आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

इत्येतद्धि भवेत्सर्वं यदि वेदार्थनिश्चयः ।
वृद्धेभ्योऽप्यविसंवादी सिद्धः स्यादन्यथा क्षतिः ॥ २७८० ॥

ityetaddhi bhavetsarvaṃ yadi vedārthaniścayaḥ |
vṛddhebhyo’pyavisaṃvādī siddhaḥ syādanyathā kṣatiḥ || 2780 ||

All this would be true, only if there were certainty in regard to the meaning of the Veda; only in that case could the notions obtained from experienced men be true (in consonance with it); otherwise the whole fabric will fall to the ground.—(2780)

Kamalaśīla

In the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out the defects in the above reasoning (of the Mīmāṃsaka):—[see verse 2780 above]

It has been argued (under Text 2777) above that—“Barring the beginninglessness of the Word and its Meaning, etc. etc.”—If, it is eternality of the Word and Meaning that is meant by their ‘beginninglessness’,—then that is inadmissible; as the much wider conclusion to the contrary has been established in the form of the ‘Perpetual Flux’.

If what is meant by the ‘beginninglessness’ of the Word and Meaning is that there is no beginning of the series of causes and effects,—then the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’, and also ‘Contradictory’; because the Relationship has no existence apart from the Relatives; and consequently, that relationship also would be eternal like the Word and Meaning.

As regards ‘Being devoid of the means, etc.’ (Text 1978),—that also is ‘Inadmissible’; because it has been proved that even when there is difference by their nature, there are some things that are capable of bringing about the idea of sameness. Consequently, what is meant is that there is a means available in the shape of the idea of the sameness of the thing cognised by both Speaker and Hearer. And it has also been pointed out (Text 2773) that ‘the Cognition cannot be obtained from the experienced men, and they also are equally ignorant’.

‘Otherwise, it would fall to the ground’;—If it be held that “the experienced persons, though themselves ignorant, comprehend the Relationship”—then such a view would be clearly contrary to a fact of Sense-perception; the Proposition being like the assertion of the blind man relating to Colours.—(2780)