1801 Verse 2855-2857

Original

कस्यचित्तु यदीष्येत स्वत एव प्रमाणता ।
प्रथमस्य तथाभावे प्रद्वेषः केन हेतुना ॥ २८५५ ॥
एवं यदि गुणाधीना प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणता ।
गुणाश्च न प्रमाणेन विना सन्ति कदाचन ॥ २८५६ ॥
ततो गुणपरिच्छेदिप्रमाणान्तरमिच्छतः ।
तस्याप्यन्यपरिच्छिन्नगुणायत्ता प्रमाणता ॥ २८५७ ॥

kasyacittu yadīṣyeta svata eva pramāṇatā |
prathamasya tathābhāve pradveṣaḥ kena hetunā || 2855 ||
evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnā pratyakṣādipramāṇatā |
guṇāśca na pramāṇena vinā santi kadācana || 2856 ||
tato guṇaparicchedipramāṇāntaramicchataḥ |
tasyāpyanyaparicchinnaguṇāyattā pramāṇatā || 2857 ||

“If in the case of some one cognition, the validity is admitted to be inherent and self-sufficient,—then why should there be any hostility towards the self-validity of the first cognition itself?”—(2855)

“If then the validity of sense-perception and other cognitions were dependent upon the perfect character (of their causes),—these perfections themselves could never be there without cognitions; hence one seeking for this other cognition apprehending the perfection of the cause would require yet another cognition apprehending the perfection of this last, and so on and on.”—(2856-2857)

Kamalaśīla

[verse 2855]:

It might be argued that—in the case of the Cognition which is in conformity with effective action, its validity is held to be inherent, self-sufficient; hence there can be no Infinite Regress.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2855 above]

Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress.—This is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 2856-2857 above]

[verses 2856-2857]:

Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress.—This is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 2856-2857 above]

Dependent upon, etc.’—i.e. dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause.

Validity’—i.e. certainty regarding its validity.

Could never be there’—i.e. could not become fit for being regarded as being there.

Tasyāpi’—of the cognition apprehending the perfection.

Anyaparicchinna, etc, etc.’—i.e. the validity would be dependent upon the certainty of the perfection apprehended by another cognition.—(2856-2857)

An instance is cited in support of the above:—[see verses 2858-2860 next]