Original
अनयैवोपपत्त्या स्यादप्रामाण्यमपि स्वतः ।
तत्रापि शक्यते वक्तुं यस्मान्न्यायोऽयमीदृशः ॥ ३००० ॥
तस्मात्स्वतोऽप्रमाणत्वं सर्वत्रौत्सर्गिकं स्थितम् ।
बाधकारणदुष्टत्वज्ञानाभावादपोद्यते ॥ ३००१ ॥anayaivopapattyā syādaprāmāṇyamapi svataḥ |
tatrāpi śakyate vaktuṃ yasmānnyāyo’yamīdṛśaḥ || 3000 ||
tasmātsvato’pramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam |
bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvādapodyate || 3001 ||By this same reasoning (that you have put forward) the invalidity also of cognitions may be proved to be inherent in them; as the same may be asserted in support of it as follows—‘therefore self-invalidity of cognitions is the general rule, and it is discarded when there is either absence of annulment, or absence of the cognition of its source being defective.’—(3000-3001)
Kamalaśīla
Further, the said general rule and its exception being ‘conceptual’,—inasmuch as they pertain to Words and their meaning,—would be always uncertain (flexible); hence they have no room in a discussion regarding the nature of entities; because all things are restricted within the limits of their own nature, and as such do not admit of the nature of other things. Hence when you put forward the general rule and its exception in this connection, it shows that yoxi are ignorant of the real objective of Buies and Exceptions. For instance, in accordance with the reasoning propounded by yourself, a general rule and exception, contrary to those put forward by you, can be conceived.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 3000-3001 above]
Kumārila has declared as follows:—“For these reasons the Validity of the Cognition must be taken as following from its being of the nature of apprehension, and it can be discarded by the Cognition of the fact of the real object cognised being really unlike what figures in the Cognition, and by the Cognition of defects in its cause”.—(Ślokavārtika, 1. 1. 2; 53).
The following Texts show that the same may be said regarding ‘Invalidity’ also:—[see verses 3002-3003 next]