Original
बाध्यते च श्रुतिः स्पष्टं क्षणभङ्गे प्रसाधिते ।
नित्या तावत्स्वरूपेण तत्कृतातो मतिः कृतः ॥ २८०४ ॥
नहि शीर्यत इत्युक्तः पुरुषश्च श्रुतावलम् ।
पुरस्तस्योदिता बाधा सुव्यक्ता तदसिद्धता ॥ २८०५ ॥
करामलकवद्यस्य देशकालनरान्तरम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं तत्र तेनायं बाधाभावोऽवसीयते ॥ २८०६ ॥bādhyate ca śrutiḥ spaṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅge prasādhite |
nityā tāvatsvarūpeṇa tatkṛtāto matiḥ kṛtaḥ || 2804 ||
nahi śīryata ityuktaḥ puruṣaśca śrutāvalam |
purastasyoditā bādhā suvyaktā tadasiddhatā || 2805 ||
karāmalakavadyasya deśakālanarāntaram |
pratyakṣaṃ tatra tenāyaṃ bādhābhāvo’vasīyate || 2806 ||When the ‘perpetual flux’ has been established, the veda, as something eternal by itself, becomes clearly discarded.—How then can there be any cognition produced by it?—It has certainly been declared in the veda often enough that ‘it does not perish’ in regard to the Puruṣa (spirit, soul); but the rejection of this has been clearly set forth above; hence the reason is clearly ‘inadmissible’.—If a man is capable of directly perceiving time, space and other souls like the jujube-fruit in the palm of his hands,—he alone can have a cognition for whom there could be no rejection (of the said ideas).—(2804-2806)
Kamalaśīla
Other two Reasons put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2349, are—(1) “because it is brought about by an assertion that does not proceed from an unreliable person”;—and (2) “because there is nothing to annul the idea”.
It is pointed out below that both of these are ‘Inadmissible’:—[see verses 2804-2806 above]
“That which is eternal by itself becomes discarded”—such is the construction.
What is meant is as follows:—It having been proved, by Inference based upon valid Reasons, that all things are subject to ‘Perpetual Flux’,—the Veda, which has been held to be eternal, becomes discarded. ‘Svarupeṇa’, by itself, has been added with a view to exclude the subject-matter.
‘How can there be any Cognition produced by it?’—That is, it cannot be. This means that the Reason—‘because it is brought about by assertions not‘proceeding from an unreliable person’—is Inadmissible, in respect of its substratum.
The words ‘It has certainly been, etc. etc.’ show that the other Reason—‘because it is free from annulment’,—is ‘inadmissible’ by itself.—We read in the Veda that ‘being imperishable, it perisheth not’ and ‘Indestructible indeed is this Soul—Of this Soul or Spirit, the rejection has been set forth in the chapter dealing with ‘No-Soul’, Hence the Reason is surely ‘inadmissible’,
Says the Opponent:—“There is the clear declaration (in the Śabara-Bhāṣya) that ‘Injunction is the name given to the assertion that prompts activity’; which shows that it is only a particular portion of the Veda that is called Injunction, not the whole Veda, And it is the ‘Cognition produced by Injunction’ that has been made the ‘Subject’ of our Reasoning. Consequently, even though there may be rejection of the Veda in regard to other matters, there can be no rejection of the Injunction. So that the Reason remains perfectly admissible”.
This does not affect our position. In some place the entire Veda has been spoken of as ‘Codanā’ (Injunction),—which name has not always been applied to the prompting Sentence only. Otherwise, the sentence ‘One should not injure living beings’ would not be an Injunction; as it does not prompt to activity.
This also would be incompatible with the assertion in the Śabara-Bhāṣya—“Both are here spoken of in the Injunction,—that which is conducive to welfare as also that which is conducive to trouble”;—because the Injunction does not prompt activity that leads to trouble,—which would justify the assertion that ‘Injunction speaks of what is conducive to trouble
Then again, the Śabara-Bhāṣya says—“The Cognition produced by the words of men is sometimes uncertain and wrong,—but there is nothing to show that the Cognition produced by the Veda is wrong
As the eternal Veda has been discarded, you cannot prevent the suspicion that the said rejection may apply to the Injunction also. As Kumārila has declared—“The fact of the Veda being a means of Right Cognition shall be proved by the fact of its not being the work of any Person”.
As a matter of fact, it is clearly seen that there is rejection of the assertions of the Veda relating to an eternal Soul,—even though it may not be the work of a person;—further, in the case of such Vedic assertions as—‘Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra’, the said suspicion (of falsity) is inevitable. Hence, as pointed out above, the Reason remains doubtful—hence—inadmissible.
This is the reason why the Author reverts to his previous position and reaffirms the idea that the Reason is doubtful—hence—Inadmissible—‘If a man is capable of directly perceiving, etc, etc.’
This also serves to set aside the following assertion (made in Śabara-Bhāṣya):—“The Cognition produced by the Veda is not found to be wrong either at another place or at another time or in another person; hence it must be true”.—(2804-2806)