Original
विरुद्धधर्मसङ्गो हि वस्तूनां भिन्नतोदिता ।
तन्निष्पत्तावनिष्पत्तेः शक्तावपि स विद्यते ॥ २८३० ॥
साधितक्षणभङ्गश्च सर्वेऽर्था इति तेषु न ।
प्रत्ययान्तरमाधातुं शक्तं किंचन शक्तिमत् ॥ २८३१ ॥
नहि तेषामवस्थानं परस्तादस्ति येन ते ।
प्रत्ययान्तरतः शक्तिं लभेरन्कुत्रचित्फले ॥ २८३२ ॥viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi vastūnāṃ bhinnatoditā |
tanniṣpattāvaniṣpatteḥ śaktāvapi sa vidyate || 2830 ||
sādhitakṣaṇabhaṅgaśca sarve’rthā iti teṣu na |
pratyayāntaramādhātuṃ śaktaṃ kiṃcana śaktimat || 2831 ||
nahi teṣāmavasthānaṃ parastādasti yena te |
pratyayāntarataḥ śaktiṃ labherankutracitphale || 2832 ||‘Difference’ among things has been explained as consisting in their being associated with contrary (divergent) properties; so that, if on the appearance of the cognition, there is non-appearance of the capacity,—the said contrary property is clearly present in the capacity.—(2830)
With reference to all things, it has been proved that there is ‘perpetual flux’; hence it is not possible for any efficient causal factor to impose a ‘capacity’ upon things.—Such things have no subsequent existence, by virtue of which they could acquire a capacity from other causes, for the bringing about of any effect.—(2831-2832)
Kamalaśīla
[verse 2830]:
The following might be urged—“It may be that no Capacity can be imposed upon an indivisible thing subsequently; why cannot it be imposed upon what is divisible?”
Answer:—[see verse 2830 above]
The following Text proceeds to point out the objection that is specially applicable when things are impermanent:—[see verses 2831-2832 above]
[verses 2831-2832]:
‘For the bringing, etc. etc.’—such as the definite cognition of things.
The rest is easily understood.—(2831-2832)