आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

वैलक्षण्याप्रतीतौ तु विजातीयार्थशङ्कया ।
कार्यावभासिविज्ञानादृते मानाविनिश्चयः ॥ २९७० ॥
तस्मिन्सदपि मानत्वं विनिश्चेतुं न शक्यते ।
उत्तराद्यक्रियाज्ञानात्केवलं तत्प्रतीयते ॥ २९७१ ॥
अतश्च प्रथमं ज्ञानं तत्संवादमपेक्षते ।
संवादेनापि संवादः पुनर्मृग्यस्तथैव न ॥ २९७२ ॥

vailakṣaṇyāpratītau tu vijātīyārthaśaṅkayā |
kāryāvabhāsivijñānādṛte mānāviniścayaḥ || 2970 ||
tasminsadapi mānatvaṃ viniścetuṃ na śakyate |
uttarādyakriyājñānātkevalaṃ tatpratīyate || 2971 ||
ataśca prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tatsaṃvādamapekṣate |
saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punarmṛgyastathaiva na || 2972 ||

If no difference is perceived,—then, on account of the suspicion of the thing being otherwise than cognised, there can be no certainty regarding validity, unless there is a cognition envisaging the resultant effect. In such a case even though the validity may be present there, it cannot be ascertained; it is recognised only through the subsequent cognition of its resultant activity. It is for this reason that the first cognition needs its corroboration; and for the same reason it is not necessary to seek for the corroboration of the corroborative cognition also.—(2970-2972)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2854, that—“Just as the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition, so should we seek for the corroboration of that corroborative cognition also”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2970-2972 above]

Even in case where the Validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception; and in such cases, the Validity is ascertained only extraneously, through the cognition of the resultant activity; and what is desired by the man having been secured by this, there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition; as there is in the case of the initial cognition.—(2970-2972)