Original
को वा ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धः शब्देन यत इष्यते ।
तच्छब्दबोधरूपं हि न तादात्म्यं विभेदतः ॥ २५०७ ॥
नच तस्य तदुत्पत्तिः शब्दस्याजनकत्व(तः) ।
तदुत्पत्तौ तु नियमात्सा सदाभाविनी भवेत् ॥ २५०८ ॥
एवं तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सदोत्पद्येत वा नवा ।
इत्येकान्ते स्थिते व्यर्था श्रोत्रसंस्कारकल्पना ॥ २५०९ ॥ko vā jñānasya sambandhaḥ śabdena yata iṣyate |
tacchabdabodharūpaṃ hi na tādātmyaṃ vibhedataḥ || 2507 ||
naca tasya tadutpattiḥ śabdasyājanakatva(taḥ) |
tadutpattau tu niyamātsā sadābhāvinī bhavet || 2508 ||
evaṃ tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ sadotpadyeta vā navā |
ityekānte sthite vyarthā śrotrasaṃskārakalpanā || 2509 ||What is the relation between the cognition and the word-sound, on the basis of which the cognition is held to be of the nature of the apprehension of that sound?—This relation cannot be that of identity, because the two are clearly different. Nor is the one produced from the other; because the word-sound is (ex hypothesi) not produced; and if it were produced, then it would appear at all times; and hence the cognition of that sound would either be produced at all times,—or it would not be produced at all. Such being the undesirable state of things, the assumption of the ‘embellishment of the auditory organ’ is entirely futile.—(2507-2509)
Kamalaśīla
All this has been said after admitting (for the sake of argument) that the Cognition, which is not helped by the Word-Sound, is of the nature of the Apprehension of that Sound. The Author now proceeds to show that the idea of the Cognition having the nature of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them.—[see verses 2507-2509 above]
There are only two kinds of relationship among things—the relation of Identity and the relation of Cause and Effect; in no third form can any help be rendered; and there can be no relationship between things which do not render some help to one another; otherwise there would be incongruities.—Neither of these two relationships is possible between the Word-Sound and its Cognition; and in the absence of such a relationship, how could the Cognition be of the nature of the apprehension of the Word-Sound? If it did, there would be incongruities.
It might be urged that—“When the Cognition is produced, it is in the form of the Word-Sound, and it is on the basis of this that the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the comprehension of the Sound,—even though there is no relationship between the two”.
This cannot be right; because Cognition has been regarded as formless; the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the view that Cognitions have forms,—But even if it were as asserted, the view set forth cannot be right; as in that case, the Sound would have to be regarded as imperceptible. That is, under the view, Sound would be imperceptible, not perceptible; and hence there being no means of knowing it, the idea of its Cognition having the form of the Word-Sound would itself be an impossibility. It could not be known by the presence of its effect; because it is not regarded as productive of effects.
The following might be urged—“Even for one who holds the view that Cognitions have forms, and the Object is productive of the Cognition,—the Object would be always imperceptible; how then can. it be known that the Cognition has the form of the Object?”
True; but the way in which it is known is this—From the presence-of the Effect, it is deduced that there is a Cause for it; and the idea that Cognition serves to differentiate the Blue and other forms, is got at from positive and negative concomitance. For instance, the Eye, the Light, and-the Mind-functioning being common to all Visual Cognitions, the difference among the Cognitions of the Blue and others cannot be due to these; hence the implication is that there is some other Cause for it,—this implication, being derived from the negative premiss just indicated; and hence it is-concluded that the said difference must be due to this other Cause. And. on the basis of this it is asserted that the form having been brought about, by that, it is this form that is apprehended by the Cognition.—But even this way is not available for you; because you do not regard the Word-Sound to be a Cause at all.
The following might be urged—“The Eye and the other factors are themselves imperceptible; how is it known that these are present in all Visual Perceptions?”
All this is quite true, when we are discussing the doctrine of Idealism. The Idealist holds that the peculiarities of every Cognition are all due to the immediately preceding subjective causal factors,—as in the case of Dreams; and he does not regard them as due to any external or objective conditions.—But all that is being said on the present occasion is on the understanding; that the External Object does exist. If it were not so, then the first point to be urged would be—how can the External Object be proved by the Effect? All that could be proved would be the presence of the Cause, not of anything external, objective; because it is quite possible that the said Cause may be something internal, subjective,—as in the case of Dreams.—Enough of this!
Even if the idea of the Word-Sound being productive is accepted,—the incongruity remains;—this is what is shown by the words—‘If it were produced, it would be produced at all times, etc. etc.’—‘Sā’ stands for the production.
The argument is summed up in the words—‘Hence the Cognition of that Sound, etc. etc.’
‘Or it would not be produced at all’,—under the view that Sound is not productive.
‘Undesirable state of things’—that the Cognition must be either always present, or always absent.—(2507-2509)