आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

नाभिप्रायापरिज्ञानादिदं ह्यत्र विवक्षितम् ।
स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यस्य विनिश्चये ॥ २९५१ ॥
नियते(तो ?)यथ(त्र ?) नैवास्ति स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ।
परिशेषबलात्तस्मिन्नप्रामाण्यं प्रतीयते ॥ २९५२ ॥
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानानपेक्षया ।
जन्मानन्तरमेवातस्तदप्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् ॥ २९५३ ॥
अप्रमाणे प्रमाणत्वविपर्यासो न सङ्गतः ।
अतोऽसंवादिनो नैव कश्चिद्वर्त्तेत तद्गतेः ॥ २९५४ ॥

nābhiprāyāparijñānādidaṃ hyatra vivakṣitam |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyasya viniścaye || 2951 ||
niyate(to ?)yatha(tra ?) naivāsti svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ |
pariśeṣabalāttasminnaprāmāṇyaṃ pratīyate || 2952 ||
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānānapekṣayā |
janmānantaramevātastadaprāmāṇyaniścayāt || 2953 ||
apramāṇe pramāṇatvaviparyāso na saṅgataḥ |
ato’saṃvādino naiva kaścidvartteta tadgateḥ || 2954 ||

What has been said is not right; as it proceeds from ignorance of what is meant by us. What is meant by us in regard to the subject of conviction regarding the self-validity of all cognitions is as follows:—In a case where the conviction regarding self-validity is not certain, what is cognised, by elimination is invalidity; because irrespectively of the fact of the real state of things being otherwise than that envisaged in the cognition,—and the fact of the source of the cognition being defective,—the conviction regarding its invalidity appears immediately after its birth.—Consequently, the invalid cognition cannot be said to be a case of the ‘reversal of validity’; hence no one would ever act in pursuance of the cognition that is not in conformity with reality; because there is always a certainty regarding its non-conformity.—(2951-2954)

Kamalaśīla

What is meant by us is as follows:—If you accept the self-validity of all cognitions, then that would imply the acceptance of the fact that ‘cognition’ is invariably concomitant with the ‘conviction of Validity’; and as a consequence of this, wherever the ‘conviction of Validity’—which embraces all cognitions—does not appear, there, by implication, remains Invalidity; and ‘Validity’ and ‘Invalidity’ are mutually exclusive. Hence it follows by implication that Invalidity also is inherent in cognitions; irrespectively of any idea of its being not in conformity with reality or of its cause being defective; in fact the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from the mere non-appearance of the conviction regarding Validity. Thus what has been asserted (by the Mīmāṃsaka)—to the effect that “the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from extraneous causes, in the shape of sublating cognitions” (Text 2940)—is not right.

Such being the case, as soon as the Cognition is born, its validity or invalidity becomes ascertained by the birth or otherwise of Conviction regarding its validity; so that the activity of no sane person can follow from an invalid cognition; how then can there be any possibility of the activity not being in conformity with reality?

‘Tadgateḥ’—i.e. from the conviction regarding non-conformity.

All these defects that have been pointed out regarding the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) should be understood to be the defects in his Reason, which is hereby shown to be not-concomitant (with the Probandum); they should not be regarded as defects of the Proposition. Otherwise, as the Proposition does not form an integral part of the argument, the pointing out of defects in it would involve a ‘Clincher’ for the other party (the Buddhist).—(2951-2954)