1938 Verse 3095

Original

अव्यक्तव्यक्तिकत्वेन व्यक्तोऽर्थो न प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
परप्रत्यक्षवत्तस्माज्ज्ञानं ज्ञातमितीष्यताम् ॥ ३०९५ ॥

avyaktavyaktikatvena vyakto’rtho na prasiddhyati |
parapratyakṣavattasmājjñānaṃ jñātamitīṣyatām || 3095 ||

There can be no ‘manifested thing’ until its manifestation has become manifested; hence it must be admitted that the cognition itself is actually cognised,—just like the sense-perception in other persons.—(3095)

Kamalaśīla

It has been asserted, under Text 2910, that—“Before the Cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form, and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3095 above]

‘Avyakta, etc.’—The compound means ‘that thing of which the manifestation has not become manifested’.

The Cognition must itself be cognised. If it were not cognised, then there would be the contingency of the absence of Cognition of all things. Because what is spoken of as ‘Cognition’ of a thing is only its manifestation—nothing else;—if this manifestation then were imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible; just as the object envisaged by another man’s Cognition is not perceived by one, because its manifestation is not manifested to the latter.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When to a certain person the manifestation of a thing has not become manifested, that thing cannot be perceptible to him;—e.g. the object envisaged by the perception appearing in another man;—the Cognition in question is one of which the manifestation has not become manifested to any person;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to a more extensive character.

The reason here adduced cannot be regarded as ‘inconclusive’; because if the thing were perceptible without its manifestation having come about, all things would become perceptible.—Such, however, is not the case. Hence the case is quite the reverse.—(3095)