Original
किञ्च शब्दवदाकाशेऽप्यभिव्यक्तिर्न युज्यते ।
ज्ञानं हि व्यक्तिरेषा च नित्यं स्याद्धेतुसन्निधेः ॥ २६०९ ॥
यथाच व्यञ्जकः शब्दे न कथञ्चित्प्रकल्पते ।
तत्रात्रैवं परोपाधिः शब्दबुद्धौ सति भ्रमः ॥ २६१० ॥
नातो दीर्घादयः सर्वे ध्वनिधर्मा इति स्थितम् ।
ध्वनीनां व्यञ्जकत्वे हि तत्स्यात्तच्च निराकृतम् ॥ २६११ ॥kiñca śabdavadākāśe’pyabhivyaktirna yujyate |
jñānaṃ hi vyaktireṣā ca nityaṃ syāddhetusannidheḥ || 2609 ||
yathāca vyañjakaḥ śabde na kathañcitprakalpate |
tatrātraivaṃ paropādhiḥ śabdabuddhau sati bhramaḥ || 2610 ||
nāto dīrghādayaḥ sarve dhvanidharmā iti sthitam |
dhvanīnāṃ vyañjakatve hi tatsyāttacca nirākṛtam || 2611 ||Further, as in the case of the word-sound, so in the case of ākāśa also, there can be no ‘manifestation’; such ‘manifestation’ would mean cognition; and this would be everlasting, as its cause would be always there.—Just as, in the case of the word, there can be no manifester,—so it cannot be in the present case also; and in reality, it is an illusion appearing, through extraneous circumstances, in regard to the cognition of the word-sound. Hence the conclusion is that length, shortness and the rest are not properties of the articulation. They could be so only if the articulations were the manifesters of the word-sound; and this idea has been rejected.—(2609-2611)
Kamalaśīla
The following texts point out that—even if Ākāśa is a positive entity, there can be no manifestation of it—[see verses 2609-2611 above]:
‘They could be so’—i.e. Length, etc. could be properties of Articulation. ‘This’—the idea that the Articulations are manifesters of the Word-Sound.—(2609-2611)