आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

तदत्रादिपदाक्षिप्ते वक्तृत्वे योऽभिमन्यते ।
निश्चयं व्यतिरेकस्य परस्परविरोधतः ॥ ३३५९ ॥
विकल्पे सति वक्तृत्वं सर्वज्ञश्चाविकल्पतः ।
न ह्याविष्टाभिलापेन वस्तु ज्ञानेन गम्यते ॥ ३३६० ॥
अत्रापि ये प्रवक्तृत्वं वितर्कानुविधानतः ।
सर्वज्ञस्याभिमन्यन्ते न तैर्वचनसम्भवे ॥ ३३६१ ॥
सर्वज्ञ इष्यते नापि विकल्पज्ञानवृत्तितः ।
तस्मिन्क्षणे विकल्पे तु वक्तुत्वं न प्रसिद्धयति ॥ ३३६२ ॥

tadatrādipadākṣipte vaktṛtve yo’bhimanyate |
niścayaṃ vyatirekasya parasparavirodhataḥ || 3359 ||
vikalpe sati vaktṛtvaṃ sarvajñaścāvikalpataḥ |
na hyāviṣṭābhilāpena vastu jñānena gamyate || 3360 ||
atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvaṃ vitarkānuvidhānataḥ |
sarvajñasyābhimanyante na tairvacanasambhave || 3361 ||
sarvajña iṣyate nāpi vikalpajñānavṛttitaḥ |
tasminkṣaṇe vikalpe tu vaktutvaṃ na prasiddhayati || 3362 ||

In this matter, the ‘speakership’ of the lord being implied by the first word uttered by him, a certain party thinks that there is an incompatibility between such ‘speakership’ and ‘omniscience’, and hence concludes that there can be no ‘omniscience’; because there can be ‘speakership’ only when there is ‘conceptual content’, while one could be ‘omniscient’ only if there were no ‘conceptual content’; as a matter of fact, (he urges) an entity is never apprehended by a cognition associated with verbal expression.—As regards this reasoning also, those who think that the ‘speakership’ of the omniscient person follows from cogitation and thinking, do not admit the omniscient person on the ground of his being a ‘speaker’; nor on the ground of his conceptual knowledge; in case, however, there is no ‘conceptual content’, there can be no ‘speakership’.—(3359-3362)

Kamalaśīla

This is the view anticipated in Texts 3359-3360, and answered in Texts 3361-3362, as follows:—[see verses 3359-3362 above]

Some people hold that the ‘Speakership’ of the Lord is due to the appearance of the ‘Conceptual Content’; while others are of the opinion that, on account of previous impetus, the Lord proceeds to speak even without any conceptual idea.

Under the former view, if what is meant to be proved is that ‘there can be no Omniscience during the conceptual state’, then the argument is superfluous; because these people themselves admit that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient.—If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the absence of Omniscience in the non-conceptual state, then, the Reason adduced is ‘inadmissible’; because in that state, there is no speaking at all; for the simple reason that in that state there is no Conceptual Content that could prompt the Speaking.—(3359-3362)