Original
दोषाभावेऽपि सत्यत्वं न सिद्ध्यत्यन्यभावतः ।
आनर्थक्याख्यमप्यस्ति तस्माद्राश्यन्तरं परम् ॥ २३५८ ॥doṣābhāve’pi satyatvaṃ na siddhyatyanyabhāvataḥ |
ānarthakyākhyamapyasti tasmādrāśyantaraṃ param || 2358 ||Even if there be no defects, truthfulness does not become proved simply because the other alternative must be accepted; because there is a third alternative possible, that of ‘meaninglessness’.—(2358)
Kamalaśīla
Further, it may be that in the Veda, there is absence, only of the defects conducive to falsity, not of the excellences; even so, the ‘inconclusiveness’ of your Probans is irresistible. This is shown in the following:—[see verse 2358 above]
If, in connection with Words, there were only two possible alternatives—falsity and truthfulness,—then, the absence of one alternative would necessarily imply the presence of the other; there is however a third alternative possible—that they are meaningless; under the circumstances, the negation of falsity does not necessarily imply the assertion of truthfulness; as there is no negation of the other alternative of meaninglessness.—(2358)