काव्ये विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

4.1 A recapitulation of data and method

As already elucidated in the previous chapter, the data in this study comprises of (1) textually documented details on asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā and (2) vignette verses that Sanskrit aestheticians supply in order to illustrate the mental states mentioned above. In the present chapter, these two sets of data shall be examined along the following lines: 1)

Grouping textually documented information under the heads of definitions, list of antecedent stimuli and consequent responses, and so on.

Analyzing vignette verses by employing three traditionally derived models for understanding narratively depicted mental states. These models look at a mental state in isolation, in the context of other mental states, and as related to the character through whom it is communicated.

Addressing certain conceptually relevant questions that were posed in the previous chapter (under 3.5) and thereby comparing and contrasting asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā with their corresponding mental states (self-conscious emotions) in contemporary psychology.

4.2 Textual documentation

**4.2.1 Asūyā **

Definitions: Asūyā is defined as “intolerance of others‟ excellence”,1 “intolerance of others‟ successful growth”,2 “intolerance of an excess of others‟ positive qualities due to one‟s own egotism”,3 “(a mental state that is of the) nature of intolerance”,4 “an act of making 1 D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 83: parotkarṣākṣamāsūyā; P.R, Ch. 4, p. 175: parotkarṣāsahiṣṇutvamasūyā

2 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 844: pararddhyasahanamasūyā

3 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 968; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 150: asūyānyaguṇarddhīnāmauddhatyādasahiṣṇutā; the commentary vijñapriyā on S.D describes auddhatya as egotism (S.D, Ch. 3, pp. 150-151: auddhatyā-dahaṅkārāndanyaguṇasya ṛddhīnāmādhikyānāmasahiṣṇutā)** **

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negative qualities out of others‟ positive ones”,5 “one‟s hatred for others‟ elevated status”,6

“an act of finding fault (with others)”,7 “either an intolerance of others‟ excellence or a desire to do some harm to others”,8 and “(a mental state) that is despised by the learned and characterized by an intolerance of prosperity for the mere reason than such prosperity belongs to others, even if such others are one‟s own children or friends”.9

List of antecedents: Bharata lists the following antecedents of asūyā – others‟ various wrongdoings; hatred; and others‟ authority, sex appeal, wisdom, learning, and recreation.10

Dhananjaya mentions garva, wickedness, and frustration.11 Sharadatanaya includes fault-finding.12 Singabhupala counts others‟ superior wealth and bravery.13According to Jagannatha, the act of perceiving others‟ excellence (due to any cause whatsoever) is an important antecedent of asūyā.14 Bhoja classifies the antecedents of asūyā into the primary and accessory groups. However, the available text of Śṛṅgāraprakāśa that deals with this portion actually provides a list of asūyā‟s consequents though it designates them as asūyā‟s accessory antecedents.15

List of consequents: Bharata reckons the following among the consequents of asūyā -

publicizing others‟ faults; tarnishing others‟ positive qualities (defaming); īrṣyā;16 not making eye-contact; downcast face; knitting eyebrows; showing disrespect; and criticizing.17 The 4 K.Anu, Ch. 2, pp. 97-98: akṣamārūpāsūyā; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 115: imāmevāsahanādiśabdairvyavaharanti 5 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 134: guṇe’pi doṣāropaḥ syādasūyā

6 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p 169: dveṣaḥ parodaye‟sūyā

7 Al.Kau, Ch. 5, p. 218: doṣadṛṣṭirasūyā

8 R.T, Ch. 5, p. 76: parotkarṣāsahiṣṇutā parāniṣṭacikīrṣā vā

9 Quotation from Bhāvaviveka in Bh.K, p. 45: anyatvādeva yatsampadasahatvaṃ suteṣvapi | suhṛtsvapi ca tatprāhurasūyāṃ ninditāṃ budhāḥ

10 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 358: nānāparādhadveṣaparaiśvaryasaubhāgyamedhāvidyālīlādibhirvibhāvaiḥ; B.P, Ch.

1, p. 16: parasya saubhāgyaiśvaryamedhālīlāsamucchrayaiḥ ** **

11 D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 83: garvadaurjanyamanyujā

12 B.P, Ch. 1, p. 16: dūrāparādhānveṣaṇādibhiḥ; an alternative Nāṭyaśāstra** reading for nānāparādha is nānāparādhānveṣaṇa (N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 358) **

13 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 134: para - - - sampatti - - - śaurya

14 R.G, Ch. 1, p. 115: parotkarṣadarśanādi

15 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796: doṣākhyāpanaguṇopaghāta- - - bhrukuṭikriyādaya uddīpanavibhāvāḥ

16 Discussed below

17 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 358: tasyāśca pariṣadi doṣaprakhyāpanaguṇopaghāterṣyācakṣuḥpradānādhomukha-bhrukuṭikriyāvajñānakutsanādibhiranubhāvaiḥ** **

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mnemonic verse quoted by him also recognizes angry looks among the consequents.18

Abhinavagupta explains “tarnishing others‟ positive qualities” (guṇopaghāta/guṇanāśana) as the process by which others‟ positive qualities are made to appear negative, for instance, by branding a religious person as a hypocrite.19 Sharadatanaya includes the turning away of one‟s face,20 Hemachandra adds talk filled with īrṣyā,21 Ramachandra and Gunachandra mention the (purposeful) concealing of others‟ positive qualities,22 and Rupa Gosvamin enumerates criticizing/making abusive remarks, slandering, and oblique glances23 among the consequents of asūyā. The eye expressions related to asūyā are „jihmā‟ („crooked‟) – that in which the eyelids hang downwards and are contracted at the outer corner of the eye, the pupils are (partly) hidden and upturned, and the glances are directed sideways24 - and

„kuñcitā‟ („contracted‟) – that in which the tip of eyelashes are bent because of the bending down of eyelids and the pupils are directed downwards.25 There is lowering – pātana – of the eyebrows26 and the nose is wrinkled - vikūṇita27 - in asūyā. The lip movement associated with asūyā is called „vivarta‟/„vivartita‟ („turned around‟) and involves pursing the lips together and dragging them towards one side of the face.28 According to Bhoja, asūyā is related to the 18 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 359: krodhaparivṛttanetraiśca

19 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 354: guṇo nāśyate doṣīkriyate yena vacanena tattathoktam yathā tapojapaniyate dāmbhiko’yamiti

20 B.P, Ch. 1, p. 16: īrṣyāparivartitavaktratā; turning the face away is included among facial expressions -

Bharata calls it vinivṛttam and describes its use in expressing asūyā (N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 21: vinivṛttamasūyāyāṃ); also discussed under gender specificity below

21 K. Anu, Ch. 2, p. 98: serṣyokti

22 N.D, Ch. 3, p. 334: guṇanihnava** **

23 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 169: tatra- - - ākṣepā - - - apavṛttistirovīkṣā - - -** **

24 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 11: lambitā kuñcitapuṭā śanaistiryaṅnirīkṣiṇī | nigūḍhā gūḍhatārā ca jihmā dṛṣṭirudāhṛtā

(If “nigūḍhā gūḍhatārā” is read as a single compound, it can mean “with pupils partly hidden”); B.P, Ch. 5, p.

129: lambitākuñcitapuṭā śanaistiryaṅnirīkṣiṇī | gūḍhodvartitatārā ca jihmā dṛṣṭirudāhṛtā; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p.

13: jihmā dṛṣṭirasūyāyāṃ

25 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, pp. 10-11: ānikuñcitapakṣmāgrā puṭairākuñcitaistathā | sannā kuñcitatarā ca kuñcitā

dṛṣṭiriṣyate; B.P, Ch. 5, p. 128: ānikuñcitapakṣmāgrā puṭairākuñcitaistathā | sannā patitatarā ca kuñcitā

dṛṣṭiriṣyate; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 13: kuñcitāsūyita

26 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 17: asūyite - - - pātanam

27 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 18: vikūṇitā saṅkucitā; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 18: vikūṇitā ca kartavyā - - - asūyitādiṣu 28 N.S,Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 20: vikūṇanaṃ vivartastu; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 20: asūyā - - - vivartanam; Sa.Ra, Vol.

4, Ch. 7, p. 166: oṣṭhayoḥ sapuṭastiryaksaṅkocena vivartitaḥ

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intellectually mediated response of utthāpaka.29 Singabhupala describes utthāpaka as the act of provoking others for a fight.30** **

List of enduring mental states in whose context asūyā can occur as a transient mental state: Bharata counts love, mirth, anger, and perseverance among the enduring mental states that can bring asūyā within their fold.31 Bhoja specifies that asūyā emerges in the context of love-in-separation (and not love-in-union).32

List of other (transient) mental states in whose context asūyā can figure: According to Bhoja, asūyā can also emerge in the backdrop of intoxication, recollection/recognition, vindictiveness, jealousy, rage, and effects of sleep such as dreaming.33

List of other mental states that can emerge in the context of asūyā: Bhoja mentions mirth, anger, ridicule, and choking of voice among the psychological and psychophysical states for which asūyā can form the background.34

Evocation and expression of asūyā in different character types: The udātta and śānta character types cannot be described as going through asūyā. 35 This is so because these characters possess a set of traits that are incompatible with the emergence of asūyā (and several other mental states).36 Bhoja particularly mentions that the udātta character does not suffer mātsarya (a mental state that is subsumed under asūyā; see below) on perceiving others‟ positive qualities. Indeed, the absence of mātsarya is included among the udātta character‟s traits.37 The opposite trait, namely, mātsarya on perceiving others‟ positive 29 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p. 977: parasparāsūyayā - - - utthāpakaḥ

30 R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 72: preraṇaṃ yatparasyādau | yoddhāyotthāpakastu saḥ

31 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

32 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 794

33 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, pp. 794-800

34 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796: hāsyakrodhā(?va)jñopahasitasvarabhedādayo vyabhicāriṇaḥ

35 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch.18, p. 1015: asūyānutpattiḥ

36 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1014: notpadyante - - - tatpratyanīkaguṇayogitvāt 37S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1014: paraguṇeṣvamātsaryam** **

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qualities, characterizes the uddhata character.38 Dhananjaya considers mātsarya as a defining feature of the uddhata character type.39

Conceptually related terms: Terms conceptually related to asūyā are „īrṣyā‟ and

„mātsarya‟/„matsara‟. For Rudra Bhatta, īrṣyā is the same as asūyā. Not only does his definition of īrṣyā match with Dhananjaya‟s definition of asūyā, but also the antecedents he lists for īrṣyā are identical to the ones Dhananjaya lists for asūyā.40 Bhoja defines īrṣyā as

“the intolerance of similar others being conferred with gifts and honor” and considers it a mental state independent from asūyā.41 According to him, īrṣyā arises from perceiving others that are similar to oneself (in terms of family background, temperament, physical beauty, knowledge, age, affluence, physical prowess, and courage) being loved, shown special consideration, and bestowed with status, honor, or gifts.42 Bhoja separately includes co-wives to the list of īrṣyā‟s antecedents43 and by doing so seems to suggest that even those who are dissimilar to oneself can evoke īrṣyā because of the very fact that one shares a specific relationship with them. Its accessory antecedent is resentment.44Among its consequents are included frustration, taking offense, picking up love quarrels, and blaming.45 According to Singbhupala, īrṣyā may be expressed through the intellectually mediated verbal response of saṃlāpa that is characterized by vehement speech.46 Bhoja describes saṃlāpa as involving an exchange of insults in public.47 The transient states that can emerge in the wake of īrṣyā

include asūyā itself in addition to anger, perseverance, wonder, logical reasoning, feeling miserable, disgust, perplexity, apathy, resentment, tremor, altered bodily glow, tear flow, 38 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1026: paraguṇeṣu mātsaryam** **

39 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: darpamātsaryabhūyiṣṭho - - - dhīroddhataḥ

40 R.Ka, p. 55: parotkarṣākṣamerṣyā syāddaurjanyānmanyuto‟pi vā

41 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 845: samāneṣu dānamānādyamarṣaṇamīrṣyā** **

42 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796: samānakulaśīlarūpavidyāvayovibhavabalaparākrameṣu ca krameṇa prīti-prā(?pra)sādasthānadānamānādaya ālambanavibhāvāḥ

43 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796: sapatnīṣu

44 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796: amarṣādavalokanādaya uddīpanavibhāvāḥ

45 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797: manyuvyalīkavipriyapranayakalahopālambhādayo’nubhāvāḥ

46 R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 72: īrṣyā - - -gabhīroktiḥ saṃlāpaḥ

47 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1081: sadasi nānāvākyairmitho’dhikṣepo hi saṃlāpakaḥ

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perspiration, and choking of voice.48 A comparison of asūyā with īrṣyā reveals that intolerance (asahana/amarṣaṇa) forms the core experience of both mental states. The fact that asūyā and īrṣyā can assume the role of each other‟s transient mental state and that īrṣyā

figures among the consequents of asūyā also indicates that the two are closely related.

However, while asūyā necessitates evaluation of others as better than oneself, the focus in īrṣyā is on the exclusive enjoyment of interpersonal and social privileges (such as access to love and status) by others that are evaluated as similar to oneself. Some aestheticians (e.g., Rupa Gosvamin, Jagannatha) subsume īrṣyā under amarṣa (resentment, vindictiveness).49

Singabhupala differentiates īrṣyā into the self-related (svaviṣaya) and the other-related (paraviṣaya) types. According to him, the former, resulting from oneself not being acknowledged (through the conferring of gifts, etc.), is subsumable under amarṣa whereas the latter, resulting from someone else being acknowledged in lieu of oneself, is subsumable under asūyā.50 To summarize, there exist the following views regarding īrṣyā: a)

Īrṣyā is the same as asūyā (Rudra Bhatta‟s view)

Asūyā, īrṣyā, and amarṣa are three different but closely related mental states (Bhoja‟s view)

c) Īrṣyā is similar to amarṣa (Rupa Gosvamin‟s and Jagannatha‟s view) d)

Īrṣyā is of two types with one of them subsumable under amarṣa and the other under asūyā (Singabhupala‟s view)

As regards mātsarya, Abhinavagupta defines it as the asūyā directed at others‟ positive qualities.51 Rupa Gosvamin and Jagannatha include it in asūyā.52 According to Sharadatanaya, matsara occurs in the context of a dyadic relationship and refers to the act of 48 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797: krodhotsāhavismayavitarkadainyajugupsāmohanirvedāsūyāmarṣavepathu-vaivarṇyāśrusvedagadgadādayo vyabhicāriṇaḥ** **

49 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 173; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 119 ** **

50 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 139: svaviṣayadānamānādyamarṣaṇarūpāyā īrṣyāyā amarṣe’ntarbhāvaḥ paraviṣayāyā-stvasūyāyām

51 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 314: mātsaryaṃ guṇeṣvasūyā

52 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p.175; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 119

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self-elevation effected by putting others down.53 Bhoja defines mātsarya as the intolerance resulting from someone else obtaining appreciation for his/her positive qualities.54 From his perspective, it is possible to differentiate between asūyā, mātsarya, and īrṣyā on the basis of features presented in Table 4.1below –

Table 4.1** **

Comparison of asūyā, mātsarya, and īrṣyā from Bhoja’s perspective Mental state

Number of actors Antecedent cause of Illustrative scenario

involved

the the mental state

emergence of the

mental state

Asūyā

Someone

else‟s A is intolerant of B‟s

superior qualities

superior

beauty;

A‟s** **

intolerance** **is an instance

of asūyā

Mātsarya

Someone

else A is intolerant of C‟s

obtaining appreciation appreciation

B‟s

for his/her positive beauty; A‟s** intolerance **is qualities

an instance of mātsarya

Īrṣyā

Someone else similar A is intolerant of C‟s

oneself

getting conferring of gifts on **B **

acknowledgment (by who she thinks is similar

way

being to

herself;

A‟s** **

conferred with gifts, intolerance** **is an instance

status, etc.)

of īrṣyā

Someone else similar **A **is intolerant of **B **

dissimilar

to sharing

common

oneself

sharing

a relationship with C; A‟s** **

common relationship intolerance** **is an instance

with a third party

of īrṣyā

Miscellasneous details: Sanskrit aestheticians highlight the mental states of asūyā, mātsarya, and īrṣyā in the context of māna – anger surfacing in romantic love when one partner perceives or infers (or remembers, suspects, anticipates, mistakenly apprehends, etc.) 53 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 43: parāpakarṣasvotkarṣavyāpāro matsaro dvayoḥ** **

54 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1332: paraguṇasambhāvanāsahiṣṇutvaṃ mātsaryam

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a wrong committed against him/her by another partner.55 Bhoja includes māna among the four types56 of love-in-separation and asūyā, mātsarya, and īrṣyā among the 24 types57 of māna. In order to specify their occurrence within the ambit of māna, he renames asūyā and īrṣyā as asūyita and īrṣyāyita respectively. Rupa Gosvamin regards īrṣyā as the antecedent of māna and asūyā as a transient mental state that can figure in the backdrop of māna.58 It is possible to make a distinction between asūyā occurring in the ambit of a māna (that presupposes a romantic relationship) and that occurring in a non-romantic relationship. Table 4.2 elucidates this distinction with an illustrative scenario.

Table 4.2

*Comparison of asūyā in non-romantic and romantic relationships *

Mental state

Illustrative scenario

Asūyā in a non-romantic relationship

A is intolerant of B‟s superior beauty; A‟s** **

intolerance** **is an instance of asūyā in a

non-romantic relationship

Asūyā in a romantic relationship

**A **and **C **have romantic love for each other;

**A **is intolerant of B‟s superior beauty

because she fears losing **C **to **B **due to the

latter‟s superior and her own inferior

beauty; A‟s** intolerance **is an instance of asūyā in a romantic relationship

****From an examination of Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it becomes evident that asūyā differs from mātsarya and īrṣyā in an important way. The latter two mental states are brought about by the active intervention of a third party (through his acts of appreciation, acknowledgment through conferring of gifts and position, and contribution to a relationship) whereas the former doesn‟t require such a caveat. In the case of asūyā, no tangible third party may be present and even if present (such as one‟s lover) may not actively intervene.

55 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1320: dṛṣṭaśrutādhyaparādhajanmā mitho mithunamānaseṣu roṣo mānaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1321: mānotpattihetavo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthāpannaśrutāśrutārthāpannaśaṅkitasambhāvitānumitopamita-viparītotprekṣitasmṛtasvapnopalabdhāhvayāḥ** **

56 The other three types are separation following (1) first encounter with a love partner, (2) travel of one partner to a far-off land, and (3) death of one partner (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 24, p. 1173: tasya bhedāḥ prathamānurāga-mānapravāsakaruṇavipralambhāḥ)

57 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1328: caturviṃśatirmānabhedajātayaḥ

58 Uj.N.M, p. 527: heturīrṣyā vipakṣādervaiśiṣṭye preyasā kṛte | sañcāriṇo’sya - - - asūyā - - -

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Sanskrit aestheticians maintain that the literary depictions of māna (especially in its form as īrṣyāyita) are most effective when female characters are made its substratum.59 It is therefore not surprising that in all the vignette verses provided by Bhoja for illustrating asūyita, īrṣyāyita, and mātsarya, only female characters are described as going through those mental states.60 Expressing īrṣyā through physical responses alone without either disclosing one‟s intent through speech or replying properly is regarded as specific to women and is called „vikṛta‟/„vihṛta‟.61 Likewise, among the responses resulting from īrṣyā in women is included vicchitti – one‟s lack of interest in and the need to be persuaded by others for grooming.62 Joy in women can result in a simultaneous occurrence - called „kilakiñcita‟ - of several mental states and expressive responses. Rupa Gosvamin includes asūyā, apart from garva, desire, fear, and anger, among the mental states that constitute kilakiñcita.63 The turning away of face due either to asūyā or īrṣyā is known as „vinivṛtta‟64 and has been described by Bharata as specific to women. Mental states, especially in relation to women, have been discussed from a developmental perspective by Sanskrit aestheticians. According to them, youth, starting at 16 years of age,65 is constituted by four non-overlapping stages in women.66 Each stage is characterized by specific physical and psychological changes.67 The 59Bhoja classifies māna into the superior, inferior, and intermediate forms. The superior (narratively delineated) form of māna has a female protagonist as its substratum whereas its inferior and intermediate forms have a male protagonist and both male as well as female protagonists as their substratum (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1320: sa uttamaḥ kanīyānmadhyamaśca nāyikānāyakobhayāśrayabhedāt); Bhoja defines īrṣyāyita as “samānāsu dānamānādyamarṣaṇam” (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1330) with the word „samānāsu‟ („among similar other females‟) in the feminine gender, thus pointing at its exclusive (literary) occurrence in females; B.P, Ch. 4, p.

79: īrṣyāmānastu kavibhiryoṣitāmeva varṇyate | sa puṃsāṃ yadi varṇyeta vairasyāyaiva kalpate 60 For example, in a vignette verse on īrṣyāyita, a hero‟s wives are described as angry at him for having spent the night with their co-wife (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1330). Likewise, in a verse illustrating asūyita, goddess Parvati is described as intolerant of her co-wife‟s superior status (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1330) 61 Uj.N.M, p. 316: hrīmānerṣyādibhiryatra nocyate svavivakṣitam | vyajyate ceṣṭayaivedaṃ vikṛtaṃ tadvidur-budhāḥ; R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 56: īrṣyayā - - - adattaṃ yogyamuttaraṃ | kriyayā vyajyate yatra vihṛtaṃ tadudīritam ** **

62 Bh.K, p. 607: prasādhanānāṃ dayitāparādhe yadīrṣyayānādarataḥ sakhīnām | prayatnato dhāraṇamaṅganābhir-vicchittireṣā kathitā munīndraiḥ; Uj.N.M, p. 309: sakhīyatnādiva dhṛtirmaṇḍanānāṃ priyāgasi | serṣyāvajñā

varastrībhirvicchittiḥ - - -

63 Uj.N.M, pp. 311, 312: garvābhilāṣa - - - āsūyābhayakrudhām | saṅkarīkaraṇaṃ harṣāducyate kilakiñcitam 64 Bh.K, p. 612: vyāvṛttaṃ vinivṛttaṃ - - - īrṣyāsūyayorapi; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 21: strīṇāṃ kāryaṃ

prayoktṛbhiḥ

65 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, p. 122: āṣoḍaśācca kaiśoraṃ yauvanaṃ syāttataḥ param 66 N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 240: sarvāsāṃ nārīṇāṃ yauvanabhedāḥ smṛtāstu catvāraḥ; B.P, Ch. 5, p. 103: strīṇāṃ

prāyeṇa sarvāsāṃ yauvanaṃ tu caturvidham

116

second and third stages see the gradual emergence as well as strengthening of asūyā and related mental states, especially in the context of romantic relationships.68

Sharadatanaya etymologically derives the word „asūyā‟ from „asu‟ (life-breath) and

„yā‟ (depart), describing it as “(a mental state) that causes life-breaths to rise up and depart”, possibly referring to asūyā‟s self-destructive nature.69 He also derives it from

„anyathā‟(„differently‟) and „sūyate‟(„produced‟), implying perhaps that asūyā‟s emergence entails a distorted view of things by way of presenting others‟ positive qualities in a bad light.70 His etymology of „matsara‟ is based on the words „mattaḥ‟ („further than me‟) and

„sarati‟ („he/she goes‟).71 On this account, matsara can be understood as the thought that one is being overtaken by another person. Vināyakabharata presents details on the stylized expression of asūyā using a combination of hand gestures.72 Each of these hand gestures individually communicates separate facets of asūyā. The index finger pointing outwards, for example, conveys the idea of another person.73 Likewise, the budded hand placed over the heart indicates positive qualities.74

**4.2.2 Garva **

Definitions: Sanskrit aestheticians have defined garva as “intoxicating elation”,75 “an act of despising others”,76 “an act of despising others due to belief in one‟s own superiority”,77 “an act of despising others because of oneself being in an esteemed 67 N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 240: naipathyarūpaceṣṭāguṇena

68 N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 241: kiñcitkaroti - - - matsaraṃ - - | - - - dvitīye tu; N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 241: - - -

pratipakṣāsūyinī - - - | - - - tṛtīye tu; B.P, Ch. 5, p. 104: īrṣyati praṇayakruddhā pratipakṣābhyasūyinī** **

69 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: asūyā sā yayā yāti prāṇināmasurutthitaḥ

70 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: sūyate’nyathā

71 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 29: mattaḥ saratyayaṃ mattaḥ saratītyeṣa matsaraḥ** **

72 Bh.K, p. 45

73 Bh.K, p. 45: sūcīhastaḥ purobhāge paraśabdanirūpaṇe

74 Bh.K, p. 45: hṛdi sthāne tu mukulo guṇabhāvanirūpaṇe

75 D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 84; S.D, Ch. 3, p.145: garvo madaḥ (The conceptual underpinnings of the word „mada‟ are discussed below under Subheading no. 8)

76 K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 85: garvaḥ parāvajñā

77 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 824: ātmotkarṣasambhāvanayā parāvajñānaṃ garvaḥ** **

117

position”,78 “a thought of oneself being great” (explained by the commentary as “having high regard for oneself and disgust for others”),79 “an act of despising of others due to one‟s superiority”,80 “self-aggrandizement by despising others”,81 “exaggerated sense of self”,82 “a thought that one is superior to all others or that all others are inferior (to oneself)”,83 “an act of despising others due to knowledge about one‟s own superiority”,84 and “high opinion about oneself associated with a disregard for meritorious others, boastfulness, exaggerated self-identity, and shamelessness”.85

List of antecedents: Bharata mentions (one‟s own) authority,86 lineage, physical beauty, youthfulness, learning/scholarship, physical prowess, and acquisition of wealth among the antecedents of garva.87 Dhananjaya adds kinship to the list.88 Bhoja lists the following among the accessory antecedents of garva – being highly valued by one‟s husband (or master), being respected by superior others, being proposed to by a suitable lady, and being praised for one‟s positive qualities.89 Ramachandra and Gunachandra include caste/tribe, intelligence/wisdom, and being the favorite of someone else.90 The following are also enumerated among the antecedents of garva - majesty,91 superhuman influence,92

78 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 962: garvo’nyeṣāmavajñānamātmasambhāvanādibhiḥ; the commentary by Jivananda

Vidyasagara

Bhattacarya

(1894)

explains

this

definition

thus:

ātmanaḥ svasya

sambhāvanādibhirgauravādibhiranyeṣāmavajñānamavamānanaṃ garvaḥ (S.K.Abh, Ch. 5, p. 588) 79 N.D, Ch. 3, p. 344: ātmanyādhikyadhīrgarvaḥ; ādhikyadhīḥ parajugupsākrāntaḥ svasminbahumānaḥ

80 R.Ka, p. 56: ātmotkarṣānyadhikkāraḥ

81 P.R, Ch.4, p. 180: anyadhikkaraṇādātmotkarṣo garvaḥ

82 Al.Kau, Ch. 5, p. 219: garvo’haṅkāraḥ

83 R.T, Ch. 5, p. 91: ātmani sarvādhikatvabuddhiḥ sarvasminnadhamatvabuddhirvā garvaḥ** **

84 R.G, Ch. 1, p. 104: ātmotkarṣādhīnaparāvahelanaṃ garvaḥ

85 Bh.K, p. 169: saiva svaviṣayā dūrīkurvāṇā guṇinaḥ parān | ślāghābhimānanairlajjyabhāvanī garva ucyate 86 Singabhupala defines authority (aiśvarya) as a state in which one‟s orders carry weight (R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 107: aiśvaryamājñāsiddhiḥ)

87 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 366: aiśvaryakularūpayauvanavidyābaladhanalābhādibhirvibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate 88 D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 84: garvo’bhijana - - - ādibhiḥ

89 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 794: bhartṛsambhāvanottamādarānurūpanārīprārthanāguṇapraśaṃsādaya uddīpanavibhāvāḥ

90 N.D, Ch. 3, p. 344: jāti - - - buddhivāllabhya - - -

91 R.Ka, p. 56: - - - bhūtibhiḥ

92 S.D, Ch. 3, p. 145: garvo - - - prabhāva - - -

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acquiring a desired object,93 sex appeal, and the privilege of being protected by the greatest of all.94

List of consequents: Bharata‟s list of garva‟s consequents includes asūyā in addition to displaying disrespect,95 confrontation, not replying back, withholding a conversation, gazing at one‟s limbs,96 vibhrama,97 mocking at others, speaking harshly (verbal aggression through death threats, etc.), transgressing one‟s superiors, criticizing, and cutting short a conversation.98 To this list, others add vacant stare and resentment,99 the improper placement of ornaments on one‟s person,100 frivolous side glances,101 lack of humility,102

dissimulation,103 ironical taunt, not listening to others‟ talk,104 mannerisms of eyes and eyebrows, laughter, exhibition of prowess,105 looking at others with one‟s neck raised, criticizing one‟s superiors,106 boastfulness, exaggerated self-identity, and shamelessness.107

The eye expression related to garva is vikośā – one in which the eyelids are expanded and don‟t blink, the eyeballs bulge out, and the pupils are not fixed.108 Among head movements, ādhūta and nihañcita communicate garva. The former involves turning the head to one side and lifting it up just once.109 It is specifically employed to gaze at one‟s (raised) arms.110 In 93 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 106: - - - iṣṭalābhādinā - - -** **

94 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 152: saubhāgya - - - sarvottamāśrayaiḥ; Uj.N.M, pp. 341, 342

95 Sharadatanaya further qualifies this display of disrespect as something that people with garva exhibit even towards their dependents (B.P, Ch. 1, p. 22: āśriteṣvapyavajñānāt)** **

96 Especially gazing at one‟s arms (B.P, Ch. 1, p. 22: dordvaya - - - avalokanāt); Dhananjaya describes such gazing as frivolous and showy (D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 84: savilāsāṅgavīkṣaṇam) 97 Discussed below under gender specificity

98 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 366: tasyāsūyāvajñāgharṣaṇānuttaradānāsambhāṣaṇāṅgāvalokanavibhramāpahasana-vākpāruṣyaguruvyatikramaṇādhikṣepavacanavicchedādibhiranubhāvairabhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ

99 B.P, Ch. 1, p. 22: śūnyālokaiḥ - - - amarṣa; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 92

100 N.D, Ch. 3, p. - - - alaṅkāravyatyāsa - - -

101 R.Ka, p. 56: salīlāpāṅgavīkṣaṇam

102 S.D, Ch. 3, p. 145: - - - avinayādikṛt

103 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 107: **- - - apahnutī - - -; also Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 153: - - - nihnavo - - -; Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary on Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 153: nihnavaḥ svābhiprāyādergopanam **

104 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 153: atra solluṇṭhavacanaṃ - - - anyasya vacanāśravaṇādayaḥ

105 R.T, Ch. 5, p. 91: bhrūdṛṣṭiceṣṭitahasitapauruṣaprakāśādayaḥ

106 Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 461: udgrīvāvekṣaṇa - - - adhikṣepātikramādguroḥ

107 Related quotation under Footnote no. 85 in this chapter

108 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 12: vikośitobhayapuṭā protphullā cānimeṣiṇī | anavasthitatārā ca vikośā dṛṣṭiriṣyate; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 13: - - - garva - - - syādvikośitā

109 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 5: ādhūtamucyate tiryaksakṛdudvāhitaṃ tu yat | garvecchādarśane - - - ādhūtaṃ** **

110 Bh. K, p. 51: garveṇa bhujavīkṣāyāṃ

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the latter movement, the neck sinks down, the shoulders are raised, and one or both eyebrows are slightly curved.111 As regards other bodily responses of garva, the cheeks are puffed up (ghūrṇa or pūrṇa),112 the face is turned upwards (udvāhi),113 and the chest is held high and stiff with its posterior part (i.e., upper back) being depressed (nirbhugna).114 Among the upper limb movements connected with garva, mention must be made of patāka, niṣadha, and sūcīmukha. The patāka is a single hand gesture in which the fingers are extended and held parallel to one another, and the thumb is bent.115 In garva, the patāka hand is moved up from one side of the body to the other and towards the forehead over which it slightly shaken.116

The niṣadha is a gesture that involves both hands. In it, the left hand clasps the right arm at the elbow and the right hand, with a tightly clenched fist, is placed over the left elbow.117 The sūcīmukha is a single hand gesture in which the index finger is extended. Like the patāka gesture, the sūcīmukha, when held close to the forehead, conveys the idea of self (“I”) in the context of garva.118 Responses consequent to garva can also result from dissimulation (avahittha), another transient mental state, though in that case, there is no actual experience of garva; quite the contrary, an outward display of garva-specific behavior only serves to mask inner displeasure.119

111 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 5: utkṣiptāṃsāvasaktaṃ yatkuñcitabhrūlataṃ manāk | nihañcitaṃ tu vijñeyaṃ - - -

prayojayet garve - - -; Bh. K, p. 338: utkṣiptabāhuśikharaṃ magnagrīvaṃ nihañcitam; also discussed below under gender specificity

112 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p. 989: unnataṃ pūrṇaṃ/ghūrṇam

113 Sa.Ra, Ch. 8, p. 176: - - - utkṣiptamudvāhi garva - - -** **

114 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 83: stabdhaṃ ca nimnapṛṣṭhaṃ ca nirbhugnāṃsaṃ samunnatam | uro nirbhugnametaddhi; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 83: garvotseke ca kartavyam. By „nimnapṛṣṭhaṃ‟, what is conveyed is that the chest is thrust forward.

115 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 29: prasāritāḥ samāḥ sarvā yasyāṅgulyo bhavanti hi | kuñcitaśca tathāṅguṣṭhaḥ sa patāka iti smṛtaḥ ** **

116 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 29: garve’pyahamiti tajjñairlalāṭadeśotthitaḥ kāryaḥ; A.Bh.2/2, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 29: garvagarbhe prayoge pārśvāntarātsvapārśvamāgaccham llalāṭābhimukha ūrdhvaḥ kartavyaḥ; Bh.K, p. 350: phālasthaḥ kiñcidvicalitaḥ karaḥ** **

117 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 60: gṛhītvā vāmahastena kūrparābhyantare bhujam | dakṣiṇaṃ cāpi vāmasya kūrparābhyantare nyaset; sa cāpi dakṣiṇo hastaḥ samyaṅmuṣṭikṛto bhavet | ityeṣa niṣadho hastaḥ; etena - - -

garva - - - kāryāḥ

118 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 44: garve’hamiti lalāṭe** **

119 B.P, Ch. 1, p. 22: antarvyathā bahirgarvabhāvanetyavahitthajāḥ

120

List of enduring mental states in whose context garva can occur as a transient mental state: Bharata enumerates love, anger, and perseverance among the enduring mental states in whose backdrop garva can make its appearance.120 Sharadatanaya includes wonder.121

Vishvanatha adds filial affection.122

List of other (transient) mental states in whose context garva can figure: Among these, Bhoja mentions joy, intoxication, recollection/recognition, effects of sleep, and mental illness.123

List of other mental states that can emerge in the context of garva: Bhoja reckons mirth, perseverance, anger, mental fickleness, and resentment among the mental states that can follow in the wake of garva.124 He extends to garva the thesis that all mental states are equally capable of functioning in a transient or an enduring capacity. According to him, garva in its enduring form can bring many of the above-mentioned mental states within its purview and undergo enhancement by them. Such enhanced garva graduates to the level of a rasa –

one that is called „uddhata‟.125 Commenting on the vignette verse provided by Bhoja to illustrate the rasa of uddhata, Singabhupala refutes the view that garva can assume the role of an enduring mental state.126

Evocation and expression of garva in different character types: According to Bhoja, garva does not figure in the repertoire of mental states that the udātta and śānta character types can be described as going through.127 Other Sanskrit aestheticians describe the udātta character as one whose garva is masked by humility, thereby implying that such a character 120 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 8, p. 378

121 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 33; Singabhupala in his commentary on Sa.Ra notes a relationship between absence of garva and absence of wonder (Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 429: garvābhāvo’vismayaḥ)

122 S.D, Ch. 3, p. 180: vatsalaṃ ca rasaṃ viduḥ

123 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, pp. 793 - 800

124 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 795

125 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: garvaprakṛtiruddhataḥ: S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 990: so’yaṃ garvaprakṛtir-uddhato nāma rasaḥ

126 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 170: nāsminnudāharaṇe garvasya sthāyitvamupapadyate 127 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1014: garvādayaśca satyapi garvādihetau jātyādiguṇasamūhe tasya notpadyante

121

type can indeed become the substratum of garva.128 Unlike the udātta character, the śānta type is free of garva under all circumstances.129 Garva is frequently communicated by the uddhata character. Among the uddhata character‟s eight unique traits, at least 3, namely, śauṇḍīrya, vilāsa, and vikatthanā, are directly connected with garva.130 Śauṇḍīrya is excessive garva,131

vilāsa, the aggregate of peculiar mannerisms (e.g., of the eyes) that stem from garva,132 and vikatthanā, boastfulness.133 Indeed, garva is the uddhata character‟s predominant mental state according to Bhoja.134 Sanskrit aestheticians‟ definitions of the uddhata character and commentaries on those definitions often mention terms that are conceptually related to garva such as darpa, ahaṅkāra, avalepa, and mada.135

Conceptually related terms: Terms conceptually related to „garva‟ include

„ahaṅkāra‟/„ahaṅkṛti‟, „abhimāna‟, „māna‟, „mada‟, „darpa‟, „śauṇḍīrya‟, „avalepa‟, „smaya‟,

„uddhasita‟, and „auddhatya‟. When Sanskrit aestheticians use the word „ahaṅkāra‟, they mean one of several things. In a limited sense „ahaṅkāra‟ (or „ahaṅkṛti‟) is synonymous with

„garva‟. The udātta character, for instance, is described either as „gūḍhagarva‟ or

„nigūḍhāhaṅkāra‟, thus indicating that the words „garva‟ and „ahaṅkāra‟ can be substituted for one another.136 According to Bhāvaviveka, ahaṅkṛti is self-assertion accompanied by 128 E.g., K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: gūḍhagarvaḥ - - - dhīrodāttaḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: gūḍhagarvo vinayacchannāvalepaḥ; N.D. Ch. 1, p.28: dhīrodāttastu vinayacchannāvalepaḥ - here the word „avalepa‟ (described below under the heading of conceptually related terms) is used as a synonym of „garva‟; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 94: vinayacchannagarvaḥ; „vinaya‟ („humility‟), a term that is conceptually related to vrīḍā, shall be explored in greater detail under 4.2.3 below** **

129 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: sarvathāpyanavalepaḥ

130 Māna, another unique trait of uddhata character, is conceptually related to garva. It is discussed in detail below (Subheading no. 8)

131 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1031: garvaprakarṣaḥ śauṇḍīryam

132 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1031: garvajanitā dṛṣṭyādiceṣṭā vilāsaḥ

133 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1031: svaguṇaślāghā vikatthanā; the udātta character, as opposed to the uddhata one, is described as avikatthana – non-boastful or possessing the trait of non-boastfulness (D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: avikatthanaḥ - - - dhīrodattaḥ - - -; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1007: svaguṇāgrahaṇamavikatthanam) 134 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: dhīroddhatāśraya uddhataḥ; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: garvaprakṛtiruddhataḥ** **

135 E.g., D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: darpa - - - bhūyiṣṭho - - - | dhīroddhatastvahaṅkārī; B.P, Ch. 4, p. 92: ahaṅkārī; R.Ka, p. 9: darpa - - - ahaṅkāravān; K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: avalipto dhīroddhataḥ (here „avalipta‟ refers to a person with avalepa); D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: darpaḥ śauryādimadaḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: avaliptaḥ

śauryādimadavān

136 K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: gūḍhagarvaḥ - - - dhīrodāttaḥ; D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 37:** nigūḍhāhaṅkāro dhīrodāttaḥ **

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ignorance about the merits and demerits both of oneself and an activity at hand.137 It is expressed through proclamations such as “I am competent in this activity but others are not”.138 Ahaṅkāra is also the exaggerated notion of “I” seen in the context of garva.139 Rupa Gosvamin describes six forms of garva, namely, ahaṅkāra, abhimāna, darpa, uddhasita, mada, and auddhatya.140 He defines ahaṅkāra as an act of putting someone else down by extoling the virtues of one‟s own group.141

In a wider sense, ahaṅkāra is akin to the ego principle. It is one of the components of the psychic apparatus.142 Some individual selves, Bhoja opines, are endowed with a special sort of ahaṅkāra (ahaṅkāraviśeṣa)143 that is the product of merits accumulated by them in the past.144 Such an ahaṅkāra alone allows the self145 to become a substratum of traits that are collectively termed „ātmaguṇasampat‟ („the aggregate of self‟s traits‟).146 What are the traits that fall under the category of ātmaguṇasampat? Bhoja uses the term „guṇasampat‟ for the 24

commonly shared traits on which self-identity may potentially be based.147 However, comparing Bhoja‟s list of traits with Kamandaka‟s (c. 5th century AD), it is clear that the term

„ātmaguṇasampat‟ needn‟t include only the 24 commonly shared traits but can also bring 137 Bh.K, p. 45: aspṛṣṭakāryātmaguṇadoṣastvahaṅkṛtiḥ

138 Bh.K, p. 45: ahaṃ tu śaktaḥ kārye’sminnāmī śaktāstu jantavaḥ** **

139 According to Bharata, one of the uses of the sūcīmukhī gesture (described above) is to convey the idea of “I”

in the context of garva (N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 44: garve’hamiti). Abhinavagupta equates this idea of “I” with ahaṅkāra (A.Bh.2/2, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 44: garve yo‟haṅkāraḥ)** **

140 Uj.N.M, p. 246: ahaṅkāro’bhimānaśca darpa uddhasitaṃ tathā | mada auddhatyamityeṣa garvaḥ ṣoḍhā

nigadyate

141 Uj.N.M, p. 246: ahaṅkāraḥ parākṣepaḥ svapakṣaguṇavarṇanāt

142 The other components, apart from ahaṅkāra, are manas and buddhi (discussed in Chapter 3, Footnote no. 64)** **

143 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 624: ahaṅkāraviśeṣasya

144 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 1: sattvātmanāmamalajanma(dharma)viśeṣajanmā; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 375: tatrāyamātmanāmanupahatebhyaḥ sukṛtaviśeṣebhya utpadyate

145 By “self” is meant the empirical self and not the transcendental Self. The transcendental Self, being independent of Matter, cannot become the substrate of traits that, according to Samkhya metaphysics, are evolutes of Matter.

146 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 375: ātmaguṇasampado - - - udayaheturbhavati; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 375: ekahetur-ityanena hetvantarābhāvamātmaguṇasampadaḥ pradarśayan; S.K.Abh: Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 904: viśiṣṭādṛṣṭajanmā-yaṃ janmināmantarātmasu ātmasamyagguṇotbhūtereko hetuḥ prakāśate

147 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1028: pādaguṇasampadārdhaguṇasampadā ca hīno madhyamaḥ kaniṣṭhaśca syāt; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, p. 1053: samastajātyādiguṇasampadyogātpādonaguṇasampadyogāccottamo madhyamaśca

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within its fold traits that are unique to each character types.148 The process by which a special sort of ahaṅkāra allows the self to become a substratum of ātmaguṇasampat can be described as follows:



When an individual engages verbally, mentally, or physically with material objects, he/she may or may not do so according to ethical principles.149



In the process of ethically or unethically engaging with material objects, an individual also earns unseen merit (puṇya/dharma) and unseen demerit (pāpa/adharma) respectively.150

Unseen merit and demerit reside in his/her buddhi and wane away only after producing their effects sometime in the future.151



Unseen merit produces its effect in the future by endowing an individual (i.e., an empirical self, understood by Bhoja as the transcendental Self in which ahaṅkāra is reflected152) with an extra-personal world of objects (comprising people, animals, and nonliving things) and a psychophysical apparatus that facilitate achievement of his/her life-goals.153

148 It is interesting to note that Kamandaka‟s Nītisāra, a treatise on polity, employs the term “ātmasampadguṇa”

(Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 74: ātmasampadguṇaiḥ) or “ātmasampat” (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 72: ātmasampatprakīrtitā) for an aggregate of traits, many of which are also found in Bhoja‟s list of shared and unique traits The Upādhyāyanirapekṣā commentary on Nītisāra calls these traits ātmaguṇasampat (Ni.Sa, Ch. 1, p. 13: ete guṇāḥ

sampatterātmasampado hetavaḥ; Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 68: svāminātmaguṇasampatsampādanameva prathamaṃ

vidheyam). Traits mentioned in Śṛṅgāraprakāśa that match with those listed in Nītisāra include the following: prabhāva, prajñā, śāstrajñāna, vāgmitva, dākṣya, and tyāga - all of which are found in Bhoja‟s list of commonly shared traits and occur under the same names in both texts (Ni.Sa, Ch. 1, p. 12); deśakālāvabodha, śakti, abhijana, sauhārda, and śaurya - commonly shared traits that occur under the names of deśakālavibhāgavid, śakta, kula, maitrī, and utsāha in Nītisāra (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 72; Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 69; Ni.Sa, Ch. 1, p. 12); dṛḍhabhaktitā - unique trait of lalita character occurring under the same name in both texts (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 69); yauvana and sthūlalakṣatā - unique traits of lalita character occurring as vayas and sthūlalakṣyatā in Nītisāra, (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 69); śīla, dākṣiṇya, kṛtajñatā - unique traits of udātta character occurring under the same name in both texts (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 69); prāgalbhya - unique trait of udātta character occurring as pragalbha in Nītisāra (Ni.Sa, Ch. 4, p. 72); and śauca - unique trait of śānta character occurring as śucitā in Nītisāra (Ni.Sa, Ch. 1, p. 12); it must be noted that the term “ātmaguṇasampat” includes only positive traits.

149 Ethical and unethical engagements are respectively called „puṇyā pravṛtti‟ and „pāpīyā pravṛtti‟ (Ny.M, Ch.

2, p. 45: pravṛttirvāgbuddhiśarīrārambhaḥ - - - sā ca dvividhā puṇyā pāpikā ca) 150 Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 46: puṇyāpuṇyapravṛttisamudbhavau - - - dharmādharmau 151 Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 47: na ca phalamadatvā dharmādharmau kṣīyete

152 Discussed under 3.3.3.3 and Footnote no. 76 in Chapter 3

153 S.T.K, p. 266: bhogaḥ puruṣārtho - - - - - - bhogo bhogasādhanānīndriyāṇyantaḥkaraṇāni cāntareṇa na sambhavati na ca tāni dharmādīn bhāvān vinā sambhavanti

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

Among the traits included under ātmaguṇasampat, some (e.g., exalted nationhood, exalted habitation, friendship) relate to the extra-personal world, others to the physical apparatus (e.g., physical beauty, physical prowess, youthfulness), and yet others to the psychical apparatus (e.g., wisdom, shrewdness). These traits can be understood as resulting from an individual‟s unseen merits and as facilitating the attainment of his/her life-goals.



To the extent that a set of goal-facilitating traits enlisted by Bhoja are present only in meritorious individuals and that such individuals are in fact individual transcendental Selves limited by ahaṅkāra, it is possible to see the connection between ahaṅkāra and the emergence of traits subsumed under ātmaguṇasampat.

From the standpoint of Bhoja‟s poetics, it is possible to posit four kinds of ahaṅkāra (Raghavan, 1978) corresponding to the four character types. The four character types themselves can be understood as four prototypes of empirical selves (or as four transcendental Selves limited by four kinds of ahaṅkāra). The ahaṅkāra of an empirical self corresponding to the uddhata character brings in its wake an aggregate of traits (12 or 18

shared traits and eight unique traits) that can facilitate his/her life-goal of object acquisition (and protection etc.). Such an aggregate of traits is inadequate though to allow for enjoyment of objects, ethical acquisition and enjoyment of objects, or eternal freedom from displeasure.

At the other end of the spectrum, the ahaṅkāra of an empirical self corresponding to the śānta character brings along with it an aggregate of traits (24 shared traits and eight unique traits) that facilitates attainment of eternal freedom from displeasure and, in addition, ethical acquisition and enjoyment of objects. Given that the life-goal of eternal freedom from displeasure stands supreme among life-goals and is also the most difficult-to-achieve,154 an empirical self (or a literary character that exemplifies such a self) pursuing it must possess a complete set of shared traits and a rare set of unique traits (enumerated in Chapter 3). The 154 Discussed under Footnote no. 61 in Chapter 3

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ahaṅkāra, therefore, of such an empirical self (or a corresponding śānta character) can be understood as the outcome of past merit greater than that necessary for the three other kinds of ahaṅkāra to emerge. On the one hand, the quantum of unseen merits that an individual has earned in the past decides the kind of ahaṅkāra he/she shall acquire in the future. And the kind of ahaṅkāra an individual inherits because of past merits transforms the real transcendental Self that he/she is into an apparent empirical self (or a character type corresponding to that empirical self) that is endowed with an aggregate of traits favorable to the attainment of one or the other life-goal. On the other hand, the aggregate of traits that an individual is endowed with decides which external objects can become the antecedent stimuli for his/her pleasurable and displeasurable mental states and through which consequent responses (in the verbal, mental, and physical modalities) he/she can engage with those objects.155 As already noted above, engagement with objects is a source of merit or demerit for the empirical self.

One can recognize a cyclical process at work here: an individual earns merit through ethical engagement and demerit through unethical engagement with external objects; the accumulated quantum of his/her past merits allows the individual to evolve into an empirical self that, at a basic level, differs from other empirical selves in the specific kind of ahaṅkāra it possesses; such a specific kind of ahaṅkāra paves way for the emergence of traits that function as building blocks of the individual‟s personality type, both in its psychophysical and extra-personal dimensions; personality type (and through it an aggregate of traits, the ahaṅkāra that brings forth such an aggregate, the accumulated quantum of past merit that 155 Bhoja describes ātmaguṇasampat as “indicating the uniqueness of (1) objects liked and perceived (by an individual) and (2) behaviors (expressed by him/her)”. By “objects liked and perceived” and “behaviors”, Bhoja refers no doubt to antecedents and consequents of mental states respectively (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 614: viśiṣṭeṣṭadṛṣṭaceṣṭābhivyañjakānāmātmaguṇasampadām). As discussed in the previous chapter, the personality type of a character decides (1) which antecedent stimuli will evoke what mental state in him/her and (2) through what consequent response will he/she express a mental state. Bhoja seems to posit that the aggregate of traits on which a personality type is based determines how a literary character classified as belonging to that type will feel and respond to some specific stimulus.

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results in such an ahaṅkāra, and past engagement with objects that produces such an accumulated quantum of merit) aids the individual in achieving one or the other life-goal; external objects that are favorable to the individual‟s life-goals become antecedent stimuli for his/her pleasure (or mental states reducible to pleasure) whereas those that are unfavorable become antecedent stimuli for displeasure (or mental states reducible to displeasure); he/she engages with a pleasure- or displeasure-giving object after evaluating the feasibility of pursuing or eliminating it respectively through his/her actions; and finally, returning back to where this cyclical process started, ethical engagement produces merit and unethical engagement, demerit.

The word „abhimāna‟, like „ahaṅkāra‟, is used in more than one sense. Rupa Gosvamin includes it among the six forms of garva enumerated earlier and explains it as “the act of recounting in an oblique way (and in front of those belonging to one‟s rival group) the superiority of one‟s (or of others‟, given they belong to one‟s group) love for somebody”.156

Some aestheticians describe abhimāna as an opinion or a resolution that takes the form “This alone, and not anything else, is the object of my liking”157 or “There may be many other attractive objects but this and this object alone I must seek”158 respectively. The Locanarocinī

commentary on Ujjvalanīlamaṇi defines abhimāna as one‟s repeated experience of an ageless and intense personal connectedness with specific others because of which one loves them irrespective of whether they possess positive qualities or not.159 Seen from a broader perspective, abhimāna is the transformation that ahaṅkāra undergoes when it appropriates something external (i.e., objects and object-directed actions) to itself. It is an assertion that can take forms such as the following: “This is mine”; “I am such and such”; “I am entitled to 156 Uj.N.M, p. 247: abhimāno nijapremotkarṣākhyānaṃ tu bhaṅgitaḥ

157 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 146: idameva mama priyaṃ nānyadityabhiprāyo’bhimānaḥ

158 Uj.N.M, p. 396: santu ramyāṇi bhūrīṇi prārthyaṃ syādidameva me | iti yo nirṇayo dhīrairabhimānaḥ sa ucyate

159 Uj.N.M, p. 396: abhimānasya gāḍhaprācīnamamatābhyāsa eva svarūpam sa ca saundaryādikama-napekṣyaiva ratimutpādayati

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this”; “I am capable of this action”; “No one else than me is entitled to this”; and “This exists for my sake”.160 Not only does ahaṅkāra transform the transcendental Self into an empirical self by casting its reflection on the former, it also allows the transformed transcendental Self to falsely appropriate objects and object-directed actions. This, it does, by first appropriating those objects and actions to itself. According to Sharadatanaya, abhimāna aids buddhi in its functioning.161 To elucidate, buddhi‟s evaluation of an object as fit to be pursued makes sense only if the empirical self, via ahaṅkāra-abhimāna, appropriates the object to itself through the assertion “I am entitled to this object”. In simple terms, an object is pursued only if its prospective owner has been established. Likewise, buddhi‟s evaluation of an object-directed action as accomplishable through current effort is meaningful only if the empirical self, again via ahaṅkāra-abhimāna, appropriates the action to itself through the assertion “I am capable of this action”. Put differently, an object-directed action can be performed only when there is an actor in place. Among the objects that may be appropriated by ahaṅkāra also figure traits.162 Since traits denote something relatively stable about a person, their appropriation can lead to the formation of self-identity. As was discussed in the previous chapter (under 3.3.3.2), trait-based self-identity is a feature of uddhata and lalita character types. Such a self-identity is however insecure for a reason that shall be discussed shortly. It was pointed out earlier that traits facilitate achievement of life-goals. As specifically regards uddhata and lalita characters, their traits facilitate acquisition (and protection etc.) and enjoyment of material objects. Since the universe of pursuable objects is largest for the uddhata character and only slightly smaller than that for the lalita character, both have to frequently contend with a high number of competitors. This, in turn, entails the prospect of failure to acquire 160 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 42: - - - yo mameti grahaḥ so’yamabhimāna itīritaḥ; Mathara‟s commentary on Sa.K, Verse 24, p. 31: rūpe’haṃ rase’haṃ gandhe’hamahaṃ vidvānahaṃ darśanīya ityevamādi - - - abhimanaḥ; S.T.K, p. 184: ahamadhikṛtaḥ, śaktaḥ khalvahamatra - - - madarthā evāmī viṣayāḥ, matto nānyo’trādhikṛtaḥ kaścidasti - - - iti yo‟bhimānaḥ; being “śakta” implies “being confident that an action is achievable through one‟s effort”

(Vibhākara commentary on S.T.K, p. 337: “asmatkṛtisādhyo’yamiti pratyayāśrayatvam”)** **

161 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 42: ahaṅkāro’bhimānena buddherupakaroti yaḥ

162 This point was discussed in Chapter 3 under Footnote no. 77

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(and protect etc.) or enjoy pursued objects. Failure leads to a disruption of trait-based self-identity. Disruption of self-identity due to one trait may be dealt with by abandoning that self-identity and forming a new one based on another trait. The uddhata and lalita characters‟ self-identities are therefore not just insecure but also volatile. The possibility of failure to acquire or enjoy a goal-congruent object (and consequent disruption of self-identity) increases as we move from the lalita superior subtype to the lalita intermediate, uddhata intermediate, and uddhata inferior subtypes. Table 4.3 below makes it clear that the fewer identity-related traits one has and the larger one‟s universe of pursuable objects, the greater the possibility of failure to acquire or enjoy a goal-congruent object and the resultant disruption of one‟s self-identity. The Table includes only four character subtypes, namely, uddhata inferior, uddhata intermediate, lalita intermediate, and lalita superior because a relationship between traits and self-identity is found only in them. The udātta and śānta character types, as shall be explained below, do not exhibit a relationship between traits and self-identity.

Table 4.3

Hierarchy of four character subtypes based on their proneness for failure to achieve a goal-congruent object and the resultant disruption of their self-identity Character subtype

Universe of pursuable Total number Possibility of failure to objects

identity-

acquire or enjoy a goal-

related traits

congruent object and the

resultant disruption of

trait-based self-identity

Lalita superior

Smaller

than

the 24

Lowest

the

four

uddhata character‟s

subtypes mentioned here

Lalita intermediate

Comparable to above

Higher than above, lower

than below

Uddhata

Large

Higher than above, lower

intermediate

than below

Uddhata inferior

Comparable to above

Highest of the four

subtypes

****The self-identity of an udātta character is more secure than that of the uddhata and lalita characters. It results from the appropriation by ahaṅkāra of ethically flawless action.

Though the udātta character does possess commonly shared traits in their entirety, such traits

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do not form the basis of his/her self-identity. Rather, they are there only to facilitate the performance of ethical action. Through his/her ethical action, the udātta character seeks to acquire (and protect etc.) and enjoy a limited number of material objects and more importantly, earn unseen merit. The chances that an udātta character will fail to acquire or enjoy a goal-congruent object are minimized because of a combination of factors. Firstly, his/her universe of pursuable objects is delimited by ethical knowledge. He/she does not pursue an object just because it is available and he/she possesses the traits through which it can be pursued. Moreover, he/she has to deal with fewer and less frequent competitors than the uddhata and lalita characters. There is therefore no precious loss of time, energy, and means spent in eliminating forces that impede the achievement of one‟s life-goal. Secondly, the udātta character is equipped with a complete set of traits through which objects can be pursued. Thirdly, even if the udātta character fails to acquire and enjoy a pursued material object, he/she still earns unseen merit due to the very fact of having performed an ethical action. Since it is ethically flawless action that forms the basis of udātta character‟s self-identity, the non-acquisition or non-enjoyment of pursued material objects does not disrupt it.

What disrupts it, however, is an insurmountable impediment to the performance of ethical action.

The self-identity of a śānta character is the most secure of all character types. It is the result of a śānta character‟s ahaṅkāra appropriating to itself the knowledge that he/she is eligible for eternal freedom from the displeasurable world of Matter. Paradoxically, the ultimate link of the śānta character with the world of Matter is ahaṅkāra itself. With eternal freedom from Matter also comes eternal freedom from ahaṅkāra. When there is no ahaṅkāra that can appropriate objects and actions, there is no possibility of abhimāna and consequently, no formation of self-identity. Therefore, the śānta character‟s self-identity that takes the form

“I am someone that is eligible for eternal freedom from the world of Matter” must be

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understood as occurring just prior to the state of nil identity.163 As was mentioned in the previous chapter (under 3.3.3.3), even the śānta character must pursue a limited number of material objects as long as he/she is embodied. Like the udātta character, the śānta character too possesses all the commonly shared traits. These traits allow the śānta character to perform ethically informed actions and acquire (and protect etc.) as well as enjoy certain objects through such actions. Non-acquisition and non-enjoyment of an object or non-performance of an action enjoined by ethical authorities (e.g., scriptures) does not however disrupt the śānta character‟s self-identity (which is why it is more secure than the self-identities of other character types). In fact, his/her universe of pursuable objects and object-directed ethical actions themselves diminish with passage of time. When actions become scarce, the unseen merit that is accumulated also diminishes. At some point, he/she is neither left with any accumulated merit nor earns it afresh. The śānta character can now prevent future transformation of the transcendental Self that he/she actually is into an apparent empirical self. Because of the following reasons, śānta characters rarely fail to acquire and enjoy the few objects they pursue. Firstly, due to the fact that their universe of pursuable objects is the smallest of all character types, śānta characters have to confront very few competitors.

Secondly, like udātta characters, they possess the complete aggregate of traits through which objects can be pursued.

At this juncture, it is important to reconcile the two senses in which the words

„ahaṅkāra‟ and „abhimāna‟ are used. In a broader sense, ahaṅkāra and abhimāna can be regarded as the very bedrock of empirical existence. All the four primary character types (representative of four prototypical empirical selves) possess such ahaṅkāra and abhimāna.

Furthermore, they form their unique, insecure or secure, self-identities only with the help of ahaṅkāra and abhimāna. In a narrower sense, „ahaṅkāra‟ and „abhimāna‟ are synonymous 163 The state of nil identity is itself the state of spiritual liberation (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, p. 1079: ityādiyogyacetaso’bhimānaḥ - - - tannivṛttau cāsyāhaṅkāravirahānmokṣa eva - - -

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with „garva‟. The more insecure a character‟s self-identity is (which is the case if the character is of the uddhata or lalita type), the greater the possibility that his/her ahaṅkāra and abhimāna will take on the nature of garva. When this happens, he/she not only forms a self-identity with the help of ahaṅkāra-abhimāna but also attempts to secure such a self-identity by (often wrongly) evaluating others as not posing a threat to it. Since the self-identity of an uddhata or lalita character type results from appropriation by ahaṅkāra of certain traits and since such traits, by being part of the psychophysical apparatus, facilitate the pursuit of specific goal-congruent objects through one or the other object-directed action, his/her evaluation of others as unthreatening can take the following forms: (a) Others do not possess traits that he/she possesses; (b) Others possess, but in lower strength (i.e., in a strength that is inadequate for acquiring or enjoying a goal-congruent object through an object-directed action), traits that he/she possesses; (c) Others have not acquired or enjoyed objects that he/she has managed to; (d) Others have, but only in a lesser way, acquired or enjoyed objects relevant to his/her life-goal, i.e., others have acquired a smaller quantity of the object, have enjoyed it less frequently, etc.; (e) Others are incapable of carrying out an object-directed action which he/she can; and (f) Others can, but only with greater effort, carry out an object-directed action. Such evaluations lead to behaviors such as disrespecting and criticizing others, transgressing superiors, etc., that are listed among the consequent responses of garva.

A second point to be noted regarding ahaṅkāra and abhimāna is that, for all practical purposes, both are similar to each other.164 This means we cannot conceive of an ahaṅkāra that has not appropriated one or the other object or action. This further means the transcendental Self transforms into an empirical self by mirroring not some free-floating ahaṅkāra but one that has appropriated to itself an object or action.

164 Both ahaṅkāra‟s act of appropriating objects/actions and the transformation it undergoes for the purpose of appropriation are known as „abhimāna‟ (Gaudapada‟s commentary on Sa.K, Verse 29, p. 138: abhimāno’haṅkāra ityabhimānalakṣaṇo’bhimānavṛttiśca)

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In the discussion carried out above, it was explained how ahaṅkāra-abhimāna‟s appropriation of traits, ethical action, or spiritual knowledge – stable aspects of an individual‟s personality – forms the basis for emergence of self-identity in the four character types. In particular, it is the ahaṅkāra-abhimāna‟s appropriation of a stable empirical self that is at the root of self-identity. It is possible to appreciate two levels of appropriation here. At the first level is the transcendental Self‟s mistaken appropriation of certain stable aspects of personality. This transforms the transcendental Self into a stable empirical self. At the second level is the appropriation of such a stable empirical self by ahaṅkāra-abhimāna and through ahaṅkāra-abhimāna by the transcendental Self. Simply put, the transcendental Self first transforms into a stable empirical self and then falsely identifies with it. The formation of self-identity depends on the second level of appropriation. „Māna‟ is a term that refers to the second level of appropriation. It is ahaṅkāra-abhimāna coming to play for a second time in order to appropriate what is itself a product of appropriation.165 Like ahaṅkāra and abhimāna, māna can also be used in a more restricted sense. As alluded to in the previous chapter (under 3.3.3.2 and Footnote no. 86), māna is „the inability to put up with loss of status‟ and is reckoned as a special trait of the uddhata character type.

How does māna used in this restricted sense relate to māna as appropriation of the empirical self by ahaṅkāra-abhimāna and thence by the transcendental Self? It is to certain stable traits that the uddhata character‟s empirical self owes its existence. And since the empirical self‟s appropriation by the transcendental self is the basis for self-identity, it follows that the uddhata character‟s self-identity is trait-based. The traits themselves serve the 165 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 375: mānamaya ityanena - - - abhimānātmano’bhimāna eva mūlam - - -; Raghavan (1978, p.478) elucidates the concept of māna thus - “Another verse also is quoted by Bhoja to illustrate Māna in which a lady is proud of herself as the wife of a great warrior. She loves herself as the beloved of her lover”.

Here, the lady‟s transcendental Self first appropriates the trait of „being the wife of a great warrior‟ and transforms into an empirical self. It then appropriates the empirical self thus formed. Appropriation of the empirical self by the transcendental Self gives rise to a self-identity that takes the form “I am the wife of a great warrior”. Commenting on the same verse, Raghvan (1978, p. 489, Footnote no. 6) remarks “This verse illustrates - - - the lady‟s pride - - - in being conscious of her being the wife of a great warrior”.

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purpose of performing actions that allow the uddhata character to acquire extra-personal objects - objects whose acquisition (and protect etc.) is evaluated by the world at large as enhancing social worth. In summary, extra-personal objects, object-relevant actions, action-relevant traits, trait-based empirical self, appropriation of the empirical self by the transcendental Self, and the formation of a (flawed) self-identity exist along a logical continuum. The series of relationships explicated above highlights the distal link that the uddhata character‟s self-identity establishes with extra-personal objects. Given the continuous competition from others for extra-personal objects whose acquisition (and protection etc.) is commonly evaluated as enhancing social worth, the uddhata character‟s self-identity is frequently prone for challenge from others. The uddhata character‟s „inability to put up with loss of status‟ is actually his/her „inability to tolerate self-identity being challenged‟. Since self-identity, traits, and actions are linked with one another, a challenge to one‟s self-identity is also a challenge to one‟s traits and actions.166 As an aspect of garva, māna makes the uddhata character discredit others‟ ability to challenge his/her self-identity.

Among the other words conceptually related to garva, mada is defined as “māna resulting from causes such as authority”.167 Understood as māna, mada must involve two levels of appropriation. In the first level, the appropriation a trait (such as authority) results in the emergence of an empirical self. In the second level, the appropriation of an empirical self that has so emerged gives rise to a self-identity. Mada is also “garva that stems from one‟s state of superior servitude” or “an altered state resulting from garva due to sex appeal, youthfulness, and such other causes”.168 Darpa is “mada caused by bravery and the like”169 or 166 For example, a coveted university chair is an extra-personal object that may be pursued by several competing individuals, each of whom has the self-identity of „I am a scholar‟ that is related to the trait of learning and the trait-appropriate action of publishing papers – an action that is relevant for securing the object, namely, the university chair.

167 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 106: aiśvaryādikṛtaḥ kaścinmāno mada itīritaḥ

168Uj.N.M, p. 249: sevādyutkarṣakṛdgarvo mada ityabhidhīyate; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 130: mado vikāraḥ saubhāgya-yauvanādyavalepajaḥ (These two senses represent a gender-specific use of the term „mada‟ as shall be pointed out under Subheading no. 9 below)

169 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: darpaḥ śauryādimadaḥ

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“garva because of one‟s access to superior forms of entertainment”.170 The Bhāvaviveka defines mada in terms of darpa. According to it, darpa “is a mental state because of which individuals engage with something that is not commonly known to be an object of desire”171

and mada “the darpa that allows individuals to evaluate external environment as facilitating their life-goals”.172 Seen from a literary standpoint, the uddhata characters differ in their attitude towards objects. There exist certain objects that the world at large does not desire because they are extraordinary and beyond its reach. The uddhata character has an attitude of desire towards such objects because acquiring similar other extraordinary objects in the past produced pleasure (or the mental state of garva characterized by an experience of pleasure).

On the one hand, the uddhata character‟s garva, as discussed above, results from discounting the possibility of challenge to his/her self-identity. On the other hand, garva also makes his/her buddhi evaluate the external environment as offering no challenge to his/her self-identity. In keeping with this line of thought, darpa and mada can be regarded as aspects of garva that respectively influence the uddhata character‟s faulty attitude towards certain objects and erroneous evaluation of object-related environment. Since erroneous evaluation corresponds to the mental state of moha (incomprehension of facts, as discussed under Table 3.6), darpa and mada can be understood as the blending of garva with two different types of moha. Śauṇḍīrya, as mentioned earlier (under 4.2, Subheading no. 7), is the excessive garva that is listed among the unique traits of uddhata characters. Stated differently, garva transforms into śauṇḍīrya by becoming an integral part of personality. Its excessiveness is attributable to it being (a) frequently evoked; (b) evoked from a large number of antecedent stimuli; (c) expressed through intense consequent responses; and (d) expressed through a wide array of consequent responses. Sanskrit aestheticians use „avalepa‟ synonymously with 170 Uj.N.M, p. 248: garvamācakṣate darpaṃ vihārotkarṣasūcakam

171 Bh.K, p. 268: arāgaviṣaye’pi yaḥ | pravṛttiṃ kurute bhāvaḥ puṃsāṃ darpaḥ sa ucyate 172 Bh.K, p. 459: sa eva svānukūlyena darśayannakhilaṃ jagat | - - - mada udāhṛtaḥ; saḥ darpaḥ** **

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„garva‟,173 „ahaṅkāra‟ (in its narrower sense),174 „mada‟,175 and „darpa‟.176 „Smaya‟ is synonymous with „garva‟.177 According to Bhavaviveka, „smaya‟ is “that which causes certain individuals to laugh boisterously even in situations where a smile would suffice”.178

Smaya represent a facet of garva marked by the expression of one particular response, namely, laughter. From Bhoja‟s perspective, smaya can be understood as the emergence of mirth within the larger context of garva. Such emergence is made possible by the fact that fundamental to both garva and mirth is the evaluation of oneself as being superior to a fellow being.179 Uddhasita is “the act of ridiculing one‟s opponents on their face” and auddhatya

“brazen garva, as revealed by openly boasting about oneself”.180

Miscellaneous details: Two Sanskrit terms, „vibhrama‟ and „bibboka‟, denote aspects of garva that are unique to women. Abhinavagupta describes vibhrama as a response consequent to garva in women.181 It arises from garva due to sex appeal182 and according to one Padmashri, quoted in Bharatakośa, brings within its purview behaviors such as an indignant smile, demanding objects for self-adornment such as flowers and jewelry from one‟s sexual partner but also rejecting them when offered, ridiculing one‟s partner, and ignoring him – either by cutting short a conversation with him to start a fresh one with other social interactants (friends, for example) or by getting up and walking away without any 173 Discussed under Footnote no. 128 in this chapter; Vijñapriyā commentary on S.D, Ch. 3, p. 130: avalepo garvaḥ

174 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: anahaṅkāraḥ sarvathāpyanavalepaḥ

175 Discussed under Footnote no. 135 in this chapter where the word „avalepa‟ appears in the altered grammatical form „avalipta‟

176 Definitions of darpa-bhūyiṣṭha (one with darpa) and avalipta (Footnote no. 135 in this chapter) are similar 177 Quotation from Sarveshvara in Bh.K, p. 751: smayaḥ - - - garva eveha kathyate 178 Bh.K, p. 751: smitahetāvapi prāpte yo:’tihāsayati sphuṭam | kāṃścideva narān - - sa bhāvaḥ smaya-saṃjñakaḥ** **

179 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 276: sarvo - - - svātmanyutkarṣamānitayā paramupahasan (Abhinavagupta‟s phrase

„svātmanyutkarṣamānitayā‟, relating to mirth, resonates with Bhoja‟s phrase „ātmotkarṣasambhāvanayā‟, relating to garva, quoted above under Footnote no. 77)

180 Uj.N.M, p. 250: spaṣṭaṃ svotkṛṣṭatākhyānamauddhatyamiti kīrtyate; Uj.N.M, p. 249: upahāso vipakṣasya sākṣāduddhasitaṃ bhavet; „uddhasita‟ and „auddhatya‟ can also be studied as gender-specific concepts – a point that shall be discussed below under Subheading no. 9

181 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 363: vibhramaḥ strīṇāṃ garve’nubhāvaḥ

182 A.Bh.2/3, Vol. 3, Ch. 22, p. 160: saubhāgyagarvakṛtaḥ (sa) vibhramaḥ

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apparent purpose when he is around.183 Abhinavagupta mentions altered speech and actions among the behaviors included under vibhrama. Altered speech and action imply speaking or doing one thing when something else ought to be spoken or done.184 Bibboka, born of garva, is the disdain a woman shows for otherwise liked objects such as dress and ornaments upon receiving them as gift from a sexual partner who has committed an offense against her and wants to make up for it.185 Rupa Gosvamin describes ahaṅkāra, abhimāna, darpa, uddhasita, mada, and auddhatya – terms that were discussed under Subheading no. 8 above – as six forms of pride in women.186 The terms „vicchitti‟ and „kilakiñcita‟, explained in relation to asūyā,187 are also relevant to garva. While vicchitti is a woman‟s response to garva that is triggered in her because of her sex appeal,188 kilakiñcita is a simultaneous occurrence in her of several mental states and expressive responses among which figures garva too.189 From a developmental perspective, garva features in the first, second, and third stages of a woman‟s youth (discussed above under 4.2.1, Subheading no. 9). In the first stage, garva leads to the puffing up and flushing/glowing of cheeks.190 Bharata describes women in the third stage of their youth as “evidently exhibiting mannerisms resulting from garva”.191 Sharadatanaya, however, reserves this description for women in the second stage, particularly in the context of their romantic relationships.192

183 Bh.K, p. 616: krodhasmitaṃ ca kusumābharaṇādiyācñā tadvarjanaṃ ca sahasaiva viḍambanaṃ ca |

ākṣipya kāntavacanaṃ lapanaṃ sakhībhirniṣkāraṇotthitagataṃ bata vibhramaṃ tat 184 A.Bh.2/3, Vol. 3, Ch. 22, p. 160: vacane’nyathāvaktavye’nyathābhāṣaṇam hastenādātavye pādenādānam - - -; under vibhrama, Abhinavagupta mentions behaviors such as grasping an object with one‟s foot rather than with one‟s hand and wearing a girdle around the neck rather than around the waist ** **

185 R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 55: iṣṭe’pyanādaro garvāt - - - bibboka īritaḥ; A.Bh.2/3, Vol. 3, Ch. 22, p. 161: iṣṭānāmiti vastrālaṅkārādīnāmiti - - -; quotation from Padmashri in Bh.K, p. 421: abhimatavastūpahṛtāvapi gurudarpā-danādarastanvyāḥ skhalitapriyasya - - -

186 In Rupa Gosvamin‟s theologically informed aesthetic theory that is centered around devotion to the Hindu god Krishna, the god‟s female confidants are regarded as substratum for the six forms of garva 187 Under 4.2.1, Subheading no. 9

188 A.Bh.2/3, Vol. 3, Ch. 22, p. 159: saubhāgyagarvamahimā hyasau

189 Related Sanskrit quotation provided under Footnote no. 63 in this chapter 190 N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 240: pīnorugaṇḍa - - -; B.P, Ch. 5, p. 103: gaṇḍayorgarvajaṃ rajaḥ; Sharadatanaya seems to use the word „rajaḥ‟ to mean „flush‟ or „glow‟, a conjecture based on his contrasting description of an elderly woman‟s cheeks as lacking in glow (B.P, Ch. 5, p. 104: - - - kāntimlāniḥ kapolayoḥ)** **

191 N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 23, p. 241: anibhṛtagarvitaceṣṭā nārī jñeyā tṛtīye tu 192 B.P, Ch. 5, p. 104: garvitā ceṣṭate rahaḥ

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The word „garva‟, according to Sharadatanaya, can be etymologically derived from

„garīyas‟, meaning „greater‟. Garva is the “state of oneself being greater (than others)”.193

Sharadatanaya provides several etymologies of the word „māna‟. In the context of garva, it is useful to examine the derivation of „māna‟ from „manyate‟ that means „think‟ or „conceive‟.

Māna is “what makes one think or conceive of oneself as liked by one‟s sexual partner”.194

Based on the discussion carried out above (under Subheading no. 8), māna may be understood here as self-identity that take the form “I am somebody that is liked by him/her”.

Sharadatanaya takes „mada‟ to be a compound of the monosyllabic words „ma‟ („wisdom‟) and „da‟ („destruction‟) and on that ground explains the word as referring to something “that destroys wisdom”.195 Since mada is an aspect of garva and garva is a mental state that negatively correlates with wisdom,196 Sharadatanaya‟s etymology, though fanciful, still brings out an important feature of garva. Vinayakabharata‟s exposition on the stylized representation of garva is aimed at teaching actors and dancers communicate the mental state to their audience through hand gestures. Certain hand gestures, either by themselves or in combination with other hand gestures, are capable of conveying specific garva-related information to the learned connoisseur. Additionally, it is through dynamic, and not static, hand gestures that effective communication of garva and other mental states is possible. For example, moving the clenched fists on both sides of the body communicates physical prowess

– one among the antecedent causes of garva.197

193 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 31: ātmano yo garīyastvabhāvo garvaḥ sa īritaḥ

194 B.P, Ch. 4, p. 79: yatpriyatvena manyate

195 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: maśabdārtho matiḥ - - - taddānātkhaṇḍanānmadaḥ

196 The uddhata character type in whom garva predominates lacks wisdom and the śānta character type in whom wisdom predominates lacks garva

197 Bh.K, p. 169: pārśvobhayormuṣṭihastau calitau baladarśane

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**4.2.3 Vrīḍā **

Definitions: According to Bharata, vrīḍā is “of the nature of having performed an act that one must not have”.198 Commenting on this definition, Abhinavagupta notes that it is not the performance of an improper act per se that is important but the knowledge of one having performed it.199 Vrīḍā brings about knowledge of the type “This was not supposed to have been done by me but I have still done it”.200 One‟s act may not have been socially or morally improper but if it evaluated as improper due to certain personal standards it can still evoke vrīḍā. What lends credence to this line of argument is the fact that people experience vrīḍā

merely upon encountering strangers and despite having done nothing wrong.201

Abhinavagupta also presents an alternative view on Bharata‟s definition of vrīḍā.

Accordingly, after committing an act which they otherwise wouldn‟t, individuals anticipate that they may be evaluated unfavorably by others. Such social evaluation of oneself may be expressed in the following manner: “People take me to be incapable of contemplating on the nature of my earlier and later (actions)”.202 Vrīḍā results from evaluating oneself in this manner. Aestheticians following Bharata have defined vrīḍā as “absence of confidence/boldness”,203 “contraction of manas”,204 “decreased confidence/boldness”,205 and

“restriction of free action”.206 Bhudeva Shukla finds fault with the definition of vrīḍā as a mental state that entails absence of confidence/boldness on the grounds that mental states 198 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7 p. 363: vrīḍā nāma akāryakaraṇātmikā

199 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 359: akāryakaraṇaśabdena tajjñānamucyate 200 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 359: akaraṇīyaṃ mayaivaṃ kṛtamityevaṃbhūtavijñānasvabhāvetyarthaḥ** **

201 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 359: ata eva strībālāderapūrvapuruṣasannidhau lajjā dṛṣṭā vināpyakāryakaraṇāt 202 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 359: pūrvāparavicāraśūnyaṃ māṃ lokaḥ kalayatīti - - -

203 D.R.Av, Ch. 4, p. 85: vrīḍā dhārṣṭyābhāvaḥ; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 150: dhārṣṭyābhāvo vrīḍā; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 343: vrīḍā adhārṣṭyam; Bh.R.Si, Ch.2.4, p. 162: adhṛṣṭatā bhavedvrīḍā; the concept of „dhārṣṭya‟ or „dhṛṣṭatā‟

(translated here as „confidence‟/„boldness‟) shall be discussed under Subheading no. 8 below - a decision based on the premise that to understand „dhārṣṭya‟ or „dhṛṣṭatā‟, it is important to first have an understanding of certain vrīḍā-related concepts.

204 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 835: manaḥsaṅkoco vrīḍā

205 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 123: vrīḍā tvanatidhṛṣṭatā

206 R.T, Ch. 5, p. 87: svacchandakriyāsaṅkoco vrīḍā

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cannot be defined negatively in terms of an absence of something.207 Bhanudatta differentiates vrīḍā from apprehension (śaṅkā) and startled fright (trāsa) based on the understanding that there is a complete arrest of action in the latter two but merely its restriction in the former.208 Some texts define vrīḍā as “contraction/shrinking of citta/cetas”.209 The Ratnāpaṇa commentary on this definition not only equates cetas with manas but also explains “contraction of cetas” as “absence of confidence/boldness”.210

„Vrīḍā‟ is regarded by certain authors as synonymous with „lajjā‟211 and „trapā‟,212 terms whose conceptual relationship with vrīḍā shall be explicated below under Subheadings no. 8

and no. 9.

List of antecedents: Bharata enumerates transgressing elders, being disrespected or humiliated by others, not fulfilling one‟s vow, and remorse among the antecedents of vrīḍā.213

According to Abhinavagupta, the list of antecedents provided by Bharata merely serves an illustrative purpose because anything that an individual would otherwise not do but ends up doing can trigger vrīḍā in him/her.214 Remorse is an antecedent of vrīḍā in the sense that it precedes the latter. In Abhinavagupta‟s view, remorse is a displeasurable realization that what one did was improper and cannot be undone.215 Bhoja adds praise (i.e., obtaining excessive praise from others216), love, and others‟ derogatory remarks (or, perhaps, one‟s 207 R.Vi, Ch. 3, p. 38: “durācārādibhirvrīḍā dhārṣṭyābhāvo’bhidhīyate” iti kecit | tanna | abhāvasya cittavṛttā-vasamāveśāt

208 R.T. Ch. 5, p. 87: na ca śaṅkāyāṃ trāse cātivyāptistatra tatra kriyāviraha eva na tu kriyāsaṅkocaḥ

209 S.K.Abh, Ch. 5, p. 964: cetonimīlanaṃ vrīḍā; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 85: vrīḍā cittasaṅkocaḥ; P.R, Ch. 4, p. 178: cetaḥsaṅkocanaṃ vrīḍā ** **

210 Ratnāpaṇa commentary on P.R, Ch.4, p. 178: cetaḥsaṅkocanaṃ dhārṣṭyābhāvaḥ - - - - - - manaḥsaṅkoco vrīḍetyarthaḥ ** **

211 Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary on Uj.N.M, p. 365: vrīḍā lajjā; also in Footnote no. 201 above 212 Al.Kau, p. 219: trapā vrīḍā

213 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 363 : sā ca guruvyatikramaṇāvajñānapratijñātānirvahaṇapaścāttāpādibhirvibhāvai-rutpadyate ** **

214 A.Bh.4, Ch. 7, Vol. 1, p. 359: guruvyatikaraṇādiprapañcamātraṃ; „guruvyatikaraṇādi‟ and „prapañcamātraṃ‟

are taken here as two different words on the authority of Kangle (1973, p. 411) 215 A.Bh.4, Ch. 7, Vol. 1, p. 359: paścādyastāpo mānaso vivekaḥ sa hi tadā kṛtasyotpuṃsanāyogātkevalaṃ

tāpayatyeva

216 S.K.Abh.Com, Ch. 5, p. 589: stavastīvraṃ guṇakīrtanamityarthaḥ** **

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awkwardness/defect) to Bharata‟s list.217 Sharadatanaya mentions remorse due to abandonment of one‟s vow.218 Following in the footsteps of Abhinavagupta who understands Bharata‟s definition of vrīḍā as the knowledge of having done an improper act, Hemachandra includes such knowledge among vrīḍā‟s antecedents.219 Ramachandra and Gunachandra regard the very presence of elders as a cause of one‟s vrīḍā.220 They also posit unfamiliarity as an antecedent of vrīḍā.221 According to Singabhupala, vrīḍā is also evoked by meeting somebody for the first time (or first-time union with one‟s sexual partner) or by the fact that one did/could not offer resistance (to another person and thereby prevent him/her from committing an offense against oneself).222 Jagannatha draws our attention to gender specificity in vrīḍā‟s antecedents with women‟s vrīḍā resulting from making eye contact with men and men‟s from failing to fulfill a vow or facing defeat.223 Bhudeva Shukla reiterates Jagannatha, adding further that women go through vrīḍā when their limbs give away telltale signs of lovemaking.224

List of consequents: Bharata‟s list of vrīḍā‟s consequents include hiding one‟s face, downcast face, brooding, drawing lines on the ground with the toenails, being fidgety with one‟s dress, finger-ring, etc., and picking at nail tips.225 Additionally, other Sanskrit 217 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 835: varṇanānurāgādijanmā; S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 964: nyaṅgarāgastavādibhiḥ; also P.R, Ch. 4, p. 178: vrīḍānaṅgarāgastavādibhiḥ; P.R appears to have replaced „nyaṅga‟ in the definition from S.K.Abh with „anaṅga‟. The word „nyaṅga‟ has been rendered as „derogatory remarks‟ on the authority of Ganapati Sastri (2002) who, in his Sanskrit commentary on Kautilya‟s Arthaśāstra, explains it as „declaration of flaws‟ (ASGS, Vol. 3, Ch. 11.1, p. 145: „doṣavacanaṃ‟). Jivananda Vidyasagara Bhattacarya (1894), however, takes the word to mean anger (S.K.Abh, Ch. 5, p. 589: nyaṅgaḥ krodhaḥ). Durgaprasad Dviveda (1915) has

„vyaṅga‟ in the place of „nyaṅga‟ and explains it as „awkwardness‟ or „defect‟(„vaikṛta‟) ( S.D, Ch. 3, p. 152) 218 B.P, Ch. 1, p. 19: pratijñāyāstyāge bhūyo’nutāpataḥ

219 K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 88: akāryakaraṇajñānādervrīḍā; Sharadatanaya too includes akāryakaraṇajñāna among the antecedents of vrīḍā though the text at hand has akāryakaraṇājñāna in its place. On the basis of Footnotes no.

198 and 218 above, it is possible to conjecture that akāryakaraṇājñāna (B.P, Ch. 1, p. 19) is a wrong textual reading for akāryakaraṇajñāna. ** **

220 N.D, Ch. 3, p. 343: - - - gurvādeḥ - - -

221 Commentary on N.D, Ch. 3, p. 343: - - - asaṃstavādeḥ - - -

222 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 123: - - - nūtanasaṅgamaiḥ | pratīkārākriyādyaiśca - - -

223 R.G, Ch. 1, p. 27: strīṇāṃ ca puruṣamukhālokanādeḥ puruṣāṇāṃ ca pratijñābhaṅgaparābhavādeḥ - - -

224 R.Vi, Ch. 3, p. 38: strīṇāṃ suratacihnaprākaṭya - - -

225 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 363: tāṃ ca nigūḍhavadanādhomukhavicintanorvīlekhanavastrāṅgulīyakasparśana-nakhanikṛntanādibhiranubhāvairabhinayaet; the phrase „drawing lines on the ground‟ („urvīlekhana‟) can be understood as „drawing lines on the ground with the tip of one‟s toenails‟ from Singabhupala‟s clear-cut description of that consequent response (R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 123: nakhānāmañcalairbhūmilekhanaṃ)** **

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aestheticians also include turning aside, covering one‟s limbs, altered bodily (especially facial) glow/blushing, indistinct speech, concealing oneself (from public gaze), avoiding going out, restlessness/inability to stand still in one place, scratching one‟s eyebrow, touching one‟s ear, keeping silent, hanging one‟s head, and covering one‟s eyes among the consequents of vrīḍā.226 The transient mental state of vrīḍā can itself give rise to two other transient mental states, namely, dissimulation (avahittha) and satisfaction (dhṛti).227 The eye movement associated with vrīḍā is known as „lajjitā‟. In it, the tips of eyelashes are slightly curved, the upper eyelids are lowered, and the pupils are turned downwards.228 The downcast face and hung head typical of vrīḍā are termed „bhugna‟ and „ābhugna‟ respectively.229 The chest movement related to vrīḍā, called „ābhugna‟, is characterized by the chest drawn inwards, the upper back raised, and intermittently slackened, slumping shoulders.230

List of enduring mental states in whose context vrīḍā can occur as a transient mental state: According to Bharata, vrīḍā can appear as a transient mental state in the backdrop of love.231 Sharadatanaya mentions mirth and anger in addition to love.232 Bhoja includes fear.233 Vidyanatha explicitly discounts the possibility of vrīḍā‟s occurrence in the context of anger as well as of sorrow and fear.234 Given Vidyanatha lists only positively valenced situations such as obtaining praise from others and romantic love among the antecedents of vrīḍā, it is understandable from his point of view that this mental state cannot occur in the 226 D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p. 85: sācīkṛtāṅgāvaraṇavaivarṇya - - -; B.P, Ch. 1, p. 19: avyaktavacanaṃ - - - ; - - -

dūrādevāvakuṇṭhanam | anirgamo bahiḥ kvāpi sarvatrāpyanavasthitiḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 88: - - - bhrūvilekhana -

- karṇasparśana - - -; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 162: tatra maunaṃ - - -; R.T, Ch. 5, p. 57: śironamana - - -

nayanapracchādanādayaḥ

227 Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 458; B.P, Ch. 1, p. 20

228 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 10: kiñcidañcitapakṣmāgrā patitordhvapuṭā hriyā | trapādhogatatārā ca dṛṣṭirlajjānvitā tu sā; quotation from Vema in Bh. K, p. 565: lajjitā dṛṣṭireṣā tu vrīḍāyāṃ viniyujyate ** **

229 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 21: bhugnaṃ lajjānvite yojyaṃ; N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 6: lajjāyāṃ - - - adhogataṃ śiraḥ

230 N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 82: nimnamunnatapṛṣṭhaṃ ca vyābhugnāṃsaṃ ślathaṃ kvacit | ābhugnaṃ taduro jñeyaṃ - - - (Abhinavagupta‟s commentary on this portion: kvaciditi madhye madhye, ślathaṃ śithilaṃ

niravaṣṭambhaṃ kṛtvā vyābhugnāvadhaḥ patantāvivāṃsau); N.S, Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 83: lajjānvite - - - ** **

231 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

232 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 33; in this context, Sharadatanaya employs a synonym („trapā‟, „apatrapā‟) for „vrīḍā‟; also, quotation from Jagaddhara in Bh.K, p. 981: - - - lajjā ca hāsyabhāvā bhavantyamī

233 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

234 P.R, Ch. 4, p. 187

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setting of anger, sorrow, or fear, all of which result from negatively valenced situations.

Alternatively, if we include negatively valenced situations such as being disrespected by others among vrīḍā‟s antecedent stimuli, we can appreciate how anger, sorrow, or fear too can frame the context of vrīḍā.

List of other (transient) mental states in whose context vrīḍā can figure: Bhoja mentions indecision, logical reasoning, effects of sleep such as dreaming, and horripilation among the psychological and psychophysical states in whose context vrīḍā can make its appearance.235

List of other mental states that can emerge in the context of vrīḍā: Bhoja allows for the possibility of all mental states, including vrīḍā, to bring within their fold several other mental states and thereby become transformed into enduring mental states that, when communicated through a literary text, can produce corresponding rasa-s in the reader.236 His list of mental states that can occur in the overarching context of vrīḍā is unfortunately not available because the portion of Śṛṅgāraprakāśa‟s manuscripts containing it has been damaged (Dwivedi, 2007).237

Evocation and expression of vrīḍā in different character types: Unlike asūyā and garva, vrīḍā is evoked in and expressed by all the four character types. However, what is relevant as an antecedent stimulus of vrīḍā for one character type may not be so for another.

For example, being praised by others triggers vrīḍā in the udātta and not the uddhata character type.238 By contrast, the latter actually indulges in self-praise as a part of his/her 235 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, pp. 794-800

236 Raghavan (1975, pp. 159-161) discusses one „vrīḍanaka‟ that is the rasa corresponding to vrīḍā. However, after examining its definition as presented in the Jain text Anuyogadvāra-sūtra, he concludes that vrīḍanaka is not quite different from vrīḍā.

237 Śṛṅgāraprakāśa by Bhojarāja, ed. Rewaprasada Dwivedi (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 798, Footnote marked with (*)

238 The following verse, quoted by Bhoja, illustrates evocation of vrīḍā in an udātta character consequent to others praising him:

tasya saṃstūyamānasya caritārthaistapasvibhiḥ |

śuśubhe vikramodagraṃ vrīḍayāvanataṃ śiraḥ || (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1001; source: Raghuvaṃśa, 15.27)

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personality.239 Even when vrīḍā is evoked in all character types from the same antecedent stimulus, namely, their knowledge of having committed an act which they shouldn‟t have, the specific nature of the act under question varies depending on the particular character type.

The uddhata character‟s vrīḍā stems from his/her failure to acquire (and protect etc.) an object whose acquisition (and protect etc.) is evaluated by the world at large as capable of enhancing social worth. Breaching ethical injunctions in the process of acquiring such an object plays no role in evoking his/her vrīḍā. The udātta character experiences vrīḍā not from a failure to acquire objects but from his/her knowledge of having inadvertently breached ethics while pursuing them. Additionally, he/she experiences vrīḍā also because of being caught up in situations where he/she is forced to make a choice between two mutually conflicting ethical positions.240

Conceptually related terms: Terms conceptually related to „vrīḍā‟ are „lajjā‟, „trapā‟,

„vinaya‟, „vailakṣya‟ „hrī‟, „mandākṣa‟, and „śālīnatva‟. „Lajjā‟ is often used synonymously and interchangeably with „vrīḍā‟. Bhāvaviveka defines lajjā as “a transformation of manas that arrests all psychophysical activities and results from the thought that others likely know about one‟s improper action”.241 This definition of lajjā is similar to Sharngadeva‟s definition of apprehension (śaṅkā) except for one crucial point. According to Sharngadeva, apprehension takes the form of thinking that “others will get to know about one‟s improper action”.242 Whereas apprehension is linked with the future prospect of others getting to know about one‟s improper action, lajjā, like vrīḍā, presents the possibility of others already knowing about it. A second difference between apprehension on the one hand and vrīḍā and Translation: When the hermits, their purpose fulfilled, praised him, his head, held lofty in courage, looked splendid by bending down in modesty (vrīḍā)

239 Discussed in Chapter 3 under 3.3.3.2

240 The prospect of having to break one ethical injunction for upholding another is enough to cause vrīḍā in the udātta character. Such a situation shall be discussed below (4.3.4.5) while analyzing the vignette verse for vrīḍā.

241 Quotation from Bhāvaviveka in Bh.K, p. 565: skhalitaṃ mama jānīyuriti cintāsamudbhavā | mānasī vikriyā

lajjā sarvavṛttivirodhinī

242 Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 447: pare jñāsyantyaparādhaṃ mama

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lajjā on the other hand is that in the former, an individual attempts to hide his/her improper actions from others243 while in the latter 2, he/she does not do so, having concluded that there is no way others cannot get to know about his/her improper action, even if that action has not yet been performed (but cannot be undone once it has performed, as discussed above under Footnote no. 215). Unlike vrīḍā, however, and like apprehension,244 lajjā brings about an arrest of all activity, physical as well as psychical.

At this juncture, it is important to examine the role played by manas in the experience of vrīḍā and lajjā. To reiterate from the previous chapter (Footnote no. 64), manas is involved in forming object- and action-related concepts. The „constriction‟ of manas in vrīḍā can be understood as a reduction in the number of action-related concepts that manas can form. In other words, vrīḍā leaves an individual with fewer action choices. Lajjā, as distinguished from vrīḍā, is a state in which the manas cannot form any action-related concept, thus leaving an individual with no action choice at all. Table 4.4 below summarizes the conceptual overlaps and divergences between vrīḍā, lajjā, and śaṅkā. Clearly, the three mental states are similar to one another in some ways and are yet dissimilar in other ways.245

Table 4.4

*Conceptual overlaps and divergences between vrīḍā, lajjā, and śaṅkā *

Mental state

The nature of thought involved

Relationship with action choice

Vrīḍā

“Others likely know about my improper Individual left with fewer ways action. I cannot stop that from of responding to an antecedent happening”

stimulus

Lajjā

“Others likely know about my improper Individual cannot decide how action. I cannot stop that from to respond to an antecedent happening”

stimulus

Śaṅkā

“Others will get to know about my Individual cannot decide how improper action. I must stop that from to respond to an antecedent happening”

stimulus

243 R.T, Ch. 5, p. 75: śaṅkā | - - - anubhāvāḥ - - - kriyāpracchādanādayaḥ

244 Discussed above under 4.2.3, Subheading no. 1

245 It is interesting to note that the definitional verse on vrīḍanaka (discussed above under Footnote no. 236) characterizes it as a mental state that is constituted by lajjā and** śaṅkā, thus pointing to the fact that vrīḍā, lajjā, and **śaṅkā are closely related concepts. The definitional verse, quoted by Raghavan (1975, p. 160), is as follows: vinayopacāraguhyagurudāravyatikramotpannaḥ | vrīḍanako nāma raso lajjāśaṅkākaraṇaliṅgaḥ

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Sanskrit aestheticians use „trapā‟, „hrī‟, and „mandākṣa‟ as synonyms of „vrīḍā‟ and

„lajjā‟.246 Rupa Gosvamin seems to employ „śālīnatva‟ in the sense of vrīḍā as a personality trait.247 „Hrī‟ is that aspect of vrīḍā due to which one shrinks from being praised or from assuming that others are aware of one‟s sexual secrets.248

As for „vinaya‟, Sanskrit aestheticians have variously interpreted it as a learned behavior, a mental state, and a cultivated personality trait. In its role as learned behavior, vinaya involves non-transgression of societal norms and scriptures (i.e., ethical dos and don‟ts elaborated by scriptures), especially in the context of an individual‟s interaction with his/her superiors (an elderly person, a master, etc.).249

As a mental state, vinaya is closely related to vrīḍā/lajjā, fear (bhaya), and dissimulation (avahittha). Rupa Gosvamin and Jagannatha equate vinaya with vrīḍā/lajjā.250

According to one commentator on Rupa Gosvamin, vrīḍā/lajjā necessitates the presence of vinaya.251 Vinaya can be regarded as a subtype of vrīḍā that is evoked by the mere presence of one‟s superiors and expressed through such learned behaviors as standing at a lower level than one‟s superior, self-devaluing talk, and downcast face.252

Vinaya is also expressed through a toned down and learned version of fear-specific responses,253 a reason why it is considered as related to fear. However, such fear is not

„natural‟ but „artificial‟ because there is no actual experience of fear corresponding to the 246 For e.g., the transient mental state of dissimulation is described by different authors as resulting from vrīḍā, lajjā, or hrī (Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 458; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 370; Uj.N.M, p. 367); also, Someshvara, quoted in Bh.K, p. 535:** **vrīḍādhogatatārā ca trapāyāṃ lajjitā bhavet; and Jāyana, quoted in Bh.K, p. 53: ābhugnaṃ - - - | - -

mandākṣa - - -

247 Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary on Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, p. 98: śālīnatvena adhṛṣṭatāsvabhāveneti** **

248 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, pp. 97-98: jñāte’smararahasye’nyaiḥ kriyamāṇe stave’thavā |śālīnatvena saṅkocaṃ bhajan hrīmānudīryate

249 B.P, Ch. 3, p. 70: vinayo lokamaryādāśāstrārthānatilaṅghanam

250 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 173; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 119

251 Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary on Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 173: lajjāyāmapi vinaya āvaśyaka iti 252 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 167: gurvādisannidhau yasmānnīcaiḥsthityādisūcakam | bhāvo vinaya eva; Singabhupala describes a type of poet who devalues himself/herself because of excessive vinaya (R.A.Su, Ch. 3, p. 269: vinīto vinayotkarṣāt svāpakarṣaprakāśakaḥ); N.S1, Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 21: bhugnaṃ lajjānvite yojyaṃ - - - | - - - tathā

vinayamantraṇe** **

253Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 434: bhayaṃ vinayabodhāya darśayetām; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 322: mṛdūn gātrakampādīn-pradarśayati** **

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external fear display.254 According to Sharngadeva, individuals communicate vinaya to their superiors through their skillful display of „artificial‟ fear.255 This way of understanding vinaya as something communicated through an external display of fear does not enlighten us about the nature of vinaya as an experienced mental state. One cannot say that vinaya entails an experience of fear because „artificial‟ fear, as we know it, is limited to an external fear display divorced from an internal fear experience. Singabhupala attempts to solve this problem by way of refuting Sharngadeva‟s claim that vinaya is akin to fear and concluding that vinaya is of the nature of dissimulation.256

To be regarded as dissimulation, vinaya must not only conceal responses arising from one mental state but also replace them with responses characteristic of another.257 What responses does vinaya conceal and what others does it replace them with? To answer this question, it is important to know beforehand that Sanskrit aestheticians delimit vinaya to superior characters.258 From Bhoja‟s standpoint, what this means is that the uddhata inferior, uddhata intermediate, and lalita intermediate characters cannot become the substratum of vinaya. Even among those characters (i.e., udātta, śānta, and lalita superior) that can become its substratum, vinaya-as-dissimulation functions differently in the case of each character. In the presence of elders, the udātta character‟s vinaya not only conceals responses resulting from garva259 but also replaces them with those of „artificial‟ fear. With respect to the śānta character, vinaya has no role to play in masking garva-specific responses because garva itself is absent from the repertoire of mental states that he/she can experience.260 It is possible to posit emotional self-control (dhṛti) as the mental state whose responses vinaya conceals in the 254 Rasaviveka, quoted in Bh.K, p. 429: kurvīta nirbhayaḥ kṛtrimaṃ bhayam 255 Sa.Ra, Ch. 7, p. 434: bhayaṃ vinayabodhāya darśayetāmatattvikam 256 R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 167: avahitthatayā tasya bhayatvaṃ dūrato gatam 257 In avahittha, the responses consequent to joy, etc. are masked by responses consequent to vrīḍā, etc.

(S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 964: avahitthaṃ tu lajjāderharṣādyākāragopanam).

258 Rasaviveka, quoted in Bh.K, p. 429: gurubhyaḥ svāmino vāpi bhītaḥ syādvinayānvitaḥ | tenottamo’pi kurvīta nirbhayaḥ kṛtrimaṃ bhayam

259 Discussed above under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 7

260 Discussed above under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 7

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śānta character. To reiterate from the previous chapter (Footnote no. 122), emotional self-control allows one to overcome the turmoil caused by negative mental states such as fear. If the śānta character must exhibit responses characteristic of fear in the presence of superiors, then he/she must be able to mask responses characteristic of emotional self-control. To conclude, in the presence of superiors, the śānta character‟s vinaya masks responses consequent to emotional self-control and replaces them with those consequent to „artificial‟

fear. As regards the lalita superior character, his/her vinaya, like that of the udātta character, also masks garva-related responses and replaces them with those of „artificial‟ fear. However, there exists a difference between the vinaya of udātta characters (as well as śānta characters) in comparison with that of lalita superior characters. According to Sanskrit aestheticians, vinaya is a cultivated trait that becomes part and parcel of personality in udātta and śānta, but not lalita superior, characters.261 In the lalita superior character, vinaya-as-dissimulation is a mental state that is inconsistently experienced and expressed across situations involving interaction with his/her superiors.

Whereas vrīḍā is about oneself having committed a wrong and the likelihood of others being aware of it, śaṅkā about the prospect of oneself being exposed for one‟s wrongdoing, vinaya about being in the presence of a social other whom one shouldn‟t wrong, vailakṣya is about oneself actually being exposed for a wrongdoing, either at the very moment of committing it or in the future. Unlike vrīḍā or śaṅkā that have wrongdoers as their substratum, vailakṣya can be experienced and expressed either or both by the wrongdoer and the person that has been wronged. Bhoja discusses vailakṣya in the context of romantic love.

According to him, „vailakṣya‟ is “lajjā that results from being exposed for one‟s wrongdoing in the setting of a romantic relationship or from realizing that one has been wronged by one‟s 261 The definitions of „udātta‟ and „śānta‟ character types , as the following examples point out, often allude to the presence of vinaya – Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, p. 111: - - - vinayī - - - | - - - dhīrodāttaḥ - - - ; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, p.

112: vinayādiguṇopeto dhīraśānta udīryate; R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 12: - - - vinītaḥ - - - | - - - dhīrodātta - - - (where

„vinīta‟ is a grammatically modified form of „vinaya‟)** **

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partner who now lies exposed for his wrongdoing”.262 Bhoja also discusses a scenario in which one‟s partner is exposed for his wrongdoing in the presence of one‟s social contacts and such exposure triggers vailakṣya in the latter.263 Smiling („smita‟) is a common response through which vailakṣya is expressed both by the wrongdoer264 and the wronged person.265

In light of the discussion carried on above, it is useful to take a relook at the definitions of vrīḍā, especially as regards their use of the term „dhṛṣṭatā‟/„dhārṣṭya‟

(translated in this section, under Subheading no. 1, as „confidence‟/‟boldness‟).

„Dhṛṣṭatā‟/„dhārṣṭya‟ literally translates as „the state of being a dhṛṣṭa‟. Narrowly speaking,

„dhṛṣṭa‟ is one way of categorizing uddhata and lalita characters based on the specific nature of their romantic relationship.266 Broadly speaking, however, the word can be used to describe a character in general, beyond the confines of a romantic relationship. On examining the definitions provided by Sanskrit aestheticians for „dhṛṣṭa‟ and „dhṛṣṭatā‟/„dhārṣṭya‟, one can understand these terms as referring to an individual with a mental state that conflicts with lajjā, śaṅkā, vinaya, vailakṣya, and bhaya267 but is compatible with garva and capalatā

(fickleness of mind, impetuousness).268 This in turn means vrīḍā, envisaged as the absence of 262 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1333: priyāvamānādvilakṣādibhyo lajjā vailakṣyam** **

263 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1370: sakhīvailakṣyaṃ

264 The smile of a wrongdoer, caught red-handed, is a common occurrence in Sanskrit plays where it is suggested through the stage direction „savilakṣasmitam‟ („with a smile of vailakṣya‟). To cite an example from the Sanskrit play Priyadarśikā, the queen mistakes her friend, enacting the king‟s role in a play-within-a-play, to be the real king and gets up to greet “him”, only to be reminded by her fellow audience about the real state of affairs. Following this incident is the stage direction „savilakṣasmitam‟ for the queen (P.D, Act 3, p. 56). Here the wrongdoer is the queen and the wrongdoing is a silly mistake.

265 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1369: vilakṣasmitam

266 The four character types are classified into the anukūla, dakṣiṇa, śaṭha, and dhṛṣṭa subtypes based on the nature of their romantic relationship (e.g., S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 15, p. 862). While the udātta and śānta character types can belong only to the anukūla or the dakṣiṇa subtype, the uddhata and lalita character types can belong to any of the four subtypes (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 15, pp. 865, 872). A detailed discussion of this typology is beyond the scope of this thesis. ** **

267 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 1, p. 1124: kṛtāparādho’pyavilakṣo dhṛṣṭaḥ (here the word „vilakṣo‟ is grammatically related to „vailakṣya‟); S.D, Ch. 3, p. 96: kṛtāgā api niśśaṅkastarjito’pi na lajjitaḥ; R.A.Su, Ch. 1, p. 18: dhṛṣṭo - -

nirbhayaḥ; Bhāvaviveka quoted in Bh.K, p. 297: lajjāśaṅke tiraskṛtya - - - ; Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary on Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.1, p. 98: śālīnatvena adhṛṣṭatāsvabhāveneti; Mukunda Dasa Gosvamin‟s commentary in Bh.R.Si.Com (e-text), Ch. 2.1, under verse 255-256: avinayavatīmavajñayā dhārṣṭyavatīm** **

268 Bhāvaviveka quoted in Bh.K, p. 297: sāvaṣṭambha ivānyeṣu (The word „avaṣṭambha‟, used here, is a synonym of „darpa‟, „avalepa‟, „smaya‟, and „mada‟, all of which were discussed above under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8, among words conceptually related to garva; A.K, Ch. 1.7, p. 46: darpo’valepo’vaṣṭambhaḥ - - - smayo

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dhṛṣṭatā/dhārṣṭya, is a mental state that brings in its wake lajjā, śaṅkā, vinaya, vailakṣya, and bhaya while also disallowing the emergence of garva and capalatā.

Miscellaneous details: Jagannatha and Bhudeva Shukla, as pointed out earlier (4.2.3, Subheading no. 3), lists different antecedents for vrīḍā in men and women. The withholding of words when there is an occasion to utter them, called „vikṛta‟/„vihṛta‟, is regarded as a response consequent to vrīḍā (as it is of īrṣyā and māna) in women.269 According to Kumbhakarna, women exhibit agitated behavior, called „cakita‟, when they experience lajjā

in the presence of their partners.270 From a developmental perspective, women experience lajjā in the first stage of youth.271 Such lajjā occurs in the context of romantic relationships.

From an etymological point of view, vrīḍā is what “appropriates citta”272 or

“conceals citta”,273 lajjā what “originates from knowledge through the process of dissolution”,274 trapā what “watches over the past, present, and future”,275 vailakṣya what

“involves the unfocussed functioning of citta”,276 hrī what “deprives a person of his/her manas as well as speech and body”,277 and mandākṣa what “impedes the sensory and motor organs to some extent”278 or “makes the sensory and motor organs sluggish”.279 Though seemingly fanciful in some cases, these etymologies do inform us about important facets of vrīḍā and other conceptually related words. A possible interpretation of these etymologies is madaḥ); Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 173: dhārṣṭyaṃ ca cāpale; Jiva Gosvamin‟s commentary in Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p.

174: cāpalaṃ ca dhārṣṭyānantarabhāvi** **

269 Also discussed above under 4.2.1, Subheading no. 9; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 131: vaktavyakāle’pyavaco vrīḍayā

vikṛtaṃ matam; P.R, Ch. 4, p. 193: vihṛtaṃ prāptakālasya vākyasyākathanaṃ hriyā** **

270 San.R, Ch. 5.3.1, p. 580: - - - lajjayā vāpi nijavallabhasannidhau | sambhramātiśayo yastaccakitaṃ - - - (The vignette verse that Kumbhakarna supplies for „cakita‟ resulting from lajjā describes the agitation of a girl whose garment is blown away in the presence of her partner by a sudden gush of wind, thus exposing her limbs to view. Given the girl‟s inadvertent “mistake” occurred in the very presence her partner, the lajjā depicted here is reducible to vailakṣya)** **

271 R.A.Su.2, Ch. 1, p. 65: saṅgame kintu lajjate;

272 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: lāti

273 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: vṛṇoti cittaṃ lāti

274 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: vittervilīya jātatvāllajjā** **

275 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyacca trayaṃ pātīti sā trapā

276 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 29:** vilakṣaṃ ceṣṭate cittaṃ yattadvailakṣyamucyate **

277 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: hriyante vāṅmanaḥkāyā iti hrīḥ paripaṭhyate

278 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: mandamakṣāṇi vāryante tāni vārayatīti vā

279 B.P, Ch. 2, p. 28: mandānīti yadakṣāṇi tanmandākṣamudāhṛtam

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as follows – (a) “appropriates citta” and “conceals citta” stand for “takes control of manas”

and “constricts manas” respectively; (b) “originates from knowledge” stands for “results from knowledge about one‟s improper action”; (c) “through the process of dissolution” stands for

“through the disappearance of pride” or perhaps, “by becoming one with the knowledge from which it is born”; (d) “watches over the past, present, and future” stands for “perpetually safeguards an individual from the performance of improper acts”; (e) “involves the unfocussed functioning of citta” stands for “is associated with the formation of purposeless action-related concepts by manas”; (f) “deprives a person of his/her manas as well as speech and body”, “impedes the sensory and motor organs to some extent”, and “makes the sensory and motor organs sluggish” stand for “limits the ability of manas to form concepts and the sensorimotor organs to interact with the environment (as evident from consequents such as keeping silent and lowered gaze)”. As regards the stylistic representation of vrīḍā on stage, Vinayakabharata mentions three different combinations of hand gestures that are specific to vrīḍā resulting from three antecedent stimuli, namely, first-time union with one‟s sexual partner, accruing praise from others, and performing an improper act.280 To communicate, for instance, vrīḍā resulting from first-time union with a sexual partner, the actor must move a hand, exhibiting the „haṃsāsya‟ gesture (that involves bringing together the tips of thumb and index fingers and additionally, keeping the other fingers apart from one another and extended281), downwards from above and thereafter join together both hands, each held in the

„ardhapatāka‟ gesture (that involves bending the thumb, little finger and forefinger while keeping the remaining two fingers extended282).283

280 Bh.K, p. 650

281 Ab.D, p. 101: madhyamādyāstrayoṅgulyaḥ prasṛtā viralā yadi | tarjanyaṅguṣṭhasaṃśleṣātkaro haṃsāsyako bhavet** **

282 Ab.D, p. 95: tripatāke kaniṣṭhā cedvakritārdhapatākikā; Ab.D, p. 94: sa eva tripatākaḥ syādvakritā-nāmikāṅguliḥ; Ab.D, p. 93: aṅgulyaḥ kuñcitāṅguṣṭhāḥ samśliṣṭāḥ prasṛtā yadi | sa patākakaraḥ - - -** **

283 Bh.K, p. 650: haṃsāsyastu purobhāge ūrdhvādhaścalito yadi | saṃyuktārdhapatākau dvau purobhāge sthitau yadi, navasaṅgamabhāve tu darśayanti manīṣiṇaḥ

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**4.2.4 Linking asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā conceptually **

Though asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā have been separately discussed above, it is possible to link the three conceptually. Firstly, asūyā is reckoned among the consequent responses stemming from garva (as mentioned under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 3). Secondly, garva and vrīḍā do not go together because they bear a positive and negative correlation with dhṛṣṭatā/dhārṣṭya respectively (as discussed under 4.2.3, Subheading no. 8). Thirdly, and at a deeper level, all the three mental states have to do with self-identity. This point was touched upon while discussing the concept of māna (under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8). Among individuals experiencing garva, asūyā, and vrīḍā, the first discounts the very possibility of challenge to his/her self-identity, the second is acutely aware of a challenge someone else poses to his/her self-identity, and the third focuses on the fact that his/her self-identity has not just been challenged, but also disrupted.

4.3 Analysis of vignette verses

**4.3.1 Preamble to analysis **

As a preliminary to the analysis of vignette verses, it is useful to provide a brief recapitulation of the three models on which the analytical exercise shall be based.

Antecedent-consequent pairs, referred to by Hogan (2003, p. 83) as “mini-narratives”, figure in all the three models and can therefore form a good starting point for such a summary.

Model 1 focuses on isolated mini-narratives, model 2 on dynamically interacting mini-narratives, and model 3 on the regulation of mini-narratives by personality type.

Understanding a mental state through model 1demands teasing out from the vignette verse a stimulus-response pair that corresponds to that mental state. If either component of this pair is not explicitly described in the vignette verse, the analyst supplies the same after making sure what is supplied by him/her tallies with the component that is explicitly described.

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According to model 2, vignette verses that purportedly illustrate isolated mental states are in fact instances of multiple mental states interacting with one another. In the context of model 2, the understanding of an individual mental state is limited by the unique dynamics of its interaction with other mental states that co-populate the same verse. Such understanding necessitates singling out from the vignette verse a number of stimulus-response pairs, each corresponding to one of many mental states, and ordering them in a way that explicates the interactional dynamics among those mental states. Like in the case of model 1, the analyst supplies either component of the stimulus-response pair if the vignette verse does not overtly allude to the same.

Model 3 brings within its scope larger portions of a literary work – portions that extend beyond an isolated verse. The model posits that an individual‟s personality type is a legacy of his/her past actions, that such a personality type not just decides what life-goal he/she will pursue but also equips him/her with the psychophysical apparatus needed to achieve it, that he/she evaluates objects as fit to be pursued or fit to be eliminated depending on whether they facilitate or impede respectively the achievement of life-goals, that objects facilitating or impeding achievement of life-goals correspondingly become antecedent stimuli for pleasurable or displeasurable mental states, and that one engages by means of consequent responses with pleasure-causing or displeasure-causing antecedent stimuli in order to pursue or eliminate them respectively. In short, it is because of his/her personality type that certain external objects become antecedent stimuli for a character‟s mental states and he/she engages with those objects via specific consequent responses. According to model 3, in order to make sense of a mental state, one must understand the character that is its substratum. This entails figuring out the character‟s personality type by exploring the larger narrative context (i.e., an entire literary work or greater portions of it) of a vignette verse for those instances in which the traits (some or all of 24 commonly shared traits, all eight unique traits, and all 16

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differentiating traits) that make up the personality type are manifested. The personality type of a primary character remains stable throughout the larger narrative context whereas that of a secondary character is volatile and can therefore be classified differently at different narrative junctures. Once personality type has been established through trait assessment, the model‟s other elements fall in place. These other elements include (a) the character‟s life-goal; (b) criterion for evaluating an object as relevant to life-goal, i.e., whether the object is favorable or unfavorable to the achievement of life-goal (“Will acquisition of this object enhance my social worth?”, “Will enjoying this object give me pleasure?”, “Will I accrue unseen merit by acquiring and enjoying this object?”, “Will acquiring and enjoying this object eternally free me from displeasure?”); (c) universe of objects that are evaluated as relevant to life-goal; (d) possibility of erroneously evaluating an unfavorable object as favorable and vice-versa; (e) possibility of erroneously evaluating a non-means as object-relevant means (i.e., evaluating an action that is unfavorable to the acquisition and enjoyment of the pursued object as being otherwise); (f) possibility of erroneously evaluating a means-incongruent trait as means-congruent, (g) possibility of erroneously evaluating means-appropriate trait strength (i.e., evaluating a weak trait as strong enough for realizing an action that is favorable to the acquisition and enjoyment of the pursued object); (h) possibility of either not acquiring or not enjoying a pursued object; (i) source of self-identity (traits that are necessary for performing actions through which socially valued extra-personal objects can be acquired and enjoyed, conformity in action to ethical injunctions, or eligibility, gained through spiritual knowledge, for eternal freedom from displeasure); (k) possibility of others challenging and disrupting the character‟s self-identity; (l) nature of situations that challenge and disrupt character‟s self-identity (e.g., presence of others who compete with or prevent him/her from acquiring a commonly pursued object, presence of others who compete with or prevent him/her from enjoying a commonly pursued object, presence of others who prevent him/her from

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performing an ethical action or force him/her to perform a non-ethical action); (m) his/her ways of reacting to situations that challenge and disrupt self-identity (e.g., discounting the challenge, forming a new self-identity and reacting to the challenging situation on its basis, devaluating an object that was hitherto important for self-identity, devaluating others pursuing that object, reevaluating object-relevant actions, experiencing displeasurable mental states, etc.); and (n) his/her ways of reacting to situations that affirm and reinforce self-identity (e.g., devaluating competitors whom one has defeated, exaggerating the value of an object whose acquisition and enjoyment reinforced self-identity, evaluating similar other objects as favourable, experiencing pleasurable mental states, boastfulness, etc.).

**4.3.2 Analysis of the vignette verse for asūyā **

**4.3.2.1 The vignette verse and its context **

As stated in the previous chapter (under Subheading no. 3.4), the following 4-lined Sanskrit vignette verse for asūyā shall be subjected to analysis:

“***yatkṣatriyeṣvapi punaḥ sthitamādhipatyaṃ ***

taireva samprati dhṛtāni punardhanūṃṣi |

***unmādyatāṃ bhujabalena mayāpi teṣā- ***

mucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni punaḥ śrutāni ||”

Translation: “That authority rests once again even with the Kshatriyas, that even they presently wield bows once again, and that even I hear about the unbridled acts of those (Kshatriyas) insane with pride born of physical prowess – once again” (Mahāvīracarita, Act Two, p. 69)

Context: The character that utters this verse is Parashurama. A Brahmin by birth, Parashurama is expected to engage in studying the scriptures and pursuing spiritual liberation. However, he embarks on a mission to avenge the killing of his father by some Kshatriya princes. Trained in archery by god Shiva himself, he puts to use his knowledge for

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the purpose of massacring all Kshatriyas 21 times in a row, sparing not even unborn foetuses in the process. Sure that the Kshatriyas have been rendered powerless and after donating the earth that he now owns to the sage Kashyapa, he retires to the forest and starts living life as a hermit. Before long, he is disturbed by the news of prince Rama, son of king Dasharatha, having broken Shiva‟s mighty bow while attempting to string it - a feat stipulated by king Janaka for Kshatriya suitors desiring to win the hand of his daughter, princess Sita, in marriage. The news is reported to Parashurama by Shurpanakha and Malyavan, two minor characters, whose motivation in doing so is to incite him. Though the breaking of Shiva‟s bow is actually an inadvertent act on Rama‟s part, Parashurama takes it to represent the resurgence of Kshatriya power. Rushing hurriedly to Janaka‟s palace, he threatens to kill Rama. A greater part of Act Two and the whole of Act Three describe Parashurama as engaging in a verbal duel with Rama and an assembly of elders on the latter‟s side. Act IV

informs us of Parashurama‟s defeat in the hands of Rama.

**4.3.2.2 Criteria for selecting the verse **

Taking into consideration criteria listed in the previous chapter (Subheading no. 3.4) for selecting a vignette verse, the following observations can be made about the verse at hand:

(1) Bhoja supplies this verse in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Vol. 2, Ch. 19, verse no. 133, p.

1041) for the purpose of illustrating asūyā as communicated through the uddhata, inferior character subtype.

(2) The literary source from which Bhoja quotes this verse is Mahāvīracarita, a Sanskrit play composed by Bhavabhuti (8th century AD).

(3) The vignette verse occurs as part of a larger narrative context that has been summarized above (under 4.3.2.1).

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(4) The character Parashurama, whom the vignette verse depicts as asūyā‟s substratum, is well-known in the Indian cultural landscape. He occurs both in the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahabhārata (Mani, 1975, pp. 568-572). Furthermore, almost all important Rāmāyaṇa-based Sanskrit plays devote sufficient space to delineate his character.284

(5) The vignette verse is in direct speech – uttered by Parashurama himself.

(6) The verse has been commented by Vira Raghava and Anundoram Borooah **4.3.2.3 Analysis of the verse based on model 1 **

Table 4.5 below lists the antecedent stimuli of asūyā that can be isolated from examining the vignette verse. Individual phrases segregated from the vignette verse inform us about the various antecedent stimuli of Parashurama‟s asūyā and, as evident from Table 4.7, also about the responses through which the character expresses his asūyā.

Table 4.5

*Antecedent stimuli of asūyā isolated from the vignette verse *

Antecedent

Phrase in the vignette verse that Comments

stimulus

informs about the antecedent

stimulus

Hatred

“kṣatriyeṣu”

(“with

the “with the Kshatriyas” is short

Kshatriyas”)

for “with the Kshatriyas that I

hate (because of the offenses

they committed in the past)”

Others‟ authority285 “kṣatriyeṣu

sthita-

mādhipatyaṃ” (“authority rests - -

with the Kshatriyas”)

Others‟ bravery

“taiḥ - - - dhṛtāni - - - dhanūṃṣi” Wielding bows is a sign of (“they - - - wield bows”)

bravery/military power

Others‟

physical “bhujabalena - - - teṣām” (“of

prowess

those - - - physical prowess”)

Others‟

various “teṣāmucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni”

By “unbridled acts” is meant

wrongdoings

(“unbridled acts of those”)

“various wrongdoings”

284 Apart from Mahāvīracarita, Parashurama features in the following important Rāmāyaṇa-based Sanskrit plays: Anargharāghava (Act IV), Bālarāmāyaṇa (Act IV), Prasannarāghava (Act IV).

285 „Authority‟ refers to „authority over earth‟. (Anundoram Borooah‟s commentary on M.Vi.Ch.2, 2.29, pp. 81-82: ādhipatyaṃ pṛthvīpālanaṃ

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Table 4.6, modelled after Table 3.1, is an exercise at subgrouping the antecedent stimuli of asūyā as communicated by and through the vignette verse. As demonstrated below, isolating a component of the accessory antecedent stimulus necessitates, even in model 1, venturing beyond the vignette verse into the larger narrative.

Table 4.6

Substratum, object, primary antecedent, and accessory antecedent of asūyā in the vignette *verse *

Antecedents and associated conceptual Representation of antecedents and associated categories in the context of asūyā

conceptual categories in the vignette verse for

asūyā

Substratum of asūyā

Parashurama

Object of asūyā

Kshatriyas

Primary antecedent of asūyā

a) Something

the Hatred of Parashurama for Kshatriyas

substratum

Authority, bravery, physical prowess, various

b) Something related to the object

wrongdoings of Kshatriyas

Accessory antecedent of asūyā

a) that awakens the mental state‟s Incitement by others/hearing about Rama‟s act memory trace

from others (Shupranakha and Malyavan)

b) that strengthens the mental state The fact of Kshatriyas gaining authority, after its memory trace has already exhibiting bravery and physical prowess as well surfaced up

as committing various wrongdoings even after

they were completely vanquished by oneself

(i.e., Parashurama)

Table 4.7 lists the consequent responses of asūyā as they are communicated through the vignette verse. It is evident that phrases from the vignette verse perform the functions of showing disrespect, abusing, etc., all of which are responses consequent to asūyā. For example, the phrase “even with the Kshatriyas” reduces the Kshatriyas to the level of being a non-entity and communicates Parashurama‟s disrespectful behavior towards them. In the like manner, the phrase “insane with pride born of physical prowess” communicates his abusive behavior. One must note that the same phrase from the vignette verse can communicate an antecedent stimulus of asūyā and also function as a verbal behavior consequent to it. For example, from the phrase “they - - - wield bows” we can figure out the antecedent stimulus, namely, others‟ physical prowess and the consequent response of concealing others‟ merits.

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Table 4.7

*Consequent responses of asūyā isolated from the vignette verse *

Consequent

Phrase in the vignette verse Comments

response

that informs

about

the

consequent response

Disrespecting

“kṣatriyeṣvapi” (“even with The word “even” stands for “even others

the Kshatriyas”)

they that are not worthy of authority

“taireva” (“even they”)** **

or do not deserve to wield bows”.286

Alternatively, it can mean “even they

that were reduced to being a non-

entity by me and are therefore

inferior to me”. In either case,

Parashurama expresses his disrespect

for Kshatriyas by regarding them as

unworthy or a non-entity

Tarnishing others‟ **“**kṣatriyeṣvapi

Though authority and the ability to

positive

qualities

sthitamādhipatyaṃ”

wield bows are positive qualities,

(projecting

their

(“authority rests - - - even they are made to appear negative positive qualities as

with the Kshatriyas”)

because of their association with

negative)

**“**taireva - - - dhṛtāni Kshatriyas

dhanūṃṣi” (“even they - - Rama‟s

superhuman

act

wield bows”)

(inadvertently) breaking Shiva‟s

“teṣāmucchṛṅkhalāni

bow is counted among unbridled

caritāni”

acts, thereby projecting the physical

(“unbridled acts of those”)

prowess responsible for that act as

negative

Concealing others‟ “taiḥ - - - dhṛtāni - - - The bow Rama wielded was not any positive qualities

dhanūṃṣi” (“they - - - wield common bow but the bow of Shiva –

bows”)** **

one no other Kshatriya could even

lift. By grouping Shiva‟s bow among

other common bows, Parashurama

conceals the fact of Rama‟s

extraordinary heroism in wielding it

Making

abusive “unmādyatāṃ bhujabalena - The phrase “insane with pride” is an comments

about - - teṣām” (“of those insane

openly

abusive

remark

about

others

with pride born of physical

Kshatriyas

prowess”)

The word “unbridled” is an openly

“ucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni”

abusive remark about Kshatriyas‟

(“unbridled acts”)

actions and hence indirectly about

Kshatriyas

themselves

the

performers of unbridled actions

Though the vignette verse does not inform us about the physical responses consequent to asūyā, it is possible to supply them by taking contextual factors into consideration. Thus, in addition to the consequents mentioned above, Parashurama can also be imagined as 286 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 2.29, p. 69: apyatadarheṣu kṣatriyeṣvādhipatyaṃ - - - | - - - tairevātadarhaiḥ

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displaying his asūyā by knitting the eyebrows, casting oblique glances, wrinkling the nose, dragging the pursed lips to one side of the face, and so on.

From the perspective of model 1, asūyā in the vignette verse is a mental state (a) experienced by the character Parashurama; (b) directed at Kshatriyas; and (c) communicated by the character to the audience by means of the eight stimulus-response pairs listed under Table 4.8 below. According to Abhinavagupta, all the antecedents of Parashurama‟s asūyā

must exist simultaneously though a vignette verse may overtly allude to just one of them.

Table 4.8

*Stimulus-response pairs through which the vignette verse communicates asūyā *

Stimulus-response pair communicating Representation of the stimulus-response pair asūyā

in the vignette verse

Hatred-disrespect

Hatred for Kshatriyas (understood from the

phrase “with the Kshatriyas” that stands for

“with the Kshatriyas that I hate”) – disrespect

for Kshatriyas

(expressed verbally by

employing the phrase “even with the

Kshatriyas” that stands for “even with the

Kshatriyas that are a non-entity/inferior to

me”)

Others‟ authority - disrespect

Kshatriyas‟ authority (understood from the

phrase “authority rests with the Kshatriyas”) –

disrespect of Kshatriyas (expressed verbally

by employing the phrase “authority rests even

with the Kshatriyas” that stands for “authority

rests even with the unworthy Kshatriyas or

the Kshatriyas that are inferior to me”

Others‟ authority – projecting others‟ Kshatriyas‟ authority (understood from the positive qualities as negative

phrase “authority rests with the Kshatriyas”) –

projecting the authority of Kshatriyas as a

negative quality (expressed verbally by

employing the phrase “authority rests even

with the Kshatriyas” that stands for “authority

resting even with the Kshatriyas is authority

at its worst”)

Other‟s bravery – projecting others‟ Kshatriyas‟ bravery (understood from the positive qualities as negative

phrase “they wield bows”) – projecting the

bravery of Kshatriyas as a negative quality

(expressed verbally by employing the phrase

“even they wield bows” standing for

“Kshatriyas wielding bows is something

undesirable”

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Stimulus-response pair communicating Representation of the stimulus-response pair asūyā

in the vignette verse

Others‟ bravery – concealing others‟ Kshatriyas‟ bravery (understood from the positive qualities

phrase “they wield bows”) – concealing the

bravery of Rama, a Kshatriya (expressed

verbally by employing the unqualified plural

word “bows”, thus hiding the fact that it was

Shiva‟s bow, not some ordinary bow, that

Rama lifted)

Others‟ physical prowess – projecting Kshatriyas‟ physical prowess (understood others‟ positive qualities as negative

from the phrase “of those [with] physical

prowess”) – projecting Kshatriyas‟ physical

prowess as a negative quality (expressed

verbally by employing the phrase “unbridled

acts of those [with] physical prowess” – a

phrase that projects physical prowess as

something

negative

because

begets

unbridled acts)

Others‟ physical prowess – making Kshatriyas‟ physical prowess (understood abusive comments about others

from the phrase “of those - - - physical

prowess”) – making abusive comments about

Kshatriyas (expressed verbally by employing

the phrase “insane with pride”)

Others‟ various wrong doings – making Various

wrongdoings

Kshatriyas

abusive comments about others

(understood from the phrase “unbridled acts”)

– making abusive comments about Kshatriyas

(expressed verbally by employing the phrase

“insane with pride” and the word “unbridled”

that, in spite of qualifying the actions of

Kshatriyas, culminates in the abuse of

Kshatriyas as performers of such actions)

**4.3.2.4 Analysis of the verse based on model 2 **

In contrast to model 1, model 2 conceptualizes asūyā not in static terms but as a mental state existing in one or the other stage along its developmental trajectory. In any given stage, asūyā may find representation as (a) a transient mental state interacting with other transient mental states, (b) an enduring mental state with a number of transient mental states populating its context, or (c) an enduring mental state interacting with other enduring mental states. To determine the stage in which the vignette verse situates asūyā, it is important to first figure out other mental states that likely interact with it – a task that demands delving deeper into the verse‟s narrative context. Table 4.9 provides additional contextual details

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from Mahāvīracarita. These details provide a larger picture in which the meaning of asūyā is inextricably interwoven with the meaning of other mental states that interact with it.

Table 4.9

*Additional contextual details aiding analysis of the vignette verse for asūyā *

Additional contextual details

Translation

Comments

“paulastyasyāpi helāpahṛta- “I angrily chopped off the Part of a versified dialogue raṇamado durdamaḥ kārta- arms of the invincible spoken by Parashurama vīryaḥ |

yasya krodhāt Kshatriya king Kartavirya behind-the-stage

kuṭhārapravighaṭita - - - – he that had subdued even

doḥśākhādaṇḍaṣaṇḍaḥ” ** **

(p. Ravana”

57)** **

“so’yaṃ triḥsaptavārānavik- “I completely massacred Part of a versified dialogue alavihitakṣatratantrapramāro” Kshatriyas 21 times”

spoken

Parashurama

(p. 57)

behind-the-stage

“vīraḥ krauñcasya bhedāt - - - “I am the hero that cleaved Part of a versified dialogue jetā tārakāreḥ” (pp. 57-58)

Mount

Krauncha

and spoken

Parashurama

defeated

even

Skanda, behind-the-stage

Shiva‟s son”

“tvāṃ pṛcchan jāmadagnyaḥ “Parashurama, angered by Part of a versified dialogue svaguruharadhanurbhaṅga-the

breaking

his spoken

Parashurama

roṣādupaiti (p. 58)

master‟s

bow,

comes behind-the-stage

asking for you (Rama)”

“eṣa - - - suniśitaṃ paraśuṃ “Carrying a sharp-edged Part of a dialogue spoken by dhārayan - - - parāgata eva” axe, he (Parashurama) has Sita‟s female friends (p. 64)** **

indeed arrived”

“tataḥ praviśati kruddhaḥ “Then enters the angry Stage direction just before paraśurāmaḥ” (p. 68)

Parashurama”

Parashurama comes onstage

“aho, durātmanaḥ kṣatriya- “It is shocking that the Dialogue uttered

vaṭoranātmajñatā” (p. 68)

wicked Kshatriya lad lacks Parashurama

after

self-awareness”

appears onstage

“priyo‟haṃ - - - śiṣyaḥ - - -

“How can it be that you Part of a versified dialogue

kathaṃ na śrutaḥ?” (p. 69)

have not heard of me, spoken

Parashurama

dearest student of Shiva soon after he makes his

(because

my onstage appearance

exceptional

physical

prowess)287?”

“eṣa eva me praśamasya “This

the

tragic Remark made by Parashu-

karkaśaḥ pariṇāmaḥ” (p. 69)

consequence

my rama just before uttering the

abstinence from anger)” 288 vignette verse

“anviṣyataḥ

pramathanāya “As I go around searching Part of a versified dialogue mama - - - ” (p. 70)

(for you) with a readiness directed by Parashurama at

to commit slaughter”

Rama after meeting him

287 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 2.28, p. 69: bhavānīpateḥ priya iṣṭastato’pi balādhikyāt 288 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, p. 69: praśamasya krodhavirateḥ karkaśo’nartharūpaḥ

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Additional contextual details

Translation

Comments

mamāpi - - - ātmānamarpa- “You present yourself to Part of a versified dialogue yasi - - - | - - - kalabhaḥ - - - me like an elephant cub to directed by Parashurama at yathā mṛgāreḥ (p. 70)

a lion”

Rama soon after they meet

“kṣaṇam śāmbhavadhanurdv-

“Let my axe fall upon your Part of a versified dialogue

edhākriyāvirbhavatkrodha - - neck for just a moment directed by Parashurama at

paraśur-bhavatu - - -tvat-

since you have broken Rama

kaṇṭhapīṭhātithiḥ” (p. 72)

Shiva‟s bow”

“rāghavaśiśoḥ - - - kṛttvā

“After chopping the head Part of a versified dialogue

śiraḥ” (p. 100)

of this child from Raghu‟s by Parashurama in Act

lineage”

Three

“jvalati paraśurmṛtyuriva me

“My axe blazes forth like Part of a versified dialogue,

- - punardvāviṃśo’pi - - -

Death. Let a merciless from

Act

Three,

kṣatrasyāstu ghoraḥ pari-

slaughter of Kshatriyas Parashurama after he is

maraḥ (p. 119)

occur for the 22nd time”

reprimanded by his elders

Listed below are 20 mental states isolated from the vignette verse‟s context.

Krodha (anger)

Utsāha (perseverance)

Garva (pride)

Asūyā (intolerant envy)

Amarṣa (vindictiveness)

Ugratā (aggressive rage)

Śoka (sorrow)

Bhaya (fear)

Avahittha (dissimulation)

Śaṅkā (apprehension)

Āvega (agitation, hurry)

Vrīḍā (guilt)

Viṣāda (despondency)

Nirveda (feeling of worthlessness)

Jugupsā (disgust)

Vismaya (surprise)

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Cintā (problem-focused contemplation)

Smṛti (recollection)

Vitarka (logical reasoning)

Moha/mati (erroneous knowledge masquerading as right knowledge)

As demonstrated in Table 4.10, Parashurama‟s dialogues can be broken down into smaller units, each of which can be understood as communicating one or more of these 20

mental states. 289 Dialogue units can be as short as a word or even part of a word and can communicate character mental states by directly mentioning them, specifying their antecedents/consequents, or performing the function of consequent behaviors (e.g., self-blame). The same dialogue unit may communicate more than one mental state.

Table 4.10

Isolating Parashurama’s mental states from the verse for asūyā and its immediate context No.

Mental state

Portion/s of the play (dialogue/stage direction/narrative context)

from which a mental state‟s presence can be inferred

Anger

“angered by the breaking of his master‟s bow” (p. 58)

“Then appears the angry Parashurama” (p. 68)

“authority rests again with the Kshatriyas”, “even they wield bows”, “unbridled acts of those insane with pride born of

physical prowess” (vignette)

Perseverance

Dialogue units given below under pride, intolerant envy,

vindictiveness, and aggressive rage

Pride

“I angrily chopped off the arms of the invincible Kshatriya king

Kartavirya – he that had subdued even Ravana” (p. 57)

“I am the hero that cleaved Mount Krauncha and defeated even

Skanda, Shiva‟s son” (pp. 57- 58)

“wicked Kshatriya lad” (p. 68) – criticism due to pride

“How can it be that you have not heard of me, dearest student

of Shiva?” (p. 69)

“I”, “even with the Kshatriyas”, “even they”, “insane”,

“unbridled” (vignette) – criticism due to pride

“You present yourself to me like an elephant cub to a lion” (p.

70)

Dialogue units given below under rage also indicate pride since

verbal aggression is a response that is common to both

289 Bhoja often infers a host of mental states from vignette verses based on the verbal responses of characters.

For example, commenting on a verse illustrating perseverance, he mentions recollection, right knowledge, and logical reasoning among the mental states that can be inferred from the character‟s verbal response (S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 984: - - - vāgārambhānumīyamāneṣu smṛtimativitarkādiṣu - - -)

164

No. Mental state

Portion/s of the play (dialogue/stage direction/narrative context)

from which a mental state‟s presence can be inferred

Intolerant envy

“wicked Kshatriya lad” (p. 68) – criticism due to envy

“with the Kshatriyas”, “they”, “those”, “authority rests”, “wield

bows”, “physical prowess”, “unbridled acts” (vignette)

“even with the Kshatriyas”, “even they”, “of those insane with

pride”, “unbridled” (vignette) – criticism due to envy

Vindictiveness

“angered by the breaking of his master‟s bow, comes asking for

you” (p. 58)

“unbridled acts of those insane with pride born of physical prowess - once again”(vignette)

“you have broken Shiva‟s bow” (p. 72)

Aggressive rage

“Parashurama, angered by the breaking of his master‟s bow,

comes asking for you” (p. 58)

“with a readiness to commit slaughter” (p. 70)

“let my axe fall on your neck” (p. 72)

“after chopping the head of this child” (p. 100)

“Let a merciless slaughter of Kshatriyas take place for the 22nd

time” (p. 119)

Sorrow

“tragic consequence” (p. 69),“authority rests even with the

Kshatriyas”, “even they wield bows”, “unbridled acts of those

(Kshatriyas)” (vignette) – complaining due to sorrow

“even I hear about the unbridled ways of those (Kshatriyas)”

(vignette) – self-bemoaning due to sorrow

Fear

There are no dialogue units directly suggest fear because

dissimulation masks the responses resulting from it

Responses resulting from fear are replaced by responses that allow inference of pride

Dialogue units given below under apprehension (anticipation of

several tragic events in the future), erroneous knowledge

(wrongly concluding that the anticipated tragic events have

already taken place and one was incapable of preventing them),

agitation (caused by the sheer number of tragic events that need

to be countered immediately), and guilt (about not having

prevented the tragic events)

Dissimulation

Dialogue units suggesting fear and pride

Parashurama‟s dissimulation is ineffective in hiding his fear

Apprehension

“they”, “bows”, “unbridled acts” – Parashurama‟s use of the plural number indicates that he not only anticipates many

negative events to occur in the future but also, because of his erroneous knowledge, believes that they have already occurred

Hurry/agitation

“carrying a sharp-edged axe” (p. 64)

“go around searching for you” (p. 70)

“Let my axe fall on your neck just for a moment” (p. 72)

Dialogue units given below under erroneous knowledge (that

exaggerate the number of tragic events)

Guilt

“rests once again”, “wield bows once again”, “hear about the unbridled acts once again” (vignette) – dialogue units about Parashurama‟s non-prevention of the tragic events

165

No.

Mental state

Portion/s of the play (dialogue/stage direction/narrative context)

from which a mental state‟s presence can be inferred

Despondency

“even I hear once again to the unbridled acts of those

(Kshatriyas)” (vignette) – informs about Parashurama failure to

prevent certain events from happening in spite of being capable

of doing so290

Feeling of

“tragic consequence of my abstinence from anger” (p. 69) –

worthlessness

represents Parashurama‟s self-depreciation as being responsible

for several tragic events

Disgust

“I hear about the unbridled acts of those insane with pride born

of physical prowess” (vignette)

“authority rests even with the Kshatriyas”, “even they wield bows” – the sight of these events

Surprise

“even”, “once again” (vignette) – represents the following

contradictions:291 (1) being a Kshatriya and holding authority, (2) being a Kshatriya and holding authority for a second time,

(3) being a Kshatriya and wielding bows, (4) being a Kshatriya

and wielding bows for a second time, (5) being Parashurama and having to hear about Kshatriyas‟ “unbridled acts”, and (6)

being Parashurama and having to hear about Kshatriyas‟

“unbridled acts” once again

Problem-

Contemplation of the form “Why did these (current) tragic

focused

events happen?” must be inferred as occurring before logical contemplation

reasoning; “once again” and “presently” (occurring in the

vignette verse) suggest Parashurama‟s attention to current

events

Recollection

“with the Kshatriyas”, “they” “of those” (vignette) – represents

recollection of enemies from the past

“I” (vignette) – represents recollection of one‟s past prowess

“even with the Kshatriyas”, “even they” – represents

Parashurama‟s recollection of his victory over Kshatriyas

“once again” (vignette) – represents recollection of Kshatriyas‟

authority, bowmanship, and unbridled acts in the past; also Parashurama‟s recollection of hearing about Kshatriyas‟

unbridled acts in the past

Logical

“That” (vignette) – indicates beginning of the reasoning process

reasoning

through the statement of three facts (Kshatriyas holding

authority, wielding bows, and committing unbridled acts at

present) whose cause must be found out

Parashurama‟s logical reasoning is flawed because it is based on erroneous knowledge

The dialogue units that suggest recollection (listed above)

represent garnering of past knowledge by Parashurama to aid logical reasoning

290 Anundoram Borooah supplies the exclamatory word „kaṣṭaṃ‟ („Alas!‟) while commenting on the vignette verse (M.Vi.Ch.2, 2. 29, p. 82). „kaṣṭaṃ‟ expresses despondency (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 15) 291 „Even‟ („api‟) indicates contradiction. Contradictory knowledge about an object is an antecedent stimulus for surprise (Bālapriyā commentary on D.L, Ch. 2, pp. 236-237: apiśabdo - - - virodhaṃ - - - bodhayan - - - | - - -

ekatra viruddhārthabodhe hi vismayaḥ)

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No.

Mental state

Portion/s of the play (dialogue/stage direction/narrative context)

from which a mental state‟s presence can be inferred

Erroneous

Erroneous knowledge aiding logical reasoning: (a) “they wield

knowledge (that bows”, “unbridled acts of those Kshatriyas” (vignette) –

masquerades as Parashurama‟s use of the plural “Kshatriyas”, „they‟, „bows‟, right

„those‟, and „acts‟ after hearing about a single Kshatriya lifting

knowledge)

and breaking one particular bow is an erroneous exaggeration;

(b) “authority rests” (vignette) – Parashurama‟s exaggeration that authority rests with several Kshatriyas on the basis of a single event is an expression of his erroneous knowledge; (c)

“bows” (vignette) – Parashurama clubs Shiva‟s mighty bow

along with ordinary bows; (d) “insane with pride born of

physical prowess” (vignette) – Parashurama‟s inclusion of

Rama among those that are proud of their physical prowess

shows his lack of knowledge about Rama‟s heroism; (e)

“unbridled acts” (vignette) – Parashurama‟s use of the word

„unbridled‟ for describing Rama‟s act expresses his ignorance about the physical prowess that such an act demands as well as

his ignorant evaluation of an inadvertent act as immoral; (f) “I”

(vignette), standing for “one that can vanquish all Kshatriyas”,

represents self-knowledge that is proven erroneous through

Parashurama‟s defeat at Rama‟s hands.

Erroneous knowledge resulting from logical reasoning: “This is

the tragic consequence of my abstinence from anger” (p. 69) –

proven erroneous when an angry Parashurama is defeated later.

Table 4.11 below analyzes multiple dialogue units from the vignette verse.

Table 4.11

Mental states suggested by dialogue units in the vignette verse for asūyā (intolerant envy) Sanskrit word/phrase

English translation of the Mental state/s that is/are suggested Sanskrit word/phrase

by the word/phrase

“yat - - - śrutāni”

Entire vignette verse

Logical reasoning

“kṣatriyeṣu”

“with the Kshatriyas”

Recollection,

intolerant

envy,

erroneous knowledge

“kṣatriyeṣvapi”

“even with the Kshatriyas” Recollection, intolerant envy, pride

“api”

“even”

Surprise

“punaḥ”

“once again”

Contemplation, recollection, guilt,

fear, surprise

“sthitam ādhipatyam”

“authority rests”

Intolerant

envy,

erroneous

knowledge

“kṣatriyeṣvapi

“authority rests even with Disgust, anger

sthitamādhipatyam” ** **

the Kshatriyas”

“kṣatriyeṣvapi punaḥ

“authority rests once again Sorrow

sthitamādhipatyam”

even with the Kshatriyas”

167

Sanskrit word/phrase

English translation of the Mental state/s that is/are suggested Sanskrit word/phrase

by the word/phrase

“taiḥ”

“they”

Recollection,

intolerant

envy,

apprehension, agitation, erroneous

knowledge

“taireva”

“even they”

Recollection, intolerant envy, pride

“samprati”

“presently”

Contemplation

“punaḥ”

“once again”

Contemplation, recollection, guilt,

surprise

“dhṛtāni dhanūṃṣi”

“wield bows”

Intolerant

envy,

apprehension,

agitation, erroneous knowledge

“taireva dhṛtāni

“even they wield bows”

Disgust, anger

dhanūṃṣi”

“taireva samprati

“even they presently wield Sorrow

dhṛtāni punardhanūṃṣi” bows once again”

“unmādyatāṃ”

“insane with pride”

Intolerant

envy,

pride,

dissimulation

“unmādyatāṃ

“insane with pride born of Intolerant

envy,

erroneous

bhujabalena”

physical prowess”

knowledge

“mayā”

“I”

Recollection, pride, dissimulation,

erroneous knowledge

“api”

“even”

Surprise

“teṣām” ** **

“of those”

Recollection,

intolerant

envy,

apprehension, agitation, erroneous

knowledge

“ucchṛṅkhalāni”

“unbridled”

Intolerant

envy,

pride,

dissimulation

“ucchṛṅkhalāni

“unbridled acts”

Intolerant

envy,

vindictiveness,

caritāni”

apprehension, agitation, erroneous

knowledge

“punaḥ”

“once again”

Contemplation, recollection, guilt,

surprise

“mayā ucchṛṅkhalāni

“I hear about the unbridled Erroneous knowledge

caritāni śrutāni”

acts”

“mayāpi teṣām-

“even I hear about the Despondency, disgust, agitation

ucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni

unbridled acts of those

śrutāni”

(Kshatriyas)”

“unmādyatāṃ bhuja-

“the unbridled acts of Anger

balena teṣām

those insane with pride

ucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni” born of physical prowess”

“mayāpi teṣām-

“even I hear about the Sorrow

ucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni

unbridled acts of those - - -

punaḥ śrutāni”

once again”

Figure 4.1 below is a schematic representation of the ways in which the 20 mental states isolated under Table 4.10 are interrelated.

168

Anger (“A Kshatriya has broken my master‟s

**Sorrow ** (“My enemies‟ elevated

Disgust (“That

bow”)

status, due to their wielding of bows

I must hear to

and commission of unbridled acts,

such acts and

**Perseverance **

deprives me of my own status”)

see my

(“Deprivin

Recollection

enemies rise

(“Kshatriyas are my

Kshatriyas of

Fear (“I was incapable of

to an elevated

past enemies”)

their status is

preventing these current acts”)** **

status through

important for

such acts”)

my life-goal”)

Dissimulation (“I must

**Erroneous **

conceal my fear”)

**Surprise **

**knowledge **(“Many

(“That

Kshatriyas are

even I

wielding bows and

Apprehension (“I fear that

must

committing several

many such acts may occur”)

hear to

unbridled acts”)

and see

such

Guilt (“I did not prevent any

things”)

of these current acts”)

**Erroneous **

**(“Right”) **

**knowledge **

Agitation (“I must do

(“This indicates

something now”)

their elevated

status in terms

of authority, etc.)

Recollection (“I prevented

such acts in the past”)

Recollection (“They did the

same in the past and enjoyed

simila

Erroneous knowledge (“I

r status”)

could have prevented them”)

Vindictiveness (“My enemies‟ acts

are humiliating me” - anger); (“I

Despondency (“Though

must punish them” - perseverance)

capable, I could not prevent”)

Rage (“They should die” – anger)

Contemplation (“Why could I

(“I shall kill them” - perseverance)

not prevent?”)

Intolerant envy (“I cannot tolerate their

elevated status” - anger); (“I must deprive

Logical reasoning (“Such acts

them of their elevated status” -

occur when I am not angry and

perseverance)

do not occur when I am angry”)

Recollection (“Such acts

Recollection (“I had deprived

occurred when I had given

Kshatriyas of their status in the past

up anger)

Erroneous knowledge (“I can deprive

them of their present status succesfully”)

Erroneous knowledge (“I did

not prevent these acts since I

had given up anger”)

Pride (“I am superior to my enemies and

can thus deprive them of their status” –

perseverance); (“How can those that are

Feeling of worthlessness (“I

inferior to me enjoy status?”- anger)

allowed these acts to happen”)

Figure 4.1. Interrelationship between Parashurama‟s envy and other mental states. Arrows indicate temporal relationship between mental states (i.e., what mental state follows what).

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Among the mental states represented in Figure 4.1, anger, perseverance, sorrow, fear, and disgust stand out because of the overarching nature of their objects and themes. The focus in Parashurama‟s anger is the enemy‟s act (or enemies‟ acts); in perseverance, his need for addressing the enemies‟ acts; in sorrow, the loss of his superior status as a result of the enemies‟ acts; in fear, his inability to prevent the enemies from committing the acts and the possibility of being unable to prevent the enemies from committing similar acts in the future (and thus facing defeat in his hands); and in disgust, the displeasurable news about and sight of the enemies‟ acts. Table 4.12 makes it clear, with corroboration from Sanskrit poetics, how Parashurama‟s all other mental states can be brought under these five mental states.

Table 4.12

List of mental states that accompany five salient mental states of Parashurama Salient mental Accompanying mental states

Corroborative

evidence

state

from Sanskrit poetics

Anger

Erroneous knowledge

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Perseverance

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Recollection

R.T, Ch. 5, p. 112

Vindictiveness

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Rage

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 321

Intolerant envy

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Pride

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 321

Perseverance

Vindictiveness

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Rage

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Intolerant envy

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Recollection

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Erroneous knowledge (“right” knowledge) N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Pride

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 324

Sorrow

Fear

N.D, Ch. 3, p. 313

Recollection

R.T, Ch. 5, p. 112

Erroneous knowledge

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 317

Despondency

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 317

Contemplation

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 317

Logical reasoning

B.P, Ch. 2, p. 33

Feeling of worthlessness

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 317

Fear

Dissimulation

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

Apprehension

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 326

Guilt

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

Agitation

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 326

Disgust

Surprise

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797

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Once the interactional hierarchy between the isolated mental states has been established, staging Parashurama‟s asūyā can be carried out. To aid the staging process, Figure 4.2 temporally situates asūyā amidst other mental states that shape and share its context. Figure 4.2 also incorporates dialogue units mirroring the said mental states.

Interacting

Anger

Recollection

Erroneous

mental

Perseverance

knowledge

states

Recollection

Vindictiveness

Erroneous

knowledge

Recollection

Erroneous

knowledge

Rage

Intolerant envy/asūyā

Pride

Dialogue

“Breaking of

“Kshatriyas”,

E.g., the plural suffix

Dialogue

units

his master‟s

“they”, “those”

in “bows” and “acts”

units under

mirroring the

bow” (p. 58)

(vignette)

pride

interacting

mental

states

“Unbridled acts”

“Authority rests”,

“Even with the

(vignette)

“wield bows”,

Kshatriyas”, “even

“insane with pride

they”, “those”,

born of physical

“once again”, “I”

prowess” (vignette)

(vignette)

E.g., “with a

readiness to

commit

slaughter” (p. 70)

“Once again”

“I” (vignette”)

(vignette)

“Authority rests even with the Kshatriyas”,

“I”, “even with the

“even they wield bows”, “unbridled acts of those

Kshatriyas”, “even

insane with pride born of physical prowess”

they” (vignette)

Figure 4.2. Temporal situation of Parashurama‟s asūyā amidst other co-contextual mental states. Arrows indicate the sequence in which the mental states occur.

Figure 4.3 below provides hypothetical thought processes that correspond to the interacting mental states depicted under Figure 4.2 above. The discussion that follows Figure

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4.3 alludes to technical terms mentioned under Subheading no. 3.3.2 and Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.

“Rama has broken my master‟s bow”

“Rama is a Kshatriya”

“Kshatriyas are my past enemies” “I cannot tolerate any act performed (Recollection) by the Kshatriyas because they are my enemies and I hate them”

(Intolerant envy)

“Through these offenses, the “Kshatriyas are committing many “I cannot tolerate offenses Kshatriyas are humiliating me. offenses (such as breaking my committed by Kshatriyas”

I must punish them for this” master‟s bow) of late” (Intolerant envy) (Vindictiveness) ** **(Erroneous knowledge) ** **

“ I will slaughter them” “These offenses indicate that “I cannot tolerate the elevated (Rage) Kshatriyas are currently status of Kshatriyas”

enjoying elevated status” (Intolerant envy)

(“Right” knowledge)

“The Kshatriyas committed

similar offenses in the past”

(Recollection)

“Depriving Kshatriyas of their status

“When Kshatriyas committed is important for my life-goal”

similar offenses in the past, (Perseverance) they also enjoyed similar

elevated status”

(Recollection)

“I had deprived the Kshatriyas of “I cannot tolerate the Kshatriyas of their elevated status in the past gaining elevated status even after (Recollection) I had deprived them of it”

(Intolerant envy)

“I can deprive the Kshatriyas of their

elevated status even this time”

(Erroneous knowledge)

“I am superior to the Kshatriyas” “Being superior to the Kshatriyas, I

“The Kshatriyas are inferior to me” cannot tolerate their elevated status”

(Pride) (Intolerant envy)

Figure 4.3. Hypothetical thought processes corresponding to Parashurama‟s asūyā and other co-contextual mental states. Arrows indicate temporal sequence.

From Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 as well as Table 4.12, it can be established that vertically, Parashurama‟s asūyā finds expression under the ambit of his anger and perseverance alike. According to Sanskrit aesthetics, this qualifies as „merger‟ between anger and perseverance at the point of asūyā. Horizontally, asūyā occurs alongside recollection,

172

pride, erroneous knowledge, and vindictiveness, all of which also feature in the context of anger and perseverance. Put differently, Parashurama‟s anger and perseverance are two relatively enduring mental states that undergo „merger‟ at the crossroads of five transient mental states, namely, recollection, erroneous knowledge, pride, asūyā, and vindictiveness.

Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 also reveal a temporal order in the occurrence of the five transient mental states. Such a temporal order can be posited based on the premise that for a given mental state „B‟ that follows, another mental state „A‟ must have necessarily preceded it. For example, Parashurama‟s asūyā about the wielding of bows and commission of “unbridled”

acts by Kshatriyas presupposes his erroneous knowledge, expressed as an exaggerated number of Kshatriyas, bows, and “unbridled” acts. Likewise, in dialogue units such as “even with the Kshatriyas” and “even they” that express Parashurama‟s criticism of Kshatriyas stemming from both asūyā and pride, it can be argued on the following grounds that pride must be inferred prior to inferring asūyā: “even with the Kshatriyas” and “even they” are short for “even with the Kshatriyas that I vanquished completely” and “even they that I vanquished completely” or, to put it in more general terms, “even with the Kshatriyas that are inferior to me” and “even they that are inferior to me”; the knowledge that his enemies are inferior to him or he is superior to them goes hand-in-hand with Parashurama‟s experience of pride; given Parashurama‟s pride, anything – authority, bowmanship/bravery, or physical prowess – that threatens to disrupt his relative position vis-à-vis the Kshatriyas by conferring exalted status on the latter can trigger asūyā in him. Similarly, recollection, inferred from the dialogue unit “once again”, must follow erroneous knowledge, inferred from “wield bows”

and “unbridled acts” because remembering the wielding of bows or commission of offenses by Kshatriyas in the past must be preceded by the erroneous knowledge that several Kshatriyas are wielding bows (and thus showing off their bravery) and committing numerous offensive acts at present. On the other hand, from the dialogue unit “I” that communicates

173

recollection as well as erroneous knowledge, the former mental state must be inferred prior to the latter because of the following reason: “I”, as conveying recollection and erroneous knowledge, is short for “I that vanquished Kshatriyas in the past” and “I that can vanquish Kshatriyas at present” respectively; clearly, knowledge of the ability to vanquish Kshatriyas at present must follow recollection of having vanquished them in the past.

As evident from the discussion carried out above, even when two different mental states such as asūyā and pride are expressed through the selfsame verbal response, it must be understood that they arise in the character at two closely separated moments and not simultaneously.292 However, because of the very fact that they are separated by an extremely small time interval, it is difficult to determine where one mental state stops and the other takes over. In other words, though a literary character such as Parashurama experiences asūyā

and pride at two closely separated moments in time, the identical verbal response that the mental states produce communicates simultaneity of their occurrence to the reader. It can be made out from Table 4.11 that the dialogue units suggesting asūyā overlap to a greater or lesser degree with those suggesting recollection, erroneous knowledge, pride, and vindictiveness. Based on the reasoning forwarded above that two or more closely occurring mental states suggested by an identical verbal response are understood by the audience as occurring together and simultaneously, it can be concluded that the vignette verse as a whole presents a case of asūyā‟s co-occurrence with recollection, erroneous knowledge, pride, and vindictiveness under the overarching fabric of anger and perseverance. In the terminology of Sanskrit aestheticians, such co-occurrence (or, to be more precise, co-communication) of mental states is referred to as „intermingling‟.

292 Commenting on the mutual „intermingling‟ (śabalatā) of several mental states, Shastri (1947) notes that according to logicians, several mental states cannot occupy a single unit in time and a new mental state cannot emerge unless another preexisting mental state disappears (commentary on R.G, Ch. 1, p. 126: naiyāyikānāṃ

naye - - - ca pūrvabhāvasya nāśe satyeva bhāvāntasyodayaḥ syāttataśca kathamekakāle nānābhāvānubhavarūpā

seyaṃ śabalateti śaṅkā) ** **

174

Apart from undergoing „merger‟ with one another at the crossroads of asūyā and other transient mental states that are themselves subject to „intermingling‟, the enduring mental states of anger and perseverance are also related via „membership‟ such that anger takes perseverance as its „member‟. In other words, as can be garnered from Figure 4.1 and Table 4.12, Parashurama‟s perseverance itself emerges within the larger domain of his anger.293

Figure 4.4 schematically represents the nature of relationship between Parashurama‟s anger, perseverance, asūyā, recollection, erroneous knowledge, pride, and vindictiveness.

Errone

**ous knowledge **

**Recolle **

**ction **

**Vindictiveness **

**Anger **

**Intermingling **

**Pride **

**Asūyā **

**Perseverance **

**Membership **

**Anger **

Merger

Figure 4.4. Schematic representation showing nature of relationship between a set of Parashurama‟s mental states including asūyā. Perseverance occurs in the context of anger and is a „member‟ of the latter. Perseverance and anger „merge‟ at the crossroads of five

„intermingling‟ mental states (though, for the sake of simplicity, „merger‟ at the point of asūyā alone has been represented)

****An examination of Table 4.11 reveals that asūyā, suggested through dialogue units such as “they”, “wield bows”, and “unbridled acts”, is horizontally related also to a second 293 Rupa Gosvamin includes perseverance among the mental states that can become a „member‟ of anger (Bh.R.Si, Ch. 4.8, p. 311: raudrasya - - - vīraścāpi suhṛdvaraḥ)

175

set of mental states comprising apprehension, agitation, vindictiveness, recollection, and erroneous knowledge. Vertically, asūyā and vindictiveness, as was discussed above, can be placed under anger and perseverance. It is clear from Figure 4.1 that apprehension and agitation occur in the context of fear and are therefore vertically related to it. To the group of mental states that feature under Parashurama‟s fear can also be added dissimulation of such fear. Figure 4.1 places fear under sorrow. Parashurama‟s recollection of his enmity with the Kshatriyas, their elevated status, and loss of that status is as much a part of sorrow as it is of anger and perseverance. This is so, because unless such recollection is presumed, his despondency (a mental state occurring in the context of his sorrow) – expressed through the dialogue unit “even I hear about the unbridled acts of those (Kshatriyas) once again” that stands for “in spite of being capable of depriving my enemies of their status by preventing them, as I did in the past, from committing such acts, I could not prevent them this time” –

will not materialize. In other words, recollection is vertically related to sorrow as it is to anger and perseverance. Finally, erroneous knowledge, expressed through the plural number in

“they”, “bows”, and “acts”, accompanies Parashurama‟s sorrow and fear too as it does his anger and perseverance. This is not surprising given that even his sorrow and fear, like his anger and perseverance, relate to the wielding of bows and commission of multiple unbridled acts by not one but many Kshatriyas. Thus, erroneous knowledge can be situated under the umbrella of anger, perseverance, sorrow, and fear.294

Once it is clear as to which mental states occur under the ambit of and along with which other mental states, the nature of their mutual relationships can be explored. Anger, perseverance, sorrow, and fear are four enduring mental states that can be described as

„merging‟ at the point of erroneous knowledge. Such „merger‟ between more than two enduring mental states is called „mixture‟. In a like manner, anger, perseverance, and sorrow 294 In order to avoid cluttering, the extended occurrence of recollection and erroneous knowledge across anger, perseverance, sorrow, and fear has not been depicted under Figure 4.1

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„mix‟ at the points of erroneous knowledge and recollection. Anger and perseverance, as discussed above, „merge‟ at the points of asūyā, vindictiveness, erroneous knowledge, and recollection. The horizontally placed transient mental states of erroneous knowledge, recollection, asūyā, vindictiveness, dissimulation, apprehension, and agitation – all of which are simultaneously communicated through dialogue units such as “they”, “wield bows”, and

“unbridled acts” – must be understood as undergoing „intermingling‟ (just as the set of mental states including erroneous knowledge, recollection, pride, vindictiveness, and asūyā was understood above). Finally, among the aforementioned enduring mental states, perseverance and sorrow are „members‟ of anger whereas fear is a „member‟ of sorrow.295

Figure 4.5 below schematically represents the relationship between Parashurama‟s anger, perseverance, sorrow, fear, erroneous knowledge, recollection, asūyā, vindictiveness, dissimulation, apprehension, and agitation.

Reiterating from Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the following relationships exist between Parashurama‟s mental states:

„Mixture‟ between anger, perseverance, sorrow, and fear at their intersection with erroneous knowledge; „mixture‟ between anger, perseverance, and sorrow at their intersections with erroneous knowledge and recollection

„Merger‟ between anger and perseverance at the points of erroneous knowledge, recollection, vindictiveness, pride and asūyā

„Intermingling‟ between erroneous knowledge, recollection, vindictiveness, pride, and asūyā; „intermingling‟ between erroneous knowledge, recollection, vindictiveness, asūyā, dissimulation, apprehension, and agitation

„Membership‟ between anger and perseverance; anger and sorrow; and sorrow and fear

295 Rupa Gosvamin regards fear and sorrow as capable of mutual „membership‟, i.e., fear can become a

„member‟ mental state of sorrow and vice versa (Bh.R.Si, Ch. 4.8, p. 311: bhayānakasya - - - karuṇaśca suhṛdvaraḥ)

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**Membership **

**Sorrow **

**Fear **

**Erroneous **

**knowledg ** **e **

Perseverance

**Mixture **

**Intermingling **

**Recollection **

**Anger **

**Dissimulation **

**Vindictiveness **

**Apprehension **

**Asūyā **

**Agitation **

**nger **

**Merger **

Figure 4.5. Schematic representation showing nature of relationship between a second set of Parashurama‟s mental states including asūyā. Only a single instance each of „mixture‟,

„merger‟, and „membership‟ are presented.

As regards asūyā, the following findings emerge when the vignette verse is analyzed on the basis of model 2:

(a)

Parashurama‟s asūyā is one among the many transient mental states that form points of „merger‟ for two of his enduring mental states, namely, anger and perseverance (b)

At different junctures in the vignette verse, Parashurama‟s asūyā is suggested by dialogue units that also additionally suggest erroneous knowledge, recollection,

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vindictiveness, pride, dissimulation, apprehension, and agitation. When these junctures are examined, two „intermingling‟ sets of mental states become apparent. In one of these sets, asūyā „intermingles‟ with erroneous knowledge, recollection, vindictiveness and pride; in the other, it „intermingles‟ with erroneous knowledge, recollection, dissimulation, vindictiveness, apprehension, and agitation.

**4.3.2.5 Analysis of the verse based on model 3 **

Analysis of the vignette verse based on model 2 brings to our attention the vital role essayed by erroneous knowledge in the interlacing web of Parashurama‟s mental states. It is erroneous knowledge that forms the common meeting point of his enduring mental states, namely, anger, perseverance, sorrow, fear, and disgust.296 Even before applying model 3 for analysing the vignette verse, this observation, by itself, suggests that Parashurama is a prototype of the uddhata personality – one that is dominated by the guṇa of tamas and characterized by erroneous knowledge (as discussed under 3.3.3.3 and Footnote no. 81 in Chapter 3). A second pointer towards Parashurama‟s uddhata status is the full-fledged repertoire of his displeasurable mental states. All the predominantly displeasurable enduring mental states (anger, sorrow, fear, and disgust) are experienced and expressed by him.

Perseverance, though a pleasurable mental state per se, is rendered displeasurable by dint of its subservience to anger (via „membership‟). As discussed in Chapter 3 (under 3.3.3.3), characters that confirm to the uddhata personality type are significantly prone to experiencing displeasurable mental states. Taking these leads from the previous analysis into consideration, one can proceed towards a more comprehensive assessment of Parashurama‟s personality as required by model 3. The assessment of personality type begins with the task of figuring out the traits that constitute it. However, the task of searching for and isolating 296 Though Figure 4.5 does not depict disgust and its relationship with erroneous knowledge, Figure 4.1 makes it clear that erroneous knowledge also accompanies Parashurama‟s disgust - understandably so, because his disgust is related to several Kshatriyas committing numerous offensive acts and wielding bows (that, as explained above, is an exaggeration of the real state of affairs)

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Parashurama‟s traits can be complicated if we do not make the following hypothetical assumption: Parashurama‟s personality can be characterized as belonging to the uddhata type in the narrative portion relevant to the current analysis. At least three reasons can be provided in support of this assumption. Firstly, such as assumption, as already explained above, derives from the analysis of the vignette verse on the basis of model 2. Secondly, in the absence of such an assumption, one will be forced to blindly search for a large number of traits (24 shared traits + 32 unique traits + 64 differentiating traits, amounting to a total of 120 traits) that encompass all the four personality types, not just the uddhata one. Thirdly, Parashurama is a secondary character that does not pervade the play Mahāvīracarita in its entirety. This means Parashurama‟s personality type is liable to be assessed differently in different narrative junctures (as discussed under 3.3.3.5 and Footnote no. 165 in Chapter 3).

Rather than taking all the different narrative junctures into consideration and concluding that Parashurama has a volatile personality on account of which there is no uniformity in the emergence, experience, and expression of his mental states, it is fruitful to hypothesize one personality type as operating in a given narrative situation, search for and isolate from the situation traits that constitute it, and study mental states such as asūyā within its confines.

Even when it is assumed that Parashurama is an uddhata character, providing additional textual details from the narrative that illustrate the culmination of each of his traits (12-18 shared traits + eight unique traits + 16 differentiating traits, adding up to a maximum of 42 traits) in behavior can make the thesis inordinately bulky. A prudent decision at this point would be to quote text that matters most – text illustrating the eight unique traits from which the diagnosis of Parashurama as an uddhata character can be clinched. The English translations of textual portions from Mahāvīracarita are furnished below for illustrating each of Parashurama‟s eight unique traits. Accompanying the English translations and enclosed within parentheses are quotes from the Sanskrit original.

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Inability to put up with loss of status

 Vignette verse and the comment “This is the grim consequence of my serenity” (“eṣa eva me praśamasya karkaśaḥ pariṇāmaḥ”; Act Two, p. 69) that precedes it: The verse alludes to Parashurama‟s loss of superiority as regards his authority over earth, bowmanship, and physical prowess. The comment preceding it indicates his inability to put up with such loss.

 “I am naturally inclined towards safeguarding my status than seeking spiritual liberation” (“yato vimuktai[te]rapi mānarakṣaṇaṃ priyaṃ nisargeṇa - - - me |”; verse, Act Three, p. 96)

Flaring up at insult

 “Now that I have crossed the limits of forbearance because of being insulted, my anger blazes forth like the submarine fire when an apocalyptic storm stirs up the ocean‟s waters” (“sphūrjatyeva sa eṣa samprati mama nyakkārabhinnasthiteḥ kalpāpāyamarut-prakīrṇapayasaḥ sindhorivaurvānalaḥ”; verse, Act Three, p. 119)

Excessive pride

 “Let anyone amongst you, reckless due to pride and intolerant of my power, waste his penance or weaponry (by putting it to use against me). But I, Parashurama, shall free the world of Rama, Janaka, and Dasharatha. What‟s more, unsatisfied with achieving this much, I shall even crush their brethren” (“tapo vā śastraṃ vā vyavaharati yaḥ kaścidiha vaḥ sa darpāduddāmastviṣamasahamānaḥ skhalayatu | arāmāṃ niḥsīradhvajadaśarathīkṛtya jagatīmatṛpastatkulyānapi paraśurāmaḥ śamayati”; verse, Act Three, pp. 107-108): Bhoja provides this very verse to exemplify Parashurama‟s excessive pride.297

297 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 1031, p. 1031

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 “He is proud in all possible ways (i.e., in mind, speech, and action298)” (“sarvākāraṃ

hi dṛpyati”; verse, Act Three, p. 98): remark about Parashurama by sage Vasishtha, family priest of Dasharatha.

Pride-related mannerisms

 “Here arrives Parashurama, causing the earth to tremble with his long and powerful strides” (“sudūravikṣepāviddhavikaṭorudaṇḍanirbharābhighātavihvalitavasundharaḥ parāgata eva”; Act Two, p. 64): comment by Sita‟s female confidants about Parashurama as he arrives at Janaka‟s palace

Boastfulness:

 “During a feud that broke out when we were practicing the discharge of weapons as a part of our military exercise, Kumara299 was defeated by me though he was surrounded by the armies of Shiva‟s attendants” (“astraprayogakhuralīkalahe gaṇānāṃ sainyairvṛto’pi jita eva mayā kumāraḥ”; verse, Act Two, p. 74)

 “Lord Shiva is himself my master in ethical knowledge, spirituality, and archery.

Given I have annihilated all the Kshatriyas, how can they ever tame me? As regards the revered Vasishtha, I respect our relationship because of his age, not because he can compete with me. That being the case, who else is there that can equal or excel me in austerity and wisdom?” (“dharme brahmaṇi kārmuke ca bhagavānīśo hi me śāsitā sarvakṣatranibarhaṇasya vinayaṃ kuryuḥ kathaṃ kṣatriyāḥ | sambandhastu vasiṣṭhamiśra-viṣaye mānyo jarāyāṃ na tu spardhāyāmadhikaḥ samaśca tapasā jñānena cānyo’sti kaḥ ||”; verse, Act Three, p. 117): Bhoja provides this verse as an example of garva in the uddhata character, intermediate subtype.300

298 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 2.12, p. 98: sarva ākārā mānasatvavācikatvakāyikatvādayaḥ prakārāḥ

299 Another name of Skanda, Shiva‟s son

300 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1040

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 “Savagery is indeed a fault in human nature. Then why brag about it?” (“nṛśaṃsatā hi nāma puruṣadoṣaḥ | tatra kā vikatthanā?”; verse, Act Two, p. 85): Rama‟s response after listening to Parashurama‟s boastful account of how he cut to pieces even Kshatriya fetuses, butchered Kshatriyas 21 times, and had his ritual bath in a lake filled with Kshatriya blood; It is to be noted that Rama employs the word „vikatthanā‟ – the very word with which Bhoja designates the trait of boastfulness

Inability to tolerate delay

 “Complete what mundane rituals you have to. Let your relatives take a look at you (for the last time). But foresters (like me) do not stay for long in cities. I wish to go back.

You must therefore not waste time” (“kriyatāṃ lokadharmaḥ | paśyantu tvāṃ jñātayaḥ |

kintu janapadeṣu na ciramāraṇyakāstiṣṭhanti | gantukāmo’smi | ato na kālaḥ parikṣeptavyaḥ”; Act Two, p. 87): Just when Parashurama challenges Rama for a fight, the latter is summoned for a marriage ritual. Parashurama allows Rama to carry out the ritual but orders him to return back soon for the fight.

Inability to suppress opinion when gripped by impulse:

 “I really want to hug you with my chest – a chest that is bristling because of this encounter with an extraordinary hero” (“vakṣo - - - me | romāñcakañcukitamadbhutavīra-lābhātsatyaṃ bravīmi parirabdhumivecchati tvām”; verse, Act Two, p. 73): Parashurama, overwhelmed by his encounter with a hero of Rama‟s stature, forgets the purpose of his arrival at Janaka‟s palace and utters these words. Subsequently, Rama reminds him that the situation does not warrant hugging.

Acting without thinking:

 “Alas! The sage Parashurama, overcome with anger, enters even the women‟s quarters of the palace” (“kanyāntaḥpurameva hā praviśati kruddho munirbhārgavaḥ”; verse, Act Two,

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p. 60): These words, uttered backstage, suggest Parashurama‟s lack of thinking about the propriety of his action.

It has been demonstrated above that Parashurama possesses the 8 unique traits that allow his categorization as an uddhata character. In fact, the play itself provides for such categorization via a verse uttered by Vasishtha in which he describes Parashurama as being

„demonic/ghoulish in personality” (“prakṛtyā punarāsuraḥ”, Act Three, p. 98) – demons and ghouls representing prototypical uddhata characters.301 Additionally, Sanskrit aestheticians have always maintained that Parashuarama is a predominantly uddhata character.302 Most important in the context of model 3 is the fact that Bhoja regards Parashurama as an uddhata character and provides four verses from Mahāvīracarita as vignettes for illustrating the uddhata character‟s (i.e., Parashurama‟s) garva, asūyā, anger, and rage.303

Once it has been ascertained that Parashurama is an uddhata character, the next exercise is to classify him as an inferior or intermediate subtype of uddhata character. This further exercise presents a unique challenge. Whereas it is easier to spot differences between uddhata, lalita, and udātta (including śānta) characters because each of them exemplifies the predominance of a different guṇa, classification of a single character into superior, intermediate, or inferior subtype demands sensitivity to an increasing or decreasing level of one particular guṇa. Also, whereas a character‟s personality type likely remains the same throughout a narrative situation, the subtype may change within the confines of that situation.

To explicate with an example, though Parashurama comes across uniformly as an uddhata character in a narrative unit taken from Mahāvīracarita, he can be recognized both as an inferior and an intermediate subtype of uddhata character at different points within that very 301 Anundoram Borooah on M.Vi.Ch.2, 3.12, p. 105: āsuraḥ paiśācaḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, pp. 235-236: asurapiśācādyāḥ

- - dhīroddhatā ete draṣṭavyāḥ

302 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: dhīroddhato bhavati | yathā jāmadagnyaḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 7, p. 299: dhīroddhataḥ | - - -

yathā jāmadagnya - - -; N.D, Ch. 1, p. 27: - - - paraśurāmasyātikrūratvakhyāpanārtho dhīroddhatatvanibandhaḥ -

-** **

303 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, pp. 1040, 1041, 1042

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narrative unit. In other words, Parashurama is no doubt dominated by the guṇa of tamas but the level of that guṇa keeps changing in a way that allows for subtyping him as an inferior or intermediate character at different points within one and the same narrative unit.

Consequently, Bhoja labels Parashurama as an uddhata, intermediate character while providing vignette verses for garva, anger, and rage but as an uddhata, inferior character in connection with the vignette verse for asūyā. Though Bhoja does not provide any explanation for this differential labeling, it can be argued on the basis of his theory that the vignette verse for asūyā allows us to infer a smaller number of commonly shared traits in Parashurama than the vignette verses for garva, etc. Put differently, since Parashurama is an uddhata character, he can possess a maximum of 18 commonly shared traits in which case he will be classified under the intermediate subtype. The vignette verse for asūyā, it would seem, prevents us from inferring some of these 18 traits. This reduction in the number of inferable traits implies Parashurama will veer towards the inferior subtype. To reiterate from Chapter 3, characters placed under uddhata, intermediate subtype possess the following 18 commonly shared traits: exalted birth, exalted lineage, exalted kinship, exalted nationhood, exalted habitation, exalted position, exalted filial connection, learning, absence of self-depreciatory talk, rhetorical ability, skill, artistic aptitude, shrewdness, physical beauty, sex appeal, generosity, physical prowess, and bravery. Table 4.13 below provides quotations from Mahāvīracarita that help infer a number of these traits in Parashurama. The vignette verse for asūyā and the verse‟s immediate context bring about a momentary exclusion of exalted position (inferable from

“authority rests once again with the Kshatriyas”; vignette verse), bravery (inferable from

“they presently wield bows once again”; vignette verse), physical prowess (inferable from

“those insane with pride born of physical prowess”; vignette verse), and absence of self-depreciatory talk (inferable from “This is the tragic consequence of my abstinence from

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anger”, p. 69) from this list of Parashurama‟s 18 commonly shared traits, thus bringing about his temporary shift towards the inferior subtype.

Table 4.13

Quotes from Mahāvīracarita that help infer commonly shared traits in Parashurama Trait

Sanskrit text that helps English translation of Comments

identify the presence or the Sanskrit text

absence of the trait

Exalted birth

“brāhmaṇo’ham**” **(Act “I am a Brahmin”

Dialogue spoken

Two, p. 86)

by Parashurama

Exalted lineage

“vaṃśe

viśuddhimati “I am born in the Dialogue spoken

ye-na

bhṛgorjanitvā” untainted lineage of by Parashurama

(Act Three, p. 97)

sage Bhrigu”

Exalted kinship

“sanābhayo

yūyam” “You

all

are

my Dialogue spoken

(Act Three, p. 93)

kindred”

by Parashurama;

“kindred” refers

to Vasishtha etc.

Exalted nation- “śastravyastasamudrada

“Obtaining a piece of Dialogue

hood

-ttaviṣayaṃ

labdhvā” land from the ocean that Rama that makes

(Act Two, p. 60)

was split up by his reference to a past

weapon”

exploit

Parashurama

Exalted

“araṇyavāsī - - - aham” “I am an inhabitant of Dialogue spoken habitation

(Act Two, p. 86)

the forest”

by Parashurama

Exalted position

“prabhutvasyotkarṣāt”

“Because

his Dialogue spoken

304 (Act Two, p. 56)

unparalleled

authority by

Malyavan

over the world”

describing Para-

shurama.

Exalted

filial “utpattirjamadagnitaḥ”

“He is born from the Dialogue spoken

connection

(Act Two, p. 75)

sage Jamadagni”

by Rama in praise

of Parashurama

Learning

“dharme brahmaṇi kār- “I

have

obtained Dialogue

muke ca bhagavānīśo hi ethical, spiritual, and Parashurama

me śāsitā” (Act Three, military

knowledge

p. 117)

from none other than

Lord Shiva”

Skill

“prākprahārapriyo’haṃ

“I like to be hit first by Dialogue spoken

mayi tu kṛtanighāte kiṃ your weapon because if by Parashurama

vidadhyātpareṇa - - - I hit you first, you will that, by alluding kabandhaḥ” (p. 48)

be reduced to a headless to the fact that he

trunk (and I will be never misses a

miss the pleasure of target, informs us

being hit)

about his skill in

the

field

archery

304 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 2.15: prabhutvasyotkarṣājjagadekasvāmitvāt

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Trait

Sanskrit text that helps English translation of Comments

identify the presence or the Sanskrit text

absence of the trait

Absence of self-

“kiṃ na kṣame yadi “I would have given up Dialogue spoken

depreciation

rāmaḥ prakṛṣṭavīryo na my anger had Rama not by Parashurama

syāt | - - - tasmātprāpya been a great warrior. If to his elders in tiraskriyāmasahano’py-I keep quiet after being Janaks‟s court;

asthāditi prastute ko humiliated by him, who

vidyāt” (Act Three, pp. will know that I am

91-92) ** **

doing so because of the

respect

have

for

elders?”

Rhetorical

“māhātmyamudgiranty- “His words, imbued Dialogue

ability

aḥ pade pade | - - - with greatness at each Vishvamitra

vācaḥ

step,

give

me praise of Parashu-

romāñcayanti mām” (p. goosebumps”

rama‟s speech

97)

Artistic aptitude

No dialogue

Shrewdness

“brahmaikatānamanaso “The

respect-worthy Dialogue spoken

hi vasiṣṭhamiśrāstvaṃ Vasishtha, we know, by Parashurama;

brūhi vīracariteṣu guruḥ has fixed his mind on by

sidelining

purāṇaḥ | vaṃśe viśu- the Supreme Being. But Vasishtha

and

ddhimati yena bhṛgor-

you, Vishvamitra, are attempting

janitvā śastraṃ gṛhīta- singularly

adept

in garner the support

matha tasya kimatra heroic exploits. Please of

Vishvamitra,

yuktam” (Act Three, p. tell me what I must do Parashurama 97)”

given I have taken to exhibits

his

arms in spite of being shrewdness

born in the untainted

lineage of Bhrigu?”

Exalted physical “mūrtimabhirāmaghorā

“His form is pleasing as Dialogue

appearance

ṃ bibhrat” (Act Two, p. well as fearsome”

Rama describing

65)** **

Parashurama

Sex appeal

No dialogue

Generosity

“tyāgaḥ saptasamudra- “His generosity is such Dialogue

mudritamahīnnirvyājad

that he gave away in Rama describing

ānāvadhiḥ” (Act Two, charity the entire earth Parashurama‟s

p. 75)

(that

won), greatness

distinguished

its

seven oceans, without a

second thought”

Physical

“vīraḥ

krauñcasya “I am the hero that Dialogue spoken

prowess

bhedāt” (Act Two, p. cleaved

Mount by

Parashurama

57)

Krauncha”

describing

his

own greatness

Bravery

“śauryaṃ

yattu

na “Your bravery, though Dialogue

tadgirāṃ pathi nanu beyond description, is Rama describing

vyaktaṃ hi tatkarma- evident from the acts Parashurama‟s

bhiḥ” ** (Act Two, p. 75) **

you perform”

greatness

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As representing the prototype of an uddhata character, Parashurama puruses the life-goal of artha. In other words, Parashurama occupies himself with the pursuit of objects whose acquisition (and protection etc.) is evaluated as capable of enhancing his social worth. The goal-congruent objects of pivotal importance in Parashurama‟s case are the knowledge of warfare and the earth.305 Figure 4.6 schematically represents the role essayed by these two objects in Parashurama‟s life.

A few Kshatriya princes murder Parashurama‟s father

Parashurama erroneously puts the blame of his father‟s murder on Kshatriyas in general Parashurama reasons that the Kshatriyas dared to murder his father because of their pride, that this pride stemmed from their status, and that this status in turn resulted from their ownership of the earth

Parashurama decides to massacre the Kshatriyas and thereby deprive them of their ownership of the earth as well as avenge the murder of his father

Parashurama puts to use his knowledge of warfare, obtained from Shiva, to massacre the Kshatriyas 21 times in a row

By massacring the Kshatriyas, Parashurama not only deprives them of their ownership of the earth and avenges the murder of his father, but also himself acquires ownership of the earth in addition to fame both as a warrior par excellence and as owner of the earth Parashurama gives away in charity the earth that he owns to Kashyapa Charity begets additional fame to Parashurama

Parashurama secures social worth/status through the fame resulting from his ownership of the earth, excellence in warfare, and donation of the earth in charity

*Figure 4.6. * The knowledge of warfare and the earth as pivotal objects in Parashurama‟s life trajectory

On the basis of Figure 4.6, Table 4.14 provides a list of Parashurama‟s object-relevant actions and demonstrates how each action is linked to another action as means to an end. Figure 4.7

is a schematic representation of the means-end linkages that exist between Parashurama‟s actions.

305 Bhoja includes knowledge and earth/land among the worldly objects/goods that are worthy of pursuit (related discussion under 3.3.3.3 and Footnote no. 63 in Chapter 3)

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Table 4.14

*Means-end linkages among Parashurama’s object-relevant actions *

Means

End

Killing anti-gods in an unarmed battle306

Pleasing Shiva

Acquiring Shiva as master

Training in martial arts

Massacring the Kshatriyas by fighting wars

Massacring the Kshatriyas by fighting Avenging father‟s murder wars

Stripping Kshatriyas of their ownership of the

earth

Acquiring fame as a warrior par excellence

Stripping Kshatriyas of their ownership Acquiring ownership of the earth of the earth

Acquiring ownership of the earth

Acquiring fame as the sole owner of the earth

Giving away the earth in charity to sage

Kashyapa

Giving away the earth in charity to sage Acquiring fame as a donor par excellence Kashyapa

Acquiring fame (as warrior and donor par Acquiring social worth/status excellence and earth‟s sole owner)

Acquiring social worth

Transient freedom from displeasure (i.e., innate

fear of losing status)

Killing anti-gods in an unarmed battle

Pleasing Shiva

Acquiring Shiva as master

Training in martial arts

Massacring the Kshatriyas by fighting wars

Avenging father‟s murder Stripping Kshatriyas of earth‟s ownership Acquiring fame as a warrior par excellence

Acquiring ownership of the earth

Acquiring fame as the sole owner of the earth Giving away the earth in charity Acquiring fame as donor par excellence

Acquiring social worth/status

Acquiring (transient) freedom from displeasure (i.e., innate fear of losing status) Figure 4.7. Schematic representation of means-end linkages among Parashurama‟s object-relevant actions. The arrows point towards ends.

306 According to the Mahābhārata, Shiva, pleased by Parashurama‟s killing of the anti-gods in an unarmed battle, bestowed his weapons on him (see discussion following Table 4.15 below)

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It is worth mentioning in relation to Table 4.14 and Figure 4.7 that Bhoja enumerates extermination of enemies, fame, and social worth/status among the purposes served by material goods such as knowledge and land.307 Whereas the knowledge of martial arts and the earth constitute Parashurama‟s basic goal-congruent objects, extermination of enemies, fame, and status can be regarded as his higher goal-congruent objects that are attainable by putting the former to use.

The universe of Parashurama‟s basic goal-congruent objects is vast. This can be garnered from the following points: Firstly, Parashurama does not approve of the Kshatriyas holding authority over any piece of earth at any point in time – past, present, or future.

Secondly, after having gained authority over the entire earth, Parashurama goes as far as to claim a new piece of land from the ocean (related quote under the trait of exalted nationhood in Table 4.13 above). The above two points indicate that Parashurama professes ownership of not just terra firma but also land beneath the ocean. Thirdly, as regards Parashurama‟s knowledge of martial arts, its vastness can be gauged from Rama‟s description of him as

“embodied knowledge of weaponry” (“kāyavānastravedaḥ”; Act Two, p. 79). Parashurama‟s intolerance of Kshatriyas‟ owning the earth and wielding bows, as spelt out in the vignette verse, also suggests that he regards the earth and the knowledge of military science as his fiefdom in relation to which he would brook no competition from his enemies. The universe of Parashurama‟s higher goal-congruent objects is also vast; arguably so because these objects owe their existence to his basic goal-congruent objects. Thus, Parashurama‟s extermination of the Kshatriyas is not limited only to those that killed his father but extends to the Kshatriya race as a whole. It is realized through a serial massacre of the Kshatriyas 21

times in a row – a massacre in which even Kshatriya fetuses are not spared. As regards fame, Parashurama‟s benchmark is that it must be unquestionable and universal (“yaśasi 307 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1020: vairanivṛttinimittaḥ śatrūcchedārthaḥ - - - mānanimittaḥ pūjārthaḥ, khyāti-nimittaḥ kīrtyarthaḥ

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niravakāśe viśvataḥ śvetamāne”; Act Three, p. 91). Finally, Parashurama status is such that even the likes of Shiva and Rama appreciate and adore him for his expertise in martial arts.

The next important element in model 3 is self-identity. Since Parashurama is an uddhata type of character, his self-identity must theoretically be based on the 12-18

commonly shared traits. As was discussed above under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8, commonly shared traits (learning, skill, shrewdness, etc.) promote actions through which goal-congruent and goal-incongruent objects can be pursued (acquired, protected, etc.) and eliminated respectively. Though all of Parashurama‟s 12-18 commonly shared traits might play a role in facilitating actions through which he can acquire (and protect etc.) goal-congruent and eliminate goal-incongruent objects, some traits likely play a more important role than others.

Table 4.15 lists the most important (commonly shared) traits of Parashuarama and the actions they facilitate.

Table 4.15

The most important traits of Parashurama and the actions they facilitate Trait

Trait-relevant action

Physical prowess and bravery

Acquiring Shiva as master

Training in martial arts

Massacring the Kshatriyas by fighting wars

Acquiring ownership of the earth

Acquiring fame as a warrior par excellence

Learning (as the outcome of training in Massacring the Kshatriyas by fighting wars martial arts)

Acquiring ownership of the earth

Acquiring fame as a warrior par excellence

Exalted position (as owner of the earth)

Acquiring fame as the sole owner of the earth

Giving away in charity the earth that is owned

Generosity (via donation of the earth)

Acquiring fame as a donor par excellence

Though the relevance of traits presented in Table 4.15 to the actions listed alongside them is largely self-evident, it is important to say a few words about how Parashurama‟s physical prowess and bravery are linked to his training. Training in the military arts is as much about the procurement of weapons as it is about the knowledge of their use. At one

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point in the narrative of Mahāvīracarita, Parashurama, speaking to Rama, recalls an incident from the past in which Shiva, pleased with his bravery – the defeat he singlehandedly caused to Skanda and his armies – gifted him a personal axe as an appreciative token (“sainyairvṛto’pi jita eva mayā kumāraḥ | - - - kṛtaprasādaḥ prādādimaṃ - - - gururme”; Act Two, p. 74).308 The instrumentality of Parashurama‟s physical prowess and bravery in facilitating his training process is also supported by a narrative from the Mahābhārata according to which Shiva first put Parashurama to a test of unarmed bravery against the anti-gods and gifted him several supernatural weapons only after he emerged victorious against them by the dint of his bravery owing to physical prowess alone.309 Once it has been determined that physical prowess, bravery, learning, exalted position, and generosity constitute the most important of Parashurama‟s 12-18 commonly shared traits, it follows within the framework of model 3 that his self-identity will be based on these traits. Table 4.16

summarizes the salient elements of model 3 in relation to the character of Parashurama.

Table 4.16

*Salient elements of model 3 in relation to Parashurama *

Elements of model 3

Elements in relation to Parashurama

Personality type

Uddhata

Personality subtype

Oscillates between intermediate and inferior subtypes

Constituent traits

8 unique traits, 12-18 shared traits, 16 differentiating traits

Personality-specific

Artha – freedom from displeasure (fear of losing status) through the life-goal

acquisition, protection, augmentation, and utilization of socially valued objects

Basic

level

goal-

Knowledge of warfare

congruent

socially Earth

valued objects

Higher level goal-

Extermination of enemies (Kshatriyas)

congruent

socially Fame

valued

objects Status

(attained by putting

to use basic level

objects)

308 Parashurama‟s use of the word „guru‟ („master‟) to denote Shiva is an indication that the latter‟s act of gifting the axe took place within the context of teaching and learning

309 M.Bh, Vol. 4, Ch. 8.34, p. 3862

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Elements of model 3

Elements in relation to Parashurama

Universe of goal-

Knowledge of warfare in its entirety

congruent objects

The whole of terra firma and land beneath the ocean

Extermination of all Kshatriyas

Unquestionable, universal fame

Superior status that is recognized by the likes of Shiva and Rama

Goal-incongruent

Knowledge of warfare, earth, fame, and status in the hands of objects

Kshatriyas

A Kshatriya‟s threat or challenge

Actions relevant to Acquiring Shiva as master

the pursuit of goal-

Training in the martial arts

congruent objects

Massacring the Kshatriyas

Owning the earth

Giving away the earth in charity

Acquiring fame

Actions relevant to Massacring the Kshatriyas

the elimination of

goal-incongruent

objects

Self-identity

Based on 12-18 shared traits

Traits

most Physical prowess, bravery, learning, exalted position, and important for self-generosity

identity

Traits that facilitate Acquiring Shiva as master – physical prowess, bravery actions relevant to Training in the martial arts – physical prowess, bravery the pursuit of goal-Massacring the Kshatriyas – physical prowess, bravery, learning

congruent objects

Owning the earth – physical prowess, bravery, learning

Giving away the earth in charity – exalted position

Acquiring fame – physical prowess, bravery, learning, exalted position, generosity

Traits that facilitate Massacring the Kshatriyas – physical prowess, bravery, learning actions relevant to

the elimination of

goal-incongruent

objects

What has been discussed above forms the backdrop for analyzing the vignette verse on asūyā by employing model 3. Given Parashurama‟s life-goal, goal-congruent and goal-incongruent objects, actions relevant to the pursuit of goal-congruent and elimination of goal-incongruent objects, important traits facilitating those actions, self-identity deriving from such traits, and the perception of being socially worthy contingent upon goal realization (i.e., when a goal-congruent object is successfully pursued and a goal-incongruent one eliminated), the analysis hinges on demonstrating how a single instance of goal frustration, initiated by

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Rama‟s act, negatively impacts his trait-based self-identity and perception of social worth, unleashing a spate of displeasurable mental states, including asūyā, in the process. Figure 4.8

(based on model 3) provides a general template for the analysis that follows.

Personality - uddhata

Set of traits

Life-goal – pursuit of

objects conferring status

Trait-based action

Traits sans action

Trait-

based

Life-goal realized

self-

(success in the

Trait is appropriate

Trait is inappropriate

identity

pursuit of goal-

congruent and

elimination of goal-

incongruent

Trait is strong

Trait is weak

objects

Effective action

Ineffective

Erroneous

action

Perception of social status gain

(Transient) freedom from displeasure

Reinforcement of trait-based action and self-identity

Life-goal frustrated (no success in the pursuit of goal-congruent and elimination of goal-incongruent objects)

Perception of social status loss

Anger at the agent

responsible for the loss

Sadness at the self‟s loss of social status

Disgust at the sight of a socially unworthy self or someone

Perseverance to defeat the

else with an enhanced social worth at the expense of oneself

agent and win back status

Invalidation of trait-based action and self-identity

Fear if the agent is undefeatable

*Figure 4.8. * Template for analyzing the mental states of uddhata characters based on model 3.

Personality comes with a life-goal and a set of traits. Self-identity and actions directed at goal-relevant objects are based on traits. Effective actions (based on appropriate, strong traits) lead to goal realization; Ineffective actions (based on weak traits), erroneous actions (based on inappropriate traits), and inaction (because traits necessary for action are absent or one does not act in spite of possessing relevant traits) lead to goal frustration.

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At the outset, it is important to mention that Parashurama‟s uddhata personality is itself regarded by several of his social interactants, especially those related to him by his Brahmin birth, as an aberration. As a result, they are seen frequently criticizing the actions that stem from traits specific to such personality – however effective those actions may be in helping him secure a host of extraordinary goal-congruent objects and great fame.

Additionally, they also advise him to imbibe serenity, which we know from Chapter 3 (see 3.3.3.2) is a unique trait of the śānta personality that, because of the excessive sattva guṇa characterizing it, is a veritable antithesis of the uddhata personality. The dialogue units that follow exemplify criticism of Parshurama‟s personality by his elderly social interactants and their advice to him regarding the importance of inculcating serenity in his personality.

“Dear child! Why this life-long obsession with wretched weaponry? You are a Brahmin learned in the Vedas. You are also the son of sage Jamadagni. Take to the sacred path (that does not demand wielding weapons). You are a forester (and are therefore especially suited for practicing spirituality). Hence, you must try to acquaint yourself with the attitudes of friendliness, etc., that can clear the mind of impurities.”310 (“ayi vatsa, kimanayā

yāvajjīvamāyudhapiśācikayā | śrotriyo:‘si jāmadagnyaḥ | pūtaṃ bhajasva panthānam |

āraṇyakaścāsi | tatparicinu cittaprasādanīścatasro maitryādibhāvanāḥ”; Act Three, p. 92): addressed by Vasishtha to Parashurama.

“The assembly of sages, the warrior Yudhajit, Dasharatha along with his ministers, the aged Romapada, and the wise Janaka, perpetual performer of sacrifices – all of these people beseech you (to gain serenity)”311 (“pariṣadiyamṛṣīṇāmeṣa vīro yudhājitsaha nṛpatiramātyai romapādaśca vṛddhaḥ | ayamaviratayajño brahmavādī purāṇaḥ prabhurapi janakānāmadruho yācakāste”; verse, Act Three, p. 94): addressed by Vasishtha to Parashurama 310 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, Act Three, p. 92: ābhyāṃ viśeṣaṇābhyāṃ śastravidyānadhikāro’dhyātma-vidyāyāṃ sāmānyātītādhikāraścoktau | śrotriya iti vaiduṣyaṃ jāmadagnya iti śāstrāparyudāsaścoktaḥ | - - -

anena śastragrahaṇamārgasyāpūtatvaṃ vyañjitam

311 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 3.5, p. 94: yācakāḥ - - - śamamiti śeṣaḥ** **

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“He may be great because of his traits but is nevertheless demonic by personality” (“kāmaṃ

guṇairmahāneṣa prakṛtyā punarāsuraḥ”; verse, Act Three, p. 98): soliloquy on Parashurama by Vasishtha.”

Even when Parashurama‟s elderly interactants agree that he is not wrong in pursuing certain goal-congruent objects, they do not approve of the actions that facilitate his pursuit because, firstly, those actions stem from a personality that is flawed and secondly, they think he is capable of acquiring (and protecting etc.) those very objects through the spiritual practice of Yoga alone without resorting to violence or experiencing displeasurable mental states such as sorrow and anger when his pursuit turns out unsuccessful (“pratyāsīdati hi te viśokā jyotiṣmatī nāma yogavṛttiḥ | tatprasādajaṃ - - - abahiḥsādhanopadheyasarvārtha-sāmarthyamapaviddhaviplavoparāgam - - -“; Act Three, p. 93, dialogue unit spoken by Vasishtha to Parashurama).

The following points emerge when we proceed to examine the vignette verse and its larger narrative context through the lens of Parashurama‟s personality by sidelining the moral judgment that it is flawed:

 The vignette verse is an overt statement of Kshatriyas‟ status gain. It also covertly suggests Parashurama‟s loss of status. “Authority rests with the Kshatriyas” is a different way of saying “Authority does not rest with me” or “I no longer own the earth that is my goal-congruent object”. Likewise, “they wield bows” can be paraphrased as “they exhibit their knowledge of warfare”, indicating that Parashurama no longer regards himself as the sole guardian of such knowledge, yet another goal-congruent object. Lastly, “unbridled acts”

stands for “acts such as the breaking of my master‟s bow by performing which the Kshatriyas challenge me”. According to Parashurama, such challenge renders questionable the claim that he is a vanquisher of all Kshatriyas and nullifies his fame as a warrior par excellence – a fame

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resulting from massacring Kshatriyas in war. Fame, again, is one among Parashurama‟s goal-congruent objects. Through dialogue units such as those quoted above, Parashurama communicates to us his recognition of Kshatriyas‟ status gain owing to their possession of the earth and the knowledge of warfare. Simultaneously, he also communicates his status loss owing to being dispossessed of those very objects. If possessing objects such as the earth can reinforce Parashurama‟s self-identity (e.g., “I am brave”), based on traits (e.g., bravery) that facilitate actions (e.g., massacring the Kshatriyas) through which such possession is realized, being dispossessed of objects must disrupt such self-identity. Thus, the vignette verse informs us simultaneously about Parashurama‟s loss of status and disruption of self-identity based on traits such as bravery (“I am not as brave as I used to be because, if I had been that brave, I wouldn‟t have let Rama break Shiva‟s bow”), physical prowess, and exalted position.

 Having established that the vignette verse captures Parashurama‟s loss of status and disruption of self-identity, we can split the context surrounding it into two parts and deal with each part separately. The first part precedes Parashurama‟s loss of status and the second follows it.

No sooner does his trait-based self-identity undergo disruption than Parashurama attempts to salvage it by blaming his loss of status on inaction owing to the practice of withdrawal from anger. In other words, “I am not as brave as I used to be because, if I had been that brave, I wouldn‟t have let Rama break Shiva‟s bow” is replaced by “Though I am as brave as always, I still allowed Rama to break Shiva‟s bow because my practice of serenity thwarted actions stemming from bravery – actions through which I would have killed Rama even before he could have attempted his act”. By attributing his loss of status on inaction due to the practice of serenity, Parashurama also conveys something else. He would rather lose an imposed identity based on serenity – a trait that is unnatural to him, given his uddhata personality – than risk losing self-identity based on traits such as bravery and physical

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prowess that he innately possesses. That Parashurama regards serenity as thrust upon him is revealed through the dialogue units given below.

“Being restrained by your elders – Chyavana and others – you gave up anger” (“vṛddhaiḥ

svaiścyavanādibhirniyamitaḥ kopādvyaraṃsī-rnanu”; verse, Act Three, p. 99): spoken by Vishvamitra to Parashurama

“The fire of my anger and this axe – both of which lay suppressed in response to the words of Chyavana and others – are revitalized by Rama‟s act of breaking the Lord‟s bow” (“evaṃ

mayā niyamitaścyavanādivākyaiḥ kopānalaśca paraśuśca punaryathaitau | devasya samprati dhanurmathanena satyamutthāpitau raghusutena tathā prasahya”; verse, Act Three, p. 100): spoken by Parashurama

After concluding that the practice of abstinence from anger led to the subsequent loss of his social status, Parashurama initiates action to regain the same. At the outset, such an action demands sacrificing his serenity at the altar of anger. That this has been achieved even before Parashurama makes his first appearance on the stage is evident from the dialogue unit

“angered by the breaking of his master‟s bow, he (used in the place of “I”) arrives”

(“roṣādupaiti”; verse, Act Two, p. 58) uttered by him backstage. There are four objects at which Parashurama directs his anger – Rama, the agent directly responsible for his loss of status; Kshatriyas, who must share blame for his loss of status because Rama identifies himself as one among them; Brahmins, who, by backing Kshatriyas, approve of his loss of status; and sages such as Vasishtha and Vishvamitra that, by attempting to turn his mind towards serenity once again, seem to care little for his loss of status. Parashurama expresses his anger through behaviors such as criticism, verbal abuse, calling names, disrespect, derision, challenge, making death threats, etc. Given below is a sample of dialogue units through which Parashurama expresses his anger.

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“After chopping the head of this child from Raghu‟s lineage” (“rāghavaśiśoḥ - - - kṛttvā

śiraḥ”; Act Three, p. 100): spoken by Parashurama in an assembly of kings, Brahmins, and sages

“Ah! You that live on alms acquired by wishing others, you nasty family priest of a vassal, you son of a bitch” (“āḥ svastivācanika, duṣṭa sāmantaputrohita, api ca re ahalyāyāḥ putra”; Act Three, p. 104): addressed to Shatananda, family priest of Janaka.

“Let my axe cut you piece by piece like it would a beast” (“paraśuḥ parvaśastvāṃ śṛṇātu”; verse, Act Three, p. 113): addressed to Janaka

“This vainly proud second-rate Kshatriya, rendered frail by old age, is babbling some nonsense” (“pralapati - - - mithyādhmātaḥ kimapi jarasā jarjaraḥ kṣatrabandhuḥ”; verse, Act Three, p. 110)

It goes without saying that Parashurama‟s verbal display of anger will negatively impact his relationship with others. Towards the end of Act Three, every other character has turned against him. This is clear-cut from the following dialogue unit, uttered by Vishvamitra in response to Rama‟s vow that he would soon defeat Parashurama.

“Here is someone that can tame arrogant men. He is a peerless hero and the very lord of this universe. All of us, headed by Vasishtha, stand proof (of his ability to tame Parashurama)”

(“ayaṃ vinetā dṛptānāmekavīro jagatpatiḥ | vayaṃ vasiṣṭhadhaureyāḥ sarve pratibhuvo:’tra vaḥ”, verse, Act Three, p. 122).

Mahāvīracarita does not depict the actual event of Parashurama‟s defeat as happening on the stage. Rather, Act Three ends with Parashurama‟s proclamation that his bow would carry out another massacre of Kshatriyas while Act Four begins with a verse that praises Rama for subduing Parashurama. However, it is not hard to find reasons for Parashurama‟s defeat. Parashurama‟s attempt to regain social status - his ultimate goal-congruent object - by defeating Rama in a fight is unlikely to meet with success because there is no match between

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him and Rama in terms of the number and nature of traits that the two possess. Rama, as the prototype of an udātta character (a point that will be discussed below in greater detail under 4.3.4.5), possesses all the 24 commonly shared traits. Among the traits that Rama possesses and Parashurama does not, the most notable is wisdom. The presence of wisdom in Rama allows him to perform carefully calibrated actions – actions emerging from traits that are adequately strong and appropriate for acquiring a goal-congruent or eliminating a goal-incongruent object that those actions are directed at. Since Parashurama lacks wisdom, his actions are not carefully calibrated. He fails to appreciate the relative difference in the strength of his and Rama‟s traits – a difference that can account for weaker, ineffective actions from his side and stronger, effective actions from Rama‟s. What‟s more, he even discounts the possibility of such a difference by evaluating Rama‟s extraordinary act of breaking Shiva‟s bow as something inconsequential. This can be gauged by his use of the plural „bows‟ rather than the singular „bow‟ in the vignette verse. Through such use, he unwisely clubs Shiva‟s divine and exceptionally mighty bow along with other mundane bows. In the light of what has been discussed above, it stands to reason that an uddhata character such as Parashurama risks defeat when he/she confronts an uddātta character such as Rama.

 Within the purview of model 3, Parashurama‟s asūyā can be understood as follows.

Parashurama acknowledges the enhanced status of the Kshatriyas due to their acquisition of objects that are congruent with both his and their life-goals. He also acknowledges the reinforcement of their trait-based self-identities on account this enhanced status. However, his acknowledgment is not tempered with tolerance. He is intolerant of the Kshatriyas‟

enhanced status and reinforced trait-based self-identity because, as per his evaluation, they do not possess traits that can facilitate the sort of actions needed to acquire a commonly pursued object; alternatively, even if the Kshatriyas do possess such traits, they do not possess them in

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the strength that he himself possesses them. According to him, it is unfair that the Kshatriyas must possess objects such as the earth (and thus gain social status) in spite of being devoid of traits essential for acquiring them while he must be deprived of those objects (and thus lose social status) in spite of being endowed with the requisite traits in their appropriate strength.

To sum up, Parashurama‟s asūyā is characterized by (a) acknowledgement of Kshatriyas‟

status gain; (b) devaluation of the actions and action-relevant traits that made such status gain possible; and (c) intolerance of Kshatriyas‟ status gain, consequent to the evaluation that status gain by those without requisite traits is something unfair.

**4.3.3 Analysis of the vignette verse for garva **

**4.3.3.1 The vignette verse and its context **

The following 4-lined verse for garva shall be subjected to analysis using model 1, 2, and 3:

“***dharme brahmaṇi kārmuke ca bhagavānīśo hi me śāsitā ***

sarvakṣatranibarhaṇasya vinayaṃ kuryuḥ kathaṃ kṣatriyāḥ** **|

***sambandhastu vasiṣṭhamiśraviṣaye mānyo jarāyāṃ na tu ***

***spardhāyāmadhikaḥ samaśca tapasā jñānena cānyo’sti kaḥ ***||”

Translation: “Lord Shiva is himself my master in ethical knowledge, spirituality, and archery.

Context: The vignette verse for garva shares it context with that for asūyā discussed above under 4.3.2. Both verses occur in the same narrative (the Sanskrit play Mahāvīracarita) and are spoken by one and the same character (Parashurama). Following Rama‟s act of breaking Shiva‟s bow, Parashurama picks up a quarrel with elderly Kshatriyas such as Dasharatha and

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Janaka. On being issued a death threat by Parashurama, Dasharatha retorts that Kshatriyas are duty-bound to tame unruly people. Vishvamitra, Rama‟s preceptor, concurs with Dasharatha and asks Parashurama to acquire wisdom - the knowledge of right and wrong - by serving at the feet of Vasishtha. He also adds that if Parashurama was committing sins in spite of knowing right from wrong, the Kshatriyas would see to it that he is punished for the same.

Parashurama utters the vignette verse in response to Vishvamitra‟s words.

**4.3.3.2 Criteria for selecting the verse **

The criteria for selecting the verse match those listed under the vignette verse for asūyā. It is therefore not necessary to repeat them here once again.

**4.3.3.3 Analysis of the verse based on model 1 **

****The analysis of the vignette verse for garva shall be along the lines of that for asūyā.

Table 4.17 lists the antecedent stimuli of garva as isolated from the vignette verse.

Table 4.17

*Antecedent stimuli of garva isolated from the vignette verse *

Antecedent stimulus

Phrase in the vignette verse Comments

that

informs

about

the

antecedent stimulus

Learning/scholarship

“dharme brahmaṇi kārmuke ca „Bhagavān‟ is a word that

bhagavānīśo hi me śāsitā”

describes someone with six

(“Lord Shiva is himself my

exalted qualities (wisdom,

master in ethical knowledge,

etc.).312 By mentioning that

spirituality, and archery”)

Lord Shiva -„bhagavān‟ - is

his teacher, Parashurama

establishes

that

his

scholarship is exalted and

perfect.

Physical prowess

“sarvakṣatranibarhaṇasya” (“I The qualifier „sarva‟ („all‟)

have

annihilated

all

the relates to the exaltedness of

Kshatriyas”)

physical prowess

Austerity (a form of “adhikaḥ samaśca tapasā - - - The phrase unit “who else is physical prowess that is ānyo’sti kaḥ” (“who else is there” suggests the exalted related to the ability to there that can equal or excel nature of austerity put up with physical me in austerity?”)

hardships)

312 Vira Raghava‟s commentary on M.Vi.Ch, 2.28, p. 68: bhagavataḥ ṣāḍguṇyapūrṇāt

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Antecedent stimulus

Phrase in the vignette verse Comments

that

informs

about

the

antecedent stimulus

Intelligence/wisdom

“adhikaḥ samaśca jñānena - - - The phrase unit “who else is

ānyo’sti kaḥ” (“who else is there” suggests the exalted

there that can equal or excel nature of wisdom

me in wisdom?”)

Table 4.18 below replicates Table 4.6 as applicable to the case of garva.

Table 4.18

Substratum, object, primary antecedent, and accessory antecedent of garva in the vignette *verse *

Antecedents

and

associated Representation of antecedents and associated

conceptual categories in the conceptual categories in the vignette verse for garva context of garva

Substratum of garva

Parashurama

Object of garva

Everyone else to whom Parashurma evaluates

himself as being superior, including the Kshatriyas,

sage Vasishtha, practitioners of austerity, and wise

men

Primary antecedent of garva

a) Something

the Exalted scholarship, physical prowess, austerity, and

substratum

wisdom

Low scholarship, physical prowess, austerity, and

b) Something related to the object wisdom

Accessory antecedent of garva

a) that awakens the mental state‟s Parashurama‟s presence in the midst of an assembly memory trace

comprising people (Kshatriyas, practitioners of

austerities, and wise men) to whom he evaluates

himself as being superior

b) that strengthens the mental Vishvamitra extolling the virtues of people state after its memory trace has (Vasishtha, Kshatriyas) to whom Parashurama already surfaced up

evaluates himself as being superior

Vishvamitra condemning Parashurama in front of

people to whom the latter considers himself as being

superior

Tables 4.19 and 4.20 respectively enumerate the consequent responses of Parashurama‟s garva and list seven stimulus-response pairs through which it is communicated. They parallel Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 for asūyā. The stimulus-response pairs for garva are derived by combining Table 4.19 and Table 4.20.

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Table 4.19

*Consequent responses of garva isolated from the vignette verse *

Consequent

Phrase in the vignette verse that Comments

response

informs about the consequent

response

Boastfulness

“dharme brahmaṇi kārmuke ca The three phrases presented

bhagavānīśo hi me śāsitā” (“Lord here

communicate

three

Shiva is himself my master in different antecedent stimuli but ethical knowledge, spirituality, function in the capacity of and archery”)

verbal behaviors representing

“sarvakṣatranibarhaṇasya”

(“I one and the same consequent

have

annihilated

all

the response, namely, boastfulness

Kshatriyas”)

“adhikaḥ samaśca tapasā jñānena

cānyo’sti kaḥ” (“who else is there

that can equal or excel me in

austerity and wisdom?”)

Disrespecting

“vinayaṃ

kuryuḥ

kathaṃ The word “Kshatriyas” stands

others

kṣatriyāḥ” (“How can they – the for “Kshatriyas, whom I have Kshatriyas – ever tame me?”)

completely vanquished and

who, therefore, are a non-entity

as far as I am concerned”; the

phrase “How can they ever

tame me?” challenges their

unquestioned ability to tame

others; since an individual

respects others that have be

ability to tame or vanquish

him/her, Parashurama‟s words

exhibit his disrespect towards

those that can neither vanquish

nor tame him

Disrespecting

“sambandhastu vasiṣṭhamiśra-

The commentary by Vira

elders

viṣaye mānyo jarāyāṃ na tu

Raghava

equates

Parashu-

spardhāyām” (“As regards the rama‟s

words

with

the

revered Vasishtha, I respect our disrespect

Vasishtha.

relationship because of his age, According to the commentary, not because he can compete with competition with an elderly me”)

and distinguished personality

such as Vasishtha is in itself a

great

sin;

Parashurama

disrespects such a personality

by declaring that the latter is

incapable of competing with

him in austerity or wisdom.313

313 Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 3.38, p. 118: mukhyagururiti tadviṣayakaspardhā tava brahmahatyāsamā - - -

gurvadhikṣepeṇa; Vira Raghava on M.Vi.Ch, 3.37, p. 117: spardhāyāṃ - - - jñānatapaḥprayuktasaṅgharṣe** **

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Table 4.20

Stimulus-response pairs through which the vignette verse communicates garva Stimulus-response

pair

that Representation of the stimulus-response pair in the

communicates garva

vignette verse

Learning/scholarship - boastfulness Parashurama‟s exalted learning (inferred from

“Lord Shiva is himself my master in ethical

knowledge,

spirituality,

and

archery”)

–

Parashurama‟s boastfulness about his learning and

his master, Shiva (indicated by the verbal response

“Lord Shiva is himself my master in ethical

knowledge, spirituality, and archery”)

Physical prowess - boastfulness

Parashurama‟s exalted physical prowess (inferred

from “I have annihilated all the Kshatriyas”) –

Parashurama‟s boastfulness about his physical

prowess (indicated by the verbal response “I have

annihilated all the Kshatriyas”)

Physical prowess – disrespecting Parashurama‟s exalted physical prowess (inferred others

from “I have annihilated all the Kshatriyas”) –

Parashurama‟s disrespect towards Kshatriyas

(indicated by the verbal response “How can they –

the Kshatriyas – ever tame me?”)

Austerity – disrespecting elders

Parashurama‟s exalted austerity (inferred from

“who else is there that can equal or excel me in

austerity?”) – disrespecting Vasishtha (indicated by

the verbal response “As regards the revered

Vasishtha, I respect our relationship because of his

age, not because he can compete with me”, where

“competing” stands for “competing in austerity”)

Wisdom – disrespecting elders

Parashurama‟s exalted wisdom (inferred from “who

else is there that can equal or excel me in

wisdom?”) – disrespecting Vasishtha (indicated by

the verbal response “As regards the revered

Vasishtha, I respect our relationship because of his

age, not because he can compete with me”, where

“competing” stands for “competing in wisdom”)

Austerity - boastfulness

Parashurama‟s exalted austerity (inferred from

“who else is there that can equal or excel me in

austerity?”) – Parashurama‟s boastfulness about his

austerity (indicated by the verbal response “who

else is there that can equal or excel me in

austerity?”)

Wisdom - boastfulness

Parashurama‟s boastfulness about his exalted

wisdom (inferred from “who else is there that can

equal or excel me in wisdom?”) – Parashurama‟s

boastfulness about his austerity (indicated by the

verbal response “who else is there that can equal or

excel me in wisdom?”)

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As was the case with the vignette verse for asūyā, it can be noted here too that the same phrase communicates an antecedent stimulus of garva and functions as a verbal response indicating behaviors such as boastfulness and disrespectfulness consequent to garva. It is important to reiterate here that physical responses resulting from garva, such as looking at others with the neck kept raised, holding the chest high and stiff, gazing at the raised arms, etc., though not described in the play, must be imagined as accompanying the verbal responses detailed above.

From the standpoint of model 1, garva in the vignette verse can be understood as a mental state (a) experienced by the character Parashurama; (b) directed at everyone else to whom he evaluates himself as being superior, and (c) communicated by the character to the audience by means of the seven stimulus-response pairs listed under Table 4.8 below. Again, like in the case of the vignette verse for asūyā, all the antecedents for Parashurama‟s garva must be regarded as simultaneously operating although selective phrases from the verse tend to communicate isolated antecedent stimuli. To elucidate, when two instances of Parashurama‟s garva are communicated by two different phrases in the vignette verse, each informing the reader about a different antecedent of garva, say scholarship and physical prowess, it does not mean that pride due to scholarship is non-existent when pride due to physical prowess is being communicated and vice versa.

**4.3.3.4 Analysis of the verse based on model 2 **

Since the context of the vignette verse for Parashurama‟s garva is same as that for his asūyā, some of the same mental states that were operative there are also operative here. This is particularly so with respect to the enduring mental state of anger (which, as depicted in Figure 4.5, brings many of Parashurama‟s other mental states within its purview). Among the transient mental states, a few of them that were isolable from the vignette verse for asūyā

may also be isolable here while others may not. It is important to mention here that the

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narrative context changes after Parashurama is defeated by Rama. The mental states isolable from that new context and the dynamics of their relationship are likely to be different than those in the context that is pertinent at present. Given below under Table 4.21 are additional contextual details that are important for the analysis. These details are culled out from Act Three of Mahāvīracarita.

Table 4.21

Additional contextual details relevant to the analysis of the vignette verse for garva Additional Sanskrit text from Translation of the Sanskrit Comments the play

text

“anutpannaṃ jñānaṃ yadi yadi “If you do not have Versified

dialogue,

ca sandehavidhuraṃ viparya-

knowledge,

your directed at

Parashu-

staṃ vā syātparicara vasiṣṭha-

knowledge is plagued with rama, by Vishvamitra;

sya caraṇau | dhruvaṃ jñāne

uncertainties, or if what you this dialogue precedes

doṣaḥ kathamaparathā durvya-

have is perverse knowledge, the vignette verse

vahṛtirviśuddhau cetpācaṃ

serve at the feet of Vasishtha.

carasi na sahante nṛpatayaḥ ||”

I am sure there is something

(p. 116)

wrong with your knowledge.

Else, how does one explain

this obnoxious behavior? But

if you are committing sins in

spite of possessing right

knowledge, the Kshatriyas

will no longer tolerate”

“kauśika!” (p. 117)

“Kaushika!”

Parashurama‟s impolite

mode

addressing

Vishvamitra without a

honorific title such as

„Sir‟

preceding

his

address;314 the dialogue

unit occurs just before

the vignette verse

“jagatsanātanagurau vasiṣṭhe”

“with respect to Vasishtha, Versified

dialogue

(p. 118)

world‟s ancient preceptor”

directed by Vishvamitra

at Parashurama; follows

the vignette verse

Table 4.22 breaks up the vignette verse for garva into multiple dialogue units – each capable of communicating one or more mental states.

314 To be contrasted with the address “Bhagavan” („Venerable Sir!”) at a prior moment (M.Vi.Ch, p. 97: bhagavan kuśikanandana)** **

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Table 4.22

Mental states suggested by dialogue units in the vignette verse and its immediate context Dialogue unit

Mental

state/s

that Comments

is/are suggested by the

dialogue unit

The whole vignette Logical

reasoning, The verse communicates logical reasoning

verse

erroneous knowledge, aimed at disproving the following theses of

perseverance, pride

Vishvamitra: (a) Parashurama needs to

acquire knowledge by serving Vasishtha

and (b) Kshatriyas are capable of taming

Parashurama. Parashurama‟s reasoning is

faulty because it is based on faulty

premises, namely, “Vasishtha cannot give

me knowledge” (disproved by the fact that

Vasishtha is regarded as the world‟s

ancient preceptor) and “Kshatriyas cannot

tame me” (disproved by Rama‟s taming of

Parashurama later in the narrative).

Parashurama‟s faulty reasoning can be

understood as giving rise to the erroneous

knowledge that Vishvamitra‟s theses are

wrong. By proving Vishvamitra‟s theses

wrong, Parashurama also communicates

his perseverance because, by doing so, he

is also establishing that his life-goal is

valid, a point that will be discussed in

detail under 4.3.3.5 below. Establishing the

validity of one‟s life goal goes hand in

hand with the experience of perseverance

since the latter is related to the pursuit of

life-goal. Pride pervades the verse since all

dialogue units communicate it.

“Lord

Shiva

is Recollection,

pride, The

dialogue

unit

communicates

himself my master in perseverance

recollection of his tutelage under Shiva. As

ethical

knowledge,

for perseverance, since it is related to life-

spirituality,

and

goals and life-goals depend on acquisition

archery”

of means, the dialogue unit, by informing

us about Parashurama‟s adequacy of

means,

also

communicates

his

perseverance.

“I have annihilated Recollection,

pride, The

dialogue

unit

communicates

all the Kshatriyas”

perseverance

Parashurama‟s

recollection

the

Kshatriya massacre that he brought about

in the past. It also communicates his

perseverance for killing the Kshatriyas that

were presently wishing to tame him for his

unruly behavior

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Dialogue unit

Mental

state/s

that Comments

is/are suggested by the

dialogue unit

“How can they – the Recollection,

pride, “Kshatriya” stands for “Kshatriyas that

Kshatriyas – ever contemplation,

were vanquished by me in the past” and

tame me?”

intolerant

envy, therefore

communicates

recollection.

perseverance

Contemplation is indicated by the question

word „how‟ and indicates Parashurama‟s

mental focus on Vishvamitra‟s thesis that

the Kshatriyas are capable of taming him.

Parashurama‟s intolerant envy is a

response consequent to his pride and takes

the form “Given I am superior to the

Kshatriyas, how can Vishvamitra say that

they can tame me?” The dialogue unit

communicates Parashurama‟s perseverance

by indicating his preparedness to tame

them if they ever tried to tame him.

“As

regards

the Pride, intolerant envy, Parashurama‟s

intolerant envy is a

revered Vasishtha, I perseverance

response consequent to his pride and takes

respect

our

the form “Given I am superior to Vasishtha

relationship because

in wisdom, how can Vishvamitra say that I

his

age,

not

must acquire wisdom from him?” The

because

can

dialogue

unit

communicates

compete with me”

Parashurama‟s perseverance by indicating

his preparedness to defeat Vasishtha if the

latter were to compete with him.

“Who else is there Pride, perseverance, By indicating that Parshurama possesses that can equal or contemplation

the means – austerity and wisdom – to

excel me in austerity

pursue his life-goal, the dialogue unit

and wisdom?”

communicates

perseverance.

Having

determined that he is superior to Vasishtha

even, Parashurama contemplates on the

possibility of anybody else equaling or

excelling him as regards austerity and

wisdom. Such contemplation is indicated

by the question phrase „who else‟ (the

answer to which is obviously „nobody‟)

“Kaushika!”

Anger

By addressing Vishvamitra in this manner

without

using

honorific

title,

Parashurama communicates his anger at

the former for challenging his superiority

to Kshatriyas (in physical strength) and

Vasishtha (in austerity and wisdom

“Kaushika!”

Vindictiveness

The dialogue unit performs the function of

screaming/calling out in an abusive

manner – a response consequent to

vindictiveness. Public humiliation by

Vishvamitra is the antecedent stimulus

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Figure 4.9 explicates the relationship between 9 mental states isolated from the vignette verse and its immediate context.

**Anger **(“Vishvamitra is akin to my enemy since he is siding with the Kshatriyas. He is challenging my wisdom by declaring that I must acquire wisdom from Vasishtha. He is also challenging my physical prowess by claiming that the Kshatriyas are capable of taming me”)

**Perseverance **(“Addressing Vishvamitra‟s challenge is important for my life-goal”) **Contemplation **(“Should I acquire wisdom from Vasishtha? Can

Kshatriyas tame me?”)

Recollection (“I have acquired wisdom from Lord Shiva

himself. I have vanquished all the Kshatriyas”)

Vindictiveness

(Vishvamitra has

**Logical reasoning **(“Since I have

humiliated me by

acquired wisdom from Shiva himself,

publicly challenging

there is no need to acquire it from

my wisdom and

Vasishtha. Since I have vanquished

physical prowess)

all Kshatriyas, they are not capable

of taming me”)

Pride (“I am superior to others in

wisdom and physical prowess”)

**Intolerant envy **(“Since I am superior to all others in wisdom and physical prowess, how can Vishvamitra claim that Vasishtha has

greater wisdom and Kshariyas are superior to me in physical power )** **

Erroneous knowledge (“Vishvamitra is wrong in

challenging my wisdom and physical prowess”)

Figure 4.9. * Explication of the relationship between 9 mental states isolated from the vignette verse for garva and its immediate context. The arrows indicate temporal relationship among mental states (i.e., what mental state follows what).

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From Figure 4.9, it is evident that there are two overarching mental states – anger and perseverance – under which it is possible to place all other mental states isolated from the vignette verse for garva and its immediate context. Table 4.23 lists the mental states that occur in the backdrop of such anger and perseverance. It also provides references from Sanskrit poetics to corroborate the relationship shared by Parashurama‟s anger and perseverance with other mental states communicated by the vignette verse for garva.

Table 4.23

List of mental states accompanying Parashurama’s two salient mental states in the context of *the vignette verse for garva *

Salient mental state Accompanying mental state

Corroborative reference from

Sanskrit poetics

Anger

Perseverance

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Vindictiveness

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Pride

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 321

Intolerant envy

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Erroneous knowledge

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Perseverance

Contemplation

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Recollection

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Logical reasoning

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Erroneous (“Right”) Knowledge

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Vindictiveness

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Pride

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 324

Intolerant envy

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

It is possible to stage garva in the present verse by taking recourse to the same method that was adopted for staging asūyā in the vignette verse analyzed earlier. The following points emerge during the staging process:

Parashurama‟s anger and perseverance represent two enduring mental states that can bring a host of transient mental states under their sway. Thus, his anger is accompanied by vindictiveness, pride, intolerant envy, and erroneous knowledge. Perseverance is also a transient mental state that figures in the backdrop of Parashurama‟s anger. However, it is less transient (and therefore more enduring) than vindictiveness, pride, intolerant envy, and erroneous knowledge while being more transient (and therefore less enduring) than

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perseverance. Parashurama‟s perseverance is accompanied by the transient mental states of contemplation, recollection, logical reasoning, erroneous knowledge, vindictiveness, intolerant envy, and pride.

Parashurama‟s anger and perseverance are two fully developed enduring mental states that undergo „merger‟ at the points of vindictiveness, pride, intolerant envy, and erroneous knowledge.

Parashurama‟s anger and perseverance are two enduring mental states that are related to one another through „membership‟ with the latter emerging as the former‟s member.

When dialogue units from the vignette verse are examined by taking into account the mental states corresponding to them, it can be seen that garva is inferable from the same dialogue units that also help infer the transient mental states of contemplation, recollection, logical reasoning, erroneous knowledge, and intolerant envy. All these transient mental states can be described as undergoing „intermingling‟. Vindictiveness must be excluded from this list because it is suggested by a dialogue unit external to the vignette verse.

Figure 4.10 is a schematic representation of the relationships described above.

**Vindictiveness **

**Contemplation **

**Erroneous knowledge **

**Intermingling **

**Recollection **

Intolerant

**envy **

**Logical reasoning **

**Pride **

**Perseverance **

**Membership **

**Anger **

Merger

Figure 4.10. Schematic representation of the relationships between mental states isolated from the vignette verse for garva. Only one instance of „merger‟ is shown.

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The following observations can be made about Parashurama‟s garva on the basis of the analysis carried out above:

(a)

Parashurama‟s garva is one among the many transient mental states that form points of „merger‟ for two of his enduring mental states, namely, anger and perseverance (b)

At different junctures in the vignette verse, Parashurama‟s garva is suggested by dialogue units that also additionally suggest contemplation, recollection, logical reasoning, erroneous knowledge, and intolerant envy.

**4.3.3.5 Analysis of the verse based on model 3 **

Since it has already been established under 4.3.2.5 that Parashurama is an uddhata intermediate/inferior type of character whose life-goal is (transient) freedom from displeasure by acquiring (and protecting etc.) objects (especially the earth) that are socially valued and can enhance his status if they are successfully acquired (and protected etc.), it is not necessary to repeat that exercise here once again. Rather, one can directly proceed to analyze the vignette verse and the context surrounding it by employing model 3. The meaning of Parashurama‟s garva is something that will emerge in the process of analyzing the vignette verse.

The vignette verse is situated in a narrative moment that depicts Parashurama‟s resistance to attempts by Vasishtha and Vishvamitra at reorienting him from the life-goal of material prosperity towards that of spiritual liberation. Parashurama‟s decision to give up serenity and take up arms, a point discussed under 4.3.2, is directly linked to a change in his goal-orientation from spiritual liberation to material prosperity. This is so, because serenity -

“the recoiling away from sense objects” (listed among the special traits of śānta characters; see 3.3.3.2 and Footnote no. 45 in Chapter 3) - is a trait that, by its very definition, connotes moving away from material objects. Likewise, taking up arms, at least as far as Parashurama goes, is an action that is relevant to the acquisition (and protection etc.) of worldly objects

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(the earth, especially). Vasishtha and Vishvamitra, however, want him to give up arms and return to the practice of serenity. They use the following methods to bring about a goal-reorientation in Parashurama:

(a)

To start with, Vasishtha advises Parashurama to give up arms and practice serenity instead (related text quoted and translated above under 4.3.2.5). By doing so, Vasishtha directly conveys to the latter the message that pursuing material prosperity is improper in his case and that he must abandon it in favor of spiritual liberation.

(b)

When Vasishtha‟s direct message fails to convince Parashurama, Vishvamitra comes up with a different strategy. He asks Parashurama to acquire wisdom by serving at the feet of Vasishtha (“If you do not have knowledge, if your knowledge is plagued with uncertainties, or if what you have is perverse knowledge, serve at the feet of Vasishtha”, quoted above under Table 4.21). Since Vasishtha‟s life-goal is spiritual liberation - a fact conceded to even by Parashurama through utterances such as “The revered Vasishtha has his mind singularly focused on the Supreme Truth” (“brahmaikatānamanaso hi vasiṣṭhamukhyāḥ”, verse, Act Two, p. 97) – Vishvamitra‟s words, understood in their extended sense, can be paraphrased as

“Wise people like Vasishtha pursue spiritual liberation whereas less wise people like you pursue material prosperity. Therefore, the latter must obtain greater wisdom from the former”. Thus, Vishvamitra not only indicates to Parashurama that his life-goal of material prosperity is lower in hierarchy than that of spiritual liberation but also informs him the means, namely, serving at the feet of Vasishtha, through which he can make the transition from material prosperity to spiritual liberation.

(c)

Vishvamitra also employs an alternate strategy in case Parashurama were to argue that he does not lack wisdom, implying thereby that his life-goal is in no way inferior to Vasishtha‟s. Vishvamitra alerts Parashurama that if he continues to engage with arms in spite of being wise, the Kshatriyas would cut him down to size (“But if you are committing sins in

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spite of possessing right knowledge, the Kshatriyas will no longer tolerate”, quoted above under Table 4.21). The implication of Vishvamitra‟s words is that if Parashurama does not stop wielding arms and take to serving wiser men such as Vasishtha, he will neither attain material prosperity (a life-goal that he wishes to attain) nor spiritual liberation (a life-goal that he should attain).

It is obvious that Vishvamitra‟s words will not go well with Parashurama. Since Vishvamitra‟s words are aimed at dissuading him from his life-goal of material prosperity, he will regard them as goal-incongruent, displeasurable, and fit to be eliminated. The initial displeasure that stems from evaluating Vishvamitra‟s words as goal-incongruent takes on the character of anger. It is immediately followed by the mental state of perseverance - a prerequisite for eliminating goal-incongruent objects and pursuing goal-congruent ones. In this case, Parashurama‟s perseverance must realize the elimination of his goal-incongruent objects, namely, the words of Vishvamitra, through the act of refutation. The vignette verse captures this refutational act. Since this act owes to the mental state of perseverance, it is proper that Table 4.22 must include the latter in the list of mental states inferable from the vignette verse. The inclusion of logical reasoning in that list is justified by the fact that refutation is possible through logical reasoning. Garva enters the picture because Parashurama‟s refutational act requires proof (a) that his life-goal stands higher in hierarchy than that of Vasishtha given he is wiser than the latter and (b) that the Kshatriyas cannot impede him in attaining his life-goal because he is superior to them in physical prowess.

**4.3.4 Analysis of the vignette verse for vrīḍā **

**4.3.4.1 The vignette verse and its context **

The following 4-lined verse for garva shall be subjected to analysis using model 1, 2, and 3:

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“***gurvādeśādeva nirmīyamāṇo ***

***nādharmāya strīvadho’pi sthito’yam | ***

***adya sthitvā śvo gamiṣyadbhiralpai- ***

rlajjāsmābhirmīlitākṣairjiteva ||”

Translation: “Ordered as it is by the preceptor, even this killing of a woman – an act that is being done now - will lead to no sin. As regards shame, we – petty beings that are here today only to move out tomorrow – have conquered even that with our eyes closed”

(Anargharāghava, Act Two, p. 92).

Context: The character uttering this verse is prince Rama, son of king Dasharatha, ruler of Ayodhya. Having obtained permission from Dasharatha, the sage Vishvamitra takes his sons, Rama and Lakshmana, along with him to his hermitage so the two princes can protect his sacrifices from being ruined by a group of demons. Among the demons is also a demoness named Tadaka. Hearing his son cry out that the ascetics were being terrorized by Tadaka and fearing his hermitage‟s destruction, Vishvamitra instructs Rama to go ahead and kill the demoness. Rama, however, does not act immediately but takes a moment to evaluate the pros and cons of killing Tadaka. The vignette verse and the verse that follows it occur as part of Rama‟s evaluation of his act. According to Rama, he would not be staying for long in the hermitage. Therefore, as long as he is there in the hermitage, it is possible for him to somehow hide his lajjā (vrīḍā) – one born of the knowledge that he performed the improper act of killing a woman – by keeping his eyes closed so nobody can make out his mental state from the expressions consequent to it. However, people in the hermitage would not stop talking about how he killed Tadaka. Rama fears Vasishtha, his family priest, would get to know about his act first-hand through the power of spirituality and would experience lajjā

himself on account of such an improper act (of a person whose family priest he is) being praised by people.

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**4.3.4.2 Criteria for selecting the verse **

Taking into consideration criteria listed in the previous chapter (Subheading no. 3.4) for selecting a vignette verse, the following observations can be made about the verse at hand:

(1) Singabhupala supplies this verse in his Rasārṇavasudhākara (under 2.67-68, p. 182) for the purpose of illustrating vrīḍā resulting from the antecedent stimulus, namely, the performance of an improper act.

(2) The literary source from which Singabhupala quotes this verse is Anargharāghava, a Sanskrit play composed by Murari (9th century AD).

(3) The vignette verse occurs as part of a larger narrative context that has been summarized above (under 4.3.4.1).

(4) The character Rama, whom the vignette verse depicts as vrīḍā‟s substratum, is well-known in the Indian cultural landscape.

(5) The vignette verse is in direct speech – uttered by Rama himself.

(6) The verse has commentaries by Ruchipati Upadhyaya and Ramachandra Mishra **4.3.4.3 Analysis of the verse based on model 1 **

Table 4.24 lists the antecedent stimuli of Rama‟s vrīḍā.

Table 4.24

*Antecedent stimuli of vrīḍā isolated from the vignette verse *

Antecedent

Phrase in the vignette verse that Comments

stimulus

informs about the antecedent stimulus

Knowledge

“nirmīyamāṇo - - - strīvadho” (“killing Though Rama has not yet killed that one has of a woman – an act that is being done the demoness Tadaka, his use of committed

now”)

the present tense (“is being done

an improper

now”) is suggestive of the fact

action

that he evaluates the act of killing

her as something he cannot but

not do (because it has been

ordered by his master). Therefore,

Rama considers the act as already

executed

217

Antecedent

Phrase in the vignette verse that Comments

stimulus

informs about the antecedent stimulus

Remorse

“strīvadho’pi” (“even killing of a

“Even” indicates that the unseen

woman”)

demerit earned by killing Tadaka

cannot be expiated by any means.

Moreover, since the act involves

taking life, it cannot be undone.

Though remorse follows the

commission of an improper act

and Rama has not yet killed

Tadaka, the certainty that he

cannot but do it allows remorse to

occur even before committing the

act.

Table 4.25 below replicates Table 4.6 as applicable to the case of vrīḍā.

Table 4.25

Substratum, object, primary antecedent, and accessory antecedent of vrīḍā in the vignette *verse *

Antecedents and associated conceptual Representation of antecedents and associated categories in the context of vrīḍā

conceptual categories in the vignette verse for

vrīḍā

Substratum of vrīḍā

Rama

Object of vrīḍā

Others, such as Vasishtha, whose evaluation of

his act as improper matters for Rama

Primary antecedent of vrīḍā

a) Something

the Knowledge of having committed an improper

substratum

act, remorse due to the knowledge that the act

cannot be undone

b) Something related to the object

Authentic knowledge about proper and improper

action

Accessory antecedent of vrīḍā

a) that awakens the mental state‟s There is no accessory antecedent in this case memory trace

because no memory trace of past vrīḍā (from

b) that strengthens the mental state committing improper acts in the past) exists in after its memory trace has already Rama. This is the first time that Rama is surfaced up

committing an improper act and experiencing

the mental state of vrīḍā resulting from it. The

vignette verse therefore presents a contrast to the

two earlier verses on Parashurama‟s asūyā and

garva that depict mental states already

experienced by the substratum in the past. After

Rama has experienced vrīḍā for the first time, it

exists in him as a memory trace to be awakened

by an accessory antecedent such as Vasishtha

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getting to know about Rama‟s act or Rama‟s

preoccupation with his act by trying to actively

recall it. Dialogues uttered by Rama and

Vishvamitra some time after the former has

killed Tadaka evince Rama‟s preoccupation the

impropriety of his act. At these instances, it must

be understood that Rama is experiencing vrīḍā

that has undergone strengthening because of his

constantly bringing back to memory the

improper act committed by him.315

Tables 4.26 and 4.27 respectively enumerate the consequent responses of Rama‟s vrīḍā and list four stimulus-response pairs through which it is communicated.

Table 4.26

*Consequent responses of vrīḍā isolated from the vignette verse *

Consequent response

Phrase in the vignette Comments

verse that informs about

the consequent response

Verbal report of one‟s “lajjā” (“shame”)

The verbal report of one‟s mental

mental state

states is a type of consequent

response (discussed under 3.2)

The eye expression, “mīlitākṣaiḥ”

(“with According to one commentary, the

known

„lajjitā‟ eyes closed”)

eyes mirror vrīḍā. Rama‟s words

(discussed under 4.2.3,

reveal his intention to hide from

Subheading no. 3)

others the ocular expressions of his

vrīḍā.316

Table 4.27

*Stimulus-response pairs through which the vignette verse communicates vrīḍā *

Stimulus-response

pair Representation of the stimulus-response pair in the

communicating vrīḍā

vignette verse

Knowledge of having committed Rama‟s knowledge of having committed the killing of an improper action – verbal a woman – Rama‟s utterance of the word „lajjā‟ for report of vrīḍā

reporting his mental state

Knowledge of having committed Rama‟s knowledge of having killed a woman –

an improper action – eye Rama‟s report of his vrīḍā-related eye expression via expression stemming from vrīḍā

the phrase “with eyes closed”

315 The dialogues that indicate Rama‟s preoccupation with his improper act are as follows: “The killing of womenfolk, though done in accordance to the words of this great sage, does not make me happy”

(“mahāmunerasya girā kṛto’pi straiṇo vadho māṃ na sukhākaroti”, versified dialogue by Rama, Act Two, p. 96) and “My dear child, though returning back from his maiden victory, does not quickly approach me because he is overcome with shame for having killed Tadaka” (“kathamayaṃ kumārāṅkavijayapratyāgato’pi tāḍakānigraheṇa hriṇīyamāṇaḥ sahasā nopatiṣṭhate vatsaḥ”, dialogue by Vishvamitra, Act Two, p. 105).

316 Ruchipati Upadhyaya‟s commentary on A.Ra, 2.59, p. 92: akṣṇi lajjā saṅkrāmata iti lokoktiḥ

219

Stimulus-response

pair Representation of the stimulus-response pair in the

communicating vrīḍā

vignette verse

Remorse - verbal report of vrīḍā

Rama‟s remorse due to the irreversible and inexpiable

nature of his gynocidal act - Rama‟s utterance of the

word „lajjā‟ for reporting his mental state

Remorse

– eye expression Rama‟s remorse due to the irreversible and inexpiable stemming from vrīḍā

nature of his gynocidal act - Rama‟s report of his

vrīḍā-related eye expression via the phrase “with eyes

closed”

Within the framework of model 1, vrīḍā in the vignette verse qualifies as a mental state (a) that is experienced by Rama; (b) that necessitates the presence of social others (the

“objects”) whose evaluation of Rama‟s act as improper matters to him; and (c) that is communicated by Rama through the four stimulus-response pairs listed above (under Table 4.26)

**4.3.4.4 Analysis of the verse based on model 2 **

As an aid to the analysis of the current vignette verse on the basis of model 2, Table 4.28 provides additional text from Act Two of the play Anargharāghava.

Table 4.28

*Additional contextual details relevant to the analysis of the vignette verse for vrīḍā *

Additional Sanskrit text Translation

the Comments

from the play

Sanskrit text

“gṛhāṇa cāpaṃ nigṛhāṇa “Wield the bow and kill Versified dialogue addressed by tāḍakām” (p. 91)

Tadaka”

Vishvamitra to Rama

“(saghṛṇātirekam)”

“(With excessive disgust) Stage direction and following it, a

“bhagavan,

Sir, are you referring to dialogue addressed by Rama to

striyamimām” (p. 91)

this woman?”

Vishvamitra

“alpakō’yaṁ

“This act is no big deal. Versified dialogue addressed by

vidhistvadājñ-aiva

Your order is more Rama

Shunahshepa,

the

garīyasī naḥ” (p. 91)

important for me”

adopted son of Vishvamitra, when

the latter cries out for help from a

menacing Tadaka

“mīmāṁsatē

“Why is my elder brother Lakshmana‟s soliloquy on seeing

kimāryō’yaṁ” (p. 92)

engaging

undue Rama occupied in thoughts

deliberation?”

“svagataṁ” (p. 92)

“To himself”

Stage direction just prior to the

vignette verse by Rama; indicates

that the vignette verse and the

verse following it are soliloquies

220

Additional Sanskrit text Translation

the Comments

from the play

Sanskrit text

“dīrghaṃ prajābhirati-

“When these surpised Soliloquy by Rama

kautukinībhirābhirasmin

people will spread my

nakīrtipaṭahe mama

infamy, the family priest,

tāḍyamāne | jyotir-

reveared Vasishtha, who

mayena vapuṣā

by his lustrous, spiritual

jagadantasākṣī lajjiṣyate

form, can know what is

kulagururbhagavān-

happening even at the far

vasiṣṭhaḥ ||”

end of the universe, will

feel ashamed”

“saroṣaṃ sasambhramaṃ “Getting up with anger Stage direction that describes cotthāya

and hurry, joining his some of Rama‟s mental states and

savinayamañjaliṃ

palms as a mark of the actions following them; occurs

baddhvā” (p. 93)

humility”

immediately

after

Tadaka

threatens hermits with death.

“daśarathagṛhe

“Don‟t come to the Versified dialogue addressed by

sambhūtaṃ māmavāpya

conclusion that my mind Rama to Vishvamitra

dhanurdharaṃ

is confused about killing

dinakarakulāskandī

the woman because it

ko’yaṃ kalaṅkanavā-

thinks that I, born in the

ṅkuraḥ | iti na

house of Dasharatha, am

vanitāmetāṃ hantuṃ

responsible for this fresh

mano vicikitsate

blemish that seeks to

yadadhikaraṇaṃ

sully the solar dynasty. I

dharmasthīyaṃ tathaiva

say this because, as

vacāṃsi naḥ ||” (p. 93)

regards matters of right

and wrong action, we go

by your words”

“(savailakṣyasmitaṃ)** **

“(With

smile

of Stage direction for Rama and a

“mahāmunerasya girā

embarrassment) - - - The versified

dialogue

him

kṛto’pi straiṇo vadho

killing of womenfolk, expressing

his

mental

state

māṃ na sukhākaroti” (p. though

done

in consequent to the killing of

96)

accordance to the words Tadaka

of this great sage, does

not make me happy”

Analysis of the dialogue units that occur in the vignette verse and its surrounding context makes it possible to isolate the following 15 mental states of Rama: 1.

Utsāha (perseverance)

Mati (right knowledge)

Garva (pride)

Jugupsā (disgust)

221

Vismaya (surprise)

Bhaya (fear)

Cintā (contemplation)

Smṛti (recollection)

Vitarka (logical reasoning)

Vrīḍā (shame)

Avahittha (dissimulation)

Śaṅkā (apprehension)

Moha (erroneous knowledge)

Krodha (anger)

Āvega (agitation, hurry)

Table 4.29 below demonstrates how dialogue units from the vignette verse and the additional textual material quoted under Table 4.28 help infer the mental states listed above.

Table 4.29

Mental states suggested by dialogue units in the vignette verse and its immediate context Dialogue unit

Mental state/s Comments

that

is/are

suggested

the

dialogue

unit

“Ordered as it is Perseverance,

Contemplation on the act of killing Tadaka is

by the preceptor, right

followed by logical reasoning. Logical reasoning

even this killing knowledge,

culminates in right knowledge. Right knowledge

of a woman – an logical

strengthens the mental state of perseverance that is

act that is being reasoning,

needed to carry out the act.

done now - will contemplation

Contemplation takes the form “Will killing a woman

lead to no sin”

bring me unseen demerit?” Logical reasoning takes

the forms “If my master had not ordered this act and I

had gone about doing it myself, it would have caused

me unseen demerit”; “Since my master has ordered

the act and I am not doing it on my own accord, I

will not incur unseen demerit because of it. I will in

fact earn unseen merit because of obeying my

master”; Right knowledge takes the form “I will earn

merit by killing Tadaka as ordered by my master”.

222

Dialogue unit

Mental state/s Comments

that

is/are

suggested

the

dialogue

unit

“This killing of a Disgust

Disgust is a result of “seeing” oneself commiting a

woman – an act

displeasurable act. The word „this‟ indicates that the

that is being done

act is happening then and there and that Rama is

now”

aware of it. Rama‟s self-criticism, indicated by the

phrase “we – petty beings”, is a response stemming

from his disgust that is consequent to his mental

visualization of seeing himself killing the demoness

Tadaka, a woman

“This killing of a Shame,

fear, Shame is situated in the larger context of fear.

woman – an act contemplation, Whereas Rama‟s shame is because of the irreversible that is being done logical

nature of his improper action, his fear is because of

now - - - As reasoning,

the irreversible nature of the infamy and shame that

regards

shame, erroneous

his family (and others such as Vasishtha, because of

we – petty beings knowledge

their association with the family,) will incur due to

that

are

here

the act. He has a way of tackling his shame (since he

today

only

knows that his stay in the hermitage will be short) but

move

out

is helpless against the shame and infamy that his

tomorrow – have

family and those associated with it will go through.

conquered

even

Since fear results from a goal-incongruent object that

that with our eyes

cannot be eliminated, it is proper that Rama must

closed”

experience fear as a consequence of his act that will

result in his family‟s ineliminable infamy and shame.

The dialogue unit also represents erroneous

knowledge because Rama need not be ashamed of his

act and evaluate it as improper in spite of it involving

the killing of a woman – a woman who was a menace

to people that did not harm her.

Contemplation takes the form “How do I tackle the

shame resulting from this act?”

Logical reasoning takes the form “If I were to stay in

this hermitage for a long time, I must be worried

about tackling my shame. Since I am not staying here

for long, I need not bother about it too much”.

Erroneous knowledge is of the type “I can tackle the

shame arising from this act”.

“(With excessive Disgust,

This dialogue unit is Rama‟s response to

disgust) Sir, are surprise

Vishvamitra‟s order – “Wield the bow and kill

you referring to

Tadaka”. The stage direction „with excessive disgust‟

this woman?”

itself informs us about Rama‟s mental state at this

narrative moment.

Rama‟s surprise stems from his evaluation of the

incongruity between Vishvamitra‟s knowledge of

ethics and his order to kill a woman

223

Dialogue unit

Mental state/s Comments

that

is/are

suggested

the

dialogue

unit

“This act is no big Perseverance,

Contemplation takes the following forms - “Do I

deal. Your order right

have the traits in me through which I can perform

is more important knowledge,

this action?” and “Must I act according to the orders

for me”

logical

of Vishvamitra‟s son?”

reasoning,

Contemplation is followed by logical reasoning of

contemplation, the form “My master‟s son is as important to me as pride

my master. If I do not follow his order to kill Tadaka,

I will incur unseen demerit. On the contrary, if I

follow his orders, I will earn positive unseen merit”

and “If I was not capable of the act, my master would

not have ordered me to do it. Because he has ordered

me to do it, it means I am capable of doing it”.

Such logical reasoning leads to right knowledge of

the forms “I am capable of killing Tadaka” and “It is

important for me to follow the order of my master‟s

son”.

Right knowledge strengthens the mental state of

perseverance so action directed at achieving a life-

goal (namely, acquiring unseen merit, discussed in

detail under 4.3.4.5) can be performed.

Though the dialogue unit “This act is no big deal”

appears to communicate pride, it is in fact right

knowledge that is arrived at by Rama through a

logical process of correctly evaluating the adequacy

of his traits for the action at hand. Furthermore, since

Rama‟s evaluation is not of the form “I am brave

enough to perform this act” but rather “My master

thinks I am brave enough to perform this act”, he

cannot, on the basis of his own evaluation, conclude

that he is superior to others. And since pride

necessitates coming to such a conclusion, Rama‟s

dialogue unit does not represent pride (as understood

in the case of characters such as Parashurama)

“Why is my elder Logical

Lakshmana‟s comment, preceding the vignette verse,

brother engaging reasoning

suggests Rama‟s logical reasoning process at work.

undue

The right knowledge that Rama arrives at in the

deliberation?”

vignette verse is the outcome of this logical

reasoning

“To himself”

Dissimulation

To say the vignette verse aloud would mean

revealing his experience of disgust, fear, and shame

to others. The stage direction “To himself” indicates

Rama‟s attempt at concealing from others the

behavioral responses that are consequent to his

experience of disgust, fear, and shame.

224

Dialogue unit

Mental state/s Comments

that

is/are

suggested

the

dialogue

unit

“When

these Fear,

Rama‟s fear is due to the evaluation that his act

surpised

people apprehension,

engenders shame and loss of repute to his family and

will spread my shame,

those connected with it (such as Vasishtha) as well as

infamy,

the contemplation, the evaluation that it is beyond his capacity to family

priest, logical

eliminate this shame and loss of repute.

reveared

reasoning,

His apprehension is that Vasishtha and others will get

Vasishtha,

who errnoneous

to know about the act. It is replaced by shame when

by his lustrous, knowledge

the knowledge that he cannot prevent Vasishtha from

spiritual form, can

getting to know about it dawns on him.

know

what

Contemplation takes the form “How will Vasishtha

happening even at

respond when he gets to know about my act?”

the far end of the

Logical reasoning takes the form “If my action brings

universe, will feel

pride and repute to the solar dyanasty, Vasishtha will

ashamed”

also be proud. If my action brings shame and

disrepute to the dynasty, Vasishtha, due to his

association with the dynasty, will experience shame”.

Erroneous knowledge takes the form “Vasishtha will

experience shame when he gets to know about my

improper act of killing a woman”. However, Rama‟s

own right knowledge, suggested by the later dialogue

unit “I say this because, as regards matters of right

and wrong action, we go by your words”, counters

his erroneous knowledge and establishes that as long

as he has acted on the orders of his master, he need

not fear that Vasishtha will be ashamed on getting to

know about his action.

“Getting up with Perseverance,

Both anger and hurry occur within the larger ambit of

anger and hurry, anger, hurry

perseverance. Rama‟s perseverance energizes the

joining his palms

action through which Tadaka can be eliminated.

as a mark of

Rama‟s anger is directed at Tadaka because of the

humility”

following reason: The life-goal of Vishvamitra as

well as Rama is to acquire merit, the former by

performing sacrifices and the latter by helping the

former carry on with performing sacrifices without

hindrance.

the

extent

Tadaka

obstructs

Vishvamitra from earning unseen merit by ruining

his sacrifices, to the same extent she also prevents

Rama from earning his own share of unseen merit.

Since anger is directed at an agent that is responsible

for the loss of a desired object (unseen merit, in this

case), it is proper that Vishvamitra and Rama must

experience anger in relation to Tadaka. Hurry relates

to Rama‟s intolerance of delay in carrying out his

action.

225

Dialogue unit

Mental state/s Comments

that

is/are

suggested

the

dialogue

unit

“Don‟t come to Perseverance,

Contemplation is of the form “What is right action

the

conclusion right

and what is wrong?”

that my mind is knowledge,

Contemplation is followed by logical reasoning that

confused

about logical

takes the form “Whichever action my master says is

killing the woman reasoning,

right is right, whichever he says is wrong is wrong”.

because it thinks contemplation, Right knowledge is of the form “I must act as my that I, born in the recollection

master says”.

house

Right knowledge strengthens perseveration, the

Dasharatha,

mental state that precedes Rama‟s action of killing

responsible

for

Tadaka.

this fresh blemish

Recollection is suggested by the words “Dasharatha”

that seeks to sully

and “solar dyanasty”. Rama recollects the fact that

the solar dynasty.

Dasharatha and all the other kings in the solar

I say this because,

dyanasty have always looked up to Vishvamitra for

as regards matters

guidance regarding what is right and what, wrong,

right

and

action. Through this dialogue unit, Rama also negates

wrong action, we

the existence of disgust, fear, apprehension, and

your

shame at that given moment

words”

“(With a smile of Fear, shame

Rama‟s fear, because of his inability to eliminate his

embarrassment) -

family‟s shame and infamy – fallouts of killing

- The killing of

Tadaka - and the personal shame resulting from

womenfolk,

killing a woman continue to haunt him way beyond

though done in

the vignette verse

accordance to the

words

this

great sage, does

not

make

happy”

Figure 4.11 explicates the relationships between 14 mental states – perseverance, anger, hurry, contemplation, logical reasoning, right knowledge, recollection, fear, shame, dissimulation, erroneous knowledge, apprehension, disgust, and surprise - isolated from the vignette verse for vrīḍā and its immediate narrative context. The mental state of pride is excluded from the figure because of the reason given above under Table 4.29, namely, that such pride is more correctly described as right knowledge that is arrived at by Rama through a logical process of correctly evaluating the adequacy of his traits for the action at hand.

226

Perseverance (“Killing Tadaka is important for my

**Fear **(“I am powerless in eliminating

**Disgust **

life-goal of acquiring unseen merit by obeying my

the shame and infamy caused to my

(“That I must

master”)

family by my own improper act of killing

perform an

a woman”)

act that

brings

Anger (“Tadaka prevents me from

**Shame **(“I have killed a

disrepute to

acquiring unseen merit”)

woman”)

the Solar

race and

Hurry (“I must k ill Tadaka now”)

sage

**Dissimulation **(„I must hide my

Vasishtha”)** **

fear, disgust, and shame”)

Contemplation (“Will I incur unseen demerit by

killing Tadaka?”)** **

**Conte **

**mpl **

**atio **

n („‟

How

n I

tackle my shame?”)

**Logical reasoning **(“I will not incur unseen

merit by doing an act ordered by my master”)

Logical reasoning (“I need not

bother about the shame since my

stay is short here”)

Right knowledge (“I will in fact earn merit by

killing Tadaka”)** **

Surprise

**Erroneous knowledge **(“I can

(“That

tackle the shame”)

even my

**Contemplation **(“Does my act bring

master

disrepute to the solar race and

must ask

Vasishtha?”)

**Apprehension **(“Vasishtha will

me to kill

get to know about my act”)** **

her”)** **

Logical reasoning (“Any act done

Shame (“I cannot prevent

by the orders of Vishvamitra is

Vasishtha from getting to know”)** **

proper”)** **

**Contemplation **(“How will

**Recollection **(“Solar race knows

Vasishtha respond?”)

proper from improper action based

on Vishvamitra‟s words”)

**Logical reasoning **(“He

will be ashamed if my act

brings disrepute to solar

**Right knowledge **(“Since my action

race and him”)

is based on Vishvamitra‟s words, it is

proper. Such action cannot bring

disrepute to solar race/Vasishtha”)

**Erroneous knowledge **(“My act brings disrepute

to the solar race and him; so he will be ashamed”)** **

Figure 4.11. Explication of relationship between 14 mental states isolated from the vignette verse for Rama‟s vrīḍā and the verse‟s immediate context. Arrows indicate temporality.

Figure 4.11 reveals four salient mental states around which Rama‟s other mental states crowd. These are perseverance, anger, fear, and disgust. Table 4.30 lists the mental states that occur in the backdrop of these four salient mental states. It also provides references from Sanskrit poetics to corroborate the relationship shared by these four mental states of Rama with his other mental states.

227

Table 4.30

List of mental states accompanying Rama’s four salient mental states in the context of the *vignette verse for vrīḍā *

Salient mental state Accompanying mental state

Corroborative reference from

Sanskrit poetics

Perseverance

Anger

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Hurry/agitation

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Contemplation

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 796

Recollection

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 324

Logical reasoning

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Right knowledge

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Anger

Hurry/agitation

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 378

Fear

Shame

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

Dissimulation

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

Apprehension

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 326

Contemplation

P.R, Ch. 4, p. 187

Logical reasoning

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 798

Erroneous knowledge

N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 326

Disgust

Surprise

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797

Erroneous knowledge

S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797

The following points emerge while staging Rama‟s vrīḍā in the context of the vignette verse:

Perseverance, anger, fear, and disgust are Rama‟s four enduring mental states that bring other transient mental states within their purview.

Perseverance and anger undergo „merger‟ at the point of agitation.

Perseverance and anger also share the relation of „membership‟ with the latter being the member mental state of the former

Since Rama‟s right knowledge (“Killing Tadaka is a proper action”) ultimately prevails over his erroneous knowledge (“Killing Tadaka is an improper action), perseverance, the mental state that is strengthened by the former kind of knowledge, is rendered capable of overpowering fear and disgust, both of which are strengthened by the latter kind of knowledge. In the terminology of Sanskrit poetics (see under Table 3.2 in Chapter 3), Rama‟s perseverence can be described as bringing about the „praśama‟ („subjugation‟) of fear and disgust. However, the „subjugation‟ is not complete. This is indicated by the reemergence of

228

fear and shame at a later point in the narrative. Sanskrit aestheticians such as Bhoja refer to the reemergence of one mental state after being „subjugated‟ by another mental state as the former‟s „śeṣa‟ („residue‟). Thus Rama‟s fear and shame leave behind a „residue‟ even though they are „sujugated‟ by his perseverance. The reemergence of fear and shame is in fact the reemergence of memory „residues‟ left behind by them.

Fear and disgust undergo „merger‟ at the point of erroneous knowledge.

f. Fear and disgust also share the relation of „membership‟ with the latter functioning as the former‟s „member‟ mental state.317 Of the given two mutually unopposed enduring mental states, the one that brings fewer transient mental states within its purview becomes a

„member‟ of the other. In this case, fear and disgust are mutually unopposed, enduring mental states. Among them, disgust brings fewer transient mental states within its ambit than fear.

As regards transient mental states, examination of the vignette verse‟s dialogue units and the mental states suggested by them reveals that one and the same dialogue unit, namely,

“This killing of a woman – an act that is being done now - - - .As regards shame, we – petty beings that are here today only to move out tomorrow – have conquered even that with our eyes closed” suggests shame, contemplation, logical reasoning, and erroneous knowledge.

Likewise, the dialogue unit, namely, “Ordered as it is by the preceptor, even this killing of a woman – an act that is being done now - will lead to no sin”, helps us infer right knowledge, logical reasoning, and contemplation simultaneously. In other words, there are two sets of transient mental states within the vignette verse and the mental states within each set can be described as undergoing „intermingling‟ amongst themselves. In one set shame, contemplation, logical reasoning, and erroneous knowledge „íntermingle‟. In another set, right knowledge, logical reasoning, and contemplation „intermingle‟.

317 Rupa Gosvamin includes disgust among the mental states that can become a „member‟ of fear (Bh.R.Si, Ch.

4.8, p. 311: bhayānakasya bībhatsaḥ - - - suhṛdvaraḥ)** **

229

Figure 4.12 is a schematic representation of the relationships („merger‟,

„membership‟, „subjugation‟, „residue‟, and „intermingling‟) discussed above.

**Contemplation **

**S ** **hame **

**Intermingling ** ** **

**L **

**og **

**ical r **

**ea **

**son **

**ing **

**Con **

**emp **

**latio **

**n **

**Intermingling **

**Right knowledge **

**Logical **

**reasoning **

**Fear **

**Hurry **

**Surprise **

Erron

**eous knowledge Disgust **

**Merger **

**Anger **

Perseverance

**F **

**ear **

Memb

**ership **

Subjug

ation, residue M

**erger **

Membership ** Subjug** **ation **

Figure 4.12. Schematic repre

sentation of the relationships between mental states isolated from the vignette verse for vrīḍā (shame)

The following observations can be made about Rama‟s vrīḍā on the basis of the analysis carried out above:

(a)

Rama‟s vrīḍā is one among the many transient mental states that occur within the ambit of his fear

(b)

At different junctures in the vignette verse, Ram‟s vrīḍā is suggested by dialogue units that also additionally suggest contemplation, recollection, logical reasoning, and erroneous knowledge.

230

**4.3.4.5 Analysis of the verse based on model 3 **

From the analysis of the vignette verse carried out above by employing model 2, it is possible to make an assumption that Rama‟s is an udātta type of character. Though the repertoire of Rama‟s mental states includes both erroneous knowledge and right knowledge, the verse and its context establish that it is right knowledge that prevails in the end. Right knowledge, under the name of „prajñā‟, finds its representation among the 24 shared traits of the udātta character. This makes us conclude that Rama is likely to be an udātta character.

Model 3, however, offers us other ways of zeroing in on a character‟s personality type. If Rama is indeed an udātta character, he must possess the 8 unique traits that are found in such a character. English translations of textual portions from Anargharāghava illustrating Rama‟s eight unique traits are given below. Accompanying the English translations and enclosed within parentheses are quotes from the Sanskrit original.

Moral character as expressed through noble behavior

 “Hey Kshatriya lad! I am delighted by your goodness” (“are kṣatriyaḍimbha, tavānena

- - saujanya - - -āpyāyito’smi”; Act Four, p. 165)318: This is a dialogue addressed by Parashurama to Rama in which the former makes an observation about the latter‟s noble behavior

 “O Child! Wherefrom this absence of humility in you today that you do not respect even those that are great and respectable?” (“āḥ vatsa, ko’yamadyatanaste durvinayagraho yadgurūnapi kṣetrīkaroṣi?”; Act Four, p. 174): This dialogue is addressed by Rama to Lakshmana, his younger brother, when the latter criticizes Parashurama for one of his rude comments. Rama‟s dialogue indicates his expection of noble behavior from Lakshama even towards Parashurama, the angry sage that wants to finish him off. In turn, the dialogue helps us infer Rama‟s own standard of noble behavior.

318 Ramachandra Mishra‟s commentary on A.Ra.2, p. 222: saujanyaṃ sādhubhāvaḥ

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Civility

 “O Hero par excellence! What can I say about you? You have been crowned emperor among

great

warriors

battle”

(“mahāvīra!

kimucyate

mūrdhābhiṣikto’si

samaraśauṇḍānām”; Act Five, p. 210): This is a dialogue directed by Rama to Vali, an opponent whom he shall soon kill. However, the fact that Vali is his opponent does not prevent him from behaving in a courteous manner towards him.

Steadfastness/not being shaken by an adversity

 (With tears in his eyes) “Ah! Dear daughter of Janaka! How is it that what I see of you is only this piece of your garment? - - - “Ravana knows that he will die in my hands. Yet he abducts my beloved” (“[sāsraṃ] hā devi videharājanandini, kathamuttarīyaśeṣā dṛśyase | -

- “jānanneva daśānano:‘paharate naḥ preyasīm”; verse in addition to a prose portion, Act Five, p. 202): Though Rama is initially overcome by sorrow at the loss of his wife, abducted by Ravana, king of demons, he regains his composure soon afterwards and expresses his resolve to kill his wife‟s abductor.

Profundity of character as manifested through restraint of expressive behaviors

 “As regards shame, we have conquered even that with our eyes closed”

(“lajjāsmābhirmīlitākṣairjiteva”, Act Two, p. 92): This dialogue unit from the vignette verse indicates Rama‟s ability to hide his shame from others.

Confidence in one‟s expertise

 “Let me see if you have the bowmanship required for killing Kshatriyas the 22nd time.

I am not happy just with the stringing and breaking of Shiva‟s bow” (“dvāviṃśamārabhyate |

drākṣyāmi tvayi vartamānamadhunā taccāpavidyādbhutaṃ śambhostasya hi kevalena dhanuṣā kṛṣṭena tuṣṭirna me ||”; verse, Act Four, p. 175): This dialogue, addressed by Rama to Parashurama, communicates his confidence is defeating the latter.

Maintenance of propriety under all situations

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 “I am afraid of the impulsivity that will make me take up arms against a Brahmin”

(“vipre śastragrahaṇaguruṇaḥ sāhasikyādbibhemi”; verse, Act Four, p. 174): When Parashurama asks Rama to stop his speech, laced with humility, and implores him to take up arms, Rama retorts by saying this dialogue, conveying thereby that he would have taken up arms only if Parashurama had not been a Brahmin.

Gratitude

 “You have gifted the city of Lanka to me” (“laṅkā - - - ekāṃ bhavānadita mahyam”, verse, Act Seven, pp. 319-320): This dialogue unit is addressed by Vibhishana, Ravana‟s younger brother, who helps Rama defeat the demon king. The gifting of Lanka, Ravana‟s capital city, by Rama to Vibhishana after the demon king has been killed indicates Rama‟s gratitude towards Vibhishana.

Modesty expressed through lack of boasting

 “I stretched the bow of Shiva with the natural curiosity of a young bow. I did not forsee that such an inauspicious event (i.e., breaking of the bow) would occur”

(“bālasvabhāvasulabhena kutūhalena kṝṣṭaṃ dhanurbhagavato vṛṣabhadhvajasya |

tatrānuṣaṅgikamamaṅgalamīdṛśaṃ tu”; verse, Act Four, p. 165): In this dialogue, addressed by Rama to Parashurama, the former speaks of his heroic act of breaking Shiva‟s bow as if it were a mistake on his part.

Given that Rama has all eight unique traits of udātta characters, it is now possible to definitely conclude that he represents a prototype of such characters. Since all udātta characters belong invariably to the superior subtype, Rama also must. This means Rama possesses all the 24 commonly shared traits listed in Chapter 3 (under 3.3.3.2) as well as 16

differentiating ones (that help us distinguish him from other character types such as Parashurama). Although a thorough reading of the play Anargharāghava will present before us instances in which each of the 24 traits materialize as behaviors, a single quote from the

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play‟s prologue itself sums up that Rama possesses these (as well as many other) traits. The stage manager, as a matter of justifying why Rama‟s tale must be told again and again, observes that no one else other than Rama possesses as many positive traits (“guṇairetāvadbhirjagati punaranyo jayati kaḥ?”; verse, Act One, p. 17).

Having determined that Rama is an udātta superior character, we can gather that his life-goal will be dharma – the acquisition (and protection etc.) of unseen merit. Acquisition of unseen merit is made possible though acions that are in accordance with the rules of dos and don‟ts as understood from ethical scriptures. Some of these rules include not saying “no” to a supplicant, not disobeying/transgressing one‟s master/elders, protecting those in distress, not killing a woman, and not abandoning daily and occasional obligatory duties.319 In the case of doubt as to which among a given set of actions he/she must perform in a given situation, the udātta character‟s decision is based on his/her knowledge about how those well-versed in ethical scriptures would act or want others to act in similar siuations.320 Successfully carried out ethical actions not only beget unseen merit but also fame to the performer of those actions (though the desire to acquire fame is not the prime motivator).321 Just as the performace of ethical actions brings unseen merit, their non-performance brings unseen demerit. Acquiring material objects such as weapons is only of secondary importance in that it facilitates the performance of ethical action. In other words, acquisition of material objects is not an end in itself. Just as the acquisition of external material objects is only a means towards the attainment of dharma, the set of traits (eight unique, 24 shared, and 16 differentiating), 319 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 995: kāyena - - - ārttatrāṇaṃ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, pp. 996-997: nityāparityāgaḥ - - -

naimittikātyāgaḥ - - - svajātidharmādavicalanaṃ - - - gurvājñānatikramaḥ - - - aprārthanābhaṅgaḥ; M.Bh, Vol. 1, Ch. 1.157, p. 474: avadhyāṃ striyamityāhurdharmajñā dharmaniścaye

320 TU, 1.11, pp. 48-49: yadi te karmavicikitsā - - - syāt ye tatra - - - dharmakāmāḥ syuḥ | yathā te tatra varteran |

tathā tatra vartethāḥ |** **

321 M.Bh, Vol. 3, 6.26, p. 2605: atha cettvamimaṃ dharmyaṃ saṅgrāmaṃ na kariṣyasi | tataḥ svadharmaṃ

kīrtiṃ ca hitvā pāpamavāpsyasi || (“If you will not wage this ethical war, you will be deprived of your life-goal of dharma as well as of fame. Furthermore, you will acquire unseen demerit”)

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assumed as acquired through the udātta character‟s unseen merit resulting from ethical action in the past, also becomes a means (internal) for the same purpose. This brief introduction to the life-goal of dharma helps us situate the vignette verse‟s analysis in perspective.

The vignette verse is situated within a larger narrative context in which there are several actors whose life-goal is the acquisition of unseen merit. However, each actor does not pursue unseen merit in isolation. To put it differently, the successful acquisition by one individual of unseen merit through the performance of his ethically prescribed actions depends on another individual‟s performance of his own ethically prescribed actions (leading to this second individual acquiring his own share of religious merit). The actors involved in the vignette verse and its larger context are as follows: the solar race, king Dasharatha, Vishvamitra, Vishvamitra‟s son Shunahshepa, Rama, Vasishtha, and Lakshmana. The solar race is a succession of kings who, by performing ethically enjoined actions, have attained both unseen merit and fame. Dasharatha, by allowing Rama and Lakshmana to accompany Vishvamitra and help the latter with the unhindered performance of sacrificial rites, not only protects the fame of this race but also acquires unseen merit for himself by putting the trait of generosity to good use. Furthermore, he helps Vishvamitra gain his own share of merit through the unhindered performance of obligatory sacrificial rites. By agreeing to accompany Vishvamitra, Rama and Lakshmana acquire unseen merit resulting from not disobeying their father. Moreover, by their very act of agreeing to accompany Vishvamitra (which is a prerequisite if Vishvamitra‟s sacrifice must go on unhindered), they facilitate the process through which the latter can acquire unseen merit. Since the protection of sacrificial rites –

one that involves killing demons – is a task assigned to them by Vishvamitra, their master, Rama and Lakshmana stand to gain unseen merit by accomplishing it. In the process, they would also gain additional unseen merit by way of saving the lives of hermits such as Shunahshepa that are exposed to the tyrranical assault of the demons. Additionally, the

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protection accorded by Rama and Lakshmana to his sacrificial rites would allow Vishvamitra to successfully complete them and thus gain his share of unseen merit. As a byproduct of killing the demons, Rama and Lakshmana would also ensure protection of the solar race‟s fame. However, the narrative situation does not evolve along these smooth lines – one in which each actor performs his act without any hitch, gains unseen merit for himself, and allows other actors also to gain their own unseen merits in the process. This is so, because a woman – the demoness Tadaka who is a goal-incongruent object both for Vishvamitra and Rama – enters the picture and complicates things. She is a goal-incongruent object for Vishvamitra because her acts spoil his sacrificial rites and prevent him from acquiring unseen merit. More importantly, they engender acquisition of unseen demerit resulting from the non-performance of obligatory duties. She is a goal-incongruent object for Rama because her continued existence is in itself an indication that he has been slack in the performance of the task assigned to him by his master. Put simply, her existence correlates with Rama‟s loss of unseen merit.

The prospect of having to kill Tadaka puts Rama in an ethical quandary. He must choose between two ethical actions – obeying his master and not killing a woman – that are incompatible with one another. Given these two actions, Rama must decide which of them is more binding on him in the given situation. Initially, Rama is in confusion – in the mental state of erroneous knowledge. He evaluates Tadaka‟s murder as an unethical action that will bring him unseen demerit, put the solar race‟s fame at stake, and displease Vasishtha because of the latter‟s association with the solar race in the office of its family priest. Since Vasishtha, like Vishvamitra, is also Rama‟s master, displeasing him would amount to transgressing one‟s master – an act that will further predispose Rama to the acquisition of unseen demerit.

Rama‟s displeasurable mental states of fear, shame, apprehension, and disgust draw their strength from his erroneous knowledge. As he continuously evaluates and reevaluates the

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ethicality involved in killing Tadaka, Rama realizes that killing her would no doubt dispose him to the experience of shame but it will neither bring him unseen demerit nor mar his family‟s fame. And if it does not mar the family‟s fame, it will not displease Vasishtha too. A life-long experience of shame is a small price that Rama is willing to pay in return for unseen merit. Rama‟s realization correlates with his mental state of right knowledge – one that stems from evaluating Tadaka‟s killing as an action that is proper because it was assigned to him by an ethically more knowledgeable and sensitive authority of the stature of Vishvamitra – one whose advice kings belonging to the solar race always relied upon for deciding the propriety or otherwise of their actions. With the dawning of realization, Rama experiences the pleasurable mental state of perseverance that provides the fuel necessary for carrying out the action of killing Tadaka.

In the backdrop of what has been discussed above, it is possible to understand Rama‟s vrīḍā as follows. Since Rama is an udātta character, his self-identity will be of the form “I am a person that never transgresses ethics in his actions”. At first, Rama evaluates that his self-identity will be disrupted in any case, either by obeying his master or by disobeying him.

With the realization that killing Tadaka does not automatically translate into unethical action and that, on the contrary, it is verily ethical, Rama‟s fear about losing his self-identity by performing that action is allayed. Vrīḍā makes its appearance when Rama foresees the possibility of killing a woman and further evaluates himself as having killed her already. It is related to the fear of losing his self-identity that is based on ethical action. It lingers on even after he realizes that killing a demoness that terrorizes people is not unethical. This lingering suggests continuous mental preoccupation with his act. Though Rama appears to have cast aside the doubt about his action being unethical at the time of committing it, at later times he does not evaluate it very positively. Vishvamitra may see nothing unethical in the killing of

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Tadaka; Rama, however, does not see it as completely ethical from a personal standpoint.322

This explains why his vrīḍā must linger on long after he has killed Tadaka.

**4.3.5 Concluding remarks on the analysis of vignette verses for asūyā, garva, vrīḍā **

Nine analyses of three vignette verses based on three different models have been presented above. The aim of these analyses is to bring to light an indigenous understanding, based on Sanskrit poetics, of three mental states - asūyā, garva, vrīḍā – as they are communicated by and through literary narratives. The first model - simplest of the three models – requires merely isolating the given mental state‟s antecedents and consequents from the vignette verse. When one actually embarks upon the exercise of isolating stimuli and responses, it becomes clear that the same phrasal unit can provide us information about both the stimulus preceding and responses following the given mental state. The second model teases out the interrelationships between mental states that populate a vignette verse and its immediate context. As Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.10, and 4.12 point out, the analyses culminate in schematic representations that can be regarded as a character‟s “mental state signatures”.

Mental state signatures derived from two vignette verses occurring within the same context will vary if those verses relate to two different character types such as Rama and Parashurama. Likewise, mental state signatures constructed from two vignette verses occurring in two different contexts can vary even if those verses relate to the same character.

Thus, for instance, a verse relating to Parashurama (preferably in the character‟s own words) before he is defeated by Rama may exhibit a mental state signature that is at odds with another verse relating to the same Parashurama after he is defeated. The third model pins down differences in personality type and life-goal as the reasons behind why vignette verses relating to different characters have different mental state signatures.

322 Though ethical standards of dos and don‟ts are established by society, personal standards can also decide ethics given those standards are based on “desire that is unpolluted (by the guṇa-s of tamas and rajas)” (Pur.Mi, p. 6: dharmajñāpakahetavaḥ - - - avigītātmecchā)

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4.4 Comparing and contrasting concepts about asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā with their corresponding self-conscious emotions: addressing questions posed in Chapter 3

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the larger question of how asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā compare and contrast with corresponding mental states in contemporary psychology can be broken down into three sub-questions, each of which shall be addressed separately below.

Do the categories of sthāyibhāva-s (enduring mental states) and vyabhicāribhāva-s (transient accessory mental states, including asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā) differ from one another in the same way that basic and self-conscious emotions do?

The list of eight (or nine) sthāyibhāva-s includes several entities that are akin to the basic emotions. Thus, sadness, fear, surprise, anger, and disgust correspond to śoka, bhaya, vismaya, krodha, and jugupsā respectively. Likewise, one can find parallels to self-conscious emotions among the 33 transient accessory mental states. For instance, asūyā, garva, vrīḍā, and amarṣa appear, on the face of it, to match with envy/jealousy, pride, shame/guilt/embarrassment, and humiliation respectively. However, this does not mean that the relationship between sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s mirrors the one that exists between basic and self-conscious emotions.

Firstly, Sanskrit poetics speaks of mental states, not emotions, thoughts, motivations, and voluntary choices. In fact, the tripartite classification of mental states into affects, cognitions, and conations (including motivations and volitions) does not apply in the case of Sanskrit poetics. All mental states are cogntions, affects, and conations in parts. To clarify, mental states involve evaluation of objects as pleasurable or displeasurable, goal-congruent or goal-incongruent, liked or disliked, and pursuable or eliminable. Furthermore, evaluation is not a blind process, but one that is based on recollection. Objects that were pleasurable or displeasurable in the past or, alternatively, that are similar to other objects that were

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pleasurable or displeasurable in the past are evaluated as pleasurable or displeasurable at present.323 Evaluation and recollection point to a cognitive component. As regards affect, all mental states are either predominantly pleasurable or predominantly displeasurable (It is important to stress on the word „predominantly‟ because, according to Sanskrit aestheticians, pleasure and displeasure always go together; there are no exclusively pleasurable or exclusively displeasurable mental states.)324. With respect to conation, the evaluations of objects as liked or disliked and pursuable or eliminable as well as of object-directed actions as effective or ineffective (“Can I pursue my goal-congruent object by performing this action?” “Can I eliminate my goal-incongruent object by performing this action?” See 3.3.3.3

under Chapter 3) indicate a conative aspect (comprising of object-directed interest and motivation to act) to mental states as much as they do a cognitive aspect. In effect, each mental state, according to Sanskrit poetics, is a bundle of interwoven thought, pleasurable or displeasurable emotional experience, and a tendency to act in a particular way. It is important to add here that we can define sthāyibhāva-s in terms of experience alone whereas, to define vyabhicāribhāva-s, we often need to invoke cognition and motivation/volition (as understood from goal-directed consequent responses). Thus, the sthāyibhāva-s of love, mirth, perseverance, and surprise are all predominantly pleasurable mental states whereas those of anger, fear, sorrow, and disgust are all predominantly displeasurable. In comparison, the vyabhicāribhāva-s are pleasurable or displeasurable depending on the sthāyibhāva-s in whose context they occur. For example, asūyā and garva are pleasurable if they occur in the context of love but displeasurable if the context is framed by anger; vrīḍā is pleasurable if it occurs in the context of love but displeasurable if the context is one of fear. Because of this non-specificity of their experiential nature, it becomes inevitable to define asūyā, garva, or vrīḍā

323 Bhoja regards recollection as the basis for all mental states (S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 958) 324 N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 42: yo’yaṃ svabhāvo lokasya sukhaduḥkhasamanvitaḥ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 43: sa ca sukhaduḥkharūpeṇa vicitreṇa samanugataḥ | na tu tadekātmā (“It [i.e., the nature of the world] is an admixture of pleasure and displeasure and is not solely pleasurable or displeasurable”); A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p.

43: laukikāḥ sukhaduḥkhātma(tmā)no bhāvāḥ

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in terms of thoughts and actions (or action-relevant traits) rather than of experience. The defintions of asūyā, therefore, allude to the trait of intolerance (that, in turn, is the absence of tolerance, one of the unique traits of an udātta character) or the action of making negative qualities out of others‟ positive ones; of garva, to the thought that one is superior to all others or the action of despising others; and of vrīḍā, to the absence of the trait of boldness, the thought that one ended up performing an action that one was not supposed to, or the restriction of action.

In this context, it is interesting to note some similarity as well as difference between the Sanskrit aestheticians‟ classification of mental states into sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s with the prototype approach to classifying emotions under basic categories and subordinate categories as adopted by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O‟Connor‟s (1987).

In both classifications, there is a superordinate category of pleasurable (sukhātmaka) and displeasurable (duḥkhātmaka) mental states/emotions. Under the superordinate categories come the basic categories of basic emotions in one case and sthāyibhāva-s in the other.

Finally, we have the subordinate categories of emotions such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, envy, jealousy, and pride that occur under specific basic categories. This is akin to vyabhicāribhāva-s occuring in the context of sthāyibhāva-s. However, unlike in the prototype approach where specific subordinate categories occur under specific basic categories (e.g., shame, guilt, and embarrassment occur under sadness; envy and jealousy under anger; pride occurs under joy), there is so such fixed relationship between sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s. Thus, garva may occur in the context of love, anger, perseverance, wonder, or filial affection; asūyā may occur in the context of love, mirth, anger, or perseverance; and vrīḍā may occur in the context of love, mirth, anger, fear, and sorrow. If Bhoja‟s theoretical perspective is taken into consideration, subordinate categories can themselves share a hierarchical relationship with one another.

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Secondly, the main criterion on which mental states are classified into sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s is the former‟s ability to sustain for a shorter or a longer duration of time as against the latter that are inherently incapable of sustaining for a long duration of time (a point Bhoja does not agree with). The basic emotions are not distinguished from self-conscious emotions based on such a temporal criterion. Having said this much, it must be admitted that the sthāyibhāva-s exhibit less individual variation than the vyabhicāribhāva-s just as the basic emotions do in comparison to the self-conscious emotions.325

A more important distinction between the two sets of psychological categories is as follows: Unlike the self-conscious emotions, basic emotions do not necessarily involve the processes of self-awareness (“I” self) and self-representation (“Me” self) (Tracy & Robins, 2007). From the persepective of Sanskrit aesthetics, it can be argued that all the mental states are self-conscious because they cannor arise in the absence of self-awareness and self-evaluation. This is so, because of the following reason: When the empirical self is exposed to worldly objects, it experiences pleasurable or displeasurable mental states. Embedded in the experience is the information that those objects are goal-congruent or goal-incongruent. Such information in turn presupposes self-awareness because if objects are goal-congruent or goal-incongruent, they must be so in relation to a subject, namely, the “I” self. Secondly, personality types, uddhata and the like, can be regarded as packages. With each package also comes a life-goal, a set of pursuable goal-congruent and eliminable goal-incongruent objects, traits that can facilitate the performance of object-relevant actions, and self-identity based either on traits or on actions. Thus, when a personality such as Parashurama or Rama pursues an object and experiences a pleasurable or displeasurable mental state in the process, it is 325 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, pp. 276-277: na hyetaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇī bhavati | - - - ye punaramī

glāniśaṅkāprabhṛtayaścittavṛttiviśeṣāste - - - jaganmadhye’pi na bhavantyeva| tathā hi rasāyanamupayuktavato glānyālasyaśramaprabhṛtayo nottiṣṭhanti (“There is no living being that is bereft of memory traces relating to the sthāyibhāva-s. But vyabhicāribhāva-s such as debility, apprehension, and so on are not invariably present in people. For instance, a sage that consumes elixirs does not experience debility, lassitude, or physical fatigue”)

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implicit in the very act of pursuit that self-identities such as “I am brave” or “I am ethical” are at work.

How are the antecedents and consequents of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā similar to and different from those of their counterpart self-conscious emotions?

When asūyā, īrṣyā, and mātsarya are compared and contrasted with envy and jealousy, several conceptual similarities and differences emerge. Perceiving that someone else has possessions and qualities which one does not have is an antecedent both for asūyā and envy.

Envy presupposes a dyadic relationship. However, asūyā may occur either in a dyadic or a triadic relationship. Unlike envy that is targeted at those who are evaluated as similar to oneself, asūyā is targeted at those who are evaluated as superior to oneself. In this respect, envy is more akin to īrṣyā. Like jealousy, īrṣyā and mātsarya also surface in situations where a third party actively intervenes. In an asūyā scenario, a third party, even if present, does not actively do something (e.g., confer gifts) to evoke asūyā in one of the remaining two parties.

Like jealousy, asūyā, īrṣyā, and mātsarya can occur as part of romantic relations in which case they are spoken of as varieties of māna or love-anger. As regards consequent responses, destructive, damaging action and defamation stem both from envy and asūyā. Likewise, frustration, taking offense, verbal arguments, and blaming can occur both in jealousy and īrṣyā. Similar to jealousy from emotional fidelity, asūyā, īrṣyā, and mātsarya (when occurring within the purview of māna) have a female predilection. Like envy, asūyā and īrṣyā are both associated with resentment and like jealousy, even asūyā is related with the experience of anger.

Garva and related mental states can be compared and contrasted with pride. Like pride, garva can result from a range of accomplishments – academic (e.g., superior knowledge), social (e.g., being born in an exalted lineage, amassing wealth), moral (e.g., generosity in the uddhata personality) and interpersonal (e.g., being able to get things done by

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others because of one‟s authority, being praised by others for one‟s positive qualities). It is possible to correlate authentic, achievement-oriented pride with the udātta character‟s experience of garva. As evident from the analysis of the vignette verse for vrīḍā, the udātta character‟s garva cannot really be called so. It is in fact the right knowledge that follows correct assessment of trait adequacy for a task at hand. Hubristic pride, narcissism, and narcissistic personality can be matched with the uddhata character‟s garva (i.e., garva as a delimited experience), śauṇḍīrya (i.e. excessive garva as a unique trait), and sthāyibhāva of garva (i.e., garva as an enduring mental state that defines personality) respectively. Bodily responses such as chest thrust forwards, raised cheeks, and head held high are found both in garva and pride. Aggressive behaviors (such as mocking at others and speaking harshly to them) and boastfulness that are listed among the consequent responses of garva correlate with those resulting from hubristic pride.

A comparison of vrīḍā and related mental states with their corresponding self-conscious emotions, namely, shame, guilt, embarrassment, shyness, modesty, and humility highlights an overlap of concepts. It is possible that different stimulus-response pairs or “mini-narratives”

(Hogan, 2003, p. 83) of vrīḍā may account for different self-conscious emotions. For example, the stimulus-response pair of „meeting a stranger – covering one‟s face‟ may communicate modesty just as „being praised in public – hanging one‟s head down‟ may embarrassment. Likewise, „being in the presence of elders – hanging one‟s head down‟ may be commensurate with humility and „failure – hanging head down‟ with shame. The following conclusions emerge when a prototypical script of shame (Fischer & Tangney, 1995) based on the North American concept of that emotion is compared and contrasted with the antecedents, consequents, and self-control procedures related to vrīḍā:



Antecedents of vrīḍā that match with those for shame: committing an improper act and transgressing elders (with deplorable action); not keeping up one‟s promise and not

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resisting somebody when one should have (with dishonourable action); defeat (with evidencing a characteristic that is deplorable); remorse and the knowledge of having committed an improper act (with self witnessing the deplorable action); and anticipation of being evalued negatively by others (with others judging the self negatively). Saying something deplorable (that features in the script for shame) can be subsumed under committing an improper act.



Consequent responses of vrīḍā that match with those for shame: lowering the head; covering the face; brooding (with preoccupation); absence of confidence/boldness (with feeling powerless); turning aside (with turning away); avoiding going out and concealing oneself (with escaping from judgment and observation); and shrinking of citta (with a sense of shrinking).



Self-control procedures relating to vrīḍā that match with those for shame: dissimulation (with disgusing one‟s negative action, statement, or characteristic)



Antecedents of vrīḍā that do not match with those for shame: being praised; unfamiliarity; meeting somebody for the first time; presence of a male; awkwardness/defect; love; accidental exposure to others of the telltale signs (such as nail marks) that indicate one‟s lovemaking; and sexual desire



Consequent responses of vrīḍā that do not match with those for shame: drawing lines on the ground; touching one‟s garment or finger ring; breaking the tips of one‟s nails; covering one‟s limbs; blushing or altered bodily glow; scratching the eyebrows; touching one‟s ears; speaking indistinctly; and restlessness/inability to stand still in one place.



Antecedents of shame that are not shared by vrīḍā: none



Consequent responses of shame that are not shared by vrīḍā: strking out at the person observing a flaw

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

Self-control procedures for shame that are not shared by vrīḍā: trying to change negative action, statement, or characteristic.

This exercise of comparing and contrasting vrīḍā with shame reveals that every aspect of the former has a match in the latter‟s script. However, there are many aspects to vrīḍā that are not found in the script for shame, indicating thereby that the concept of vrīḍā includes the North American concept of shame plus something else. This „something else‟ possibly overlaps with the concept of embarrassment. Thus, the prototypical script for embarrassment (Parrott & Smith, 1991) includes antecedent items such as (a) unfamiliar role or surroundings; (b) presence of other person(s); (c) giving the appearance of defect; (d) something private and intimate becoming public; and (e) oneself becoming the center of attention that correlate respectively with the antecedents of vrīḍā, namely, (a) unfamiliarity; (b) presence of a male; (c) awkwardness/defect; (d) accidental exposure to others of the telltale signs that indicate lovemaking; and (e) being praised. Embarrassment‟s script also includes fidgetiness – a response that has parallels with restlessness and actions such as touching one‟s garment or finger ring that are seen in vrīḍā.

Sanskrit aestheticians appear to employ specific Sanskrit words to designate vrīḍā that is communicated by particular stimulus-response pairs. Thus, vrīḍā that is communicated through embarrassment-specific stimulus-response pairs goes by the name of „vailakṣya‟

(„appearing out of place – smile‟) or „hrī‟ („being praised in public – hanging one‟s head down‟; „one‟s sexual secrets becoming exposed – remaining silent‟) and that communicated through modesty-specific stimulus-response pairs by the name of vinaya.326 Śālīnatva can be 326 An example from a Sanskrit drama illustrating vailakṣya was provided above under Footnote no. 264. The following example illustrates embarrassment (vrīḍā, going by the name of „hrī‟): svedaḥ kapole ślathatā dukūle kimetadityāligiraṃ nipīya |

darānamatkandharabandhurāṅgī tūṣṇīṃ kuraṅgīnayaneyamāste || (R.Vi, Ch.3, p. 38) Translation: “There are sweat drops on your cheek and your dress is loose. What is the matter?” – listening to these words of her friend, the doe-eyed girl bent her head down and remained silent.

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correlated with the personality trait of shyness. Vrīḍā resulting from evaluation of the type

“This was not supposed to have been done by me but I have still done it” (see 4.2.3, Footnote no. 200) that is about a specific behavior can be understood as akin to guilt.

How do the indigenous models of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā derived from Sanskrit poetics compare and contrast with contemporary psychological models of and approaches to emotions, self-conscious emotions, and other psychological concepts (personality, personality traits, goals, etc.)?

Of the three indigenous models that have been employed in the study, model 3 bears a close affinity with the cognitive appraisal model of self-conscious emotions proposed by Tracy and Robins (2004, 2007). Self-awareness, self-representation, self-identity, and goals are common elements found in both models. However, while the cognitive appraisal model restricts itself to self-conscious emotions, model 3, based on Bhoja‟s understanding of mental states in the backdrop of personality typology, is applicable to all mental states. A second difference is that the cognitive appraisal model relates to real-life people and situations whereas Bhoja‟s model is primarily a tool to understand and analyze the mental states of literary characters. It can be argued, however, that Bhoja‟s model holds good for real-life situations too because it derives from the assumptions of Samkhya philosophy that is concerned with the mundane and not, literary, world. A third difference is that the cognitive-appraisal model alludes to identity-relevant goals whereas the indigenous model concerns itself with four long-term personality-relevant life-goals. In model 3, personality is the decisive factor as regards goal, goal-congruent and goal-incongruent objects, object-relevant actions, traits facilitating actions, and self-identity based either on traits or actions. Thus, both life-goals (and intermittent goals that lead to the attainment of life-goals) and self-identity have an identical source in personality. Bhoja‟s theory anticipates the relationship between goals and traits in the manner of McCabe and Fleeson (2016). The 24 commonly shared traits

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listed by Bhoja match with the 24 personality strengths of Peterson and Seligman (2004) not only in their number but also to a great extent in their form. Some items in the list of personality strengths find their correspondence among the unique traits of udātta and śānta character types. Table 4.31 compares several of the personality traits listed by Bhoja with personality strengths.

Table 4.31

Matching personality traits (Bhoja) with personality strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) Personality trait

Personality strength

Artistic aptitude

Creativity

Exalted nationhood

Citizenship

Learning

Love of learning

Bravery

Spatiotemporal propriety of thought and behavior

Self-regulation

Ability to accurately decode others‟ expressive behaviors

Social intelligence

Exalted enterprise

Vitality

Friendship

Love

Perspective

Wisdom

Generosity

Kindness

Absence of self-depreciatory talk

Hope

Gratitude (unique trait of udātta character)

Gratitude

Modesty (unique trait of udātta character)

Modesty

Moral character (unique trait of udātta character)

Integrity

Forbearance (unique trait of śānta character)

Forgiveness and mercy

Disincliniation to enjoy worldly pleasures (unique trait of Spirituality śānta character)

Moving from mental states to personality, one can draw comparisons between Bhoja‟s and Fromm‟s (1947/2002) theories. Fromm‟s non-productive orientations correlate with the uddhata and lalita characters. The uddhata character whose life-goal is the acquisition of material wealth is comparable with the exploiting orientation whereas he/she with the life-goal of protecting and augmenting material wealth is akin to the hoarding orientation. The lalita character whose life-goal is worldly enjoyment bears similarity with the receiving orientation. The udātta character mirrors Fromm‟s productive orientation. The śānta character can be regarded as a productive orientation that is singularly relevant to the Indian context.

Whereas the udātta character is productive within the confines of this world, the śānta

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character is productive in a deeper sense of attaining eternal freedom from the ultimately displeasurable world of objects. Another point of similarity between Bhoja‟s and Fromm‟s theories is that the former‟s character types are, like the latter‟s productive and unproductive orientations, „“ideal types”‟ (Fromm, 1947/2002, p. 61). According to Sanskrit aestheticians, only the primary character of a narrative must represent an ideal; the secondary characters need not. The secondary characters exemplify, in Fromm‟s words, the “blends of various orientations” (Fromm, 1947/2002, p. 112). Table 4.32 presents the correlation between Bhoja‟s character personality types and Fromm‟s orientations.

Table 4.32

Correlating Bhoja’s character personality types with Fromm’s orientations Character personality type (Bhoja) Orientation (Fromm)

Udhhata (object-acquiring)

Non-productive - exploiting

Uddhata (object-protecting and -

Non-productive - hoarding

augmenting)

No correspondence327

Non-productive - marketing

Lalita

Non-productive – receiving

Udātta

Productive

Śānta

No correspondence

From a narrative methodology point-of-view, model 1 can be understood as limiting itself to isolated „mini-narratives‟ (Hogan, 2003) of mental states such as garva; according to model 2, mini-narratives of vyabhicāribhāva-s such as garva are embedded within the mini-narratives of sthāyibhāva-s such as krodha (anger) and furthermore, mini-narratives of mental states interact with one another by forging a variety of relationships with one another; from the perspective of model 3, the possible number of mini-narratives through which mental states such as garva can be inferred in a character is limited by his/her personality type as well as spatio-temporal propriety. From a social constructionist perspective, the stimulus-response pairs (i.e., mini-naratives) suggesting a literary character‟s mental state such as 327 According to Fromm (1947/2002, p. 67), “the marketing orientation developed as a dominant one only in the modern era”; accordingly, no correspondence exists to the marketing orientation in Bhoja‟s classification.

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garva can be regarded as resembling the social emotion scripts for that mental state. Literary characters can breach mini-narratives just as real-world individuals can breach social scripts.

Sanskrit aestheticians refer to the mental state that is suggested by a breached mini-narrative as the „semblance‟ („ābhāsa‟) of that mental state in order to distinguish it from its „genuine‟

counterpart that is suggested by a standard mini-narrative. Breaching of a mental state‟s mini-narrative can occur under the following two conditions: (a) when the stimulus that evokes a character‟s mental state is unconventional and (b) when the character in which the mental state emerges is not the conventional substratum for that mental state.328 To illustrate with an example, Parashurama‟s bragging about his savage act of cutting Kshatriya fetuses into pieces (See under 4.3.2.5 in the discussion relating to Parashurama‟s unique trait of boastfulness) suggests a „semblance‟ of garva because it stems from the unconventional stimulus of savagery (that, however, is wrongly evaluated by the character as physical prowess). Model 2 can be compared with a dynamical systems approach to multiple emotions, albeit in literary characters rather than real-life individuals. In their study on the dynamics of multiple emotions, Chakraborty and Konar (2009) arouse multiple emotions in their experiment subjects by exciting them with a base emotion and then superimposing the latter with other relatively short-lived emotions. Sanskrit poets do the same with their characters. They set the stage by evoking long-lasting sthāyibhāvas (e.g., anger) in a character and then allow several relatively short-lasting vyabhicāribhāva-s (e.g., intolerant envy, pride, rage, vindictiveness) to populate the former‟s context and relate with one another in a temporal succession where the evocation of one mental state presupposes the evocation of another mental state in an earlier moment.

328 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 177: ābhāsaḥ punareteṣāmasthāne vṛttito bhavet

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**4.5 Discussion **

The three objectives of this study that were spelt out in the beginning of this chapter have been addressed above. The analysis incorporates textual documentation, application of three indigenous models to examine and understand character mental states as communicated through vignette verses and their immediate as well as distant contexts, and a comparative evaluation of concepts related to the target indigenous mental states and their corresponding categories in contemporary psychology. The documentation is based on 17 primary texts dealing with Sanskrit poetics, three texts on dramaturgy and music, Abhinavagupta‟s commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra, and rarely cited texts that are extant only as manuscripts.

Textually documented information under each of the three target mental states have been grouped under nine headings such as definitions, list of antecedents, and list of consequents.

As regards the analysis of the vignette verses, it is important to appreciate the following point in the context of model 3. Verses relating to two different character types, uddhata and udātta

– exemplified by Parashurama and Rama respectively – have been analyzed to drive home the message that a difference in life-goals makes different individuals (or literary character) experience altogether different sets of mental states. To dwell a bit more on this point, mental states, according to Bhoja, are markers of life-goals. In other words, it is possible to predict what an individual‟s life-goal is and whether they are fixed or changing from time to time on the basis of knowledge about his/her mental states. Some mental states (such as satisfaction/

emotional self-control) indicate that an individual is closer to spiritual liberation whereas others (such as erroneous knowledge, garva, and asūyā) indicate that he/she is farther away from spiritual liberation, purusuing rather the life-goals of material prosperity or material enjoyment. Mental states such as joy (and vrīḍā, discussed below) are experienced by individuals pursuing any of the four life-goals. However, the stimulus that evokes it is not the same for all of them. This difference in stimulus that evokes a given mental state also informs

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us about individuals‟ different goals. Thus, the joy of someone pursuing material prosperity may be evoked by others‟ misfortune whereas that of someone else pursuing ethical conduct, by others‟ accomplishment of their life-goals.

In the specific case of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā, it can be concluded that these mental states don‟t just indicate to an individual the life-goal of his/her pursuit; they also inform the individual his/her relative position to others as regards success or failure in achieving a life-goal that he/she shares in common with them. Table 4.33 lists the life-goals whose pursuit correlates with the experience of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā. It also makes explicit the self-evaluation vis-à-vis social others that is active in the experience of these three mental states.

Table 4.33

Life-goals and self-evaluations related to the experience of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā

Mental state Life-goal

the Self-evaluation that is active in the mental

mental state

state („A‟ is a hypothetical other)

Asūyā

Material prosperity (artha), “„A‟ is ahead of me in the pursuit of wealth material enjoyment (kāma)

and happiness”

Garva

Material prosperity, material “I am ahead of „A‟ in the pursuit of wealth enjoyment

and happiness”

Vrīḍā

Material prosperity, material “I am lagging behind „A‟ in the pursuit of enjoyment, ethical conduct wealth and happiness”

(dharma), spiritual liberation “I was ahead of „A‟ in the pursuit of wealth (mokṣa)

and happiness. Now I am lagging behind

„A‟”

“I was on par with ethical others such as „A‟

in acting according to scriptural injunctions.

Now I am lagging behind them”

“I was on par with spiritual others such as

„A‟ in withdrawing myself from the world

of objects. Now I am lagging behind them”

Finally, comparing and contrasting asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā with the corresponding self-conscious emotions from contemporary psychology reveals conceptual divergences and convergences at the more fundamental levels of sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s on the one hand and the basic and self-conscious emotions on the other. Conceptual overlaps and differences also exist between asūyā and the related mental states of īrṣyā and mātsarya with

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envy and jealousy; garva and the related mental state of śauṇḍīrya with authentic pride, hubristic pride, narcissism, and narcissistic personality; and vrīḍā and the related mental states of vailakṣya, hrī, vinaya, and śālīnatva with shame, embarrassment, guilt, humility, and modesty.

To conclude, the thesis presents an indigenous understanding based on Sanskrit poetics of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā - mental states that correspond to categories studied in contemporary psychology under the umbrella of self-conscious emotions. In doing so, the study isolates three models for understanding mental states by gathering their constituent elements that lie scattered in the primary texts of Sanskrit poetics. Additionally, the thesis also employs them for analyzing vignette verses supplied by aestheticians to illustrate the three target mental states. Can these models be brought down from their aesthetic pedestal and applied to an understanding of mental states experienced by real-world people caught up in mundane situations? This is a topic that shall be touched upon in the concluding chapter.

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