Original
इत्येवमिष्यतेऽर्थश्चेन्ननु चाव्यतिरेकिणी ।
शक्तिः सर्वपदार्थानां पुरस्तादुपपादिता ॥ २८१७ ॥
इष्टकार्यसमर्थं हि स्वरूपं शक्तिरुच्यते ।
तस्य भावात्मताभावे भावो न स्यात्सकारकः ॥ २८१८ ॥ityevamiṣyate’rthaścennanu cāvyatirekiṇī |
śaktiḥ sarvapadārthānāṃ purastādupapāditā || 2817 ||
iṣṭakāryasamarthaṃ hi svarūpaṃ śaktirucyate |
tasya bhāvātmatābhāve bhāvo na syātsakārakaḥ || 2818 ||If this is what is meant,—then the said capacity (potency) of all things cannot re non-different prom themselves, as explained before;—in fact, ‘capacity’ is the name given to that form of the thing (cause) which is capable of producing the desired effect; if then, that form were not of the nature of a positive entity, then the said thing could not be an active agent (efficient cause).—(2817-2818)
Kamalaśīla
With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to refute the above arguments (of the Mīmāṃsaka in support of the Inherent Validity of Cognitions):—[see verses 2817-2818 above]
Now what is it that is meant by the term ‘inherent’ (belonging to it by its very nature)?—(a) Does it mean that it is ‘inherent’ in the sense that being eternal, it has no cause? Or (b) that it is ‘inherent’ in the sense that, even though it is not-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Cognitions have their essence (existence) brought about by their causes,—and not that it is imposed upon them subsequently by other causes?—These are the two alternative views possible.
Now, the first of these [that it has no cause] is not acceptable; because (1) would such a ‘Capacity’ be something different (from the Cognition to which it belongs)? Or (2) non-different from it? Or (3) neither different nor non-different? Or (4) both different and non-different?—These four alternatives are possible.
Of these the first [that the Capacity is something different] cannot be accepted. Because, there can be no connection between them, and also, because in that case, things could never be active agents, etc. etc.—as it has been explained several times, when the conclusion arrived was that in the case of all things, their capacity (Potency) is not anything different from the things themselves.
This is what is pointed out in the words—‘In fact Capacity is the name, etc. etc.’—The ‘Capacity’ of the nature of things consists in its efficiency to produce its effect; and if this ‘nature’ were not of the nature of a positive entity, then that entity could not be an active agent; and thus (not being capable of effective action) it would become a ‘non-entity’.—(2817-2818)