3.1 Preamble
Reiterating from the literature review, there are no studies that have analyzed asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā – the three mental states (bhāva-s) this thesis focuses on – within an interdisciplinary framework that brings together contemporary psychology and traditional Sanskrit poetics. An important objective of this study is to gain an understanding of the concepts that underlie three mental states - asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā – documented in Sanskrit poetics and thereby contributing to the growing knowledge base of Indian psychology. This is a prerequisite for achieving the second objective, namely, comparing and contrasting the target mental states with their corresponding self-conscious emotions from modern psychology. Towards realizing the above-mentioned objectives, the following two sets of data shall been chosen: (1) textual documentation from Sanskrit poetics and (2) vignette verses that Sanskrit aestheticians quote for the purpose of illustrating mental states such as asūyā.
As will be explained below in greater detail, this study engages with textually documented data in a dual sense. Firstly, and narrowly speaking, it seeks to bring under one roof what different Sanskrit aestheticians have to say about asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā.
Secondly, and more importantly, it also aims to explicate the analytical tools that Sanskrit poetics equips us with for the purpose of understanding narratively represented mental states.
In doing so, the study moves beyond the confines of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā, venturing into the more basic category of mental state itself and its relationship to a literary character‟s personality. Having identified the relevant analytical tools from Sanskrit poetics, the study shall employ them to make sense of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā as they are communicated in and through vignette verses. Given the nature of the study‟s data, namely, historically placed and [[44]] culture-specific texts that must be both interpreted and analyzed, a qualitative approach is aptly suited for the task at hand.
It is important to mention here that though Sanskrit aestheticians provide us the analytical tools with which mental states of literary characters can be understood as well as supply vignette verses that illustrate those mental states, they are at best sketchy in their analysis of such verses. To examine vignette verses in detail, one may have to situate them in their broader context wherever feasible. This implies including in one‟s analysis larger sections of the narratives from which the verses have been selected. By incorporating these crucial concerns, the study demonstrates how Sanskrit poetics can aid us in understanding narrative mental states both at the micro-level (an isolated vignette verse) and the macro-level (the narrative context as a whole).
3.2 Documented textual data on asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā
As pointed out above, this study shall collate documented textual data on asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā from Sanskrit poetics. The following 17 primary texts on Sanskrit poetics(enumerated here in their historical order) shall be consulted for the purpose: Nāṭyaśāstra by Bharata (c. 2nd century BC to c. 2nd century AD), Daśarūpaka by Dhananjaya (10th century AD), Śṛṅgāraprakāśa and Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa by Bhoja (11th century AD), Bhāvaprakāśana by Sharadatanaya (12th century AD), Kāvyānuśāsana by Hemachandra (12th century AD), Nāṭyadarpaṇa by Ramachandra and Gunachandra (12th century AD), Rasakalikā by Rudra Bhatta (12th century AD), Sāhityadarpaṇa by Vishvanatha (14th century AD), Rasārṇavasudhākara by Singabhupala (14th century), Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa by Vidyanatha (14th century), Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu and Ujjvalanīlamaṇi by Rupa Gosvamin (15th century AD), Alaṅkārakaustubha by Kavikarnapura (16th century AD), Rasataraṅgiṇī by Bhanudatta (16th century AD), Rasagaṅgādhara by Jagannatha (17th century AD), and Rasavilāsa of Bhudeva Shukla (17th century). In addition to the above-mentioned texts on [[45]] Sanskrit poetics, the study shall frequently allude to Sharngadeva‟s (13th century AD) Saṅgītaratnākara and sometimes to Kumbhakarna‟s (15th century AD) Saṅgītarāja and Nandikeshvara‟s (circa. 6th century AD) Abhinayadarpaṇa, allied works that deal with dramaturgy and/or music. Among commentaries, it shall frequently refer to Abhinavagupta (10th-11th century AD) Abhinavabhāratī on the Nāṭyaśāstra. Rarely, it shall call our attention to commentaries on other texts.1 And last but not least, the study shall consult Kavi‟s (1951) Bharatakoṣa, a Sanskrit encyclopedia of dramaturgical and musical terms that provides citations from rare and often unpublished texts (extant in manuscripts) such as Bhāvaviveka and Vināyakabharata.2
The rationale for choosing the above-mentioned texts can be summed up as follows -
The texts represent a wide historical spectrum of work on Sanskrit poetics and therefore capture successive contributions of aestheticians towards understanding mental states communicated through literary works.
Among the texts chosen for this study, a few are foundational, some are commentaries on the foundational texts, others offer new insights, some elaborate on or simplify concepts presented in the foundational texts, yet others add to the bulk of theoretical data, some deal at length with specific topics related to the study, and a couple of them fulfill two or more of the criteria mentioned above.
It is possible to group textually documented details on asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā under the following heads:
Definitions: Most of the texts mentioned above provide definitions of narratively represented mental states, including asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā. Bhanudatta frequently 1 Such commentaries shall be mentioned as and when something is quoted from them.
2 Kavi describes Bhāvaviveka as “a small book written by a Malayāḷi whose name is not mentioned” and that
“consists of beautiful definitions on bhāvas” (Bh.K, p. xxv). Vināyakabharata is a recent text of unknown authorship that faithfully documents contemporary practices in expressive dramaturgy (Bh.K, p. 612)
[[46]]
substantiates the veracity of his definitions by pointing out how they are free of both over-and under-inclusiveness.
List of antecedents: Antecedents (vibhāva-s) of mental states can be classified into two groups, primary antecedents (ālambanavibhāva-s) and accessory antecedents (uddīpanavibhāva). Primary antecedents are stimuli without which a mental state cannot even arise. A mental state that has arisen following exposure to the primary antecedent persists as a memory trace.3 Accessory antecedents are stimuli that allow mental states existing as memory traces to surface.4 Alternatively, the accessory antecedents may also strengthen a mental state that has been evoked.5 They are situational factors. To understand a further subgrouping of primary antecedents, it is important to first acquaint ourselves with what are the substratum (āśraya) and object (viṣaya) of a mental state. According to Bhoja, the substratum of a mental state is either a person or an animal.6 It is in the substratum that a mental state arises.7 Likewise, the object of a mental state is a person, an animal, or a nonliving thing.8 It is at the object that a mental state is directed.9 The substratum and the object of a mental state can themselves function as the mental state‟s primary antecedents.
Furthermore, anything that is related to the substratum or the object of a mental state can also don the role of primary antecedent. Table 3.1 elucidates what has been described above by taking an instance of fear as example. In this example, the fear that a child experiences on hearing about ghosts persists as a memory trace waiting to surface at nightfall. The fear evoked in this manner undergoes strengthening when the child hears hooting owls and howling dogs.
3 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 628: - - - ālambanavibhāvaḥ - - - | tena - - - saṃskāro jāyate 4 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 629: saṃskārapratibodhahetavaḥ punaruddīpanavibhāvāḥ
5 The progressive strengthening of a mental state through the sequential addition of elements such as accessory antecedents is described below under 3.3.2 below.
6 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 1006: tatrāśrayastridhā pumān strī tiryagādayaḥ
7 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1320: yasyotpadyate sa āśrayaḥ
8 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 1008: viṣayastridhā cetanastiryagacetanaśca 9 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, p. 1321: yasmin - - - utpadyate sa viṣayaḥ
[[47]]
Table 3.1
Substratum, object, primary antecedent, and accessory antecedent in an instance of fear Antecedents of a mental state and associated Example
conceptual categories
Substratum of mental state
Child
Object of mental state
Ghost
Primary antecedent of mental state
a)
Something related to the substratum
Young age
b)
Something related to the object
Hearing about ghosts
Accessory antecedent that awakens a mental Nightfall
state existing as memory trace
Accessory antecedent that strengthens an already Hearing hooting of owls and howling of evoked mental state
dogs
Bharata does not categorize antecedents into the above-mentioned groups. Aestheticians such as Jagannatha separately enumerate these two groups of antecedents only while dealing with the enduring mental states. Bhoja, however, makes this distinction even while listing the antecedents of transient mental states such as the ones chosen for this study.
List of consequents: Consequents (anubhāva-s) follow a mental state and can be regarded as effects/responses stemming from the latter. They are classified into four groups: vāgārambha (verbal/vocal), gātrārambha (physical), cittārambha (mental, includes the verbal report of a mental state as well as psychophysical reactions such as perspiration and tear flow), and buddhyārambha (modulated by the intellect).10
10 Wonder (adbhuta), for example, is expressed through the following anubhāva-s: (1) verbal reactions such as saying “Wow!” or „Bravo!”, making sounds with ballooned cheeks, laughing loudly, shouting in joy, singing, and raising/lowering one‟s voice; (2) physical reactions such as rotating fingers or cloth piece, getting up repeatedly and jumping, donating gifts, dancing, embracing another person, patting another person‟s palm with one‟s own; (3) mental and psychophysical reactions such as attending to an object and concentrating on it, expanded eyes, bright countenance, shedding tears of joy, gooseflesh, and fixed, unblinking stare (B.P, Ch. 3, pp. 65, 66: dhyānaṃ nayanavistāraḥ prāsādo vadane dṛśi | ānandāśru saromāñcamanimeṣāvalokanam; aniścalatvaṃ manaso yasmāttanmānaso’dbhutaḥ | celāṅgulīnāṃ bhramaṇamutthāyotthāya valganam; dānaprabandho naṭanamāśleṣaśca parasparam | parasparasya bhujayoḥ parasparatalāhatiḥ ; evamādivikāro yaḥ sa bhavedāṅgiko’dbhutaḥ
|
hāhākāraḥ
sādhuvādaḥ
kapolāsphālanadhvaniḥ;
uccairhāso
harṣaghoṣau
gītamuccāvacaṃ vacaḥ | evamādivikāro yaḥ sa bhavedvāciko’dbhutaḥ); one can intellectually modulate responses by employing specific phonetic sounds or through atypical physical actions - Sanskrit aestheticians recommend, for example, that sounds such as ś, ṣ, ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh, kkh, cch, jjh, kr, and rk be used profusely when poets, through their characters, want to communicate the mental states of anger, disgust, or perseverance (S.Dar, Ch. 8, P. 428: vīrabībhatsaraudreṣu - - - vargasyādyatṛtīyābhyāṃ yuktau varṇau tadantimau; uparyadho dvayorvā sarephau ṭaṭhaḍaḍhaiḥ saha | śakāraśca ṣakāraśca - - -; compare: “Within literary studies, many have
[[48]]
List of enduring mental states in whose context asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā can occur transiently: Starting with Bharata, Sanskrit aestheticians have enumerated probable transient mental states that can strengthen an enduring mental state by springing up in its context. It is therefore possible to catalogue the enduring mental states in whose backdrop asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā can feature as transient states.
List of other mental states in whose context asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā can figure: Though the prevalent view is that the enduring mental states alone can frame the larger context of transient mental states, Bhoja extends that privilege to all mental states. In other words, each of the 49 mental states that he enumerates is capable of bringing an array of other transient mental states within its fold and graduating to the level of an enduring mental state.
His list, therefore, of the mental states in whose context asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā can figure is bigger than the one traditionally provided.
List of other mental states that can arise in the context of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā: From Bhoja‟s viewpoint, it is easy to understand that just as asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā can emerge in the larger context of other mental states, other mental states too can emerge in the larger context of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā.
Evocation and expression of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā in different character types: Bhoja classifies all important literary characters into the uddhata, lalita, udātta, and śānta likewise noted correspondences between sounds and emotions. Fónagy (1961), for example, compared aggressive and tender poems by the Hungarian poet Petöfi and found that /t/, /k/, and /r/ were more frequent in aggressive poems, while /l/, /m/, and /n/ were more frequent in tender poems”; Majid, 2012, p. 424); as an example of how physical responses triggered by mental states can be modulated by intellect, Bhoja quotes the following verse – one in which a clever girl expresses anger towards her lover by behaving courteously.
ekatrāsanasaṃsthitiḥ parihṛtā pratyudgamāddūratastāmbūlānayanacchalena rabhasāśleṣo’pi saṃvighnitaḥ |
ālāpo’pi na miśritaḥ parijanaṃ vyāpāratyantyāntike kāntaṃ pratyupācārataścaturayā kopaḥ kṛtārthīkṛtaḥ || (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p. 970; Source: Amaruśataka, 18)
Translation: Under the pretext of getting up to greet me from afar, she avoided sitting with me on the same seat.
Under the pretext of fetching betel leaves to chew, she prevented me from giving her a quick hug. Under the pretext of giving instructions to her servants, she evaded talking to me. In this way, the clever girl expressed her anger towards me even as she performed her duty.
[[49]]
types. Some of these character types cannot be narratively depicted as being the substratum of asūyā and garva.
Terms that are conceptually related to asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā: Such terms may be employed as near synonyms of the target mental states or in a more specialized sense. The following terms shall be included in the study – „īrṣyā‟, „mātsarya‟ (under asūyā);
„ahaṅkāra‟/‟ahaṅkṛti‟, „abhimāna‟, „māna‟, „mada‟, „darpa‟, „śauṇḍīrya‟, „avalepa‟, „smaya‟,
„uddhasita‟, and „auddhatya‟ (under garva); and „lajjā‟, „trapā‟, „vinaya‟, „vailakṣya‟, „hrī‟,
„mandākṣa‟, and śālīnatva (under vrīḍā).
Miscellaneous details including gender specificity, etymological details, and specialized gestural representation: The evocation of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā (as well as mental states denoted by conceptually related terms) from specific antecedents and their expression through particular consequent responses can be mediated by gender. Among Sanskrit aestheticians, Sharadatanaya devotes sufficient space for providing etymological details of mental state words. Vināyakabharata has verses dealing with the specialized gestural representation of mental states, including asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā, on the stage.
3.3 Tools from Sanskrit poetics for understanding narrative mental states
****How does one understand narrative mental states, i.e., mental states that are ascribed to literary characters and communicated by literary works to their audience? A close examination of the history of Sanskrit poetics helps us explicate three different models that Indian aestheticians have relied upon in order to answer this question. The basic assumptions on which the three models stand are as follows -
Model 1: In any literary work, it is possible to identify and isolate individual mental states Model 2: In any literary work, mental states occur in the context of their dynamic interaction with other mental states.
[[50]]
Model 3: In any literary work, the evocation and expression of the same mental states differs from one character type to another.
These three models pave way for three methods of understanding narratively represented mental states. Model 1 provides for understanding decontextualized mental states, model 2 for understanding mental states in the context of other mental states, and model 3 for understanding mental states by invoking character typology. Historically speaking, model 1 is the earliest since Abhinavagupta criticizes it in favor of model 2. Model 3, the latest, finds its complete expression in Bhoja although an important connection this model makes between a character‟s life-goals and his/her mental states is already envisaged by Abhinavagupta.11 Below, the three models shall be elaborated separately.
**3.3.1 Model 1 **
**Aestheticians such as Singabhupala and Rupa Gosvamin adopt this model. After defining each mental state and providing a non-exhaustive list of its antecedent stimuli and consequent responses, they illustrate it with vignette verses. These verses are usually taken from well-known literary sources. At times, however, aestheticians themselves make up such verses. Verses may also be provided taking antecedent causes into account. Thus one verse may illustrate pride due to learning, another due to youth and beauty, a third due to physical prowess, and so on. According to the first model, it is possible to separate out portions (such as a verse) of a literary text and understand them as communicating individual, isolated mental states to the audience. To be able to pinpoint the mental state that occurs in a specific narrative juncture, one must access information about what antecedent stimulus and consequent response feature in that juncture. It is from the knowledge of such stimulus-response pairs - what Hogan (2003, p. 83) refers to as “mini-narratives”– that we gain access, 11“Some mental states are primary because they are dependent on life-goals” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 276: tatra puruṣārthaniṣṭhāḥ kāścitsaṃvida ityeva pradhānam); “Through their subservience to the primary mental states, even other mental states may be indirectly related to life-goals” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 276: ratyādyaṅgatayā tu pumarthopayogitvamapi syādeṣām) **
[[51]]
even in our everyday lives, to the inner, otherwise inaccessible, mental states of real-life others. For reasons stated below, it is possible to communicate a single mental state, both in real-life and literature, through several mini-narratives. Firstly, the list of antecedent stimuli and consequent responses related to a mental state is never exhaustive. In other words, it is not possible to enumerate all the causes that can trigger a mental state and likewise, all the responses that can result from it. Bharata is therefore careful in keeping his list of antecedents and consequents open-ended.12 Secondly, even if we hypothesize a finite list of antecedent stimuli and consequent responses for a mental state, the number of possible mini-narratives that can be arrived at by combining them in different ways is likely to be big. Vignette verses that illustrate specific mental states do so by invoking one of the several mini-narratives through which such mental states can be communicated. Quite often, a verse that communicates a mental state may do so without explicitly describing either the antecedent stimulus or the consequent response. In such cases, the audience can and do fill gaps in their knowledge of the mini-narrative by supplying whatever is missing, be it stimulus or response.13 In doing so, they make sure what is supplied by them is consonant with what is directly known through the verses.14
12 This is evident from Bharata‟s use of the word „ādi‟ („etc.‟) after every enumeration of antecedent stimuli and consequent responses.
13 Though, for the sake of simplicity, one could take a mental state as capable of being communicated through a stimulus-response pair, a distinction must be made in this regard between the transient and enduring mental states. To communicate the former, it suffices if the audience is informed about a stimulus-response pair. To communicate the latter, however, an extra piece of information other than a stimulus-response pair must be provided. This extra piece of information pertains to accompanying transient mental states. In other words, authors communicate transient mental states to their audience by invoking descriptions of stimuli and/or responses. Likewise, they communicate enduring mental states by invoking descriptions of one or all of the following three elements – stimulus, response, and transient mental states. In verses that communicate a transient mental state, an overt description of stimulus or response may be missing. Similarly, in verses that communicate an enduring mental state, an overt description of stimulus, response, or transient mental states may be missing. In either case, the audience extrapolates whatever is missing, ensuring thereby that the communication process is realized despite the information provided by a verse being incomplete. When Sanskrit aestheticians analyze vignette verses that do not provide information on stimulus, response, or transient mental states, they too employ the same strategy (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 35: yatra kvacidekasmādeva - - - rasabodhastatretara-dvayamākṣepyam). As an example of how this strategy works, the following verse provided by Jagannatha for illustrating the mental state of recollection (smṛti) can be examined.
tanmañju mandahasitaṃ śvasitāni tāni sā vai kalaṅkavidhurā madhurānanaśrīḥ |
[[52]]
Abhinavagupta criticizes the practice of supplying vignette verses to illustrate specific mental states. According to him, it is unlikely that an isolated mental state pervades such verses throughout. To quote from Abhinavabhāratī (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 302),
“tena vyabhicāriṣu pṛthakpṛthagyatkaiścidudāhṛtaṃ tanna tantranyāyānupāti | tathā hi -
dhṛtau yadudāhṛtaṃ “asambhāvyaṃ devāt” ityādi tatrāpi harṣavismayagarvamatiprabhṛtīnāṃ
-
-
- ityādisūcitānāṃ sambhāra eva | - - - anyathā hi dhṛtyekavacanatve sarvatra ślokārthe dṛṣṭirekaiva citranyasteva bhavet | - - - ata eva vicchidya vicchidya vitarkāntaraṃ samudeti |”
-
sTranslation: “When some aestheticians attempt to illustrate each transient mental state with exemplary verses that are specific to it, they go against the tenets of this science.
Therefore, when one quotes the verse beginning with “asambhāvyaṃ devāt”15 as an example of the transient mental state satisfaction (dhṛti), it must be understood that other transient mental states such as joy (harṣa), wonder (vismaya), pride (garva), and rational discernment (mati) are also communicated through it. If that were not the case, i.e., if the whole verse were to communicate only satisfaction, the reader‟s experience would be static. The dynamism that results from one mental state following another would remain unrecognized”.16
A second criticism that Abhinavagupta levels at model 1 is about the trend of illustrating mental states stemming from different antecedent stimuli through separate vignette verses. The gist of his argument is that though a verse may overtly allude to only one antecedent stimulus, mental states such as love often stem from an aggregate of several adyāpi me hṛdayamunmadayanti hanta sāyantanāmbujasahodaralocanāyāḥ || (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 95; Source: composed by the aesthetician, Jagannatha, himself)
Translation: That pretty smile, those breaths, and that beautiful, blemish-free face of the maiden with eyes like a lotus in twilight make me mad to this day.
Commenting on this verse, Jagannatha notes that responses consequent to recollection such as raising the eyebrows and stillness of limbs (that are not part of the description) must be supplied by the audience themselves (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 96: bhrūnnatigātraniścalanatvādaya ākṣepagamyā anubhāvāḥ) 14 Kāvyapradīpa commentary on K.P, Ch. 4, p.72: ekaikenāpyākṣiptaikānuguṇetaradvayasacivena 15 According to Kangle (1973, p.256), the full verse is not available 16 Table 3.6 below provides definitions of transient mental states mentioned in this quote as well as of others
[[53]]
antecedent stimuli.17 Seen in this light, the practice of matching one vignette verse with one antecedent stimulus appears artificial and simplistic.
**3.3.2 Model 2 **
Model 2 can be regarded as an offshoot of Abhinavagupta‟s criticism of model 1.
According to it, the mental states of literary characters, as communicated to the audience by individual narrative junctures, exist in particular stages along their evolutionary trajectory.
These stages are determined by the specificity of relationship that a given mental state shares with other mental states. At a preliminary level, mental states can be classified under the transient and enduring categories. The enduring mental states, unlike the transient ones, are inherently capable of bringing many other mental states within their purview.18 Whereas other Sanskrit aestheticians list eight (or nine) specific mental states under the enduring and around 41 in the transient categories, Bhoja regards all mental states as capable of a transient or enduring existence. In other words, according to Bhoja, the same mental state, depending on the extent to which it is developed in a narrative, may or may not be capable of bringing other mental states under its jurisdiction. When capable, it dons the role of an enduring mental state; when not, of a transient one. After establishing whether a mental state is transient or enduring, one can further qualify it as existing in a particular stage. Transient 17 Abhinavagupta discusses this point in relation to the enduring mental state of love. Replying to the opponent who argues that the antecedent stimuli for love, namely, seeing a beautiful girl and being able to access objects of pleasure such as mansions and gardens may not occur at one and the same time (and therefore there is no harm in providing separate verses that illustrate love stemming from each antecedent cause), he concludes thus
“The aggregate of antecedent stimuli is always completely present” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 298: pūrṇataiva vibhāvavargasya”). A similar observation is made in relation to the enduring mental state of perseverance.
(A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 319: ete ca sampūrṇasvabhāvā eva vibhāvā bhavanti) 18 Some aestheticians, however, argue that even transient mental states can bring other transient mental states within their purview. To explicate further with an example, when „B‟, a hypothetical transient mental state, brings other transient mental states, say „C‟, „D‟, and „E‟, within its ambit, „B‟ must be regarded as relatively less transient and more enduring than „C‟, „D‟, and „E‟. At the same time, „B‟ may be one among the transient mental states occurring in the context of another mental state, „A‟. „B‟, in this case, is more transient and less enduring than „A‟. Here, „A‟ is the most enduring mental state whereas „C‟, „D‟, and „E‟ are the least enduring mental states; as regards „B‟, it occurs in between the most and the least enduring mental states (Quotation from Vipradasa in Bh.K, p. 437: nanu nirvedādayaḥ syuryathāṅgaṃ sthāyināṃ tathā; anye’pi yāntyaṅgabhāvaṃ
nirvedādestataḥ katham | sañcāriṇa iti jñeyā nirvedādestaducyate; nātra sañcāribhāvatvamanaṅgatvasya kāraṇam
| kintvaṅgatayā (? kintvaṅgatā yā) sā caiṣāṃ pradhānāpekṣayā bhavet; na svāṅgāpekṣayā tenāṅgitvaṃ svāṅgaiḥ
pravartatām | somāṅgabhūtasya paśoḥ puroḍāśo:‘ṅgatāṃ vrajet; tenāṅgyapi paśuḥ somasyāṅgatāṃ bhajate yathā
| tathā svāṅgairaṅgino:‘pi cintādyā vyabhicāriṇaḥ; aṅgaṃ rasasyāṅginaḥ syuḥ - - -) ** **
[[54]]
mental states may not bring other mental states within their ambit but they do interact with them. Depending on the dynamics of its interaction with other mental states, a transient mental state may be said to exist in one of the following stages: emergence of one transient mental state following the disappearance of another (udaya); disappearance of one transient mental state followed by emergence of another (śānti);19 co-emergence of one transient mental state with another (sandhi);20 and intermingling of several transient mental states (śabalatā) that may or may not be opposed to one another or that share the same antecedent stimulus and consequent response (and are therefore so interwoven with one another as to be incapable of being disentangled from one another).21 When two transient mental states co-emerge, both may disappear by suppressing one another (parasparābhibhava).22 Further complexity is accounted for by combinations of these stages in multiple ways. Kavikarnapura provides a numerical estimate of such combinations.23 Similar to transient mental states, those that are enduring can also be understood as existing in one of many stages. A close reading of discussions on this topic by Sanskrit aestheticians (especially Bhoja) can help 19 The disappearance of one mental state demands the emergence of another. Likewise, the emergence of one mental state demands disappearance of another (R.G, Ch.1, p.125: bhāvaśāntau bhāvāntarodayasya bhāvodaye vā pūrvam bhāvaśānterāvaśyakatvāt)
20 Co-emergence refers to two mental states emerging at the same time in the same individual. As observed by Nagesha Bhatta (18th century AD) in his commentary on R.G, the two mental states described as co-emerging actually emerge at two different moments in time but the interval between them is so minute that it doesn‟t actually matter (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 125: ekadeśavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaikakālavṛttitvarūpamityarthaḥ | sūkṣmabheda-stvakiñcitkara ityarthaḥ)
21 R.G, Ch. 1, pp. 124-126: bhāvasya - - - śāntirnāśaḥ; bhāvodayo bhāvasyotpattiḥ, bhāvasandhiranyonyā-nabhibhūtayoranyonyābhibhavanayogyayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam, bhāvaśabalatvaṃ bādhyabādhakabhāvam-āpannānāmudāsīnānāṃ vā vyāmiśraṇam. The occurrence of vrīḍā (equated with „shame‟) immediately after garva (equated with „pride‟) exemplifies a situation in which the mental state that follows is opposed to what precedes it. On the contrary, the occurrence of asūyā (equated with „envy‟) immediately after garva exemplifies a situation in which the mental state that follows is unopposed to what precedes it. When two transient mental states are described as „mutually unopposed‟, it means they serve the cause of a common enduring mental state.
As regards enduring mental states, Sanskrit aestheticians have listed which among them are mutually unopposed and mutually opposed. For example, love-disgust and love-mirth form mutually opposed and unopposed pairs respectively (R.G, Ch. 1, pp. 57-58: eteṣāṃ parasparaṃ kairapi sahāvirodhaḥ kairapi virodhaḥ | tatra - - -
śṛṅgārahāsyayoḥ - - avirodhaḥ | śṛṅgārabībhatsayoḥ - - - virodhaḥ | - - - rasapadenātra prakaraṇe tadupādhiḥ
sthāyibhāvo gṛhyate ); a vignette verse illustrating „intermingling‟ of mental states that share the same antecedent stimulus and consequent response is provided by Jagannatha in R.G, Vol. 1, pp. 115 - 116
22 In his Sanskrit commentary on Rasagaṅgādhara, Shastri (1947) notes that the depiction of two mental states mutually cancelling one another, though possible, does not account for charm (camatkāra) in a literary work (commentary on R.G, Ch. 1, p.125: “parasparābhibhūtayorbhāvayoḥ sandhau dvayoreva na camatkāraḥ”) 23 For example, he calculates that the four stages of udaya, śānti, sandhi, śabalatā can mutually combine in 16
different ways (Al.Kau, Ch. 5, p. 221)
[[55]]
explicate as many as10 stages, one of which an enduring mental state can exist in at a given narrative moment.24 Though Bhoja discusses these stages with respect to the mental state of love (rati), he makes it clear that they are equally applicable to other mental states as well.25
In the stage of „birth‟ („janma‟), a literary character‟s enduring mental state is (a) evoked by its primary antecedent stimulus for the very first time; (b) expressed through a minimally intense consequent response; and (3) accompanied by a single transient mental state. In the stage of „supplementation‟ („anubandha‟), an enduring mental state, already evoked by its primary antecedent stimulus, is (a) re-evoked by its accessory antecedent stimuli; (b) expressed through several and more intense consequent responses; and (c) accompanied by a small set of transient mental states. In the stage of „exuberance‟ („prakarṣa‟), an enduring mental state, re-evoked at frequent intervals by its primary antecedent stimulus and multiple accessory antecedent stimuli, is (a) expressed through many and maximally intense responses and (b) accompanied by a large set of transient mental states. A mental state is fully developed in this stage. In the stage of „contact‟ („samparka‟), one fully developed enduring mental state meets another fully developed one. The latter mental state may or may not be opposed to the former. However, both mental states must arise from discrete antecedents, give rise to discrete consequents, and be accompanied by a discrete set of transient mental states. In the stage of „merger‟ („saṃsarga‟), two enduring, fully developed mental states arise simultaneously. They share a common antecedent stimulus, a consequent response, or a 24 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 800: vibhāvājjanma bhāvānāmuddīpanavibhāvataḥ | anubandho’nubhāvebhyaḥ prakarṣa upajāyate; bhāvāntarānuṣaṅgastu sthāyinopadrave sati | samparkastu tayostulyabalabhāvottaro’nugaḥ; S.P, Vol.
1, Ch. 13, p. 802: tatrālambanavibhāvādutpannamātrā jātā, - - - utpatteranantaramuddīpanavibhāvai-ruddīpyamānā sānubandhatvādanubhandhinī, - - - satyanubandhe saṃskārasyānavaratapratibodhāt- - -
anubhāvaiḥ sañcāribhiḥ saṃsṛjyamānā prāptaprakarṣāvasthā prakṛṣṭā, - - - atha - - - tulyabalabhāvāntara-samparkiṇī sampṛktā, - - - balīyasā bhāvāntareṇābhibhūtāpi saṃskāramātreṇānuvartata ityanuvartinī; S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, pp. 910 - 912: tulyakālabalotpattihetau bhāvāntarodaye | saṃsargastasya yastena saṅkaraḥ sa nigadyate rasāntaratiraskārādanyarāgācca tasta yaḥ |bhavatyapacayo vṛddhestaddhrāsaṃ taṃ pracakṣate, balavatsūpajāteṣu pratikūleṣu hetuṣu | sarvātmanā samucchedaḥ praśamastasya varṇyate; āśrayātprakṛtervāpi saṃskārasthairyato’pi vā | yo’syātyantamavicchedaḥ sa śeṣa iti śabdyate 25 S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 946: ta ete - - - rasaprakārā hāsādiṣvapi prāyaśo dṛśyante
[[56]]
transient mental state and may or may not be mutually opposed.26 In the stage of „mixture‟
(„saṅkara‟), more than two enduring, fully developed, opposed or unopposed mental states undergo „merger‟.27 In the stage of „residue‟ („śeṣa‟) or „retracing‟ (anugama), a fully developed enduring mental state, though momentarily suppressed by another fully developed, opposed or unopposed mental state, reappears because its irrepressible memory trace or the substratum‟s personality forces it to do so. In the stage of „weakening‟ („hrāsa‟), a fully developed enduring mental state loses its intensity as a result of encountering another fully developed, enduring mental state that is opposed to the former. „Weakening‟ of an enduring mental state that is directed at a particular object also results from replacement of that object by a new one. In the stage of „subjugation‟ („praśama‟), a fully developed enduring mental state disappears altogether when another fully developed, more intense, and opposed enduring mental state invades its context. Finally, in the stage of „membership‟
(aṅgāṅgibhāva), one fully developed enduring mental state brings another unopposed, fully developed mental state within its purview.28 Table 3.2 lists the components (stimulus, response, and accompanying mental states) into which mental states (transient and enduring) can be analyzed in each of the stages discussed above. Additionally, Table 3.2 elucidates the stage-wise interactional dynamics among mental states using the hypothetical mental states
„A‟, „B‟, „C‟ „d‟, „e‟, „f‟, and „g‟ as examples. Here, „A‟, „B‟, and „C‟ stand for enduring mental states. The remaining hypothetical mental states, designated as „d‟, „e‟, „f‟, and „g‟, represent mental states that occur transiently in the overarching context of one or the other enduring mental state.
26 B.P, Ch. 6, p. 134: dvayoḥ praveśe saṃsargo bhāvo yadi samo bhavet** **
27This becomes evident when one examines instances of saṅkara in Bhoja‟s illustrative verses and his comments thereon (e.g., verses provided in S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, pp. 940, 964, 976, 978); B.P, Ch. 6, p. 134: dvitrāṇāmapi saṃsargasāmye saṅkara ucyate
28 Bh.R.Si, Ch. 4.8, p. 311: suhṛdāmiśraṇaṃ - - - | tasmādaṅgāṅgibhāvena melanaṃ - - - ; bhavenmukhyo:’thavā gauṇo raso:‘ṅgī kila yatra saḥ | kartavyaṃ tasya tasyāṅgaṃ suhṛdeva raso budhaiḥ ** **
[[57]]
Table 3.2
Components into which transient and enduring mental states can be analyzed stage-wise Mental
Stage
Componential analysis of each stage with examples
state
provided within parentheses
Emergence
Antecedent stimulus and consequent response of a
Transient
disappearing and an emerging mental state („e‟
mental
emerges after „d‟ disappears)
state
Disappearance
Antecedent stimulus and consequent response of a
disappearing and an emerging mental state („e‟
disappears before „f‟ emerges)
Co-emergence
Antecedent stimulus and consequent response of two
mental states evoked simultaneously („d‟ and „e‟ exist
at the same time without cancelling one another)
Intermingling
Antecedent stimulus and consequent response of
several mental states that, though occurring serially,
can be conceptualized as forming one unit; one and the
same stimulus-response pair shared by two transient
mental states („d‟, „e‟, „f‟, and „g‟ occur serially under
„A‟; alternatively, „d‟ and „e‟ share the same stimulus-
response pair and occur under „A‟)
Mutual
Antecedent stimulus and consequent response of two
suppression
mental states that disappear by suppressing each other
(„d‟ and „e‟ disappear by suppressing one another)
Birth
Primary antecedent stimulus and consequent response
Enduring
of an enduring mental state; antecedent stimulus and
mental
consequent response of an accompanying transient
state
mental state („A‟ accompanied by „d‟)
Supplementation Primary antecedent stimulus as well as accessory antecedent stimuli and several consequent responses of
an enduring mental state; antecedent stimuli and
consequent responses of several accompanying
transient mental states („A‟ accompanied by „d‟ and
„e‟)
Exuberance
Primary antecedent stimulus as well as accessory
antecedent stimuli and several consequent responses of
an enduring mental state; antecedent stimuli and
consequent responses of many accompanying transient
mental states („A‟ is accompanied by „d‟, „e‟, „f‟, and
„g‟)
Contact
Primary antecedent stimulus, accessory antecedent
stimuli, and consequent responses of two enduring
mental states; antecedent stimuli and consequent
responses
of
many
transient
mental
states
accompanying the two enduring mental states; the
stimuli, responses, and accompanying transient mental
states of the two enduring mental states are discrete
(„A‟ is accompanied by „d‟, and „e‟; „B‟ is
accompaniedby „f‟, „g‟)
[[58]]
Mental
Stage
Componential analysis of each stage with examples
state
provided within parentheses
Merger
Primary antecedent stimulus, accessory antecedent
stimuli, and consequent responses of two enduring
mental states; antecedent stimuli and consequent
responses
of
many
transient
mental
states
accompanying the two enduring mental states; the two
enduring mental states share the same stimuli,
responses, or accompanying transient mental states
(„A‟ and „B‟ are both accompanied by „d‟ and „e‟)
Mixture
The same as „merger‟ but involving more than two
enduring mental states („A‟, „B‟, and „C‟ are
accompanied by „d‟ and „e‟)
Residue
Stimuli, responses, and transient mental states - each
with its own stimulus and response - related to two
enduring mental states, one of which reappears in spite
of being suppressed by the other (If „A‟ reappears after
being suppressed by „B‟, the components of „A‟ before
suppression, of the suppressing mental state „B‟, and
of a reappearing „A‟ can be singled out)
Weakening
Stimuli, responses, and transient mental states - each
with its own stimulus and response - related to two
enduring mental states, one of whose appearance
diminishes the intensity of the other (If „A‟ is
weakened by an intervening „B‟, the components of
„A‟ before and after weakening as well of „B‟ can be
singled out)
Subjugation
Stimuli, responses, and transient mental states - each
with its own stimulus and response - related to two
enduring mental states, one of which subjugates the
other (If „A‟ is subjugated by another mental state „B‟,
the components of „A‟ before subjugation as well as of
the subjugating „B‟ can be singled out)
Membership
Stimuli, responses, and transient mental states of two
unopposed enduring mental states among which one
takes the other as its „member‟ and therefore stands
superior to it in hierarchy („A‟ is accompanied by „d‟
and „e‟, „B‟ is accompanied by „f‟ and „g‟, „A‟ brings
„B‟ within its purview)
To understand a mental state through model 2, one must stage it in the manner described above. Staging gives us information about the extent to which a mental state is developed and the dynamics of its interaction with other mental states. Inherent in the process of staging are the following:
[[59]]
(a)
Determining if the target mental state functions in the capacity of a transient or an enduring mental state
(b)
Given the target mental state is transient, determining the enduring mental state under whose ambit it features, the other transient mental states with which it interacts, and the nature of such interaction („emergence‟, „disappearance‟, „co-emergence‟, „intermingling‟, and „mutual suppression‟)
(c)
Given the target mental state is enduring, determining the extent to which it is developed („birth‟, „supplementation‟, and „exuberance‟)
(d)
Given the target mental state is enduring, determining the nature of its interaction with other enduring mental states („contact‟, „merger‟, „mixture‟, „residue‟, „weakening‟,
„subjugation‟, and „membership‟)
Analyzing a vignette verse based on model 2 often demands going beyond the verse itself to include larger portions of the literary work from which it has been culled out for the purpose of exemplification. Model 2 can be applied to construct what can be called a character‟s current “mental state signature” – a schematic representation of several interacting mental states, including the one that is being studied, at specific narrative junctures. Examples of such mental state signatures are presented in chapter 4 (see Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.10, and 4.12) while analyzing vignette verses using model 2. The mental state signature of a character remains consistent as long his/her life-goal remains the same, a point that is discussed in Chapter 4 (under 4.3.5).
**3.3.3 Model 3 **
The third model, as already stated above, focuses on the character in whom mental states are evoked and who experiences and expresses them.29 It derives from Bhoja‟s 29 According to Bhoja, a literary character may be described as experiencing a mental state strongly because of two reasons: his/her personality type and relative strength of an antecedent stimulus. In other words, an antecedent stimulus may be weak but the mental state evoked by it may be strong due to the specific personality of the character described as experiencing that mental state. Alternatively, if an antecedent stimulus is strong, it
[[60]]
theorization of mental states as rooted in a literary character‟s personality. Before trying to understand this model in greater detail, it is important to appreciate its philosophical underpinnings.
**3.3.3.1 The Samkhya foundations of model 3 **
Samkhya figures among the six major systems of Indian philosophy. To briefly summarize its principal tenets as they are relevant here, there are two ultimate realities –
multiple, conscious, and inactive transcendental Selves (puruṣa-s) and a single, unconscious, and active Matter (prakṛti). Matter encompasses not just the external world at large and the objects existing in it, but also the body-mind complex. All of Matter is continuously evolving because of the dynamic interplay between the three elemental attributes (guṇa-s) that constitute it, namely, sattva, rajas, and tamas. Though these three attributes cannot be directly perceived, they can be inferred from the effects they bring about. Sattva is responsible for clarity, rajas for activity, and tamas for inertia. In sentient creatures, sattva manifests as pleasure, rational thought, and agile physical movements, rajas as displeasure, confused thought, and agitated physical movements, and tamas as blunting of emotions, irrational thought, and immobility. Though all the three elemental attributes coexist in Matter‟s every manifestation, 30 the changes that the latter undergoes are determined by which of the three emerges strongest at a given moment in time.31 Unlike Matter, transcendental Selves do not change. However, because of identifying themselves with their reflection in Matter, not unlike oneself identifying with one‟s image in a mirror, they falsely appropriate to themselves the changes that Matter undergoes. Concurrent with such false identification is a may be capable of evoking a mental state in a character whose personality type would otherwise not allow the evocation of that mental state from the same, but a weaker, stimulus (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 615: saṃskārotpattiśca viṣayātiśayānnāyakaprakṛteśca - - - tadvaśācca tathāvidhānubhavabhāvanotpattiḥ). However, it is the effect of personality type on mental states that Bhoja discusses at length.
30 S.T.K, p. 126: anyonyasahacarā avinābhāvavṛttayaḥ
31 S.T.K, p. 152: na ca guṇapradhānabhāvo vaiṣamyaṃ vinā; S.T.K, p. 242: guṇānāṃ vaiṣamyamekaikasy-ādhikabalatā dvayordvayorvā, ekaikasya nyūnabalatā dvayordvayorvā. Among the three guṇa-s, sattva and tamas bring about opposite effects. Therefore, when sattva gets stronger, tamas will invariably be rendered weaker.
[[61]]
transformation of transcendental Selves into empirical selves or beings (jīva-s). Model 3 is not so much about the transcendental Selves that are free of their association with Matter as it is about empirical selves that are enmeshed and ensnared in it. In particular, it is about characters represented in literary texts as exemplifying specific types of empirical selves.
Further, it is about how the evocation and expression of mental states differs from one literary character to another in keeping with the type of being that an author develops him/her as.
Regarding the influence of Samkhya metaphysics on Bhoja, Raghavan (1978, p. 743) observes that he “establishes some contact of a substantial nature” with Samkhya in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa. However, Bhoja “owes more to Samkhya than he himself has admitted”
(Raghavan, 1978, p. 466). Raghavan has particularly discussed the impact Samkhya had on Bhoja‟s analysis of the aesthetic process – one by which everyday mental states, transformed into their literary counterparts, delight the connoisseur through the very act of being communicated to him/her. This study, on its part, examines Bhoja‟s categorization of literary characters in the light of guṇa theory and the relationship between character categories and narratively represented mental states.32
**3.3.3.2 Bhoja’s categorization of literary characters **
Since Matter is constantly changing, beings enmeshed in Matter also must. This does not however imply that the change is random and unpredictable. The psychophysical apparatus of jīva-s often evolves along lines that indicate preponderance of one specific guṇa.
It is on this ground that Samkhya philosophy classifies beings into categories such as sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa.33 Because of its consistency and predictability, prakṛti (as it 32 Noting the usefulness of Bhoja‟s theorization for character analysis, Raghavan (1978, p. 433) observes -
“When Bhoja wanted to relate a type of man to a Rasa and to define character by Rasa, one hopes that if desired, this line would have resulted in a lot of literary criticism of the nature of character-study so common in Western critical literature”
33 For e.g., Ishwara Krishna (c. 4th century AD) classifies all of creation into the topmost, sattva-predominant type (exemplified by gods), the lowermost tamas-predominant type (comprising of beasts), and the intermediate type (consisting of humans). In each of these types, the other two guṇa-s do exist but as subordinate to the one that predominates (Sa.K, Verse 54, P. 52: ūrdhvaṃ sattvaviśālastamoviśālaśca mūlataḥ sargaḥ | madhye
[[62]]
manifests in individual beings) can be understood as akin to personality.34 Bhoja transports the Samkhya concept of prakṛti to Sanskrit poetics and uses it for classifying important literary characters into four types: sattvodrikta (characterized by an excess of sattva guṇa), sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa. In doing so, Bhoja conceptualizes literary characters as possessing a personality just like real-world individuals do. In the context of Sanskrit poetics, he renames the four categories as śānta, udātta, lalita, and uddhata (corresponding to sattvodrikta, sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa categories respectively).35
Bhoja provides a list of 24 common (sāmānya) traits,36 some or all of which are shared by the four personality types mentioned above. He regards these traits as the source of self-identity in specific characters.37 The 24 traits are as follows: exalted birth (jāti), exalted lineage (anvaya), exalted kinship (abhijana), exalted nationhood (nivāsa), exalted habitation (āspada), exalted position (pada), exalted filial connection (pitarau), superhuman influence (prabhāva), wisdom (prajñā), learning/domain-specific knowledge (śāstrajñāna), absence of self-depreciatory talk (adīnavākyatā), rhetorical ability (vāgmitva), spatiotemporal propriety of thought and behavior (deśakālāvabodha), ability to accurately decode others‟ expressive behaviors (iṅgitākārajñatā), skill (dākṣya), artistic aptitude (kalāvaidagdhya), shrewdness (caturatā), physical beauty/exalted physical appearance (rūpasampat), sex appeal (saubhāgya), generosity (tyāga), friendship (sauhārda), exalted enterprise (mahārambhatā), rajoviśālo brahmādistambaparyantaḥ; also, Mathara‟s commentary on this verse: tatrāpi rajastamasī staḥ kintu sattvasyodriktatā - - -) ** **
34 “Personality is that which permits a prediction of what a person will do in a given situation” (Cattell, 1950, p.2); Sperry (2016, p. 1235) relates personality type with “a consistent and predictable pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving”
35 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 15
36 As will be discussed below, these traits are the basis for classifying characters into superior, intermediate, and inferior subtypes (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1012: uttamatvādihetavaśca - - - sāmānyaguṇāḥ)** **
37 These traits will henceforth be referred to as “identity-related traits”, “traits on which self-identity may be based”, or “commonly shared traits”. The formation of trait-based self-identity is mediated by “abhimāna” (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, p. 1058: jātyādibhirabhimānaḥ) and “ahaṅkāra”, terms that are discussed further under Footnote no. 64 in this chapter and 4.2.2. ** **
[[63]]
physical prowess (śakti), and bravery (śaurya).38 Characters that possess all the 24 traits are classified as superior (uttama) and those with 18 and 12 traits as intermediate (madhyama) and inferior (kaniṣṭha) respectively.39 The 6 shared traits that the intermediate character does not possess are wisdom, superhuman influence, spatiotemporal propriety of thought and behavior, ability to accurately decode others‟ expressions, exalted enterprise, and friendship.40 The inferior character‟s trait profile lacks any 6 of the 18 traits that the intermediate character possesses.41 It is important to note that among the traits that the intermediate and inferior characters don‟t possess is wisdom. Uddhata characters are either intermediate or inferior. Lalita characters are either superior or intermediate. Both udātta and śānta characters are superior. The self-identity of an uddhata or lalita character is based on the traits he/she possess and is of the nature of “I am one of exalted birth”, “I am learned”, etc.
38 A careful reading of the verses provided by Bhoja to illustrate the 24 identity-related traits facilitated translation of the Sanskrit trait names into their English equivalents. To elucidate with an example, nivāsa and āspada might both generally mean “abode” in Sanskrit. The verses provided by Bhoja for illustrating self-identity based on nivāsa and āspada are as follows respectively:
evaṃ tayoradhvani daivayogādāseduṣoḥ sakhyamacintyahetu |
eko yayau caitrarathapradeśān saurājyaramyānaparo vidarbhān || (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1028; source: Raghuvaṃśa, 5.60)
Translation: By chance, the two met each other on the way and became friends. And then one of them proceeded towards the province ruled by Citraratha and the other towards Vidarbha, promising because of the good governance it enjoyed.
śriyaḥ padaṃ dvāravatīti nāmnā purī parītā lavaṇārṇavena |
astyāvṛtevāmararājadhānī nistriṃśanīlena nabhastalena || (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1092; source: unknown) Translation: There exists a city by name Dvaravati, an abode of the Goddess of fortune. Surrounded by the salty ocean, it looks like heaven‟s capital bound by the deep blue sky.
It is clear that the first verse refers to a group of people united under a common rule and the second merely to a place fit for being inhabited. On this basis, self-identities based on nivāsa and āspada have been understood as the traits of exalted nationhood and exalted habitation.
39 The discussion carried on above concerns distribution of identity-related traits in male characters. In female characters, these traits are distributed differently. In them, some or all of 16 identity-related traits can be present.
Of these, 7, namely, anvaya, śāstrajñāna, adīnavākyatā, vāgmitva, caturatā, rūpasampat, and saubhāgya are commonly shared with all the four male character types. Of the remaining nine traits, yauvana, suveṣatā, priyaṃvadatva, and dṛḍhabhaktitā * * correspond to four of the eight unique traits that a lalita * * male character possesses, śīla, kṛtajñatā, and avikatthana correspond to three of the eight unique traits that an udātta male character possesses, mānitā * * corresponds to * * māna of the uddhata male character, and śucitā to śauca of the śānta male character. Like male characters, their female counterparts can also be categorized into three subtypes. Of the 16 identity-related traits, the superior subtype possesses all, the intermediate subtype 12, and the inferior subtype eight (Sh.P, vol.2, ch. 21, p. 1097: ya ete ṣoḍaśa proktā - - - yuktastairuttamasteṣāṃ pādahānyā tu madhyamaḥ | ardhahānyā kaniṣṭhaḥ syānnāyikāsvapyayaṃ vidhiḥ). The Sanskrit names of the eight unique traits and 16 differentiating traits were translated into English based on the short descriptions that Bhoja provides of them. ** **
40 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, p. 1058: uttamasya prajñāprabhāvadeśakālāvabodheṅgitākārajñānamahārambhatā-sauhārdābhimānāḥ ṣaḍitare’pi syuḥ; By specifying that the superior character possesses the 6 extra traits of wisdom, etc., Bhoja informs that these 6 traits are absent in the intermediate character 41 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1028: kaniṣṭhasya tu aṣṭādaśabhyo yadṛcchayā’nye’pi jātyādayaḥ ṣaḍ na bhavanti
[[64]]
On the other hand, the self-identity of an udātta or śānta character is not dependent on the traits he/she possesses (though he/she possesses all the 24 traits mentioned above and is also aware of the fact that he/she does). What it however depends on shall be discussed shortly.
In addition to the 24 traits on which self-identity may be based, each character type also possesses a set of eight unique traits. The uddhata‟s set of unique traits include māna (inability to put up with loss of status), tejas (enhancement of energy when insulted), śauṇḍīrya (excessive pride), vilāsa (mannerisms associated with pride), vikatthanā
(boastfulness), asthiratva (impatience/inability to tolerate delays in one‟s undertakings), agambhīratā (inability to suppress opinions when gripped by impulse), and sāhasa (impetuousness/acting without thinking).42 The lalita‟s set of eight unique traits comprises suveṣatā (being well-groomed), sampriyatā (attractiveness), yauvana (youthfulness), sthūlalakṣatā (liberality in bestowing others with gifts), priyamvadatva (pleasing talk), lālitya (natural gracefulness in mannerisms), mādhurya (freedom from fury under all circumstances), and dṛḍhabhaktitā (fidelity in relationships, especially romantic ones).43 The udātta‟s unique traits are śīla (moral character as expressed through noble behavior), dākṣiṇya (civility), sthairya (steadfastness), gāmbhīrya (profundity of character as manifested through restraint of expressive behaviors), prāgalbhya (confidence in one‟s enterprise), śobhā (maintenance of propriety under all circumstances), kṛtajñatā (gratitude), and avikatthana (modesty).44 Lastly, the
set
of
unique
traits
that
characterize
a śānta character are kṣamā
(tolerance/forbearance/ability to suffer things without getting angry), vaśitva (complete control over one‟s sensory and motor faculties), santoṣa (contentment/freedom from desires), 42 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, pp. 1030-1033: paribhavāsahiṣṇutvaṃ mānaḥ, adhikṣepādanalpodgāraviśeṣastejaḥ, garvaprakarṣaḥ śauṇḍīryam, garvajanitādṛṣṭyādiceṣṭā vilāsaḥ, svaguṇaślāghā vikatthanā, prārambheṣvakāla-pratīkṣā:‘sthiratvam, rāgādibhirāśayaprakāśanamagambhīratā, kāryeṣvavimṛśya pravṛttiḥ sāhasam** **
43 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, pp. 1059-1061: udāranepathyaprayogaḥ suveṣatā, sarvajanamanohāritvaṃ sampriyatā, tāruṇyāvatāro yauvanam, analpadātṛtvaṃ sthūlalakṣyatā, manojñabhāṣitā priyaṃvadatvam, abuddhikṛtā
śṛṅgārākāraceṣṭā lālityam, sarvāvasthāsvanugratā mādhuryam, sthirānurāgatvaṃ dṛḍhabhaktitā** **
44 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, pp. 1006-1007: susvabhāvatā śīlam, avicalitatvaṃ sthairyam, iṅgitākāraguptir-gāmbhīryam, prayoganissādhvasatā prāgalbhyam, aucityāparityāgaḥ śobhā, svaguṇāgrahaṇamavikatthanam
[[65]]
praśama (recoiling away from sense objects, serenity), śauca (cleanliness), ārjava (guilelessness), vaiśāradya (contemplativeness), and vairāgya (disinclination to enjoy worldly pleasures).45 The unique traits, according to Bhoja, form the very core of a personality type.46
They are (1) diagnostic of a personality type and (2) responsible for the distinctiveness of mental states communicated by a personality type.47
Apart from the traits enumerated above (24 commonly shared traits plus eight unique traits),48 Bhoja also enlists 16 other traits that can differentiate between the four character types. Table 3.3 contrasts these 16 traits as they manifest in the uddhata and udātta character types. Evidently, each of the uddhata character‟s 16 differentiating traits finds an exact opposite in the udātta character, thus making it easy for us to appreciate the contrast. It is also possible to similarly differentiate other sets of characters, say the lalita from the śānta or the udātta from the śānta.
To elucidate the conceptual basis of Bhoja‟s trait classification using a hypothetical example, if „A‟ and „B‟ represent two types of literary characters, the 16 differentiating traits, the 24 shared triats (of which „A‟ and „B‟ can each partake a smaller or a larger number), and the 8 unique traits are respectively useful in determining how „A‟ differs from „B‟ or vice versa, how „A‟ and „B‟ are similar to one another, and how „A‟ and „B‟ are unique in their own ways.
45 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, pp. 1084-1085: akopanatvaṃ kṣamā, jitendriyatā vaśitvam, anākāṅkṣā santoṣaḥ, viṣayavyāvṛttiḥ praśamaḥ, malapramoṣaḥ śaucam, amāyāvitvamārjavam, vicāraparatā vaiśāradyam, bhogeṣva-nīpsā vairāgyam** **
46 E.g., S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1008: so’yamasya viśeṣaguṇayogaḥ - - - āntaraḥ
47 Whereas the eight unique traits are diagnostic of character type, the 16 differentiating traits are mostly about how different character types tend to feel and respond in similar situations or in relation to similar people/objects. Table 3.3 above points out, for example, that the uddhata character tends to disrespect the virtuous whereas the udātta character tends to respect them. Taken together, the eight unique and 16
differentiating traits can be understood as constituting a personality type 48 Many of the shared and unique traits enumerated above occur under the same name or as synonyms in the Nītisāra, a work on polity written by Kamandaka (c. 5th century AD). According to Kamandaka, kings must necessarily possess these traits, the aggregate of which is called ātmasampat or ātmaguṇasampat. The correspondence of traits in Bhoja‟s śṛṅgāraprakāśa with those in Kamandaka‟s Nītisāra shall be discussed in the next chapter (4.2.2, Subheading no. 8) under the topic of ahaṅkāra.
[[66]]
Table 3.3
Contrasting the differentiating traits of uddhata and udātta characters Uddhata49
Udātta50
Elation following positive outcomes
Absence of elation following positive
outcomes
Succumbing to displeasurable mental
Not succumbing to displeasurable
states (sorrow etc.)
mental states
Helplessness in the face of difficulties
No helplessness in the face of
difficulties
Disruption of ethical conduct by overriding
No disruption of ethical conduct by
desire
desire
Competition with ill-matched rivals
Competition with righteous superiors
Absence
of
disgust
at
despicable
Presence of disgust at despicable
objects/acts
objects/acts
Absence of arrogance only when rendered
Absence of arrogance in spite of being
powerless
powerful
Absence of remorse for one‟s mistakes
Remorse
even
for
unintentional
mistakes
Disrespect for the virtuous
Respect for the virtuous
Envy
regarding
others‟
positive
Absence of envy regarding others‟
qualities/feats
positive qualities/feats
Joy at others‟ misfortune
Absence of joy at others‟ misfortune
Predisposition to find faults in others
No such predisposition
Irrational
anger
(anger
directed
at
Absence of irrational anger
inappropriate objects)
Not finishing an undertaking
Finishing an undertaking
Awe at one‟s own/others‟ extraordinary
Absence of awe at one‟s own/other‟s
acts
extraordinary acts
Trait-based self-identity
No trait-based self-identity
At this point, it is interesting to compare Bhoja‟s way of classifying character types with that adopted by Ramachandra and Gunachandra. Such a comparison can help us appreciate why character types such as udātta must always be superior or alternatively, why an uddhata character cannot fall within the superior subtype.
49 The 16 differentiating traits of the uddhata character are enumerated in S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, pp. 1023: abhyudayādibhirutsekaḥ,
śokādibhirvaiklavyaṃ,
vyasanādibhirdīnatvaṃ,
rāgādibhirdharmabādhā,
cariteṣvasadṛśaspardhā, nīcārtheṣvapyajugupsā, aśaktāveva kṣāntiḥ, skhaliteṣu nānuśayaḥ, sadācāreṣvādaraḥ, paraguṇeṣu
mātsaryaṃ,
paravyasaneṣu
praharṣaḥ,
parāpavādeṣu
prītiḥ,
asthāneṣu
krodhaḥ,
prārabdheṣvanirvāhaḥ, karmātiśaye vismayaḥ, svajātyādibhiścābhimānaḥ
50 The 16 differentiating traits of the udātta character are enumerated in S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, pp. 1001: abhyudayādibhirnotsekaḥ, śokādibhirna vaiklavyaṃ, vyasanādibhirna dīnatvaṃ, rāgādibhirna dharmabādhā, cariteṣūttamaspardhā, nīceṣvartheṣu jugupsā, śaktisadbhāve kṣāntiḥ, pramādaskhaliteṣvanuśayaḥ, sadācāriṣ-vādaraḥ, paraguṇeṣvamātsaryaṃ, paravyasaneṣu na praharṣaḥ, parāpavādeṣu na pravṛttiḥ, asthāneṣu na krodhaḥ, prārambheṣu nānirvāhaḥ, karmātiṣayairna vismayaḥ, jātyādibhirnābhimānaḥ
[[67]]
As is evident from the discussion above, Bhoja first provides a list of 24 traits (that can form the basis for self-identity) and then categorizes character types based on the presence of some or all of those traits in them. Table 3.4 depicts an alternate approach, taken by Ramachandra and Gunachandra, to classify literary characters based on an aggregate of traits possessed by each of them. Instead of a common list of traits such as exalted birth, exalted lineage, exalted nationality, wisdom, artistic aptitude, physical beauty, and so on with each character type partaking all or some of them, Ramachandra and Gunachandra provide three separate lists of non-overlapping traits based on which characters can be classified as superior, intermediate, and inferior.51 Additionally, they also enumerate traits that allow classification of characters into the sānta and other types. Unlike Bhoja, Ramachandra and Gunachandra do not conflate these two typologies.
****Table 3.4
Ramachandra’s and Gunachandra’s twofold classification of characters based on the *presence of specific traits *
Character typology 1 and associated traits
Character typology 2 and associated traits
Śānta: free of egotism, compassionate, Superior: providing succor to others in humble (does not transgress elders), and distress, favorable to others, generosity morally upright.52
(joyful willingness to sacrifice anything for
the sake of others), adept in the ways of the
Udātta: possessing depth of character world and branches of knowledge, having (difficult to comprehend), capable of depth of character, courageous (not timid handling displeasurable mental states such even in the face of great calamity), endowed as sorrow and anger, forbearing, and acting with vigor and warriorship, and morally with discriminative foresight.54
upright.53
51 The traits based on which characters are classified into the superior, intermediate, and inferior types have been described even by Bharata (N.S, Vol. 3, Ch. 24, pp. 248-251)
52 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: dhīraśānto’nahaṅkāraḥ kṛpālurvinayī nayī
53 N.D, Ch. 4, p. 370: śaraṇyo dakṣiṇastyāgī lokaśāstravicakṣaṇaḥ | gāmbhīryadhairyaśauṇḍīryanyāyavān-uttamaḥ pumān (here, the word „dakṣiṇa‟ is glossed as „anukūla‟, i.e., „favorable‟); Ramacandra and Gunacandra define „dhairya‟ as “absence of timidity even in the face of great calamity” (N.D, Ch. 1, p. 25: dhairyaṃ
mahāvyasane’pyakātaryam); it is possible to understand „śauṇḍīrya‟ as „vigor and warriorship‟ rather than as
„excessive pride‟ based on Sharadatanaya‟s explanation of the word (B.P, Ch. 3, p. 70: vīryaṃ vicitramavyagrā
pravṛttiryuddha-karmaṇi | śuṇḍāravadbalaṃ yasya - - -; - - - tacchauṇḍīryamudāhṛtam ); the explanation of
„tyāga‟ as „joyful willingness to sacrifice anything for the sake of others‟ is likewise borrowed from Sharadatanaya (B.P, Ch. 3, p. 75: deyasya cāparicchittirdattasyaivānabhijñatā | dadato harṣavṛddiryatsa tyāga iti kīrtitaḥ)
54 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: dhīrodātto’tigambhīro nyāyī sattvī kṣamī sthiraḥ
[[68]]
Character typology 1 and associated traits
Character typology 2 and associated traits
Lalita: given to romantic love, addicted to Intermediate: clever in the ways of the the arts, rejoicing in pleasure, and soft in world, adept in the arts, etc.56
demeanor.55
Uddhata: inconsistent (in mind, speech, and Inferior: sinful, given to backbiting, lazy, action),
of
an
angry
temperament, ungrateful, quarrelsome, less capable of
intoxicated with pride (from causes such as handling
displeasurable
mental
states,
bravery), deceiving, and boastful.57
lustful, speaking harshly, and foolish.58
A close examination of the trait sets under typology 1 and 2 that are presented in Table 3.4 clearly indicates that being uddhata, for example, is not commensurate with being superior because traits characterizing the former (such as deceiving) are opposed to those identified with the latter (such as moral uprightness). Arguing on similar lines, it can be concluded that śānta and udātta characters cannot belong to the inferior subtype. A second point worth noting is that Bhoja‟s classification of characters into the intermediate and inferior subtypes is based on the absence in them of certain desirable traits (“desirable”
because they determine self-identity and it is unusual for self-identity to be based on undesirable traits) that are present in the superior subtype. The inferior subtype, for instance, lacks the trait of wisdom. In Ramachandra‟s and Gunachandra‟s classification system, the inferior subtype is described in positive terms as possessing the trait of foolishness rather than as lacking the trait of wisdom.
The traits proposed by Bhoja can be examined purely on the basis of which three Samkhya guṇa-s they fall under.59 All the 24 shared traits are characterized by sattva. Among unique traits, eight are of the nature of tamas, eight of rajas, eight of sattva, and eight of excessive sattva. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to arrange character types (uddhata, 55 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: śṛṅgārī dhīralalitaḥ kalāsaktaḥ sukhī mṛduḥ
56 N.D, Ch. 4, p. 370: madhyo madhyaguṇaḥ; the authors‟ gloss on this phrase names a couple of traits found in the intermediate character – lokavyavahāracāturyakalāvicakṣaṇatvādayaḥ
57 N.D, Ch. 1, p. 28: dhīroddhataścalaścaṇḍo darpī dambhī vikatthanaḥ |
58 N.D, Ch. 4, p. 370: nīcaḥ pāpīyān piśuno’lasaḥ | kṛtaghnaḥ kalahe klībaḥ strīlolo rūkṣavāgjaḍaḥ ** **
59 The traits listed above can be understood as springing from the three guṇa-s. Through their emergence from one or the other guṇa, they aid us in inferring the latter‟s presence.
[[69]]
lalita, udātta, and śānta) and their subtypes (inferior, intermediate, superior) hierarchically along increasing levels of sattva as represented in Table 3.5 below –
Table 3.5:
Hierarchical arrangement of literary character types along increasing levels of sattva Character
The level of Reason
type
sattva60
Uddhata
Least
1) Possesses only 12 shared traits characterized by sattva
inferior
2) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by tamas
Uddhata
More
than 1) Possesses 18 shared traits characterized by sattva
intermediate above, lesser 2) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by tamas than below
Lalita
More
than 1) Possesses 18 shared traits characterized by sattva
intermediate above, lesser 2) Does not possess unique traits characterized by tamas than below
3) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by rajas
Lalita
More
than 1) Possesses all the 24 shared traits characterized by sattva superior
above, lesser 2) Does not possess unique traits characterized by tamas than below
3) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by rajas
Udātta
More
than 1) Possesses all the 24 shared traits characterized by sattva above, lesser 2) Does not possess unique traits characterized by tamas or than below
rajas
3) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by sattva
śānta
Highest
1) Possesses all the 24 shared traits characterized by sattva
2) Does not possess unique traits characterized by tamas
3) Possesses all the eight unique traits characterized by an excess of sattva
**3.3.3.3 Character typology in the context of life-goals **
****Each of the four personality types seeks life-goals somewhat differently. The four life-goals, collectively referred to as puruṣārtha-s, include artha (material prosperity: acquiring, safeguarding/protecting, augmenting, and utilizing material objects), kāma (deriving pleasure through the enjoyment of material objects), dharma (being ethical in the achievement of both artha and kāma and thereby gaining unseen merit, i.e., puṇya), and mokṣa (spiritual liberation, becoming eternally free from displeasure by abandoning all material objects due to the realization that they are ever-changing and the pleasure resulting from them is 60 Referring back to Footnote no. 31 in this chapter, sattva and tamas are opposite elemental attributes.
Therefore, the relative increase in the level of sattva across character types correlates with a corresponding decrease in tamas.
[[70]]
impermanent in the final analysis).61 They have been discussed at length in traditional Indian knowledge systems. Bhoja links these life-goals to the four personality types.
Before dealing with each character type separately, it is important to spell out certain key ideas that have a bearing on the subsequent discussion –
The achievement of life-goals is not an end in itself. Rather, individuals are motivated to realize their life-goals only because they can experience pleasure (sukha) or avoid experiencing displeasure (duḥkha) as a consequence. Therefore, the experience of pleasure and the non-experience of displeasure can be regarded as the ultimate goals of life.62
Life-goals (and through them the ultimate goals of pleasure and absence of displeasure) are inextricably linked to objects. The acquisition, protection, augmentation, utilization, enjoyment, or abandonment of objects is what life-goals are all about. The life-goal of artha, for example, is realized through the pursuit of objects such as knowledge, land, livestock, food grains, money, gold, merchandise, furniture, spouse, children, and friends.63
In the context of model 3, it is useful to understand the nature of object-self interaction as per Samkhya philosophy. From a Samkhya standpoint, each individual (empirical self) possesses a psychophysical apparatus with whose help he/she can perceive an object, experience pleasure or displeasure after perceiving the object, form a concept about the object (e.g., “This is a pleasurable object”), intelligently evaluate the concept so formed for its truth value and convert it into conclusive, doubtless object-related knowledge (e.g., 61 Traditional knowledge systems recognize a hierarchy among the four life-goals. Mokṣa is regarded as the supreme life-goal. Dharma follows mokṣa. Artha and kāma are subordinate to dharma. Also, mokṣa and dharma are the most difficult to achieve (S.S.Vr, Ch. 1, p. 4: dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu caturṣu puruṣārtheṣu madhye śreṣṭhaḥ puruṣārthaḥ - - - | trayāṇāṃ kṣayitvānmokṣasyoktanivṛttirūpasyākṣayitvā - - -; Pur.Mi, p. 31: jīvarāśerātyantikasaṃsāroccheda eva paramaḥ puruṣārthaḥ - - - ; Pur.Mi, p. 32: - - - mokṣaḥ paramaḥ
puruṣārthaḥ | tadantaraṅgasādhanaṃ dharmaḥ | - - - dharmopayogitayārthaḥ | tadubhayāvirodhī kāma - - - ; Pur.Mi, p. 31:** dharmamokṣayoratyantāprāptayoḥ ) **
62 S.P.Bh, Ch. 1, p. 11: tacca duḥkhabhoganivṛtteḥ puruṣārthatvaṃ - - - saiva svataḥ puruṣārthaḥ | evaṃ
sukhamapi na svataḥ puruṣārthaḥ | kintu tadbhoga eva svataḥ puruṣārthatvaṃ yātīti | tadidaṃ
duḥkhabhoganivṛtteḥ puruṣārthatvaṃ - - - ; Dinakarī commentary on K.Av, Ch. 5, p. 800: sukhaṃ
duḥkhābhāvaśca puruṣārthaḥ sambhavatītyarthaḥ
63 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1018: vidyā bhūmiḥ paśavo dhānyaṃ hiraṇyaṃ bhāṇḍamupaskaraḥ kalatraṃ putro mitramiti
[[71]]
“This is indeed a pleasurable object”), assume a positive or negative attitude towards the object based on his/her conclusive knowledge about it, appropriate the object to himself/herself, conceptualize a prospective action, evaluate the feasibility of the prospective action directed at the object, and engage with or disengage from the object.64 With the aid of their unique psychophysical apparatuses, individuals strive to realize their life-goals, experience pleasure, and avoid experiencing displeasure.
Immediately after one has had sense-based perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣajñāna) of an object, one experiences pleasure or displeasure.65 Subsequently, one evaluates the object as pleasurable/means to pleasure/ pleasure-causing (sukhātmaka/sukhasādhana/sukhahetu) or 64 The psychophysical apparatus has an external and an internal organ (called bahiḥkaraṇa and antaḥkaraṇa respectively). The external organ comprises of the physical body, sense organs, and motor organs. The internal organ, though one in reality, transforms itself into what are known as manas, buddhi, and ahaṅkāra (loosely translatable as „mind‟, „intellect‟, and „ego‟) for the purpose of discharging different functions. Through manas, the empirical self can form an object- or action-related concept (saṅkalpa) pending its evaluation by buddhi.
Through buddhi, the empirical self can experience pleasure and displeasure, assume attitudes (expressible in terms of likes/dislikes - icchā/dvēṣa), make effort (prayatna), form a memory trace (saṃskāra), effect recollection (smṛti) of objects and object-related experiences, evaluate concepts formulated by manas for ascertainment (niścaya or adhyavasāya) of their truth value, and convert concepts into conclusive knowledge (jñāna). Conclusive knowledge leads to ethical or unethical engagement with material objects. Buddhi is also the receptacle of merit (puṇya/dharma) or demerit (papa/adharma) that stems respectively from ethical or unethical engagement. Through ahaṅkāra, the empirical self can bring about the appropriation (abhimāna) of external objects, experiences, traits, actions, attitudes, etc. to itself (Mathara‟s commentary on Sa.K, Verse 33, p. 36: antaḥkaraṇaṃ trividhamiti buddhyahaṅkāramanasāṃ grahaṇam; Sam.Sa, Part 1, Ch. 3, p. 14: mahadahaṅkāramanastritayātmaka-syāntaḥkaraṇasya, where mahat is synonymous with buddhi; Sa.K, Verse 27, p. 32: manaḥ saṅkalpakam; S.T.K, p. 190: „idamevaṃ, naivamiti‟ samyakkalpayati; S.T.Av, p. 18: gamiṣyāmītyatra gamanakriyā anāgatā, tadanubhāvapūrvakaṃ tadvata ātmano bhāvanaṃ saṅkalpasvarūpam; S.T.K,
p.
48:
buddhitattvasya
sukhādayo’pi pariṇāmabhedāḥ; Ny.S.B, Ch. 3. 2, p. 103:
antaḥkaraṇasyecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhāni dharmā iti kasyaciddarśanaṃ - - - ; Kiranavalī commentary on S.T.K, p. 164: pravṛttiḥ prayatnalakṣaṇā icchājanya-guṇātmikā yadyapyantaḥkaraṇaṃ buddhistadvartinī - - -; S.P.Bh, Ch. 2, p. 126: buddherevākhilasaṃskārādhāratā; S.S.Vr, Ch. 2, p. 106: smṛtidarśanānmano’numīyate, in which context the commentor Vedanti Mahadeva equates „manas‟ with „buddhi‟ – S.S.Vr, Ch. 2, p. 105: mano buddhireva; S.T.K, p. 177: adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ kriyākriyāvatorabhedavivakṣayā; S.T.K, p. 51: niścayo’dhyavasāya ityanarthāntaram; Adhyavasāya is also equated with jñāna – S.T.K, p. 46: adhyavasāyaśca buddhivyāpāro jñānam; Sa.K, p. 44: dharmādyāḥ - - - karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ, where the commentator Vācaspati glosses
“karaṇa” as buddhi ( S.T.K, p. 233: karaṇaṃ buddhitattvam); p. 184: abhimāno’haṅkāraḥ | yat khalvālocitaṃ
mataṃ ca tatrāhamadhikṛtaḥ śaktaḥ khalvahamatra madarthā evāmī viṣayā matto nānyo’trādhikṛtaḥ
kaścidastyato’hamasmīti yo’bhimānaḥ so’sādharaṇavyāpāratvādahaṅkāraḥ). To summarize, manas forms concepts about objects and prospective actions; buddhi evaluates those concepts and transforms them into conclusive knowledge; and ahaṅkāraḥ appropriates actions and objects (about which buddhi has formed conclusive knowledge) to itself.
65 The contact of empirical self with an object via a specific sense organ results both in perceptual knowledge and an experience of pleasure/displeasure (Vibhākara commentary on S.T.K, p. 355: indriyārthasannikarṣāt-sukhaduḥkhe bhavatastadvyudāsārthaṃ jñānamiti). However there is no one-to-one relationship between perceptual knowledge and experience. Depending on contextual factors, the same perceptual knowledge may be followed by two divergent experiences. For example, the tactile perception of coldness due to an application of sandalwood paste over the body is followed by an experience of displeasure in winter and pleasure in summer.
[[72]]
displeasurable/means to displeasure/displeasure-causing (duḥkhātmaka/duḥkhasādhana/
duḥkhahetu).66 In terms of their relevance to one‟s life-goals, pleasurable and displeasurable objects can also be described as favorable (anukūla) and unfavorable (pratikūla) respectively.67 To elucidate, objects that are evaluated as pleasurable are also evaluated as facilitating the achievement of one‟s life-goals. Likewise, objects that are evaluated as displeasurable are also evaluated as impeding the achievement of one‟s life-goals. Such an evaluation is possible because achievement of life-goals is not as an end in itself but only a means to experience pleasure or avoid experiencing displeasure. Based on an attitude of desire (rāga/icchā) or hatred (dveṣa) and action tendency, objects that are evaluated as pleasurable and favorable are further evaluated as liked (iṣṭa) and fit to be pursued (upādeya) and those evaluated as displeasurable and unfavorable as disliked (aniṣṭa) and fit to be eliminated (heya).68 Active engagement (pravṛtti) with an object that has been evaluated as described above necessitates a readiness to act (cikīrṣā).69 Readiness to act in turn stems from evaluations about a potential object-directed action – whether the action can be accomplished through one‟s current effort (idānīntanakṛtisādhyatā) and whether it can become a means to what is liked (iṣṭasādhanatā).70 Evaluating whether an action can become a means to what is liked boils down to answering the question “By performing this action, will I be able to 66 Ny.M, Ch. 1.2, p. 62: prathamamindriyārthasannikarṣotpannamālocanajñānam - - - tadanantaraṃ hi sukha-sādhanatvasmṛtirbhavati - - -
67 By prospectively evaluating that one shall experience pleasure (the ultimate life-goal) or displeasure (antagonistic to the ultimate life-goal) due to an object, one also ascertains that the object is favorable or unfavorable (i.e., a facilitator or an impediment to one‟s life-goals) (Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 76: - - -
phalamanucintitavatastatkāraṇayoranukūlapratikūlayorasya - - -)
68 When a pleasurable object is directly perceived or otherwise recollected, a memory trace of former pleasure due to the same (or similar) object is activated. Activation of the memory trace helps individuals recollect their former pleasure and assume a positive attitude towards the object. The development of negative attitude towards a displeasurable object can be explained on similar lines (Vachaspati‟s commentary on Y.Su, Ch. 2, pp. 64, 65: tatsādhane (sukhasādhane) tu smaryamāṇe dṛśyamāne vā sukhānusmṛtipūrva eva rāgaḥ | dṛśyamānamapi hi sukhasādhanaṃ tajjātīyasya sukhahetutāṃ smṛtvā tajjātīyatayā vāsya sukhahetutvamanumāyecchati | - - -
dukhābhijñasyeti pūrvavadvyākhyeyam); Ny.M, Ch. 2, p.46: anukūleṣvartheṣu - - - rāgaḥ pratikūleṣu - - -
dveṣaḥ; Ny.M, Ch. 1.2, p. 62: sukhasādhanatvaniścayo bhavati tasmādeṣa sukhasādhanamiti tata upādeyajñānamutpadyate** **
69 Vibhākara commentary on S.T.K, p. 303: cikīrṣādvārā pravṛttisādhanamanuvyavasāyaṃ - - - ; K.Av, Ch. 5, p.
806: cikīrṣā - - - pravṛttau janakaṃ bhavet** **
70 Vibhākara commentary on S.T.K, p. 303: idamiṣṭasādhanamidānīntanamatkṛtisādhyaṃ ceti jñānābhāvāt pravṛttiranutpannetyāha; K.Av, Ch. 5, p. 801: taddhetuḥ (cikīrṣāhetuḥ) kṛtisādhyeṣṭasādhanatvamatirbhavet
[[73]]
acquire (and protect etc.) what is fit to be acquired (and protected etc.) or eliminate what is fit to be eliminated and thereby continue to fulfill my life-goals, experience pleasure, or avoid experiencing displeasure?” There is no readiness to act if one evaluates that a potential object-directed action can become a means to what is disliked (dviṣṭasādhanatā).71 And what is disliked, in the final analysis, is an experience of displeasure. Where there is no readiness to act, there is also disengagement from (nivṛtti) from an object.72
Engagement with an object, by itself, does not guarantee success in the achievement of life-goals. In successful engagement, an individual derives pleasure from actually being able to pursue (acquire, protect, etc.) a pleasurable object or eliminate a displeasurable one.
Unsuccessful engagement, on the contrary, leads to an experience of displeasure because of one‟s failure to pursue a pleasurable object or eliminate a displeasurable one.73 It is important to note that one experiences pleasure or displeasure both after perceiving an object (and prior to directing one‟s action at it) and after directing one‟s action at it.
It is the empirical self, and not the transcendental Self, that engages with or disengages from material objects. As pointed out earlier, when the transcendental Self misidentifies with its reflection in Matter, it is transformed into an empirical Self. Where exactly in Matter is the transcendental Self reflected (for the consequent misidentification to materialize) has been a subject of debate. It is either buddhi74 or ahaṅkāra75 (described under Footnote no. 64) that is most often spoken of as substratum of the Self‟s reflection. An alternate line of thinking not only allows the transcendental Self to be reflected in buddhi or 71 Si.Mu on K.Av, Ch. 5, p. 802: balavaddviṣṭasādhanatājñānaṃ tatra pratibandhakam 72 Vibhākara commentary on S.T.K, p. 303: pravṛttinivṛttiprayojakeṣṭāniṣṭasādhanatājñānam; Si.Mu on K.Av, Ch. 5, p. 834: dviṣṭasādhanatājñānasya nivṛttiṃ prati janakatvam** **
73 The objects with which one successfully engages, the pleasure that results from successful engagement, the objects with which one unsuccessfully engages, and the displeasure that results from unsuccessful engagement can all be clubbed under the umbrella term “phala” (“fruit”). Of these, pleasure and displeasure can be regarded as the primary “fruits” and the objects that are a means to pleasure and displeasure as secondary “fruits” (Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 74: sukhaduḥkhe mukhyaṃ phalaṃ tatsādhanaṃ tu śarīrendriyaviṣayādi gauṇaṃ | sarvaṃ hīdaṃ
pravṛttidoṣākṣiptaṃ phalamityuktam)** **
74 S.S.Vr, Ch. 1, p. 75: yadyapi kūṭasthatvādātmano bhoktṛtvaṃ nāsti tathāpi buddhicchāyāpatyetyuktam 75 S.P.Bh, Ch. 6, p. 229: jīvatvaṃ - - - ahaṅkāraviśiṣṭapuruṣasya dharmo na kevalapuruṣasya** **
[[74]]
ahaṅkāra but also buddhi or ahaṅkāra to be reflected in the Self.76 The reflection of ahaṅkāra in the transcendental Self transforms the latter into an empirical self. Subsequently, the empirical self wrongly appropriates to itself an object77 or an object-directed action78
originally appropriated by ahaṅkāra. When an ahaṅkāra that has appropriated to itself a trait such as wisdom is reflected in the transcendental Self, the latter (in its transformed state as an empirical self) develops a false self-identity based on that trait.79
It is possible to relate specific types of psychophysical apparatuses with each of the four character types (which can be regarded as four prototypes of empirical selves). To put it differently, the predominance of sattva, rajas, or tamas allows, as the case may be, for the psychophysical apparatus to evolve along specific lines. The uddhata and the śānta characters have the most flawed and the most perfect psychophysical apparatus respectively. Among the organs that constitute the psychophysical apparatus, it is with respect to buddhi that character types manifest notable differences. Buddhi is the internal organ through which an individual evaluates bare object-related and action-related concepts for their truth value and transforms them into conclusive, doubtless knowledge – knowledge on the basis of which he/she engages with or disengages from an object. Such knowledge is stored as a memory trace (saṃskāra) in the buddhi, only to resurface when the same (or similar) object is encountered (and then recollected) in the future. As a prelude to the discussion that follows, the following can be said about the functioning of buddhi in different characters: 1.
The uddhata character: Relying on an extremely flawed buddhi, he/she erroneously evaluates objects and prospective actions under the influence of confusion and lack of clarity 76 S.P.Bh, Ch. 1, p. 66: vṛtticaitanyayoranyonyaviṣayatākhyasambandharūpatayānyonyasminnanyonyaprati-bimbasiddheśca; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 375: athātmani pratibimbadvāreṇāvasthitasyāhaṅkāraguṇaviśeṣasya - - -
abhimānāparanāmnaḥ, where the word “ātmani” refers to the transcendental Self 77 Objects can be extra-personal (people, animals, non-living things), corporeal (physical body), and psychical (attitudes, pleasure, displeasure, effort). Traits can also become objects that are wrongly appropriated by the empirical self (i.e., the transcendental Self transformed by ahaṅkāra‟s reflection). Among traits, some are related to the extra-personal space and others to the psychophysical space. This point is elaborated in the next chapter under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8.
78 Action is directed at extra-personal and corporeal objects
79 This point shall be elaborated in the next chapter under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8
[[75]]
(moha)80, generates perverse knowledge (mithyājñāna)81 as a consequence, and allows such false knowledge to guide him/her in his/her object-directed actions.
The lalita character: Such a character evaluates objects and prospective actions with a buddhi that is colored by his/her subjective attitude (i.e., personal likes and dislikes) about them – a subjective attitude that results from past experiences of pleasure or displeasure in relation to those very objects or actions (or objects and actions that are similar to them).
His/her object-directed actions are based on knowledge derived from attitude-dependent evaluations.
The udātta character: His/her buddhi-based evaluations about objects and prospective actions are neither influenced by confusion nor by personal likes and dislikes. Rather, they are informed by impersonal, ethical principles. Knowledge stemming from ethically informed evaluations determines his/her object-directed actions.82
The śānta character: Impersonal ethical principles and realization of the truth that all objects are ultimately displeasurable influence his/her evaluations about objects and prospective actions. His/her object-directed actions derive from the knowledge that is generated through such evaluations.
Perverse knowledge is not confined to the uddhata character though it finds its full expression in him/her. In a subtler way, both lalita and udātta characters also possess it. The 80 Also discussed under Table 3.6; confusion and lack of clarity stem from the fear of losing one‟s sense of social worth, a point that shall be deliberated upon while dealing with the uddhata character 81 Perverse knowledge presents an object as something it is not (Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 47: atasmin taditi jñānaṃ
mithyājñānaṃ). An uddhata character evaluates an object that is pleasurable as displeasurable, favorable as unfavorable, and fit to be pursued as fit to be eliminated (and vice versa). He/she therefore directs his actions at objects that are unfavorable to his/her life-goals and therefore a source of displeasure. Mithyājñāna is regarded as a type of moha (Ny.M, Ch. 2, p. 47: mohapakṣastu caturvidho mithyājñānaṃ vicikitsā mānaḥ pramāda iti).
Alternatively, it is spoken of as synonymous with moha (Ny.S.B, Ch. 4.2, p. 224: .mithyājñānaṃ vai khalu mohaḥ). In either case perverse knowledge leads to erroneous evaluation which in turn leads to perverse knowledge. ** **
82 The evaluations of an udātta character are less erroneous than those of the uddhata and lalita characters because they are based on impersonal, ethical principles. However, because ethical principles relate to the world of Matter and to actors falsely identifying with it, even such evaluations have an element of error from the standpoint of reality.
[[76]]
udātta character has perverse knowledge from the standpoint of reality,83 the lalita character from the standpoint of reality as well as ethics, and the uddhata character from the standpoint of reality, ethics, and experience.
As regards the universe of objects that a character type can evaluate as favorable and therefore pursuable, it is largest for the uddhata character and smallest for the śānta character.
This is natural because the uddhata character is not restrained by subjective attitude (born of past experience), ethical injunctions, or realization of truth in making a choice of pursuable objects.
The uddhata character seeks artha by neglecting the remaining three life-goals.84
He/she evaluates objects in the following manner: “Does this object possess externally visible characteristics by which it can be evaluated by the world at large as valuable? If it does, then it is something I must acquire, protect, augment, and utilize85 because doing so will enhance my status in the eyes of others”. The uddhata character‟s evaluation of an object‟s value stems from what its possession will do to his/her sense of social worth.86 He/she does not evaluate an object in the following manner:
Will enjoying the object give me pleasure?
Is the acquisition, protection, augmentation, or utilization of the object ethical as gleaned from scriptural knowledge as well as from observing how people, guided by such knowledge, behave?
Will the object eternally free me from experiencing displeasure?
83 In reality, objects are neither pleasurable nor displeasurable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, and neither fit to be pursued nor fit to be eliminated because such classifications are relevant only to the “false” empirical self that engages or disengages with Matter, not the “true” transcendental Self that stands apart from Matter.
84 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1022: dhīroddhatastu dharmakāmāvanapekṣamāṇaḥ sarvadārthamevānurundhyata ityarthaśṛṅgāre tadadhikāritvenāsya vyapadeśaḥ | ** **
85 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1021: so’yaṃ vidyādirarjito, rakṣito, vardhita, upayuktaścārthaḥ |
86 As mentioned earlier, māna, defined as an “inability to put up with loss of status” (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p.
1030: “paribhavāsahiṣṇutvaṃ”), is reckoned among the unique traits of uddhata characters. Elsewhere in the same chapter, Bhoja classifies pursuable objects into various categories, one of which is “objects desired for the purpose of accruing māna” and equates māna with pūjā, i.e., social esteem (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1020:
“mānanimittaḥ pūjārthaḥ”)
[[77]]
As a result of not evaluating objects on these parameters, he/she doesn‟t accrue pleasure, merit, or freedom from displeasure in the course of pursuing them. Furthermore, since uddhata characters lack in the trait of wisdom,87 they may incorrectly evaluate an unfavorable object as favorable. 88 In other words, uddhata characters tend to erroneously evaluate an object that may actually impede their life-goal as facilitating its cause. Secondly, they may wrongly evaluate the means through which an object can be acquired.89 Thirdly, even when they do evaluate goal-relevant means correctly, uddhata characters may still err in determining which traits are appropriate for securing goal-relevant means. Fourthly, in spite of correctly figuring out the appropriate traits, uddhata characters may wrongly evaluate the trait strength that is adequate for securing goal-relevant means.90 Due to such erroneous evaluations, uddhata characters rarely acquire their objects of pursuit. And even after acquiring, they may fail to protect, augment, or utilize them.
Whenever liked objects are acquired, there is a reinforcement of the uddhata‟s trait-based self-identity and sense of social worth. Non-acquisition of objects (or loss of acquired objects), on the other hand, disrupts the uddhata character‟s trait-based self-identity and sense of social worth. The uddhata character‟s sorrow (śoka) stems from non-acquisition of liked object or loss of an acquired one. His/her anger (krodha) is directed at the perceived cause of 87 Prajñā (wisdom) correlates with buddhi and is often spoken of as being identical with the latter (Mathara‟s commentary on Sa.K, Verse 22, p. 27: buddhiḥ - - - prajñā - - - iti paryāyāḥ); prajñā is sometimes included among the transformations of buddhi (Vijnana Bhikshu‟s commentary on Y.Su, Ch. 2, p. 156: buddhivṛttiṃ
prajñāṃ).
88 In other words, the uddhata characters confuse the pratikūla for the anukūla (and vice versa). While discussing mental states in relation to udātta characters, Bhoja offers brief notes on how they uniquely manifest in such characters. Such notes are however not available for the other three character types. An udātta character‟s love, according to Bhoja, is directed at favorable objects (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1008: “anukūleṣu ratiḥ”). Given that uddhata characters are at variance with udātta characters in terms of their traits, as Table 3.3 clearly demonstrates, it is possible to surmise that the former‟s love will be directed at unfavorable objects that are wrongly evaluated as favorable
89 This means the uddhata characters wrongly evaluate an action that is not iṣṭasādhana as being iṣṭasādhana (and vice versa)
90 Errors in determining which traits are appropriate for securing a goal-relevant means and whether such traits are present in adequate strength have to do with incorrect evaluation of kṛtisādhyatā. To put it differently, an uddhata character may wrongly evaluate a goal-relevant means (i.e., an action) as realizable through his/her effort (that in turn is contingent on the presence of specific traits in some particular strength) when in fact it is not.
[[78]]
object non-acquisition (or loss). If this perceived cause of object non-acquisition (or loss) possesses traits stronger than what he/she possesses, the uddhata character experiences fear (bhaya).91 The character may attempt to rectify these disturbances and overcome the displeasurable mental states experienced therefrom by devaluing the very object of his/her pursuit. He/she may also devaluate others who pursue it (ethically or otherwise) or support its pursuit. This, in turn, can elicit displeasurable mental states in others and lead to interpersonal conflicts. Apart from devaluing objects and others, the uddhata character may also reconsider the means through which the liked object can be acquired, again without evaluating the strength of a trait needed to secure that means.
In summary, when the uddhata character acquires liked objects, there is a transient alleviation of his/her fear of losing social worth. This transient alleviation of a displeasurable mental state (i.e., fear) is as far as he/she can go in terms of fulfilling life‟s ultimate goals, namely, pleasure and absence of displeasure. The uddhata character‟s displeasurable mental states result from
non-acquisition of liked objects or loss of liked objects after their acquisition because
he/she does not have the traits necessary to secure the means for acquiring and protecting the object
he/she does not have traits in the strength that is appropriate for securing the means for acquiring and protecting the object
91 According to Bhoja, displeasurable mental states such as fear, sorrow, and anger are pronounced only in the uddhata and lalita characters. The other two character types are mostly immune to these mental states or have them in response to fewer and very specific antecedent causes, as for example, sorrow as a result of facing a serious calamity or anger from repeated insult to their physical prowess (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, pp.1013, 1015, 1016: svaśaktidharṣaṇeṣu krodhaḥ, mahāduḥkheṣu śokaḥ, bhayānutpattiḥ, śokānutpattiḥ). In his elucidation of the process by which enduring mental states arise in all beings, Abhinavagupta makes the following observation regarding bhaya (fear), śoka (sorrow), and krodha (anger) – “Every living being becomes sorrowful when separated from the object of its liking, angry at the object causing this separation, and fearful of the latter if incapable of confronting it” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 276: abhīṣṭaviyogasantaptastaddhetuṣu kopaparavaśo’śaktatayā tato bhīruḥ). He notes elsewhere that mental states such as sorrow and fear characterize inferior and not superior individuals (A. Bh, Vol 1, Ch. 6, p. 282: ata evānuttamaprakṛtiṣu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti | pāmaraprāyaḥ sarvo’pi - - - śocati, bibheti - - -). ** **
[[79]]
recognizing later that objects initially evaluated as facilitators of one‟s life-goal (i.e., facilitators) and therefore diligently pursued are in fact its inhibitors 3.
the fact that all objects, even those that are evaluated as pleasurable and therefore pursued, lead ultimately to an experience of displeasure92
interpersonal conflicts that occur because
others, having the necessary traits in their appropriate strength, are able to acquire (and protect etc.) an object that they themselves desire
he/she bypasses ethics
he/she devaluates objects that he/she cannot acquire but that may be regarded as valuable by others
he/she devaluates others who pursue objects that one has not been able to acquire The lalita character evaluates an object on the basis of whether enjoying it will or will not give him/her pleasure. However, he/she does not evaluate whether ethics prescribes or proscribes the acquisition (and protection etc.) of the object or if the object can eternally free him/her from displeasure. If enjoying the object will lead to pleasure, then he/she makes attempts to acquire it. Acquisition of objects, however, is not the lalita character‟s life-goal.93
Among the lalita characters, the uttama subtype, because he/she also possesses the trait of wisdom, seeks objects that are correctly evaluated as favorable. He/she rightly evaluates the means through which the object can be enjoyed and the match between means and trait strength. The madhyama subtype, like the one among uddhata characters, errs on several fronts because of an absence of wisdom. In both the uttama and madhyama subtypes of lalita characters, pleasure resulting from the enjoyment of a liked object leads to reinforcement of trait-based self-identity. Non-attainment of pleasure leads to introspection (“Was there an 92 Y.Su, Ch. 2, p. 61: duḥkhameva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ;Vijnana Bhikshu‟s commentary on Y.Su, Ch. 2, p. 112: viṣayasukhasya pariṇāmaduḥkhatvaṃ;“When a person realizes that for those with discernment everything is ultimately a source of displeasure and there exists no such thing as pleasure - - -” (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1077: sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ vivekina iti jñānātsukhameva nāstīti jānīyāt)** **
93S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 1022: dhīralalitastu dharmārthāvabhibhūya kāma eva pravartate
[[80]]
error in means-trait strength match?”) in the uttama, wise subtype. However, in the madhyama, unwise subtype, it leads to devaluation of the pursued (and previously liked) object as well as of other social actors pursuing it. This is similar to what is seen in the uddhata subtype.94
To summarize, when a lalita character enjoys liked objects, there is a transient experience of pleasure. To that extent, he/she is partly successful in achieving the ultimate life-goal of pleasure. The lalita character‟s displeasurable mental states stem from 1.
an inability to experience pleasure because
he/she does not have the traits necessary to secure the means (for enjoying the object)
he/she does not have the traits in the strength that is appropriate for securing the relevant means
recognizing later that objects initially evaluated as facilitators of one‟s life-goal (i.e., facilitators) and therefore diligently pursued are in fact its inhibitors The above factors are relevant with respect to the madhyama subtype 3.
the fact that all objects, even those that are evaluated as pleasurable and therefore pursued, lead ultimately to an experience of displeasure
This factor is relevant with respect to both the madhyama and uttama subtypes 4.
interpersonal conflicts that occur because
others, having the necessary traits in the strength that is appropriate for securing specific means, are able to enjoy an object that they themselves desire
he/she devaluates objects that he/she is unable to enjoy but that may be valued by others
he/she devaluates people who pursue objects that he/she is unable to enjoy 94 The intermediate subtypes among lalita and uddhata characters are quite similar (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 20, p. 1058: madhyamasya jātyabhimānādayo dhīroddhatenaiva vyākhyātāḥ, pādaguṇasambandhīddhatāyā ubhayatra tulyatvāt)
[[81]]
The above factors are relevant with respect to the madhyama subtype
he/she bypasses ethics
This factor is relevant with respect to both the madhyama and uttama subtypes The udātta character evaluates an object on ethical parameters, i.e., whether ethics (as understood from scriptural texts and observation of how people that abide by these texts behave) prescribes or proscribes the acquisition (and protection etc.) and pleasurable enjoyment of that object.95 Put differently, the udātta character evaluates whether he/she will accrue unseen merit by acquiring and enjoying the object. The self-identity of an udātta character derives from his/her abidance to ethical dos and don‟ts rather than from the 24 traits that he/she possesses. Therefore, when an udātta character acquires (also protects etc.) a liked object, there is no reinforcement of any trait-based self-identity. Rather, one‟s identity of the form “I am someone whose conduct never transgresses ethics” gets reinforced. On the contrary, the inability to acquire (and protect etc.) a liked object leads to introspection (“Since I have acted in accordance to ethics, must the non-acquisition of this object bother me?”,
“Was there an error in means-trait strength match?”). The udātta character, because of his/her wisdom, correctly evaluates whether the object of one‟s pursuit is favorable or not.
To put in a nutshell, when the udātta character acquires (and protects etc.) and enjoys objects within an ethical framework, there is an experience of pleasure. The udātta character‟s displeasurable mental states stem from
the fact that all objects, even those that are evaluated as pleasurable and therefore pursued, lead ultimately to an experience of displeasure
encountering impediments to the performance of ethical action
interpersonal conflicts as a result of being wrongly devalued by others (mostly uddhata characters) who are unable to acquire or enjoy a commonly liked object 95 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1022: vidyādyarthānāmadharmakāmabādhayā - - - dhīrodāttaḥ pravartate ** **
[[82]]
The śānta character evaluates whether an object is conducive to eternal freedom from displeasure. On the one hand, he/she has the realization that his/her life-goal of eternal freedom from displeasure demands detachment from the ever-changing, ultimately displeasurable, world of Matter.96 On the other hand, in spite of such a realization, the śānta character must still pursue (i.e., acquire, protect, augment, utilize, and enjoy) a limited number of worldly objects as long as he/she is embodied.97 In making this choice, he/she (like the udātta character) is guided by ethically established standards of dos and don‟ts.98
Acquiring (and protecting etc.) and enjoying liked objects does not reinforce the śānta character‟s trait-based self-identity because the latter does not even exist in the first place. On the contrary, as the list of pursuable objects gets smaller, his/her identity of the nature of “I am someone that is eligible for spiritual liberation” becomes more strongly reinforced.99 Not being able to acquire and enjoy liked objects or losing objects after they have been leads to introspection (“Since I have acted in accordance to ethics, must the non-acquisition of this object bother me?”, “Was there an error in means-trait strength match?”, “Since all objects are ultimately displeasurable, should I be bothered if I don‟t acquire this particular object?”,
“Since all objects are ultimately displeasurable, should losing this particular object bother me?”). Because he/she is wise, the śānta character correctly evaluates whether an object of his/her pursuit is favorable or not.
In summary, when the śānta character acquires (and protects etc.) and enjoys objects within an ethical framework, there is an experience of pleasurable mental states. Experience 96 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, pp. 1076, 1077: nivṛttau duḥkharūpatayā jagatsvarūpamavagacchataḥ - - - sarvaṃ
duḥkhamiti tattvajñānaṃ syāt
97 S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1081: dhīrapraśāntanāyakasya lokayātrārthaṃ kriyāpravṛttihetutvāt** **
98 Like that of udātta characters, the ethical conduct of śānta characters too is not disrupted by desire (S.P, Vol.
2, Ch. 21, p. 1084)
99 The śānta character has self-identities of the following sorts – “I am fit to attain eternal freedom from displeasure”; “I have studied scriptures that advocate such freedom”; “I am continuously engaged in performing activities that are conducive to disengagement from the world of impermanent objects”; “I am never lax in performing duties that are obligatory on an everyday and occasional basis”, etc. (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1079: asti me mokṣādhigame yogyatā, adhītāni mayā mokṣaśāstrāṇi, nirantarā nivartakadharmotpattihetavaḥ
kriyākalāpā na vīyate nityanaimittikāni - - - ityādiyogyacetaso’bhimānaḥ)
[[83]]
of pleasure, however, is tempered with the understanding that all pleasurable objects are displeasurable in the final analysis. Pleasure and displeasure are therefore regarded as two faces of the same coin. The śānta character rarely experiences displeasurable mental states.
When he/she does experience them, it is because of being wrongly devalued by others (mostly uddhata characters) and encountering impediments to the achievement of spiritual liberation.
3.3.3.4 The relationship between mental states and character typology That personality type, life-goals, and mental states are mutually related has been observed even by Abhinavagupta. Given below are two quotations from Abhinavabhāratī that dwell upon such a relationship:
“Dhīrodāttadhīralalitadhīroddhatadhīrapraśāntānāṃ
pūrṇopāyapravṛttatvena
nāyakānāmatādṛgupāyāśrayeṇa
pratināyakānāṃ
ca
caritaṃ
saphalatvāphalatvena
sākṣātkriyamāṇaṃ vīrādbhutābhyāṃ, vīraśṝṅgārahāsyairvīraraudrabhayānakakaruṇairvīra-bībhatsaśāntaiśca pratināyakagatarasāntarasāntaratayā sātiśayacamatkāragocarībhūtaiḥ - - -
dharmādicatuṣkopādeyadhiyamadharmādibhyaśca nivṛttiṃ niśśaṅkaṃ vidhatte - - - |”
“The actions of heroes belonging to the udātta, lalita, uddhata, and śānta types – types that engage with objects conducive to their life-goals after ensuring that the aggregate of means relevant for such an engagement are at their disposal – bear fruit. Alternatively, the actions of anti-heroes – characters lacking in the aggregate of means – do not bear fruit.
When the actions of heroes are narratively depicted as if they were happening in front of our own eyes, we aesthetically partake of the following mental states: perseverance and wonder (in the case of udātta heroes); perseverance, love, and mirth (in the case of lalita heroes); perseverance, anger, fear, and sorrow (in the case of uddhata heroes); and perseverance, disgust, and tranquility (in the case of śānta heroes). Likewise, we aesthetically partake of a different set of mental states when we are involved in the anti-heroes‟ narratively depicted
[[84]]
actions. In the process, narratives undoubtedly teach us why we must choose the four life-goals of ethics, etc., and abstain from non-ethics, etc.” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 7.).
“tatra puruṣārthaniṣṭhāḥ kāścitsaṃvida ityeva pradhānam | tadyathā ratiḥ
kāmastadanuṣaṅgidharmārthaniṣṭhā |100 krodhastatpradhāneṣvarthaniṣṭhaḥ | kāmadharma-paryavasito’pyutsāhaḥ samastadharmādiparyavasitaḥ | tattvajñānajanitanirvedaprāyo vibhāvo mokṣopāya iti tāvadeṣāṃ prādhānyam |”
“Among them (mental states), some are principal because they are founded on life-goals. To elucidate, love is founded primarily on material pleasure and secondarily on ethics and material prosperity; anger, in those prone to it, is founded on material prosperity; perseverance, though founded for the most part on material pleasure and ethics, is actually founded on all the four life-goals starting with ethics; and anything that is an antecedent stimulus for the mental state of nirveda – boredom/dejection, born of true knowledge, towards worldly objects – is a means for securing eternal freedom.” (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 276.).
The credit for further expanding upon these ideas must go to Bhoja. As already alluded to in the discussion on character typology and life-goals, the personality type to which a literary character belongs has a bearing on his/her experience of pleasurable and displeasurable mental states. A character, because of his/her personality, may experience a mental state, say pride, only due to a limited set of antecedent stimuli. Moreover, the character‟s personality also determines the responses through which a mental state can be expressed.101 Lastly, a character may not even experience certain mental states such as pride in spite of their antecedent stimuli (such as exalted lineage) being present.
100 Hemachandra (12th century AD), quoting Abhinavagupta verbatim, notes “kāmatadanuṣaṅgidharmārth-aniṣṭhā” (K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 64)** **
101 Commenting on the mental state of fear, Abhinavagupta remarks that it must be expressed through muted responses in a character dominated by sattva guṇa (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 322: ye’pi ca sattvapradhānāsteṣāṃ
sattvasamutthaṃ prayatnakṛtamebhirevānubhāvaiḥ kāryam | kintu mṛduceṣṭitairyatastatkṛtakam)
[[85]]
Bhoja provides versified examples from the large corpus of Sanskrit literature to illustrate the unique manner in which 49 mental states manifest in each of the four personality types (including the following six subtypes: uddhata inferior, uddhata intermediate, lalita intermediate, lalita superior, udātta superior, and śānta superior). Furthermore, he also presents the view that each personality type is associated with a predominant mental state –
uddhata with pride (garva),102 lailta with affection (sneha, including both romantic and non-romantic love),103 udātta with rational discernment (mati) or ego (ahaṅkāra),104 and śānta with a subtype of satisfaction (dhṛti) known as śama105 – the mental state of having had enough of the world - or with śama as a distinct mental state (that is separate from dhṛti).106 It is possible to consider each of these mental states as dispositional traits in the respective character types.107
While dealing with the udātta personality type, Bhoja supplements vignette verses with some useful comments that can help us appreciate the unique manner in which some mental states are evoked or expressed in him/her as well as the non-evocation or infrequent evocation of other mental states. Table 3.6 documents these comments as well as provides near English equivalents and definitions of the 48 mental states that Bhoja deals with.108
102 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: dhīroddhatāśraya uddhataḥ; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: garvaprakṛtiruddhataḥ** **
103 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 632: dhīralalitāśrayaḥ preyān; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: śāntaḥ snehaprakṛtiḥ; S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 988: snehasthāyibhāvaḥ preyān; S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 988: ratiprītyorapi cāyameva mūlaprakṛtiriṣyate** **
104 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: dhīrodāttāśraya ūrjasvī; S.K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 990: tattvābhiniveśinī matiḥ - -
- sā ca - - - udāttasvarūpeṇa niṣpadyate; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: ahaṅkāraprakṛtiḥ punarūrjasvī
105 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 632: dhīrapraśāntāśrayaḥ śāntaḥ; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 633: śamaprakṛtiḥ śāntaḥ; S.
K.Abh, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, p. 988: dhṛtisthāyibhāvaḥ - - - śānta iti gīyate; anye punarasya śamaṃ prakṛtimāmananti |
sa tu dhṛtereva viśeṣo bhavati |
106 Bhoja‟s view is that mati and a special type of dhṛti, called śama, are the predominant mental states of the udātta and śānta character types. That ahaṅkāra and śama (as distinct from dhṛti ) are their predominant mental states respectively is the view of some unnamed scholars whom he quotes (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, p. 632: kecit) 107 The mental states of garva and śama, for instance, figure among the unique traits of uddhata and śānta character types respectively
108 Though Table 3.6 provides the approximate English equivalents of Sanskrit mental state words and the descriptions of concepts represented by them principally on the authority of Bhoja, the views of other Sanskrit aestheticians such as Dhananjaya, Jagannatha, Ramachandra and Gunachandra, Singabhupala, and Bhanudatta are also occasionally taken into consideration, especially when they can give us an alternative or a more nuanced understanding of individual mental states. The table does not include states such as physical disease and epilepsy that other Sanskrit aestheticians take into consideration.
[[86]]
Table 3.6 also serves the function of standardization: English equivalents of Sanskrit mental state words used elsewhere in this thesis shall be based on that provided under Table 3.6.
Table 3.6
*Mental states and their manifestation in udātta characters *
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 1
Rati (romantic love): directed at favorable partners.109
[[2]]
Prīti (non-romantic love): directed at social others that are of noble character.110
[[3]]
Utkaṇṭhā (restless longing): directed at social others that are of the superior type.111
[[4]]
Cintā (contemplation about the means to obtain/overcome favorable/unfavorable objects; concentration, the focusing the mind on an object; focused mental preoccupation with situations such as the non-acquisition of a pursued, pleasurable object or the acquisition of a displeasurable one; brooding; leading to responses such as recollection, etc.; is preceded or followed by logical reasoning): based on considerations of ethics, material prosperity, and pleasure.112
[[5]]
Mati (rational discernment, right knowledge, ascertaining/concluding/appraising about an object or a situation on the basis of scientific facts or logical reasoning, conclusive knowledge of facts; is expressed through responses such as clarification of a doubt): leads to the establishment of a viewpoint.113
109 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 1008: anukūleṣu ratiḥ
110 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 811: ratirevāsaṃprayogaprayojanā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1008: anavagīteṣu prītiḥ
111 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 840: manaso’śāntirutkaṇṭhā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.1008: uttameṣūtkaṇṭhā
112 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 842: dṛṣṭaśrutānumiteṣu prāptiparihārārthamupāyaparibhāvanā manasaścintā; R.T, Ch.
5, p. 82: cintā dhyānam | - - - dhyānaṃ - - - cittaikāgratā**; ** N.D, Ch. 3, p. 335: cintā priyānāpteḥ - - - |
priyasyeṣṭasyāprāptirapriyaprāptirvā; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 335: smṛtyādayo’pyanubhāvāḥ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, p. 357: anena cintāyāḥ pūrvottarakakṣyayorvitarko bhavatīti śikṣayati; contemplation may be verbally expressed in the form of asking questions beginning with „how‟, „why‟, „who‟, „for whom‟, etc. as evident from the following two vignette verses –
sandhyā rāgavatī svabhāvakuṭīlā gaṅgā dvijihvaḥ phaṇī
vakro’ntarmalinaḥ śaśī ca satataṃ jātyaiva mūrkho vṛṣā |
itthaṃ durjanasaṅkule patigṛhe vāsaḥ kathaṃ sahyatāṃ
devyāḥ pāṇiniviṣṭamāsyamasakṛccintānvitaṃ pātu vaḥ || (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 841; source: not provided) Translation: “Twilight (whom my husband adores) is fiery red with passion; Ganga is naturally crooked; the serpents are double-tongued; the crescent moon, full of blemish in his heart, is not straight; the bull, by its very birth, is bull-headed - so, how can I stay put in my husband‟s house whose members are bad in so many different ways?” The goddess, lost thus in contemplation, places her palm over the face. Let her troubled countenance offer us protection.
adharadyutirastapallavā mukhaśobhā śaśikāntilaṅghinī |
akṛtapratimā tanuḥ kṛtā vidhinā kasya kṛte mṛgīdṛśaḥ || (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 101; source: aesthetician‟s own composition)
Translation: Her lips put down the beauty of fresh shoots and her face far surpasses the moon in its luster. For whose sake has the Creator created this doe-eyed beauty‟s peerless form?
; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1009: dharmārthakāmeṣu cintā
113 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 826: śāstraparibhāvanayārthanirdhāraṇaṃ matiḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 87: śāstracintanohāpohādibhyo’rthaniścayo matiḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, pp. 336-337: bhrānticchidādikṛt - - - bhrāntiḥ
[[87]]
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 6
Smṛti (remembering something previously experienced; knowledge owing to memory traces and taking the form of spontaneous recollection as well as cued recognition, results from focused mental preoccupation, seeing or hearing about something similar to what was seen or heard about in the past, etc.): does not err with respect to the correct temporal ordering of events.114
[[7]]
Vitarka (logical reasoning; can take four forms: (a) probability of a single hypothesis being valid, (b) probability of two different hypotheses being equally valid, (c) the improbability of a hypothesis following from some established piece of knowledge, and (d) probability of two different hypotheses being equally invalid; logical reasoning can take the form of conjecture or culminate in a conclusion; its antecedent stimuli are (a) doubt (knowledge that presents two mutually opposed hypotheses as equally plausible), (b) speculation (knowledge that presents a single hypothesis as plausible), and (c) negative knowledge (knowledge that presents the anti-hypothesis as plausible); it is expressed through responses such as raising questions, examining something that must be ascertained, etc.; according to Jagannatha, logical reasoning differs from contemplation in that it presents the possibility of conclusion unlike the latter; logical reasoning can be based either on true or false facts; logical reasoning based on true facts leads to right knowledge whereas that based on false facts leads to erroneous knowledge; conjecturing about objects to the extent one‟s knowledge allows): aids understanding the nature of reality115
[[8]]
Śaṅkā (apprehension; expectation of an unfavorable outcome, can take the following two forms: (a) svātmagata or self-directed - anticipating an unfavorable outcome because of one‟s own wrongdoing and (b) paragata or other-directed -
anticipating an unfavorable outcome because of someone else‟s wrongdoing): is commensurate with the object of pursuit.116
[[9]]
Nidrā (sleep): occurs only in privacy.117
[[10]]
Svāpa/Supta (any effect of sleep such as dreaming): occurs only at night.118
[[11]]
Prabodha (waking up after sleep): occurs in the second half of the night.119
saṃśayo - - - ; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 173: arthanirdhāraṇaṃ matiḥ, tadeva nirṇayaḥ; S.P, Vol 2, Ch. 18, p.1009: uttarapakṣe matiḥ
114 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 842: manasyanubhūtārthapratibimbanaṃ smṛtiḥ; R.T, Ch. 5, p. 84: saṃskārajanyaṃ
jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ | saṃskārajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyabhijñārūpaṃ smaraṇarūpaṃ ca, saṃskārajanyatveno-bhayasaṅgrahaḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 362: sā ca - - -samānadarśanodāharaṇacintā - - - ādibhirvibhāvaiḥ
samutpadyate; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 357: sadṛśasya darśanaṃ śravaṇaṃ vā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.1009: avyāhatakramā smṛtiḥ
115 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 827: artheṣu yathāmatyūho vitarkaḥ; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 111: sandehādyanantaraṃ
jāyamāna ūho vitarkaḥ; R.T, Ch. 5, p. 105: vitarkaścaturvidho vicārātmā saṃśayātmānadhyavasāyātmā
vipratipattyātmā ceti; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, pp. 164-165: vitarkastūha ucyate, vinirṇayānta evāyaṃ tarkaḥ; R.G, Ch.
1, p. 111: sa ca niścayānukūlaḥ - - - cintāyā niyamena niścayaṃ pratyaprayojakatvāt; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p.
372: sandehaḥ kiñcidityubhayāvalambī pratyayaḥ saṃśayarūpaḥ, vimarśo viśeṣapratītyākāṅkṣātmikā icchā, bādhakapramāṇena pakṣāntarābhāvapratītimātraṃ vipratyayaḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 374: tāmabhinayed-vividhavicāritapraśna - - - ; R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 127: nirṇayāntaḥ syādasatyaḥ satya eva vā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.
1009: tattvānupātī vitarkaḥ ** **
116 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 831: aniṣṭāgamotprekṣaṇaṃ śaṅkā; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 353: ātmaśabdena svātmagato’parādha ucyate, paraśabdena paragato’parādhaḥ; the two forms of apprehension can, for example, take the form of thoughts such as “Will I get caught for robbing?”(Self-directed) and “Will this person rob me?”
(Other-directed); S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1010: phalānusāriṇī śaṅkā ** **
117 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 838: indriyāṇāṃ nimīlanaṃ nidrā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1010: vivikteṣu nidrā
118 nidrādikāryaṃ suptam (S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 838); niśīthe svāpaḥ (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1010)
[[88]]
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 12
Vrīḍā (shame; embarrassment; contraction of the mind): results from being praised, etc.120
[[13]]
Avahittha (dissimulation; feigning; concealing one‟s intentions and facial expressions; concealment of responses stemming from one mental state by way of projecting, in its place, the responses of another mental state; all mental states are amenable to concealment by responses of other mental states): Pan-situational, i.e., the udātta character never reveals his/her real mental states by way of behavioral responses.121
[[14]]
Dhṛti (satisfaction/contentment; not desiring anything beyond what one wants to achieve): consequent to achieving more than what is usually possible.122
[[15]]
Harṣa (joy; lucidity of mind due to fulfillment of a wish): consequent to others achieving their goals.123
[[16]]
Romāñca (horripilation; a feeling of internal blooming or expansion): consequent to perceiving others‟ heroic deeds.124
[[17]]
Hāsa (mirth; expansion of the mind consequent to joy, etc.): Expressed merely through smile (and not through boisterous laughter).125
[[18]]
Utsāha (perseverance; a particular kind of effort one puts in order to achieve one‟s life-goals; a mental state that, by bringing together an individual‟s want and striving, is a constant presence as long as his/her life endures; is caused by factors such as not being content with achieving less, decisive clarity about one‟s life-goals and goal-relevant (goal-congruent and –incongruent) objects, valor, reputation due to one‟s capacity for causing distress to enemies, impetuousness, etc.; Bhanudatta also includes erroneous knowledge among the causes [see under „moha‟ below and related footnote]; is expressed through military action, pride, appropriate and timely employment of expedients that can secure one‟s life-goal, generosity, etc.): in relation to some significant undertaking.126
119 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 839: nidrātyayeṣu cetanālābhaḥ prabodhaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1010: apararātre prabodhaḥ** **
120 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 835: varṇanānurāgādijanmā manaḥsaṅkoco vrīḍā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1011: svaślāghādiṣu vrīḍā
121 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 835: iṅgitākāragopanamavahittham; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, pp. 163-164: anubhāvapidhānārthe‟vahitthaṃ, prāyeṇa sarvabhāvānāṃ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1011: sarvatraivāvahittham ** **
122 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 822: abhīṣṭaprāpteradhikā’spṛhā dhṛtiḥ; „dhṛti‟ can also be translated as „emotional control‟, i.e., „the mental state that allows one to overcome the turmoil caused by greed, sorrow, fear, etc.‟ (R.G, Ch. 1, p. 99: lobhaśokabhayādijanitopaplavanivāraṇa- kāraṇībhūtaścittavṛttiviśeṣo dhṛtiḥ); S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.
1011: sambhavādhikye dhṛtiḥ.
123 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 821: manorathāvāptau manaḥprasādo harṣaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1011: parārthasiddhau harṣaḥ
124 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 822:ātmano vikṣobhajanmāntaśśarīrocchvāso romāñcaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1012: parāpadāne romāñcaḥ
125 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 823: harṣādibhirmanovikāsaviśeṣo hāsaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1012: smitamātrakārī
hāsaḥ
126 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 826: puruṣārtheṣvāparisamāpteḥ prayatnaviśeṣa utsāhaḥ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 332: na tūtsāhaśūnyā kācidapyavasthā | icchāprayatnavyatirekeṇa pāṣāṇāpatteḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, pp. 324-325: sa ca asammohādhyavasāya- - - balaparākramaśaktipratāpa - - - ādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate, utsāho’dhyavasāyāt - - -
avismaya - - - ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, p. 318: asammohenādhyavasāyo hi vastutattvaniścayaḥ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, p. 319: dharmādirūpamarthaviśeṣamabhisandhāya - - - yo’dhyavasāyo niścayaḥ - - - svalpe’pi santoṣo vismayaḥ, śauryaṃ yuddhādikriyā, tyāgo dānaṃ, vaiśāradyaṃ sāmādyupāyacatuṣkasyaikadvitricaturādibhedair-yathāviṣayaṃ niyojanam; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 793: - - - sāhasādaya ālambanavibhāvāḥ; R.T, Ch. 2, p. 36; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1012: mahārambheṣūtsāhaḥ
[[89]]
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 19
Glāni (debility; weakness resulting from physical and mental affliction): doesn‟t result even from observing extreme religious vows.127
[[20]]
Krodha (anger; the arousal of temper against objects thought of as unfavorable; anger directed at a person that has committed a grave offense; anger directed at one‟s enemy because of the latter‟s acts): results from others‟ repeated devaluation of one‟s ability.128
[[21]]
Śoka (sorrow, evoked by the acquisition of a disliked object or the destruction of a liked one, expressed through tearfulness, pallor, bemoaning one‟s own self and fate, complaining about someone else, etc.): occurs only due to a significant catastrophe/never occurs.129
[[22]]
Aśru (tear flow): occurs only due to an excess of sorrow, etc.130
[[23]]
Sveda (perspiration): occurs only while performing an arduous task.131
24
Śrama (bodily and mental fatigue following excessive physical activity): occurs only from an excess of fatigue/never occurs.132
25
Mūrchā/Pralaya (fainting; cessation of sensation): only due to being hit very forcefully, etc.133
26
Garva (pride): never occurs.134
27
Mada (intoxication): does not arise since intoxicants are not consumed.135
28
Amarṣa (vindictive anger; resentment; sustained anger at wrongdoers; vindictiveness; anger resulting from insult and humiliation; a mental state that results from others‟ wrongdoings, especially public insult and humiliation, and taking the form of desire to exact revenge; expressed through contemplation, verbal aggression through death threats, calling out somebody in an abusive way/screaming etc., goal-directed action, etc.): never occurs.136
127 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 849: manaḥpīḍādijanmā śarīrāvasādo glāniḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1012: vratātiśayādiṣu na glāniḥ
128 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 843: manaḥpratikūleṣu taikṣṇyaprabodhaḥ krodhaḥ; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 39: - - - paramā-parādhajanmā- - - krodhaḥ; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 172: ālambanamaristatra tacceṣṭoddīpanaṃ matam; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch.
18, p. 1013: svaśaktidharṣaṇeṣu krodhaḥ
129 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 852: iṣṭavirahādibhirmanovaidhuryaṃ śokaḥ; Quotation from Bhāvaviveka in Bh.K, p.
676: upalabdhāvaniṣṭasya cittaṃ yadabhihanyate | duḥkhātmā sammataḥ śokaḥ; S.D, Ch. 3, p. 155: iṣṭanāśādibhiścetovaiklavyaṃ śokaśabdabhāk; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 313: bāṣpavaivarṇyanindanaiḥ - - -
nindanamātmano daivasyānyasya copālambhaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1013: mahāduḥkheṣu śokaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: śokānutpattiḥ
130 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 855: duḥkhakrodhānandajaṃ nayanajalamaśru; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1013: duḥkhādyatiśayayoge’śrūdgamaḥ
131 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 832: śramānurāgādyapekṣamanaḥkṣobhajanmā vapurjalodbhedaḥ svedaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1013: prārambhātireke svedaḥ
132 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 849: niratiśayaprayāsajanmā manaḥśarīrāyāsaḥ śramaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1014: āyāsātiśayayoge śramaḥ; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 18, p. 1017: śramānutpattiḥ
133 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 856: sarvendriyāstamayaḥ pralayaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: mahāprahārādiṣu mūrcchāgamaḥ
134 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 824: ātmotkarṣasambhāvanayā parāvajñānaṃ garvaḥ; according to Sanskrit aestheticians, though the udātta character does experience garva, he/she can also conceal responses resulting from it – a point that shall be discussed in the next chapter (under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 7 and 4.2.3, Subheading no. 8); S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: garvānutpattiḥ;
135 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 825: madirādyupayogānmanassammohānandasambhedo madaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 14, p.
1015: madānutpattir-madyapānapratiṣedhenaiva siddhā
136 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 844: kṛtāparādheṣu krodhāpraśāntiramarṣaḥ; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 85: amarṣaḥ praticikīrṣā; R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p.133: adhikṣepāvamānādyaiḥ krodho’marṣa itīryate; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 108: parakṛtāvajñā-dinānāparādhajanyaḥ - - - amarṣaḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 370: ākṣiptānāṃ sabhāmadhye; 136 A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch.
90
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 29
Asūyā (envy; intolerance of others‟ prosperity): never occurs.137
30
Īrṣyā (jealousy; intolerance of similar others being conferred with gifts and honor): never occurs.138
31
Ugratā (rage; verbal, physical aggression against an offender): never occurs.139
32
Jugupsā (disgust, repulsion, or contempt; results from the sensory perception, recollection, or mention of something unappealing or undesirable such as listening to the praise of one‟s enemy and takes the form of criticizing objects by exposing their faults): never occurs.140
33
Vismaya (surprise; mental expansion from watching something extraordinary; triggered, among other causes, by the occurrence of something improbable or extraordinary): never occurs.141
34
Capalatā (fickleness of mind; acting without thinking): never occurs.142
35
Ālasya (lassitude; dislike for physical activity): never occurs143
36
Bhaya (fear, resulting from an object that is life-threatening, loss of fame, committing an offense, etc.): never occurs.144
37
Trāsa (startled fright following exposure to something scary, etc.): never occurs.145
38
Kampa/Vepathu (tremor): never occurs.146
39
Stambha (paralysis/stupefaction): does not arise.147
40
Unmāda (mental illness; irrelevant talk due to strong passions): never occurs.148
7, p. 367: amarṣa iti pratikaraṇecchārūpo’yaṃ; K.Anu, Ch. 2, p. 85: amarṣaḥ praticikīrṣā; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p.
369: - - - cintana - - -; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 108: - - - vākpāruṣyādi - - -; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 314: vākpāruṣyaṃ
vadhādyupanyāsena tarjanam; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 169: - - - ākrośa - - -; B.P, Ch. 1, p. 22: - - - vyavasāya - - -
:S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1014: amarṣānutpattiḥ
137 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 844: pararddhyasahanamasūyā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: asūyānutpattiḥ ** **
138 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 845: samāneṣu dānamānādyamarṣaṇamīrṣyā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: īrṣyānutpattiḥ
139 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 846: doṣato vāgdaṇḍapāruṣyamugratā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: ugratānutpattiḥ
140 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 858: padārthanindanaṃ jugupsā; R.T, Ch. 1, p. 27: apriyadarśanasparśanasmaraṇa-janitā manovṛttiḥ - - - jugupsā; R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 164: ahṛdyānāṃ padārthānāṃ darśanaśravaṇādibhiḥ | - - - sā
jugupsā - - -; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 797: aniṣṭa - - - parikīrtanādayaḥ; S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 858: padārthanindanaṃ jugupsā; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 316: paraślāghāsamudbhavaḥ | bībhatsaḥ - - -; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 316: paraślāghāyāṃ hi viśeṣato doṣadarśanena jugupsate; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 316: nindanaṃ doṣodghāṭanaṃ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: jugupsānutpattiḥ
141 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 828: atiśayitapadārthadarśanāccitavistāro vismayaḥ; B.P, Ch. 1, p. 61: karmaṇo’tiśayānnṝṇāṃ - - - | asambhāvyasya cārthasya sambhavotpattdarśanaiḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: vismayānutpattiḥ ** **
142 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 836: manaso’sthairyaṃ capalatā; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: capalatānutpattiḥ; Ramachandra and Gunachandra equate capalatā with sāhasa, which, as described above (under 3.3.3.2 and Footnote no. 42), is included by Bhoja among the unique traits of the uddhata personality (N.D, Ch. 3, p. 335: cāpalaṃ sāhasaṃ - - -); furthermore, their definition of capalatā matches Bhoja‟s definition of sāhasa 143 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 837: śṛṅgārādibhirmānasaḥ kriyāvidveṣa ālasyam; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: ālasyānutpattiḥ
144 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 829: raudrādidarśanānmanaso vaiklavyaṃ bhayam; R.G, Ch. 1, p. 39: paramānarthaviṣayakaḥ - - - sa bhayam; Nagesha Bhatta‟s commentary on R.G, Ch. 1, p. 39: paramānartheti |
maraṇādisampādaketyarthaḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 315: pātakākīrti - - - (I conjecture this reading in the place of
“patākākīrti”); S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: bhayānutpattiḥ
145 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 830: raudrādijanmā cittacamatkārastrāsaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1015: trāsānutpattiḥ
146 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 834: bhayānurāgādyapekṣacittavikṣobhajaḥ kampo vepathuḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.
1016: kampānutpattiḥ ** **
147 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 832: bhayānurāgādijanmā ceṣṭāpratighātaḥ stambhaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: bhayānutpattiḥ ** **
91
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 41
Viṣāda (despondency; dampening of enthusiasm due to adverse fate, etc.; it results from the non-acquisition of a pursued object in spite of having the means to do so, expressed through contemplation, etc.): never occurs.149
42
Vaivarṇya (altered glow of the body, discernable especially in the face; pallor): never occurs.150
43
Dainya (feeling miserable and low because of an absence of confidence): never occurs.151
44
Svarabheda (choking of voice): never occurs.152
45
Āvega (hurry/mental agitation deriving from a strong need to respond, resulting from an unexpected, liked or disliked stimulus such as hearing about or seeing something pleasant or unpleasant; is of eight types, each with its own stimulus-response pairs, as for instance, that resulting from storm, fire accident, attack by enemies, falling meteorites, earthquake, and encountering an elephant in rut): never occurs.153
46
Moha (indecision; blanking of mind; erroneous knowledge; one‟s inability to make a decision about how one must act; one‟s inability to determine the real nature of objects because of being overwhelmed by fear, separation from a liked object, mental agitation/hurry, recollection of one‟s past enmity with others, despondency, and sorrow; the absence of knowledge that is required to engage with or disengage from an object; indecisive mental preoccupation with objects; knowledge that is proven to be erroneous from the standpoint of reality often masquerades as right knowledge; the hero‟s and antihero‟s perseverance for achieving their respective life-goals is guided by what they take to be right knowledge though reality-testing proves the former‟s knowledge to be genuine and the latter‟s to be erroneous): never occurs.154
148 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 847: kāmādyabhiṣaṅgātiśayādasambaddhapralāpa unmādaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p.
1016: unmādānutpattiḥ ** **
149 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 850: daivādibhiḥ samrambhavighāto viṣādaḥ; A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 364: upāyairapyanukrāntasya kāryasyānistaraṇaṃ phalāsampattiryataḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 341: viṣādaḥ - - - cintanaiḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: viṣādānutpattiḥ
150 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 854: viṣādādijanma kānteranyathātvaṃ vaivarṇyam ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: vaivarṇyānutpattiḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 376: mukhavarṇaparāvṛttyā - - - | vaivarṇyamabhinetavyaṃ** **
151 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 853: sattvatyāgādanutkarṣo dainyam ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: dainyānutpattiḥ
152 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 833: harṣādijanmā vāgbhaṅgaḥ svarabhedaḥ; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1016: svarabhedānutpattiḥ
153 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 854: pratīkārāśayā manovyākulatāvegaḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 336: āvegaḥ
sambhramo’tarkyāt, atarkyamacintitopanatamiṣṭamaniṣṭaṃ vā; B.P, Ch. 1, p. 20-21: āvegastu mahotpātavātavarṣāgnikuñjarāt || priyāpriyāśruteścāpi vyasanābhihatairapi | evamaṣṭavidho jñeya āvegaḥ
sambhramātmakaḥ; a type of āvega that results from seeing or hearing about one‟s enemy is characterized by responses such as grasping weapons (B.P, Ch. 1, p. 21: śastrāstragrahadhāraṇaiḥ | śatruvyasanajaḥ); S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1017: āvegānutpattiḥ
154S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 851: itikartavyatāyāmanāloko mohaḥ; R.G, Ch.1, p. 98: bhayaviyogādiprayojyā
vastutattvānavadhāriṇī cittavṛttirmohaḥ; N.D, Ch. 3, p. 339: acaitanyaṃ (mohaḥ) pravṛttinivṛttijñānābhāvaḥ; Shastri‟s (1947) commentary on R.G, Ch. 1, p. 98: vastutattvānavadhāraṇarūpamavasthāntaraṃ prāptā sā
cintākhyacittavṛttireva tathā arthānmohaḥ; N.S, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 362: moho nāma - - - āvega-pūrvavairānusmaraṇa - - - ādibhirvibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate; Bh.R.Si, Ch. 2.4, p. 159: viṣādādeśca; Quotation from Bhāvaviveka in Bh.K, p. 676: śokaḥ moharodanabhāvanaḥ; though Sanskrit aestheticians describe „moha‟
mostly as indecision or blanking of mind (and hence, absence of knowledge), it can also mean erroneous knowledge (A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 319: mithyājñānaṃ mohaḥ)**; ** A.Bh.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, p. 318: asadvastvabhiniveśo’saṃmoho rāvaṇādigata utsāhakārītyasat | aśabdārthatvāt; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1017: mohānutpattiḥ ** **
92
No. Udātta character‟s mental states with Bhoja‟s comments on them 47
Jāḍya (inertia; sluggishness of mind as reflected in action): never occurs.155
48
Nirveda (boredom; mental fatigue due to worldly detachment, etc.; self-depreciation; dejection due to the realization of having led a worthless life; feeling of worthlessness about oneself; results from humiliation, insult, or seeing one‟s enemy prosper etc.) never occurs.156
**3.3.3.5 The static-dynamic nature of character personality type **
Is a character‟s personality type static or dynamic? In other words, does a character‟s typology remain unchanged throughout a literary work or does it undergo changes from time to time? Can a character that is identifiable as uddhata at one juncture of a literary work be depicted as udātta at another juncture of the same work? To answer these questions, one must turn to Dhanika (10th century AD), author of the Avaloka commentary on Daśarūpaka. Also discussed below is the possibility of integrating Dhanika‟s observations into model 3. ** **
As already mentioned, characters are classified into different types based on which of the three guṇa-s is predominantly functional in their psychophysical apparatus. Here, one must make a distinction between primary (aṅgibhūta) and secondary (aṅgabhūta) characters.
The primary characters, including the hero (nāyaka) and the heroine (nāyikā), pervade a literary work more completely than secondary characters.157 It is an important tenet of Sanskrit poetics that primary characters be characterized in a uniform manner throughout a literary work. 158 If the hero is, for example, initially depicted as an udātta character, he must not be depicted as an uddhata character at a later point in the narrative. Understood from the 155 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 857: manasaḥ kriyāsvapāṭavaṃ jāḍyam; S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1017: jāḍyānutpattiḥ
156 S.P, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, p. 858: vairāgyādibhirmanaḥkhedo nirvedaḥ; D.R.AV, Ch. 4, p.79: nirvedaḥ
svāvamānanam; R.A.Su, Ch. 2, p. 98: naiṣphalyamatirnivedaḥ; N.S.4, Vol. 1, Ch. 7, p. 350: nirvedo nāma - - -
avamānādhikṣepa - - ādibhirvibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate; N.D, Ch. 3, pp. 31-32: paravibhūtidarśanādayaḥ S.P, Vol.
2, Ch. 18, p. 1017: nirvedānutpattiḥ; the udātta character does not experience boredom though he/she must perform certain duties repeatedly and monotonously, as illustrated by through the following verse: tāmantikanyastabalipradīpāmanvāsya goptā gṛhiṇīsahāyaḥ |
krameṇa suptāmanu saṃviveśa suptotthitāṃ prātaranūdatiṣṭhat) || (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1017; source: Raghuvaṃśa, 2.24)** **
Translation: Placing objects of worship and a lamp by the holy cow‟s side, the guardian king (Dilipa) and his queen would rest after she had rested, sleep after she had slept, and wake up in the morning after she had.
The verse illustrates how king Dilipa, an udātta character, took routine care of the cow without getting bored of the monotony inherent in his chore.
157 S.P, Vol 2, Ch. 21, p. 1086: kathāśarīravyāpī - - - nāyakaḥ
158 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: aṅginastu rāmādeḥ - - - ārambhopāttāvasthāto’vasthāntaropādānamanyāyyam
93
standpoint of guṇa theory, this means that the sattva guṇa predominates in an udātta type of hero (or heroine) all along the course of a literary work. This also means that the hero‟s (or heroine‟s) life-goals and the nature of his (or her) mental states (that are intimately related to character type and life-goals) remain unaltered in the narrative.
Unlike that of primary characters, the characterization of secondary characters (including those that support the primary character and those that are in opposition to the latter159) needn‟t be uniform throughout a work. A single secondary character may, for instance, be depicted as uddhata and udātta at different points in the same narrative.160 These secondary characters can be regarded as exhibiting a preponderance of different guṇa-s at different times. The dynamism in a secondary character‟s personality also indicates that his/her life-goals (and consequently, the nature of his/her mental states) are prone to change from time to time. The preponderance of sattva, rajas, or tamas in a given character at a given point in time must be inferred by evaluating the presence of one or more of the traits (unique and differentiating) that constitute his/her personality. The primary character has a well-defined personality with a set of core, unique traits that are inherent, always present, and never violated.161 The secondary character, on the other hand, may or may not have a well-defined personality. In the latter case, no enduring, inviolable core traits are discernable.
Rather, the character may exhibit traits unique to different personality types at different times.162 As regards differentiating traits, the primary character exhibits them consistently in 159Bhoja classifies secondary characters (male/female) into three groups, upanāyaka/upanāyikā, anunāyaka/anunāyikā, and pratināyaka/pratināyikā. Characters belonging to the first group are those that are respected by the hero/heroine and are equal to or greater than the latter but don‟t occupy an exalted position (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1086: nāyakābhyarhaṇīyaḥ sama utkṛṣṭo vānavāptapada upanāyakaḥ). The second group comprises of characters that are slightly inferior to the hero/heroine but play an important role in the narrative (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1087: nāyakātkiñcidūnaḥ kathāśarīre viśeṣopayogavānanunāyakaḥ). Both these two groups of characters are favorably disposed towards the hero/heroine. Characters included in the third group are opposed to the hero/heroine and are potentially capable of overthrowing the latter (S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 21, p. 1088: nāyakapratikūlavṛttistaducchedārhaḥ - - - pratināyakaḥ). ** **
160 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: na cāvasthāntarābhidhānamanucitamaṅgabhūtanāyakānāṃ
161 E.g., S.P, Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 1008: so’yamasya viśeṣaguṇayogaḥ svābhāviko niratiśaya āntaro nityaśca** **
162 D.R.AV, Ch. 2, p. 38: mahasattvāderavyavasthitatvāt; N.D, Ch. 1, p. 27, pradhānanāyakasya cāyaṃ niyamo gauṇanetṝṇāṃ tu svabhāvāntaramapi pūrvasvabhāvatyāgena nibaddhyate
94
specific situations or in relation to specific people/objects. The secondary character, however, may or may not demonstrate them consistently.
**3.3.3.6 Explication of model 3 **
In order to get a holistic picture of model 3, it is important to understand how the various components of that model operate in an interrelated manner. Model 3 is based on the premise that to understand a mental state communicated through literature, one must understand the personality type to which the character that has the said mental state belongs.
According to this model, primary literary characters can be regarded as pursuing one of four life-goals. Depending on the relative ease with which they can be achieved, life-goals are regarded as existing along a hierarchy with material prosperity placed lowest (easiest to achieve) and spiritual liberation highest (most difficult to achieve). Aiding in the achievement of life-goals is a tailor-made assortment of traits that each character type possesses. The traits that aid in the achievement of one life-goal differ both in their number and nature from those necessary for another life-goal. Given the relative ease with which material prosperity can be achieved, a character pursuing it must possess only some of the 24 commonly shared traits and an aggregate of eight frequently encountered unique traits. On the contrary, a character pursuing the most-difficult-to-achieve life-goal of spiritual liberation must possess all the 24
commonly shared traits and an aggregate of eight rarely encountered unique traits. The life-goal that a character type is depicted as pursuing and his/her life-goal-based personality type determine whether an external object can even become an antecedent stimulus for his/her mental state and if it does become one, whether the mental state that is evoked by it will be pleasurable or displeasurable.163 A character type engages with an external object only if is 163 Apart from the character‟s personality type, the spatiotemporal context in which he/she is situated determines what object he/she can regard as worth pursuing (acquiring, protecting, augmenting, and enjoying within an ethical framework), avoiding, or confronting and thereby direct his/her mental states at. The more true an author‟s depiction of a character‟s mental state is to the latter‟s personality and spatiotemporal context, the more authentic will the audience experience its communication as. Being true to character‟s personality and spatiotemporal context confers on a literary work the quality of propriety (aucitya).
95
pleasurable (i.e., evokes a pleasurable mental state after sense perception) or displeasurable (i.e., evokes a displeasurable mental state after sense perception). He/she disengages from the object if it is neither pleasurable nor displeasurable. Whether and why an object is experienced as pleasurable, displeasurable, or neither depends on the character‟s life-goal.
Engagement, mediated by action, takes the form of pursuing a pleasurable object or eliminating a displeasurable one. In successful engagement, a character has relevant traits in a strength that is appropriate for pursuing (and thereby acquiring, safegurading, augmenting, utilizing, or enjoying) a pleasurable object or eliminating a displeasurable one. This is not the case in unsuccessful engagement. Successful engagement reinforces and unsuccessful engagement weakens a character‟s self-identity (based on traits or ethical action164) though it must be kept in mind that the very probability of unsuccessful engagement is greatest with a character whose life-goal is material prosperity and becomes lesser and lesser as we move up the hierarchy of life-goals. Characters experience pleasurable or displeasurable mental states consequent to their engagement with objects just as they did prior to engagement, merely by perceiving those objects with their sense organs.
An uddhata character looks up to the world for information on whether an object is pleasurable or displeasurable. As mentioned above, merely perceiving an object with a sense organ can evoke a pleasurable or displeasurable mental state. But even this does not happen as regards the uddhata character. This is because of a dominance of the tamas element in his/her psychophysical apparatus, including the sense organs. Since the uddhata character‟s own sense organs do not inform him/her about the pleasurable or displeasurable nature of an object, he/she must rely on the world for such information. The world, however, can only provide information on what the acquisition or non-acquisition of an object can do to one‟s social worth. The experience of pleasure or displeasure following sense perception, being 164 I have not included the śānta‟s character‟s self-identity here because that is strengthened not by successful engagement with objects but by successful disengagement from them.
96
subjective, is something one must do for oneself. Caught between having to decipher whether an object is pleasurable or not before he/she can engage with it but unable to do so based on his/her personal experience, the uddhata character concludes that an object whose acquisition will enhance his/her social worth is pleasurable and an object that will diminish it is displeasurable. When a “pleasurable” object is acquired or a “displeasurable” one eliminated, the uddhata character has temporary relief from an underlying displeasurable mental state, namely, the fear of losing his/her status. This temporary relief from fear is what the uddhata character interprets as a pleasurable mental state. Worldly information decides what object is pleasurable for the uddhata character and the uddhata character‟s relief from fear (conceived as a pleasurable mental state) on acquiring that object validates worldly information.
As against uddhata characters, lalita and udātta characters positively experience pleasurable and displeasurable mental states, both after perceiving and engaging with objects.
For the lalita character, past pleasurable objects decide which current objects are likely to be pleasurable and the experience of a pleasurable mental state after perceiving or engaging with a current object validates the information that the past object was pleasurable. For the udātta character, a pleasurable object is one that ethical scriptures allow to be perceived (given ethical scriptures can delimit sense contact) and engaged with. The experience of a pleasurable mental state after such an object is perceived and engaged with validates his/her knowledge of ethical scriptures. What is important here are ethically mediated acts of perceiving and engaging with an object. An object that is ethically perceived and engaged with does not become displeasurable just because it is not acquired. It still remains pleasurable because the ethical acts directed at it did produce unseen merit. The lalita character‟s successful engagement with an object produces a pleasurable mental state here and now but an udātta character‟s successful engagement not just produces a pleasurable mental state here and now but, via unseen merit, also in the future.
97
For the śānta character, objects are neither pleasurable nor displeasurable, i.e., they evoke neither pleasurable nor displeasurable mental states in him/her. This in turn means he/she does not engage with them. When disengagement with the world of material objects is complete, he/she realizes his/her essential nature as the unchanging, transcendental Self.
Since engagement with objects (pleasurable or displeasurable) is, in the final analysis, a source of displeasurable mental states, the śānta character, by disengaging from objects, can be understood as pursuing a state that promises eternal freedom from displeasure. The knowledge that objects are in essence displeasurable determines his/her disengagement from an object. In turn, such knowledge is validated by the limited freedom from displeasure that disengagement from an object brings about.
Making sense of narratively elaborated mental states using model 3 hinges on deciphering character typologies. This demands close reading of a literary work. The understanding of character mental states employing model 3 can be carried out by following the steps mentioned below -
Determining if the character is primary or secondary: The primary character pervades a literary work more completely than secondary characters.
Once a character has been identified as primary, zeroing in on the personality type that he/she exemplifies: The primary character consistently demonstrates a set of traits (unique and differentiating) based on which it can be concluded that he/she belongs to the uddhata, lalita, udātta, or śānta types.
Once a character has been identified as secondary, zeroing in on the personality type that he/she exemplifies: The secondary character may possess either a well-defined personality or one that is nebulous. In the former case, it is possible to group him/her under one of the four personality types. In the latter case, the expression of traits is temporary and
98
inconsistent across similar situations or in relation to the same objects.165 Such a secondary character might fit the description of one personality type at a given narrative moment but of another type at a different moment.
Further qualification of characters identified as uddhata or lalita: Within the framework of model 3, udātta and śānta characters always belong to the superior subtype.
However, lalita characters can be superior or intermediate and uddhata characters intermediate or inferior. Assessing how many of the 24 identity-related traits a lalita or uddhata character possesses can aid us in subtyping them. Lalita characters possessing 24 and 18 traits are considered superior and intermediate respectively. Likewise, uddhata characters possessing 18 and 12 traits are regarded as intermediate and inferior respectively. In the case of lalita intermediate, uddhata intermediate, and uddhata inferior subtypes, we must assess not just the presence of some traits but also the absence of others such as wisdom.
When the four prototypical character types are scrutinized in the light of whatever positive traits (taking all of their traits into account) they possess, it can be concluded that the uddhata character‟s positive traits are mostly social (e.g., exalted kinship) and physical (e.g., physical beauty); the lalita‟s are social, physical, and intellectual (e.g., wisdom); the udātta‟s are social, physical, intellectual, and moral (e.g., modesty, civility, gratitude); and the śānta‟s are social, physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual (e.g., contentment, complete control over sensory and motor faculties).166
Incorporating other elements of the model into the analysis: These include life-goals, hierarchy among life-goals, source of self-identity, universe of pursuable objects, nature of objects pursued, criteria by which pursuable objects (objects whose acquisition, etc., are important for attaining life-goals) are evaluated, evaluation of means relevant for attaining 165 Dhanika regards Parashurama‟s depiction in the play Mahāvīracarita as exemplifying the secondary character who agrees with the description of different personality types at different narrative junctures (D.R.AV, Ch. 2, P.
38).
166 Also discussed in Chapter 4 under 4.2.2, Subheading no. 8
99
life-goals, evaluation of traits that are appropriate for securing goal-relevant means, evaluation of the match between goal-relevant means and trait strength, the effect which success or failure in acquiring (also safegurading, etc.) and enjoying pursued objects has on self-identity, possibility of success in object pursuit, possibility of facing competition from others, possibility of interpersonal problems, and the extent to which well-being (pleasure and freedom from displeasure) is achieved. Table 3.7 below presents in a nutshell some of the elements of model 3. Understanding mental states by analyzing a vignette using model 3
neccesitates extracting such elements from the verse and its larger narrative context.
Table 3.7
Comparative summary of elements in model 3
Component
Uddhata
Lalita
Udātta
Śānta
Predominant
Material
Pleasure due
Ethical conduct
Eternal
life-goal
prosperity
to material
(dharma)
freedom from
(artha)
enjoyment
displeasure
(kāma)
(mokṣa)
Hierarchy
Disregard for
Subordination
Attainment of
Attainment of
among one‟s
kāma, dharma, of artha and
artha and kāma
artha and
life-goals
and mokṣa,
dharma to
within the frame-
kāma within
kāma;
work of dharma;
the confines of
disregard for
does not aim for
dharma with
mokṣa
mokṣa
the realization
that such
attainment
cannot lead
one to mokṣa
Source of self-
A set of traits
A set of traits
Action that does
Eligibility for
identity
not transgress
achievement of
ethical dos and
mokṣa through
don‟ts
spiritual action
Trait
12 to18 shared
18 to 24 shared 24 shared traits,
24 shared
endowment
traits, eight
traits, eight
eight unique
traits, eight
unique traits,
unique traits,
traits, and 16
unique traits,
and 16
and 16
differentiating
and 16
differentiating
differentiating
traits
differentiating
traits
traits
traits
Nature of traits
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Social
Social
Social
Social
Intellectual
Intellectual
Intellectual
Moral
Moral
Spiritual
100
Component
Uddhata
Lalita
Udātta
Śānta
Universe of
Largest
Smaller than
Smaller than
Smallest,
pursuable
uddhata‟s but
uddhta‟s and
tending to zero
objects
larger than
lalita‟s but larger
udātta‟s and
than śānta
śānta‟s
Nature of object
Object that
Object that can Object per se is
Objects/actions
pursued
enhances
give pleasure
unimportant;
are per se
social worth
when enjoyed
ethical action
unimportant;
directed at or
recoiling from
using an object
objects (that
are important
include mind
and body too)
is important
Distinctive
“Can acquiring “Can enjoying “Does ethical
“Can this
criteria for
it enhance my
it give me
authority enjoin
object aid me
evaluating an
social worth?” pleasure?”
its acquisition and in attaining
object of pursuit
enjoyment?”
eternal
“Can its
freedom from
acquisition and
displeasure?”
enjoyment earn
“Are its
me unseen
acquisition
merit?”
and enjoyment
enjoined by
ethical
authority?”
Evaluation of an May wrongly
Erroneous in
Non-erroneous
Non-erroneous
object‟s
evaluate an
intermediate
relevance for
unfavourable
subtype ; Non-
goals
object as
erroneous in
favorable
the superior
subtype
Evaluation of
Likely to be
Likely to be
Non-erroneous
Non-erroneous
goal-relevant
erroneous
erroneous in
means (i.e.,
intermediate
actions)
subtype
Evaluation of
Likely to be
Likely to be
Non-erroneous
Non-erroneous
traits that are
erroneous
erroneous in
appropriate for
intermediate
securing means
subtype
Evaluation of
Likely to be
Likely to be
Correctly
Correctly
means-trait
erroneous
erroneous in
evaluates
evaluates
strength match
intermediate
subtype
101
Component
Uddhata
Lalita
Udātta
Śānta
Effect of success Reinforcement
Reinforcement
Reinforcement of
Reinforcement
in object pursuit
of trait-based
of trait-based
action-based self-
of self-identity
on self-identity
self-identity
self-identity
identity that takes
that takes the
the form “I am a
form “I am
person that never
eligible to
transgresses
attain eternal
ethics”
freedom from
displeasure”
Effect of failure
Disruption of
Disruption of
Failure does not
Failure does
in object pursuit
trait-based
trait-based
disrupt self-
not disrupt
on self-identity
self-identity;
self-identity;
identity because
self-identity
attempts to
intermediate
one knows that
because one
correct the
subtype tries to one has acted
knows that
disruption by
correct the
ethically; one
one has acted
devaluing the
disruption by
introspects on the
ethically; one
pursued object devaluing the
reason for failure
introspects on
pursued object;
the reason for
superior type
failure and on
introspects on
the changing
the reason for
nature of all
failure
objects
Possibility of
Is often not
May be
Is often
Is often
success in object successful due
successful or
successful
successful;
pursuit
to paucity of
otherwise
alternatively
traits
the question of
such success
does not even
arise since
one‟s attempt
is to recoil
from the world
of objects
Possibility of
Highest
Less than
Less than lalita‟s
Least
competition
uddhata‟s
from others for
an object of
common pursuit
Possibility of
Highest
Less than
Less than lalita‟s
Least
interpersonal
uddhata‟s
problems
Extent of well-
Transient
Transient
Sustained but still Eternal
being that is
freedom from
experience of
time-bound
freedom from
achieved
the experience
pleasure
experience of
the experience
of displeasure
pleasure
of displeasure
(innate fear of
losing social
status)
102
Explaining a character‟s mental states by invoking his/her personality type: Model 3, really speaking, explains character personality rather than character mental states. A character‟s personality, however, is not something that is unrelated to his/her mental states.
Rather, it forms the basis of the latter. If we must understand literary mental states, we must go beyond mere identification of the stimulus-response pairs through which they are communicated to us. A narrative analysis that incorporates the steps outlined above can bring clarity to our knowledge about a character‟s personality. And the clearer we are about a character‟s personality, the more obvious it is to us why, at some point in the narrative, he/she (1) communicates to us a mental state through one, and not another, stimulus-response pair and (2) communicates to us one, and not another, mental state. The primary characters‟ mental states can be explained as resulting from a single, stable personality that pervades an entire narrative. The secondary characters‟ mental states, on the other hand, may have to be explained by invoking a dynamic personality that, at different points in the narrative, approximates different personality types.
3.4 Vignette verses for analysis
Sanskrit aestheticians have for long supplied vignette verses illustrating the 49 (or 50) mental states that they enumerate. At times, vignette verses have also been supplied keeping different antecedent stimuli, successive stages in the development of mental states, and character types in mind. What is however missing in most cases is an enunciation of how a vignette verse serves it purpose, i.e., how it aptly illustrates what it is supposed to. Bhoja, for example, supplies vignette verses that demonstrate how each one of the 49 mental states manifests in various character types (uddhata inferior, uddhata intermediate, lalita intermediate, lalita superior, udātta, and śānta) but given the very large number of such verses, he desists from offering expositions on them. As regards this study, a detailed analysis of vignette verses is indeed the task at hand though the researcher shall confine to analyzing
103
just three verses, one each for asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā. These verses were selected keeping the following criteria in mind –
The vignette verse is by a prominent Sanskrit aesthetician for the purpose of illustrating a specific mental state.
The literary source from which the verse has been quoted is available.
The verse occurs as part of a larger narrative context.
The character whose mental state is conveyed through the verse is culturally well-known.
The verse is in direct speech – in the words of the character whose mental state is communicated through it. In other words, it is not a report of one character‟s mental state by another.
Additionally, the study shall consult Sanskrit commentaries, wherever available, on the source texts from which the vignette verses have been taken.
Given below are details of the three vignette verses chosen for analysis. Given the researcher‟s background in translating Sanskrit texts to English, he has translated these verses himself.
Verse 1 (for asūyā):
“***yatkṣatriyeṣvapi punaḥ sthitamādhipatyaṃ ***
taireva samprati dhṛtāni punardhanūṃṣi |
***unmādyatāṃ bhujabalena mayāpi teṣā- ***
mucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni punaḥ śrutāni** **||” (M.Vi.Ch, 2.29, p. 69) Aesthetician supplying the verse: Bhoja, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Vol. 2, Ch. 19, verse no. 133, p.
1041)
Primary source of the verse: Bhavabhuti‟s (8th century AD) Mahāvīracarita Commentaries: by Vira Raghava (18th century AD), Anundoram Borooah (1877 AD)
104
Translation: “That authority rests once again even with the Kshatriyas, that even they presently wield bows once again, and that even I hear about the unbridled acts of those (Kshatriyas) insane with pride born of physical prowess – once again”167
Character that is the substratum of asūyā: Parashurama
Verse 2 (for garva)
“***dharme brahmaṇi kārmuke ca bhagavānīśo hi me śāsitā ***
sarvakṣatranibarhaṇasya vinayaṃ kuryuḥ kathaṃ kṣatriyāḥ |
***sambandhastu vasiṣṭhamiśraviṣaye mānyo jarāyāṃ na tu ***
spardhāyāmadhikaḥ samaśca tapasā jñānena cānyo’sti kaḥ ||” (M.Vi.Ch. 3.37, p. 117) Aesthetician supplying the verse: Bhoja, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Vol. 2, Ch. 19, verse no. 126, p.
1040)
Primary source of the verse: Bhavabhuti‟s (8th century AD) Mahāvīracarita Commentaries: by Vira Raghava (18th century AD), Anundoram Borooah (1877 AD) Translation: “Lord Shiva is himself my master in ethical knowledge, spirituality, and archery.
Given I have annihilated all the Kshatriyas, how can they ever tame me? As regards the revered Vasishtha, I respect our relationship because of his age, not because he can compete with me. That being the case, who else is there that can equal or excel me in austerity and wisdom?”168
Character that is the substratum of garva: Parashurama
167 The literal translation of “mayāpi teṣāmucchṛṅkhalāni caritāni punaḥ śrutāni” is “their unbridled acts have once again been heard even by me”. Keeping, however, the natural flow of English in mind, it has been rendered in the active voice as “even I hear about the unbridled acts of those (Kshatriyas)”
168 S.P provides a slightly altered reading for the third and fourth lines of the verse: sambandhastu vasiṣṭhamiśraviṣaye mānyo jarāvāniti spardhāyamadhikaḥ samaśca dhanuṣi jñāne ca nāstyeva me (“As regards the revered Vasishtha, I respect our relationship because he is old. In the event of a competition, is there anybody who can equal or excel me in austerity and knowledge?”); Anundoram Borooah takes a different reading as authentic and comments on it: na tu spardhāyāmadhikaḥ samaśca tapasā jñānena cānyo’sti me (“Vasishtha cannot excel me in competition. Moreover, he equals me in knowledge and austerity”; M.Vi.Ch.2, 3.37, p.121)
105
Verse 3 (for vrīḍā)
“***gurvādeśādeva nirmīyamāṇo ***
nādharmāya strīvadho’pi sthito’yam |
***adya sthitvā śvo gamiṣyadbhiralpai- ***
rlajjāsmābhirmīlitākṣairjiteva ||” (A.Ra, 2.59, p. 92) Aesthetician supplying the verse: Singabhupala, Rasārṇavasudhākara (under 2.67-68, p. 182) Primary source of the verse: Murari‟s (9th century AD) Anargharāghava Commentaries: by Ruchipati Upadhyaya (15th century AD) and Ramachandra Mishra (20th century AD)
Translation: “Ordered as it is by the preceptor, even this killing of a woman – an act that is being done now - will lead to no sin. As regards shame, we – petty beings that are here today only to move out tomorrow – have conquered even that with our eyes closed”.
Character that is the substratum of vrīḍā: Rama
The verses quoted and translated above shall be analyzed using methods derived from the three models detailed in this chapter. While employing analytical methods borrowed from models 2 and 3, additional narrative context shall be taken into consideration as deemed appropriate.
3.5 Comparing and contrasting concepts about asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā with their** **corresponding self-conscious emotions: posing a set of questions
****An additional objective of this study, apart from gaining an indigenous understanding of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā, is to examine how these mental states compare and contrast with the psychologically researched self-conscious emotions of envy/jealousy, pride, and shame/guilt/embarrassment respectively. This larger question shall be addressed by breaking it up into several smaller ones, namely,
106
Do the categories of sthāyibhāva-s and vyabhicāribhāva-s (including asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā) differ from one another in the same way that basic and self-conscious emotions do?
How are the antecedents and consequents of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā similar to and different from those of their counterpart self-conscious emotions?
How do the indigenous models of asūyā, garva, and vrīḍā derived from Sanskrit poetics compare and contrast with standard contemporary psychological models of and approaches to emotions, self-conscious emotions, and other psychological concepts (such as personality, goals, and traits)?
To conclude, the third chapter commences by listing various heads under which data on myriad mental states documented in Sanskrit poetics can be grouped. It goes on to explicate three analytical models derived from Sanskrit poetics that can help us understand the mental states of literary characters as they are communicated to us through illustrative verses supplied by aestheticians. By thus spelling out certain general principles of analysis applicable to narratively elaborated mental states, this chapter has set the stage for understanding three specific mental states – a task that shall be addressed in the subsequent chapter.
107