Original
निष्पन्नानंशरूपस्य प्रामाण्यस्य स्वहेतुतः ।
तदेवं न विनाशाप्तिर्निश्चयेऽन्यव्यपेक्षणात् ॥ २८४१ ॥
न तत्स्वभावनिष्पत्त्यै प्रमान्तरमपेक्ष्यते ।
तद्रूपनियार्थं तु प्रतिपत्तावपेक्ष्यते ॥ २८४२ ॥niṣpannānaṃśarūpasya prāmāṇyasya svahetutaḥ |
tadevaṃ na vināśāptirniścaye’nyavyapekṣaṇāt || 2841 ||
na tatsvabhāvaniṣpattyai pramāntaramapekṣyate |
tadrūpaniyārthaṃ tu pratipattāvapekṣyate || 2842 ||The validity, being something indivisible, having been brought about by its own causes,—there would be no destruction of it by its dependence on something else; as such dependence is necessary only for bringing about certainty (regarding the validity).—(2841)
The other pramāṇa is not needed for the bringing about of the validity itself; it is needed in the pramāṇa only for the cognition of certainty regarding its exact character.—(2842)
Kamalaśīla
[verse 2841]:
It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2814, that—“the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were held to be dependent on something else”.
The following Text points out that this argument is ‘Inconclusive’:—[see verse 2841 above]
The same idea is f urther clarified:—[see verse 2842 above]
[verse 2842]:
The following might be urged:—“If you are seeking to prove the fact of the validity of Cognition being ‘extraneous’ in relation to the Pramāṇa itself, then we also admit it, and hence your argument is futile; because the existence of the Cognition itself is held to be proved by Presumption,—what to say of its validity, which consists in its Capacity?—In the matter, however, of the bringing about of its effect in the shape of the certain cognition of the object, the Cognition does not need anything else; that is why the validity has been described as ‘self-sufficient’, ‘inherent’”.
This cannot be right; because the certain cognition of the object of the Cognition cannot be got at without certainty regarding its validity. Because how can the object, which is still subject to doubt and uncertainty, be independent and self-sufficient, in the bringing about of its effect? If it were dependent upon apprehensions produced by other Means of Cognition,—how could you avoid Infinite Regress involved in your view? So what has been suggested is nothing.—(2842)