आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेये तु शङ्क्यते ।
वेदे कर्तुरभावाच्च दोषाशङ्कैव नास्ति नः ॥ २८९५ ॥
अतो यदनपेक्षत्वाद्वेदे प्रामाण्यमुच्यते ।
तदाप्तेन प्रणीतेऽपि सुतरां सिद्ध्यति स्वतः ॥ २८९६ ॥

doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeye tu śaṅkyate |
vede karturabhāvācca doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ || 2895 ||
ato yadanapekṣatvādvede prāmāṇyamucyate |
tadāptena praṇīte’pi sutarāṃ siddhyati svataḥ || 2896 ||

“In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt whether there are defects or not. In the case of the veda, however, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion for us regarding the presence of defects.—Consequently, just as validity (and reliability) is accepted in the case of the Veda, on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient,—so the same validity becomes established in regard to the words of a trustworthy person also.”—(2895-2896)

Kamalaśīla

Says the Opponent—If, in the case of certain words emanating from a personality, no defects are found,—even so they are suspected; because they always subsist in such words. So that, just as the excellences, by their sheer presence, are capable of setting aside the defects,—so the defects also may be capable of setting aside the excellences;—why then should it be said that—‘not being cognised, the Defects do not set aside the validity?’

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2895-2896 above]

The idea is as follows:—“It is not necessary for us to prove the validity of the human assertion; in fact, all this effort of ours is meant for proving the authority of the Veda; so that, if the human assertion turns out to be invalid and unreliable,—that does no harm to the Veda; as its validity is proved by the absence of defects;—this is what is meant by the phrase ‘on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient’.

This has been thus asserted in the Bhāṣya (Śabara)—‘Hence the Veda is authoritative and reliable, because it is not dependent upon anything else; such being the case, there can be no need for another cognition or another Person; because the Veda is self-sufficient in its validity’ (Sū. 1. 1. 5).—(2895-2896)