma, there is certainly some sort of connection between Manu and others and the Veda; but the exact character of this connection we are unable to ascertain. In fact, when persons learned in the Veda have the firm conviction that a certain act should he done, it is only right to assume that this conviction is based on the Veda, and not upon a misconception; it is only thus that wo would be assuming a source of knowledge in keeping with the character of the knowledge itself. And this assumption rests upon the possibility of such source being found in Vedic texts, in the form of mantras and arthavādas scattered far and wide by reason of lapses (of time, etc.). In some cases we also find direct Vedic Injunctions themselves, as the source (of what is found in the Smṛti); e.g., the injunction that ‘one should not converse with a woman in her courses,’ which is found in the Veda in connection with Upanayana and Study (supplies the basis for the general prohibition of such conversation, contained in the Smṛtis).

What we have stated here is only a small portion of this vast subject; more of this should be learnt from the Smṛtiviveka [as follows]:—

‘The view that some Vedic texts have become lost is not accepted by me; as this view necessitates several unwarrantable assumptions. It is far more reasonable to accept the view that the Smṛtis have brought together the injunctions of actions scattered about here and there. In fact even at the present day we find that a person who is surrounded by several Vedic scholars and teachers is capable of composing works after having heard from those persons the several Vedic texts. It is only natural that persons who have actually seen the writer at the time, basing his statements upon direct Vedic texts should accept them as trustworthy; and we also come to have due confidence in them as far as possible. As a matter of fact, the details of performance are indicated by Mantras; and there is indication of them also by Names; there can be no performance, unless there is some sort of indication regarding the nature of the action and the qualifying conditions. For instance, the connection of a particular deity with the Āghāra -offering is indicated by the words of a Mantra; and the reason for this lies in the indicative character of Mantras, which character becomes possible only if the Deity is taken to be indicated by them. When one action enters into the constitution of another well-accomplished one, it does not interfere with the form of this latter [so that when a Deity indicated by the Mantra is introduced into an action enjoined by a distinct Injunctive passage, it does not interfere with the nature of this action]. For instance, in connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice, we find that the desirable result proceeding from it is got at from sources other than its originative Injunction. Thus it is quite reasonable to assume details in connection even with a well-established injunction, specially when the needs of the Injunction are not supplied even by Mantras and Arthavādas.

‘[An objection is raised]—

“The revered Pāṇini has laid down that Injunction is expressed only by the Injunctive and other cognate affixes. So that Mantras and Arthavādas, describing as they do only accomplished entities, can never express an injunction. If then, from theArthavāda, which is not directly injunctive, some sort of Injunction were deduced by means of an indirect interpretation put upon the Arthavāda,—how could any reliance be placed upon such an Injunction? In fact such an interpretation would lead to a syntactical split; specially as (in such arthavādas as they obtain a standing who perform the Rātrisatra) the Rātris tra offerings do not necessarily stand in need of the ‘standing.’ In fact it is only a detail of the direct Injunction (and not that of the vāda) which can be accepted as indicated by supplementary sentences. As regards the prohibition of Theft, etc. (which has been sought to be deduced from the Arthavāda passage ‘the theft of gold, etc., etc.’), this will certainly be amenable to a direct Injunction; and as in the event of the arthavāda being made to yield the necessary injunction, syntactical split would be inevitable. Nor is there any analogy between the Vācastoma and the Aṣṭakā; for in the sacrifice all the details are performed in accordance with injunctions deduced from mantras; while in the case of the Aṣṭakā there are no grounds for regarding the mantra as indicative of any details of performance. Further, no indicative power of the mantra can prompt one to any course of action, unless there is some sort of a general connection; and in the case in question there is no such connection either of context or of any such factor.”

‘To the above objection the following reply is given by those who hold the view that also are the source of Dharma:—(a) In the case of the passage “they obtain a standing, etc.,” even though there is no directly injunctive agency in the form of the Injunctive affix and the rest, yet the idea of injunction is held to be supplied by the conjugational affix let (in the verb “upayanti,” “offer”). (b) Similarly in the case of the verb “patanti” “they fall” (occurring in the passage “Theft of gold, etc.”), or in that of the verb “use corrupt words” (occurring in another arthavāda passage), (c) In connection with the Vācastoma, we have the distinct injunction beginning with the expression ‘sarvadāśa ṭayīḥ anubrūyāt,’—this name “dāśatayī” being applied to the ten Ṛk. verses selected each out of the ten maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda. (d) As regards the general connection (of the mantra) with the action, this is said to be brought about by the force of the Name,—the Gṛhyamantras being named after the acts (with which they are connected). (e) As regards the arthavāda passage “Theft of gold, etc., etc.,” that this is subservient to the Science of the Five Fires is indicated by the fact that it contains a deprecation of the said Theft, etc.; and this cannot be possible except when the Prohibition (of the Theft, etc.) is also implied. That the passage is subservient to the Science of Five Fires is indicated by the trend of the whole context; and the idea that the Theft, etc., should not be done serves to emphasise the said subserviency; and there is no incompatibility between these two [the idea of subserviency and that the acts should not be done ]. Lastly, as regards the view that the Vedic texts in corroboration of the Smṛti rules h ave always been inferred (and never actually found by any one in the Veda),—it stands on the same footing as the notion of long-standing tradition; both would be of the nature of the “blind following the blind”; and we do not perceive any difference between these two views.’

From all this it follows that when Gautama speaks of the Householder’s Life being ‘directly enjoined’ (by the Veda), what he means is that the words of the Veda enjoin it directly, without the intervention of any other process; that which is cognised immediately after the hearing of the words is said to be ‘directly known’; while after something has been cognised, if the reflection over the capacities of that thing leads to the cognition of another thing, this latter is not said to be ‘directly perceived.’ Thus everything becomes duly established.

[Having discussed the idea expressed by the expression ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām,’ the Author next proceeds to explain the words themselves]—‘Smṛtiśīle tadvidām’ ‘the conscientious re-collection of those versed in the Veda,’—The compound ‘smṛtiśīle’ stands for ‘Smṛti and śīla.’—‘Śīla’ has been explained as the abandoning of love and hate; and this is a ‘root of a Dharma,’—not like the Veda and Smṛti, which are ‘root of Dharma’ in the sense of being the source of knowledge of Dharma,—but in the sense that it is a means of accomplishing Dharma; for by abandoning love and hate one acquires merit (Dharma).

Question:—“Dharma has been described as what leads to welfare; and certainly the abandoning of love and hate is itself of that character (of Dharma); so that there being no difference between the two (i .e., between Dharma and the abandoning of love and hate), how can it be said that the said abandoning accomplishes Dharma?”

Answer:—We have already pointed out that the authors of Smṛtis use the term ‘dharma s,’ ometimes in the sense of acts which form the subjects of Injunctions and Prohibitions (i.e., meritorious and unmeritorious deeds), and also sometimes in the sense of that peculiar thing (force, i.e., merit) which proceeds from the performance of acts and continues to exist until it has brought its reward (to the doer). That there is such a thing as this latter can be believed only on the authority of the scriptures. If the sacrificial performance were to disappear without bringing about any such force, then, bow could its results appear at some remote period of time? It is this peculiar something that is meant by the term ‘dharma’ here [when it is said that ‘the abandoning of love and hate accomplishes Dharma.’] And certainly the said ‘Śīla’ is the ‘root’ of ‘Dharma’ in this sense; so that there is nothing incongruous in this. The use of the word ‘Dharma’ in this sense is common; e.g., in the verse—‘Dharma is the only friend that accompanies one even on death’ (Manu, 8.17). Since the act disappears immediately after it has been done, bow could it continue to exist at any other time (as mentioned in this verse)?

Some people bring forward the following objection:—

“As a matter of fact, everything that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis is the source of Dharma; and since ‘Śīla’ also is included among the acts thus enjoined, there is no point in mentioning it separately. In fact Manu himself is going to enjoin it in the following verse—‘Day and night one should take care to subdue the senses’ (7.41),—and again—‘When the mind has been subdued, the two groups of five become subdued.’ And it is this ‘subjugation of the mind’ which constitutes the ‘abandoning of love and hate,’ as we shall explain later on.”

Some writers answer this by saying that ‘Śīla’ has been separately mentioned with a view to indicate its superior importance; it is something that comes useful in the performance of all acts; and is important also by itself; being just like the Agnihotra and such other acts; and further, it is a ‘Dharma’ for all castes and conditions. It is for these reasons that it has been specifically mentioned in the present verse, which sets forth the most general conception of Dharma.

Our explanation however is as follows:—‘Śīla’ stands for Samādhi, ‘composure of the mind;’ the root ‘Śīl’ signifies ‘composing,’ and ‘composure’ is a property of the mind; so that ‘Śīla’ here stands for the withdrawing of the mind from other things and concentrating it upon what is enjoined in the scriptures.

The copulative compound (‘Smṛtiśīle’) connotes interdependence; hence what is meant to be the ‘source of Dharma’ is ‘Smṛti’ (Recollection) and ‘śīla’ (composed mind, Conscience) as interdependent; and ‘śīla’ does not stand for being the means of accomplishing Dharma (as explained by some people, above). The sense therefore comes to be that what is the ‘source of Dharma’ is Conscientious Recollection, and not mere Recollection. Hence, even though some persons may be ‘versed in the Veda,’ yet any recollection that they may have at a time when they are not duly attentive to the subject cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge of Dharma; and this for the simple reason that unless people have fixed their attention upon what is prescribed in the scriptures, they are liable to fall into error.

As regards the particle ‘ca’ found in the verse, this ‘should be construed after the term ‘tadvidām,’ ‘of people versed in the Veda’; and it is due to the exigencies of metre that it has been placed before that term. This particle has a copulative force; and since nothing that has gone before can be copulated, it serves to bring in here the epithet ‘sādhūnām’ (good, righteous) that comes next. So that there are three qualifications intended here: the ‘Recollection’ that is authoritative is of such persons as (1) are learned, having learnt the soiences from a qualified teacher (), (2) are attentive to what is prescribed in the scriptures (śīla) and (3) are in the habit of acting up to the injunctions of the scriptures (sādhu, good, righteous). It has been declared that all these qualifications existed in Manu and other writers (of Smṛtis). If it were not so, then it would never have been possible for their words to have been accepted by the wise.

“If this is what is meant, it should be stated dearly, in the form ‘the words of Manu and others, are the sources of Dharma’; what is the use of setting forth the characteristics (of the writers)?”

True; but there might be persons who may not agree to the words of Manu and others being authoritative; and it is with reference to such persons that the text has set forth the well-established grounds for regarding them as trustworthy. Even, at the present day, a man who is possessed of the qualifications mentioned in the text, has his words accepted with the same amount of trust and confidence as the words of Manu and others; as we find in cases where learned men pronounce their opinion upon the precise character of the expiatory rite to be performed by one who has committed a certain sin. In fact a person possessed of the said qualifications has ever been recognised as constituting the ‘pariṣad’ ‘court,’ by himself alone: ‘The Brāhmaṇa should act up to that Dharma which even a single person learned in the Vedas should declare to be Dharma’—says Manu (12.113). For these reasons, there can be no reasonable ground for enumerating the names of ‘Recollectors,’ as ‘Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Aṅgiras’ and so forth. For we find that many such persons as Paiṭhīnasi, Baudhāyana, Pracetas and the rest are recognised by the wise and learned as reliable ‘Recollectors,’ and yet these names are not found in any of the lists (supplied by various Smṛtis).

What thus the words ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām’ mean is that ‘when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said qualifications, and they also accept a certain work as really by that person,—the word of such a person (and of the work composed by him), even though proceeding from a human source, should be recognised as an authoritative source of the knowledge of Dharma. So that even at the present day if there were a person possessed of the said qualifications, and he were to compose a work by reason of just those qualifications, then for later generations they would be accepted to be just as authoritative as the words of Manu and others. People of the present generation—who would be contemporaries of the said writer—would not derive their knowledge of Dharma from the words of such a writer, because the sources of information available to him would be all available to them also. Hence it is that until a teacher of the present day clearly indicates the source from which he has derived a certain information, learned people do not accept his word as reliable. When however he has pointed out his source and his work has been accepted as authoritative, then at some future time if the case of his work be found to be analogous to that of the Smṛti rules regarding Aṣṭakā and other acts (whose basis in the Veda we of the present day cannot find), it would be only right to infer its authoritative character from the fact of its being accepted by the wise and the learned (which fact could not be explained except on the basis of its being duly authoritative).

‘Ācārascaiva sādhūnām’ ‘The practice of Good Men’;—the particle ‘ca’ connects the epithet ‘vedavidām’ (of persons versed in the Veda) with this phrase also. These two qualifications (‘goodness’ and ‘Vedic learning’) indicate the ‘Śiṣṭa,’ ‘the cultured man.’ The ‘practice of cultured men’ also is ‘source of Dharma.’—‘Practice’ means conduct, behaviour. When, in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti statements, but cultured men are found to regard it as ‘Dharma’ and do it,—then that act also should be accepted as ‘enjoined by the Veda,’ just like the act prescribed in the Smṛti. To this category belong such acts as the following—(a) the tying of the bracelet and such other auspicious rites performed during marriage, etc., (b) the worshipping of famous trees, Yakṣas, road-crossings and such things, varying in various countries, done by the girl on her day of marriage, (c) the number of hair-locks kept on the head, varying with different countries; (d) the exact manner of attending on guests, teachers and other respectable persons, consisting in the addressing of sweet and agreeable words, saluting, rising to receive and so forth; for instance, it is customary with some people to recite the Pṛṣṇi-sūkta with grass in hand, when banding over the horse consecrated for the Aśvamedha sacrifice. It is such customs that are meant by ‘Practice’ here. It is not possible to collect in any compilation all such practices, there being endless forms of them, varying with the diversities in the nature of men, caused by such variable circumstances as the calm or disturbed condition of their mind and so forth. The same act that may have been found, on several, occasions, to be pleasing (to one person), may, on another occasion, turn out to be unpleasant (to another person). For instance, a house-holder may be in the habit of being in constant attendance upon his guests;—this may be quite pleasing to one guest, who may be pleased at finding the man attending upon him like a servant; but the same close attendance becomes unpleasant to another guest, who may feel—‘the feeling of restraint caused by this man’s constant presence is so galling that I do not find an opportunity to sit at ease.’ Hence, in corroboration of such ‘Practices’ it is not possible for us to assume Vedic texts, corroborating them either collectively or individually. The Aṣṭakā and such other acts, on the other band, have a fixed form; and hence we have Smṛti rules regarding their performance. This is what constitutes the difference between ‘Recollection’ and ‘Practice’ (Smṛti and Ācāra).

‘Ātmanastuṣṭireva ca’,—‘Self-satisfaction also’—‘is source of Dharma’ is to be construed here also. This ‘self-satisfaction’ also is meant to be of those only who are ‘learned in the Veda and Good’ (‘Vedavidām sādhūnām’). The fact of this ‘Self-satisfaction’ being ‘source of Dharma’ has been held to be based upon the trustworthy character (of the people concerned). When such persons as are possessed of the stated qualifications (of being good and learned) have their mind satisfied with a certain act, and they do not feel any aversion towards it, that act is ‘Dharma.’

“But it may happen that a man’s mind is satisfied with a prohibited (sinful) act; and this would have to be regarded as Dharma. Again, a man may have hesitation (and doubt) regarding what is enjoined in the Veda; and this latter would h ave to be regarded as n ot‘ Dharma.’”

(a) As a matter of fact, the ‘self-satisfaction’ of the high-souled and extremely good men endowed with the said qualifications, is possessed of such tremendous force that, under its influence ‘Dharma’ may become ‘Adharma’ and ‘Adharma’ become ‘Dharma’; but this cannot be so in the case of men tainted with love and hate, etc. Whatever goes into a salt-mine, becomes transformed into salt; similarly everything is rendered pure by the unpremeditated ‘self-satisfaction’ of persons learned in the Veda. [The mere fact of an act being prohibited does dot make it Adharma ] for though the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi vessel’ has been prohibited at the Atirātra sacrifice, yet when the holding comes to be done, in accordance With a Vedic injunction, it is not sinful. But in the present case, there is no question of option, as there is in the case of the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi’. What happens in this case is that the Prohibitions take effect in regard to all cases except the one that falls within tho purview of the said ‘self-satisfaction.’

(b) Or (the second answer to the objection is that), people like those mentioned in the verse can never feel any self-satisfaction at what is ‘Adharma.’ The mongoose bites only that herb which is an antidote of poison, and not any other herb; hence the notion that ‘whatever herb is bitten by the mongoose is destructive of poison.’

(c) (Thirdly) The revered teachers have explained as follows:—What is meant is that, in cases of optional alternatives, that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the mind feels satisfied. It is in accordance with this that the Author will say later on, in connection with the purification of things and expiatory rites—‘the penance should be performed until the mind may feel satisfied.’

(d) Or, what is said in the Text may be taken as ruling out the unbelieving Atheist; as a matter of fact, the Atheist does not feel any ‘self-satisfaotion’ in doing even those aots that are enjoined in the Veda; hence such acts though done by him are absolutely useless.

(e) Or, what the Text teaches is that in the performance of all acts, one should have a tranquil mind; i.e., at the time of doing anything one should keep his mind free from anger, stupefaction, grief and so forth, and should remain happy. Hence like ‘Śīla’ this also is laid down as pertaining to all acts.

Cf. Āpastamba, 1.1.11.1—3; Gautama, 1.1—4 and 28. 48; Vaśiṣṭha, 1. 4—6; Baudhāyana, 1.1.1.1—6; Yājñavalkya, 1.7.

The meaning of ‘Śīla’ and ‘Ācāra’ separately has been the source of much misunderstanding. The difficulty has been solved by Medhātithi taking the term ‘Smṛtiśīle, as standing, not for ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla,’but for ‘Smṛti’ as qualified by ‘Śīla,’ this being ‘freedom from hatred and attachment;’ ‘Smṛti—Śīla’ stands for that ‘Smṛti,’ recollection, which the learned have when their mind is calm and collected, not perturbed by passions of any kind. The reason suggested by Buhler is not satisfactory.

Kullūka has explained ‘Śīla’ as standing for the virtues enumerated by Hārīta—‘Brāhmaṇa-like behaviour, devotion to gods and Pitṛs, gentility, kindness, freedom from jealousy, sympathy, absence of cruelty, friendliness, agreeable speech, gratefulness, being prepared to grant shelter, mercy, and calmness.’ Nārāyaṇa puts it vaguely as ‘that to which learned men are prone.’

‘Self-satisfaction’—This is meant to apply to cases where the scriptures provide options (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Kullūka);—or to cases not covered by any of the aforesaid sources (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

In connection with this verse, the student desirous of carrying on further investigation, is advised to read Kumārila’s Tantravārtika, Adhyāya I (Translation—Bibliotheca Indica).

Medhātithi (p. 57, l. 8)—‘Viśvajitā’—See Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 4.3.15—10.

Medhātithi (p. 57, l. 20)—‘Kvachidarthavādādeva’—for an example, see Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.4.29.

Medhātithi (p. 60, l. 29)—‘Kartṛsāmānyāt’—This refers to Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.3.2.

Medhātithi (p. 62, l. 2) — ‘Yathā āghāre devatāvidhiḥ—Śabara on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 2.2.10 says—

[ādhāre] māntravarṇako devatāvidhiḥ | ita indra ūrdhvo’dhvaro divi…indravāna svāhesyādhāramādhārayati—ityevamasāvādhāro yadyasyendro devatā

Medhātithi (p. 60, ll. 7-8) ‘Tulye śrautatve’—Though in regarding both the Śruti-rule and the Smṛti-rule to be equally ‘Śrauta,’ ‘Vedic’—Medhātithi apparently accepts the view of Kümārila as against Śabara (according to whom’ the Smṛti-rule is not Śruti, but stands on a distinctly inferior footing),—ultimately his view comes to be the same as Śabara’s—viz., that in case of conflict between Śruti and Smṛti, the latter is set aside in favour of the former; while according to Kumārila, there is option.

Medhātithi (p. 63, l. 1)—‘Viśvajityodhikāravat’—See Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.7.18—19. In connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice we have the text—‘one should give away his entire property, sarvasva.’ The conclusion is that the injunction of the giving away of one’s entire property having been already found in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma,—at which one is bound to pay as fee either 1,200 gold pieces or his entire property,—what the mention of the giving of entire property at the Viśvajit means is that at this latter sacrifice, the fee must consist of the entire property, and not of 1,200 gold pieces; and this has been taken to imply that the man who seeks to perform the Viśvajit must possess more than 1,200 gold pieces.

Medhātithi (p. 64, 1. 4)—‘Indriyāṇām &c’—The first part of this quotation occurs in Manu 7. 44; but the second half is from some other work.

This verse has been quoted in the Vidhānapārijāta (vol. II, p. 511) in support of the authority of Sadāchāra, as bearing upon the propriety of tasamudrādhāraṇa;—also in the Smṛtikaumudī (p. 1) which remarks that the Practice of cultured men is authoritative only when it is not repugnant to Śruti and Smṛti.

The Aparārka (p. 82) quotes the verse in support of the view that the Practices of Good Men also, as distinct from the Smṛti, are an authoritative source of our knowledge of Dharma. It is interesting to note that it reads vedavitsmṛtiśīlatā in place of ātmanastuṣṭireva ca.

It is quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 5), which adds the following explanation:—

Veda is the means of knowing Dharma; so also are the ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla’—i.e. freedom from love and hate,—of persons learned in the Veda;—‘āchāra’ such as the tying of the bracelet and so forth;—and ‘ātmatuṣṭi’, i. e., when there are several options open to us, it is our own satisfaction that should determine the choice of one of them;—also in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 17b);—and in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 17).

This is quoted in the Vīramitrodaya (Paribhāṣa, p. 10), which adds the following notes:—

‘Vedaḥ’ is the collection of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts, as defined by Āpastamba;—‘akhilaḥ’, the actual texts available, as also those presumed on the strength of ‘transference’ and that of ‘Indicative Power’, ‘Syntactical Connection’, ‘Contest’, ‘Position’ and ‘Name’ (Jaimini iii);—or ‘akhilaḥ,’ ‘entire,’ may be taken as meant to preclude the notion that the said authority belongs only to the three Vedas, and not to the Atharva’, which is based upon such assertions of Āpastamba and others as ‘Yajña is enjoined by the three Vedas’. That the ‘Atharva is an authority for Dharma is due to the fact that it prescribes the performance of the Tulāpuruṣa and other propitiatory rites for all castes, even though it does not deal mainly with the performance of the Agnihotra or other Śrauta rites.—When the text says that these are the means of knowing ‘Dharma’ Right, it implies that they are the means of knowing also what is ‘Adharma,’ ‘wrong’ it being necessary for the scriptures to furnish an idea of all that is wrong and hence a source of impurity of the mind, which obstructs the acquiring of true knowledge.—‘Mūlam’, ‘Source’, the means of knowing;—‘Todvidām’, those learned in the Veda; this implies that in the case of ‘Smṛti’ and the rest, tḥe authority is not inherent in themselves, but due to their being based upon the Veda—

‘Smṛti’ the Dharmaśāstra compiled by Yājñavalkya and others.—‘Śīla’ implies the thirteen qualities enumerated by Hārīta—viz., Faith in Brahman, Devotion to Gods and Pitṛs, Gentility, Harmlessness, Freedom from jealousy, Freedom from harshness, Friendliness, Sweetness of speech, Gratefulness, Kindness for sufferers, Sympathy, Calmness. This ‘Śīla’ differs from ‘Ācāra’; it stands for the negative virtues, the avoidance of wrong, while the former stands for the positive active virtues; the doing of right.—‘Ācāra’, the tying of the bracelet during marriage and so forth.—‘Sādhūnam atmanastuṣṭiḥ’, whenever doubt arises regarding what is right, what determines the question is the ‘self-satisfaction’ of those that are ‘Sādhu’ i. e., have their minds replete with the knowledge of the Veda and the impressions gathered therefrom; i. e., that course is to be accepted as ‘light’, which commands the unanimous approval of the said persons;—such is the explanation suggested by the Kalpataru. In support of this view we have the following passage from the Taittirīya, relating to cases of doubt regarding Dharma,—‘Thou shouldst behave in that manner in which behave those Brāhmaṇas who are impartial, honest, steady, calm and righteous.’ This implies the authority of the Pariṣat ‘Assembly’.—Or ‘sādhūnām’ may be construed with ‘āchāraḥ’, which would imply the authority also of those ‘good men’—men free from all evil qualities,—who are not ‘learned in the Veda’; so that for superior Śūdras, the practices of their forefathers would be authoritative.—‘Self-satisfaction’ is the determining factor in the case of options; but this is an authority for the man himself, not for others.

**(Verses 6, 10 and 12)
**

Baudhāyana, Dharmasūtra, 1.1.6.—‘Dharma has been enjoined in each Veda.’ ‘The second source of knowledge consists of the Smṛtis.’ ‘The third is what proceeds from the cultured, i. e., those persons who are free from jealousy and selfishness, fairly well off, free from avarice, haughtiness, greed, delusion, and anger.’ ‘Those persons are cultured who have studied the Vedas along with their supplements and who are versed in the art of making deductions from them; those are the persons from whom the direct knowledge of Śruti can be derived.’

Gautama, Dharmasūtra, 1.1-2.—‘Veda is the source of Dharma’: ‘the Smṛti and Śīla of persons learned in the Veda.’

Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.2-3.—‘The convention of persons knowing Dharma is authoritative’: ‘and also the Vedas.’

Vaśiṣṭha, Smrti, 1.4-6.—‘In the absence of Śruti and Smṛti, the custom of the cultured is authoritative’: ‘those persons are cultured whose mind is free from selfish desires’: ‘that is to be regarded as Dharma which is not prompted by a selfish motive.’

Yajñavalkya, Smṛti, 1-7.—‘Śruti, Smṛti, the practice of good men, self-satisfaction determination based upon right volition,—these four are the source of Dharma.’

Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.4.7.—‘The Śruti is more authoritative than custom which derives its authority only from assumption (of corroboration of Śruti).’

Ibid, 30.9.—‘In cases of conflict, what is stated in the Śruti is more authoritative.’

Jaimini, the writer of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (1.1.2), has emphatically declared that the Vedic Injunction is the only trustworthy source of our knowledge of Dharma, i.e., of what is right, i.e., what is conducive to good, temporal and spiritual (Vaiśeṣika-Sütra 1.1.2); though he knew of the later ‘lawbooks, Smṛtis, and customs,’ yet he had no hesitation in declaring that these are to be relied upon only so far as they are not repugnant to anything declared in the Veda.

Coming to the strictly legal writers we find—1. Baudhāyana, (1.1.1-6) naming—(a) Veda, (b) the Smṛti, and (2) ‘Śiṣṭāgama,’—the ‘Āgama,’ teaching, of the ‘Śiṣṭas’ ‘cultured’ men;—i. e., ‘those who are free from ill-feeling, devoid of vanity, possessed of sufficient grain, not greedy, devoid of hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger;—those who have studied, in the right manner, the Veda along with its supplements and are well versed in making deductions out of them.’

[There is no mention of ‘custom’ here at all. It is ‘scripture’ pure and simple; but no longer the Veda only, but also the Smṛtis, and the deductions therefrom and teachings based thereupon by persons with very special qualifications.]

Parāśara, 1.20.—‘At the beginning of each Kalpa, there appear Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva……… the propounders of (1) Śruti, (2) Smṛti and (3) Sadāchāra.’

kalpe kalpe kṣayotyattau brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ |
śrutismṛtisadācāranirṇetāraśva sarvadā ||

To the same end we have Āpastamba (1.1.2-3) declaring that the ‘convention or opinion of those versed in Dharma’ and ‘also the Veda,’ are the authority. It only means that when those learned in Dharma are agreed in regard to the righteousness of a certain course of action, that is to be accepted as authoritative.

This is made clear by Vaśiṣṭha (1.4-6)—‘In the event of the aforesaid’ (i.e., Śruti and Smṛti) not being available, the practice of cultured men is the authority,—the cultured man being defined as one who is entirely unselfish, having no desires of his own.

The same opinion is expressed more definitely by Gautama (1.1. 1-2)—‘Veda is the source of Dharma, also the Smṛti (Recollection) and Śīla of those learned in the Veda.’

[In all this ‘custom’ begins to be admitted; but only that of the ‘cultured.’]

The next step in advance is taken by Manu (2.6)—

vido’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām |
ācāraśvaica sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca ||

Also Vyāsa—

dharmamūlaṃ vedamāhuḥ grantharāśimakṛtrimam |
tadvidāṃ smṛtiśīle ca sādhvācāraṃ manaḥpriyam ||

By this the sources of Dharma are (1) Veda, (2) Smṛti, (3) Sadāchāra and (4) ‘Svasya priyam.’

[What is exactly meant by these terms we shall see later on.] The same is recapitulated in Manu (2.12)—

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
etaccaturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣāddharmasya lakṣaṇam ||

This is slightly improved upon by Yājñavalkya (1.7)—

śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
samyaksaṅkalpajaḥ kāmo dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtam ||

By which the sources of law are fivefold:—(1) Veda, (2) Smṛti, (3) Sadāchāra, (1) Svasya priyam and (5) Samyak-saṅkalpaja Kāma. [For the exact signification of these, see below.]

Thus the sources of Law are: (1) ‘Śruti,’ (2) ‘Smrti’ (3) ‘Sadāchāra’—‘practices of the good’ (with regard to these there is unanimity among all old authorities), (4) ‘Svasya priyam’ or ‘ātmanastuṣṭiḥ,’ ‘self-satisfaction.’ In regard to the fourth also Manu and Yājñavalkya are agreed. In Manu however we find one thing more, which is not found in Yājñavalkya—viz., ‘Sīla’; and Yājñavalkya speaks of ‘Samyaksaṅkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ,’ which is not found in Manu. Vīramitrodaya on Yājña has identified these two.

We shall see now what these terms mean according to the Commentators and the more important Digest-writers.

####### (A) Śruti

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6.—The word ‘Veda’ stands for the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, and Sāmaveda (also Atharva Veda), along with their respective Brāhmaṇas, There are 21 Recensions of the Ṛgveda, 100 of the Yajurveda, 1,000 of the Sāmaveda and 9 of the Atharvaveda. The Vedic character of the Atharva cannot be denied, because, like the other Vedas, this also is not the work of a human author, it helps to make known man’s duties, it is free from mistakes, it prescribes the Jyotiṣṭoma and such other rites exactly in the same manner as the other Vedas do. [This is denied by Vīramitrodaya on Yājñavalkya; see below.] Though there are certain texts that forbid the study of the Atharva Veda, yet all that this means is that one should not confuse the teachings of the other Vedas with those of the Atharva; for instance, at the performance of rites in accordance with the three other Vedas, one should not use Mantras of the Atharva Veda.

This ‘Veda’ is the ‘root,’ i.e., source, cause, of dharma, in the sense that it makes it known, and it does this by means chiefly of such passages in the Brāhmaṇas as contain injunctive expressions; sometimes also by means of Mantras. And the other parts of the Veda—the Arthavāda or Declamatory Passages—have their use in eulogising what is enjoined by the corresponding injunction; Mantras and names help in indicating the details of the acts prescribed.

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 26.—When Manu speaks of the ‘entire Veda,’ he means to include the Arthavādas, commendatory and condemnatory exaggerations, also.

Kullūka on Manu, 26.—‘Veda’ stands for the Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman and Atharvan; the whole of these, including the injunctions, Mantras and Arthavādas, the last also serving the purpose of helping the injunction by persuasion. Both Mantras and Arthavādas serve the useful purpose not only of persuasion, but also of reminding the agent of the details of the action undertaken. The authority of Śruti and the rest also rests upon.the fact of their having their source in the Veda.

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2.6.—Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman and Atharvan are the authority for Dharma.

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1.3-7.—‘Śruti’ is to be taken, not in the strictly limited sense of the ‘Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts,’ but for all the fourteen ‘Sciences’—the Four Vedas, their six ‘subsidiaries’ or ‘limbs,’ Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mīmānsā, and Dharmaśāstra.

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Śruti’ is Veda.

(I) Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Śruti’ is Veda—it is the only determining factor in all matters relating to the Agnihotra and other rites. As Vyāsa says, this is the only pure authority (i.e., entirely trustworthy), all the rest being ‘adulterated,’ i.e., of doubtful authority; that law is the highest which is learnt from the Veda, what is propounded in the Purāṇas and other works being of a lower grade.

Says Manu—‘The Veda embodies all knowledge’ (2.7).

‘The learned man should enter upon his own duties, resting upon the authority of the Revealed Word’ (2.8). ‘The Veda should be known as the Revealed Word, Śruti’ (2.10).

Vīramitrodaya-Tīkā on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Śruti’ is Veda—as in Manu (2.10). It is the sole authority in regard to Agnihotra and such rites.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25.—‘Śruti’ stands for ‘Veda,’ which, according to Āpastamba’s definition, is the name given to the ‘collection of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts’;—the ‘whole’ of this authoritative, i.e., the direct, texts themselves, as also those that are deducible from the implications of ‘Indication,’ ‘Syntactical Connection,’ ‘Context,’ ‘Position’ and ‘Name,’ and also the transformations undergone by the original texts under well-recognised principles. Another implication of the epithet ‘entire’ is that the Atharva Veda also is to be accepted as authoritative, and not only the ‘trinity of Vedas,’ as one might be led to suppose from the words of Āpastamba, who says that ‘Dharma is to be learnt from the three Vedas.’ It would be wrong to deny the authority of the Atharva Veda, because, even though it has nothing to say regarding the setting up of the Sacrificial Pires or the details of the Agnihotra and other rites, yet on certain matters it is our only authority; such propitiatory rites for instance as those relating to the ‘Tulāpuruṣa’ and the like, which affect all the castes. When we speak of these being the ‘source of dharma,’ ‘means of knowing what Dharma, Right, is,’ it follows that they are the means of knowing also what ‘Adharma’ ‘wrong’ is; it is necessary to understand what is ‘wrong’ in order to discard it and thereby prepare the mind for perceiving what is ‘right.’

This ‘Śruti’ operates in the following seven forms:

(1) The Injunction or Mandatory text—e.g., ‘one shall sacrifice the goat to Yāyu’—this is a trustworthy guide as to what one should do.

(2) The Prohibitive Text—e.g., ‘one shall not eat the flesh of an animal killed by the poisoned arrow this is a guide as to what one shall avoid.

(3) The ‘Declamatory’ text of two kinds: the commendatory and the condemnatory; the former serves the purpose of delineating the excellence of the course of action enjoined by the Mandatory text; e.g., the text ‘Vāyu is the eftest deity,’ serves to indicate the excellent properties of the deity Vāyu to whom the offering of the goat has been enjoined; the condemnatory text serves to deprecate the course of action prohibited; e.g., the assertion that ‘the tears of weeping Rudra became silver’ is meant to deprecate the giving of silver as the sacrificial fee, which has been forbidden by a prohibitive text. Texts of this declamatory kind are of use sometimes in settling a doubtful point: e.g., it having been enjoined that one should place wet pebbles under the altar, and the injunction being silent as to the substance with which the pebble is to be wetted, the doubt on this point is settled by a subsequent ‘declamatory’ text, ‘clarified butter is glory itself,’ which clearly indicates the clarified butter as the substance with which the pebbles are to be wetted.

(4) The Mantra text—e.g., ‘Devasya tvā savituḥ,’ etc., serves to remind the performer of the details of the performance in the shape of the deity and so forth.

(5) The proper names of particular sacrifices help in the determining of the exact action connoted by the common root ‘yaji,’ ‘to sacrifice’ occurring in the injunctive text.

(6) The meaningless syllables, stobhas, introduced in the Sāma-chant, serve the purpose of marking time and cadence;

and (7) the Upaniṣad text serves to promulgate that knowledge of Brahman which destroys all evil.

Parāśara, 1-20—speaks of the ‘propounders of Śruti’ appearing at the beginning of each kalpa. From the words it would seem as if the three gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara were the said ‘propounders.’ But Mādhava (p. 98) takes the ‘propounders of Śruti, Smṛti and Sadāchāra’ separately from Brahmā, etc., and he supplies a peculiar account of the ‘propounders of Śruti’—which extends the scope of the authority of this source of knowledge. He says that by the ‘propounders of Śruti’ here are meant

(1) Vyāsa, who divided the Vedic text into the several recensions;

(2) the expounders of those Recensions—such as Kaṭha and Kuthuma;

(3) the contents of Kalpasūtras, such as Baudhāyana, Āśvalāyana, aud Āpastamba, and also the ‘authors’ of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, Jaimini and the rest.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskara-Sāra MSS.—The Veda is the main authority for Dharma. Any inconsistencies that may be found in it can be easily explained away. This authority belongs not only to the Injunctions, but also to Mantras, names and declamatory passages.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 3.—The Veda is authoritative as it is independent of human authorship.

####### (B) Smṛti

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6.—‘Smṛti’ is Recollection and ‘Śīla’ denotes freedom from love, hatred and such improper feelings; this latter, according to one explanation, is a means of accomplishing Dharma, and not a means of knowing it; and it has been separately mentioned in the present connection only with a view to emphasise its importance. Not satisfied with this, he has taken the two terras ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla’ in the compound as inter-related; and as together standing for a single means of knowing Dharma, in the shape of ‘Recollection during that state of the mind when it is calm, free from all disturbing influences of love, hatred and so forth’,—i.e., ‘Conscientious Recollection.’ The authority of ‘Smṛti’ thus becomes qualified. Even though a certain writer may be a Ṛṣi versed in Veda, yet if his ‘recollection’ and its compilation come about at a time when his mind was perturbed by discordant feelings, much trust cannot be placed upon such ‘Recollection.’

This again has to be taken along with ‘Sādhūmām’; so that we have a threefold condition for the trustworthiness of a writer of Smṛti:—

1. he must be learned (‘tādvidām’),
2. he must be ‘conscientious,’ ‘free from love and hatred’ (‘Śīla’),
3. and he must be ‘righteous’ (‘Sādhūmām’), be habitually engaged in carrying out the injunctions of the Veda.

The upshot of the whole is that when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said three qualifications—and a certain compilation is also recognised as made by that person,—the word of such a person as found in his recognised work, should be recognised as an authoritative exponent of Dharma. Sc that even at the present day if there were such a person and he were to compose a work, then for all later generations that work would be regarded just as highly as those of Manu and others. This is the reason why Medhātithi is averse to the practice of enumerating the authoritative ‘Smṛtis.’ (Trans., p. 204.)

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 2.6.—In cases where no Vedic texts are available, the law can be determined with the help of the Smṛti of persons learned in the Veda—the term ‘Smṛti’ standing for the reflections over a certain subject, as also the treatises embodying those reflections.

Kullūka on Manu, 2.6.—The Smṛti of ‘persons learned in the Veda’ is authoritative,—this last qualification being added for the purpose of indicating that the authority of Smṛti is due to its having its source in the Veda.

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2.6.—‘Smṛti’ stands for the work of Manu and others. It stands here for only such Smṛti as is not incompatible with tho Veda. All the rest are to be rejected whenever they are found to be repugnant to any direct text of the Veda. But where there is no such repugnance, we are justified in assuming that the Smṛti must be based upon a Vedic text now lost to us; and it is on this assumption that its trustworthiness rests.

Nandana on Manu, 2.6.—The ‘Smṛti of men learned in the Veda.’ This stands for Smṛtis, Purāṇas and Itihāsas.

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Smṛti’ and ‘Dharmaśāstra’ are synonymous terms. “How do we know that the Smṛtis are all based upon the Veda, from which they derive their authority? Certainly we do not find Vedic texts in support of everything that is ordained in the Smṛtis. As for the Vedic texts that are found to support some Smṛti assertions, such support is found also in the case of the heterodox scriptures.”—The simple answer to this question is that in the face of the direct assertion of Manu and other Smṛti-writers that their work is ‘based on the Veda,’ we have no justification for thinking otherwise. They being great Vedic scholars, could not have lied on this point. As a matter of fact also we find that every one of the injunctions contained in the Smṛtis has its source in the Veda; in some cases the connection is direct, in others indirect; for instance, we have the single Vedic injunction ‘one should study the Veda’; now studying is not possible without teaching, hence the injunction of teaching is implied by the former—the teaching cannot be done without some one to teach; this implies the receiving and initiating of a pupil; this implies the necessity of having children; this again that of marrying and so on; most of the other injunctions may have their source traced in the single Vedic text.

(I) Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Smṛti’ is that ordinance which, in matters relating to Dharma, has its source in the Veda; its authority is ‘adulterated,’ i.e., not so absolute as that of Śruti; it supplies us with information regarding the duties of all castes and the four life-stages; one should carefully do all that has been ordained, Smṛtam, by persons most learned in the Veda and eschew what is forbidden by them. [This writer like Kumārila makes a distinction between ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Purāṇa.’] There are chances of our going astray in the matter of interpreting a Vedic text and learning the law from it; but there is no fear of any such mistake being committed by the Smṛti-writers who were thoroughly well-versed in the Vedic lore. [From this it would seem that this writer flourished during the transition period, when the centre of gravity was beginning to shift from the Veda towards the Smṛti.]

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Smrti’ is Dharmaśāstra.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Smṛti’ is ‘Dharmaśāstra’—‘Legal Ordinances’ (Manu 2-10); it is the sole authority regarding the Aṣṭakā and such rites.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25.—‘Of persons learned in the Veda’; this has been added with a view to make clear that the authority of the Smṛtis does not rest upon themselves: it is derived entirely from the fact of their having their source in the Veda. The name ‘Smṛti’ stands for the legal ordinances, ‘Dharmaśāstra,’ compiled by Yājñavalkya and others.

Madanapārijāta, p. 11.—Manu is the most important of the expounders of law. Among others, some are mentioned by Yājñavalkya (see above). But this list is not exhaustive. Though all these ‘expounders’ do not always agree, yet, on the main principles, they are all agreed; the differences, if any, are confined to minor points; and these latter discrepancies can always he explained.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra MSS.—“How can any authority attach to the Smṛtis of Manu and others, which being of human origin are open to the suspicion of the possibility of all those defects to which human writers are liable; and for this reason these cannot be regarded as authoritative in the same manner as the Vedas are, whose authority is above suspicion.”—The answer to this is that inasmuch as these Smṛtis are found to be mere reproductions of what is contained in the Veda, they must be regarded as duly authoritative. The very name ‘Smṛti,’ ‘Recollection,’ implies that they only reproduce what the authors have learnt elsewhere; and as Manu and others are known to have been learned in the Veda it stands to reason that knowing as they did that the Veda was the sole authority on Dharma, when they proceeded to note down for the benefit of others what the laws were that regulated Dharma, they could not but have drawn upon the Veda. It is true that they arc found to contain many rules that we cannot trace to the Veda as known to us; but if they were mere reproductions of whatever is found in the Veda, no one would care for them. So we are led to the inference that as on most of the points dealt with by them, their assertions are found to be based on Vedic texts, the other points also must have had their source in the Veda; but in those Vedic texts that have become lost to us. We have the Veda itself testifying to the trustworthy character of at least one Smṛti-writer, Manu—‘Whatever Manu has said is wholesome.’

Smrticandrikā, pp. 1 et scq.—The ordinances composed by Manu and other writers, being based on the Veda, are our sole authority on Dharma. That the Smṛtis have their source in the Veda is deduced from the fact that they only expound what is contained in the Veda. Says Bhṛgu—‘Whatever Dharma has been expounded by Manu has all been set forth in the Veda.’ Śaṅkara also says that ‘the Smṛtis have their source in the Veda.’ But this refers to only what the Smṛti says regarding spiritual matters, and not to what they lay down regarding temporal matters; as is distinctly declared in the Purāṇa—‘All these (smṛtis) have their source in the Veda—save those portions that deal with visible (temporal) matters.’

Question.—“When the Smṛti itself only expounds whatever is already set forth in the Veda and is on that account, based upon the Veda, then the Veda itself being sufficient for all purposes, what is the use of the Smṛti or Dharmaśāstra?”—The Smrticandrikā quotes Marīci as giving the answer to this question—‘The requisite texts of the Veda are difficult to understand and are scattered about in various places; all these are collected and explained by the Smṛtis.’

The Purāṇas are also included under Smṛti, as the Veda itself names ‘Itihāsa-Purāṇa’ along with ‘the four Vedas.’ Viṣṇu also places the Purāṇas on the same footing as ‘Manu-Smṛti,’ ‘Veda and its subsidiary sciences,’ ‘Science of Healing.’

This establishes the authority of the authors of the Gṛhyasūtras also; since all that these do is to lay down practical manuals setting forth the details of the various rites along with the necessary Mantras belonging to that individual Vedic recension to which the manual is inferred to appertain. As says Devala—‘Manu and others are the expounders of the Law; the authors of the Gṛhyas are the expounders of the application of Law.’

Saṃskāra-Mayūkha, p. 2.—The Smṛti includes the Āyurveda Smṛtis also, as also Purāṇa and the astronomical ‘Saṃhitās,’ compilations of Varāhamihira and others; as also the Saṃhitā texts which are included in the Skandapurāṇa.

Now we have got to determine what works are entitled to be classed under ‘Smṛti’ or ‘Dharma-Śāstra,’ which latter is what is meant by ‘Smrti.’

The original Smṛti-writers are thus enumerated by Yājñavalkya (1.4-5):—

1. Manu,
2. Viṣṇu,
3. Yama,
4. Aṅgiras,
5. Vaśiṣṭha,
6. Dakṣa,
7. Saṃvarta,
8. Śātātapa,
9. Parāśara,
10. Āpastamba,
11. Uśanas,
12. Vyāsa,
13. Kātyāyana,
14. Bṛhaspati,
15. Gautama,
16. Śaṅkha-Likhita,
17. Hārīta,
18. Atri,
19. and Yājñavalkya himself.

The following is from Parāśara (Ācāra 12-15), where Vyāsa relates to his father the Smṛtis he has already learnt:

1. Manu,
2. Vaśiṣṭha,
3. Kaśyapa,
4. Garga,
5. Gautama,
6. Uśanas,
7. Atri,
8. Viṣṇu,
9. Saṃvarta,
10. Dakṣa,
11. Aṅgiras,
12. Śātātapa,
13. Hārīta,
14. Yājñavalkya,
15. Āpastamba,
16. Śaṅkha,
17. Likhita,
18. Kātyāyana,
19. Pracetas.

On Parāśara (1.20), which speaks of ‘propounders of Smṛti,’ Mādhava (p. 98), mentions the following additional names:

1. Vyāsa,
2. Yama,
3. Parāśara,
4. Bhṛgu,
5. Nārada,
6. Baudhāyana,
7. Pitāmaha,
8. Sumantu,
9. Kāśyapa,
10. Babhru,
11. Paiṭhīnasi,
12. Vyāghra,
13. Satyavrata,
14. Bharadvāja,
15. Kārṣṇājini,
16. Jābāli,
17. Jamadagni,
18. Lokākṣi.

The Smṛticandrikā reproduces the same list.

Yājñavalkya and Kātyāyana being omitted, these two lists make the number 36.

The same writer quotes from the Mahābhārata the following:—

1. Umā-Maheśvara,
2. andi,
3. Brahmā,
4. umāra,
5. Dhūmrāyaṇa,
6. Kaṇva,
7. Vaiśvānara,
8. Bhṛgu,
9. Yājñavalkya,
10. Mārkaṇḍeya,
11. Kuśika,
12. Bharadvāja,
13. Bṛhaspati,
14. Kuni,
15. Kuṇibāhu,
16. Viśvāmitra,
17. Sumantu,
18. Jaimini,
19. Śakuni,
20. Pulastya,
21. Pulaha,
22. Pāvaka,
23. Agastya,
24. Mudgala,
25. Śāṇḍilya,
26. Solabhāyana,
27. Bālakhilya,
28. Saptarṣi,
29. Vyāghra,
30. Vyāsa,
31. Vibhāṇḍaka,
32. Vidura,
33. Bhṛgu,
34. Aṅgiras,
35. Vaiśampāyana.

The Smṛticandrikā reproduces Paiṭhīnasi’s list (given by Mādhava), but adds that the list is not exhaustive, as in addition to them there are others also, eg., Vatsa, Marīci, Devala, Pāraskara, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Ṛṣyaśṛṅga, Likhita and Chāgaleva. It quotes Śaṅkha as enumerating

1. Manu,
2. Yama,
3. Dakṣa,
4. Viṣṇu,
5. Aṅgiras,
6. Bṛhaspati,
7. Uśanas,
8. Āpastamba,
9. Gautama,
10. Saṃvarta,
11. Ātreya,
12. Hārīta,
13. Kātyāyana,
14. Śaṅkha,
15. Likhita,
16. Parāśara,
17. Vyāsa,
18. Śātātapa,
19. Pracetas,
20. Yājñavalkya.

Also Aṅgiras quoted mentions the following and calls them Upa-Smṛti:

1. Logākṣi,
2. Kāśyapa,
3. Vyāsa,
4. Sanatkumāra,
5. Śāntanu,
6. Janaka,
7. Vyāghra,
8. Kātyāyana,
9. Jātūkarṇa,
10. Kapiñjala,
11. Baudhāyana,
12. Kaṇāda,
13. and Viśvāmitra.

Yājñavalkya’s and Paiṭhīnasi’s lists are reproduced also by the Saṃskāramayūkha (p. 2). To them it adds ‘Viśvāmitra and the rest.’

The Purāṇa has been defined as that which has five characteristic features in the shape of the accounts of (1) Creation, (2) Dissolution, (3) Genealogy, (4) Age-Cycles, and (5) History of Dynasties.

The Viṣṇupurāna names the following eighteen Purāṇas and the Bhāgavata adds the number of verses in each:

1. Brahma, 10,000,
2. Padma, 55,000,
3. Viṣṇu, 23,000,
4. Śiva, 24,000,
5. Bhāgavata, 18,000,
6. Nāradīya, 25,000,
7. Mārkaṇḍeya, 9,000,
8. Agni, 15,400,
9. Bhaviṣya, 14,500,
10. Brahmavaivarta, 18,000,
11. Liṅga, 10,600,
12. Varāha, 24,500,
13. Skanda, 81,000,
14. āmana, 10,000,
15. Kūrma, 17.000,
16. Matsya, 14,000,
17. Garuḍa, 19,000
18. and Brahmāṇḍa, 12,000.

Total number of verses, 4,00,000.

The Brahmavaivarta has the Vāyupurāṇa in place of the Brahmāṇḍa, and this diversity is due to the two enumerations referring to two distinct cycles.

In addition to these eighteen ‘Purāṇas,’ there are 18 ‘Upapurāṇas,’ ‘secondary Purāṇas.’ These have been named in the Kūrmapurāṇa:

1. Sanatkumāra,
2. Narasiṃha, 18.000,
3. Nānda (recited by Kumāra),
4. Śivadharma (recited by Nandīśvara),
5. Nāradīya,
6. Durvāsas,
7. Kāpila,
8. Mānava,
9. Uśanas,
10. Brahmāṇḍa,
11. Vāruṇa,
12. Kālikā,
13. Māheśvara,
14. Śāmba,
15. Saura,
16. Parāśara,
17. Mārīca,
18. and Bhārgava.

In place of ‘Nānda,’ the Brahmavaivarta has Vāśiṣṭha-Laiṅga.

The Saṃskāramayūkha also reproduces the lists of the Viṣṇupurāṇa (for Purāṇas) and of Kūrmapurāṇa (for Upapurāṇas).

Vīramitrodaya, Paribhāṣā, pp. 10-24.—The knowledge of ‘Veda’ implies also the knowledge of certain other branches of study, which is essential to the proper understanding of the Veda. These have been thus enumerated by Yājñavalkya—‘There are fourteen departments of knowledge and of Dharma. The four (1-4) Vedas along with (5) Purāṇas, (6) Nyāya, (7) Mīmāṃsā, (8) Dharma-Śāstra, (9-14) the six ‘Limbs’ or subsidiary sciences of the Veda.’

Here ‘Nyāya’ stands for the system propounded by Gautama and others, dealing with such subjects as the means of knowledge and so forth, ‘Mīmāṃsā’ for the system of interpretation propounded by Jaimini and that of philosophy propounded by Bādarāyaṇa, ‘Dharmaśāstra’ for the ordinances of Manu and others, and ‘Limbs of the Veda’ for—(a) Phonetics, (b) Rituals, (c) Grammar, (d) Etymology, (e) Prosody and (f) Astronomy.

There is a diversity of opinion regarding the lists of recognised ‘Purāṇas’ and ‘Dharmaśāstras,’ as shown above.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5.—‘Purāṇa’—the Brahma and the rest;—‘Nyāya’—Reasoning; ‘Mīmāṃsā,’ discussion relating to the exact meaning of Vedic passages;—‘Dharmaśāstra,’ the Smṛtis of Manu and others; and the four Vedas with the six ‘subsidiary sciences’ are the ‘means’ of knowing Dharma; and also of Dharma itself, through that knowledge.

####### (C) Sadācāra

Medhātithi on Manu, 2-6.—‘Sādhūnām āchāraḥ,’ ‘Practice of good men’ also has to be construed with ‘Vedavidām’ ‘learned in the Veda,’ and the two qualifications ‘Goodness’ and ‘Vedic learning,’ come under ‘culture.’ When in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti declarations available, but cultured people are found to do it as ‘Dharma,’—something right—then that action is to be regarded as ‘enjoined in the Veda’ in the same manner as anything laid down in the Smṛti. What are meant by ‘practices’ here are such customs as the tying of the bracelet at marriage, the keeping of an exact number of hair-locks on the head, the exact manner of receiving guests and so forth. Each of such practices has to be taken on its own merits; it is not possible to assume Vedic texts corroborating those ither severally or even collectively; as the rightness or wrongness of a certain practice varies with circumstances; e.g., a certain cultured man may be very assiduous in attending upon his guests—never leaving them for a single moment unattended, and so forth. This may he quite agreeable to one guest who likes constant attendance; but there may be another to whom all this close attendance is disagreeable; he would prefer much rather to be left alone to himself. There is no such variation possible in regard to what is prescribed in the Smṛti; and herein lies the difference between what is prescribed in the ‘Smṛti’ and what can be learnt from the ‘Practices of the cultured.’

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 2-0.—In cases where we find no guidance either from Vedic texts or Smṛti or the Śīla of learned men, we have to be guided by the ‘Ācāra,’ Practice, of ‘Sādhus,’ persons engaged in the performance of acts in accordance with the Veda. ‘Ācāra’ really stands for the recalling and practising of what has been done by the good men of the past, i.e., Usage or Custom.—This is regarded as inferior to ‘Śīla’ on account of the possibility of suspicion regarding the correctness of tradition upon which it is based.

Kullūka on Manu, 2-6.—‘Ācāra’ stands for the practice of dressing oneself in blankets or tree-bark and so forth.

‘Sādhūnām’; of the good, i.e., righteous persons.

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2-6.—Such practice as binding of the bracelet at marriage and so forth, which is current among ‘Sādhus,’ i.e., people free from ill feeling.

Nandana on Manu, 2-6.—Nandana takes ‘Ācāra’ by itself offering no remarks about it, and construes ‘Sādhūnām’ with ‘Ātmanastuṣṭi.’

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1-7.—‘Sadāchāra’ stands for those religious or spiritual (as distinguished from temporal or worldly) acts that are done by such men as are free from selfishness and devoid of hypocrisy and other defects. This is mentioned apart from ‘Smṛti,’ (1) because there is no compilation of the said practices, as there is of the ordinances; and (2) the trustworthiness of practices is doubtful, which is not the case with Smṛti.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1-7.—‘Sadāchāra’ is the practice of cultured people, i.e., such people as are free from ill-will, vanity, possessed of sufficient funds (i.e., not in want of living), not greedy, free from hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger; those who have studied the Veda and its supplements in the right manner, and are expert in making deductions therefrom (Baudhāyana),—the supplements being the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and also Grammar and the other subsidiary sciences; ‘those expert in making deductions therefrom’ are those versed in the Smṛtis,—the latter being regarded as indicative of the Veda. When the texts speak of ‘Sadāchāra’ as an authority what they refer to is the fact that the customs obtaining in Brahmāvarta and other civilised lands are all based on the Veda (and not that custom qua custom is to be accepted as in itself authoritative): any custom that is repugnant to any clear text of the Veda is to be rejected. Vaśiṣṭha’s declaration that ‘all the customs current in Āryāvarta are authoritative’ means that most of them are so; as is clear from another declaration of his to the effect that customs of the cultured are to be accepted as authority only on points where no Veda or Smṛti texts are available.

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1-7.—‘Sadāchāra’—practice of the cultured, not of the uncultured.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1-7.—‘Sadāchāra’ is thus defined in the Viṣṇupurāṇa: “Good men, free from all defects, are called Sat, and their practice, Ācaraṇa, is what is called ‘Sadāchāra.’” It is the sole authority in regard to the Holākā and such observances.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-29.—Gautama declares that such local, tribal and family customs as arc repugnant to the scriptures are not authoritative;—‘Scripture’ here stands for ‘Veda, Smṛti and Purāṇa.’ This Ācāra stands for positive virtues, as distinguished from ‘Śīla’ which stands for the negative ones. If we connect ‘Sādhūnām’ with ‘āchāraḥ,’ then the meaning comes to be that the practices of even those not learned in the Veda are to be accepted as authoritative, when these are men free from all weaknesses and defects; it is in this sense that in the case of Śūdraṣ, the practices of one’s ancestors become an authoritative source of knowledge of Dharma.

Parāśaramādhava, p. 100.—‘Sadāchāra’—e.g., Holākā, Udvṛṣabha and the like. Those who ‘expound’ or ‘determine’ these are the elders of each family or tribe.

Madanapārijāta, pp. 11-12.—Dharma depends upon ‘Ācāra’—[But this term is used here in a very wide sense, being defined as]—‘Ācāra is the name of that course of conduct which is enjoined in Śruti and Smṛti and which is prescribed by the Good.’—This āchāra is to be learnt from persons born in Madhyadeśa and other countries:—(a) the tract of land between Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī—Brahmāvarta; (b) between Himalaya and Vindhya and between Gaṅgā and Yamunā, West of Prayāga—Madhyadeśa; (e) between Himalaya and Vindhya and the Eastern and Western Oceans—Āryāvarta.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra.—“It is difficult to believe that the endless practices or customs that have grown, and are still growing up from time to time, should be all based upon Vedic texts. Even Manu’s declaration cannot be taken as testifying to the authority of each and every custom. For if their authority rested upon the trustworthy character of the ‘cultured’ persons among whom it is current, then there would be an interdependence; the people would be ‘cultured’ because they follow those practices and the practices would be authoritative because they are followed by those persons. Further, customs and practices are found to vary in different parts of the country; and certainly all of these cannot he authoritative.”

It is not each and every practice of the ‘cultured’ that we regard as authoritative; that alone can be regarded as a trustworthy guide which is done by the cultured people as ‘Dharma,’ that which they do knowing it to be ‘righteous.’ And certainly the many misdeeds of well-known great men that are cited could not have been done by them as ‘dharma’; when the learned regard an act as ‘dharma’ they must do so on the strength of some Vedic text known to them; hence these Practices and Customs also must be inferred to have their source in the Veda.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5.—‘Ācāra’ stands for the tying of the bracelet and such practices.

Ibid, p. 6.—The ‘Śiṣṭaṣ,’ ‘cultured,’ are defined by Manu (12-109)—

dharmeṇādhigato yaistu vedaḥ saparibṛṃhaṇaḥ |
te śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā jñeyāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetavaḥ ||

The paribṛṃhaṇa of the Veda being the subsidiary sciences, Itihāsa and Purāṇa. Says Bṛhaspati—

itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet |

[This occurs in the Mahābhārata also.]

On questions where we find no Śruti or Smṛti text we are to be guided by the opinion of the ‘Pariṣad,’ ‘Assembly.’ Says Manu (12.108)—

amāmnāteṣu dharmeṣu kathaṃ syāditi ced bhavet |
yaṃ śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā brūyuḥ sa dharmaḥ syādaśaṅkitaḥ ||

This ‘Assembly’ should consist of at least 10 ‘cultured’ men—as declared by Gautama—

anāmnāte daśāvaraiḥ śiṣṭairūhavadbhiḥ alubdhaiḥ praśastaṃ kāryam |

That is, what these people say is ‘good’ should be done. Baudhāyana also prescribes the same number—

daśāvarā pariṣat |

Yājñavalkya says—

catvāro vedadharmajñāḥ parṣat traividyameva vā |
sā brūte yaṃ sa dharmaḥ syādeko vā’dhyātmavittamaḥ ||

by which the Assembly should consist either (1) of four men versed in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstra, or (2) of those men each versed in three Vedas, or (3), of only one man who is the best ‘knower of the philosophy of the Self.’

Manu also (12.110 and 112) fixes the number at (1) ten or (2) three of those who are fully learned in the three Vedas.

The opinion of this ‘Assembly’ is as authoritative as the Veda itself,—says Yama.

Manu (4.178) sanctions the authority of ‘Family Custom’—

yenāsya pitaro yātā yena yātāḥ pitāmahāḥ |
tena yāyāt satāṃ mārgaṃ tena gacchanna riṣyati ||

But this can be a guide only in matters where the scriptures are found to he at variance with one another;—as is clear from the words of Sumantu—

yatra śāstragatirbhinnā sarvakarmasu bhārat |
tasmin kulakramāyātmācāraṃ tvācared brudhaḥ ||

Saṃskāramayūkha, p. 1.—That ‘Sadāchāra’ is authoritative which is not repugnant to Veda and Smṛti texts.

####### (D) Śīla—Samyak-Saṅkalpaja-Kāma (Mentioned in Manu 2-6.)

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6.—Medhātithi takes the two terms ‘Śīla’ and ‘Smṛti’ as interrelated,—the two together standing for ‘conscientious recollection’ (see under ‘Smṛti’), so that according to him ‘Śīla’ is not a distinct means of knowing Dharma. He also suggests another explanation of ‘Śīla’ by which it pertains to all acts; the meaning being that whatever one does one should do with the mind free from all ‘love and hate.’

Sarvajñanārāyāṇa on Manu, 2.6.—In cases where neither Vedic nor Smṛti tests are available one’s duty can be determined on the basis of the ‘Śīla’ of a large number of persons learned in the Veda, i.e., their ‘natural inclination,’ ‘temperament.’ In support of the authority of this we have the Vedic text which declares that ‘whatever the learned man feels is to be regarded saintly’;—wherever this is not available, we have to he guided by the ‘āchāra,’ practice, of ‘Sādhus.’

Kullūka on Manu, 2.6.—‘Śīla’ stands for ‘devotion to Brahman’ and such other qualities enumerated by Hārīta (ride above). According to Govindarāja however it stands for ‘freedom from love and hate.’

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2.6.—‘Śīla’ is conduct, action, of those learned in the Veda, i.e., those who know that the injunctions contained in the Veda are to he acted up to; or it may stand for the thirteen qualities spoken of by Hārīta (see above).

Nandana on Manu, 2.6.—Nandana defines it as ‘that excellent quality of the soul which makes a man respected among the wise,’ as defined in the Mahābhārata; as an example is cited that magnanimity which was shown by Yudhiṣṭhira when he asked for the life of his stepbrother Nakula before that of his brother Bhīma and Arjuna, when all of them had been devoured by the alligator.

Yājñavalkya, 1.7.—speaks of Samyakṣaṅkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ, determination or judgment after full reflection.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1-7.—This means ‘that desire to act in a certain way which arises from rightful volition,’ i.e., the determination to attain a certain object by a definite means in accordance with the Scriptures.

According to Viśvarūpa this helps only in determining one out of a number of optional alternatives.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1-7.—‘Samyakṣaṅkalpa’ is such volition as is free from love, hatred and such aberrations. ‘Kāma’, a well-considered vow. Or this may be the same as what Manu has called ‘Śīla,’ which has been described in the Mahābhārata as consisting in knowledge and sympathy, in thought, word and act, towards all living beings;—this is called a ‘source of Dharma’ in the sense that it is helpful in the man possessed of this quality being better able to understand what is said in the Veda. Hārīta has described ‘Śīla’ as consisting in the following ten qualities:—‘Devotion to Brāhmaṇas, Gods and Pitṛs, sympathy, freedom from jealousy, kindly disposition, friendliness, sweet words, mercy and calmness.’ This is to be accepted as authoritative only in regard to those cases of doing (such acts as the helping of a Brāhmaṇa) which are not covered by the Vedic injunctions bearing on the subject. According to others, however, it is the authority in regard to such determinations as ‘I shall not drink water except with food.’

Another interpretation of the whole verse .—‘ Samyak’ qualifies ‘Śruti,’ and means ‘duly understood’; and it also qualifies ‘Smṛti,’ where it means ‘based upon the Veda’;—

‘Svasya’ is to be taken by itself and construed with ‘āchāraḥ’ the meaning being ‘the practice or custom of one’s own ancestors’:—‘priyam ātmanaḥ’ means ‘self-satisfaction’; ‘Samyakṣaṅkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ’ means the desire to act in a certain way after proper reflection; this would vary with different individuals; some men would be satisfied with the mere assertion of a trustworthy person,while others would want corroborative texts.

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7.—Such desire as is not repugnant to the scriptures, e.g., in such cases as the determination not to drink water except with food.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, p. 10.—This means a ‘well-considered vow’ such as ‘I shall not drink water except with food’; or it may stand for the ‘desire to do good and so forth which arises from a proper, i.e., philanthropic, determination’; in this sense it stands for the same thing as the ‘Śīla’ in Manu’s text.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25.—The term ‘Śīla’ stands for the thirteen qualities enumerated by Hārīta. It stands, it will be seen, for the negative virtues, and is as such distinguished from ‘Ācāra,’ practice or custom, which stands for the positive ones.

On Yājña. 1.7 the Vīramitrodaya identifies the Śīla of Manu with the ‘Samyakṣaṅkalpajakāma’ of Yājñavalkya.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5.—‘Śīla’ connotes freedom from love, hatred and so forth.

####### (E) Ātmanastuṣṭi—Svasya Priyam

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6.—This ‘self-satisfaction’ is meant to be of those only who are ‘learned in the Veda and good’ (‘Vedavidām sādhūnām’), the idea of this being that the ‘source of Dharma’ is based upon the trustworthy character of the persons concerned. When the ‘learned and good’ feel satisfied regarding the righteousness of a certain action, that action must be accepted as right; because such men can never feel satisfied with anything that is wrong. The older treatises however have explained the meaning to be that in oases of optional alternatives that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the man’s own mind feels satisfied. There is yet another explanation by which what is meant is that ‘whenever one is doing anything he should keep his mind tranquil and calm’ and in this sense like ‘Śīla,’ ‘freedom from love and hate,’ this ‘self-satisfaction’ also pertains to ‘all acts.’

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 2.6.—In cases where we have no other means of ascertaining the right course of action, we are to he guided by ‘self-satisfaction’; i.e., we should do that the doing of which makes us feel easy at heart and satisfies the conscience. This is inferior to ‘Śīla’ and ‘Ācāra’ as it pertains to the mind of a single individual and hence is lacking in that corroboration by others which is available in the case of the other two.

Kullūka on Manu, 2.6.—‘Self-satisfaction’ is authoritative only in regard to the choice of alternatives.

Nandana on Manu, 2.6.—Nandana construes this with

‘Sādhūnām,’ by which explanation the meaning is that the self-satisfaction of exceptionally righteous persons is to be regarded as trustworthy.

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Self-satisfaction’ meant here is such as is not incompatible with Vedic texts, and is not due to restlessness;—the taking to renunciation, for instance, during a time when the family is in trouble, would not be ‘lawful,’ even though one may feel self-satisfaction in it……‘Svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ’ may also mean ‘Liberation.’

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Self-satisfaction’ serves to determine which one of several sanctioned alternatives has to be adopted, e.g., the performance of Upanayan in the 7th or the 8th year.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7.—It is that which brings satisfaction to one’s own mind. This is to be accepted as authority only in regard to cases that are distinctly declared to be subject to such authority, in such texts as ‘when one feels that there is a load in his mind until a certain act is done, that act he shall do.’

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1.7.—‘Svasya priyam’ means ‘self-satisfaction’; i.e., the satisfaction regarding the propriety of a certain act, in the mind of such men as arc steeped in Vedic tradition. This same idea is expressed by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila in the verse etena vaidikāneka ‘Trustworthiness belongs to the self-satisfaction of such persons as have their minds steeped in the moral grandeur of the Veda.’ This ‘self-satisfaction’ must be that of the enquirer himself, and he cannot go about seeking for that of all Vedic scholars. This is the sole authority in regard to such questions as to whether or not the performance of the expiation of a certain sin shall be repeated; this having been declared by Bṛhaspati:—‘One should go, on doing an act until his mind becomes lightened,’—i.e., free from the incubus of the sinful act committed. Others, however, have held that ‘self-satisfaction’ is what determines which of the several equally authoritative alternative courses of action one shall adopt.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25.—‘Sādhūnām’ in Manu has to be construed with ‘tuṣṭiḥ’; the sense being that when there is a doubt as to what is ‘right,’ that course of action is to be accepted as ‘right’ with regard to which there is satisfaction among ‘good men,’ i.e., men whose minds are steeped in Vedic lore. Such is the explanation given by the Kalpataru; this view has the support also of a Taittirīya text, which says—‘When there are doubts regarding what is right, one should act in the manner that those Brāhmaṇas act who are impartial, judicious, trustworthy and highly righteous.’ This implies the authority also of the Pariṣad, ‘Council’ or ‘Assembly.’ This ‘self-satisfaction’ is authoritative only in the determining of one out of a number of optional alternatives, and there too it is authority only for the man himself; and the ‘self-satisfaction’ of one man can have no authority for another.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra - M S.—Mere self-satisfaction is not authoritative. What is meant is that when a cultured and learned man feels satisfied that a certain course of action is righteous, that satisfaction itself is to be regarded as a trustworthy guide.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5.—This is authority only in determining one of several optional alternatives.

####### Comparative Authority

Manu, 2.10.—‘The Veda is to be known as Śruti, R evealed Word, and the Dharmaśāstra, Legal Ordinances, as Smṛti; in all matters these two do not deserve to be criticised.’

According to Medhātithi, ‘Custom’ also is included under ‘Smṛti’ here. Kullūka does not accept this view; according to him the text puts the Smṛti distinctly above Custom, which means that Custom contrary to Smṛti is to he rejected.

Manu (2.14) says—‘Whenever there is conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as lawful’; the same with two Smṛti texts, adds Medhātithi; i.e., the two courses of action laid down by the conflicting texts are to be treated as optional alternatives.

Viśvarūpa on yājñavalkya, 1.7.—According to Manu, in all purely spiritual matters the Veda is the highest authority; the Smṛti-writers themselves regard the authority of the Smṛti as extremely weak in comparison with that of the Śruti; all which leads to the conclusion that when Smṛti conflicts with Śruti, it is to he rejected.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7.—In the determining of Dharma, says Vyāsa, the Veda is the only pure source of knowledge, ‘pure,’ i. e., whose authority is beyond suspicion;—all the rest are ‘mixed’—i. e., their authority is open to doubt. Hence that is the highest Dharma which is learnt from the Veda; what is declared in the Purāṇa anil other works is the lower Dharma. All other works of human origin are to be rejected in the matter of Dharma. Vaśiṣṭha says that “Dharma is that which is prescribed by Śruti and Smṛti; and it is in the absence of these that the ‘Practice of the Cultured’ is to be accepted as authoritative.”

Saṃskāramayūkha, p. 1.—

The order is

1. Śruti,
2. Smṛti,
3. Sadācāra,
4. Svasya Priyam,
5. Samyakṣaṅkalpaja-kāma.

Among Smṛtis Manu is most authoritative, as says Aṅgiras—manvarthaviparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate (i.e., not to be honoured). Also the Veda itself—yad vai manuravadat tad bheṣajam |

Smṛticandrikā, pp. 15-17.—Says Manu (2.14)—tu yatra syāt tatra dharmāvabhau smṛtau, i.e., where two Śruti texts are mutually contradictory, both are right; i.e., the two courses laid down are to be treated as optional alternatives. The same rule applies to cases of conflict between two Smṛti texts; says Gautama tustyabalavirodhe vikalpaḥ.—When there is conflict between Śruti and Smṛti the latter is to be rejected; so also when Custom conflicts with Smṛti, the former is rejected, as is clear from Vaśiṣṭha’s words—śrutismṛtivihito dharmaḥ tadabhāve śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam. The same applies to the opinion of the Assembly also. When there is conflict between Manu and another Smṛti, the former is to be accepted; as says Aṅgiras:—

yat pūrvaṃ manunā proktaṃ dharmaśāstramanuttamam |
na hi tat samatikrasya vacanaṃ hitamātmanaḥ ||

Also Bṛhaspati—

vedā(du|rtho)panibaddhatvāt prādhānyaṃ tu manoḥ smṛtaṃ |

In cases where the same act is prescribed in equally authoritative texts in two different forms, we have to accept the more elaborate of the two and reject the simpler.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 25-29.—When there is a conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as equally authoritative, and in actual practice the two courses of action are to be treated as optional alternatives. Similarly when there is a conflict between two Smṛti texts or between two ‘customs.’ When there is conflict between a Vedic text and a Smṛti text, preference is to he given to the former as possessed of inherent authority, while the latter owes its authority to an assumed Vedic text. When there is a conflict between a Smṛti text and a Custom, the Smṛti is to he regarded as the more authoritative; e.g., the custom of the marrying of the maternal uncle’s daughter cannot he accepted as authoritative when it is found to be in conflict with the distinct Smṛti text forbidding that practice.

There is a further distinction among authorities of the same class also. For instance, between two Vedic texts, if one is of doubtful import while the meaning of the other is clear, then the latter is to be given preference. If one treats of a more important matter than the other, it is to be given preference; e.g., if one deals with something to be done, while the other, with a minor detail of the act, the former is to set aside the latter. What occurs in the opening sentence sets aside what occurs in the concluding sentence; e.g., the opening sentence speaks of the ‘three Vedas,’ and the concluding sentence speaks of the ‘Ṛk Verse’ as to he recited ‘loudly,’ the signification of the word ‘Ṛk’ in the latter is sublated by that of the word ‘Veda’in the former, and the ‘loudness’ becomes connected with the three Vedas, and not with the Mantras of the Ṛk Veda only. If what is said in one text is beset with more difficulties than what occurs in another, then the former is to be rejected; e.g., one text lays down that a man who accepts the gift of horses should perform as many sacrifices as the horses he receives; while another speaks of Prajāpati having given a horse to Varuṇa and performed a sacrifice to this deity—by which the giver and not the receiver, is to perform the sacrifice;—now if we accept the former, i.e., if we accept the view that the sacrifice is to be performed by the receiver of the gift, then we shall have the following difficulties in the construing of the latter text: (1) it will be necessary to take the Dative in ‘Varuṇāya’ (‘to Varuṇa’) as standing for the Ablative (‘from Varuṇa’), and (2) to take the verb ‘given’ as standing for ‘accepted’; while on the other hand, if we accept the latter text, according to which the sacrifice is to be performed by the giver of the horse, then the only difficulty involved in the construing of the former text is to take the verb ‘accept’ as standing for ‘give’; and hence it is the former text that is rejected, and the conclusion is that the giver of a horse is to perform sacrifices. Where one thing is enjoined in connection with a particular Veda, this is given preference over what would apply to that same, in accordance with what has been prescribed in connection with another Veda; e.g., in connection with the Yajurveda we have the injunction that its Mantras are to be recited in an undertone; in accordance with this rule one may be led to think that the chanting of the Vāravantīya (Sāma-hymn) is to be done in an undertone; but this is precluded by the ‘high pitch’ that has been enjoined in connection with the chanting of the mantras of the Sāma-Veda. What is enjoined in regard to the particular ‘Vedic Recensional School’ to which the performer’s family belongs is given preference over what may have been enjoined in connection with another school. The general law is superseded by the particular, and so on.

In the case of Smṛtis also,—the ‘orthodox’ Smṛti sets aside the ‘heterodox,’—among the ‘orthodox’ Smṛtis also, if a certain course of action is sanctioned by one, hut condemned by another, the latter sets aside the former, and the action in question is to he avoided. What is laid down in reference to imperceptible transcendental effects sets aside what is enjoined for temporal or worldly ends; e.g., the law prohibiting the killing of the Brāhmaṇa sets aside the law that ‘one may kill a person who is threatening to kill,’ as the latter course of action is meant only to serve the perceptible purpose of saving one’s life.. The Smṛti that is based upon a Vedic Arthavāda is set aside by that which is based upon a Vedic injunction; e.g., the law sanctioning the killing of the cow in honour of an honoured guest,—being based upon an Arthavāda passage commendatory of the ‘churning’ or ‘rubbing’ of sticks,—is set aside by that which prohibits the said killing,—this latter being based upon the Vedic injunctive passage—‘Kill not Aditi, the hornless cow.’

Among ‘Custom,’ ‘self-satisfaction’ and ‘well considered vow,’—the preceding is more authoritative than the following; as declared by the Mitākṣarā.

In some cases what is sanctioned by higher authority is rejected by what is said by a lower authority; e.g., the drinking of wine (at the Sautrāmaṇi sacrifice), even though enjoined by the Veda, is not considered right, in view of its prohibition during Kali - Yuga contained in the Smṛti.

Any Smṛti that goes against the ordinances of Manu is to be rejected—as declared by Bṛhaspati (see above). This is the view of the Kalpataru also.—Customs, local, tribal as well as family, are to be rejected if repugnant to the Veda or the Smṛti or the Purāṇa.

As between Śruti and Smṛti, the conclusion arrived at is thus expressed by Vyāsa:—‘That law which is deduced from the Veda is the higher, while that declared in the Purāṇa and other Smṛtis is the lower; which means that in cases of conflict our first duty is to do what is laid down in the Veda, and the doing of what is declared in the Smṛti can be justified only as a substitute, i.e., to be adopted only when there is no possibility of the other being adopted. And this for the simple reason that according to Manu (11.30), if one follows the ‘second best’ course when the best course is possible, his action becomes futile; so that tho conclusion indicated by this is that even in cases of conflict tho Smṛti does not entirely lose its authoritative character; all that happens is that the course of action sanctioned by it is rendered fruitless by reason of the superiority of authority attaching to the Vedic text to the contrary.

The variability of the Law is unfeignedly declared by Parāśara in 1.22:—

‘The Law or the Right is one in the Kṛta Cycle, different in the Tretā Cycle, yet different in the Dvāpara Cycle, and yet different in the Kali Cycle,—varying as it does with the character of the Time-Cycles.’

On this Mādhava makes the following observations:—

The ‘difference’ spoken of here is, not of the nature or essence, of the Law or Right, but of its modes. If it were the former, then it would imply a corresponding diversity in the Veda also, as the source of that Law; while as a matter of fact, the Veda does not vary with the time-cycles. As regards the modes however, we have several instances of diversity; for instance, though the act of the Agnihotra- offering itself is the same, yet there is diversity in regard to the mode of performing it according as it is performed in the morning or in the evening. For instance, at the evening-performance the sprinkling is to be done with the mantra ‘Ṛtantva satyena pariṣiñchāmi,’ while that at the morning-performance with the mantra ‘Satyantva ṛtena pariṣiñchāmi.’ Thus in the present instance also, the variation lies in the mode of doing what is ‘right,’ and not in what is ‘right’ itself; the variations being due to the nature of the time-cycle and of the capacity of the man doing the acts. This matter has been fully discussed in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra VI.3, where the conclusion arrived at is that in the case of the Agnihotra and such other obligatory rites, only those prescribed details have to be performed which it is within the capacity of the performer to perform. Baudhāyana also has declared that the obligatory acts are to be performed to the extent that one can; they should, on no account, be entirely omitted.

The most important instance of variation is cited by Parāśara (1.23) himself—“In the Kṛta Cycle, Austerity is the highest Dharma or Duty;—in the Tretā, Learning;—in the Dvāpara, Sacrifice,—and in the Kali, Charity.” To the last Bṛhaspati adds ‘sympathy and self-control.’

There is variation, according to Parāśara (1.24), not only in Law, but also in the authority:—‘Duringthe Kṛa, the Laws are those ordained by Manu,—during the Tretā, those ordained by Gautama,—during the Dvāpara, those ordained by Śaṅkha-Likhita,—and during the Kali, those ordained by Parāśara.’ This distinction however has never been observed in actual practice, as even up to the present time, the work of Manu holds the highest position among the Smṛtis.

####### Conclusion

From the above we conclude that all the authorities are agreed on the following points—(a) The Veda is the first and paramount authority, (b) The Smṛti is authoritative only in so far as it is not repugnant to the Veda, to which it owes its authority; but only on matters on which we have no paramount authority, (c) Practices or Customs are trustworthy guides, only as they are current among the ‘cultured,’ and then too only those that are not repugnant to Vedic or Smṛti texts. (d) The same with regard to Tribal or Family Customs. (e) The judgment of the ‘Assembly’ of the learned is to be accepted as authoritative only when it is not repugnant to the Veda, and only when tho judgment is ‘unbiased’ by improper feelings. There is not a single text, or ‘explanation,’ which favours the opinion that Custom is to override original texts,—an opinion that has been upheld by the Privy Council, and endorsed by eminent writers on Anglo-Hindu Law. Neither Vijñāneśvara (Mitākṣarā) nor Jīmūtavāhana (Dharmaratna) nor Nīlakaṇṭha (Mayūkha) countenances any such view; and these three are regarded by our lawyers as the founders of the principal ‘Schools of Law.’

006 The whole Veda is the (first) source of the sacred law, next the tradition and the virtuous conduct of those who know the (Veda further), also the customs of holy men, and (finally) self-satisfaction.

Whatever Dharma for whatever person has been described by Manu,—all this is declared in the Veda; since the Veda embodies all knowledge.—(7)

यद् उक्तं वेदवित्संबन्धेन स्मृतेः प्रामाण्यम्, तद् अनेन प्रकटयति । यः कश्चिद् धर्मो वर्णधर्म आश्रमधर्मः संस्कारधर्मः सामान्यरूपो विशेषरूपश् च, कस्यचिद् ब्राह्मणादेर् वर्णस्य, मनुना परिकीर्तितः । स सर्वो ऽपि वेदे ऽभिहितः प्रतिपादितः । यथा चैतत् तथा पूर्वश्लोक उक्तम् । सर्वज्ञानमयो हि सः । सर्वेषां ज्ञानानाम् अदृष्टविषयाणां हेतुर् निमित्तं वेदः । सर्वैर् ज्ञानैर् निर्मित इवेति ज्ञाने⁴⁰ तद्विकारत्वम् अध्यारोप्य मयट् कृतः । यो हि यद्विकारः स तन्मयस् तत्स्वभाव इत्य् उच्यते । वेदश् च ज्ञानहेतुत्वात् तन्मय इति । सत्कार्यदर्शने⁴¹ कारणं कार्यस्वभावम् इति । अथ वा सर्वज्ञानाद् धेतोः, आगतः “हेतुम् अनुष्येभ्यः” (पान् ४.३.८१) इति मयट् क्रियते ॥ २.७ ॥

This verse proceeds to make it clear how the authority of the Smṛti (Recollection) is due to its connection with persons knowing the Veda.

‘Whatever Dharma’—duties relating to castes, duties relating to life-stages, duties relating to sacramental rites, in their general or special forms—‘for whatever person’—for the Brāhmaṇa or other castes—‘has been described by Manu’—‘all this is declared in the Veda’—i.e., is expounded in it; how this is done has been shown in the preceding verse.

‘Since the Veda embodies all knowledge’;—Veda is the cause, the source, of all that is worth knowing, in regard to superphysical things. The affix ‘mayaṭ’ has been added in the sense that the Veda is made up of all knowledge; applying to ‘knowledge’ the character of being the product of the Veda. When one thing is the produot of another, the latter is spoken of as ‘embodying’ the former, i.e., of the same nature as the other; and Veda, being the source of knowledge, is said to ‘embody’ it. According to the Sāṅkhya theory of the Product being always existent in the Cause, the Cause is of the same nature as the Product.

Or, the meaning may be that ‘the Veda proceeds from all knowledge’ as its source; the ‘mayaṭ’ affix in this sense being used according to Pāṇini’s Sūtra 4.3.81.—(7)

This verse is quoted in Hemādri (Śrāddha, p. 20.7.)

Taittirīya-Saṃhitā, 2-2-6.2.—‘Whatever Manu has said is wholesome.’

Parāśara-Smṛti, 1.21.—‘During each Kalpa Manu declares the Dharmas.’

007 Whatever law has been ordained for any (person) by Manu, that has been fully declared in the Veda: for that (sage was) omniscient.

Having fully perceived all this with the eye of knowledge, the learned man should enter upon his own duties, resting upon the authority of the Revealed Word.—(8)

सर्वं⁴² ज्ञेयं कृतकाकृतकम्, शास्त्रगोचरं प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरम् अप्रत्यक्षादिगोचरम्,⁴³ स्अमवेक्ष्यइतज् ज्ञानचक्षुषा तर्कव्याकरणनिरुक्तमीमांसादिविद्यास्थानश्रवणचिन्तनात्मकेन । चक्षुर् इव चक्षुः शास्त्राभ्यासः, ज्ञानस्य कारणत्वसामान्यात् । यथा चक्षुषा रूपं ज्ञायते, एवं शास्त्रेण धर्म इति सामान्यम् । समवेक्ष्य सम्यग् विचारपूर्वकं निरूप्य, श्रुतिप्रामान्यतो वेदप्रामाण्येन धर्मे निविशेत, धर्मम् अनुतिष्ठेत् ।

• सर्वेषु हि शास्त्रेषु सम्यग्ज्ञातेषु वेदप्रंआण्यम् एवावतिष्ठते, नाज्ञातेषु । तथा हि, तानि शास्त्राणि निपुणत्वेन चिन्तयन्, न तेषां प्रामाण्ये सम्यग् युक्तिर् अस्ति, वेदे त्व् अस्तीति निश्चिनोति । सर्वग्रहणं ज्ञेयविशेषणम् । निखिलशब्दश् च समवेक्ष्येति क्रियाविशेषणम् । निखिलं समवेक्ष्य निःशेषेण पूर्वपक्षेण शास्त्रान्तराणां प्रामाण्ये वेदस्य वाप्रामाण्ये यावन्त्यः काश्चन युक्तयः प्रतिभासन्ते ताः सर्वाः प्रदर्श्य, सिद्धान्तसिद्धैर् हेतुभिर् यथालक्षणलक्षितैर् निराकृत्य, स्वपक्षसाधने चोपन्यस्ते वेदप्रामाण्यम् अवतिष्ठत इति निखिलशब्देन प्रदर्श्यते । तेन तौ निखिलसर्वशब्दौ पर्यायाव् अपि भिन्नविषयत्वान् न पुनरुक्तौ । स्वग्रहणम् अनुवादः । यो ह्य् अन्यस्य धर्मः सो ऽन्यस्याधर्म एव ॥ २.८ ॥

‘All this’—all tilings that can be known, those that are created as well as those that are uncreated (eternal); all that is dealt with in the scriptures, what is amenable to perception and other ordinary means of knowledge, and also what is not so amenable.

‘Having perceived with the of knowledge’—in the shape of the learning of and pondering over the various sciences of Reasoning, Grammar, Philology, Mīmāmsā and the rest. The study of the scriptures is called the ‘eye’ in the sense that it is like the eye, in being the instrument of knowledge; the similitude being that ‘Dharma is known by means of scriptures in the same way as Colour is known by means of the Eye.’

‘Honing perceived’—i.e., after having ascertained by means of due consideration.

‘Resting upon the authority of the Revealed Word.’—i.e., in accordance with the authority of the Veda.

‘Should enter upon his duties’—i.e., perform his dharma.

After all the sciences have been studied, the trustworthy character becomes fully established, which is not done until the sciences have been duly studied. When a man carefully ponders over the sciences, he comes to the conclusion that there are no grounds for believing in the authority of these sciences, while there are reasons for trusting the authority of the Veda.

‘Sarvam,’ ‘all,’ qualifies all that is to be known; and ‘nikhilam,’ ‘fully,’ is an adverb modifying the participle ‘samavekṣya,’ ‘having perceived,’—‘Having fully perceived,’—i.e., (1) having stated, in the form of the primâ facie Argument, all possible semi-arguments in support of the view that the other sciences are authoritative,—or that the Veda is not authoritative,—(2) having refuted those arguments by means of perfectly valid reasonings based upon the established theory,—when one states his own finally considered view, the final conclusion arrived at is that the Veda is authoritative;—all this is what is implied by the term ‘fully.’ Thus though the term ‘sarva’ and ‘nikhila’ are synonyms, yet since they serve two distinct purposes, they are not regarded as being a needless repetition.

The term ‘sva,’ ‘own’ is purely explanatory; what is the ‘duty’ of one man is not the ‘duty’ of another.—(8)

‘Idam’—The Śāstras (Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka);—the ordinances of Manu (Nārāyaṇa);—the various said sources of the knowledge of Dharma (Nandana).

Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 1.21.5.—‘One should undertake that act which he determines upon with due knowledge.’

Āpastamba, 2.2.2.—‘For all castes, greatest happiness accrues from the performance of their own duties.’

Āpastamba, 2.16.1.—‘Those who act after proper discrimination become reputed as highly righteous, and these are persons whose act has been described by Manu as Śrāddha.’

Gautama-Dharmasūtra, 11.31.—‘Men of all castes and in all stages of life, who are firm in their own duties, enjoy the fruits of their acts and then become born in highly qualified countries, and families, wherein they are endowed with learning, character, intelligence and happiness.’

Gautama-Dharmasūtra, 13.2.—‘Those firm in their own duties are free from all blame.’

Gantama-Dharmusūtra, 13.15.—‘The Brāhmaṇa should take his food at the house of only those persons who are reputed to he addicted to their own Dharma.’

Atri-Saṃhitā, 25.—‘Those persons who perform their own duties and remain firm therein, are loved by people, even though they may be at a distance.’

Atri-Saṃhitā, 25.—‘Even the Śūdra, if he is firm in his Dharma, attains Heaven.

Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra, 1.2.19.—‘The Brāhmaṇa and the rest should remain firm in their own duties.’

008 But a learned man after fully scrutinising all this with the eye of knowledge, should, in accordance with the authority of the revealed texts, be intent on (the performance of) his duties.

For the man performing the duty laid down by the revealed word and the recollections obtains fame here, and after death, unsurpassed happiness.—(9)

यो नास्तिकतया वैदिकानि निष्फलानि कर्माणीति व्यामुह्य न तदनुष्ठाने प्रवर्तेत, तस्य प्रवृत्त्यर्थं सुहृद् भूत्वा दृष्टफलप्रदर्शनं करोति । तिष्ठतु तावद् अन्यत् फलम् । श्रुतौ स्मृतिषु च यद् उदितम् उक्तं धर्माख्यं कर्म तद् अनुतिष्ठन्न् **इह **अश्मिंल् लोके यावज् जीवति तावत् कीर्तिं प्रशस्यतां पूज्यतां सौभाग्यं लभते । न्याय्ये पथि स्थितो महापुण्यो ऽयम् इति सर्वेण पूज्यते । प्रियश् च सर्वस्य भवति । प्रेत्य देहान्तरे यस्माद् अन्यद् उत्तमं नास्ति तत् सुखं प्राप्नोति । प्रायेण स्वर्गकामस्याधिकारः, निरतिशया च प्रीतिः स्वर्गः, तत उच्यते अनुत्तमम् इति । तस्मान् नास्ति कस्यापि दृष्टफलार्थिनो ऽत्रैव प्रवृत्तिः प्रयुक्तेत्य्⁴⁴ एवंपरम् एतत् ॥ २.९ ॥

There might be some one who, being an unbeliever, might form the misconception that the acts laid down in the Veda are fruitless, and omit to do them; hence with a view to induce such a man to undertake the performance of those acts, the Author, placing himself in the position of a friend, proceeds to indicate the. perceptible results that follow from the acts in question, to say nothing of other kinds of results.

The man who performs the act, known as ‘duty,’ ‘Dharma,’—which is ‘laid down by the Revealed Word and the Recollections—obtains ‘here,’ in this wold, as long as he lives, ‘fame,’ praise, honour, regard; that is, all men respect him and love him as one ‘who is firm in the rightful path and highly virtuous.’

‘After death,’—in another body—he obtains that ‘happiness’ superior to which there is no other happiness. As a matter of fact, almost all the acts are prescribed in the Veda as to be done by one who desires Heaven; and ‘Heaven’ stands for ‘unsurpassed happiness’; hence it is that the author speaks of ‘unsurpassed happiness.’

For these reasons, it is only right that the unbeliever also, who seeks for nothing but visible results, should undertake the performance of the acts in question. This is the purport of the text.—(9)

This verse is quoted in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 14);—in the Vīramitrodaya (Paribhāṣā, p. 61), which explains that, ‘anuttamam sukham’ stands for the rewards that are spoken of in connection with each act;—and in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 16b).

Atri-Saṃhitā, 16.—‘By me has been described that Dharma in which remaining firm, men of the various castes acquire reputation in the world and after death attain the highest condition.’

Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 2.2.5.—‘In course of evolution, the man, by the residue of the results of his past acts, obtains his caste, his- body, his complexion, strength, intelligence, knowledge and also other things and activities; and in its revolution, this process brings him happiness in both worlds.’ Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 2.2.7.—‘Through acts conducive to sin, one becomes born in undesirable families.’

Gautama-Dharmasūtra, 11-31.—‘People of various castes and in various stages of life, remaining firm in their duties, on death, enjoy the fruits of their acts, and by reason of the residue of those, become born again in a good family of superior caste, endowed with long life, learning, wealth, happiness and intelligence.’

Vaśiṣṭha-Smṛti, 1.2.—‘The man who performs his duties with due knowledge becomes highly praiseworthy in the world, and after death attains Heaven.’

Dakṣa-Smṛti, 2.66.—‘The Householder, ever intent on his own duties, partakes of Heaven.’

Laghu-Viṣṇu-Smṛti, 2.17.—‘Whatever has been prescribed in the Śruti and in the Smṛti,—all this should be done by the Housoholder; otherwise, he becomes open to censure.’

009 For that man who obeys the law prescribed in the revealed texts and in the sacred tradition, gains fame in this (world) and after death unsurpassable bliss.

The Veda should be known as the ‘revealed word,’ and the Dharmaśāstra as the ‘recollections’; in all matters, these two do not deserve to be criticised, as it is out op these that Dharma shone forth.—(10)

“Scripture is not authoritative; why then should contrariness to it be regarded as undesirable? That the scripture (Veda) is unauthoritative is proved by such discrepancies as (a) untruthfulness, (b) inconsistency and (c) repetition.

(a) Such sacrifices as the Kārīrī (which is laid down as to be performed for obtaining rain) are performed by men desiring min, but as a matter of fact no rain comes after the performance. As regards the rain that might come at some future time, it has been well said—‘The Kārīrī having been performed during the autumn, when the cornfields were drying up, if the rain falls during the spring, this only leads to cattle-disease!’ Further, as regards the Jyotiṣṭoma and such other sacrifices, which are spoken of as bringing their rewards at some future time, since the acts will have completely disappeared after performance, the assertion that their reward would come after a hundred years would be exactly like the confident assertion of the Vampirist. From this it is clear that the Veda is untruthful,

(b) There is ‘inconsistency’ also: when it is said ‘libations should be offered after sunrise,’ if it were offered before sunrise, it would be clearly wrong; as it is said—‘those who perform the Agnihotra before sunrise utter falsehood morning after morning.’ Then again, it is said ‘that the libations should be offered before the sun has risen,’ for (it is said) ‘the offering made after sunrise would be like the offering of reception to the guest after he had gone.’ Now in the former we have the injunction of offering after sunrise, and a deprecation of offering before sunrise, while in the latter we have the reverse. So that people are always in doubt as to which alternative they should adopt.

(c) The same Agnihotra that is enjoined in one Vedic Rescension is found to be enjoined in another Rescension also; and it has been held (by the Mīmāmsakas) that the act, mentioned in the various texts, is one and the same (Agnihotra) And this is a clear Repetition.”

• उच्यते । इह सदाचारो न श्रुतिः, न स्मृतिः, निबन्धाभावात् । निबद्धाक्षरा हि स्मृतयः प्रसिद्धाः । अतस् तस्य स्मृतित्वम् उपपादयति । यत् कार्यं धर्मं शास्त्य् अर्थं⁴⁵ तद् धर्मशास्त्रम् । यत्र धर्मः शिष्यते कर्तव्यतया प्रतीयते सा स्मृतिः । निबन्धानिबन्धाव् अप्रयोजकौ । शिष्टसमाचाराद् अपि धर्मस्य कर्तव्यतावगतिः । सो ऽपि स्मृतिर् एव । ततश् च यत्र कस्मैचित् कार्याय स्मृतेर् उपादानं तत्र सदाचारो ऽपि ग्रहीतव्यः ।

• धर्मशास्त्रं चेत् स्मृतिर् वेदो ऽपि सर्वमुख्यं धर्मशासनम् इति तस्यापि स्मृतित्वप्रसङ्गः । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थम् आह- श्रुतिस् तु वेदो विज्ञेयः । यत्र श्रूयते धर्मानुशासनशब्दः सा श्रुतिः । यत्र च स्मर्यते सा स्मृतिः । तच् च समाचारे ऽप्य् अस्तीत्य् अतः सो ऽपि स्मृतिर् एव । न हि तत्राप्य् अस्मृतवैदिके शब्दे प्रामाण्यम् ।

• अथ वा श्रुतिग्रहणं स्मृतेर् वेदतुल्यत्वार्थम् ।

• किं पुनः श्रुतिस्मृतयोः समानं कार्यं यत् समाचारे⁴⁶ ऽप्य् अन्येन प्राप्यते ।

• उच्यते । ते सर्वार्थेष्व् अमीमांस्ये । ते श्रुतिस्मृती । सर्वेष्व् अर्थेष्व् अत्यन्तासंभाव्येष्व् अपि दृष्टविषयैः प्रमाणैः, यथा तस्माद् एव हिंसालक्षणात् पदार्थात् क्वचिद् अभ्युदयः क्वचित् प्रत्यवायः, “सुरापानान् नरकः सोमपानात् पापशुद्धिः” इत्यादौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षगमनेन विचारो न कर्तव्यः । आशङ्कापक्षान्तरसंभावनं मीमांसनम् । यथा- “हिंसा चेत् पापहेतुः स्वरूपाविशेषाद् वैदिक्य् अपि तथा भवितुम् अर्हति; अथ वैदिक्य् अभ्युदयहेतुः, लौकिक्य् अपि तथा स्यात्, तद्रूपसमानत्वात्” । यस्य यद् रूपं वेदाद् अवगतं तस्य तद् विपरीतरूपसंभावनम् असत्तर्काश्रयैर् असम्यग्घेतुभिर् यद् विचारणं तत् सिद्धान्ताभिनिवेशः स इह प्रतिषिध्यते । न पुनर् अयम् अर्थो वेदस्याद्यः⁴⁷ पूर्वपक्षः, उत स्विद् यः⁴⁸ सिद्धान्त इत्य् एषा मीमांसा निषिध्यते । यतो वक्ष्यति-

• यस् तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतर । इति । (म्ध् १२.१०६)

• किं पुनर् अयम् अदृष्टार्थो मीमांसनप्रतिषेधः ।

• नेति ब्रूमः । ताभ्यां धर्मो हि निर्बभौ । अनेन तार्किकप्रमाणानां वेदार्थविपरीतसाधनानाम् आभासताम् आह । ईदृशा हि तेषां हेतवः- “वैदिकी हिंसा पापहेतुः, हिंसात्वात्, लौकिकहिंसावत्” । तत्र हिंसायां पापहेतुत्वं न कुतश्चिद् अन्यतः प्रमाणात् सिद्धम् अन्तरेणागमम् । एवं चेन् नास्ति हिंसायाः पापसाधनसिद्धौ हेतुः यावद् आगमः प्रामाण्येन नाभ्युपगतः । अभ्युपगते चागमप्रामाण्ये तद्विरुद्धो हेतुर् न युज्यते, अप्रामाण्यापत्तेर् आगमस्य । ततश् चेतरेतरव्याघातः । पूर्वं प्रामाण्येन परिग्रहः पश्चाद् अप्रामाण्यम् इति । सो ऽयं स्ववचनविरुद्धः पक्षः । नैनं तार्किका अन्य्मन्यन्ते, “मम माता वन्ध्या” इतिवत्, आगमविरुद्धश्⁴⁹ च ।

• अथोच्यते । नैवागमः प्रमाणम् । कथं तद्विरोधोद्भावनं दूषणम्, अनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः । कारीर्यादिकर्मणां तत्समनन्तरं फलार्थितयानुष्ठीयमानानां न नियमतो ऽनुष्ठानसमनन्तरं फलप्राप्तिः । कालान्तरे भविष्यतीति चेत्, उक्तम् अत्र ।

• कृता शरदि कारीरी भृशं शुष्यत्सु शालिषु ।

• वसन्ते जायते वृष्टिस् तस्या गोमरकः फलम्⁵⁰ ॥ इति ।

यान्य् अप्य् अन्यत्रभाविफलानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि तत्रापि निरन्वयविनाशात् कर्मणो वर्षशते फलं भविष्यतीति निःसंदिग्धवैतालिकव्यवहारोपमम् एतत् । तस्माद् अनृतम् । व्याघातः- उदिते होतव्यम्, अनुदिते जुह्वतो दोषः- “प्रातः प्रातर् अनृतं ते वदन्ति पुरोदयाज् जुह्वति ये ऽग्निहोत्रम्” (ऐत्ब् ५.३१) । तथानुदिते होतव्यम्- “यथा अतिथये प्रद्रुताय दद्यात् तादृग् एतद् यज् जुहुयात्” (त्ब् २.१.२.१२) इत्य् एकत्रोदितहोमो विधीयते ऽनुदितहोमनिन्दया, तद् एव विपरीतम् अन्यत् । तत्र कः⁵¹ पक्ष आश्रीयताम् इत्य् अनध्यवसायः । यद् एवाग्निहोत्राद्य् एकस्यां शाखायां विद्यते तद् एव शाखान्तरे ऽपि । सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययम् एकं कर्मेत्य् अभ्युपगमः । ततश् च पुनरुक्तम् ।

• तत्रानृतम् एव तन् न भवतीत्य् एतेनैव पादेन प्रतिपाद्यते । यतो वेदाद् धर्म एव कर्तव्यतामात्रं यागादिविषयं निर्बभौ विभाति गम्यते, न पुनः कालविशेषः फलस्योत्पत्तौ, अधिकारवाक्येषु कालविशेषाश्रवणात् । विधितो हि फलं भवतीत्य् एतावद् गम्यते । कालावच्छेदो न विधिः । धात्वर्थसंबन्धिनो हि कालविभागा भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानाः । न चैतद् धात्वर्थफलं⁵² किं तु वैधम् । धत्वर्थफलं हि तदानीम् एव निर्वर्तते देवतोद्देशेन द्रव्यत्यागो हविर्विकारादि । यदि कश्चित् कस्यचिद् आज्ञाकरो भवति, तेन प्रेष्यते “गच्छ, याहि ग्रामम्” इति । स आज्ञासंपादने प्रवृत्तः कदाचित् प्रारम्भ एव वेतनफलं लभते, कदाचिन् मध्ये, कदाचित् कृत आज्ञाविषये समन्तरम् अन्येदुर् वा कालान्तरे ऽथ वा । एवम् एतच् छास्त्रफलम् अनियतकालम् । दिव्यवृष्ट्यादेस् तु स्वाभाव्येन प्रत्यासत्तिमात्रं गम्यते, न तु तदहर् एवोत्पत्तिः ।

• प्रतिबन्धकानि च यथा फलस्यैवंविधस्य लोके भवन्ति, तथा वेदे ऽपि पुराकृतं दुष्कृतादि । तथा च वेद एवैतद् दर्शयति- “यदि न वर्षेत् तथैव वसेत्” इति । सर्वस्वारे तु विवदन्ते- “नैतत् क्रतुफलम् । अङ्गम् एतत् स्मरणम्⁵³ । क्रतुफलं यः कामयेतानामयः स्वर्गलोकम् इयाम्”⁵⁴ इति ।

यच् चोक्तं हिंसायां लोकवेदयोर् न विशेष इति, तत्र शास्त्रावगम्यो हि तस्या अयं स्वभावः, न प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरः । तत्र च भेदः । रागलक्षणा लौकिकी हिंसा, विधिलक्षणालौकिकी हिंसा । विधिलक्षणा त्व् अग्नीषोमीयस्येति महान् भेदः । तस्मान् न किंचिद् वेदे ऽनृतम् । व्याघातं परस्तात् परिहरिष्यति श्लोकेनैव ॥ २.१० ॥

Objection:—“Is this a treatise on the meanings of words, a lexicon,—like the works beginning with such words as Ātmabhūḥ, Parameṣṭhī (are the names of Brahmā), and so forth,—that it is stated that ‘Revealed Word’ means the Veda, and ‘Recollections’ means the Dharmaśāstra?”

Answer:—In ordinary life, the ‘Practices of Cultured Men’ are not regarded either as ‘Revealed Word’ or as ‘Recollection,’ on the ground of their being not codified; codified treatises alone are known as ‘Smṛtis,’ ‘Recollections’; and it is for the purpose of declaring that these Practices also are included under ‘Smṛti’ that the author has set forth this verse.

‘Dharmaśāstra,’ ‘Dharma-ordinance,’ is that which serves the purpose of ‘ordaining’ (teaching) Dharma as to be done; and ‘Smṛti’ is that wherein Dharma is taught, i.e., laid down as to be done; and codification or non-codification is entirely immaterial. Now as a matter of fact a knowledge of what should be done is derived from the Practices of Cultured Men also; so that these also come under ‘Smṛti.’ Hence whenever mention is made of ‘Smṛti’ in connection with any matter, the Practices of Cultured Men should also be taken as included under the name.

“If all Dharmaśāstra (‘ordinance of Dharma’) is ‘Smṛti’ then the Veda also, which is the ‘ordinance of Dharma’ par excellence, would have to be regarded as Smṛti,”—with a view to preclude the possibility of such an idea being entertained, the author has said—‘The Veda should be known as the Revealed Word.’ Where the words conveying the ‘Teaching of Dharma’ are directly perceived (heard), it is the ‘Revealed Word’; while where the words of Teaching are only recollected, it is ‘Smṛti’; and since this latter condition is also fulfilled by the ‘Practices of Cultured Men,’ this latter also comes under ‘Smṛti’; as a matter of fact, no authority can attach to any Practice, in corroboration whereof a Vedic text is not ‘recollected.’

Or, the mention of the ‘Revealed Word’ may be explained as serving the purpose of showing that the Smṛti is equal to the Veda.

Question:—“What is that common function of Revealed Word and Recollection which rhe present verse seeks to attribute to the Practices of Cultured Men?”

Answer:—‘In all matters these two should not be criticised’;—‘These two’—i.e., Revealed Word and Recollection.—‘In all matters’—i.e., even in regard to apparently inconceivable things, such as are entirely beyond the scope of those means of knowledge that are applicable to perceptible things; e.g., (a) the same act of killing leads, in one case, to good, and while in another case it leads to sin; (b) the drinking of wine leads to Hell, while the drinking of Soma removes sin. In such matters, we should not proceed to discuss the various pros and cons. ‘Criticism’ consists in raising doubts and conceiving of contrary views. For example—“If the act of killing is sinful, then since the act of killing is the same in all cases, that done in the course of Vedic sacrifices should also be sinful;—if the latter killing is a source of good, ordinary killing also should be conducive to good; the act being exactly the same in both cases.”

What is prohibited here is that ‘criticism,’ in which we conceive of the form of an act to be quite the reverse of what is declared in the Veda, and proceeding to examine it by means of reasonings based upon false premisses, begin to insist on the conclusion thus arrived at. It is not meant to prohibit such enquiry and discussion as to whether the Prima Facie View or the Established Thesis is in due accord with the Veda. That such an inquiry is not meant to be prohibited is clear from what the author says later on—‘He alone, and none else, knows Dharma, who examines it by reasonings.’ (Manu, 12.106)

Question:—“Is this criticism prohibited with a view to some invisible (superphysical) results?”

We say—no. Because it was out of these two that Dharma shone forth. [This is what is intended by the said prohibition.]

This assertion points out the fact that all the arguments, set forth by casuists in support of things contrary to what is laid down in the Veda, are fallacious. These arguments are of the following kind—“The killing of animals in the course of Vedic sacrifices must be sinful, because it is killing, like any ordinary killing.”—Now that killing is sinful is learnt from no other source of knowledge except scriptures; under the circumstances, no reason can be found to establish the sinfulness of killing until the scriptures have been accepted as authoritative; and when once the authority of the Veda has been admitted, it could not be reasonable to bring forward arguments against it, as this would invalidate the (acknowledged) authority of scriptures; and this would involve self-contradiction: at first the scriptures were admitted to be authoritative, and then subsequently they are held to be un-authoritative; and this opinion would be contrary to the person’s own previous assertion,—no casuist ever says ‘my mother is childless’; and it is also contrary to the scriptures.

The Casuist might argue as follows:—

“Scripture is not authoritative; why then should contrariness to it be regarded as undesirable? That the scripture (Veda) is unauthoritative is proved by such discrepancies as (a) untruthfulness, (b) inconsistency and (c) repetition.

(a) Such sacrifices as the Kārīrī (which is laid down as to be performed for obtaining rain) are performed by men desiring min, but as a matter of fact no rain comes after the performance. As regards the rain that might come at some future time, it has been well said—‘The Kārīrī having been performed during the autumn, when the cornfields were drying up, if the rain falls during the spring, this only leads to cattle-disease!’ Further, as regards the Jyotiṣṭoma and such other sacrifices, which are spoken of as bringing their rewards at some future time, since the acts will have completely disappeared after performance, the assertion that their reward would come after a hundred years would be exactly like the confident assertion of the Vampirist. From this it is clear that the Veda is untruthful,

(b) There is ‘inconsistency’ also: when it is said ‘libations should be offered after sunrise,’ if it were offered before sunrise, it would be clearly wrong; as it is said—‘those who perform the Agnihotra before sunrise utter falsehood morning after morning.’ Then again, it is said ‘that the libations should be offered before the sun has risen,’ for (it is said) ‘the offering made after sunrise would be like the offering of reception to the guest after he had gone.’ Now in the former we have the injunction of offering after sunrise, and a deprecation of offering before sunrise, while in the latter we have the reverse. So that people are always in doubt as to which alternative they should adopt.

(c) The same Agnihotra that is enjoined in one Vedic Rescension is found to be enjoined in another Rescension also; and it has been held (by the Mīmāmsakas) that the act, mentioned in the various texts, is one and the same (Agnihotra) And this is a clear Repetition.”

That there is no ‘untruthfulness’ in the Veda is what is meant by the last quarter of the Verse (‘it was out of these that Dharma shone forth’). Because out of the Veda ‘Dharma alone—i.e., only that a certain act should be done, in the form of sacrifice,—‘shone forth,’ is expounded; and it does not say anything definite in regard to the time at which the rewards shall appear; this is clear from the fact that the passages that speak of rewards do not make mention of any time; all that we learn from the Injunction is that a certain result shall follow, and the Injunction does not specify the time. As a matter of fact, divisions of time, past, present and future, are related to what is expressed by the verbal root; while the Result is not denoted by the verbal root at all; it is only implied by the Injunction; what is denoted by the verbal root (i.e., the act of ‘sacrifice’) is actually accomplished at the time (of the performance), in the form of the offering of a substance for the benefit of a certain deity,—the fulfilment of this offering appearing in the form of the transformation of the substance offered (into the fire, for instance). Further in ordinary life also, we find that when a person, who is an obedient servant of another, is directed to go to a certain place, he at once obeys the order; though as regards his wages, in some cases he may obtain it at the very beginning; but also sometimes during the act, or even after the act has been accomplished; and then also he may get them on the same day, or the next day, or at some future time. In the same manner, there is no limit as to the time at which the results spoken of in the scriptures will appear; all that is meant is that (by the performance of the act) the result, in the shape of Heaven, Rain or so forth, is brought within reach,—and not (hat they appear on the very same day. Then again, just as there are obstacles in the way of the realising of results of acts done in the ordinary course of life, so there are also in the case of the acts prescribed by the Veda,—such obstacles consisting of past sins and so forth. This (possibility of the Rain not coming immediately after the act) is clearly shown in the Veda itself when it says ‘if the rain should not come, the man should continue as before.’ And as regards the Sarvasvāra sacrifice (which is laid down as leading the performer to heaven), people have explained that the reward does not consist in the immediate entrance to Heaven, in fact it consists in what the man actually desires, and the desire is in the form ‘may I reach heaven without difficulty [ i.e., after death; immediate translation to heaven would mean immediate death, which no man desires].

As regards the argument that there is no difference in the act of killing as done in ordinary life and as done during a Vedic sacrifice,—what has to be borne in mind is the fact that the sinfulness of the act of killing is known only from the scriptures, it is not amenable to perception or any ordinary means of knowledge; and there is certainly a difference: the ordinary killing is prompted by passion, while the sacrificial killing is prompted by Vedic Injunction; and as the killing of the animal offered to Agni-Soma is prompted by the Vedic Injunction, this constitutes a great difference. From all this it is clear that in the Veda there is nothing ‘untruthful.’

As regards ‘Inconsistency’ (which is the second point urged against the Veda), the Author is going to answer it in the text itself (Verses 14-15 below).—(10)

‘Amimāṃsye’—‘not to be called into question’ (Buhler, acc. to Medhātithi) ‘Irrefutable’ (Burnell, improved by Hopkins into ‘not to be discussed’).

For an interesting discussion regarding the anṛtavyādhātapunaruktadoṣa attaching to the Veda, the reader is referred to Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra 2.1.58-63.

Medhātithi (p. 69, l. 4) ‘Sarvasvāre tu vivādante’—The Sarvasvāra is an Iṣṭi sacrifice which is described as leading the sacrificer directly to heaven; and in regard to this there is a difference of opinion among Vedic scholars: some hold that entrance into heaven is not the actual result, the result being the accomplishment of what the man desires—viz., the fulfilment of his wish to go to heaven without any hindrance, whenever he may die.

This has been quoted by the Mitākṣarā under 1.7, in support of the view that the name ‘Smṛti’ is applied to the Dharmaśāstra.

Hetuśāstrāśrayāt’.—‘Relying upon the argumentative science of the Bauddhas, Cārväkas

**(Verses 6, 10 and 12)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 2.6 (Sources of Knowledge of Dharma)].

010 But by Sruti (revelation) is meant the Veda, and by Smriti (tradition) the Institutes of the sacred law: those two must not be called into question in any matter, since from those two the sacred law shone forth.

If a twice-born person, relying upon the science of dialectics, should disregard these two sources, he should be cast out by good men,—the detractor of the Veda being an infidel.—(11)

असत्य् अप्रामाण्यहेतौ⁵⁵ वेदस्य यो द्विजो हेतुशास्त्राश्रयात्, हेतुशास्त्रं नास्तिकतर्कशास्त्रं बौद्ध्चार्वाकादिशास्त्रम्, यत्र वेदो ऽधर्मायेति पुनः पुनर् उद्घुष्यते, तादृशं तर्कम् आश्रित्य यो ऽवज्ञां कुर्यात् श्रुतौ स्मृतौ च, केनचिद् अकार्यान् निवर्त्येत “मैवं कार्षीः, प्रतिषिद्धं वेदेन” इति, तम् अनादृत्य चिकीर्षेत्- “किं नाम⁵⁶ यदि वेदे स्मृतिषु वा प्रतिषिद्धम्, न हि किंचित्⁵⁷ तयोः सम्यक् प्रामाण्यम् अस्ति” इति कथयेत्, मनसा वा विचिन्तयेत् । तर्कशास्त्रेषु निबद्धादरो यदि दृश्येत, स साधुभिः शिष्टैर्⁵⁸ बहिःकार्यः तिरस्कार्यस् तत्तत्कार्येभ्यो याजनाध्यापनातिथिसत्कारादिभ्यः । क्रियाविशेषस्यानिर्देशाद् विद्वदर्हेभ्य⁵⁹ इति गम्यते । यतो ऽविदान् सम्यगसंस्कृतात्मा तार्किकगन्धितयैवं व्यवहरति । आसु च क्रियासु विदान् अधिक्रियते । अत एव पूर्वश्लोके विचार ईदृशः प्रतिषिध्यते यतस् तदवज्ञानपरतया क्रियते, न तु⁶⁰ यतस् तदर्थविशेषजिज्ञासया । एवमर्थम् एव हेतुम् आह- नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः । अतश् च पूर्वपक्षे यो वेदस्याप्रामाण्यं ब्रूयान् नासौ नास्तिकः स्यात् । सिद्धान्तदार्ढ्यार्थम् एव पूर्वपक्षे हेतुकथनम् । वेदनिन्दक इति स्मृतिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तुल्यत्वेनोभयोः प्रकृतत्वाद् अन्यतरनिर्देशेनैव सिद्धम् उभस्यापि ग्रहणम् इत्य् अभिप्रायः ॥ २.११ ॥

यस् त्व् एतम् अर्थम् अविदित्वा, वेदशब्दस्य विवक्षितार्थत्वम् एव मत्वा, स्मृतिनिन्दकस्य न बहिष्कारः, अनेन वेदनिन्दकस्यैव विहित⁶¹_ इति प्रतिपद्येत, तं प्रत्याह ।_

On the ground of ‘untruthfulness’ and ‘unreliability’ if a twice-born person, relying upon the science of dialectics the ‘science of dialectics’ here stands for the polemical works written by Atheists, treatises of Bauddhas and Charvākas, in which it is repeatedly proclaimed that “the Veda is conducive to sin”;—relying upon such a science, if one should scorn the Veda; i.e., when advised by some one to desist from a certain course of action which is sinful according to the Veda and the Smṛti, in the words—‘Do not do this, it is prohibited by the Veda,’—if he disregards this advice and persists in doing it, saying, ‘what if it is prohibited in the Veda or in the Smṛtis? They are not at all authoritative’;—even without saying this, if he should even think in this manner,—and if he is found to pay much attention to the science of dialectics;—such a person should he cast out by the good—despised by all cultured persons—out of such acts as ‘officiating at sacrifices,’ ‘teaching,’ ‘honours of a guest’ and so forth. Since the text does not specify the acts (from which the man should be kept out), it follows that he should be kept out of all those acts that are fit for the learned. And the reason for this lies in the fact that it is only the ignorant man, whose mind is uncultured and who smacks of the polemic, that can speak as above (in deprecation of the Veda); and to the said acts (of officiating, etc.) it is only the learned man that can be entitled. It is in view of this that such ‘criticism’ has been prohibited in the preceding verse,—such criticism being due to want or respect,—and it does not deprecate such inquiry as might be instituted for the purpose of elucidating the true meaning of the Veda.

It is in view of all this that the author states the reason for what he has asserted—‘The detractor of the Veda being an infidel.’ Thus the man, who would set forth arguments in support of the view that ‘the Veda is unauthoritative,’ only by way of a primâ facie statement, would not he an ‘infidel’; because such statement of the arguments would he made only for the purpose of strengthening the final conclusion (that the Veda is authoritative).

The text speaking of tin; ‘detractor of the Veda,’ has not mentioned the Smṛti; hut the idea is that both stand on the same footing, and both equally form the subject-matter of the context; hence the mention of any one of them implies both.

Some people might however take the term ‘Veda’ (in the expression ‘detractor of the Veda’) to be actually restricted to the Veda only, and they would thence conclude that ‘the detractor of Smṛtis’ should not be cast out, the casting out in this verse being declared for the ‘detractor of the Veda’ only. With a view to such people the Author adds the following verse.—(11)

Hetuśāstrāśrayāt’.—‘Relying upon the argumentative science of the Bauddhas, Cārvākas &c.’ (Medhātithi);—‘Relying on methods of reasoning directed against the Veda’ (Kullūka and Nārāyaṇa).

The argumentative person is always decried: see e. g. 4.30, where the ‘Hetuka’ is described as not fit to be honoured; the ‘Hetuka’ is mentionod in 12. 111. as a person who must be a member of the Pariṣad; though in the latter text the term has been explained as ‘one well-versed in the principles of Mīmāṃsā and the Śāstras’ (see Mitākṣarā on 3. 301, p. 1384).

‘Nāstiko vedanindakaḥ’—see Parāśaramādhava (Prāyaścitta, p. 424) where we read—‘The detracting of the Veda is of three kinds—(1) The first is that which consists in seeking to prove the untrustworthy character of the Veda by means of arguments culled from Bauddha, Jaina and other treatises;—this has been described by Yājñavalkya as being equal in heinousness to the murdering of a Brāhmaṇa. (2) The second consists in neglecting the acts laid down in the Veda and Śrutis, through one’s tendency to wranglings and disputations;—it is this that is referred to by Manu under 2.11, who further regards it as equal in heinousness to the drinking of wine. (3) The third consists in lack of due faith,—the acts laid down being done only through fear of popular odium, and not through any faith in them; tins has been mentioned among Minor Sins.

This verse has been quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 4) which reads ‘ubhe’ for ‘mūle’ and explains it as ‘Śruti and Smṛti’; for ‘śrayāt’ it reads ‘shraya’.

Hārīta-Smṛti, 7.21,—‘That person is a Nāstika who decries what is said in the Veda, who does not discriminate between virtue and vice and who does not admit the existence of the other world.’

Yājñavalkya, 1-227.—‘The insulting of the Teacher, the decrying of the Veda, the killing of a friend, all this should be regarded as equal to the killing of the Brāhmaṇa.’

011 Every twice-born man, who, relying on the Institutes of dialectics, treats with contempt those two sources (of the law), must be cast out by the virtuous, as an atheist and a scorner of the Veda.

The Veda, the Smṛti, the Practice of cultured Men, and what is agreeable to oneself—these directly constitute the fourfold means of knowing Dharma.—(12)

नात्र कश्चिद् विशेषः । वेदनिन्दाप्रतिषेधेन स्मृतिसदाचारात्मतुष्टीनाम् अपि निन्दकस्य बहिष्कारो ऽनेन विहितः । तेषाम् अपि वेदमूलधर्माभिधानम् । अतः स्मृत्यादिनिन्दको वेदनिन्दक एव ।

• ननु श्लोकद्वयेन नार्थः । एवं वक्तव्यम्-

• श्रुत्यादीन् आत्मतुष्ट्यन्तान् हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः ।

• यो निन्देत् स बहिष्कार्यः साधुभिर् नास्तिकत्वतः ॥

• उच्यते । नाचार्या ग्रन्थगौरवं मन्यन्ते । बुद्धिगौरवं यत्नेन परिहरन्ति । तस्मिन् हि सति असम्यगवबोधो धर्मस्य । स च पुरुषार्थं विहन्ति । भेदनिर्देशे ऽपि हि चोदयेयुः- वेदग्रहणम् एव कर्तव्यम्, सर्वस्य धर्मस्य वैदिकत्वात् । तस्माद् विस्पष्टार्थं भेदेनोभयनिर्देशः, संक्षिप्तरुचीनां पूर्वश्लोकः, अन्येषां श्लोकद्वयम् ।

• स्वस्य च प्रियम् आत्मनः इत्य् अनेन प्राग् उक्ता आत्मतुष्टिर् एवोक्ता । स्वग्रहणं वृत्तपूरणार्थम् । एतत् साक्षाद् धर्मस्य लक्षणम् निमित्तं ज्ञापकम्, न पुनः प्रत्यक्षम् । यथा नैरुक्तम् “साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः” इति (निर् १.२०) । विधाशब्दः प्रकारवचनः । एकम् एव धर्मे प्रमाणं वेदाख्यम् । तस्य त्व् एते भेदाः स्मृत्यादयः ।

• अन्ये तूपसंहारार्थम् इमं श्लोकं व्याचक्षते, समाप्तं धर्मलक्षणप्रकरणम् इति । पुनःपाठः समाप्तिं सूचयति, यथा द्विरभ्यासो वेदाङ्गेषु “संस्थाजपेनोपतिष्ठन्त उपतिष्ठन्त” इति (आश्श् १.१३.१०) । तथा च पिण्डीकृत इव प्रागुक्तो ऽर्थो हृदि वर्तते । यथा नैयायिकाः “अनित्यः शब्दः”(न्सू-व् १.१.३३) इति प्रतिज्ञाय, साधनोपन्यासं कृत्वा, निगमयन्ति- “तस्माद् अनित्यः शब्दः” इति । प्रायेण चैषा ग्रन्थाकाराणां रीतिः । तथा महाभाष्यकारो ऽपि क्वचित् सूत्रं वार्तिकं वा पठित्वा व्याख्याय पुनः पठति ॥ २.१२ ॥

There is no difference here. The prohibition of detracting the Veda implies that there should be casting out of also one who detracts the Smṛti, the Practic Men and Self-satisfaction. These also describe only such Dharma as is based upon the Veda; hence the detractor of these is also the ‘detractor of the Veda.’

Objection:—“There is no need for having both the verses; a single verse would have been sufficient, somewhat to the following effect:—‘the twice-born person, who, relying upon the Science of Dialectics, should scorn the sources of Dharma, beginning with Veda and ending with Self-satisfaction, should be cast out by all good men, on account of his being an infidel.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—Teachers do not mind the burdening (prolexity) of their works; what they make every effort to avoid is the burdening of the intellect (of the learner); as it is the latter which interferes with the right understanding of Dharma; and this misunderstanding obstructs the fulfilment of the ends of man.

Then again, even if the author had mentioned all the four sources of Dharma (as suggested by the objector), some people might still argue thus—“the author should have mentioned the Veda only, all Dharma being based upon the Veda.” Hence it is for the purpose of clearness that the author has stated the matter in both ways: the former verse being intended for those who like brevity, and both the verses for other persons.

‘What is agreeable to oneself’ is the same as the ‘self-satisfaction’ spoken of before. The term ‘oneself’ is added only for filling up the metre.

‘These constitute directly the means of knowing Dharma’—‘Lakṣaṇa’ means cause, indicator; and Sense-Perception is not the means of knowing Dharma, as some people have held, speaking of (the sages as) ‘persons who have directly perceived Dharma.’

In the compound ‘Chaturvidham,’ ‘fourfold,’ the term ‘vidhā’ means kind, form. As a matter of fact, Veda is the only source of knowledge of Dharma, and Smṛti and the rest are only so many forms of the Veda.

Other people have explained this second verse as serving the purpose of recapitulating (all that has been said regarding the sources of Dharma). The description of the means of knowing Dharma having been finished, it is the end of this section that is indicated by the repetition (contained in the present verse). Such is the fashion with treatises on the Vedāṅgas; e.g., ‘saṃsthājapenopatiṣṭhante upatiṣṭhante’ (when; ‘upatiṣṭhante’ is repeated for indicating the end of the section); and when the author sets forth the second verse he has in his mind the sum-total of all that has been said in the present section. It is just as the Naiyāyikas, having propounded the Proposition that ‘Word is non-eternal,’ set forth the reasons in support of it, and then re-iterate the conclusion, saying ‘therefore word is non-eternal.’ In fact such is the way of all writers; e.g., the author of the Mahābhāṣya (Patāñjali) also sometimes states the Sūtra or the Vārtika, and having explained it, repeats it again.—(12)

The first half of this verse is precisley the same as that of Yājñavalkya 1.7.

**(Verses 6, 10 and 12)
**

See Comparative notes for [Verse 2.6 (Sources of Knowledge of Dharma)].

012 The Veda, the sacred tradition, the customs of virtuous men, and one’s own pleasure, they declare to be visibly the fourfold means of defining the sacred law.

The knowledge of Dharma is ordained for those who are not addicted to the pursuit of wealth and pleasures; and for those seeking for the knowledge of Dharma, the Revealed Word is the highest authority.—(13)

“When the act is endowed with a certain faculty, it does not lose that faculty, even though it may be performed with some other end in view; it must always bring about its natural effects; e.g., even though one may drink poison, with the idea that it is an efficacious medicine, yet it does not fail to kill him. Similarly even though the act may be done with a view to some visible reward, yet it cannot fail to bring about the invisible results mentioned in ’ the scriptures. Why then should you have this aversion, which makes you assert that an act should not be undertaken with a view to worldly advancement?”

गोभूमिहिरण्यादिधनम् अर्थः । तत्र सक्तिस् तात्पर्येण तदर्जनरक्षणार्थं कृषिसेवादिव्यापारकरणम् । कामः स्त्रीसंभोगः । तत्र सक्तिः, नित्यं तदासेवनं तदङ्गानां च गीतवादित्रादीनाम् । तद्वर्जितानां पुरुषाणां धर्मज्ञानं धर्मावबोधो विधीयते विशेषेण धीयते, व्यवस्थितं भवति । “धीङ् आधाने”⁶² (ध्प् ११३६) इत्य् अस्यैतद् रूपम् ।

• किम् अर्थं पुनस् तत्र सक्तानां न⁶³ भवति धर्मज्ञानम्, यावता ते ऽपि यथाक्षणं⁶⁴ तदविरोधिन्य् अवसरे भोजनादाव् इतिहासश्रवणाद् अन्योपदेशात् समाचाराद् वा शक्नुवन्ति ज्ञातुम् । इत्य् अत आह- धर्मं जिज्ञासमानानाम् इति । मुख्यं प्रमाणं धर्मे वेदः, स च तैर् न शक्यो ज्ञातुम् । अत्यन्तदुर्विज्ञानो ह्य् असौ निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणतर्कपुराणमीमांसाशास्त्रश्रवणम् अपेक्षते स्वार्थबोधे ।

• न चेयान् ग्रन्थराशिः सर्वव्यापारपरित्यागेन विना शक्य आसादयितुम् । समाचारेतिहासादेः कतिपये धर्मा अवगम्यन्ते, न वेदादिवत् समस्ताङ्गयुक्तो ज्योतिष्टोमादिप्रयोगः । अत उक्तम्- प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः । न तु समाचारादेः प्रामाण्यापकर्षः । तद् उक्तम्-

• यो ऽहेर् इव धनाद् भीतो मिष्टान्नाच् च विषाद् इव ।

• राक्षसीभ्य इव स्त्रीभ्यः स विद्याम् अधिगच्छति ॥ (म्स्सं ४१२१)

• अपरे त्व् अर्थकामा⁶⁵ दृष्टफलैषिण उच्यन्ते । तत्र सक्तानां पूजाख्यात्यादिकामानां दृष्टफलार्थितया लोकपक्तिमात्रप्रयोजनानां न धर्मज्ञानं धर्मानुष्ठानं विधीयते उपदिश्यते ।

• ज्ञायते ऽस्मिन्न् इति ज्ञानम् अनुष्ठानम् इत्य् उच्यते । अनुष्ठीयमानो हि धर्मो व्यक्ततरो भवति, शास्त्रावगमकालतो ऽपि । अतो ऽनुष्ठानं धर्मज्ञानम् उच्यते । अत एतद् उक्तं भवति । यद्य् अपि धर्मानुष्ठानाल् लोकपक्त्यादि दृष्टं प्रयोजनम् उपलभ्यते,⁶⁶ तथापि न तत्सिद्धिपरतया तत्र प्रवर्तितव्यम्, किं तर्हि, शास्त्रेण तच् चोदितम् इति कृत्वा । तथा च प्रवृत्तौ यदि दृष्टम् अपि भवति, भवतु, न विचार्यते । तथा च श्रुतिः स्वाध्यायस्य दृष्टं फलम् अनुवदति- “यशो लोकपक्तिः” इति, “लोकः पच्यमानश् चतुर्भिर् एनं भुनक्ति, अर्चया दानेनाज्येयतया⁶⁷ चावध्यतया” इत्यादि (श्ब् ११.५.७.१) । श्लोकश् चात्र भवति ।

• यथेक्षुहेतोर् इह सेचितं पयस् तृणानि वल्लीर् अपि च प्रसिञ्चति ।

• तथा नरो धर्मपथेन संचरन् यशश् च कामांश् च वसूनि चाश्नुते ॥

• ननु च यस्य यः स्वभावो ऽवगतः सो ऽन्योद्देशेनाप्य् अनुष्ठीयमानो न स्वभावच् च्यवते, करोत्य् एव तत्कार्यम् । यथा विषं औषधोद्देशेनापि पीतं हन्त्य् एव । अतो दृष्टार्थतयाप्य् अनुष्ठीयमानानि कर्माणि शास्त्रीयाण्य् अदृष्टार्थान्य् अपि भविष्यन्ति । को भवतो मत्सरो लोकावर्जनहेतुतया न प्रवर्तितव्यम् इति येनात्थ । अत आह । धर्मं जिज्ञासमानानाम् । वेदो धर्मे प्रमाणम् । तेन चैतद् उक्तम्- दृष्टफलकामार्थानां नादृष्टं भवति । न केवलम् अदृष्टं न भवति, यावत् प्रतिषिद्धसेवनाद् अधर्मो ऽपि भवति ॥ २.१३ ॥

‘Wealth’ stands for cattle, land, gold and so forth, and ‘addiction’ to it means being entirely taken up with the undertaking of cultivation, service, etc., for the purpose of acquiring and accumulating wealth.

‘Pleasures’ stands for sexual pleasures; and ‘addiction’ to these means constant recourse to it, as also to its accompaniments in the shape of singing and music, etc.

For people who are devoid of these (wealth and pleasures), ‘the knowledge of Dharma,’ the true understanding of Dharma, ‘is ordained,’ specially propounded, accomplished; the verb ‘vidhīyate’ is derived from the root ‘dhīṅ’ to accomplish.

Objection.—How is it that people addicted to wealth and pleasures can have no knowledge of ‘Dharma?’ In fact such persons also, as time permits them, can obtain some knowledge of ‘Dharma,’—by listening at the time of eating and at such times as do not interfere with their pursuit of wealth and pleasure, to stories and to the precept or example of others (who know Dharma).”

In view of the above objection, the author has added the words—‘for those who seek the knowledge of Dharma,’ etc. The chief authority for Dharma is the Veda; and the Veda can never be understood by the persons referred to. It is extremely difficult to comprehend and for its due comprehension it requires the thorough study of the sciences of Nigama (Vedic commentaries), Nirukla (Philology), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), Tarka (Logic) Purāṇa (History) and Mīnāmsā (Exigetics). And this entire mass of literature can never be acquired by a man unless he renounces all other activities. What can be learnt from stories and examples are only a few stray Dharmas, and not the entire body of Dharma, in the shape of the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrifices, along with all its accessory details, which can be learnt only from the Veda and the other sources of Dharma. It is in view of all this that the text says—‘the Revealed Word is the highest authority.’ This how ever is not meant to take away the force of ‘Example’ as a source of knowledge.

What is stated in the text is corroborated by the following well-known saying—‘He alone acquires learning who shuns wealth like snake, sweetmeats like poison, and women like evil spirits?

[ Another explanation of the verse.]

According to others again the expression ‘arthakāma’ stands for hankering after visible rewards—and for people ‘addicted’ to these,—those who hanker after honour, fame, etc., and who, seeking after visible results, have no other end in life save worldly advancement—‘the knowledge of Dharma,’ i.e., ‘performance of Dharma,’—is not ‘ordained,’ taught. The term ‘jñāna’ (’knowledge’) stands for’that in which the act becomes recognised’ (jñāyate asmin), i.e., its performance; it is only when the Dharma is performed that it becomes clearly manifest, clearer indeed than that comprehended at the time that the scriptures are studied. It is for this reason that it is the performance that is spoken of as ‘jñāna,’ ‘knowledge.’

What the text means therefore is this:—Even though the performance of Dharma brings worldly advancement, yet one should not undertake it entirely with a view to that fame; it should be undertaken with the sole idea that it is prescribed by the scriptures. The act having been done with this idea, if some visible result also follows, it may do so, but it is not what is thought of by the man. In fact the

Veda itself describes the result following from Vedic study as ‘fame and worldly advancement,’ in the passage—‘the world progressing endows him with four things—honour, gifts, freedom from taxes and freedom from death.’ To the same effect is the following saying—‘The water supplied for the growth of sugar-cane waters also the grasses and creepers, in the same manner when a man treads the path of Dharma, he also obtains fame, pleasure and riches.’

Objection.—

“When the act is endowed with a certain faculty, it does not lose that faculty, even though it may be performed with some other end in view; it must always bring about its natural effects; e.g., even though one may drink poison, with the idea that it is an efficacious medicine, yet it does not fail to kill him. Similarly even though the act may be done with a view to some visible reward, yet it cannot fail to bring about the invisible results mentioned in ’ the scriptures. Why then should you have this aversion, which makes you assert that an act should not be undertaken with a view to worldly advancement?”

It is in view of this objection that the text adds—‘For those seeking for the knowledge of Dharma, the Revealed Word is the highest authority.’ And what this means is that ‘those who seek for visible rewards do not obtain any invisible reward,—and it is not only that he does not obtain the invisible result, he commits sin also by being addicted to what is prohibited.’—(13)

‘Vidhīyate’.—Medhātithi puts forward a second explananation of this.

Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 2.20.1.—‘In the performance of duties one shall not allow considerations of worldly things.’

Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 1-2.7.—‘In all countries one should imitate the behaviour of all such good men as are self-controlled, experienced, free from greed and haughtiness.’

Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, 1-30.9.—‘In cases of conflict what is laid down in the Śruti is more authoritative.’

Gautama-Dharmasūtra, 1.6.—‘When there is a conflict between two equally authoritative texts, there is option.’

Jaimini-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, 1.3.3.—‘When a Smṛti conflicts with Śruti, it has no authority; where it does not conflict, there is presumption of corroborative Śruti.

Also see the Comparative notes for [Verse 2.6 (Sources of Knowledge of Dharma)].

013 The knowledge of the sacred law is prescribed for those who are not given to the acquisition of wealth and to the gratification of their desires; to those who seek the knowledge of the sacred law the supreme authority is the revelation (Sruti).

Where there is conflict between two Vedic texts, both are held to be Dharma; both have been rightly pronounced by the wise to be Dharma.—(14)

“The text speaks of both being Dharma, which means that there should be combination (and not option); as it is only when there is combination that both could be Dharma; otherwise (), only one of them could be Dharma. (at a time).”

प्राग् उक्तो व्याघातः परिह्रियते । यत्र श्रुत्योर् द्वैधम्, विरुद्धाभिधानम्, यं धर्मो ऽयम् इति काचिच् छ्रुतिर् आह, तम् एवाधर्मम् इत्य् अन्या । तत्र उभाव् अपि तौ धर्माव् अनुष्ठेयौ विकल्पेन ।

• तुल्यबले हि ते श्रुती । तत्रेयं प्रमाणम् इयं नेत्य् अशक्यो विवेकः । अत “एकार्थतुल्यबलविरोधे विकल्पः” (च्ड़्। ग्ध् १.४) इत्य् उभाव् अपि तौ धर्माव् इत्य् उक्तम् । तत्र समुच्चयः प्राप्नोति । एवम् उभौ धर्मौ भवतः । अन्यथा एकः स्यात् ।

• नेति ब्रूमः । पर्यायेणापि प्रयोगे नोभयशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिविरोधः । न ह्य् अयं सापेक्ष्यद्वयविषय एव । न्याय्यश् च विकल्पः । यथाग्निहोत्राख्यम् एकं कर्म, तस्य कालत्रयम् उपदिष्टं । तत्र कर्म प्रधानम्, कालो गुणः । न चैकस्मिन् प्रयोगे कालत्रयसंभवः । न च कालानुरोधेन प्रोयोगावृत्तिर् युक्ता । नाङ्गानुरोधेन प्रधानम् आवर्तनीयम् । तस्मान् न्याय्यो ऽयम्, “तुल्यबलविरोधे विकल्पः” (ग्ध् १.४) इति वचनात्⁶⁸ ।

• उभाव् अपि हि तौ धर्मौ- ननु च को भेदस् तत्र धर्माव् इत्य् अस्माद् एतस्य ।

• न कश्चित् । पूर्वेण स्वमतम् उपन्यस्तम् उत्तरेणान्यैर् अपि मनीषिभिर् एतद् एवोक्तम् इति स्वमतम् आचार्यान्तरमतसंवादेन द्रढयति ॥ २.१४ ॥

The objection urged above (in the Bhāṣya on Verse 10) is answered here.

When ‘between two Vedic texts there is ‘conflict,’—i.e., setting forth of contrary facts,—e.g., what is declared to be ‘Dharma’ by one text is pronounced to bo ‘adharma’ by another;—in such cases both are Dharma,—i.e., to be performed as optional alternatives. The authoritative strength of the two texts is equal; hence it cannot bo discerned which is reliable and which is not. Thus the conflict being between two equally authoritative texts bearing upon the same subject, there must be option.

Objection.—

“The text speaks of both being Dharma, which means that there should be combination (and not option); as it is only when there is combination that both could be Dharma; otherwise (), only one of them could be Dharma. (at a time).”

We deny this. The use of the word ‘both’ is incompatible with separate, performance (even acts performed one after the other, and not conjointly, can be spoken of as ‘both’); the word does not necessarily denote two things taken together.

Further, option is distinctly the reasonable course to adopt. The action known as ‘Agnihotra’ is one only; and with reference to this single act, three points of time have been laid down; now the action forms the primary factor, the comes in only as a subordinate element; nor is it possible to adopt all the three points of time in connection with any single performance; nor again can it be right to repeat the performance for the sake of the time; as it is never right to repeat the primary for the sake of the secondary factor. From all this it follows that option is most reasonable, as declared in the words ‘whenever there is conflict between authorities of equal force, there is option.’ (Gautama, 1.3.)

‘Both have bent proclaimed to be Dharma.’—“What is the difference between this statement and the former one, ‘both are Dharma’?”

There is no difference; in the former statement, the author has stated his own opinion, and in the latter he supports his opinion by the opinion of other teachers, by pointing out that ‘this is what has also been proclaimed by other wise men.’—(14)

This verse is quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 15) as describing the comparative authority of the several sources. Where there are two Vedic texts setting forth two conflicting views, both are to be accepted, since they have been so accepted by authorities older than Manu himself, i. e. the two are to be regarded as optional alternatives.

It is quoted also in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 136.)

Gautama-Dharmasūtra, 1.6.—‘When there is a conflict between two equally authoritative texts, there is option.’

Also see the Comparative notes for [Verse 2.6 (Sources of Knowledge of Dharma)].

014 But when two sacred texts (Sruti) are conflicting, both are held to be law; for both are pronounced by the wise (to be) valid law.

At sunrise, or before sunrise, or at early dawn,—the sacrificial act may be performed at any time,—such is the pronouncement of the Veda.—(15)

उदाहरणम् इदं समनन्तरप्रदर्शिते⁶⁹ विरोधे । य एते त्रयः काला इतरेतरनिन्दया होमस्य विहिताः, तत्रायम् अर्थः श्रुतिवाक्यानाम्- सर्वथा वर्तते यज्ञः । सर्वप्रकारो होमः प्रवर्तते, प्रवर्तनीय इत्य् अर्थः । या उदितहोमनिन्दा सा न तत्प्रतिषेधार्था, किं तर्ह्य् अनुदितहोमविध्यर्था । एवम् इतरत्रापि । तेनायम् अर्थ उक्तो भवति । सर्वथा कर्तव्य एतेषां कालानाम् अन्यतमस्मिन् काले । तत्र यस्मिन् कृतस् तत्र संपूर्णः शास्त्रार्थो भवति । इतीयं वैदिकी श्रुतिर् एवंपरा । अस्मिन्न् अर्थे ऽस्यास् तात्पर्यम्, न पुनर् निन्द्यमानप्रतिषेधे ।

• यज्ञः होमः, अत्राग्निहोत्राख्यो ऽभिप्रेतः, यागहोमयोर् यतो नात्यन्तं भेदः । देवताम् उद्दिश्य द्रव्यस्य स्वत्वत्यागः “नेदं मम, देवताया इदम्” इति यागः । एतच् च स्वरूपं होमे ऽप्य् अस्ति । अयं तु विशेषः- द्रव्यस्य⁷⁰ होमे प्रक्षेपः अधिकः, आरोपणविशेषो⁷¹ ऽग्न्यादौ । अतो यज्ञशब्देनात्र होमस्याभिधानम् । होमे ह्य् एते कालाः श्रुताव् आम्नाताः, न यागमात्रे ।

• उदितादिशब्दैश् च “उदिते होतव्यम्” इत्यादिका श्रुतिर् एकदेशेन लक्ष्यते । येयम् “उदिते होतव्यम्, नोदिते होतव्यम्” इति श्रुतिः सैवंपरेत्य् एवं योजना ।

• समयाध्युषितशब्देन समुदायेनैवोषसः⁷² काल उच्यते ।

• अन्ये तु पदद्वयम् एतद् इत्य् आहुः । समयशब्दः समीपवचनः समीपिनम् अपेक्षते । उदितानुदितयोः संनिधानात् तत्समीपी संध्याकालः । अध्युषितं रात्रेर् विवासकालः । व्युष्टायां रात्राव् इत्य् अर्थः । कासुचिच् छ्रुतिष्व् एवं पठितम्, कासुचिद् एवम् इति श्रुतिवाक्यानुकरणम् एषा स्मृतिः, तत्र किं पदद्वयम् एतद् उतैकम् इति तत एव निर्णयः ।

• अतो विकल्पेनैकं होमाख्यं कर्म प्रति कालत्रयविधानान्⁷³ नास्ति विरोधः । सिद्धरूपे हि वस्तुनीतरेतरविरुद्धरूपसमावेशासंभवात् स्याद् विरोधः, न साध्ये⁷⁴ । साध्यं ह्य् अनेनापि सिध्यत्य् अनेनापित्य् अवगम्यते । तत्र कुतो विरोधः ।

• एष एव च स्मृतीनां विरुद्धानां विकल्पो न्याय्यः ॥ २.१५ ॥

This is an instance of the ‘conflict’ spoken of in the preceding verse.

In regard to the offering of the Agnihotra-lilbtions, all these three points of time have been prescribed,—and the injunction of each of these deprecates the others; and the sense of these Vedic texts is that ‘the merificial act may be performed at any time’;—in all ways the offering proceeds, i.e., it should proceed. As regards the deprecation of the offering done after sunrise (which is found in the text enjoining the time before sunrise), this deprecation is not meant to be an interdict; it is only meant to be an injunction of the offering before sunrise. Similarly in the other cases. Thus what is meant is that the act may be performed at any one of the three points of time; and the command of the scriptures becomes fulfilled by the offering being done at any one time.

‘Such is the pronouncement of the Veda.’—This is what is meant by the Vedic declaration; and it does not mean that what is deprecated is interdicted.

The ‘sacrificial act’ spoken of here is what is known as the ‘Agnihotra-homa’; there is not much difference between ‘yāga’(a sacrifice) and ‘homa’ (libation-pouring). When one renounces his proprietary right over a substance in favour of a certain deity,—the idea in his mind being ‘this belongs to the deity now, and not to me,’—this is what constitutes ‘yāga’ ‘sacrifice’; and exactly the same is the form of ‘Homa,’ ‘Pouring of libation,’ also. The only difference is that in Homa there is the additional factor of the substance being thrown, deposited in a specified manner, in fire or some such receptacle. It is in view of this similarity that the Homa is spoken of here as ‘yajña.’ That this is so is proved by the fact that the three points of time spoken of have been prescribed in the Veda in connection with Homa, and not all kinds of sacrifice.

The expressions ‘udite’ (‘after sunrise’) and the rest are to be taken as parts of, and as standing for, such declarations as ‘udite hotavyam’ (‘the Homa should be performed after sunrise’) and so forth;—the construction being that ‘the meaning of the declaration that the Homa should be performed after sunrise, not before it, etc., etc., is as follows.’

By the compound word ‘samayā’ the time of early dawn is meant. Others have taken it as consisting of two words: ‘samayā’ meaning near, requires its correlative in the shape of something that is near; and since the two points of time mentioned in the sentence are those ‘before’ and ‘after sunrise,’ the required correlative in the present instance is the time of twilight. ‘Adhyuṣita’ stands for the time of departure of the night, and means ‘at the departure of night.’ [So the compound means ‘that twilight which comes after the departure of night.’]

The words of the text are intended to quote the words of the Veda, which are found to be read in one form in one text, and in another form in another text; so that whether the expression ‘samayādhyuṣita’ is one word or two words can be ascertained only from the original texts.

Thus then, the same act of Homa being laid down in the Veda as to be done optionally at any one of the three points of time, there is no inconsistency. It is only in connection with two accomplished entities that, when found to be incompatible with one another, they are held to be ‘inconsistent’; the same cannot be true in connection with things still to he accomplished [and all actions belong to this latter category]. For what has got to be accomplished may be accomplished either in one way or another; and how could there be any inconsistency in this?

In the case of conflicting Smṛti -texts also, the most reasonable view to take is that they lay down optional alternatives.—(15)

‘Samayādhyuṣite’;—The dawn (Medhātithi),—or that twilight which comes after the departure of the night (Ibid, and Govindarāja);—the time when neither the sun nor the stars are visible (Kullūka).

This verse has been quoted by the Madanapārijāta (p. 175) as indicating the two divisions of the time ‘before sunrise’;—these two divisions being ‘Anudita’ and ‘Samayādhyuṣita.’ These two are more fully described by Kātyāyana, who defines the ‘anudita’ as ‘the sixteenth part of the night, adorned by stars and planets’,—and the ‘Samayādhyuṣita’ as that time in the morning when the stars have disappeared, but the sun has not risen.

The same authority defines the ‘udita ‘sunrise,’ as that when the mere streak of the sun is visible, not all its rays.

It is quoted also in the the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Ācāra, p. 326);—in the Saṃskāraratnamālā, (p. 2) as laying down the two times for Homa, and it reads ‘homaḥ’ for ‘yajñaḥ’;—in the Ācāramayūkha (p. 65) as laying down the time for the morning Homa;—and in the Nityāchārapradīpa (p. 410.)

Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra, 2.1.—‘One should offer libation of cooked food both morning and evening.’

Kātyāyana-Smṛti, 1.9.35.—‘Before the stars are distinctly visible and before the redness of the sky has disappeared, one should offer the evening oblation.’

Muṇḍopaniṣad, 1.2.1.—‘All those detailed acts that the wise ones have found mentioned in the Vedas,—all these one should always perform.’

Muṇḍopaniṣad, 1.2.3.—‘One who does not perform the Agnihotra, or the Darśapūrṇamāsa, or the Cāturmāsya, or the Vaisvadeva……destroys his entire family.’

Īśopaniṣad, 2.—‘One should desire to live for a hundred years, all along doing his duties.’

Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad, 2.1.—‘The Agnihotra should be continued till death.’

015 (Thus) the (Agnihotra) sacrifice may be (optionally) performed, at any time after the sun has risen, before he has risen, or when neither sun nor stars are visible; that (is declared) by Vedic texts.

That person alone, and none other, should be regarded as entitled to the scripture, for whom the sacraments beginning with conception and ending with the crematorium, are prescribed as to be done with mantras.—(16)

“When the Śūdra is not entitled to study the scripture and learn its meaning, how can he be entitled to the performance of the acts therein prescribed? Unless the man knows the exact form of the act, he cannot do it; unless he studies the scriptures, he cannot know what is contained in them; and no unlearned person is entitled to the performance of any (religious) act.”

“विदुषा ब्राह्मणेनेदम् अध्येतव्यम्” (म्ध् १.१०३) इति पठन्ति । स चार्थवादः । तत्र तव्यप्रत्ययदर्शनात् कस्यचिद् विधिभ्रान्तिः स्यात् । तथा च सति क्षत्रियवैश्ययोर् अध्ययनं निवर्तत इत्य् एतदाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थो ऽयं श्लोकः क्षत्रियवैश्ययोः प्राप्तिं दर्शयति । तथा यथाकामी शूद्रो ऽप्य् अप्रतिषेधाद् अध्येतुं प्रवर्तेत तन्निवृत्यर्थम् अपीत्य् एवम् इदं श्लोकं पूर्वे व्याचक्षरे ।

• शास्त्रशब्दो ऽयं मानवग्रन्थवचनः । अधिकारो मयैतद् अनुष्ठेयम् इत्य् अवगमः । न च शब्दराशेः सिद्धस्वभावस्यानुष्ठेयत्वावगतिः संभवति । न हि द्रव्यम् अनाश्रित्य क्रियाविशेषं साध्यतयावगम्यते । अतः शास्त्रविषयायां कस्यांचित् क्रियायाम् अधिकार इत्य् अवगम्यते । तत्र “कृभ्वस्तयस्” तावन् न विषयतया प्रतीयन्ते । भ्वस्त्योर् भवत्यर्थत्वात् । भ्वस्तिसंबन्धे ह्य् अयम् अर्थः प्रतीयते- “शास्त्रस्य यद् भवनं या च सत्ता ताम् अनुतिष्ठेत्” इति । न चान्यदीयायां सत्तायाम् अन्यस्यानुष्ठातृत्वसंभवः । करोत्यर्थे ऽपि न संभवति, पदानां नित्यत्वाद् वाक्यानां चान्येन कृतत्वात् । अतः शास्त्रसहचारिण्य् अध्ययनक्रिया प्रतीयते । अतो ऽयम् अर्थ उक्तो भवति । शास्त्राध्ययने तस्याधिकारः । यथैवाध्ययने तथैव तदर्थश्रवणे ऽपि⁷⁵ ।

• ननु आदिमत्त्वान्⁷⁶ मानवस्य ग्रन्थस्य कथं तद्विषयो विधिर् अनादिवेदमूल इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । उच्यते । यानि कानिचन शास्त्रप्रतिपादकानि वाक्यानि न तानि शूद्रेणाध्येयानीति शक्यते सामान्यतो ऽनुमानम् । यानि वेदवाक्यानि यानि तदर्थव्याख्यानवाक्यानि व्याख्यातॄणां तत्प्रतिरूपकाणि तान्य् अपि प्रवाहनित्यतया नित्यान्य् एव । अनुष्ठानं तु शास्त्रविषयः । तत्र चातुर्वर्णस्याधिकारः । ननु एवं सत्य् अनुपात्तकर्तृविशेषेषु सामान्यधर्मेषु शूद्रस्याधिकारप्रसङ्गः । यथा च⁷⁷ न भवति तथा च⁷⁸ तत्र तत्र कथयिष्यामः ।

• ननु कथम् अध्ययनावबोधाधिकारनिषेधे कर्माधिकारः । न ह्य् अविदितकर्मरूपस्य तदनुष्ठानसंभवः, न चाध्ययनम् अन्तरेण तदर्थावबोधसंभवः, न चावैद्यो ऽधिक्रियते । सत्यम् । परोपदेशाद् अपि यावत् तावत् सिद्ध्यति परिज्ञानम् । यं ब्राह्मणम् आश्रितः शूद्रो यो वार्थतः प्रवृत्तः स एनं शिक्षयिष्यतीदं कृत्वेदं कुर्व् इति । अतो न कर्मानुष्ठानप्रयुक्ते शूद्रस्याध्ययनवेदने, स्त्रीवत् परप्रत्ययाद् अप्य् अनुष्ठानसिद्धेः । यथा स्त्रीणां भर्तृविद्यैव प्रसङ्गाद् उपकरोति न कर्मश्रुतयो विद्यां प्रयुञ्जते । तेषाम् एव स्वप्रत्ययो ऽनुष्ठानहेतुर् येषां “स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्यः” इति विधिर् अस्ति पुंसाम् । स च पुंसां त्रैवर्णिकानाम् । तेषाम् अपि नार्थज्ञानप्रयुक्ते ऽध्ययनवेदने, अपि तु विधिद्वयप्रयुक्ते आचार्यकरणविधिना स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधिना⁷⁹ च ।

• निषेको गर्भाधानम्, स आदिर् यस्य संस्कारकलापस्य स निषेकादिः । गर्भाधानं च विवाहाद् अनन्तरं प्रथमोपगमे “विष्णुर् योनिं कल्पयतु” (र्व् १०.१८४.१) इति मन्त्रवत् केषांचिद् विहितम् । परेषाम् आ गर्भग्रहणात् प्रत्यृतु । श्मशानम् अन्तो ऽस्येति श्मशानान्तः । श्मशानशब्देन मृतश्रीराणि यत्र निधीयन्ते तत् स्थानम् उच्यते । तच् च साहचर्यात् प्रेतसंस्कारं पराचीम् इष्टिं लक्षयति । सा हि मन्त्रवती, न स्थानम् । अनेन च द्विजातयो लक्ष्यन्ते । तेषां हि मन्त्रवन्तः संस्काराः । द्विजातीनाम् इति नोक्तम् । विचित्रा श्लोकानां कृतिः स्वायंभुवस्यास्य मनोः ।

• मन्त्रैर् उदित उक्तो विधिर् इति नायं संबन्धः । न हि मन्त्रा विधिं वदन्ति । किं तर्हि, प्रयोगावस्थस्य विधेयस्य स्मारकाः, न विधायकाः । तस्माद् एवं व्याख्येयम् । मन्त्रैर् युक्तः समन्त्रको येषाम् अयम् विधिर् इति ।

• नान्यस्य कस्यचिद् इत्य् अनुवादः, द्विजातीनां नियतत्वात् । अथ वा कश्चिन् मन्येत द्विजातीनाम् अयं विहितो ऽवश्यकर्तव्यः । शूद्राणां त्व् अशिष्टो ऽप्रतिषिद्ध इति । तदाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थम् इदम् उक्तम् ॥ २.१६ ॥

In Adhyāya I (Verse 103) are found the words ‘this should be studied by the learned Brāhmaṇa’; and though this is a mere Arthavāda, yet the presence of the potential affix ‘tavya’ (in the term ‘adhyetavyam’) might lead people into the mistake that it is an Injunction; and in that case the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya would be precluded from the study. It is with a view to preclude this possibility that we have the present verse, which shows the capability of the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya also to study.

The older commentators have also taken this verse as serving to preclude the possibility of the Śūdra studying the scripture, which he might be tempted to do.

The term ‘scripture’ here stands for the compilation by Manu.

‘Entitled,’—the ‘title’ meant here consists in the idea that ‘this should be done by me.’ But no ‘collection of words’—which is an accomplished entity—can be regarded as ‘to be done’; nor, on the other band, can any action be regarded as ‘to be accomplished,’ except as related to a certain substance. Hence the ‘title’ is understood to pertain to a certain action relating to the scripture. Now in the present context, the action intended is not found to be either making, or being, or existing; as for ‘being’ and ‘existing,’ they both mean ‘to be’; so that if these were the action meant, the meaning would be—‘one should undertake the being or the existing, as related to the scripture’; but as a matter of fact the ‘being’ of one thing cannot be undertaken by another. The action of ‘making’ also would not be applicable; because so far as the words are concerned, all are eternal (and as such cannot be made); while as regards sentences, they have been already made by another person (the author of the scripture). From all this it follows that the action intended is that of studying as pertaining to the scripture. So that the meaning comes to be this—‘the man is entitled to the study of the scripture’; and just as to the studying, so also to the learning of its meaning.

“In as much as the work of Manu has had a beginning in time, how could any injunction relating to it (as the present verse is supposed to be) be based upon the Veda, which is beginningless?”

Our answer is as follows:—It is quite open to us to infer some such general (Vedic) injunction as that ‘the Śūdra should not study such sentences as serve to expound the scriptures.’ Further, these statements of the expounders of the Veda that serve to explain Vedic texts bear a certain resemblance to these texts; and hence they are as much the subject of a bcginningless tradition as the Vedic texts themselves.

What forms the subject-matter of the scriptures is actual performance, and to this all the four castes arc entitled [though to the study of the scriptures the three twice-born castes alone are entitled].

“If such be the case, then it would be permissible for the Śūdra to perform all those acts which are prescribed in a general manner, without reference to any specified persons.”

How this contingency does, not arise we shall show, as occasion arises.

Objection:—

“When the Śūdra is not entitled to study the scripture and learn its meaning, how can he be entitled to the performance of the acts therein prescribed? Unless the man knows the exact form of the act, he cannot do it; unless he studies the scriptures, he cannot know what is contained in them; and no unlearned person is entitled to the performance of any (religious) act.”

True; but the requisite knowledge can be obtained from the advice of other persons. The Śūdra may be dependent upon a Brāhmaṇa; or a Brāhmaṇa may be doing the work of instructing people for payment; and such a Brāhmaṇa might very well instruct the Śūdra to ‘do this, after having done that’ and so forth. So that the mere fact of the Śūdra performing the acts does not necessarily indicate that he is entitled to the study and understanding of the scriptures; as performance can be accomplished, even on the strength of what is learnt from others; as is done in the case of women; what helps women (in the performance of their duties) is the learning of their husbands, which becomes available to them through companionship. Then again, the texts laying down the acts do not imply the direct knowledge (of the injunctive texts). It is only in the case of men, to whom is addressed the injunction of Vedic study—contained in the words ‘one should study the Veda’—that the performance of duties proceeds upon the basis of their own learning; and this injunction is meant only for the male member’s of the three higher castes. But in the case of these also their study and understanding of the scriptures is not prompted by their knowledge of what is contained in them; it is prompted entirely by the two injunctions—(1) the injunction of having recourse to a duly qualified teacher, and (2) the injunction of Vedic study.

‘Conception,’ is ‘ impregnation ’; that series of sacraments which begins with this is called ‘niṣēkādiḥ,’ ‘beyinning conception.’ This sacrament is laid down as to be performed after the marriage (of the parents),—with the mantra ‘viṣṇuryoniṅkalpayatu,’ etc. (Ṛgveda, 10.18.1.1)—on the occasion of the first intercourse only, for some people, while for others at each menstrual period, till conception takes place.

That which has the ‘crematorium’ for its end is called ‘ending with the crematorium.’ The word ‘crematorium’ stands for that place where dead bodies are disposed of; and through association it indicates the rites performed for the dead, called the ‘Antyeṣṭi’; as it is only this performance that is done with mantras, and not the place (which is what is directly denoted by the word ‘crematorium’).

The qualification mentioned in the text points to the Twice-born castes; it is only these persons who have their sacraments done with mantras. The author does not say simply ‘dvijātīnām,’ ‘for the twicc-born’ (and he has taken to the round-about way of saying the same thing), because Manu Svāyambhuva has a peculiar style of composing his verses.

The passage is not to be construed to mean that ‘the sacraments are laid down in mantras’; because mantras do not contain the injunction of any acts; they are not injunctive; they only serve as reminders, during the performance of the act, of the details enjoined in other texts. Hence the passage should be explained as meaning—‘those for whom the sacraments are laid down as to be done with Mantras.’

‘None other,’—is purely explanatory; the rest of the sentence having already served the purpose of restricting what is said to the twice-born castes. Or, it may be taken as reiterated for the preventing of the idea that some one might entertain the notion that ‘what is laid down here is something that must be done by the twice-born castes, while for the Śūdra it is neither prescribed nor interdicted.’—(16)

‘Mantraiḥ’—This has been added with a view to exclude the woman and the Śūdra, whose sacraments are not performed ‘with mantras’ (see 2.66 and 10.127).

Burnell remarks—‘In Vedic times the reception of outsiders into the community was, to a certain extent, recognised, and ceremonies (e. g. the Vrātyastoma) were in use for this purpose.’

It is rather difficult to be very dogmatic regarding what was, or what was not, recognised ‘in Vedic times.’ But if the ceremony of the Vrātyaṣtoma is the sole authority for the statement, then it has to be borne in mind that the writer has not comprehended the purpose of those ceremonies. If he had taken the trouble to find out what ‘vrātya’ meant, he would have found out that the ceremony was performed for the re-admission of those who had become excluded by reason of the omission of certain obligatary rites; and it was not meant for admitting absolute ‘outsiders’.

This verse has been quoted by the Mitākṣarā on 1.3 (p. 6)—in support of the view that it is the Twice-born persons alone who are entitled to study the Dharma Śāstra.

It is quoted also in the Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 512) to the same effect—also in the Aparārka (p. 14);—in the Smṛticandrikā (p. 18.) which explains ‘Niṣeka as the Garbhādhāna sacrament and ‘smaśāna’ as the ‘after-death rites;—and in the Varṣakriyākaumudī (p. 574) as implying that the rites are to be performed for the Śūdra also, but without Vedic Mantras.

Medhātithi (p. 73, 1. 26)—Ācāryakoraṇavidhinā svādyāyādhyayanavidhināca.’ Here both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara views of Śāstrārambha are accepted by the writer.

016 Know that he for whom (the performance of) the ceremonies beginning with the rite of impregnation (Garbhadhana) and ending with the funeral rite (Antyeshti) is prescribed, while sacred formulas are being recited, is entitled (to study) these Institutes, but no other man whatsoever.