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अतीन्द्रियार्थदृक्तस्माद्विधूतान्तस्तमश्चयः ।
वेदार्थप्रविभागज्ञः कर्त्ता चाभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥ ३१२३ ॥atīndriyārthadṛktasmādvidhūtāntastamaścayaḥ |
vedārthapravibhāgajñaḥ karttā cābhyupagamyatām || 3123 ||For these reasons please accept the view that there has been an author of the Veda,—one who is capable of seeing things beyond the senses, who has shaken off the entire mass of darkness and ignorance, and who is conversant with the meaning of the Veda and its divisions.—(3123)
Kamalaśīla
The following Text sums up the whole section:—[see verse 3123 above]
‘Darkness’—i.e. Ignorance, ‘afflicted’ as well as ‘unafflicted’ [vide Yogasūtra—‘Vṛttayaḥ-kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ’]; the ‘mass’ of this Ignorance has been shaken off by him;—‘conversant with its divisions’—i.e. the right expounder.
‘Author’—i.e. of the Veda.
Thus it has been established that the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) is found to be entirely annulled by Means of Valid Cognition,—his Reason, in the shape of ‘being present when the other is present’, is Inconclusive,—the proof for the Reason (adduced by the Buddhist) being present where the Probandum is present has been already indicated above, under Text 2939.
As regards the four alternatives set forth (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under the commentary on Text 2811, f(l) Both validity and invalidity are inherent in cognitions,—(2) Both are extraneous at times,—(3) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extraneous,—and (4) Validity is extraneous and Invalidity is inherent],—and the objections urged against three of them,—they do not affect the Buddhists at all. Because they do not accept any of these alternatives, their view being that there can be no hard and fast rule in the matter; as it has been already explained that both these, Validity and Invalidity, may be sometimes inherent and sometimes extraneous, Hence it was not right to put forward the said four alternatives only; as a fifth alternative was also possible that there can be no hard and fast rule applying to all cases.
Other people have offered an entirely different explanation of the Proposition (regarding the self-validity of Cognitions)“Validity consists in being of the nature Consciousness; hence it must be natural (inherent) in ail cognitions,—it cannot be due to the presence of any excellences; as even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should be the ‘essence of cognition It is for this reason and in this sense that Cognition is spoken of as ‘self-valid’, All that the excellences do is to remove the defects; hence for the removal of defects, the validity of the cognition needs the excellences; and these are not needed for the bringing about of the validity itself”.
The above view cannot be right. Because it is not correct to say that validity consists in being of the nature of Consciousness; as in that case there would be validity in wrong cognitions also.—If it be held that—“Validity is a particular form of Cognition itself”,—then it should not be said that—“Validity is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not brought about by excellences; because oven in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should be validity” (as asserted above). Because if Validity were held to be a particular form of Cognition,—then alone could there be any justification for the pointing out of the falsity of the premiss that the same validity is due to the presence of excellences,—not of anything else. As a matter of fact, however, when it has been asserted that “it is present also in wrong cognition’, the falsity pointed out is not in the premiss that ‘the particular form, of Cognition is due to the presence of excellences’,—but in regard to Cognition in general; and the other party does not hold that cognition in general is brought about by excellences; it is only a particular cognition that is held to be so brought about; and it is not possible to point out falsity in the premiss that ‘a particular cognition is brought about by excellences’.
Then again, we also do not hold the extraneous validity to be due to excellences; by denying which yon are seeking to prove inherent, validity. What we hold is that a particular cognition, even though apprehended, might be due to a mistake, and as such it cannot bring about the certainty of conviction in accordance with the said apprehension; hence it is concluded that validity, being due to the appearance of the said conviction, must be extraneous.
Further, the same may be said in regard to Invalidity also; as follows—Invalidity is of the essence of cognition;—and this is natural and inherent in cognitions,—and not due to defects; because it is possible even when there is no defect, as in the case of Right Cognition; that is why Invalidity is said to be inherent; and all that the defects do is to set aside the Excellences; hence it is for the setting aside of the excellences, that the Invalidity needs the defects,—not for the bringing about of the Invalidity itself.
Thus there is nothing in the explanation put forward above by some people.
Ubeyaka, on the other hand, has declared as follows:—“The validity of cognitions consists, not in their being of the nature of Consciousness, but in being in conformity with the real state of things; because, in a ease where there is Consciousness, if there is no conformity with the real state of things,—the cognition is invalid; e.g. the cognition of silver in regard to the piece of shell; and conversely, even when there is no Consciousness, if there is conformity with real state of things, the cognition is valid; e.g. the cognition of smoke in Fire, Hence from this positive and negative concomitance, it follows that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things”.
“The cognition of this conformity proceeds from that same cause which brings about the original cognition itself,—not from any other circumstantial conditions; it is in this sense that the validity of cognitions is spoken of as inherent in themselves;—the term ‘sva’ (in the word ‘svataḥ’) stands for ‘svakīya’, ‘what belongs to oneself’; so that the word ‘svataḥ’ means ‘due to its own cause The second half of the passage—‘the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be produced in it by something else’,—only serves to point out the reason for denying the idea of its being brought about by other circumstances; the meaning being that ‘the capacity which is not present in. the thing itself cannot be brought about by anything else,—i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself’,”
The following might be urged against the above view;—As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions; how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of ‘being the cause of cognitions’?—From this it is clear that validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself, This ‘other circumstantial cause’ must be one that is accompanied by excellences; so that the cause of validity would consist also in the excellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. In the ease of Verbal Cognition the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in ‘being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person’, So that there being no such composer (or Speaker) in the ease of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as invalid.
The answer to this (provided by Ubeyaka) is as follows:—“What has been just asserted does not affect our position; because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. It is not possible for us to recognise any positive functioning of the Excellences towards the bringing about of the effect in the shape of validity; what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition themselves, independently of anything else. As regards the function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision),—that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences”.
It might be argued that—The Sense-organs and the other Means of Cognition are there in the case of the invalid cognition also; so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases; as the cause of it would be there in its efficient condition.
“This is not so,”—says Ubeyaka—“because after the defects have been cured, other causes would become operative towards the bringing about of particular effects”.
The following might be urged:—Why is not the contrary of this accepted—that the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition bring about wrong cognitions, independently of other things,—and that on the cure of the excellences, other circumstantial causes become operative towards bringing about the right cognition in conformity with the real state of things?
Ubeyaka’s answer to this is as follows:—“True; this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same ‘presence of three factors’ which brings about the cognition itself; and hence it is assumed that in the case of Perception also, the validity would be produced by the same cause that produces the cognition. As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes,—Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of validity”.
[The Author’s answer to the a,bove view of Ubeyaka]—All this is certainly not free from objections. For instance, it has been asserted that “the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; and that it proceeds from the cause of the cognition itself”,—This is superfluous, futile; because we also admit that ‘that cognition alone is valid which is in conformity with the real nature of things’,—which clearly means that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things.—But the ‘cognition’ is specially mentioned as qualifying ‘validity’; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the Smoke and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of ‘cognition’; hence it cannot be admitted that validity consists only in ‘being in conformity with the real state of things’. Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. For instance, even though the Smoke, which is invariably concomitant with Fire, is there,—the Agent does not have recourse to activity towards the securing of the Fire, until the cognition of the Smoke comes about; which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man’s activity. This has been thus declared—‘The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained’.
As regards the character of ‘being in conformity with the real state of things’, which belongs to the Cognitions, and which is there in the form of the capacity to lead up to the thing cognised,—this consists in this same getting at the thing; as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; and the capacity of things forms their very nature or essence; hence who could ever think of securing it from other things,—in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. If this were so, then there would be incongruities.
This validity then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about,—because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the cognition of effective action. Hence when the validity is said to be extraneous; it is in reference to the said certainty regarding it, not in reference to its being produced. Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the production of the validity by other causes; as on that point there is no dispute at all. As regards the certainty, however, regarding the capacity of things, you also hold that it is brought about by extraneous causes, This has been declared thus (by Kumārila himself)—“The capacities of things are proved through Presumption based upon the fact that certain effects cannot be explained otherwise” [Ślo-Vā., p, 341].
As regards the argument that “the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else”,—which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes,—that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; so that that also should have to be regarded as inherent in the cognition. Hence the Reason adduced is no Reason at all; as it is false and inconclusive.
It has been argued that—“Excellences are never recognised as operating positively towards the bringing about of Invalidity”.
It cannot be understood what the clear meaning of this affirmation is. What is the meaning of this ‘positive operation’?—If it means intentional activity towards the producing of a certain effect, following upon the determination that ‘I shall do this’,—then such activity cannot be possible for the Sense-organs. Nor is it possible for things to act intelligently and intentionally; because all things being momentary, effort and activity are impossible; consequently, for the Sense-organs also, no positive activity is possible; and hence they can never serve as Causes.—If it be argued that—“even without any operation in the form of activity, the Sense-organs operate, by their mere presence, towards the production of effects; and as such are held to be Causes”,—then the answer is that this can be said, with equal reason, in regard to Excellences also. In the producing of the effects, all Causes are not always found to have an activity apart from their mere presence,—The following might be urged—“When the Excellences are present, the Defects disappear, and thence comes about validity; so that, as they act through the disappearance of the defects, it is said that there can be no positive operation possible for the Excellences”.—The same, however, may be said regarding the Defects also; for instance, when the Defects are present, the “Excellences disappear and thence there comes about, invalidity; hence towards the bringing about of Invalidity also, the Defects would have no positive operation. Thus Invalidity also would be inherent,—there being no difference between the two cases. As a matter of fact, Defects are never found to set aside Excellences and operate directly towards the bringing about of Invalidity. Hence there can be no causal relation apart from the condition that the presence and absence of one thing is concomitant with the presence and absence of the other. Such causal relation is equally possible for Defects as well as Excellences.
It has been argued that—“The form of the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, independently of anything else, serves to bring about cognitions in conformity with the real state of things”.
This also is not right; because, all cognitions would, in this case, be valid,—as their efficient cause would be always present; specially as they would be of the nature of Consciousness. The character of being of the nature of Consciousness, as present in cognitions, is inseparably related to the preceding cognition; so that even when there are defects, their efficient cause and the said character would be there in the case of all cognitions the character of being in conformity with the real state of things would also, in the same way, be there in all cognitions.
The following might be urged—“In the case of Defects bringing about Invalidity, the efficient cause would not be there in all cases; because Validity and its opposite, being mutually exclusive, could never be present in the same cognition. The character of being of the essence of Consciousness, however, can be present in all cases, without any opposition”.
If that is so, then the Sense-organ by itself, independently of everything else, cannot turn out to be the cause; because, even when the Sense-organ is there in its efficient condition, its effect, in the shape of Validity, does not come about. What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; and when between two things, one does not come about even when the other is there, the former cannot be regarded as having the latter as its only cause; if it did so, there would be incongruities.
Then again, you have got to explain this—If Validity has its efficient cause present in its perfect condition, why is it that it does not come about, even when the Defects are there?—If the answer is that—“it does not come about on account of the presence of the Defect, which is a cause operating against the Validity”,—then, the same may be said regarding Invalidity also; it does not come about at the time on account of the presence of the Sense-organ, etc. which are the cause operating against the Invalidity.
Further, even if the Validity were unwilling to come about because it is afraid of the Defect which operates against it,—how could its own cause which is present there in its efficient condition, ignore the effect? In fact, the untrammelled potency of the cause would be manifested only if it forced the effect to come about, even though unwilling.—If the idea is that the Sense-organ would not bring about Validity, when its potency would be obstructed by the presence of Defects,—then, being impotent, it could not bring about the Cognition either. Otherwise it would not be true that “Validity is brought about by the cause of the Cognition itself”; as it would not come about even when the Cognition has come about. If between two things, one is not produced even when the other has been produced,—then both cannot be regarded as necessarily having the same cause; as for instance, when the paddy-sprout is not produced on the production of the *Kodrava -*sprout;—and it has been found that even when the Cognition has been produced, its Validity is not always produced; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Then again, when a Potency forms the very essence of a thing, nothing can obstruct it, without destroying the nature of that thing. Thus then it may be possible to assert as follows—‘Please accept the view that there is validity of all Apprehensions, because the Potency which is inherent in a thing cannot be destroyed by anything else’ [a parody of Kumārila’s assertion].
The following might be urged—“What is held to be the cause of validity is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are free from defects; so that the above objections are not applicable”.
If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the Sense-organ as along with Excellences—which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be free from defects. Thus you cannot say that “the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes”.
“What the Excellences operate towards is the removal of defects, not the producing of validity”.
That cannot be right. ‘Removal’ is a mere negation; hence there can be no operation towards it; for instance, it is not possible for anything to have any operation towards a non-entity, like the ‘Hare’s Horn’, which is not something to be produced.
It has been argued that—“In the case of Inference, it has been found that the presence of the Three-factors, which produces the Cognition, brings about the Validity also”.
This also is inadmissible. What brings about the Inferential Cognition is, not merely the presence of the three factors, but also such excellences in the cogniser as absence of delusion, and full remembrances and, impressions. For instance, even when the three factors are present, if the man has no recollection of the relationship and other impressions regarding these factors, the Inferential Cognition does not appear at all; consequently, from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clear that it is not true that what produces the validity is the same cause that produces the cognition itself. Hence the conclusion to the contrary remains irresistible.
It has also been argued that—“The effect in the shape of wrong cognition does not proceed from the mere Sense-organs”.
This is an extremely audacious statement. It implies the possibility of Wrong Cognitions appearing independently of the Sense-organs. When one thing, by its very nature, does not proceed from another, it can never be dependent upon the latter; as otherwise, it would lead to absurdity. As a matter of fact, even the cognitions of ‘two moons’ and the like which appear in men suffering from defective vision, never appear independently of the Sense-organs.
Further, if Validity is described as ‘conformity with the real state of things’,—then how is it ascertained that the Cognition produced by the Veda is in conformity with the real state of things,—in view of which you, who are a man of limited vision, come to regard it as valid i In fact, the presence of a potency in a thing cannot be ascertained by men who have not perceived the effects of such Potency. If it were so ascertained, it would lead to incongruities.
Thus it is found that the Validity is not proved in the case of the Veda,—in the hope of establishing of whose reliability all this verbal net-work has been spread out (by the Mīmāṃsaka); so that all this effort has been like the effort of the man who thumps mere husks, in the hope of finding rice. This point need not be laboured any further.—(3123)