1619 Verse 2524

Original

भिन्नाभानां मतीनां चेदेकालम्बनता कथम् ।
तुल्यं रूपधियामेतच्चोद्यं बाह्यार्थवादिनाम् ॥ २५२४ ॥

bhinnābhānāṃ matīnāṃ cedekālambanatā katham |
tulyaṃ rūpadhiyāmetaccodyaṃ bāhyārthavādinām || 2524 ||

“how can there be a single objective basis for cognitions which appear as diverse?”—If this is urged, then [the answer is that] the same objection, as against the upholders of the external world, is equally applicable to the cognitions of colour also.—(2524)

Kamalaśīla

“How can there be a single object for Cognition which appears as diverse?”

What the Opponent means is that in this way the Cognitions of Colour, Taste, etc. might be said to have one and the same objective basis.

The answer to this is as follows:—‘The same objection, etc. etc.’;—

‘To Cognitions of Colours’—i.e. to Cognitions envisaging Colour—this same objection is equally applicable.—How can there be a single objective basis for the distinct Cognitions of things far and near?

All this objection is applicable to those who uphold the reality of the External World, who attribute the form to the Object, not to the Cognition. Those, however, who uphold the Idea alone,—i.e. the Idealists,—for them all Cognition is equally objectless, being self-cognised, and is produced in the distinct and other forms; and hence to these Idealists, the objection does not apply.—Those upholders of the External World who attribute the form to the Cognition do not admit that there is absolute sameness of form between the Object and the Cognition; so that there would be the same form, in certain aspects; and hence there would be no incongruity in there being the same object for Cognitions appearing as diverse; consequently, the objection would not be applicable to these also.—(2524)