आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Source: TW

The problem of personhood in ontology is evident in that the terms typically used for it in the Western tradition, Greek prosōpon and Latin persōna, both refer to masks or roles which by definition can be played by many individuals, and many such roles played by each one. Genuine uniqueness cannot be captured by the specification of any finite number of properties.

This is why the Platonists theorize it through the first principle, the principle of individuation, which is prior to Being and hence to form.

Leibniz skirts the problem through his principle of identity of indiscernibles, in effect declaring by fiat that there will be an individuating property. The Stoic concept of the idiōs poion arguably functions in the same fashion. Platonists, by contrast, locate idiōtēs, “uniqueness”, purely numerical difference, in the first principle, which is accordingly manifest in the “highest” (central) individuals (the henads or Gods) and in the “lowest” (peripheral) individuals (those under the infima species).