आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

नित्यत्वेऽस्ते च वाक्यस्य धर्मिदृष्टान्तयोरपि ।
नित्यवाक्योद्भवत्वस्य स्पष्टाऽसिद्धः प्रतीयते ॥ २८०२ ॥
इत्थं चापौरुषेयत्वे चोदनाया अनिश्चिते ।
सन्दिग्धासिद्धता दोषः पश्चिमेष्वपि हेतुषु ॥ २८०३ ॥

nityatve’ste ca vākyasya dharmidṛṣṭāntayorapi |
nityavākyodbhavatvasya spaṣṭā’siddhaḥ pratīyate || 2802 ||
itthaṃ cāpauruṣeyatve codanāyā aniścite |
sandigdhāsiddhatā doṣaḥ paścimeṣvapi hetuṣu || 2803 ||

The eternality of the sentence having been rejected, the character of ‘proceeding from the eternal sentence’ is clearly recognised as non-existent in the ‘subject’ and in the corroborative instance.—Thus, then the fact of the Vedic injunction not being the work of a person being uncertain, your subsequent reasons also are open to the charge of being doubtful—hence—inadmissible.—(2802-2803)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2347, that—“The Cognition brought about by the Veda must be correct, because it proceeds from the eternal sentence, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2802-2803 above]

Here also, as before, the Reason is ‘inadmissible’, and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’.

The Locative ending in the term ‘Dharmidṛṣṭāntayoḥ’ is with reference to the ‘character of proceeding from the eternal sentence’.

‘Vākyasya’—is to be construed with ‘nityatve’; the Genitive ending denoting relationship’.

‘Nityavākyodbhavatvasya’ goes with ‘asiddhiḥ’.

‘Paścimeṣu’—the subsequent Reasons—such as ‘being produced by causes free from defects’ and so forth.—(2802-2803)