1776 Verse 2812-2813

Original

स्वतःसर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गृह्यताम् ।
इत्येतस्य च वाक्यस्य भवद्भिः कोऽर्थ इष्यते ॥ २८१२ ॥
मेयबोधादिके शक्तिस्तेषां स्वाभाविकी स्थिता ।
नहि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥ २८१३ ॥

svataḥsarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyamiti gṛhyatām |
ityetasya ca vākyasya bhavadbhiḥ ko’rtha iṣyate || 2812 ||
meyabodhādike śaktisteṣāṃ svābhāvikī sthitā |
nahi svato’satī śaktiḥ kartumanyena śakyate || 2813 ||

You have made the assertion that—“the validity of all pramāṇas{GL_NOTE::} should be regarded as inherent in them”—[Ślokavārtika, codanā-sūtra 47].—now what is the meaning that you attach to this assertion?—(2812)

“[What is meant is that] the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable thing, etc., belongs to the pramāṇas by their very nature; the capacity that is not inherent in a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else.”—(2813)

Kamalaśīla

[verse 2812]:

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the Mīmāṃsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition:—[see verse 2812 above]

To this question—what is the meaning that you attach to this assertion?—the other party provides the following answer:—[see verse 2813 above]

[verse 2813]:

If Cognition is what is ‘Pramāṇa’ in the sense of the form of Cognition, then the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable,—i.e. the cognition of what is to be cognised,—must be inherent in it; because Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of things.—If, however, the Eye and the Organs are meant to be ‘Pramāṇa’, in the sense of the ‘means of Cognition’, then the capacity to bring about the right cognition of things must be inherent in it; and the Vedic Injunction also must have the capacity inherent in it, of bringing about the cognition of things beyond the senses. All this is included under the term ‘ādi’, ‘etc.’ (in the compound ‘meyabodhādike’).

The argument in support of this idea is added in the words (of the second line)—‘The capacity that is not, etc, etc.’.—(2813)

The same idea is further explained by the Mīmāṃsaka:—[see verse 2814 next]