1887 Verse 3004-3006

Original

तथाहि बाधकाभावात्प्रामाण्यं भवतोचयते ।
बाधाभावोऽप्यभावाख्यं प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ॥ ३००४ ॥
तस्यापि बाधकाभावात्प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते ।
तत्र तत्रैवमिच्छायां व्यवस्था नोपलभ्यते ॥ ३००५ ॥
अनपेक्षप्रमाणत्वं बाधकप्रत्यये यतः ।
न सिद्धं तेन नैवायं पूर्वज्ञानमपोहते ॥ ३००६ ॥

tathāhi bādhakābhāvātprāmāṇyaṃ bhavatocayate |
bādhābhāvo’pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaramiṣyate || 3004 ||
tasyāpi bādhakābhāvātprāmāṇyamabhidhīyate |
tatra tatraivamicchāyāṃ vyavasthā nopalabhyate || 3005 ||
anapekṣapramāṇatvaṃ bādhakapratyaye yataḥ |
na siddhaṃ tena naivāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate || 3006 ||

For instance, you assert ‘validity’ on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition; and ‘absence of sublation’ also is held to be a distinct form of cognition, named ‘non-apprehension’;—so that the validity of this latter also is asserted on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition; and this process proceeding on and on, there can be no resting ground (stability).—(3004-3005)

Because the fact of the validity of the sublating cognition being self-sufficient has not been proved, therefore it cannot set aside the preceding cognition.—(3006)

Kamalaśīla

[verses 3004-3005]:

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka), under Text 2866, that—“The sublating Cognition consists in the conviction that the thing cognised is otherwise than as cognised; and this conviction, being self-sufficient, sets aside the preceding Cognition”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3006 above]

[verse 3006]:

As the form of Cognition called ‘Non-apprehension’ is always dependent upon something else, its validity cannot be regarded as proved.—(3006)