Original
ततश्च चोदनाजन्यमतिप्रामाण्यसिद्धये ।
दोषवर्जितहेतूत्थभावाद्युक्तिरपार्थिका ॥ २९३१ ॥tataśca codanājanyamatiprāmāṇyasiddhaye |
doṣavarjitahetūtthabhāvādyuktirapārthikā || 2931 ||Thus then, for establishing the validity of the cognition arising from the Veda,—any such assertion as that it arises from causes free from defects and so forth, is of no use.—(2931)
Kamalaśīla
‘Hetūtthabhāva’—character of arising from causes.
‘And so forth’—includes—(a) the assertion of its not being the work of an untrustworthy person, (b) the assertion that it is never sublated. As has been declared in the following passage—“The Cognition produced by the Veda is valid,—(a) because it is produced by causes free from defects,—like cognitions produced by the Inferential Indicative, the Words of a Trustworthy Person, and Sense-perception; also (b) because it is not the work of an untrustworthy person, and (c) because it is free from sublation”—(Ślokavārtika, Sū. 1. 1. 2; 184-185). Consequently, for the proving of the validity of the Cognition produced by the Veda,—when the Mīmāṃsaka states a reason,—it becomes implied that the validity of that Cognition is due to extraneous causes;—and this idea is negatived by the same writer when he asserts that “the validity of all Cognitions is inherent in themselves”. Thus there is clear self-contradiction.—(2931)
The following Texts anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the Mīmāṃsaka to the above:—[see verses 2932-2934 next]