1889 Verse 3008-3009

Original

बाधकः प्रत्ययश्चायं पूर्वज्ञानमपोहते ।
अनपेक्षप्रमाणत्वाद्यदि शङ्काऽत्र किं भवेत् ॥ ३००८ ॥
अनपेक्ष्यप्रमाणत्वं शङ्क्यते चात्र बाधकम् ।
विरुद्धमेतदाशङ्का निश्चिते न हि जायते ॥ ३००९ ॥

bādhakaḥ pratyayaścāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate |
anapekṣapramāṇatvādyadi śaṅkā’tra kiṃ bhavet || 3008 ||
anapekṣyapramāṇatvaṃ śaṅkyate cātra bādhakam |
viruddhametadāśaṅkā niścite na hi jāyate || 3009 ||

If the sublating cognition sets aside the preceding cognition, because its validity is self-sufficient,—why should there arise any suspicion regarding it? What could be suspected would be the possibility of another sublating cognition with self-sufficient validity; but such a suspicion would be self-contradictory, and could never arise in regard to what has been duly ascertained.—(3008-3009)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2867, that—“It may be that there too, there may be need for another sublating Cognition in certain cases, where suspicion might be aroused in the mind of the person by the previous Cognition; but that suspicion ceases after very little effort”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3008-3009 above]

If the sublating Cognition is one of which the validity is not dependent upon anything else,—then, how could there arise any suspicion regarding its sublation,—in view of which it is said that ‘there may be need for another sublating Cognition’? Hence there is clear self-contradiction—involved in the statements that ‘the validity of the sublating Cognition is self-sufficient’ and that ‘its sublation is suspected—Because what is meant by ‘independence’, ‘self-sufficiency’, is that it has become an object of firm conviction; and as a matter of fact, where there is firm conviction, any suspicion regarding it is absolutely impossible. Because as between ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’, one always sets aside the other; and ‘suspicion’, as envisaging both ends, operates in the manner of ‘uncertainty’, ‘doubt’,—(3008-3009)