Mark Intro

विस्तारः (द्रष्टुं नोद्यम्)

Source: TW

This edition and was produced as part of a project for Sampurṇānanda Sanskrit University, Varanasi to edit Tantric Texts financed by the University Grants Commission. The editor was also financially assisted by the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH).

The Text and its Name

Genre

The Sanskrit text edited and published here for the first time of the Saṁvitprakāśa by Vāmana-datta is a philosophical tract of medium length, the first section of which is framed in the form of a prayer addressed to Viṣṇu who is also variously called Hari, Mādhava, Vāsudeva and Acyuta. What makes this text particularly interesting and important is not only the fine style in which it is written and the depth of its contents, but the fact that it appears to represent a genre of Vaiṣṇava monism the existence of which has been virtually unknown.

Although a Vaiṣṇava text, the idealist monism it presents is in many respects parallel to its Kashmiri Śaiva cquivalents. One could go so far as to say that just as we refer to the Śaiva monism that developed in Kashmir between the 9th and 11th centuries as Kashmiri Śaivism, we can analogously refer to the system expounded in this text, which was written in Kashmir probably sometime during the same period, as a form of Kashmiri Vaisnavism. The similarities in style and conception between the Saṁvit-prakāśa and Kashmiri Śaiva literature in general makes this work an object of study for the modem scholar of Kashmiri Śaivism just as it was for Kashmiri Śaivites in the past. Thus, prior to its recovery in manuscript, we knew of the existence of the Saṁvit-prakāśa almost exclusively through quotation in Kashmiri Śaiva sources,¹ where references appear alongside those drawn from Śaiva works with no incongruity.²

Names

We have called our text Saṁvitprakāśa and this is the name by which it was generally known to Kashmiri Śaivites, although it is also occasionally referred to by other names. Thus Bhagavad-utpala [[2]] calls it the ‘Stuti’³, ‘Ātmasaptati’⁴ and ‘Saṁvitprakaraṇa’⁵ in three single instances.

These names seem to be derived from those of the sections into which the text is divided. In the two manuscripts used for this edition (see below), there are seven sections called ‘prakaraṇa’. In one of the manuscripts, the length of each section is noted by the scribe at the end of each one. They are:

Title	Reported length	Actual length
1) Saṁvitprakāśa	160	137.5
2) Ātmasaptati	59	59
3) Vikalpaviplava	61	59
4) Vidyaviveka	-	98
5) Varṇavikāra	52	52
6) Paramārthaprakāśa	22	27
7) ?	-	?

As the colophons do not mention the name of the text and neither does the author who refers to it simply as ’the work’ (kṛti), one might be tempted to suggest that ‘Saṁvit-prakāśa’ is not the real title of all the text but just of the first chapter. That this may be the case seems to be supported by the name ‘Saṁvit-prakaraṇa’ given as that of the source of a quote drawn from out text. As this reference is drawn from the first section it appears that in this case the name of the section of the text from which the reference is drawn is presented as if it were that of the whole text. That this happens is confirmed by the of one reference as being from the ‘Ātma-saptati’ which is, in fact, drawn from the second section which goes by this name. But that this principle is not uniformly applied is evidenced by the existence of one reference drawn from the first section that is said to be from the ‘Stuti’. Although the first section is indeed written in the style of a philosophical hymn addressed to Visņu, the word ‘stuti’ appears in the title of the second section.

Anyway, that ‘Saṁvitprakāśa’ is not just the name of the first section but of all the text is confirmed by the fact that this is how the source is named even when other sections apart from the first are quoted. Even so, in so far as by far the greater majority of references are drawn from the first section, the name Saṁvitprakāśa frequently refers equally to both the text as a whole and a section of it.

Manuscripts and State of the Text

Only two manuscripts were used for this edition, namely:

A) Manuscript number 1371 deposited in the library of the of the Research Department, Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. It consists of twentyone oblong sheets of paper numbered one to twelve. It is written in fairly clear Devanagari, indicating, assuming its Kashmiri origin, that it is not very old. The text breaks off abruptly at the beginning of the seventh section. The sudden interruption of the text before the end of the page may be either because the scribe did not finish copying the entire text or else that this was the condition of the text in the manuscript from which he was copying. I am grateful to Professor R. Gnoli for having given me a copy of this manuscript.

B) The second manuscipt is deposited in the central library of Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and is numbered C4003. It is sixteen folios long, the sheets folding together as do those of a European book. Written in Sarada characters, this manuscript is distinctly older than A. It breaks off at verse 90 of the fourth section and concludes with verses 23 to 27 of the sixth. The scribe writes at the end:

अतः परं यदा लेखकेन विस्मृतिवशात् त्यक्तम् आसीत्
तत् पृथक् पत्रत्रयान्तरं लिखितम् ॥
संवित्प्रकाशः ॥

A third possible manuscript is deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona, number 472 (1875-6), it is written in Devanagari script. Although the catalogue describes it as complete, it is just two folios long. Named Saṁvitprakāśa, it is attributed to Harṣadattasūnu.

Although manuscript A generally contains better readings than B, they not infrequently agree in readings that require emendation, [[4]] indicating that they are derived from closely related sources which bear the defective text of an original common source. The main evidence to support this view is the condition of the first section of our text. Thus, whereas the length of the succeeding sections corresponds to that stated in the colophons, the first section which Vāmanadatta himself says is 160 verses long, runs into not more than 138. This discrepency can be partially, at least, accounted for by the loss of the initial portion of the text. Thus, the beginning lacks the usual benedictory verse and starts very abruptly so that even though both manuscripts agree, there can be little doubt that the original text did not begin this way.

Further evidence to suggest this is found in the Lakṣmītantra. The fourteenth chapter of this Tantra quotes extensively from the first section of our text.⁶

As it happens, these reference are all drawn in serial order from the Saṁvitprakāśa. The first of these verses, known to be from the Saṁvitprakāśa independently from references, is not found in the manuscripts. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that it comes from the initial, lost portion of our text. Apart from this omission, it appears from internal evidence that the text of the first section has suffered losses within it as well as additions. The edition of the text has therefore entailed the following emendations in its basic forms:

1. The second line of verse 10 is not found in either manuscripts as found in Spandapradīpikā (p. 112) where this verse is quoted. That the text has suffered a loss is supported by the ‘yatha’ in the first line which requires a ’tatha’ in the second and so this line has been added in the critical edition.
2. Similarly, the ‘yatha’ is the second line of verse 1/35 suggests the existance of another line containing ’tatha’ or the like. Possibly L.T., 14/22 contains a modified version of this line but as its original form is uncertain the critical text has not been altered.
3. Line 1/37ab is not found in the manuscripts but has been added on the basis of a quote in Spandapradīpikā (p. 111) where this line is found. Conversely, although an extra line appears in verse 1/57 which is missing in the quote found in Spandapradīpikā (p. 97), it has not been omitted in the critical edition.

Vāmanadatta, the Author of the Saṁvitprakāśa

[[5]]

Ekāyana

Kashmiri Śaiva authors refer to the writer of the Saṁvitprakāśa as Vāmanadatta.⁷ He himself confirms that this is - his name in the concluding verses of each section.⁸ He also says that he was bom a brahmin in Kashmir and that he belonged to the Ekāyana.⁹ In this way he tells us that he was a Pañcarātrin for it is to the Ekāyana that the Pañcarātra affiliates itself. Thus Rāmānuja’s teacher, Yāmunācārya, who lived in South India about the middle of the tenth century wrote a work, now lost, called the Kāśmirāgama-prāmāṇya. There he is said to have sought to establish the revealed character (apauruṣeyatva) of the Ekāyana branch of the white Yajurveda which Pañcarātrins claim is the original source of their Agamic literature.¹⁰

The Pancarātra tradition considers the Ekāyanaveda to be a ‘secret tradition’ (rahasyamnaya).¹¹ But even so, the dominant feature of the Ekāyana is traditionally said by Pañcarātrins to be its Vedic character which thus establishes the authority of the Pāñcarātra and its sacred literature. Revealed, according to the Iśvarasaṁhitā, to Śandilya at the beginning of Kālīyuga by Saṁkarṣaṇa, it is described as the Ekāyana Veda, being the one path to liberation.

[[6]]

The word ‘Ekāyana’ appears already in the Chandogyopanisad as the name of a ‘fifth Veda’ thus indicating the antiquity of early, possibly Vaiṣṇava, groups that referred to their scriptures in these terms. At any rate, the point is that the term ‘Ekāyana’ is extensively found in Pancarātra literature as a way of referring to the Pancarātra and its scriptures as affiliated to the Veda. Indeed, according to these sources, the Ekāyana is not just a part of the Veda but the ‘very root of the tree of the Veda’,¹² that ‘stands at the head of the Vedas’.¹³ Quite in keeping with Vāmanadatta’s affirmation of his Ekāyana affiliations, the text confirms his thoroughgoing Vaisnavism and his incorporation of Pancarātra concepts in places confirms his Pañcarātra associations.¹⁴

All we know about Vāmanadatta is what he himself tells us in this, his only recovered work. He says that his mother was called Ratnadevī and that his father was Devadatta, the son of Rātradatta.¹⁵ He also refers to his daughter Vamadevī who, he tells us, wrote a hymn to Viṣņu, possibly called Haristuti.¹⁶

Other vāmana-s

We must therefore distinguish our Vāmanadatta from the Vāmananatha, also known as ŚrīVāmana and Hrasvanatha, who wrote the (A)Dvayasampatti, in so far as the latter was not the son of Devadatta but of Harṣadatta.

[[7]]

Anyway, this text, which seems to have originally been a commentary on the Vijñānabhairava or, at any rate dedicates space to commenting on a verse from it, is entirely Śaiva.

Similar considerations cast doubt on the identity of our Vāmanadatta with the author of the Svabodhodayamañjari. The author of this short but interesting yogic tract, cast in the style of the Vijnañabhairava¹⁷ identifies himself as Vāmanadatta, the son of Harṣadatta.¹⁸ Thus, there can be no doubt that there were at least two Vāmanadatta’s known to Kashmiri Śaiva authors by Abhinavagupta’s time.

Again, Yogarāja quotes a verse as being by vīravamaka. which translated reads:

“We worship (the deity) incessantly by means of the transcendental fire sacrifice in which the fuel is the forest of duality and death itself the human victim (mahāpaśu).”¹⁹

Although this verse cannot be traced in the manuscripts of the Saṁvitprakāśa, they are incomplete and it could, anyway, have been drawn from another work by our Vāmanadatta. However, this does not seem very likely in so far as the form of the ’transcendental fire sacrifice’ is drawn from a nodel that is clearly more Śaiva then Vaiṣṇava.

[[8]]

The word ‘vīra’ in the author’s name lends further weight to the view that this verse is drawn from a work written by a Śaiva, rather than Vaiṣṇava, author. Thus, it is not at all certain whether vīraVāmanaka and our Vāmanadatta were the same person.

Abhinavagupta connection

The same uncertainty prevails concerning Abhinavagupta’s reference to a Vāmanaka as one of his teachers in the Tantrāloka.²⁰ Although Abhinavagupta does refer to Vāmanadatta with respect in one place as ‘guru’ he may simply mean that he was one of his venerable predecessors or elder contemporaries rather than literally his teacher. However, even though Abhinavagupta was averse to Vaiṣṇavas, as are Śaivites in general, he was prepared to concede that the views of others were valuable even if they taught what he considered to be lower doctrines. Thus he wrote that: “I myself, for this very reason, have frequented, moved by curiosity for lower doctrines and scriptures, masters of all sorts, logicians, Vedic scholars, Buddhists, Jainas and Vaiṣṇavas etc..”²¹ Perhaps Vāmanadatta was one of these Vaiṣṇava teachers to whom Abhinava refers. If so, Vāmanadatta was his elder contemporary thus placing him in the beginning of the eleventh century.

Again, Bhagavad-utpala quotes Vāmanadatta frequently and, although his date is uncertain, we can be sure that he was not prior to Utpaladeva, Abhinava’s grand-teacher, as he also quotes from his Iśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā in a number of places.²²

[[9]]

But although we can thus be sure that Vāmanadatta was not later than Abhinavagupta there is no certain evidence available at present to establish a minimum date for him. Even so, it seems to me that Vāmanadatta was probably either an elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta or belonged to the generation just preceding him. At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that he lived and wrote in Kashmir sometime between the 9th and 12th century, that is, during the period of Kashmiri Śaivism’s most vigourous growth. This was a period during which such a large number of Kashmiri scholars and religious men turned their attention to writing and teaching that in many cases it is hard to decide who preceded whom and, indeed, many were contemporaries of different ages. The style and content of Vāmanadatta’s work is in itself eloquent testimony to his belonging to this rich period of India’s religious history.

The Vaiṣṇava Monism of the Saṁvitprakāśa

Saṁvitprakāśa, the title of the first chapter, coincides, as we have seen, with the name of the entire text and, in fact, the symbolic notion of consciousness as luminous is indeed one of the major themes of the text as a whole and of the first chapter in particular. Vāmanadatta, like the Pratyabhijñā philosopher, Utpaladeva, makes extensive use of this analogy thus imparting a Pratyabhijñā-like tone to his mode of discourse.

Adhārakārikā

This feature markedly distinguishes Vāmanadatta’s work from another monistic Vaiṣṇava tract that has come down to us and that we know was studied in 10th century Kashmir, namely, the Parāmarthasāra, also known as the Adhārakārikā written by Patañjali, alias Śeṣa, traditionally identified (certainly mistakenly) with the author (s) of the Mahabhaṣya commentary on Panini’s grammar and the Aphorisms on Yoga. Thus, although the latter work is monistic, conceiving the one ultimate reality to be Viṣnu who is pure consciousness, just as Vāmanadatta does, light analogics are virtually absent.²³

This divergence is emblematic of the divergent approach the two authors adopt to establish their monism and the aspect of the unity of reality which they have choosen to fix their attention upon. Ādisesa’s work reads much like a short treatise an Advaita Vedānta, indeed the author is represented as one who ‘knows the Veda and its limbs’ and as ‘having seen all the Vedāntaśāstra,’ on the basis of which he wrote his work.²⁴

[[10]]

Instead of the neuter Brahman, however, we find Viṣṇu who is represented as the supreme soul (paramātman)²⁵, but even though he is characterised as the ‘cause of creation, persistence and destruction’²⁶ the universe is Viṣṇu’s Māyā, which is unreal.²⁷ Clearly, there is a palpable contradiction here but even so, Ādisesa remains true to his Vaiṣṇava creed and so refuses to take recourse to Advaita Vedānta’s solution to this problem by making a distinction between the pure absolute - Brahman - which is eternally just as it is, unrelated to diversity in any way except as the reality behind an illusion, and the personal God - Iśvara -Who creates, sustains and destroys all things that, like the world he seemingly creates, is real only to the extent that he is the Brahman that appears to be him.

Thus Ādiśeṣa makes free use of the entire gamout of standard analogies to explain in what sense Viṣṇu’s Māyā is just an unreal illusion: it is like the water in a mirage (mr̥gatr̥āṣṇikā), the silver seen in nacre, the snake in the rope, the two moons mistakenly perceived by someone with an eye discase.²⁸

[[11]]

The specific character of individual things that appear to exist in the illusory world of Māyā is similarly explained by taking recourse to the standard Advaita notion of limiting adjuncts (upadhi) produced by ignorance. The analogy is also the well known Advaita one of the sun that shines reflected in different pools of water-just so the Supreme Self appears diversified in the things of the world, established as it is in all the limiting conditions that delineate apparently existing objects.²⁹ Consequently, even though Viṣṇu is said to be the creator, Ādiśeṣa declares that:

“Just as there is no cause of the creation and destruction of the snake (mistakenly perceived) in the rope,
so too there is no cause here of the arising and destruction of the universe.”³⁰

Thus, just as at the cosmic level the ultimate principle does nothing, so too at the individual level, the Self, like the Sāṁkhyan Puruṣa, is perfectly inactive.

We can contrast this view with that presented by Abhinava in his Śaiva adaptation of this text.³¹ Abhinava agrees with Ādiśeṣa that the individual soul merges into the Brahman when he overcomes Māyā and that it consists essentially of thought constructs centred on duality.³²

Ādiśeṣa says that this takes place when the soul realises that Viṣṇu’s Māyā is insubstantial like the snow, foam or bubbles formed from water or the smoke that issues from a fire. The practicioner must contantly refresh this awareness ( bhāvanā), through it he is liberated by becoming one with the Brahman. According to Abhinava, however, contemplative insight (bhāvanā) into the nature of the principles of existence is the result of realising one’s own universal “I” consciousness that is experienced not just as the one universal consciousness which is the passive ground of Being but as supremely active, thus he writes:

[[12]]

“I am the Lord who playfully propels the machine of the wheel of energies. My nature is pure and I hold the position of the Lord of the great wheel of energies. It is in me alone that all things manifest as do jars and other ( objects) in a clean mirror. Everything extends out of me as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one who sleeps. I myself am all things (and they are related to me) like hands, feet and other (limbs are related to the) body. I alone manifest in all this like the light (that shines) in (all) existing things.”

इति शक्तिचक्रयन्त्रं क्रीडायोगेन वाहयन् देवः ।
अहमेव शुद्धरूपः शक्ति-महा-चक्र-नायक-पद-स्थः॥
मय्येव भाति विश्वं दर्पण इव निर्मले घटादीनि ।
मत्तः प्रसरति सर्वं स्वप्नविचित्रत्वमिव सुप्तात् ॥
अहमेव विश्वरूपः करचरणादिस्वभाव इव देहः ।
सर्वस्मिन्नहमेव स्फुरामि भावेषु भास्वरूपमिव ॥
P.S., 47-9.

While Abhinava affirms the activity of the Self which he understands to be not just a knower but also an agent, Ādisesa categorically denies that the Self is active. Present in the body the Self is the embodied soul (dehi ), his presence stimulates the activity of the body, mind and senses, but he does nothing, just as the magnet that attracts iron to itself is inactive.

मायामयोऽप्यचेता गुणकरणगणः करोति कर्माणि
तद्-अधिष्ठाता देही सचेतनोऽपि न करोति किञ्चिदपि ।
यद्वद् अचेतनम् अपि सन् निकटस्थे भ्रामके भ्रमति लोहम् ।
तद्वत् करण-समूहश् चेष्टति चिदधिष्ठिते देहे
A. K., 11-12.

Thus :

“The embodied soul sees, hears, smells, touches, tastes and perceives but in so far as he (as the Self is really ) devoid of intellect, senses and body, he does nothing.”

द्रष्टा श्रोता धाता
स्पर्शयिता रसयिता ग्रहीता च।
देही देहेन्द्रिय-धी-
विवर्जितः स्यान् न कर्तासौ
Ibid., 62.

[[13]]

Abhinava modifies this verse to fit his own view and places it at the conclusion of his previous statement concerning the experience of the Self’s authentic nature as the agent of creation etc., thus his version reads:

“Even though the one who sees, hears and smells, being devoid of the senses and body does nothing, it is I alone who deploy the various reasonings of the philosophies and scriptures.”

द्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता
देहेन्द्रिय-वर्जितोऽप्य् अकर्तापि ।
सिद्धान्तागम-
तर्कांश् चित्रान् अहम् एव रचयामि॥
P.S., 50.

According to Ādisesa there is no agent because there is nothing in reality for him to act upon.(4) Abhinava and Ādisesa agree that the Lord is not affected by the troubles of the world, it is the deluded who are peaceful, happy or sad according to their state of mind.

शान्त इव मनसि शान्ते
हृष्टे हृष्ट इव मूढ इव मूढे । व्यवहारस्थो न पुनः
परमार्थत ईश्वरो भवति
A.K. 34.

Cf.

शान्ते शान्त इवायं
हृष्टे हृष्टो विमोहवति मूढः ।
तत्त्व-गणे सति भगवान्
न पुनः परमार्थतः स तथा ॥
P.S., 38.

The Self seems to act due to the activity of the mind etc., just as the sun reflected in running water seems to move. Again, although the Self is omnipresent, it is manifest in the intellect just as Rahu becomes visible when he devours the moon during an eclipse.

गच्छति गच्छति सलिले
दिनकर-बिम्बं, स्थिते स्थितिं याति । अन्तःकरणे गच्छति
गच्छत्य् आत्मापि तद्-वदिह

राहुर् अदृश्योऽपि यथा
शशिबिम्बस्थः प्रकाशते जगति ।
सर्वगतोऽपि तथात्मा
बुद्धिस्थो दृश्यताम् एति ။
A.K., 17-8 C., P.S. 7-8.

Thus Ādisesa’s system tends towards a monism of the Advaita Vedānta type and develops the Sāṁkhya theme of Puruṣa’s passivity with respect to Prakr̥ti, here identified with Māyā. The embodied soul does nothing, it is Māyā that acts. The Self seems to be an agent and enjoyer only because of its association with the body.

Indeterminateness

Now, even though Vāmanadatta agrees with Ādisesa that there is only one reality and that it is pure consciousness which he praises devoutly as Viṣṇu, he sets off on a different tack to present and establish his monism.

Like all monists, Vāmanadatta stresses in various ways the indeterminate nature of the one reality it is not exclusively one or other of possible prototypical categories that characterize things such as subject and object, inner and outer [[14]] etc., and it is beyond conceptualization and hence speech.³³

This implies, according to Vāmanadatta, that the duality verbal expression necessitates is not real but is merely a conceived idea³⁴ thus distinctions such as that between subject and object are false.[^14-3]

However, this does not mean that the world and those that perceive it are unreal illusions. The world of things cannot be based on their non-existence.³⁵ Vāmanadatta stresses that the appearance of an illusory snake would not be possible if there were no rope. Māyā is not the illusory world, it is the false knowledge of ignorance which perceives duality in Viṣṇu who is one and non-dual. When this Māyā is destroyed one perceives ultimate reality as it is.³⁶

The world is not unreal, on the contrary it is as real as Viṣṇu himself who making it as he pleases, is one with it. Thus, according to Vāmanadatta, the world is actually created, sustained and destroyed by Viṣṇu who, in doing so, forms himself into the universe thus assuming his external form to then revert to his own internal, undifferentiated nature when it is destroyed.

Vāmanadatta thus develops a peculiar position of his own here. According to him, it is possible to explain the generation of the world both in terms of real and apparent change. The Advaita view maintains that the world is a product of a seeming change in the Brahman, like the apparent change that takes place when we perceive a rope mistakenly to be a snake. This view is sharply contrasted with the one that asserts that the Brahman changes into the universe by altering itself, like milk that becomes curd. Vāmanadatta accepts both as equally possible explanations:

“He whose unique nature is supremely pure consciousness alone assumes physical form. This can be explained both in terms of real and apparent change. (Explained as merely) apparent change, it is You, O Acyuta ( Who persist unchanged although) it [[15]] appears to be otherwise.

(And as a ) real transformation, it is always You (who, although essentially the same, assume many forms) just as gold (fashioned into an ) earring (remains gold).”³⁷

Even so, Vāmanadatta stresses that subject/object distinctions are not ultimately real. It is the notion based on duality (bhedasaṁkalpa) that splits up the unity of consciousness into subject and object, inner and outer.³⁸ Both the condition of the subject and that the of object are states of Viṣṇu who is the one, pure consciousness and so they are ultimately false in themselves.³⁹ It is only the foolish who, seeing the world of subjects and objects, believe that that is the way things are also within Viṣnu whereas he is really beyond all phenomenal being and hence contamination by such relative distinctions. As Viṣṇu is the universal nature of all things like the gold of gold ornaments - there can be no distinction within him.⁴⁰ There can be no time or space within him who is the one support of all, and consists of all things while at the same time transcending all particulars.⁴¹

Language and Māyā

Thus, Māyā is the ignorance or false knowledge of duality. The way this false knowledge operates is through language - for that which is undivided within one’s own consciousness appears to be fragmented when it reaches the plane of speech.⁴² Duality is just the way we talk about things and hence think about them. The primary form of this duality is that between subject and object. But if we reflect upon this relation and what it entails we discover that it is not as it initially appears to be.

[[16]]

Momentariness of māyā

Objectivity (meyatva), Vāmanadatta argues, amounts to a state of limitation and the exclusion of elements one from another (pariccheda), and this doesn’t take place within consciousness (jñāna) which is not an object of knowledge but the prerequisite condition of all knowledge. Indeed it is this, the ultimate nature of the perceiving consciousness (graha) of both subject and object, that is real and persists when they cease: all else is false.⁴³ The notions that ’this is other than me’ and ‘I am different from that’ run contrary to oneness and cannot persist even for an instant⁴⁴ and they do not in fact do so for all thought is momentary.(5) In reality cognitive consciousness (jñāna) shines by itself, it does not require any object.⁴⁵

The status of things as objects of knowledge is not due to some inherent attribute they possess of themselves, but is due to their relation to a perceiving subject, while the subjectivity (mātṛtva) in the perceiving subject has no existence apart from the object.⁴⁶

The establishment (siddhi ) of truly existing things is independent (anapeksa ). There is neither subjectivity nor objectivity in those things that are independent.⁴⁷

Other dualities

Similarly, if it is impossible to conceive of knowledge with no field of application (viṣaya ), it is also impossible for this field to exist without content (viṣayin ).⁴⁸

The same argument holds good with relation to action (karma) and the agent. Action pertains to that which is made manifest by consciousness (prakāśya ) but this can have no existence in the absence of an agent,⁴⁹ but as nothing is manifest but consciousness itself there can be no question of action or agency.

Creativity of consciousness

At the same time, however, Vāmanadatta affirms that Viṣṇu, the consciousness which is the one ultimate reality, is genuinely creative. The entire universe arises out of him⁵⁰ and he precedes and supports all the business of daily life (vyavahāra), be it that of the body, speech or mind.⁵¹

[[17]]

As consciousness, Viṣṇu is the unique cause of all things, ⁵² and nothing can act apart from him⁵³ for all that is impelled to action in any way is ultimately impelled by consciousness, the one reality.[^17-1]

Ultimate reality of consciousness

Thus what Vāmanadatta means when he says that

“creation has no being (satta): being pertains to consciousness”

is not just that all this world of the fettered (samsara) is merely an imaginary notion (vikalpa ),⁴⁴ but that, unlike consciousness which requires nothing, there is no phenomenal entity which just exists and is known as such in itself independently of consciousness.⁴⁵ (4) It is this seeming independence which is false.⁴⁶

Vāmanadatta thus accepts that the one reality is varied (vicitra); unity is different from relative distinctions and duality (bheda), it is the whole of reality which is involved in it, not just one reality or existing thing contrasted with another independent reality.

Caturātman

Vāmanadatta explains all this by taking recourse to a common Pancarātra notion which understands Viṣṇu as four-fold (caturātman) as himself and his emanations (vyūha). These four are equated with various quaternities of mutually dependent elements that represent phases or levels within the entire range of reality. These are variously defined in different contexts as:

1. Reality (vastu ), phenomenal being (bhava ), determinate particulars (artha) and action (kriyā).⁴⁷
2. The four levels of speech: Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī.⁴⁸
3. Subject (pramātr̥ ), object (meya ), means of knowledge (mana) and veridical cognitive consciousness (miti).⁴⁹

This way of understanding causality leaves Vāmanadatta free to talk about Viṣṇu’s cosmically creative activity in terms which often remind us of Kashmiri Śaivism and that fits with a world view that generally characterized the monisms of Tantric systems as a whole as distinct from those developed from the Upanisads(??). This form of monism is formed by an identification of the opposites which thus simultaneously involves their transcendence.

[[18]]

Unitary reality

Reality is one because it includes everything, thus it is free of duality. Oneness is not achieved merely by denying multiplicity as unreal from the perspective of a higher transcendental reality. In this way Viṣṇu is completely established in himself at all times and yet generates and destroys the universe that arises from him and falls back into him like the ocean that is in itself waveless and yet generates waves.⁵⁴

svātantrya

Thus, requiring nothing outside himself, Viṣṇu is endowed with perfect creative freedom (svātantrya )⁵⁵ and so he unfolds everywhere,⁵⁶ while the arising and falling away of all things takes place in the Lord who is the centre of all the daily dealings of life.⁵⁷ Thus although Viṣṇu is pure, uninterrupted consciousness, free of subject and object and the source from which consciousness arises ⁵⁸, the passivity of knowledge does not contradict the activity of action: they are ultimately one⁵⁹.(4) Viṣṇu is equally cause, effect and instrument for he is all things ⁶⁰.

Oneness is thus established by establishing the ultimate identity of seemingly contrasting categories in Viṣṇu who is pure consciousness. Thus the absence of subject-object distinctions within Viṣṇu is due to their identity, it is not attributed to their ficticious character. Once the object is known as it truly is, it is realised to be consciousness.⁶¹

Again, just as the object can never be independent of the knowledge of it⁶², so this knowledge is not different from the perceiving subjectivity.⁶³ Thus, everything is pervaded by consciousness and consumed by it just as fire burns and pervades fuel ⁶⁴ and so, as Viṣnu is pure consciousness, he is all things. ⁶⁵

[[19]]

Prakāśa

But although Viṣṇu contains everything and is in everything,⁶⁶ he is not conditioned by the things conditioned by time, space and form because he is internal consciousness.

Now all this can be expressed simply and directly, as Vāmanadatta does, by representing Viṣṇu-consciousness, the one reality, as light. Although this is a metaphor in a sense, in another, absolute divine consciousness and the world manifested in and through it are literally the light of consciousness and this is the way it is experienced. This presentation of the one, absolute reality as light is well know to Indian thought from very early times. It finds its classic expression in the following verse which appears in a number of Upanisads:

“The sun shines not there, nor moon and stars; These lightnings shine not, much less this (earthly) fire! After Him, as He shines, doth everything shine. This whole world is illumined by His light.”⁶⁷

From this point of view all things can be classified into two basic types, namely, those things which illuminate (prakāśaka) and those which are illuminated (prakāśya). The illuminators are both the perceiving subjects and their activity through which the objects of illumination are known, made know and hence, from this idealist point of view, created. All these illuminating lights shine by virtue of Viṣṇu, the one light.⁶⁸

In this sense, Viṣṇu is always immediately apparent as all things, in the act of knowing them and as the knower. As the immediate appearance of things just as they are, that is, as the shining of the universal light, they reveal Viṣṇu’s nature which is thus directly apparent (prakaṭa). The light of the sun illumines an object and so makes it apparent (prakaṭa), whereas before it was obscure (aprakaṭa) and hence unknown. But Viṣṇu is always apparent as all things, there is no need to find ways to make him evident, nor is there any need of proofs to establish his existence.⁶⁹

[[20]]

Thus, the light which is the illuminator (prakāśaka) is at the same time the object of illumination without this compromising its essentially luminous nature as the pure presentation of things just as they are in the immediacy of their direct experience. Thus Vāmanadatta writes:

“None dispute that You (O Lord ) are the essential nature of (all) things; it is not darkness (aprakāśa) that shines when (the light of consciousness) becomes the object of illumination.”⁷⁰

In this way Vāmanadatta accounts for unity as the identity of opposites understood as aspects of the same noumenous reality, namely, the shining of the light of consciousness. But while the illuminator as light manifests the object and thus presents itself as the object’s manifest appearance, it also transcends it:

“Just as these things are separate from the light of the sun and it is undivided, so are You separate from all these objects of Your illumination.”⁷¹

Unconditionality

This verse illustrates Vāmanadatta’s second approach to oneness, namely, what might be called the logic of transcendence⁷² in which the unity of the absolute is established as being beyond diversity. Viṣṇu, the one reality is unaffected by the diversity of things - he is unconditioned. Although present in that which has form and is determined by time and space, he is free of them.⁷² But this is not because they are unreal or less then real in respect to Viṣṇu’s reality: Viṣṇu is free of time, space and form because he encompasses everything; the universe is full of Viṣṇu and there is no state in which he is absent.⁷³ Thus Vāmanadatta’s transcendental logic is soon transformed into a ’logic of immanence’ in which the absolute is understood as one because it excludes nothing rather than because it stands beyond the many phenomena subject to a conditioned, contingent state of existence.

vikalpa

But if all this is true and Viṣṇu is that same consciousness which is in every perceiving conscious being as its most essential nature why are we not aware of this fact directly and so, being conscious of our ultimate identity with Viṣṇu, be in his same state? The answer, Vāmanadatta affirms, is to be found in the [[21]] negative, privative character of thought (vikalpa ). This is a theme Vāmanadatta develops extensively throughout the third prakaraṇa where he discusses the nature of thought and its formation through the power of speech.

The world of daily life is perceived through a veil of thought constructs which represent what is presented by the shining of the light of consciousness in conceptual terms. Those who cannot penetrate through this veil of conceptual representation and be conscious of the immediacy of things and themselves just as they are, that is, as clearly evident manifestations of the light of consciousness, are cut off both from the outer reality of the object and the inner reality of the subject. Thus removed from themselves and, by the same token, from the world around them, they are helplessly caught up in the trammels of conditioned existence. Thus Vāmanadatta pertinently quotes the dictum : “all thought is samsara.”⁷⁴(5)

Like all Hindu monists Vāmanadatta preaches that liberation comes by identifying ourselves with the true Self, namely, Viṣnu and by freeing ourselves of false identification with the body and all else that is not Self (anātman). For while the Self is bliss itself, non-Self - its very opposite is suffering.⁷⁵

But while the Self must be known, it cannot be known as an object. If the Self where to be an object the subject who perceives it would be superior to it. Thus there would be something higher then the Self and therefore another higher than that would be required in order to know it. Ultimate Being cannot be known like a sense object, for all sense objects are limited, conditioned entities.⁷⁶-

This does not mean that the Self is never known objectively, rather that it is not known in itself as it is in this way. When consciousness is perceived as an object it becomes the things of the world that are ‘other’ than the Self. As Vāmanadatta says:

“Just as one perceives the external form of that which is in the field of vision,
just so consciousness,
established in the act of perception,
perceives its own nature as the object of knowledge.” ⁷⁷

[[22]]

In order to know the Self, we must find another made of knowledge:

“Transcending all things, how can anyone describe Your nature ( O Lord )? Description applies only to that which is divided while the Self of none is such and that (Self) is You, Who are the Self of All, and so for this reason also You cannot be described. The nature of the Supreme Self, free of alterations and divisions is the only means to know You: You can never be conceived.”⁷⁸

Words, the vehicle of thought, seemingly break up the unity of reality for the ignorant. We distinguish between one thing and another labelling one and then the other according to their functions this division is a purely mental construct, although useful, indeed essential, for daily life, it is not real.⁷⁹

Distinctions as false

If some existing thing where to stand contradicted by another, this contradiction would necessarily extend to its essential nature. The being of entities cannot in itself oppose itself; difference, distinction and contradiction are all notions, they are not qualities inherent in the being of things.⁸⁰ Similarly, if Viṣṇu is everything and he is discernable in both subject and object, this distinction too is false it is just a notion.⁸¹ Viṣṇu must be known directly and not as the subject knows his object and that is only possible if he is the Self:

“Everyone knows one’s own nature (svarupa ),
none can know that of another
and one’s own omnipresent nature is You (O Lord).
Thus the universe is full of You.”⁸²

[[23]]

Epistemology

Vāmanadatta seeks to establish that this awareness of Self is the basis of all knowledge, even the most mundane. He builds up his epistemology on the basis of an idealism that accounts for the possibility of knowledge by positing it not as the product of cognitive acitivity but as its a prior ontological and epistemological ground which cognitive activity simply reveals. Veridical cognitive consciousness (mānatā )⁸³ is in every case one’s own self-awareness alone (svasanvedana) which is understood to be the very Being (satta) of consciousness free of thought constructs.⁸⁴ The three sources of right knowledge (pramā) are direct perception, inference and scripture.⁸⁵ All means of knowledge (pramāna) are each individually associated with their specific object and so do not allow the subject to experience pure awareness directly⁸⁶ unless he makes a special effort to do so. Thus Vāmanadatta writes:

“You transcend all thought constructs and so, although directly apparent, are forgotten,
as happens with something in front of a man whose mind if full of desire for something else.”⁸⁷

ahaṁbhāva

But although Viṣṇu is worshipped as consciousness and this consciousness manifests as the objects of the world in and through the act of perception, Vāmanadatta does not go as far as his Kasamiri Śaiva counterparts who, perceiving reality in much the same way, conclude that the world order and all that transcends it are encompassed in the self-reflective awareness of a universal “I” consciousness. Thus, while Vāmanadatta’s phenomenology coincides with that of Utpaladeva and of later Kashmiri Śaivites in general as far as the phenomenon of presentation is concerned, there is divergence in the characterization of the representational aspect, that is, the judgement of what is presented by the shining of the light of consciousness. A Kashmiri Śaivite would say that Vāmanadatta does not tackle this problem thoroughly.

[[24]]

Implicit in his view is that not all representation is conceptual and that this non- conceptual representation is essentially an awareness of the Self as all things and as beyond them and that it is the basis of all knowledge, but he doesn’t take the next step and posit that this awareness is inherent in consciousness, in the sense that consciousness is self-awareness through which the world of conceptual representation is generated and hence the play of objectivity. I am not referring here to a mere absence of a technical term such as ‘vimarśa’, more to the point is that Vāmanadatta categorically rejects any form of egoic projection onto absolute consciousness. All sense of self must be eradicated. As Vāmanadatta says:

“O Mādhava, only You remain when one free of ego (reflects that)
You perform this action and ( that it accords with) Your nature.
Now if this separation (from You) which corresponds to this (false) presumption of egoic existence dissolves into the Self by devotion to You,
separation is destroyed and oneness is established.”⁸⁸

The sense of oneness as “I” is never an independent self-subsisting awareness; according to Vāmanadatta it is always the subject of predication as when one thinks: “this is different from me and I am different from that."(4)⁸⁹ It is thus essentially a thought construct like all relativizing analytic notions. Instead of being a notion centred on the object it is a notion concerning oneself (asmad-vikalpa) and so must, like its objective counterpart, be rejected as short of ultimacy.

Vāmanadatta equates the ego with the notion of personal existence as individual, appropriating or acquisitive consciousness. It consists of an intent (saṁkalpa) to make the object one’s own. Thus, rather than the sense of “I” it is better described as the sense of “mine”. This sense of “mine” (mamatā ) expresses itself each moment as an intention which leads to another, thus maintaining its existence. Vāmanadatta thus describes it as a transitory (anitya) product of the pulsing activity of consciousness (spanda ). Just as death is the inevitable result of its persistence, so death ceases when it comes to an end.⁹⁰

[[25]]

Here we notice a radical departure from the Śaiva phenomenology of Utpaladeva. This need not surprise us. The ego is understood in most schools of Indian thought as relative, a product of thought constructs which serves as a provisional subjective referent for a consciousness that wrongly identifies itself as the body and mind. At best, it is understood as part of the inner mental organ operating there as the factor which personalizes or appropriates the perceptions reflected and made known in the intellect.⁹¹ It is Utpaladeva, who formulates for the first time in his Iśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā a notion of the absolute as a pure ego consciousness and makes full use of it in a completely developed system thus extending the universal Hindu doctrine of Self into a higher metaphysics of the Self as a Fichtian-like superego.⁹² That Vāmanadatta’s views are compatible with this ulterior development is exemplified by the extensive quotation of his work in the fourteenth chapter of the Lakṣmītantra⁹³ for in this work Lakṣmī, Viṣnu’s spouse and power, is characterized as his “I-ness” (ahanta) while he is eternal and perfect “I” consciousness. Thus Lakṣmī proclaims in the Lakṣmītantra:

“He, Hari being “I” (the Self) is regarded as the, self in all beings. I am the eternal I-hood of all living beings.”⁹⁴

And:

“Therefore Brahman, the eternal, is called Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa because the I-entity is always inherent in I-hood. The I-entity is always recognised as the source of I-hood; for one cannot exist without the other and cach is invariably linked to the other.”[^25-5].

śaiva influence

The Lakṣmītantra, which is certainly later than Utpaladesa, makes use here, as in much of the rest of its metaphysics, of notions that are typically Kashmiri Śaiva. ⁹⁵

[[26]]

If an original Pancarātra saṁhitā is free to do this, there is no reason to be surprised if Vāmanadatta, who was a Kashmiri living in Kashmir during the period of Kashmiri Śaivism’s most energetic period of growth, drew inspiration from the Śaiva monism current in his day. The close affinity between Vāmanadatta’s views and monistic Śaivism is clearly evidenced by Abhinavagupta addressing him respectfully as ’teacher’,⁹⁶ even though throughout his works he consistently relegates Vaisnavism to a lower level than Śaivism as a whole and particularly that of his own Śaiva traditions.⁹⁷ In short, Vāmanadatta’s work, despite its divergence in certain respects from Śaiva monism - particularly with regard to the ultimacy of the ego-sense - still remains, nonetheless, highly compatible with it. The extensive use Bhagavad-utpala makes of the Saṁvit-prakāśa as a source of references in his commentary on the Spandakarikā clearly exemplifies how Vāmanadatta’s work can serve to bridge the gap between Śaivism and Vaisnavism in the Kashmiri Śaiva context.

[[27]]

Bhagavadutpala, as his ancestry and traditional appellation - Utpala Vaiṣṇava - suggest, had strong ties with the Vaiṣṇava community although he was undoubtedly a Śaivite when he wrote his commentary.⁹⁸ Vāmanadatta’s work served his purpose admirably, for here was a text that he could freely quote that would find approval by both groups and so link together more closely the Pancarātra and Śaiva sources that he freely quotes without deference to one or the other in an attempt to establish that the doctrine of the Spandakārikā is taught in both.

Krama

Apart from these general, pervasive Śaiva influences that can be discerned in Vāmanadatta’s work, we find more specific references which show that Vāmanadatta accepted the more esoteric, strongly Śākta oriented Śaiva traditions prevalent in Kashmir, namely, those of the Krama school. Thus, for example, we can discern clear traces of Krama notions in the following passage:

“O Lord, the abiding condition of all things is that of Your own immutable nature simultaneously (manifest everywhere ),
it can be known by means of its progressively mutating nature (kramasvarupa) (that is such without thereby) running contrary to the simultaneity (of the immediacy of Being). Simultaneity is possible in the absence of progressive change (krama) which in its turn ( is possible only) in the absence of the former.
Thus, as they are mutually contradictory, they cannot arise from one another.
So, in this way, those who have realised the ultimate truth know that You manifest Your self-luminous conscious nature as the state of mutual dependence (between these polarities and all things).”⁹⁹

This way of understanding the fundamental polarities of existence as progression -krama -versus simultaneity -yaugapadya, is typical of Krama absolutism
which views the absolute as dynamic consciousness that, forming itself into all things,
is the entire process of creation, persistence and destruction,
while standing beyond them in a fourth ineffable - anakhya - state in which consciousness is at once all of them simultaneously.

[[28]]

From this point of view, the ineffability and absolute nature of consciousness, the one reality, lies in its being this progression without, even so, changing. This position is summed up by Abhinava when he says:

“the pure principle of consciousness transcends all talk of succession (krama) or its absence (akrama).”¹⁰⁰

There is one place in Vāmanadatta’s work where his Krama leanings are made fully explicit. In the beginning of the fourth section he makes a plea for tolerance, insisting that, although Viṣṇu’s energy assumes various names and forms according to different schools of thought, one cannot say that these differences correspond to separate principles or, for that matter, that they do not. This is, anyway, of no importance, that which one should abandon is not a view but karma which is binding and that which is to be taken up is the pure consciousness of the subject. He concludes that this power is:-

“One and abides in many states
as both mobile and motionless.
She rests on the foundation of time
which is the twelve - petal lotus
and by her progressive differentiation (kalana),
She, Kālakarṣiṇī, makes her (etemal) Time manifest as having assumed the form of (temporal) time by means of the generation and destruction of (all) existing things.”¹⁰¹

Kālakarṣiṇī, also called KālaSaṁkarṣiṇī, is well known as a form of Kālī venerated in the Krama school. Her association with the twelve-petelled lotus described as the foundation of time is possibly a reference to the cycle of twelve Kālīs that lies at the core of Krama mysticism.

[[29]]

Discontinuity

Important also as indicative of Vāmanadatta’s non-Vaiṣṇava influences is his representation of the arising and falling away of images within consciousness as a discontinuous process: there is a gap between the arising of one form and the falling away of another. The attentive soul who can catch this moment and the centre between one perception and the next, no longer feels the bondage of the illusory play of Māyā through the activity of thought but experiences it all as the pure expansion of consciousness.¹⁰² We can compare this view with Kṣemarāja who says:

“This supreme plane of awareness consists of all the powers (of consciousness) pulsing in unity.
Although actually manifest to all constantly,
on the plane of Māyā it does not sustain a firm realisation of consciousness within oneself.
Even there, however, it is clearly manifest at every junction (between cognitions).”¹⁰³

In the centre between perceptions the attentive soul can experience
the pure indeterminate awareness ( nirvikalpa)
that serves as the basis of determinate perception as its source, resting place and end.
In the centre abides what Vāmanadatta calls ‘pure experience’ Śuddhānubhava ¹⁰⁴, that is, the fundamental self-awareness (sva-samvedana) through which consciousness is perceived and is the basis of all knowledge which Kashmiri Śaivites identify, as we have already noted, with absolute “I” consciousness.

Vaiṣṇavatva

Finally, it is important to stress that despite the powerful influence Śaiva monism apparently exerted on Vāmanadatta he remains thoroughly Vaiṣṇava throughout his work.

Viṣṇu is his sole object of devotion which he also worships as his incarnations that he understands as hypostheses or aspects of consciousness and its manifestations.¹⁰⁵

His Pañcarātra associations are also clearly evident from his presentation of the four vyuhas - Vasudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, to which he assigns mystic centres in the body as part of a developing praxis in which their association with their energies plays a prominent role.¹⁰⁶

[[30]]

Practice

Indeed, despite the space Vāmanadatta dedicates in his work to establishing,
even as he praises Viṣṇu,
that consciousness alone, free of all diversity and subject - object distinctions, is ultimately real,
his primary concern is with practice.

mantra

Thus not only does he dedicate space to a description of the yogic centres and channels in the body viewed from the perspective of his sophisticated idealism,
he also devotes the entire fifth chapter to an analysis of the phonemes as vital components of Mantra and vehicles of the sound (nada) or word (sabda) energy of consciousness which he identifies with the syllable Om and that make Mantras powerful and cosmically significant as incorporating within themselves the energies of all manifestation and what lies in the transcendent beyond it.

This concern fits naturally with Vāmanadatta’s recurrent references to Speech (vāc), its levels, forms and nature. Here he deals with a common concern of both Śaivites and Vaiṣṇavas discussed not only in their secondary śastric traditions but also in the primary scriptures of both groups.

Conclusion

To conclude we can say that the discovery and edition of Vāmanadatta’s work may well serve as a stimulus for further research into the interaction between Śaivism and Vaisnavism in general and, more specifically, between their monistic forms. Thus a work like Bhaskara’s Kakṣya-stotra evidences, in the passages quoted from it, signs of the author’s attempts to integrate certain basic Pañcarātra notions into his Śaiva monism.¹⁰⁷ Other works, like the Cic-chakti-saṁstuti,¹⁰⁸ that we know of only from quotations, exhibit a sort of intermediary character. This text, focusing on śakti, draws from both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava ideas to support its Śākta monism.

Again, although the Parāmartha-sāra draws its inspiration from other sources to develop its monism, its existence is a further indication that, although less extensive than their Śaiva equivalents, Vaiṣṇava monisms deserve to be carefully researched and not only in the works of known authors but, more especially, in the original Piñcarātra scriptures amongst which some, particularly the Ahirbudhnyasaṁhitā and the Lakṣmītantra, exhibit marked Śaiva influences.

List of Abbreviations

Title	Abbreviation
Adhārakārikā	A.K.
Tantrāloka	T.A.
Parāmarthasāra	P.S.
Parātriśikāvivarana	P.T.V.
Mahārthamañjari	M.M.
Lakṣmītantra	L.T.
Luptāgamasaṁgraha	L.A.S.
Vijñānabhairava	V.B.
Saṁvitprakāśa	S.P.
Spandanimaya	Sp.Nir.
Spandapradipikā	Sp. Pra.
Spandasamdoha	Sp.Sam.

[[31]]

The Lakṣmītantra and the Saṁvitprakāśa

[[Appendix]]

Listed below are the verses in chapter fourteen of the Lakṣmītantra that are related to those of the Saṁvitprakāśa.

1. L.T. 14/8ab reads :

नीले पीते सुखे दुःखे
चित्स्वरूपम् अखण्डितम् ।

S.P. quoted in T.A., 5/154 cd reads संविद्रूपम् in the place of चित्स्वरूपम् this verse quoted in Sp. Pra, p. 96, agrees with the L.T. cxactly.

2. L.T. 14/9-10 :

विकल्पोऽपि हि मद्-रूपं
स्वाच्छन्द्याद् एव निर्मितम् ।
चेत्यं विकल्प्यते येन
बहिर् अन्तर् व्यवस्थया
न बहिर् नैव चान्तस् तच्,
चिद्-रूपं मम तत् परम्
वेद्य-वेदक-रूपेण
भेद्यते मे स्वयं तया ॥

Cf. S.P., 1/1-2. Although these verses are substantially different in the L.T their common form with the S.P. is still clearly discernable.

3. L.T., 14/11 corresponds to S.P., 1/3, only the fourth pada contains variants, L. T. reads :

..रूपं तच्चेत्यतां गतम् ।

and S.P.:

.. नौमि तद् वैष्णवं पदम् ||

4. L.་., 14/12:

दूरापास्त-विकल्पेन
चेतसा यत्र भूयते
मध्यमां वृत्तिम् आस्थाय
चेत्यं संवित्तया तदा ॥

Cf., S.P., 1/4.

[[32]]

5. L.T., 14/13:

यथा चक्षुः-स्थितं रूपं
बाह्ये स्वं रूपम् ईक्ष्यते ।
तथा ज्ञान-स्थितं रूपं
ज्ञेये स्वं रूपम् ईक्ष्यते ॥

Cf., S.P., 1/9.

6. L.T., 14/14:

यथा वह्नि-समाविष्टं
काष्ठं तद्-रूपम् ईक्ष्यते
तथा संवित्-समाविष्टं
चेत्यं संवित्तयेक्षते॥

Cf. S.P., 1/9ab:

यथाग्निना समाविष्टं
सर्वं तद्-रूपम् ईक्ष्यते

The second line is not found in the extant manuscripts of the Saṁvitprakāśa, when Bhagavadutpala quotes this verse in Sp. Pra., p. 112 he supplies the second line which reads there:

तथा ज्ञान-समाविष्टं
सर्वं तद्-रूपम् ईक्ष्यताम्

7. L.T., 14/15:

वेद्यं वेदनतां नीत्वा
यदा वेत्त्रा निरूप्यते ।
तदा वित्तिमयी सा ऽहं
प्रत्यक्षा स्फुट-भासिनी ॥

CI. S.P., 1/24:

वेद्यं स्वरूपतां नीत्वा
यदा जानाति वेदनम् । तदानीं वेद्यता का स्यात्
का वा वेदनता परा ॥

[[11]]

Note that the manuscripts of the Saṁvitprakāśa read al instead of वेदनता, the latter reading is found in Sp. Pra., p. 89 and is decidedly better and so has been adopted.

8. L.T., 14/18ab:

मद्-ध्यानामृत-निष्यन्द-
क्षालिताशेष-वासनाः

Cf. S.P., 1/26 ab:

त्वद्-ध्यानामृत-निःष्यन्द-
निःशेष-शालिने नमः ॥

9. L.T., 14/19:

मम चित्तैक-रूपाया
वेद्य-वेदकतां जनाः
अ-विद्ययैव मन्यन्ते
मत्-संकल्पितया पुरा

Cf. S.P., 1/28

तवाचित्रैक-रूपस्य
वेद्य-वेदकतामयी॥
नाथ मिथ्यैव मन्यन्ते
सत्य-चिन्-मात्र-रूपिणः ॥

Note that MSS A, D, E and G of the L.T. read चित्रैक in the place of चित्तैक. This reading is clearly closer to the S.P.

10. L.T., 14/20b:

नं शान्ता नोदिता नापि
मध्यमाहं स्वरूपतः ।

Cf. S.P., 1/28 cd:

न शान्तम् उदितं नापि
तव रूपं न मध्यमम्

11. L.T., 14/21:

परित्यक्त-विभागेन
निस्तरङ्गेण चेतसा
ज्ञाये, विकल्प्यमाना तु
प्रत्यक्षाप्य् अस्मि विस्मृता ॥

cf. S.P., 1/34 cd - 35 ab:

परित्यक्त-विभागेन
ज्ञायसे न विकल्पसे ॥
विकल्पातीत-रूपत्वात्
प्रत्यक्षाऽप्य् असि विस्मृतः ।

12. L.T., 14/22ab:

पुरः स्थितो यथा भावश्
चेतसो ऽन्याभिलाषिणः ।

This line corresponds to S.P., 1/35 cd.

13. L.T., 14/25:

यथा जात्या सितं वस्त्रं
रक्तं रागेन केनचित् ।
पुनः स्व-वर्णम् अप्राप्य
नैव रागान्तरं श्रयेत् ॥

S.P., 1/40

The first line is identical, the second reads:

तत्-पद-प्राप्त-शुक्लत्वं
पुना रागान्तरं श्रयेत्

14. L.T., 14/27:

तथैवोच्चारयन् वाक्यं
वर्णाद् वर्णं कथं व्रजेत् ।
यदि मध्ये न विश्रान्तो
मयि शुद्ध-चिद्-आत्मनि ॥

S.P., 1/43

अयम् उच्चारयन् वाक्यं
वर्णाद् वर्णं कथं व्रजेत् ।
यावन् मध्ये न विश्रान्तस्
त्वयि शुद्धचिदात्मनि ॥

15. L.T., 14/28

एवं शुद्धा स्वतन्त्रापि
यद्-आकारोपरागिणी
तत्-त्यागापर-संचारा
मध्ये शुद्धैव भाम्य् अहम्

[[33]]

S.P., 1/44 reads चितिर् जात्या in the place of स्वतन्त्रापि and तिष्ठति for भाम्यहम्

16. L.T. 14/29 coincides with S.P., 1/45

L. T. reads: अग्नी-षोमेन्धनो,

S.P.: अग्नीषोमेश्वरो

17. L.T., 14/30:

धिया ध्येयम् अनालम्ब्य
विषयं चास्पृशन् बहिः ।
यद्-अन्तरा वेदयते ??
तन् मे रूपमनाकुलम्

S.P., 1/46:

धिया देहम् अनालम्ब्य
विषयं चादिशन्नपि
यदन्तरा वेदयते
तद् रूपं तव निर्मलम्

[[34]]

18. L.T., 14/35:

भावैर् विना यथा भानुः
समुदेति नभःस्थले
वेद्यैर् विनैव मे रूपम्
एवं प्रद्योतते स्वयम्

S.P., 1/52:

समुदेति यथा भावान्
विना भानुर् नभस्तले ।
वेद्यं विनैव भगवन्,
भवान् केन हृतोदयः ॥

19. L.T., 14/36:

अत्यन्ताच्छ-स्वभावत्वात्
स्फटिकादिर् यथा मणिः ।
अपरक्तो जपाद्यैस् तु
स्वेन रूपेण नेक्ष्यते

S.P., 1/53:

अत्यन्ताच्छ-स्वभावत्वात्
स्फटिकस्य यथा स्वकम् ।
रूपं परोप-रक्तस्य
नित्यम् एवोपलभ्यते

20. L.T., 14/38:

कुण्डलादेर् यथा भिन्ना
न लक्ष्या कनक-स्थितिः
न च शक्या विनिर्देष्टुं
तथाप्य् अस्त्य् एव सा ध्रुवम्

S.P., 1/57ab:

यथोद्धृतकुण्डलादेः
कनकस्य स्वयं स्थितिः ।

1/56cd:

पृथङ् न शक्या निर्देष्टुं
न च तत्रास्ति तावता॥

21. L.T., 14/39:

एवं नित्या विशुद्धा च
सुखदुःखाद्य्-अभेदिता ।
स्व-संवदन-संवेद्या
मम संविन्-मयी स्थितिः

S.P., 1/57:

एवं नित्या निजा शुद्धा
सुख-दुःख-निषेधनात् ।
स्व-संवेदन-संवेद्या
तव संविन्मयी स्थिति: ॥

22. L.T., 14/45:

काप्यवस्था न मे सास्ति
यस्यां संविन् न वर्तते ।
तेन मां चिद्घनाम् एकां
सर्वाकाराम् उपासते ॥

S.P., 1/70:

काप्यवस्था न ते सास्ति
यस्यां संविन् न वर्तते ।
तेन चिद्घनम् एव त्वां
योगिनः पर्युपासते ॥

Now that the Lakṣmītantra has been established to be of South Indian origin and as not being older than the 12th century (sce above, p. 27 n. 6) there can be no doubt that it has borrowed from the Saṁvitprakāśa and not the other way round. This fact serves to indicate that even though Vāmanadatta’s work was not generally well known outside Kashmir it did travel to the South, [[35]] its citation in Maheśvarananda’s Mahārthamañjari, composed in South India in the 13th century, further confirms. Moreover, the compatibility of the views of the Samvitprakāśa with those of the Lakṣmītantra, despite certain important differences, indicates how this kind of monistic Vaisnavism found substantial acceptance- amongst some Pañcarātrins.

The Saṁvitprakāśa Ouoted in Other Sources

Listed below are the verses which are quoted from the Saṁvitprakāśa in other texts:

Chapter I

Verse

10

12

13

20

24

Source

Sp. Pra., p. 112. Sp. Pra, p. 111.

V.B 109, St. Ci., p. 83.

Sp. ra., p. 120. Sp. Pra., p. 89.

30-31

Sp. Pra., p. 111.

37-38ab

Sp. Pra., p. 111.

41-42

Sp. Pra., p. 96.

44

Sp. Pra., p. 96.

48-49

Sp. Pra., p. 96.

52

53-5

56-57

70

76-8

Sp. Pra., p. 97. Sp. Pra., p. 95-6. Sp. Pra., p. 97. Sp. Pra., p. 104. Sp. Pra., p. 87. Sp. Pra., p. 90,114.

93

100cd-102ab

Sp. Pra., p. 100.

104cd-106ab

Sp. Pra., p. 85.

109 cd-111ab

Sp. Pra., p. 93.

Chapter 2

18cd-19ab

55555

30

45

58

Sp. Pra., p. 89. P.T.V., p. 83. Sp. Pra., p. 114. Sp. Pra., p. 88.36

SaṁvitprakāśaII

Chapter 3

2

M.M., p. 25.

27

M.M., p. 25.

Chapter 5

26

Sp. Pra., p. 89, 125.

Other possible quotes:

1. Sp. Nir., p. 48:

भदृश्रीवामनेनाप्य् उक्तम् -

आलम्ब्य संविदं यस्मात्
संवेधे न स्वभावतः।
तस्मात् संविदितं सर्वम्
इति संविन्मयो भवेत् ॥

2. M.M., p. 109, P.S., p. 146, in the latter we read: यथाह भट्टश्रीवीरवामनकः

यत्रेन्धनं द्वैतवनं,
मृत्युर् एव महापशुः
अलौकिकेन यज्ञेन
तेन नित्यं यजामहे॥

3. T.A., 5/154cd-5ab:

नीले पीते सुखे दुःखे
संविद्-रूपम् अखण्डितम् ।
गुरुभिर् भाषितं तस्माद्
उपायेषु विचित्रता॥

Jayaratha cornments:

‘गुरुभिः’ वामनदत्ताचार्येण भाषितम् इति संवित्-प्रकाशे॥

The verse is found complete in Sp. Pra., p. 96:

नीले पीते सुखे दुःखे
चित्-स्वरूपम् अखण्डितम्।
विशिनष्टि विकल्पस् तच्
चित्रयोपाधि-सम्पदा॥

[[37]]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tantrāloka by Abhinavagupta (12 vol.) with viveka by Jayartha. Part 1 edited by M.R. Sastri. Parts 2-12 edited by M.S. Kaul, K.S.T.S., no. 23, 1918; 28, 1921; 30, 1921; 36, 1922; 35, 1922; 29, 1921; 41, 1924; 47, 1926; 59, 1933; 57, 1936 and 57, 1938.

Parāmarthasāra by Abhinavagupta with vivṛti by Yogarāja. K.S.T.S., no. 7, 1916. Edited by J.C. Chatterjee. Parāmarthasāra by Ādiśeṣa with vivarana by Raghavananda. Acyutagranthamālā vol. 9. Vidyavilāsa Press, Varanasi, 1989. Edited by Surya Nārāyaṇa Śukla.

Parātriśikāvivarana by Abhinavagupta. K.S.T.S., no. 18, 1918. Edited by M.S. Kaul.

Mahārthamañjarī and parimala by Maheśvarananda. Yogatantragranthamālā, no. 5. Benares, 1972. Edited by Vrajavallabha Dviveda.

Lakṣmītantra. The Adyar Library Series vol. 87, 1975, the Vasanta Press, Adyar. Edited with Sanskrit gloss and by V. Krishnamacharya.

2,

Luptagamasamgraha. Part 1 collected and edited by Gopinatha Kavirāja. Yogatantragranthamālā no. Varanasi, 1970; part 2 collected and edited by Vrajavallabha Dviveda. Yogatantragranthamālā no. Varanasi, 1983.

Vijñānabhairava with commentaries by Kṣemarāja (incomplete) and Sivopadhyāya. K.S.T.S., no. 1918. Edited by M.R. Śastri.

Spandakārikā with vṛtti by Kallaṭabhatta. K.S.T.S., no. 5, 1916. Edited by J.C. Chatterjee.

Spandanirnaya by Kṣemarāja. K.S.T.S., no. 43, 1923. Edited with English translation by M.S. Kaul.

[[38]]

Spandapradīpikā by Bhagavadutpala. Published in the Tantrasamgraha vol. 1. Yogatantragranthamāla no. 3 pp. 83-128. Edited by G. Kavirāja, Benares, 1970.

Spandasamdoha by Kṣemarāja. K.S.T.S., no. 43, 1925. Edited by M.R. Śāstrī.