2082 Verse 3358

Original

नाविरुद्धविधाने च युक्तमन्यनिवर्त्तनम् ।
अन्यता रूपसद्भावाद्रसाभावोऽपि गम्यते ॥ ३३५८ ॥

nāviruddhavidhāne ca yuktamanyanivarttanam |
anyatā rūpasadbhāvādrasābhāvo’pi gamyate || 3358 ||

The affirmation of what is not incompatible cannot be rightly regarded as setting aside the other. otherwise the presence of colour might mean the absence of taste.—(3358)

Kamalaśīla

It might be argued that—“It may be that Incognisability and the rest are not incompatible with Omniscience: even so they indicate the nonexistence of the Omniscient Person.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3358 above]

Some people argue as follows Even though ‘Cognisability’, etc. are not incompatible with ‘Omniscience’, yet the character of ‘being a speaker’ is certainly incompatible with it; because Omniscience cannot co-exist along with ‘Speakership’, of which ‘Conceptual Content’ is the indirect Cause; because on the principle that ‘one cannot utter words without previous cogitation and thinking’. Conceptual Content is the cause of Speaking; and as all Conceptual Content is associated with verbal expression, it cannot apprehend the forms of things,—this latter being amenable to only such cognition as is free from Conceptual Content; thus during the conceptual stage, there being no apprehension of the form of things, there can be no Omniscience. Thus Omniscience being contrary to (incompatible with) Speakership, the presence of one would mean the absence of the other, due to the non-apprehension of its Cause. So that our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive—This Reason, ‘Speakership’ is implied by the term ‘ādi’ in the sentence ‘one who has the characters of being knowable, cognisable, etc. etc.’ (under Text 3157).”

This is the view anticipated in Texts 3359-3360, and answered in Texts 3361-3362, as follows:—[see verses 3359-3362 next]