Original
नैःस्वाभाव्योऽस्ववित्तौ च नहि तज्जातु जायते ।
प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः प्रसिद्धेयमेवं सर्वज्ञता भवेत् ॥ ३३५७ ॥।naiḥsvābhāvyo’svavittau ca nahi tajjātu jāyate |
prākpravṛtteḥ prasiddheyamevaṃ sarvajñatā bhavet || 3357 |||Being featureless and uncognised even by itself, it can never come into existence. thus it would mean that before its appearance, the omniscience actually existed (and was not brought into existence by any cause).—(3357)
Kamalaśīla
If yon hold the view that “Omniscience disappears on the appearance of the character of ‘being an entity’ and ‘cognisability’,”—then, in that case, it would mean that, before the appearance of the character of ‘being an entity’, etc. the Omniscience was ‘not an entity’ and was not ‘cognisable’ even by itself; and thus, (a) being a non-entity, it would be featureless, and (b) being incognisable, there would be no self-cognition of it; which means that the Omniscience is never brought about, and does not exist at all; how then can it be said to have appeared previously and then ceased? Certainly there can be no appearance, coming into existence, of what is featureless. Nor can there be any basis for the existence of what is not cognised; as all notions of the existence of things are dependent upon their being cognised. What is meant by all this is that the reasoning of the Opponent involves self-contradiction.
Then again, if its previous appearance is admitted, then this appearance itself, without any effort on our part, establishes the existence of Omniscience; hence it cannot be right to deny it; otherwise there would be self-contradiction.—This is what is pointed out in the Text, by the words—‘Before its appearance, etc. etc.’;—i.e. if it is admitted that the Omniscience existed before the appearance.—(3357)