1836 Verse 2914-2915

Original

न ह्यर्थस्यान्यथाभावः पूर्वेणात्तस्तथात्ववत् ।
तदत्राप्यन्यथाभावे धीर्यद्वा दुष्टकारणे ॥ २९१४ ॥
तावता चैव मिथ्यात्वं गृह्यते नान्यहेतुकम् ।
उत्पत्त्यवस्थमेवेदं प्रमाणमिति मीयते ॥ २९१५ ॥

na hyarthasyānyathābhāvaḥ pūrveṇāttastathātvavat |
tadatrāpyanyathābhāve dhīryadvā duṣṭakāraṇe || 2914 ||
tāvatā caiva mithyātvaṃ gṛhyate nānyahetukam |
utpattyavasthamevedaṃ pramāṇamiti mīyate || 2915 ||

The false character of the thing is not apprehended by the former (i.e. the invalid cognition) in the way in which the true character (is apprehended by the valid cognition). Thus then, it is only when there appears the cognition of the truth being otherwise,—or the cognition that the source of the cognition has been defective,—that the falsity (invalidity) of the cognition becomes recognised; not on any other grounds. At the time that it appears it is always recognised as valid.”—(2914-2915)

Kamalaśīla

Says the Opponent—The same is equally true of the valid Cognition also; because that also, in some cases, has the semblance of the Invalid Cognition.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2914-2915 above]

‘The former’—i.e. the invalid cognition.

‘Atta’—apprehended.

‘True character’;—this is a corroborative instance per dissimilarity.

What is meant is as follows Falsity is not. apprehended by the Invalid cognition in the same way in which truth is apprehended by the Valid cognition; hence the two do not stand on the same footing. Because as soon as it is born, the Valid cognition is recognised as valid; but the Invalid cognition is not similarly recognised as invalid, as soon as it is born; because it has always the semblance of the Valid cognition.

‘Tadatrāpi, etc. etc.’—This sums up the view that the Invalidity of Cognitions is extra,neous.

‘Yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe’—‘dhīḥ’ has to be construed here also.

‘It is only then that the falsify of the Cognition becomes apprehended’;—i.e. when there, is the idea that the real state of things is otherwise,—and when there is the idea that the source of the Cognition has been defective.

The following might be urged—The falsity of the Cognition could be admitted only when it would be definitely known that these two ideas are actually true; and for the purpose of recognising the truth of these ideas, there would be need for another Cognition; so that there would be an infinite regress.

The answer to this is given in the words—‘At the time that it appears, etc. etc.’;—‘it’ stands for the said two ideas—(1) of the real state of things being otherwise and (2) of the source of the Cognition being defective.—Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.—(2914-2915)