2028 Verse 3270

Original

नचाप्यदृष्टिमात्रेण तदसत्ताविनिश्चयः ।
हेतुव्यापकतायोगादुपलम्भस्य वस्तुषु ॥ ३२७० ॥

nacāpyadṛṣṭimātreṇa tadasattāviniścayaḥ |
hetuvyāpakatāyogādupalambhasya vastuṣu || 3270 ||

Mere ‘non-apprehension’ cannot prove his non-existence. because apprehension is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of things.—(3270)

Kamalaśīla

The following might be urged—“That same Non-apprehension which you have described as a form of Inference, will be the proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person; what need have we to seek for another proof?”

It is true that Non-apprehension is a proof, a Means of Cognition. But the following has to be borne in mind, in this connection:—When you put forward ‘Non-apprehension’ as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, do you mean the absence of your own apprehension? Or the absence of the apprehension of all men? The Non-apprehension also,—is it meant to be without any qualification,—as is shown by the absence of any such qualifying phrase as ‘of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility’? Or is it meant to be qualified in some way?—The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by unqualified Non-apprehension by yourself.

This is what is pointed out in the following—[see verse 3270 above]

The term ‘mere’ has been added with a view to exclude the qualification ‘fulfilling the conditions of apprehensibility

‘Cannot prove His non-existence’—i.e. cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

“Why?”

Because, in regard to things, Apprehension is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader—As a matter of fact, Apprehension by people of limited vision is not the ‘pervader’ of things,—in the sense in which the ‘Tree’ is the ‘pervader’ of the ‘Śiṃśapā’ (a particular Tree).—[That is, all things are not apprehended, just as all trees are not Śiṃśapā; i.e. ‘being a thing’ is wider than ‘being apprehended’]; because even when the ‘thing’ is there, there may be no “apprehension’ of it by reason of remoteness and other circumstances.—Nor is ‘apprehension’ the ‘cause’ of things,—in the sense in which Fire is the cause of Smoke; because it is the things that are the cause of apprehension.—When one thing is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of another thing, the absence of one cannot mean the absence of the other; for, if it did, there would be incongruities. As regards the presence of the ‘Non-apprehension’ of the effect, it does not imply the absence of all Causes, but implies the absence of only that Cause whose capacity is untrammelled; and in the case in question, for men of limited vision, the capacity of things to bring about Apprehension is not untrammelled; by virtue of which the absence of Apprehension could prove the non-existence of the things.—(3270)