Original
इदं च वर्द्धमानादेर्नैरात्म्यज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
न समस्त्यात्मदृष्टौ हि विनष्टाः सर्वतीर्थिकाः ॥ ३३२५ ॥
स्याद्वादाक्षणिकस्या(त्वा?)दि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रबो(बा?)धितम् ।
बह्वेवायुक्तमुक्तं यैः स्युः सर्वज्ञाः कथं नु ते ॥ ३३२६ ॥
वाहीकादिप्रसिद्धेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षेऽर्थे स्खलन्ति ये ।
कथं सम्भाव्यते तेषामत्यक्षाधिगमः स्फुटः ॥ ३३२७ ॥
असर्वज्ञत्वमेवं तु अ(प्र?)स्पष्टमवगम्यते ।
मिथ्याज्ञानानुषङ्गित्वाद्विपरीतप्रकाशनात् ॥ ३३२८ ॥
स्थाणौ नर इति भ्रान्तः प्रतिपत्त्या(त्ता?) यथा परः ।
सर्वाभिश्च परीक्षाभिर्विज्ञेयो हेतुसिद्धितः ॥ ३३२९ ॥
सम्यक् सर्वपदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानाच्च सर्ववित् ।
हेतावतो न सम्बोध्या संदिग्धव्यतिरेकिता ॥ ३३३० ॥idaṃ ca varddhamānādernairātmyajñānamīdṛśam |
na samastyātmadṛṣṭau hi vinaṣṭāḥ sarvatīrthikāḥ || 3325 ||
syādvādākṣaṇikasyā(tvā?)di pratyakṣādiprabo(bā?)dhitam |
bahvevāyuktamuktaṃ yaiḥ syuḥ sarvajñāḥ kathaṃ nu te || 3326 ||
vāhīkādiprasiddhe’sminpratyakṣe’rthe skhalanti ye |
kathaṃ sambhāvyate teṣāmatyakṣādhigamaḥ sphuṭaḥ || 3327 ||
asarvajñatvamevaṃ tu a(pra?)spaṣṭamavagamyate |
mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvādviparītaprakāśanāt || 3328 ||
sthāṇau nara iti bhrāntaḥ pratipattyā(ttā?) yathā paraḥ |
sarvābhiśca parīkṣābhirvijñeyo hetusiddhitaḥ || 3329 ||
samyak sarvapadārthānāṃ tattvajñānācca sarvavit |
hetāvato na sambodhyā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā || 3330 ||This knowledge of the doctrine of ‘no-soul’ as described does not belong to vardhamāna and others; in fact, all philosophers have become lost in the doctrine of the ‘soul’,—all such doctrines as the ‘syādvāda’ and others involving the notions of things being not-momentary, are discarded by direct perception; how then can persons who have asserted’ many such unreasonable things be ‘omniscient’? People who tremble over things that are perceptible and known even to the ploughman,—how could they ever have any clear knowledge of things that are beyond the senses? Thus the fact of these persons being not-omniscient is clearly understood from their being attached to wrong doctrines and expounding wrong teachings; just in the same way as any other man who perceives the man in the post is said to be mistaken.—One is to be recognised as omniscient only when he has been found to satisfy all tests and all reasons, and has been found to have the true knowledge of all things.—Thus then our reason should not be regarded as being one whose contrary is open to doubt.—(3325-3330)
Kamalaśīla
The following Texts show that what has been just said disposes of what has been urged by the other Party under Text 3148, to the effect that—“There being many Omniscient Persons, imparting mutually contradictory teachings,—how can any one be singled out as the One Omniscient Person?”—[see verses 3325-3330 above]
If the said knowledge of Truth belonged to Vardhamāna, Kapila and others,—then they also might be omniscient. As a matter of fact however, all these persons have been held in the clutches of the crocodile of the false doctrine of the ‘Soul’, which is the root of all evil,—and have taught that things ate not-momentary and so forth, which are all annulled by Perception and other forms of Cognition;—being thus found to be tripping even in regard to things known even to the veriest child, how could their knowledge of supersensuous things ever fall within range of possibility,—in view of which it could be asked—“what proof is there that Kapila is not omniscient?” [as has been asked by the other party under Text 3149].—Because there is the following proof available which can be clearly stated:—People who are attached to false doctrines cannot be omniscient;—e.g. the man who mistakes the Post for the Man;—Vardhamāna and others are actually attached to false doctrines;—hence there is apprehension of something pervaded by its contradictory; as ‘attachment to false doctrines’ is pervaded by ‘being non-omniscient’, which is the contradictory of ‘omniscience—The Reason here put forward caṇnot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’; because by all sorts of tests it has been shown that all these Teachers have taught false doctrines.—Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘inconclusive’, on the ground of its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful; because omniscience has been held to depend upon the full knowledge of all things without exception; and a person who possesses True Knowledge can never have any false idea of things at all—(3325-3330)