०१ धर्मकामसम्बन्धः

Learn that Dharma, which has been ever followed by, and sanctioned by the heart of, the learned and the good, who are free from love and hate.—(1)

प्रथमो ऽध्यायः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यार्थतत्त्वदर्शनार्थो ऽनुक्रान्तः । जगत्सृष्ट्यादिवर्णनं च तच्छेषम् एव व्याख्यातम् । इदानीं शास्त्रम् आरभते । तत्र प्रतिज्ञातो ऽर्थो जगत्सर्गादिवर्णनेन व्यवायाद् विस्मृत इत्य् अनुसंधानार्थं पुनः शिष्यान् प्रति बोधयति ।

• यो धर्मो भवतां शुश्रूषितस् तम् इदानीं मयोच्यमानं निबोधत अवहिता भूत्वा शृणुत । प्रथमे ऽध्याये पञ्चषाः श्लोकाः प्रयोजनादिप्रतिपादनार्थाः । परिशिष्टम् अर्थवादरूपम् । तच् चेन् नातिसम्यग् अवधारितं न धर्मपरिज्ञाने महती क्षतिः । इह तु साक्षाद् धर्म उपदिश्यते । ततो ऽवधानवद्भिर् अवधारणीयो ऽयम् अर्थ इति पुनर् उपन्यासफलम् । धर्मशब्द उक्तार्थो ऽष्टकाद्यनुष्ठानवचनः । बाह्यदर्शनिनस् तु भस्मकपालादिधारणम् अपि धर्मं मन्यन्ते । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं विद्वद्भिर् इत्यादीनि विशेषणपदानि । विद्वांसः शास्त्रसंस्कृतमतयः प्रमाणप्रमेयस्वरूपविज्ञानकुशलाः । ते च वेदार्थविदो विद्वांसः, नान्ये । यतो वेदाद् अन्यत्र धर्मं प्रति ये गृहीतप्रामाण्यास् ते विपरीतप्रमाणप्रमेयग्रहणाद् अविद्वांस एव । एतच् च मीमांसातस् तत्त्वतो निश्चीयते ।

• सन्तः साधवः, प्रमाणपरिच्छिन्नार्थानुष्ठायिनो हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थाय यत्नवन्तः । हिताहितं च दृष्टं प्रसिद्धम् । अदृष्टं च विधिप्रतिषेधलक्षणम् । तदनुष्ठानबाह्या असन्त उच्यन्ते । अत उभयम् अत्रोपात्तं ज्ञानम् अनुष्ठानं च । विद्यमानतावचनः सच्छब्दो न संभवति, आनर्थक्यात् । यद् धि येन सेव्यते तत् तेन विद्यमानेनैव ।

• **सेवा **अनुष्ठानशीलता । भूतप्रत्ययेनानादिकालप्रवृत्तताम् आह । नायम् अष्टकादिधर्मो ऽद्यत्वे केनचित् प्रवर्तित इतरधर्मवत् । एतद् एव नित्यशब्देन दर्शयति । यावत्संसारम् एष धर्मः । बाह्यधर्मास् तु सर्वे मूर्खदुःशीलपुरुषप्रवर्तिताः कियन्तं कालं लब्धावसरा अपि पुनर् अन्तर्धीयन्ते । न हि व्यामोहो युगसहस्रानुवर्ती भवति । सम्यग्ज्ञानम् अविद्यया संच्छन्नम् अपि तत्क्षये निर्मलताम् एवैति । न हि तस्य निर्मलतया छेदः संभवति¹ ।

• अद्वेषरागिभिः । इदं बाह्यधर्मानुष्ठाने द्वितीयं कारणम् । व्यामोहः पूर्वम् उक्तः । अनेन लोभादय उच्यन्ते, रागद्वेषग्रहणस्य प्रदर्शनार्थत्वात् । लोभेन मन्त्रतन्त्रादिषु प्रवर्तयन्ति । अथ वा रागद्वेषयोर् लोभो ऽन्तर्भूतः । आत्मनि² ये भोगोपायास् तेषु रक्ताः³ उपायान्तरेण⁴ जीवितुं असमर्था⁵ लिङ्गधारणादिना जीवन्ति । तद् उक्तम्- “भस्मकपालादिधारणम्, नग्नता, काषाये च वाससी बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविका” इति । द्वेषो विपरीतानुष्ठानकारणम् । द्वेषप्रधाना हि नातीव तत्त्वावधारणे समर्था भवन्ति, अतो ऽधर्मम् एव धर्मत्वेनाध्यवस्यन्तीति । अथ वोभाव् अपि रागद्वेषौ तत्त्वावधारणे प्रतिबन्धकौ । सत्याम् अपि कस्यांचिच् छास्त्रवेदनमात्रायां लब्धे ऽपि विद्वद्व्यपदेशे रागद्वेषवत्तया विपरीतानुष्ठानं संभवति । जानाना अपि यथावच् छास्त्रं कस्यचिद् द्वेष्यस्योपघाताय प्रियस्य चोपकराय कौटसाक्ष्याद्यधर्मं सेवन्ते⁶ । तेषां वेदमूलम् एवानुष्ठानम् इत्य् अशक्यनिश्चयम्, कारणान्तरस्य रागद्वेषलक्षणस्य संभवात् । अतस् तत्प्रतिषेधः ।

• अत्र चोद्यते⁷ । सद्भिर् इति सच्छब्दः साधुतावचनो वर्णितः । कीदृशी च साधुता तस्य, यदि रागद्वेषाभ्याम् अधर्मे प्रवृत्तिः संभाव्यते । तस्माद् अद्वेषरागिभिर् इति न वक्तव्यम् ।

• एवं तर्हि हेतुत्वेनोच्यते । यतो रागादिवर्जिता अतः सन्तो भवन्ति । रागद्वेषप्रधानत्वाभावश् चात्र प्रतिपाद्यते । न सर्वेण सर्वं तदभावयोग्यावस्थागतस्य हेतोर् निरन्वयम् उच्छिद्यते । तथा च श्रुतिः- “न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोर् अपहतिर् अस्ति” इति (छु ८.१२.१) ।

• रागः विषयोपभोगगृध्नुता । तत्प्रतिषेधव्यापारो द्वेषः⁸ । लोभो मात्सर्यम् असाधारण्येन स्पृहा, “परस्य चैतन् मा भूद् विभवख्यात्यादि” । चित्तधर्मा एते । अथ वा चेतनावस्तु स्त्रीसुतसुहृद्बान्धवादिषु स्नेहो रागः, लोभो ऽचेतनेष्व् अपि धनादिषु स्पृहा ।

• हृदयेन । हृदयशब्देन चित्तम् आचष्टे । अनुज्ञानं च हृदयस्य प्रसादः । एषा हि स्थितिः । अन्तर्हृदयवर्तीनि बुद्ध्यादितत्त्वानि । यद्य् अपि बाह्यहिंसाभक्ष्यभक्षणादिषु मूढा धर्मबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तन्ते, तथापि हृदयाक्रोशनं तेषां भवति । वैदिके त्व् अनुष्ठाने परितुष्यति मनः ।

• तद् अस्य सर्वस्यायम् अर्थः । न मया तादृशो धर्म उच्यते यत्रैते दोषाः सन्ति । किं तु य एवंविधैर् महात्मभिर् अनुष्ठीयते स्वयं च यत्र चित्तं प्रवर्तयति वा । अत आदरातिशय उच्यमानेषु धर्मेषु युक्तः ।

• अथ वा हृदयं वेदः । स ह्य् अधीतो भावनारूपेण हृदयस्थितो हृदयम् । ततश् च त्रितयम् अत्रोपात्तम् । यदि तावद् अविचार्यैव स्वाग्रहात् काचित् प्रवृत्तिः कस्यचित् तथाप्य् अत्रैव युक्ता । एतत् हृदयेनाभ्यनुज्ञात इत्य् अनेनोच्यते । अथाप्य् अयं न्यायः “महाजनो येन गतः स पन्थाः” (म्भ् ३. अप्प्। ३२.६८) इति, तद् अप्य् अत्रैवास्ति । विद्वांसो ह्य् अत्र निष्कामाः प्रवृत्तपूर्वा अनिन्द्याश् च लोके । अथाप्रामाणिकी प्रवृत्तिः, सापि वेदप्रामाण्यात् सिद्धैवेति । सर्वप्रकारं प्रवृत्त्याभिमुख्यम् अनेन जन्यते ।

• अन्ये त्व् एतं श्लोकं सामान्येन धर्मलक्षणार्थं व्याचक्षते । एवंविधैर् यः सेव्यते स धर्मो ऽवगन्तव्यः । प्रत्यक्षवेदविहितस्य स्मार्तस्य वाचारतः प्राप्तस्य सर्वस्यैतल्लक्षणं विद्यते । अत्र तु य एतैः सेव्यते तं धर्मं निबोधतेति पाठो युक्तः ॥ २.१ ॥

The First Discourse was undertaken for the purpose of showing the real character of the subject-matter dealt with by the Treatise; the description of the creation of the World and such other subjects have also been explained as supplementary to the said delineation of the subject-matter of the Treatise. It is now that the Treatise actually begins. As the promised subject of the Discourse, interrupted by the description of world-creation and such other subjects, may have been lost sight of,—the Teacher again addresses his pupils with a view to recall the subject to their minds.

That ‘Dharma,’ which you desired to learn is now being expounded by me,—please now ‘learn,’—i.e., be attentive and listen.

In Discourse I, five or six verses (85—91) were meant to point out the purpose of the Treatise; the rest of it is mere ‘declamatory description’ (Arthavāda). So that, if all that has not been carefully learnt, there is not much harm; in the present Discourse however ‘Dharma’ itself is being directly expounded; hence this subject should be carefully learnt. This is the meaning of the re-iteration (in this verse, of Dharma being the subject-matter of the Treatise).

The term ‘dharma,’ as already explained, denotes the performance of the Aṣṭakā and such other prescribed acts. External philosophers regard as ‘dharma’ also such acts as the wearing of ashes, the carrying of begging-bowls, and so forth;—and it is with a view to exclude these from the category of ‘Dharma’ that the author adds the qualifications—‘followed by the learned,’and so forth.

The ‘learned’ are those whose minds have been cultured by the study of the sciences; those that are capable of discerning the real character of the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. The ‘learned’ (meant here) are those who know the real meaning of the Veda, and not others. In fact those persons that admit sources other than the Veda to be the ‘means of knowledge’ in regard to Dharma are ‘unlearned,’ ‘ignorant’; in as much as their notions of the means and objects of knowledge are wrong. That this is so, we learn thoroughly from Mīmāmsā (Sūtra, Adhyāya I).

The ‘Good,’—i.e., righteous men; those who translate into action what is known from authoritative sources, and who always try to obtain what is wholesome and avoid what is not wholesome;—what is ‘wholesome’ and ‘not wholesome’ among visible things is well known; among the ‘Unseen,’ that which forms the subject of ‘Injunction’ is ‘wholesome,’ while that which forms the subject of ‘prohibition’ is ‘not wholesome.’ Those who are outside the said pale of acting in accordance with the said authoritative sources of knowledge are called ‘not good’ (unrighteous). It is for these reasons that both knowledge and acting have been mentioned here (by means of the two epithets, ‘learned’ and ‘good’).

It is not possible for the term ‘saṭ’ (in ‘sadbhiḥ’) to be taken in the sense of existing at the present time; because in this sense the epithet would be entirely superfluous: when a certain thing is ‘followed’ by one, it is only when this latter exists at the time [so that existence would be already implied by the other epithet.]

By ‘following’ in the present context is meant capability of acting (in conformity with). The Past-participial affix (in ‘sevitaḥ,’ ‘followed’) indicates the fact of the Dharma having been in force from times without beginning. As a matter of fact, such Dharma as consists of the Aṣṭakā and other rites are not, like ordinary Dharmas or Duties, set up by any person during the present time. This same fact is also indicated by the term ‘ever.’ (The sense is that) this Dharma has continued ever since the world-process has been going on. All other extraneous Dharmas, being set up by ignorant and wicked persons, though they may obtain currency for some time, drop out in course of time; no mere delusion can continue for thousands of ages. True knowledge on the other hand, even though it may for a time be shrouded by ignorance, shines forth in all its brilliance, upon the destruction of that ignorance. Being by its very nature, pure and brilliant, it can never undergo entire destruction.

‘Who are free from love and hate’—What is referred to here is another cause that leads men to take to heterodox dharmas. ‘Delusion’ having been already described (as leading to the same end), the present phrase serves to indicate greed and the rest; the direct mention of ‘love and hate’ being meant to be only illustrative; e.g., it is by reason of Greed that people have recourse to magical incantations and rites. Or ‘Greed’ may he regarded as included (not merely indicated) by ‘Love and Hate.’ People who are too much addicted to what brings pleasure to themselves, on finding themselves unable to carry on their living by other means, are found to have recourse to such means of livelihood as the assuming of hypocritical guises and so forth. This has been thus described—‘The wearing of ashes and carrying of begging bowls, being naked, wearing of discoloured clothes—these form the means of living for people devoid of intelligence and energy.’

‘Hate,’—leads to the performance of acts contrary to those prescribed. People filled with hate are not quite capable of comprehending the truth; and hence they come to regard the wrong act (adharma) as the right one (dharma).

Or, both ‘Love’ and ‘Hate’ may be regarded as obstacles to the discernment of truth. As a matter of fact, even when some slight knowledge of the scriptures has been acquired, and the man has acquired the name of being ‘learned,’—there is every possibility of his acting otherwise (than in strict accordance with the scriptures), if he happens to be under the influence of love or hate. For instance, people, though fully conversant with the scriptures, do commit such wrong acts as the giving of false evidence, with a view either to do harm to some one whom he hates, or to do good to some one whom he loves, and certainly one cannot be sure that such acting of these people is based upon the Veda; for the simple reason that there are present other forces (controlling his action), in the shape of Love and Hate. It is for this reason that these are prohibited.

The following objection is hero put forward:—“In the word ‘sadbhiḥ,’ the term ‘saṭ’ has been explained as denoting righteousness; but what sort of righteousness could belong to the man for whom it is considered possible to do wrong under the influence of Love and Hate? Consequently, it is not necessary to add the epithet ‘free from love and hate’ (this being already implied by the word ‘good’).”

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—As a matter of fact, the epithet in question (‘free from love and hate’) is mentioned as the reason or ground (of the aforementioned ‘goodness’ or ‘righteousness’); the sense being that ‘it is because they are free from Love and Hate that they are good.’

What is really meant is the absence of undue predominance of Love and Hate (and not absolute absence); because no man, even though there be forces at work tending to make him free from Love and Hate, can get rid of these entirely, as declared by Śruti (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 8-12-1)—‘So long as one has a body, there can be no cessation of the agreeable and the disagreeable.’

‘Love’ here stands for hankering after the enjoyment of things; and ‘Hate’ is that which leads one to avoid or escape from a certain thing. ‘Greed’ is the jealous hankering after the sole possession of an object; the feeling being in the form ‘may all this prosperity, fame and the like not belong to any other person.’ All these are functions of the Mind. Or, ‘Love’ may be taken as standing for the affection one feels towards sentient beings, like one’s wife, son, relations and so forth; and ‘greed’ for the longing that one has for riches and such insentient things.

‘By the heart.’—‘Heart’ here stands for the Mind;—‘sanction’ is satisfaction of mind. The real condition of things is this: Buḍḍhi and other principles are located inside the Heart; and even though deluded persons have recourse to such unrighteous acts as the killing of animals apart from sacrifices, the eating of prohibited food and so forth,—thinking them to be right ‘Dharma,’—yet they have compunctions in their hearts; in the case of the performance of actions prescribed in the Veda, on the other hand, the Mind feels satisfied.

The sense of all this is as follows:—‘The Dharma that I am going to expound is not one beset with the said defects;—it is one that is actually followed by high-souled persons and towards which the Mind itself urges us. For these reasons it is only right that great regard should be paid to the Dharmas that are going to be propounded.’

Or, ‘Heart’ may be taken as standing for the Veda; the Veda, duly studied and borne within the heart in the form of ideas and conceptions, is called ‘heart.’

The present statement refers to the following three cases:—(1) when a person, without much thought, undertakes an action, through sheer impulse,—it must be right; this is what is meant by ‘sanctioned by the heart’;—(2) the same expression also includes the case when one acts according to custom, depending upon the dictum ‘that is the right path by which great men have gone’;—(3) when ‘learned’ persons, without any ulterior motives, are found to act in a certain manner they are never blamed for it, and even when people do not find their action authorised (by the Veda), they accept the fact that it must be based upon the Veda. In every way the present verse makes men have recourse to activity.

Other people explain this verse as serving the purpose of providing a general definition of ‘Dharma’; the sense being—‘that which is done by such persons should be regarded as Dharma’; this definition is applicable to all forms of Dharma,—that which is directly prescribed by the Veda, that which is laid down in the Smṛti and also that which is got at from Right Usage. In accordance with this explanation, however, the right reading would be—‘yaḥ elaih sevyate tam dharmam nibodhata.’

‘Hṛdayenābhyanujñātaḥ’—The term ‘hṛdaya’ stands for the heart—conscience. The phrase stands for what is spoken of later on, in verse 6 below, as ‘ātmanastuṣṭih’ Medhātithi has suggested that ‘hṛdaya’ may stand for the Veda.

Medhātithi (p. 48. l. 15). ‘Mīmāṃsātaḥ’—This refers to Mīmāṃsāta Sūtra I. i—2 ‘Chodanālakṣaṇo’artho dharmaḥ.’

This verse has been quoted in the Parāśaramādhava (Ācāra, p. 80), in corroboration of the definition of Dharma provided by Viśvāmitra, that ‘Dharma is that which when done is praised by good men learned in the scriptures.’ From this it follows that according to this writer ‘hṛdayenāvhyanujñātaḥ’ means the samething as ‘Yam āryāḥ praśaṃsanti’ in Viśvāmitra’s definition.—It is quoted in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 10), which explains hṛdayenābhyanujñātaḥ as ‘which is definitely known in the mind, for certain,’ find ‘adveṣarāgibhiḥ’ as ‘persons free from improper love and hate—in the Vīramitrodaya (Paribhāṣā, p. 80), which adds the following notes—This verse supplies a definition of Dharma in general. ‘Vidvadbhiḥ’ those conversant with what is contained in the Veda;—‘Sadbhiḥ,’ those who have the right knowledge of things;—these two qualifications are meant to indicate that ‘Dharma’ is rightly known by means of the Veda;—‘adveṣarāgibhiḥ,’ free from such love and hate as are conducive to evil this is meant to indicate that Dharma is that which is not conducive to any undesirable effects; —‘ hṛdayenabhyanujñātaḥ indicates that Dharma is conducive to all that is good; as it is only the good to which men’s minds are attracted:—thus then the complete definition of Dharma, as indicated by the text, is that it is that which, not being conducive to any evil effects, is known through the Veda as conducive to good. The three qualifications serve the purpose of excluding such acts as the performance of the Śyena sacrifice.—This definition of ‘Dharma,’ ‘Right,’ also implies that of ‘Adharma,’ ‘Wrong,’ as that which is known through the Veda as conducive to evil.’

This is quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 13); and in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 156).

Vaśiṣṭha, Dharmaśāstra—‘Dharma is that which is enjoined in Śruti and Smṛti.’

Jaimini, Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, 1.1.2.—‘Dharma is that which is described in the Veda as conducive to good.’

Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, 1.2.2.—‘That is Dharma which brings about prosperity and the highest good.’

Āpastamba, Dharma-Sūtra, 1.20.7.—‘That the doing whereof gentlemen praise is Dharma, and that which they deprecate is Adharma.’

Kumārila, Ślokavārtika, 2.14.—‘The fact of these acts being conducive to good is, in every case, learnt from the Veda; and in this sense are they regarded as Dharma; and for this reason Dharma is not perceptible by the senses.’

Viśvāmitra (quoted in Parāśaramādhava, p. 80).—‘That the doing of which men learned in the scriptures praise is Dharma; that which they deprecate is called Adharma.’

Under all these definitions ‘Dharma’ is the name of the ‘meritorious act’; but the term has also been used in the sense of the merit acquired by the doing of the act.

Nyāya view (quoted in Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, p.29).—‘Dharma is that quality of man which is brought about by the performance of the enjoined act: Adharma is that quality of man which is brought about by the performance of the forbidden act.’

001 Learn that sacred law which is followed by men learned (in the Veda) and assented to in their hearts by the virtuous, who are ever exempt from hatred and inordinate affection.

It is not right to be absorbed in desires—“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desire; for the study of the Vedas itself is prompted by desire, as also every act prescribed in the Veda.”—(2)

“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desires; that is, as a matter of fact, in this world, there is no activity for one who is entirely without desire. To say nothing of such acts as cultivation of land, trade and the like, which are done by men of experience,—even the ‘study of the Veda,’ the learning of the Veda, which the boy is made to do by his father and others, being even chastised by them, even this is not possible without some desire; reading consists in the uttering of words; and utterance never proceeds, like the sound of thunder, without desire.—‘Well, if the Boy desires to read, why is he beaten?’—It is by beating that his desire is aroused; the only difference is that in connection with things that the person likes, the desire arises of itself (and does not need an incentive in the shape of the beating).—Similarly ‘the acts prescribed in the Veda,’—as compulsory in connection with the Darśapūrṇa nāṣa and other sacrifices are not possible without desire. There is no possibility of a man giving away to Deities things that belong to himself, unless there is a desire in him for doing so. Hence the prohibition of ‘absorption in desires’ becomes an interdict upon all acts prescribed in the Veda and iu the Smṛtis.”—(3)

फलाभिलाषः कर्मप्रवृत्तेर् हेतुर् यस्य स कामात्मा, तद्भावः कामात्मता । तत्प्रधानता आत्मशब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते । सा न प्रशस्ता निन्दिता । अतश् च निन्दया प्रतिषेधानुमाने “न कर्तव्या” इति प्रतीयते । अर्थात् सौर्यादीनां सर्वेषां काम्यानां निषेधो ऽयम् । अथ वा किं विशेषेण ब्रूमः सौर्यादीनाम् इति । सर्वम् एव क्रियानुष्ठानं फलसिद्धर्थम्, न स्वरूपनिष्पत्तये । न च काचन निष्फला क्रिया । यद् अपि “न कुर्वीत वृथा चेष्टाम्” (म्ध् ४.६३) इति, “भस्मनि हुतम्” (म्ध् ३.१८१), “विषयान्तरे देशराजवार्ताद्यन्वेषणम्”, तत्रापि क्रियाफलं विद्यते । किं तु प्रधानफलं स्वर्गग्रामादि पुरुषस्य यद् दृष्टादृष्टयोर् उपयुज्यते तदभावाद् वृथा चेष्टेत्य् उच्यते ।

• अथोच्यते । भवतु क्रिया फलवती । तद्विषये ऽभिलाषो न कर्तव्यः, वस्तुस्वाभाव्यात् फलं भविष्यति । अत्रापि सौर्यादीनाम् अफलत्वम् । काम्यमानं फलं ज्ञातम् । नानिच्छोस् तद् भविष्यतीति । न च लौकिकी प्रवृत्तिर् दृश्यते फलाभिसंधिनिरपेक्षा । न चात्र विशेषः श्रुतौ-⁹ वैदिकेषु कर्मसु फलं नाभिसंधेयम् इति । तत्र फलवत्सु श्रुतेषु कामनानिषेधाद् अप्रवृत्तौ श्रुतिविरोधः । नित्येषु तु प्राप्तिर् एव नास्ति । विशेषानुपादानाच् च लौकिकव्यापारनिवृत्तौ दृष्टविरोधः । तद् इदम् आपतितम्- न किंचित् केनचित् कर्तव्यम्, सर्वैस् तूष्णींभूतैः स्थातव्यम् ।

• उच्यते । यत् तावद् उक्तं काम्येषु सौर्यादिषु निषेधप्रसङ्ग इति, तत्र वक्ष्यति-

• यथासंकल्पितांश् चेह सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुते । इति । (म्ध् २.५)

निषेधे हि कुतः संकल्पः, कुतश् च कामावाप्तिः । यद् अपि विशेषानुपादानाल् लौकिके ऽपि प्रसक्त इति, तत्रोपात्त एव विशेषः, “यो धर्मस् तं निबोधत” (म्ध् २.१) इति धर्मस्य प्रकृतत्वात् । यद् अप्य् उक्तं नित्येषु फलाश्रवणात् फलाभिसंधेः प्राप्तिर् एव नास्ति, किं निषेधेनेति, तत्राप्य् उच्यते- फलाभावात् कश्चित् सम्यक् शास्त्रार्थम् अजानानो न प्रवर्तेत, सौर्यादिषु च श्रुतफलेषु फलाभिसंधिपूर्विकां प्रवृत्तिं दृष्ट्वा सामान्यतो दृष्टेन “यत् कर्तव्यं तत् फलहेतोः क्रियते” इत्य् अश्रुतम् अपि फलम् अभिसंदधीत, तन्निवृत्त्यर्थम् इदम् आरभ्यते । यद्य् अप्य् अयं न्यायः- “यत् फलवच् छ्रुतं तत् तथैव कर्तव्यम्, यद् अपि¹⁰ निष्फलम् एव कर्तव्यतया शास्त्रेण यावज्जीवादिपदैर् विनैव विश्वजिन्न्यायेन फलकल्पनयावगमितं तस्यान्यथानुष्ठाने¹¹ प्रसङ्ग एव नास्ति”, तथापि य एतं न्यायं प्रतिपत्तुम् असमर्थः स वचनेन प्रतिपाद्यते । न्यायतः प्रतिपत्तौ हि गौरवम्, वचनात् तु लघीयसी सुखप्रतिपत्तिर् इति सुहृद् भूत्वा प्रमाणसिद्धम् अर्थम् उपदिशति स्म ।

• ¹² कामशब्दो ऽयं यद्य् अपि हृच्छयवचनो दृष्टस् तथापि तस्येहासंभवात् काम इच्छा अभिलाष इत्य् अनर्थान्तरम् । तत्र वक्ष्यमाणपर्यालोचनया फलाभिलाषेण न सर्वत्र प्रवर्तितव्यम् इत्य् अयम् अर्थः स्थास्यति ।

• परस् तु कामात्मताम् इच्छामात्रसंबन्धमात्रं पदार्थं मन्वानश् चोदयति- न चैवेहास्त्य् अकामतेति । न चेह लोके काचिद् अकामिनः प्रवृत्तिर् अस्तीत्य् अर्थः । आस्तां तावत् कृषिवाणिज्यादि व्युत्पन्नबुद्धिना क्रियमाणम्, यः स्वयं वेदाधिगमः वेदाध्ययनं बालः कार्यते पित्रादिना ताड्यमानः सो ऽपि न कामम् अन्तरेणोपपद्यते । अध्ययनं हि शब्दोच्चारणरूपम् । न चोच्चारणम् इच्छया विना निर्घातध्वनिवद् उत्तिष्ठति । इच्छति चेत् किम् इति ताड्यत इति । सैव तथेच्छोपजन्यते । अभिमते तु विषये स्वयम् उपजायत इत्य् एतावान् विशेषः । यश् चायं वैदिको वेदविहितः कर्मयोगो दर्शपूर्णमासादि कर्मानुष्ठाने नित्यत्वेनावगतः सो ऽपि न प्राप्नोति । न ह्य् अनिच्छतो देवतोद्देशेन स्वद्रव्यत्यागोपपत्तिः । तस्मात् कामात्मतानिषेधे सर्वश्रौतस्मार्तकर्मनिषेधः प्रसक्त इति ॥ २.२ ॥

The man for whom desire for reward forms the sole motive to act is said to be ‘absorbed in desires’; and it is this character that is expressed by the abstract noun; the term ‘ātman’ in this compound denoting preponderance.

‘It is not right?,’—i.e., it is deprecated.

[An objection is raised]—“This deprecation leads us to infer that the said absorption in desires is prohibited.—This means that the text contains the prohibition of all such sacrifices as the Saurya and the like, which are performed with a desire for a definite reward. Or, why should we specify the Saurya and other sacrifices? All performance of actions is for the accomplishment of a desirable end; no one acts simply for the accomplishing of the act itself; in fact there is no action without results. As for the assertion (contained in 4.63) that ‘one should not act aimlessly’ [which might be taken to imply that there are aimless actions, such as] pouring libations on extinguished fire, or seeking for information regarding what is happening to kings and places of other countries,—in reality, in these cases also there is some result following from the act; and all that is meant by calling them ‘aimless’ is that they do not bring about any important results, in the shape of attainment of Heaven, acquisition of village-property and so forth, which are useful to men in the invisible and visible spheres. It might be argued that—‘It may be that the action brings about a reward; what is meant is that the man should have no desire for that reward; even though, in the very nature of things, the reward will follow.’ Even so the Saurya and other sacrifices would be without rewards; that alone is regarded as ‘reward’ which is actually desired; so that there could be no ‘reward’ for one who has no desires. In the ordinary world, we do not find any such activity as is absolutely independent of a desire for reward. Nor have we any such Vedic declaration as that ‘in connection with Vedic actions alone there should be no desire for reward.’ On the contrary, all Vedic acts have been prescribed as bringing definite rewards; so that if desire for rewards is interdicted, it would mean that the acts would not be done; and this would militate against the spirit of the Vedas. As regards the compulsory acts (prescribed in the Veda), there is no possibility of rewards in their case. Then again, since the prohibition in the text is a general one (and not restricted to Vedic acts only), it would lead to the cessation of all ordinary activity of the world, and would thus run counter to visible practice also, and it comes to this that no one should do anything, all should sit silent.”

To the above objection we make the following reply:—

(1) It has been argued that the Text implies the prohibition of the Saurya and such other sacrifices, which are admittedly prompted by desire for rewards; as regards this, the author is himself going to say (in Verso 5) that ‘the man fulfils the desires he may have entertained’; if he had meant to prohibit (by the present verse) such acts, how could there be any ‘entertainment’ or ‘fulfilment’ of desires?

(2) The second point urged is that, since the text does not specify Vedic acts alone, the interdict would apply to ordinary actions also. But the required specification has already been made by the text (in the preceding verse), where it says—‘Learn that Dharma’; which shows that it is Dharma (and not the ordinary activity of the world) that forms the subject-matter of the present discourse.

(3) The third point raised is that—“in as much as no rewards are mentioned in connection with the compulsory acts, there can be no possibility of any desire for rewards in the case of these; so that no useful purpose could be served by the prohibiting of such desires.”—

Now in answer to this we make the following observations:—

(a) By reason of no rewards being spoken of, no one would ever undertake the performance of any compulsory act, unless he were a person thoroughly conversant with the scriptures (and hence realising the importance of compulsory duties):

and (b) in the case of the Saurya and such other acts as have rewards mentioned in connection with them, finding that men are prompted to their performance by desire for those rewards, people might be led to the generalisation that whatever one is to do should be done with the desire for a definite reward; and thus come to undertake the performance of the compulsory acts also only through a desire for reward, oven though no such reward has been spoken of in the scriptures.

And it is with a view to preclude these possibilities that the text lays down the interdict. Though the general rule is that—

(a) an act which is mentioned as leading to a definite result can only be performed with a view to that result,

(b) while that which is laid down in the scriptures as not bringing any reward, and in connection with which one cannot assume a reward according to the principle enunciated in relation to the Viśvajit -sacrifice [Pūrvamīmāmsā-Sūtra, 4.3. 15-16; that where no reward is mentioned, the attainment of heaven should be regarded as the reward], can never be performed otherwise (than in the purely disinterested manner),—yet there may be persons who are conversant with this principle; and it is to these persons that the text addresses the exhortation; specially as it would be rather difficult to carry conviction to such persons by mere reasoning; and the requisite knowledge is conveyed in a simpler and easier manner by means of direct advice.

It is for this reason that the author has, in a friendly spirit, conveyed a teaching which is thoroughly established by proofs.

Though the word ‘Kama’ is generally found to be used in the sense of sexual desire, yet, since in the present context that sense is not applicable, it has to be taken as synonymous with ‘icchā’ (Desire) and ‘abhilāṣa,’ (Longing). So that in view of what follows, the meaning of the text comes to be that ‘one should not undertake the performance of all acts simply with a desire for reward.’

The opponent, taking the ‘absorption in desires’ to mean mere presence of desire in general, urges the following objection:—

“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desires; that is, as a matter of fact, in this world, there is no activity for one who is entirely without desire. To say nothing of such acts as cultivation of land, trade and the like, which are done by men of experience,—even the ‘study of the Veda,’ the learning of the Veda, which the boy is made to do by his father and others, being even chastised by them, even this is not possible without some desire; reading consists in the uttering of words; and utterance never proceeds, like the sound of thunder, without desire.—‘Well, if the Boy desires to read, why is he beaten?’—It is by beating that his desire is aroused; the only difference is that in connection with things that the person likes, the desire arises of itself (and does not need an incentive in the shape of the beating).—Similarly ‘the acts prescribed in the Veda,’—as compulsory in connection with the Darśapūrṇa nāṣa and other sacrifices are not possible without desire. There is no possibility of a man giving away to Deities things that belong to himself, unless there is a desire in him for doing so. Hence the prohibition of ‘absorption in desires’ becomes an interdict upon all acts prescribed in the Veda and iu the Smṛtis.”—(3)

Much ingenuity has again been displayed to show that verses 2—5 are a ‘later interpolation.’ Burnell remarks that it must be so, because ‘in the old Vedic religion, all ceremonies and sacrifices were avowedly performed in order to gain desired objects of various kinds.’ He evidently forgot that what is expounded by Manu is not exactly what the writer speaks of as ‘the old Vedic religion.’

‘Na praśastā’—Because leading to new births, and obstructing Final Release.

Medhātithi, (p. 50, 1. 27)—Viśvajit-nyāya—see Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 4.3.15—16.

Bhagavadgītā, 3.5.—‘Apart from action done for sacrifice, all action tends to the bondage of men.’

Bhagavadgītā, 5.—‘Renouncing the fruit of the act, if one engages himself in it with a concentrated mind, he attains eternal peace; doing it without concentration, and drawn by desire to the fruit of the act, he becomes bound.’

Ibid, 6.27.—‘If one performs an act as a duty, without any regard for its fruit, etc.’

Ibid, 9.20.—‘Men learned in the three Vedas, drinking Soma, having their sins washed off, perform sacrifices and seek to go to heaven; having reached the sacred regions of Indra, they enjoy, in heaven, pleasures fit for the gods.’

Sūtasaṃhitā, 3.4.—‘It is only the unfortunate people who, imbued with due faith, betake themselves to acts prescribed as leading to certain desirable results; those are extremely fortunate who engage themselves only in those daily and occasional acts that are obligatory; for these latter liberation is obtained without effort; doing with due faith, as they do, every act simply because it is enjoined by the scriptures.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.20.1-2.—‘One should not do his duties with the view to attain worldly ends;—those that bring no fruits are conducive to good.’

Ibid, 1.21-5.—‘Having fully comprehended the nature of acts, one should undertake that which he likes.’

002 To act solely from a desire for rewards is not laudable, yet an exemption from that desire is not (to be found) in this (world): for on (that) desire is grounded the study of the Veda and the performance of the actions, prescribed by the Veda.

Desire has its root in Thought; Sacrifices proceed from Thought; Vows and Restraints—all these have been described as originating in Thought.—(3)

ततश् च यद् उक्तं यागस्य कामेन विना न स्वरूपनिष्पत्तिर् इति, तद् अनेन विस्पष्टं कृत्वा कथयति । संकल्पो यागादीनां मूलं कामस्य च । यागादींश् चिकीर्षन्न् अवशयं संकल्पं करोति । संकल्पे च क्रियमाणे तत्कारणेन कामेन संनिधातव्यम् अनिष्टेनापि । यथा पाकार्थिनो ज्वलनं कुर्वतस् तत्समानकारणो धूमो ऽप्य् अनिष्टो जायते । तत्र न शक्यं यज्ञादयः करिष्यन्ते, कामश् च न भविष्यतीति ।

• अथ को ऽयं संकल्पो नाम यः सर्वक्रियामूलम् ।

• उच्यते । यच् चेतःसंदर्शनं नाम, यदनन्तरं प्रार्थनाध्यवसायौ क्रमेण भवतः । एते हि मानसा व्यापाराः सर्वक्रियाप्रवृत्तिषु मूलतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । न हि भौतिका व्यापारास् तम् अन्तरेण संभवन्ति । तथा हि, प्रथमं पदार्थस्वरूपनिरूपणम्- “अयं पदार्थ इमाम् अर्थक्रियां साधयति” इति यज् ज्ञानं स इह संकल्पो ऽभिप्रेतः । अनन्तरं प्रार्थना भवति इच्छा । सैव कामः । “कथम् अहम् इदम् अनेन साधयामि” इति इच्छायां सत्याम् अध्यवस्यति “करोमि” इति निश्चिनोति¹³ सो ऽध्यवसायः । ततः साधनोपादाने बाह्यव्यापारविषये प्रवर्तते । तथा हि, बुभुक्षित आदौ भुजिक्रियां पश्यति, तत इच्छति “भुञ्जीय” इति, ततो ऽध्यवस्यति “व्यापारान्तरेभ्यो विनिवृत्त्य भोजनं करोमि” इति, ततः कर्मकारणस्थानाधिकारिण आह “सज्जीकुरुत रसवतीम्, संचारयत” इति ।

• नन्व् एवं सति न यज्ञादयः संकल्पमात्राद् भवन्ति, अपि तु संकल्पप्रार्थनाध्यवसायेभ्यः । तत्र किम् उच्यते “यज्ञाः संकल्पसंभवाः” इति ।

• संकल्पस्याद्यकारणत्वाद् अदोषः । अत एवोत्तरत्र “नाकामस्य क्रिया काचिद् दृश्यते” इति वक्ष्यति ।

• व्रतानि । मानसो ऽध्यवसायो व्रतम्- “इदं मया यावज्जीवं कर्तव्यम्” इति यद् विहितम् । यथा स्नातकव्रतानि । यमधर्माः प्रतिषेधरूपाः अहिंसादयः । कर्तव्येषु प्रवृत्तिः, निषिद्धेभ्यो निवृत्तिः, नान्तरेण संकल्पम् अस्ति ॥ २.३ ॥

Thought is the root of sacrifice and other acts, as also of desire; when a man is going to perform a sacrifice, or any act, he must think of it: and when the thinking has been done, there must follow, from the said Thinking, Desire,—however undesirable this latter may be; for instance, when a man, going to cook, lights fire, there arises, from the fire, the undesirable smoke also. Thus it is impossible that sacrifices should be performed and there should be no desire at all.

Question.—“What is this Thought, which is the root of all action?”

Answer.—We explain it as follows:—Thought is that function of the mind which precedes Desire and Resolution; all these three are functions of the mind, and they are at the root of all activity. As a matter of fact, no physical activity is possible without Thought. What happens in the case of all activity is that—(a) first of all we have the Thought or Idea of the exact nature of a thing, and what is meant by ‘Thought,’ in the present context is the cognition that one h as of a certain thing as capable of accomplishing a definite desirable purpose;—(b) after this follows a longing, a wish; and this is ‘desire’;—(c) after the desire has arisen in the form ‘how may I obtain it,’ the man resolves, determines, that he shall act (towards the obtaining of the thing); and this is ‘Resolution.’ It is only after these three mental operations have been gone through that the man proceeds to that external activity which would accomplish the desired end. For instance, when a man is hungry, (a) he thinks of—has the idea of—the action of eating,—(b) then he desires ‘may I eat,’—(c) then comes the resolution ‘I shall desist from all other activity and take to eating,’—(d) then he says to the persons in charge of the place where the act of eating is to be done—‘make ready,’ ‘set the kitchen going.’ [ Objection ]—“If this is so, then Sacrifices and other acts do not proceed from mere Thought, but from Thought, Longing and Resolution; then why is it said that Sacrifices proceed from Thought?”

[ Answer ]—There is no force in this objection, since Thought is the prime cause. It is in view of this that the author is going to assert (in the next verse) that ‘there is no action done by one who is entirely without desires.’

Votes—A ‘vow’ consists in a mental resolve, in the form ‘this shall be done by me as long as I live’; to this class belong the vows of the Snātaka.

Restraints—are negative in their character,—such as desisting from, killing and so forth.

[The meaning of all this is that] without thought there is neither activity towards what ought to be done, nor desisting from what is prohibited and ought not to be done.”—(3)

‘Saṅkalpamūlaḥ kārnaḥ’—Nandana explains this as—‘The desire for rewards is the root of the will to act.’

‘Vratāni’—The term stands for all those duties that one makes up his mind to perform all through life,—according to Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa;—‘the vow of the Religious Student’—according to Nandana.

‘Yamadharmāḥ’—‘The prohibitive rules’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa);—‘the rules pertaining to the Recluse and the Renunciate’ (Nandana).

Yājñavalkya, 1.7 .—‘ The desire that has its source in proper reflection is the source of Dharma.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.5.—‘They teach that whatever one determines and thinks of with the mind, or speaks of with speech, or sees with the eyes,—he becomes that same.’

Bhagavadgītā—‘Desires have their source in the will,’

003 The desire (for rewards), indeed, has its root in the conception that an act can yield them, and in consequence of (that) conception sacrifices are performed; vows and the laws prescribing restraints are all stated to be kept through the idea that they will bear fruit.

No action is ever found in this world to be done by a man entirely without desires; whatever a man does is. the outcome of desire.—(4)

पूर्वेण शास्त्रीये प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती संकल्पाधीने व्याख्याते । अनेन लौकिकेषु कर्मसु तदधीनतोच्यत इति विशेषः । नेह लोके कर्हिचित् कदाचिद् अपि जाग्रदवस्थायां क्रिया¹⁴ काचिद्¹⁵ अनुष्ठेयत्वेनानिच्छतः संभवति । यत् किंचिल् लौकिकं वैदिकं वा कुरुते कर्म विहितं प्रतिषिद्धं च तत् सर्वं कामस्य चेष्टितम् । ॥ २.४ ॥

हेतुत्वाच् चेष्टितं कामस्यैवेत्य् उक्तम् । तद् इदम् अतिसंकटम्, कामात्मता न प्रशस्ता, न चानया विना किंचिद् अनुष्ठानम् अस्ति । अत्र प्रतिविधत्ते ।

The preceding verse has described the fact that such activity and cessation from activity as are laid down in the scriptures are dependent upon knowledge; and the present verse speaks of similar dependence in the case of ordinary acts of the world; this is the difference between the two verses.

‘Iha’ means ‘in this world’;—‘Karhichit’ means ‘ever,’ ‘at any time.’ During the waking state, action is ever found in this world to be done by any person who is without desire for performing that action.

Whatever act, scriptural or temporal,—the permitted or the prohibited—is done is the outcome of desire. Since desire is the cause of all activity, every act is called the ‘outcome of desire.’

Thus the position becomes extremely difficult: ‘It is not right to be absorbed in desires’ (as declared in Verse 2), and yet there is no activity without desire.—(4)

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.2.7.—‘Having fully understood the nature of actions, one should perform that which he wishes.’

004 Not a single act here (below) appears ever to be done by a man free from desire; for whatever (man) does, it is (the result of) the impulse of desire.

Behaving in the right manner, in regard to these (desires), a man attains the position of Immortals; and even in this world he obtains all the desires that he may have thought of.—(5)

तेषु कामेषु सम्यग् वर्तितव्यम् । का पुनः सम्यग्वृत्तिः । यद् यथाश्रुतं तत् तथैवानुष्ठेयम् । नित्येषु फलं नाभिसंधेयम्, अश्रुतत्वात् । काम्येषु त्व् अनिषेधः, तेषां तथाश्रुतत्वात् । फलसाधनतयैव तानि विधितो ऽवगम्यन्ते । फलानिच्छोस् तदनुष्ठानम् अश्रुतकरणं¹⁶ स्यात् । नित्येषु फलाभिसंधिर् व्यामोह एव । न ह्य् अभिसंधिमात्रात् प्रमाणतो ऽनवगते फलसाधनत्वे फलम् उत्पद्यते । एवं कुर्वन् गच्छति प्राप्नोत्य् अमरलोकताम् । अमराः देवाः, तेषां लोकः स्वर्गः । तन्निवासात् अमरेषु लोकशब्दः स्थानस्थानिनोर् अभेदात् “मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति” इतिवत् । तेनायं समासः- अमराश् च ते लोकाश् च अमरलोकाः, तद्भावः अमरलोकता । देवजनत्वं प्राप्नोति देवत्वं प्राप्नोतीत्य् अर्थः । वृत्तानुरोधाद् एवम् उक्तम् । अथ वा, अमरांल् लोकयति पश्यत्य् अमरलोकः । “कर्मन्य् अण्¹⁷” (पाण् ३.२.१) । तदन्ताद् भवप्रत्ययः । देवदर्शी संपद्यते । अनेनापि प्रकारेण स्वर्गप्राप्तिर् एवोक्ता भवति । अथ वा, अमर इव लोक्यते लोके ।

• अर्थवादश् चायम् । नात्र स्वर्गः फलत्वेन विधीयते, नित्यानां फलाभावात्, काम्यानां च नानाफलश्रवणात् । तेन स्वर्गप्राप्त्या शास्त्रानुष्ठानसंपत्तिर् एवोच्यते लक्षणया । यद् अर्थं कर्मणाम्¹⁸ अनुष्ठानं तत् संपद्यत इत्य् अर्थः । तत्र नित्यानां प्रत्यवायानुत्पत्तिर् विध्यर्थसंपत्तिर् वा प्रयोजनम् । काम्येषु तु यथासंकल्पितान् यथाश्रुतं संकल्पितान् । प्रयोगकाले यस्य कर्मणो यत् फलं श्रुतं तत् संकल्प्य अभिसंधाय मनसा कामयित्वा “इदम् अहम् अतः फलं प्राप्नुयाम्” इति, ततः सर्वान् कामान् काम्यान् अर्थान् समश्नुते प्राप्नोति ।

• अतः परिहृता संकटापत्तिः, यतो न सर्वविषयः कामो निषिध्यते । किं तर्हि, नित्येषु फलाभिलाषलक्षणः । साधनसंपत्तिस् तु काम्यैव ।

• ब्रह्मवादिनस् तु सौर्यादीनां निषेधर्थं कामात्मतेति मन्यन्ते । फलार्थितया क्रियमाणा बन्धात्मका भवन्ति, निष्कामस् तु ब्रह्मार्पणन्यायेन कुर्वन् मुच्यते । तद् उक्तं भगवता कृष्णद्वैपायनेन “मा कर्मफलहेतुर् भूः” (भ्ग् २.४७) । तथा-

• साधनानाम् अकृत्स्नत्वान् मौर्ख्यात् कर्मकृतस् तथा ।

• फलस्य चाभिसंधानाद् अपवित्रो विधिः स्मृतः ॥ इति ।

बहवश् चात्र व्याख्याविकल्पाः, असारत्वात् तु न प्रदर्शिताः ॥ २.५ ॥

To the above Pūrvapakṣa, the Author replies in this verse.

[What is meant is that] one should behave in the right manner in regard to these—desires.

“What is this right behaviour?”

It consists in doing an act exactly in the manner in which it is found mentioned in the scriptures. That is, in regard to the compulsory acts one should not think of rewards at all, for the simple reason that no rewards have been mentioned in connection with them; while in regard to the voluntary acts, there is no prohibition of thinking of rewards, for the simple reason that these acts are actually mentioned as bringing definite rewards; in fact what we know of these acts from the scriptural injunctions is that they are the means of obtaining certain rewards; so that the performance of these by a man who has no desire for those rewards would be doing something that is not enjoined in the scriptures at all. As regards the compulsory acts however, to think of rewards would be a pure mistake; for when the acts have not been prescribed as leading to any results, no results could proceed from them by merely the man’s seeking for them.

By doing so [ i.e., by behaving rightly in regard to desires] one goes to—attains—the position of Immortals. ‘Immortals’ are the Gods; their ‘position’ is Heaven; and by reason of the Gods residing in Heaven, the term ‘position’ is applied to the gods themselves, the position being identified with the occupier of the position; just as we have in the expression ‘the elevated sheds are shouting’ [where the ‘sheds’ stand for the men occupying them]. Hence the compound ‘Amaraloka’ is to be expounded as a Karmadhāraya—‘the immortal positions’; and with the abstract affix ‘tat’ we have the form ‘amaralokatā’ So the meaning is that ‘he obtains the character of a divine being,’ ‘he attains divinity.’ The author has made use of this expression in view of metrical exigencies.

Or, the compound ‘amaralokatā’ may he explained as one who sees—‘lokayati’—the gods—‘amarān’; the term ‘loka’ being derived from the root ‘loka’ with the passive affix ‘aṇ’ (according to Pāṇini 3.2.1); and then the abstract affix tal added to it; so that the meaning is that ‘he becomes capable of seeing the Gods’; and this also means that he attains heaven.

Or again, the expression may mean that ‘he is looked upon as a God’—‘amara iva lokyate’—among men.

This whole passage is mere declamatory Arthavāda; and if does not lay down Heaven as the result actually following from the action spoken of; because as a matter of fact, the compulsory acts do not lead to any results at all, while the voluntary acts are prescribed as leading to diverse results. So that what the ‘attaining of heaven’ spoken of in the text means is the due fulfilment of what is enjoined in the scriptures; which is only an indirect way of saying that ‘that particular end is attained with a view to which the action was done.’ Thus in the case of the compulsory acts, the end in view would be either the avoiding of the sin (that might be incurred by the omission of the act), or the due fulfilment of what has been enjoined in the scriptures; and in the case of the voluntary acts, the end is the attaining of rewards thought of, i.e., those contemplated as mentioned in the scriptures; when a man is going to perform an act, he thinks, in his mind, of that reward which has been mentioned in the scriptures as following from that act; having thought of that reward, he has a desire for it—‘May I obtain this reward by the doing of this act’; and then he obtains all those desires—i.e., the desirable things.

In the manner above described we have set aside the difficulty (that had been set up by the Pūrvapakṣa); for what the text prohibits is not the desire for each and everything, but the entertaining of desires only in connection with the compulsory acts; and in regard to these also there must be desire for the obtaining of things necessary for the due performance of them.

The Brahmavādins (Vedāntins) however regard the words ‘it is not right to be absorbed in desires’ as a prohibition of the Saurya and all such other acts as are laid down as bringing rewards; and their reason is that all actions done with a view to rewards become setters of bondage; and it is only when an act is done without any thought of rewards—doing it simply as an offering to Brahman—that the man becomes released. This is what the revered Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana has declared in the words (a) ‘May there be no action done with a view to rewards’ (Bhagavadgītā, 2.47),—and again, ‘The perform nce of an act becomes vitiated, (a) by the incompleteness of accessories, (b) by the illiteracy of the performer, and (c) by the thought of rewards.’

Various explanations have been offered of the present verse; but we have omitted them because they are of no importance.

Vaśiṣṭha, Smṛti, 1-2.—‘The righteous man who acts with full knowledge is highly praised among men and after death, attains heavenly regions.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.5.2-9.—‘When the religious student acts with concentrated mind, then alone are his aots fruitful.’

Ibid, 2.2.2.—‘For all castes, the highest happiness is attained only when they are engaged only in their own duties.’ Ibid, 2.23.7.—‘Thus alone are all desires fulfilled.’

Ibid, 2.23-12.—‘They win Heaven till the very dissolution.’

Gautama, Dharmasūtra, 11-31.—‘Men of all castes and in all life-stages, adhering to their own duties, on death, enjoy the fruits of their acts, and then become born in a pleasant country, and in families of high castes, excellent learning, character and intelligence.’

Gautama, 27-54.—‘One who knows his duty wins by his knowledge and adherence, the heavenly regions.’

Baudhāyana, Dharmasūtra, 1.3.13.—‘In this manner great sages attain the highest position of Prajāpati.’

005 He who persists in discharging these (prescribed duties) in the right manner, reaches the deathless state and even in this (life) obtains (the fulfilment of) all the desires that he may have conceived.